@deque/axe-auth 1.1.0-next.fb07beab → 1.1.0-next.fea0aa8a

package/dist/oauth/getValidAccessToken.js

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.getValidAccessToken = getValidAccessToken;
+const discoverOIDC_1 = require("./discoverOIDC");
+const errors_1 = require("./errors");
+const refreshTokens_1 = require("./refreshTokens");
+const tokenStore_1 = require("./tokenStore");
+const DEFAULT_EXPIRY_BUFFER_MS = 60_000;
+function defaultOnWarning(message) {
+    if (process.stderr.isTTY) {
+        console.error(`axe-auth: ${message}`);
+    }
+}
+function isInvalidGrant(err) {
+    return (err instanceof errors_1.OAuthFlowError &&
+        err.code === "TOKEN_EXCHANGE_FAILED" &&
+        err.details?.error === "invalid_grant");
+}
+function notAuthenticated(message, cause) {
+    return new errors_1.OAuthFlowError("NOT_AUTHENTICATED", message, cause === undefined ? undefined : { cause });
+}
+/**
+ * Returns a currently-valid access token string for the given issuer,
+ * refreshing via the stored refresh token if the cached access token
+ * is within `expiryBufferMs` of expiring (or already expired).
+ *
+ * Throws `OAuthFlowError("NOT_AUTHENTICATED", ...)` when the user
+ * must re-run `axe-auth login` — covers an empty / corrupt /
+ * version-mismatched store, an expired access token with no refresh
+ * token to rotate with, and a refresh attempt rejected with
+ * `invalid_grant` (which also clears the stored tokens).
+ *
+ * Throws `OAuthFlowError("TOKEN_EXCHANGE_FAILED", ...)` for transient
+ * failures during refresh (network errors, 5xx, malformed responses)
+ * and leaves the stored tokens intact so a retry is possible.
+ *
+ * Throws `OAuthFlowError("DISCOVERY_FAILED", ...)` when the issuer
+ * URL cannot be reached or parsed at refresh time.
+ *
+ * **Concurrency note.** Not safe against parallel invocations for
+ * the same issuer. Keycloak rotates refresh tokens by default; if
+ * two parallel calls both land on the refresh path, only one
+ * winner's rotated refresh token will be persisted and the loser's
+ * rotated token is stranded. The intended consumer is the
+ * `axe-auth token` CLI (a one-shot), so this is fine in context;
+ * per-request callers should wrap in an in-flight-Promise singleton
+ * keyed by issuer.
+ */
+async function getValidAccessToken(options) {
+    const { issuerURL, clientId, expiryBufferMs = DEFAULT_EXPIRY_BUFFER_MS, tokenStore = new tokenStore_1.KeyringTokenStore(), loadedEntry, signal, allowInsecureIssuer, onWarning = defaultOnWarning, now = Date.now, } = options;
+    const loaded = loadedEntry ?? (await tokenStore.load());
+    if (!loaded.ok) {
+        switch (loaded.reason) {
+            case "empty":
+                throw notAuthenticated("No stored credentials. Run `axe-auth login` first.");
+            case "corrupt":
+                throw notAuthenticated("Stored credentials are unreadable. Run `axe-auth login` to re-authenticate.");
+            case "version-mismatch":
+                throw notAuthenticated(`Stored credentials are from an unsupported schema version (v:${loaded.storedVersion}). Run \`axe-auth login\` to re-authenticate.`);
+        }
+    }
+    // Refuse on issuer/client mismatch: refreshing tokens at a
+    // different endpoint would leak the refresh token to the wrong
+    // server.
+    if (loaded.entry.issuerURL !== issuerURL ||
+        loaded.entry.clientId !== clientId) {
+        throw notAuthenticated(`Stored credentials are for issuer ${loaded.entry.issuerURL} (client ${loaded.entry.clientId}), but the requested issuer is ${issuerURL} (client ${clientId}). Run \`axe-auth login\` to re-authenticate.`);
+    }
+    const tokens = loaded.entry.tokens;
+    if (now() + expiryBufferMs < tokens.expiresAt) {
+        return tokens.accessToken;
+    }
+    if (!tokens.refreshToken) {
+        throw notAuthenticated("Access token has expired and no refresh token is available. Run `axe-auth login` to re-authenticate.");
+    }
+    const config = await (0, discoverOIDC_1.discoverOIDC)(issuerURL, {
+        signal,
+        allowInsecureIssuer,
+    });
+    let fresh;
+    try {
+        fresh = await (0, refreshTokens_1.refreshTokens)({
+            tokenEndpoint: config.tokenEndpoint,
+            clientId,
+            refreshToken: tokens.refreshToken,
+            now,
+            signal,
+        });
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        if (isInvalidGrant(err)) {
+            // Best-effort clear: if the clear itself fails, still surface
+            // NOT_AUTHENTICATED so the user gets the "please run login"
+            // signal — the next run will refresh, land back here, and
+            // retry the clear.
+            try {
+                await tokenStore.clear();
+            }
+            catch (clearErr) {
+                onWarning(`Failed to clear stored tokens after refresh rejection: ${clearErr instanceof Error ? clearErr.message : String(clearErr)}. Next run may need to clear manually.`);
+            }
+            throw notAuthenticated("Your session has expired. Run `axe-auth login` to re-authenticate.", err);
+        }
+        // Transient failure — leave the store alone so the user can
+        // retry without re-logging-in.
+        throw err;
+    }
+    // HAZARD: Keycloak (and most rotating-refresh-token providers) have
+    // already consumed the old refresh token server-side by the time
+    // `refreshTokens` returns. If persisting the rotated set fails
+    // here, we hold a valid access token in memory but the stored
+    // refresh token is now stale — the next invocation will POST it,
+    // get `invalid_grant`, and prompt re-authentication.
+    //
+    // We still return the fresh access token so the current call is
+    // useful, and warn the caller so "why does the next run need me to
+    // log in again?" has a breadcrumb.
+    try {
+        await tokenStore.save({
+            tokens: fresh,
+            issuerURL: loaded.entry.issuerURL,
+            clientId: loaded.entry.clientId,
+            allowInsecureIssuer: loaded.entry.allowInsecureIssuer,
+            walnutURL: loaded.entry.walnutURL,
+        });
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        onWarning(`Refreshed tokens could not be saved: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}. The current call will succeed, but the next invocation will require re-authentication.`);
+    }
+    return fresh.accessToken;
+}

