@deque/axe-auth 1.1.0-next.789db6ed → 1.1.0-next.907ffbd7

package/README.md

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 # @deque/axe-auth
 
-CLI for authenticating with Deque's axe MCP server and other services.
+CLI for authenticating with Deque services via the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code + PKCE flow (RFC 6749, RFC 7636, RFC 8252 §7.3).
+
+**Status: early.** The `axe-auth` binary this package installs currently implements only `--version` / `--help`. The OAuth flow machinery (discovery, PKCE, loopback callback server, token exchange, keychain persistence) is in place; the user-facing subcommands (`login`, `logout`, `token`) are being added in [#423](https://github.com/dequelabs/axe-mcp-server/issues/423).
 
 ## Installation
 
@@ -20,19 +22,23 @@ npx @deque/axe-auth
 axe-auth [options]
 ```
 
-### Options
-
 | Flag              | Description         |
 | ----------------- | ------------------- |
 | `-v`, `--version` | Show version number |
 | `-h`, `--help`    | Show help message   |
 
-> Login, token exchange, and keychain storage are owned by sibling issues under epic [#410](https://github.com/dequelabs/axe-mcp-server/issues/410). This package currently ships only the loopback callback server module; see the architecture docs below.
-
 ## Architecture
 
-Design notes live in the repository under [`packages/axe-auth/docs/`](https://github.com/dequelabs/axe-mcp-server/tree/develop/packages/axe-auth/docs):
+Design notes live under [`packages/axe-auth/docs/`](https://github.com/dequelabs/axe-mcp-server/tree/develop/packages/axe-auth/docs):
 
-- [`oauth-flow.md`](https://github.com/dequelabs/axe-mcp-server/blob/develop/packages/axe-auth/docs/oauth-flow.md) — high-level OAuth 2.0 + PKCE flow and where each concern lives.
-- [`callback-server.md`](https://github.com/dequelabs/axe-mcp-server/blob/develop/packages/axe-auth/docs/callback-server.md) — `startCallbackServer` API, error codes, and RFC 8252 conformance.
+- [`oauth-flow.md`](https://github.com/dequelabs/axe-mcp-server/blob/develop/packages/axe-auth/docs/oauth-flow.md) — high-level OAuth 2.0 + PKCE flow.
+- [`callback-server.md`](https://github.com/dequelabs/axe-mcp-server/blob/develop/packages/axe-auth/docs/callback-server.md) — `startCallbackServer` API and RFC 8252 conformance.
 - [`callback-page.md`](https://github.com/dequelabs/axe-mcp-server/blob/develop/packages/axe-auth/docs/callback-page.md) — HTML response design, branding, and CSP rationale.
+
+## Caveats
+
+- **Linux keychain support is untested.** `@napi-rs/keyring` requires a working D-Bus Secret Service (GNOME Keyring, KWallet, etc.). Users on headless or minimal-desktop Linux environments may see `KEYRING_UNAVAILABLE`; a file-backed `TokenStore` fallback is tracked as a follow-up ([#464](https://github.com/dequelabs/axe-mcp-server/issues/464)).
+
+## Contributing
+
+Running the OAuth flow end-to-end against a local Keycloak, plus the two smoke-test scripts, is documented in [`docs/local-dev.md`](https://github.com/dequelabs/axe-mcp-server/blob/develop/packages/axe-auth/docs/local-dev.md).

package/dist/oauth/authorizationURL.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/** Options for `buildAuthorizationURL`. */
+export interface BuildAuthorizationURLOptions {
+    /** Authorization endpoint resolved from OIDC discovery. */
+    authorizationEndpoint: string;
+    /** OAuth client identifier registered with the authorization server. */
+    clientId: string;
+    /** Loopback redirect URI the callback server is listening on. */
+    redirectUri: string;
+    /** PKCE `code_challenge` derived via S256. */
+    codeChallenge: string;
+    /** CSRF `state` value, echoed by the auth server and validated on callback. */
+    state: string;
+    /**
+     * OAuth scopes to request. No default — callers must choose explicitly.
+     * Keycloak-idiomatic value for a refresh-token flow is `["offline_access"]`;
+     * Google uses `access_type=offline` (a custom parameter) instead; Auth0
+     * tolerates `offline_access` only with specific audience settings.