package/dist/oauth/index.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,16 @@
 export { startCallbackServer } from "./callbackServer";
 export type { CallbackServerOptions, CallbackServerHandle, CallbackResult, } from "./callbackServer";
-export { OAuthCallbackError } from "./errors";
-export type { OAuthCallbackErrorCode, OAuthCallbackErrorOptions, } from "./errors";
+export { OAuthCallbackError, OAuthFlowError } from "./errors";
+export type { OAuthCallbackErrorCode, OAuthCallbackErrorOptions, OAuthFlowErrorCode, OAuthFlowErrorOptions, } from "./errors";
+export { authorize } from "./authorize";
+export type { AuthorizeOptions } from "./authorize";
+export { getValidAccessToken } from "./getValidAccessToken";
+export type { GetValidAccessTokenOptions } from "./getValidAccessToken";
+export { refreshTokens } from "./refreshTokens";
+export type { RefreshTokensOptions } from "./refreshTokens";
+export type { TokenSet } from "./tokenResponse";
+export { KeyringTokenStore, STORED_BLOB_VERSION } from "./tokenStore";
+export type { LoadResult, StoredEntry, TokenStore } from "./tokenStore";
+export type { KeyringEntry, KeyringEntryFactory } from "./keyringBinding";
+export { discoverOIDC } from "./discoverOIDC";
+export type { OIDCConfiguration, DiscoverOIDCOptions } from "./discoverOIDC";

package/dist/oauth/index.js

@@ -1,7 +1,19 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.OAuthCallbackError = exports.startCallbackServer = void 0;
+exports.discoverOIDC = exports.STORED_BLOB_VERSION = exports.KeyringTokenStore = exports.refreshTokens = exports.getValidAccessToken = exports.authorize = exports.OAuthFlowError = exports.OAuthCallbackError = exports.startCallbackServer = void 0;
 var callbackServer_1 = require("./callbackServer");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "startCallbackServer", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return callbackServer_1.startCallbackServer; } });
 var errors_1 = require("./errors");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "OAuthCallbackError", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return errors_1.OAuthCallbackError; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "OAuthFlowError", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return errors_1.OAuthFlowError; } });
+var authorize_1 = require("./authorize");
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "authorize", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return authorize_1.authorize; } });
+var getValidAccessToken_1 = require("./getValidAccessToken");
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "getValidAccessToken", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return getValidAccessToken_1.getValidAccessToken; } });
+var refreshTokens_1 = require("./refreshTokens");
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "refreshTokens", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return refreshTokens_1.refreshTokens; } });
+var tokenStore_1 = require("./tokenStore");
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "KeyringTokenStore", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return tokenStore_1.KeyringTokenStore; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "STORED_BLOB_VERSION", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return tokenStore_1.STORED_BLOB_VERSION; } });
+var discoverOIDC_1 = require("./discoverOIDC");
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "discoverOIDC", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return discoverOIDC_1.discoverOIDC; } });

package/dist/oauth/issuerURL.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/**
+ * Canonicalizes an OIDC issuer URL for equivalence comparison. Two URLs
+ * that normalize to the same string refer to the same issuer, which is
+ * what `discoverOIDC` uses to build discovery URLs and what
+ * `KeyringTokenStore` uses to key keychain entries.
+ *
+ * Rules (per RFC 3986 §6.2 URI comparison):
+ * - Trailing slashes stripped from the path.
+ * - Scheme and authority (host + optional port) lowercased — both are
+ *   case-insensitive per the RFC.
+ * - Default ports (80 for http, 443 for https) collapsed via `URL.host`.
+ * - Path preserved case-sensitively.
+ * - Query string and fragment dropped: OIDC issuers are defined by
+ *   scheme + authority + path, and carrying them through would break
+ *   downstream path concatenation (e.g. appending
+ *   `/.well-known/openid-configuration`).
+ *
+ * If the input is not a parseable URL, the function trims trailing
+ * slashes and returns — discovery will surface a clearer error than
+ * this function could.
+ */
+export declare function normalizeIssuerURL(url: string): string;

package/dist/oauth/issuerURL.js

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.normalizeIssuerURL = normalizeIssuerURL;
+/**
+ * Canonicalizes an OIDC issuer URL for equivalence comparison. Two URLs
+ * that normalize to the same string refer to the same issuer, which is
+ * what `discoverOIDC` uses to build discovery URLs and what
+ * `KeyringTokenStore` uses to key keychain entries.
+ *
+ * Rules (per RFC 3986 §6.2 URI comparison):
+ * - Trailing slashes stripped from the path.
+ * - Scheme and authority (host + optional port) lowercased — both are
+ *   case-insensitive per the RFC.
+ * - Default ports (80 for http, 443 for https) collapsed via `URL.host`.
+ * - Path preserved case-sensitively.
+ * - Query string and fragment dropped: OIDC issuers are defined by
+ *   scheme + authority + path, and carrying them through would break
+ *   downstream path concatenation (e.g. appending
+ *   `/.well-known/openid-configuration`).
+ *
+ * If the input is not a parseable URL, the function trims trailing
+ * slashes and returns — discovery will surface a clearer error than
+ * this function could.
+ */
+function normalizeIssuerURL(url) {
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = new URL(url);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return url.replace(/\/+$/, "");
+    }
+    // `URL.protocol` is already lowercased by the URL parser.
+    // `URL.host` retains input casing, so lowercase it explicitly.
+    const host = parsed.host.toLowerCase();
+    const pathname = parsed.pathname.replace(/\/+$/, "");
+    return `${parsed.protocol}//${host}${pathname}`;
+}

package/dist/oauth/keyringBinding.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/** Minimal keyring-entry surface consumed by the package's stores. */
+export interface KeyringEntry {
+    /** Writes the password for this entry. */
+    setPassword(password: string): void;
+    /** Reads the current password, or returns `null` if none is set. */
+    getPassword(): string | null;
+    /** Deletes the password and returns `true` if one existed. */
+    deletePassword(): boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Factory for `KeyringEntry` values. Injection seam for tests;
+ * production callers use the default that constructs
+ * `@napi-rs/keyring` entries lazily.
+ */
+export type KeyringEntryFactory = (service: string, account: string) => KeyringEntry;
+/**
+ * Default `KeyringEntryFactory`. Resolves `@napi-rs/keyring` lazily
+ * so platforms without a prebuilt binding only see a
+ * `KEYRING_UNAVAILABLE` on first store construction, not on module
+ * import.
+ */
+export declare const defaultEntryFactory: KeyringEntryFactory;