+     */
+    scopes: readonly string[];
+}
+/**
+ * Builds the OAuth authorization URL (RFC 6749 §4.1.1 + RFC 7636 §4.3)
+ * that the user's browser is sent to. Non-OAuth params already present
+ * on the authorization endpoint (e.g. Keycloak's `kc_idp_hint`) pass
+ * through unchanged. Throws if the endpoint already carries any of the
+ * OAuth-required params — that collision is a server misconfiguration
+ * we refuse to paper over.
+ */
+export declare function buildAuthorizationURL(options: BuildAuthorizationURLOptions): string;

package/dist/oauth/authorizationURL.js

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.buildAuthorizationURL = buildAuthorizationURL;
+const errors_1 = require("./errors");
+// Names of OAuth params we always set. If any of these are already
+// present on the authorization endpoint URL returned by discovery,
+// something is wrong on the server side (or with the caller's
+// endpoint override) and silently keeping both values would be a
+// security trap: the authorization server's disambiguation is
+// unspecified and varies by implementation.
+const OAUTH_REQUIRED_PARAMS = [
+    "response_type",
+    "client_id",
+    "redirect_uri",
+    "code_challenge",
+    "code_challenge_method",
+    "state",
+    "scope",
+];
+/**
+ * Builds the OAuth authorization URL (RFC 6749 §4.1.1 + RFC 7636 §4.3)
+ * that the user's browser is sent to. Non-OAuth params already present
+ * on the authorization endpoint (e.g. Keycloak's `kc_idp_hint`) pass
+ * through unchanged. Throws if the endpoint already carries any of the
+ * OAuth-required params — that collision is a server misconfiguration
+ * we refuse to paper over.
+ */
+function buildAuthorizationURL(options) {
+    const url = new URL(options.authorizationEndpoint);
+    const collisions = [];
+    for (const name of OAUTH_REQUIRED_PARAMS) {
+        if (url.searchParams.has(name))
+            collisions.push(name);
+    }
+    if (collisions.length > 0) {
+        throw new errors_1.OAuthFlowError("INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_ENDPOINT", `Authorization endpoint ${options.authorizationEndpoint} already carries OAuth-required param(s) ${collisions.join(", ")}; refusing to ship a URL the server may disambiguate unpredictably.`, { details: { params: collisions.join(",") } });
+    }
+    // `set` each required OAuth param. Non-OAuth params the discovery
+    // endpoint already carries (e.g. Keycloak's `kc_idp_hint=github`)
+    // ride through untouched since we never reference those names. The
+    // collision check above has already proved none of the OAuth names
+    // exist on the URL, so `set` and `append` are equivalent here —
+    // `set` just reads more conventionally.
+    url.searchParams.set("response_type", "code");
+    url.searchParams.set("client_id", options.clientId);
+    url.searchParams.set("redirect_uri", options.redirectUri);
+    url.searchParams.set("code_challenge", options.codeChallenge);
+    url.searchParams.set("code_challenge_method", "S256");
+    url.searchParams.set("state", options.state);
+    url.searchParams.set("scope", options.scopes.join(" "));
+    return url.toString();
+}

package/dist/oauth/authorize.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+import { type TokenSet } from "./tokenExchange";
+import { type TokenStore } from "./tokenStore";
+/** Options for `authorize`. */
+export interface AuthorizeOptions {
+    /**
+     * Authorization-server URL the discovery document claims as its
+     * `issuer`. For Keycloak, callers build this as
+     * `${serverURL}/realms/${realm}`. For other providers it is the
+     * hostname (or issuer path) advertised in their discovery document.
+     */
+    issuerURL: string;
+    /** OAuth client ID registered with the authorization server. */
+    clientId: string;
+    /**
+     * OAuth scopes to request. Required — this library has no opinion
+     * about which scopes your provider expects. Keycloak callers who
+     * want a refresh token typically pass `["offline_access"]`; Google
+     * uses `access_type=offline` as a separate query param and
+     * therefore needs an empty scope list plus that param threaded
+     * through elsewhere.
+     */
+    scopes: readonly string[];
+    /** Max time to wait for the loopback callback, in milliseconds. */
+    timeoutMs?: number;
+    /** Aborts the in-flight discovery, callback wait, and token exchange. */
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
+    /**
+     * Override for the token persistence layer. Defaults to
+     * `KeyringTokenStore` keyed by the normalized issuer URL.