package/dist/oauth/keyringBinding.js

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.defaultEntryFactory = void 0;
+const node_module_1 = require("node:module");
+const errors_1 = require("./errors");
+const requireFromHere = (0, node_module_1.createRequire)(__filename);
+// Lazy-resolved Entry constructor. Importing @napi-rs/keyring at the
+// top of this module would run its native binding loader at
+// module-load time, throwing before any of our OAuthFlowError code
+// catches it and preventing the module from being imported at all on
+// platforms without a prebuilt. We defer the require into
+// `defaultEntryFactory`, which turns that import-time failure into a
+// `KEYRING_UNAVAILABLE` surfaced on the first store construction —
+// not on first save/load/clear, since callers construct stores
+// eagerly as default-arg expressions. Runtime keychain errors
+// (missing D-Bus Secret Service, macOS Keychain denial, etc.) are a
+// separate concern and surface later, inside save/load/clear.
+let cachedEntryCtor = null;
+function resolveEntryCtor() {
+    if (cachedEntryCtor)
+        return cachedEntryCtor;
+    try {
+        const mod = requireFromHere("@napi-rs/keyring");
+        cachedEntryCtor = mod.Entry;
+        return cachedEntryCtor;
+    }
+    catch (cause) {
+        throw new errors_1.OAuthFlowError("KEYRING_UNAVAILABLE", `Could not load @napi-rs/keyring. A prebuilt native binding for this platform may be missing.`, { cause });
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Default `KeyringEntryFactory`. Resolves `@napi-rs/keyring` lazily
+ * so platforms without a prebuilt binding only see a
+ * `KEYRING_UNAVAILABLE` on first store construction, not on module
+ * import.
+ */
+const defaultEntryFactory = (service, account) => {
+    const Ctor = resolveEntryCtor();
+    return new Ctor(service, account);
+};
+exports.defaultEntryFactory = defaultEntryFactory;

package/dist/oauth/openBrowser.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+import type { ChildProcess, SpawnOptions } from "node:child_process";
+/** Injection seam for `child_process.spawn`. Used by tests. */
+export type SpawnFn = (command: string, args: readonly string[], options: SpawnOptions) => ChildProcess;
+/** Options for `openBrowser`. */
+export interface OpenBrowserOptions {
+    /** Override for `process.platform`. Used by tests. */
+    platform?: NodeJS.Platform;
+    /** Override for `child_process.spawn`. Used by tests. */
+    spawnFn?: SpawnFn;
+    /**
+     * Override for `process.env.BROWSER`. The de-facto convention shared
+     * with `xdg-open` and Python's `webbrowser`: when set, it names the
+     * command to invoke instead of the platform default. Parsed shlex-style
+     * (POSIX shell tokenization) so values like `firefox --new-window` or
+     * `/path/with\ spaces/firefox` work as expected. An empty or missing
+     * value falls back to the platform default.
+     */
+    browserEnv?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Launches the system browser at `url` in a detached child process.
+ * Honors `$BROWSER` when set, falling back to the platform default
+ * (`open` / `xdg-open` / `cmd start`). Returns synchronously once the
+ * child is spawned — completion of the browser load is intentionally
+ * not awaited.
+ *
+ * @param url Absolute URL to open.
+ * @param options Platform/spawn/env overrides; only exposed for tests.
+ */
+export declare function openBrowser(url: string, options?: OpenBrowserOptions): void;

package/dist/oauth/openBrowser.js

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.openBrowser = openBrowser;
+const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process");
+const shlex_1 = require("shlex");
+const errors_1 = require("./errors");
+// On Windows `start` is a cmd.exe builtin, not a standalone binary.
+// The empty `""` pair is a positional placeholder for the window
+// title — without it `start` treats the URL as the title.
+//
+// The escape class covers:
+// - `& | ^ < >` — cmd metacharacters that would otherwise split the
+//   command line.
+// - `"` — would prematurely terminate the argument and break
+//   `start`'s quoting.
+// - `%` — triggers cmd.exe environment-variable expansion (e.g.
+//   `%USERNAME%`), which could leak or alter the URL.
+// - `\r \n` — embedded newlines let a crafted URL inject additional
+//   commands onto cmd.exe's line.
+//
+// URLs normally percent-encode most of these (so this is defense in
+// depth), but we do not fully trust the authorization endpoint that
+// came back from discovery.
+function windowsCommand(url) {
+    return {
+        command: "cmd.exe",
+        args: ["/c", "start", '""', url.replace(/[&|^<>"%\r\n]/g, (c) => `^${c}`)],
+    };
+}
+function browserCommand(platform, url, browserOverride) {
+    if (browserOverride && browserOverride.length > 0) {
+        const [command, ...extraArgs] = browserOverride;
+        return { command, args: [...extraArgs, url] };
+    }
+    switch (platform) {
+        case "darwin":
+            return { command: "open", args: [url] };
+        case "win32":
+            return windowsCommand(url);
+        default:
+            // linux / freebsd / openbsd — xdg-open is part of xdg-utils which
+            // is near-universal on desktop Linux. Environments without it
+            // (headless servers, containers) will report the missing binary
+            // via an asynchronous child-process `error` event, which this
+            // module deliberately swallows (see `child.once("error", ...)`
+            // below); `BROWSER_LAUNCH_FAILED` is only raised for synchronous
+            // `spawn()` throws. The caller's fallback is the URL already
+            // surfaced via `onAuthorizationUrl` so the user can finish the
+            // flow manually.
+            return { command: "xdg-open", args: [url] };
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Launches the system browser at `url` in a detached child process.
+ * Honors `$BROWSER` when set, falling back to the platform default
+ * (`open` / `xdg-open` / `cmd start`). Returns synchronously once the
+ * child is spawned — completion of the browser load is intentionally
+ * not awaited.
+ *
+ * @param url Absolute URL to open.
+ * @param options Platform/spawn/env overrides; only exposed for tests.
+ */
+function openBrowser(url, options = {}) {
+    const platform = options.platform ?? process.platform;
+    const spawnFn = options.spawnFn ?? node_child_process_1.spawn;
+    const browserEnv = options.browserEnv ?? process.env.BROWSER;
+    let browserOverride;
+    if (browserEnv && browserEnv.length > 0) {
+        try {
+            browserOverride = (0, shlex_1.split)(browserEnv);
+        }
+        catch (cause) {
+            throw new errors_1.OAuthFlowError("BROWSER_LAUNCH_FAILED", `Failed to parse $BROWSER (${browserEnv}). Open this URL manually:\n${url}`, { cause });
+        }
+    }
+    const { command, args } = browserCommand(platform, url, browserOverride);
+    let child;
+    try {
+        child = spawnFn(command, args, {
+            detached: true,
+            stdio: "ignore",
+        });
+    }
+    catch (cause) {
+        throw new errors_1.OAuthFlowError("BROWSER_LAUNCH_FAILED", `Failed to launch the system browser (${command}). Open this URL manually:\n${url}`, { cause });
+    }
+    // `spawn` itself can succeed (the parent fork was fine) and then emit
+    // `error` asynchronously if the binary isn't on PATH. We can't surface
+    // that synchronously, but attaching a handler prevents the default
+    // "unhandled error" crash. Callers get a benign no-op if the browser
+    // never opens; the authorize() orchestrator prints the URL alongside
+    // the launch so the user has a fallback.
+    child.once("error", () => { });
+    child.unref();
+}

package/dist/oauth/pkce.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/**
+ * Generates a cryptographically random PKCE `code_verifier` per RFC 7636
+ * §4.1. 43 base64url characters, 256 bits of entropy.
+ */
+export declare function generateCodeVerifier(): string;
+/**
+ * Derives the PKCE S256 `code_challenge` for the given verifier per
+ * RFC 7636 §4.2: `BASE64URL(SHA256(ASCII(verifier)))`.
+ *
+ * @param verifier The PKCE verifier produced by `generateCodeVerifier`.
+ */
+export declare function deriveCodeChallenge(verifier: string): string;
+/**
+ * Generates a cryptographically random OAuth `state` value for CSRF
+ * protection. 22 base64url characters, 128 bits of entropy.
+ */
+export declare function generateState(): string;