+     */
+    tokenStore?: TokenStore;
+    /** Override for the system browser launcher. Injected for tests. */
+    openBrowser?: (url: string) => void;
+    /**
+     * Called with the authorization URL just before the browser launch.
+     * The default prints to stderr only when stderr is a TTY, so a
+     * parent CLI consuming this library as a dependency does not
+     * double-print. Pass a custom handler to route the URL through your
+     * own UI, or `() => {}` to suppress entirely.
+     */
+    onAuthorizationUrl?: (url: string) => void;
+    /**
+     * Called for soft warnings that are not errors but warrant user
+     * attention (e.g. `offline_access` was requested but the server did
+     * not return a `refresh_token`, or the browser failed to launch).
+     * The default prints to stderr only when stderr is a TTY. Pass a
+     * custom handler to route warnings through your own UI, or `() =>
+     * {}` to suppress entirely.
+     *
+     * Non-TTY callers who want warning visibility (log files, parent
+     * CLIs, background workers) should pass an explicit handler.
+     * Dropped warnings have no visible symptom at the time they fire —
+     * users only discover the consequence later (e.g. being prompted to
+     * re-authenticate at the next session).
+     */
+    onWarning?: (message: string) => void;
+    /**
+     * Forwarded to the discovery step. Loopback hosts (`localhost` /
+     * `127.0.0.1` / `[::1]`) are always permitted over http; this flag
+     * is the opt-in for non-loopback http issuers and for non-loopback
+     * http endpoints returned by discovery. Default `false`.
+     */
+    allowInsecureIssuer?: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Runs the full OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code + PKCE flow (RFC 6749 +
+ * RFC 7636): discovery, PKCE + state generation, loopback callback
+ * server, browser launch, code → token exchange, and keychain
+ * persistence.
+ *
+ * Note on identity: this library uses the OIDC discovery well-known
+ * path as a convention (most OAuth 2.0 providers expose it) but does
+ * *not* perform OIDC-strength identity validation — no id_token
+ * parsing, nonce checks, or JWKS signature verification. Callers
+ * needing authenticated identity claims should layer that on top.
+ *
+ * @returns The `TokenSet` on success. Also persisted via `tokenStore`.
+ *   `refreshToken` will be absent if the requested scopes did not
+ *   include `offline_access` (or the provider's equivalent).
+ * @throws {OAuthFlowError} For discovery, token-exchange, or keychain failures.
+ * @throws {OAuthCallbackError} For loopback/callback-server failures.
+ */
+export declare function authorize(options: AuthorizeOptions): Promise<TokenSet>;

package/dist/oauth/authorize.js

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.authorize = authorize;
+const callbackServer_1 = require("./callbackServer");
+const discoverOIDC_1 = require("./discoverOIDC");
+const pkce_1 = require("./pkce");
+const authorizationURL_1 = require("./authorizationURL");
+const openBrowser_1 = require("./openBrowser");
+const tokenExchange_1 = require("./tokenExchange");
+const tokenStore_1 = require("./tokenStore");
+const errors_1 = require("./errors");
+function defaultOnAuthorizationUrl(url) {
+    if (process.stderr.isTTY) {
+        console.error(`Authorization URL: ${url}`);
+    }
+}
+function defaultOnWarning(message) {
+    if (process.stderr.isTTY) {
+        console.error(`axe-auth: ${message}`);
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Runs the full OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code + PKCE flow (RFC 6749 +
+ * RFC 7636): discovery, PKCE + state generation, loopback callback
+ * server, browser launch, code → token exchange, and keychain
+ * persistence.
+ *
+ * Note on identity: this library uses the OIDC discovery well-known
+ * path as a convention (most OAuth 2.0 providers expose it) but does
+ * *not* perform OIDC-strength identity validation — no id_token
+ * parsing, nonce checks, or JWKS signature verification. Callers
+ * needing authenticated identity claims should layer that on top.
+ *
+ * @returns The `TokenSet` on success. Also persisted via `tokenStore`.
+ *   `refreshToken` will be absent if the requested scopes did not
+ *   include `offline_access` (or the provider's equivalent).
+ * @throws {OAuthFlowError} For discovery, token-exchange, or keychain failures.
+ * @throws {OAuthCallbackError} For loopback/callback-server failures.