package/dist/oauth/pkce.js

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.generateCodeVerifier = generateCodeVerifier;
+exports.deriveCodeChallenge = deriveCodeChallenge;
+exports.generateState = generateState;
+const node_crypto_1 = require("node:crypto");
+// PKCE per RFC 7636. We only ever emit S256; plain is permitted by the RFC
+// but explicitly disallowed by our authorization-server config so it can't
+// silently fall back in the face of a buggy server.
+/**
+ * Entropy for the PKCE `code_verifier`. 32 bytes yields 43 base64url chars
+ * (no padding), the minimum length RFC 7636 allows (43–128). 256 bits
+ * matches the S256 hash's security ceiling.
+ */
+const VERIFIER_ENTROPY_BYTES = 32;
+/**
+ * Entropy for the CSRF `state` parameter. 16 bytes yields 22 base64url
+ * chars — unguessable without bloating the authorization URL.
+ */
+const STATE_ENTROPY_BYTES = 16;
+/**
+ * Generates a cryptographically random PKCE `code_verifier` per RFC 7636
+ * §4.1. 43 base64url characters, 256 bits of entropy.
+ */
+function generateCodeVerifier() {
+    return (0, node_crypto_1.randomBytes)(VERIFIER_ENTROPY_BYTES).toString("base64url");
+}
+/**
+ * Derives the PKCE S256 `code_challenge` for the given verifier per
+ * RFC 7636 §4.2: `BASE64URL(SHA256(ASCII(verifier)))`.
+ *
+ * @param verifier The PKCE verifier produced by `generateCodeVerifier`.
+ */
+function deriveCodeChallenge(verifier) {
+    return (0, node_crypto_1.createHash)("sha256").update(verifier, "ascii").digest("base64url");
+}
+/**
+ * Generates a cryptographically random OAuth `state` value for CSRF
+ * protection. 22 base64url characters, 128 bits of entropy.
+ */
+function generateState() {
+    return (0, node_crypto_1.randomBytes)(STATE_ENTROPY_BYTES).toString("base64url");
+}

package/dist/oauth/predicates.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+/**
+ * Narrows `v` to `string` when it is a non-empty string. Useful for
+ * validating JSON fields from authorization-server responses, where
+ * the spec declares a field as "string" but servers occasionally
+ * return `""` / `null` / missing.
+ */
+export declare function isNonEmptyString(v: unknown): v is string;

package/dist/oauth/predicates.js

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+"use strict";
+// Type-guard predicates shared across the oauth modules. Keep this
+// narrow: anything more substantial than a one-liner probably
+// belongs in its own module rather than piling in here.
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.isNonEmptyString = isNonEmptyString;
+/**
+ * Narrows `v` to `string` when it is a non-empty string. Useful for
+ * validating JSON fields from authorization-server responses, where
+ * the spec declares a field as "string" but servers occasionally
+ * return `""` / `null` / missing.
+ */
+function isNonEmptyString(v) {
+    return typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0;
+}

package/dist/oauth/refreshTokens.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+import { type TokenSet } from "./tokenResponse";
+/** Options for `refreshTokens`. */
+export interface RefreshTokensOptions {
+    /** Token endpoint resolved from OIDC discovery. */
+    tokenEndpoint: string;
+    /** OAuth client identifier. */
+    clientId: string;
+    /** The refresh token to exchange for a new access token. */
+    refreshToken: string;
+    /** Source of `now`. Defaults to `Date.now`. Injected for test determinism. */
+    now?: () => number;
+    /** Aborts the underlying fetch when fired. */
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
+}
+/**
+ * Exchanges a refresh token for a fresh access token via RFC 6749 §6.
+ *
+ * Some providers (Keycloak by default) rotate refresh tokens and
+ * return a new one in the response; others leave the refresh token
+ * alone. When the server omits `refresh_token` from the response,
+ * the returned `TokenSet` carries forward the input `refreshToken`
+ * so callers never lose refresh capability after one use.
+ *
+ * @throws {OAuthFlowError} with code `TOKEN_EXCHANGE_FAILED` on any
+ *   failure. `details` surfaces the OAuth `error` /
+ *   `error_description` when present; callers distinguishing
+ *   "refresh revoked" from "network hiccup" should inspect
+ *   `details.error === "invalid_grant"`.
+ */
+export declare function refreshTokens(options: RefreshTokensOptions): Promise<TokenSet>;