+ */
+async function authorize(options) {
+    const { issuerURL, clientId, scopes, timeoutMs, signal, tokenStore = new tokenStore_1.KeyringTokenStore(issuerURL), openBrowser = openBrowser_1.openBrowser, onAuthorizationUrl = defaultOnAuthorizationUrl, onWarning = defaultOnWarning, allowInsecureIssuer, } = options;
+    // Discovery first. If the auth server is unreachable we want to fail
+    // *before* opening a browser — a rejected discovery throw is
+    // strictly more useful than a browser tab pointing at a
+    // wrong/unreachable URL.
+    const config = await (0, discoverOIDC_1.discoverOIDC)(issuerURL, {
+        signal,
+        allowInsecureIssuer,
+    });
+    const codeVerifier = (0, pkce_1.generateCodeVerifier)();
+    const codeChallenge = (0, pkce_1.deriveCodeChallenge)(codeVerifier);
+    const state = (0, pkce_1.generateState)();
+    const callback = await (0, callbackServer_1.startCallbackServer)({
+        expectedState: state,
+        timeoutMs,
+        signal,
+    });
+    try {
+        const authURL = (0, authorizationURL_1.buildAuthorizationURL)({
+            authorizationEndpoint: config.authorizationEndpoint,
+            clientId,
+            redirectUri: callback.redirectUri,
+            codeChallenge,
+            state,
+            scopes,
+        });
+        // Surface before launch so the URL is always visible even if the
+        // browser spawn fails (or never does anything useful, e.g. on a
+        // headless box).
+        onAuthorizationUrl(authURL);
+        try {
+            openBrowser(authURL);
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            // Only swallow the "could not launch browser" case: the URL was
+            // already surfaced via onAuthorizationUrl so the user can
+            // complete the flow manually. Any other error (a bug in an
+            // injected openBrowser, an unexpected throw) must propagate so
+            // callers and tests can see it.
+            if (err instanceof errors_1.OAuthFlowError &&
+                err.code === "BROWSER_LAUNCH_FAILED") {
+                onWarning(err.message);
+            }
+            else {
+                throw err;
+            }
+        }
+        const { code } = await callback.result;
+        const tokens = await (0, tokenExchange_1.exchangeCodeForTokens)({
+            tokenEndpoint: config.tokenEndpoint,
+            clientId,
+            code,
+            codeVerifier,
+            redirectUri: callback.redirectUri,
+            signal,
+        });
+        // If the caller requested offline_access but no refresh_token
+        // came back, warn. Prefer the server's reported `grantedScope`
+        // when present (RFC 6749 §5.1) since the provider's consent
+        // screen may have dropped the scope.
+        if (scopes.includes("offline_access") &&
+            tokens.refreshToken === undefined) {
+            const grantedSuffix = tokens.grantedScope
+                ? ` (server granted: ${tokens.grantedScope})`
+                : "";
+            onWarning(`'offline_access' was requested but no refresh_token was returned${grantedSuffix}. Cross-session refresh will not be available.`);
+        }
+        await tokenStore.save(tokens);
+        return tokens;
+    }
+    finally {
+        await callback.close();
+    }
+}

package/dist/oauth/discoverOIDC.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/** Subset of the OIDC discovery document that this package consumes. */
+export interface OIDCConfiguration {
+    /** Issuer identifier. Same value the authorization server will claim in tokens. */
+    issuer: string;
+    /** Endpoint the browser is redirected to for authorization. */
+    authorizationEndpoint: string;
+    /** Endpoint for code → token exchange and refresh-token grants. */
+    tokenEndpoint: string;
+    /** Present on most providers (Keycloak, Auth0); OIDC spec does not require it. */
+    revocationEndpoint?: string;
+    /** Present on providers that implement RP-initiated logout (OIDC session management). */
+    endSessionEndpoint?: string;
+}
+/** Options for `discoverOIDC`. */
+export interface DiscoverOIDCOptions {
+    /** Aborts the underlying fetch when fired. */
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
+    /**
+     * Permit non-HTTPS issuer URLs whose host is not a loopback literal.
+     * Loopback hosts (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `[::1]`) are always
+     * allowed over http since they cannot be intercepted remotely; this
+     * flag is for corporate dev setups or reverse-proxy scenarios where
+     * http is the only available path. Default `false`.
+     */
+    allowInsecureIssuer?: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Fetches and parses the OpenID Connect discovery document for a given
+ * issuer. Fails fast (no retry) so the caller does not open a browser
+ * against an unreachable authorization server.
+ *
+ * This function uses the OIDC discovery well-known path as a
+ * convention — most OAuth 2.0 providers expose it regardless of
+ * whether you intend to perform identity validation. This library
+ * itself does not perform OIDC identity validation (no id_token /
+ * nonce / signature checks); callers needing OIDC-strength identity
+ * assurance should layer that on top.
+ *
+ * Verifies that the server's claimed `issuer` matches the URL the
+ * caller passed in, per OIDC Discovery §3 / defence against a hostile
+ * discovery response redirecting `authorization_endpoint` and
+ * `token_endpoint` to attacker-controlled hosts.
+ *
+ * @param issuerURL Authorization-server URL the discovery document
+ *   claims as its `issuer`. For Keycloak, callers build this as
+ *   `${serverURL}/realms/${realm}`. For other providers it is the
+ *   hostname (or issuer path) advertised in their discovery document.
+ *   Trailing slashes tolerated.
+ */
+export declare function discoverOIDC(issuerURL: string, options?: DiscoverOIDCOptions): Promise<OIDCConfiguration>;

package/dist/oauth/discoverOIDC.js

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.discoverOIDC = discoverOIDC;
+const errors_1 = require("./errors");
+const issuerURL_1 = require("./issuerURL");
+const LOOPBACK_HOSTS = new Set(["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "[::1]"]);
+function isNonEmptyString(v) {
+    return typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0;
+}
+function optionalString(v) {
+    return isNonEmptyString(v) ? v : undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * Throws `DISCOVERY_FAILED` if `url` is not safe to transmit OAuth
+ * secrets over. `https:` is always fine; `http:` is only fine for
+ * loopback hosts, or for any host when `allowInsecurePermitted` is
+ * `true`. `label` describes the URL being checked ("issuer URL",
+ * "token_endpoint", etc.) and appears in the error message.
+ */
+function assertSecureURL(url, label, allowInsecurePermitted) {
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = new URL(url);
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new errors_1.OAuthFlowError("DISCOVERY_FAILED", `${label} is not a valid URL: ${url}`);
+    }
+    if (parsed.protocol === "https:")
+        return;
+    if (parsed.protocol === "http:") {
+        const host = parsed.host.toLowerCase();
+        // Keycloak on localhost:8080 → host === "localhost:8080"; strip
+        // the port for the loopback check.
+        const hostname = host.replace(/:\d+$/, "");
+        if (LOOPBACK_HOSTS.has(hostname))
+            return;
+        if (allowInsecurePermitted)
+            return;
+        throw new errors_1.OAuthFlowError("DISCOVERY_FAILED", `Refusing to use ${label} over http:// against non-loopback host ${parsed.host}. Use https:// or pass allowInsecureIssuer: true to override (only do this on trusted networks).`);
+    }
+    throw new errors_1.OAuthFlowError("DISCOVERY_FAILED", `Unsupported ${label} scheme '${parsed.protocol}'; expected https: or http: (loopback only).`);
+}
+function buildDiscoveryURL(issuerURL) {
+    // Use URL parsing (rather than string concat) so the discovery path
+    // lands on the URL's pathname, not accidentally after a query string
+    // or fragment. `normalizeIssuerURL` already strips those, but
+    // defense in depth keeps the contract obvious from the code.
+    const normalized = new URL((0, issuerURL_1.normalizeIssuerURL)(issuerURL));
+    normalized.search = "";
+    normalized.hash = "";
+    normalized.pathname = `${normalized.pathname.replace(/\/$/, "")}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;
+    return normalized.toString();
+}
+function parseConfiguration(body, url) {
+    const missing = [];
+    if (!isNonEmptyString(body.issuer))
+        missing.push("issuer");
+    if (!isNonEmptyString(body.authorization_endpoint)) {
+        missing.push("authorization_endpoint");
+    }
+    if (!isNonEmptyString(body.token_endpoint))
+        missing.push("token_endpoint");
+    if (missing.length > 0) {
+        throw new errors_1.OAuthFlowError("DISCOVERY_FAILED", `OpenID configuration at ${url} is missing required field(s): ${missing.join(", ")}`);
+    }
+    return {
+        issuer: body.issuer,
+        authorizationEndpoint: body.authorization_endpoint,
+        tokenEndpoint: body.token_endpoint,
+        revocationEndpoint: optionalString(body.revocation_endpoint),
+        endSessionEndpoint: optionalString(body.end_session_endpoint),
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Fetches and parses the OpenID Connect discovery document for a given
+ * issuer. Fails fast (no retry) so the caller does not open a browser
+ * against an unreachable authorization server.