package/dist/oauth/refreshTokens.js

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.refreshTokens = refreshTokens;
+const errors_1 = require("./errors");
+const tokenResponse_1 = require("./tokenResponse");
+const userAgent_1 = require("../userAgent");
+/**
+ * Exchanges a refresh token for a fresh access token via RFC 6749 §6.
+ *
+ * Some providers (Keycloak by default) rotate refresh tokens and
+ * return a new one in the response; others leave the refresh token
+ * alone. When the server omits `refresh_token` from the response,
+ * the returned `TokenSet` carries forward the input `refreshToken`
+ * so callers never lose refresh capability after one use.
+ *
+ * @throws {OAuthFlowError} with code `TOKEN_EXCHANGE_FAILED` on any
+ *   failure. `details` surfaces the OAuth `error` /
+ *   `error_description` when present; callers distinguishing
+ *   "refresh revoked" from "network hiccup" should inspect
+ *   `details.error === "invalid_grant"`.
+ */
+async function refreshTokens(options) {
+    const now = options.now ?? Date.now;
+    // RFC 6749 §6 permits a `scope` parameter to request a subset of
+    // the originally-granted scopes. We deliberately omit it: Keycloak
+    // (our primary target) preserves the scope set across refresh, so
+    // re-sending would be redundant. Callers targeting a provider that
+    // reduces scopes when `scope` is omitted (some Okta configurations
+    // are rumored to) will need a provider-specific code path.
+    const body = new URLSearchParams({
+        grant_type: "refresh_token",
+        client_id: options.clientId,
+        refresh_token: options.refreshToken,
+    });
+    const issuedAt = now();
+    let response;
+    try {
+        response = await fetch(options.tokenEndpoint, {
+            method: "POST",
+            headers: {
+                "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+                Accept: "application/json",
+                "User-Agent": userAgent_1.USER_AGENT,
+            },
+            body,
+            signal: options.signal,
+        });
+    }
+    catch (cause) {
+        throw new errors_1.OAuthFlowError("TOKEN_EXCHANGE_FAILED", `Could not reach the token endpoint at ${options.tokenEndpoint}. Check your network connection.`, { cause });
+    }
+    if (!response.ok) {
+        await (0, tokenResponse_1.throwTokenEndpointError)(response, "Token refresh");
+    }
+    const fresh = await (0, tokenResponse_1.parseTokenResponse)(response, issuedAt, options.tokenEndpoint);
+    return {
+        ...fresh,
+        refreshToken: fresh.refreshToken ?? options.refreshToken,
+    };
+}

package/dist/oauth/revokeToken.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/** Options for `revokeRefreshToken`. */
+export interface RevokeRefreshTokenOptions {
+    /** Revocation endpoint resolved from OIDC discovery. */
+    revocationEndpoint: string;
+    /** OAuth client ID. */
+    clientId: string;
+    /** The refresh token to revoke server-side. */
+    refreshToken: string;
+    /** Aborts the underlying fetch when fired. */
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
+}
+/**
+ * Revokes a refresh token via RFC 7009. Servers SHOULD return 200
+ * regardless of whether the token was valid (the spec doesn't want
+ * revocation to be a probing oracle for token existence). In
+ * practice this helper still surfaces network errors and any
+ * non-2xx response from the revocation endpoint, on the assumption
+ * that a 4xx is more likely a misconfiguration the user should hear
+ * about than a routine condition to swallow.
+ *
+ * Throws a plain `Error` rather than `OAuthFlowError`: revocation
+ * is best-effort cleanup invoked from `axe-auth logout`, and the
+ * caller already handles failure by warning + continuing with the
+ * local clear. Adding a dedicated `OAuthFlowError` code for this
+ * one shallow operation is more bloat than the discrimination is
+ * worth.
+ */
+export declare function revokeRefreshToken(options: RevokeRefreshTokenOptions): Promise<void>;