+ *
+ * This function uses the OIDC discovery well-known path as a
+ * convention — most OAuth 2.0 providers expose it regardless of
+ * whether you intend to perform identity validation. This library
+ * itself does not perform OIDC identity validation (no id_token /
+ * nonce / signature checks); callers needing OIDC-strength identity
+ * assurance should layer that on top.
+ *
+ * Verifies that the server's claimed `issuer` matches the URL the
+ * caller passed in, per OIDC Discovery §3 / defence against a hostile
+ * discovery response redirecting `authorization_endpoint` and
+ * `token_endpoint` to attacker-controlled hosts.
+ *
+ * @param issuerURL Authorization-server URL the discovery document
+ *   claims as its `issuer`. For Keycloak, callers build this as
+ *   `${serverURL}/realms/${realm}`. For other providers it is the
+ *   hostname (or issuer path) advertised in their discovery document.
+ *   Trailing slashes tolerated.
+ */
+async function discoverOIDC(issuerURL, options = {}) {
+    const allowInsecure = options.allowInsecureIssuer ?? false;
+    assertSecureURL(issuerURL, "issuer URL", allowInsecure);
+    const url = buildDiscoveryURL(issuerURL);
+    let response;
+    try {
+        response = await fetch(url, { signal: options.signal });
+    }
+    catch (cause) {
+        throw new errors_1.OAuthFlowError("DISCOVERY_FAILED", `Could not reach the authentication server at ${url}. Check the URL and your network connection.`, { cause });
+    }
+    if (!response.ok) {
+        throw new errors_1.OAuthFlowError("DISCOVERY_FAILED", `Authentication server at ${url} responded with HTTP ${response.status}. Check the issuer URL.`);
+    }
+    let body;
+    try {
+        body = await response.json();
+    }
+    catch (cause) {
+        throw new errors_1.OAuthFlowError("DISCOVERY_FAILED", `Authentication server at ${url} did not return a valid JSON OpenID configuration`, { cause });
+    }
+    if (body === null || typeof body !== "object") {
+        throw new errors_1.OAuthFlowError("DISCOVERY_FAILED", `OpenID configuration at ${url} was not a JSON object`);
+    }
+    const config = parseConfiguration(body, url);
+    // OIDC Discovery §3: the `issuer` value returned MUST equal the URL
+    // the client used for discovery. Without this check (and without
+    // id_token signature validation, which this library does not do),
+    // a hostile discovery response could redirect the authorization and
+    // token endpoints to attacker hosts while still appearing to come
+    // from the legitimate origin.
+    if ((0, issuerURL_1.normalizeIssuerURL)(config.issuer) !== (0, issuerURL_1.normalizeIssuerURL)(issuerURL)) {
+        throw new errors_1.OAuthFlowError("DISCOVERY_FAILED", `Issuer mismatch: requested ${issuerURL} but discovery document claims ${config.issuer}`);
+    }
+    // Enforce scheme on the endpoints the flow actually hits. A tampered
+    // discovery response could claim the legitimate issuer while
+    // returning http://... for authorization_endpoint or token_endpoint,
+    // which would leak the auth code + PKCE verifier to a cleartext
+    // path. Same loopback / allowInsecureIssuer policy as the input.
+    assertSecureURL(config.authorizationEndpoint, "authorization_endpoint", allowInsecure);
+    assertSecureURL(config.tokenEndpoint, "token_endpoint", allowInsecure);
+    if (config.revocationEndpoint) {
+        assertSecureURL(config.revocationEndpoint, "revocation_endpoint", allowInsecure);
+    }
+    if (config.endSessionEndpoint) {
+        assertSecureURL(config.endSessionEndpoint, "end_session_endpoint", allowInsecure);
+    }
+    return config;
+}

package/dist/oauth/errors.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+/** Error codes raised by the loopback callback server. */
 export type OAuthCallbackErrorCode = 
 /** No callback arrived within `timeoutMs`; a retry is reasonable. */
 "TIMEOUT"
@@ -11,12 +12,62 @@ export type OAuthCallbackErrorCode =
  | "BIND_FAILED"
 /** Caller's `AbortSignal` fired. Expected; no user-facing message. */
  | "ABORTED";
-export type OAuthCallbackErrorOptions = {
+/** Options for `OAuthCallbackError`. */
+export interface OAuthCallbackErrorOptions {
+    /** Structured metadata for callers that want to surface specific fields. */
     details?: Record<string, string>;
+    /** Underlying error that triggered this failure. */
     cause?: unknown;
-};
+}
+/**
+ * Error raised by the loopback callback server when the authorization
+ * response cannot be consumed (timeout, state mismatch, provider error,
+ * malformed response, bind failure, or caller abort).
+ */
 export declare class OAuthCallbackError extends Error {
+    /** Discriminator for programmatic handling. */
     readonly code: OAuthCallbackErrorCode;
+    /** Structured metadata carried alongside the error, if any. */
     readonly details?: Record<string, string>;
     constructor(code: OAuthCallbackErrorCode, message: string, options?: OAuthCallbackErrorOptions);
 }
+/** Error codes raised by the OAuth flow orchestrator and its helpers. */
+export type OAuthFlowErrorCode = 
+/** OIDC discovery could not reach or parse the authorization server. No browser was opened. */
+"DISCOVERY_FAILED"
+/** Could not launch the system browser. User should be told to open the URL manually. */
+ | "BROWSER_LAUNCH_FAILED"
+/** Authorization code → token exchange was rejected by the authorization server. */
+ | "TOKEN_EXCHANGE_FAILED"
+/** System keychain is unavailable (e.g. no D-Bus secret service on Linux). */
+ | "KEYRING_UNAVAILABLE"
+/** Authorization endpoint returned by discovery cannot be used (e.g. already carries an OAuth-required param). Server misconfiguration. */
+ | "INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_ENDPOINT";
+/** Options for `OAuthFlowError`. */
+export interface OAuthFlowErrorOptions {
+    /** Structured metadata for callers that want to surface specific fields. */
+    details?: Record<string, string>;
+    /** Underlying error that triggered this failure. */
+    cause?: unknown;
+}
+/**
+ * Error raised by anything in the OAuth flow outside the callback
+ * server itself: OIDC discovery, browser launch, token exchange, or
+ * keychain access.
+ *
+ * **Logging note.** For code `TOKEN_EXCHANGE_FAILED`, `message` may
+ * include the authorization server's `error_description`, which is
+ * free-form text the server controls and could plausibly contain
+ * user-identifying or otherwise sensitive information. Prefer
+ * structured logging via the discriminated `code` and the explicit
+ * `details` fields; avoid echoing the raw `message` (or the result
+ * of `console.error(err)`, which includes it) into shared log sinks
+ * without a redaction step.
+ */
+export declare class OAuthFlowError extends Error {
+    /** Discriminator for programmatic handling. */
+    readonly code: OAuthFlowErrorCode;
+    /** Structured metadata carried alongside the error, if any. */
+    readonly details?: Record<string, string>;
+    constructor(code: OAuthFlowErrorCode, message: string, options?: OAuthFlowErrorOptions);
+}

package/dist/oauth/errors.js

@@ -1,8 +1,15 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.OAuthCallbackError = void 0;
+exports.OAuthFlowError = exports.OAuthCallbackError = void 0;
+/**
+ * Error raised by the loopback callback server when the authorization
+ * response cannot be consumed (timeout, state mismatch, provider error,
+ * malformed response, bind failure, or caller abort).
+ */
 class OAuthCallbackError extends Error {
+    /** Discriminator for programmatic handling. */
     code;
+    /** Structured metadata carried alongside the error, if any. */
     details;
     constructor(code, message, options = {}) {
         super(message, { cause: options.cause });
@@ -12,3 +19,30 @@ class OAuthCallbackError extends Error {
     }
 }
 exports.OAuthCallbackError = OAuthCallbackError;
+/**
+ * Error raised by anything in the OAuth flow outside the callback
+ * server itself: OIDC discovery, browser launch, token exchange, or
+ * keychain access.
+ *
+ * **Logging note.** For code `TOKEN_EXCHANGE_FAILED`, `message` may
+ * include the authorization server's `error_description`, which is
+ * free-form text the server controls and could plausibly contain
+ * user-identifying or otherwise sensitive information. Prefer
+ * structured logging via the discriminated `code` and the explicit
+ * `details` fields; avoid echoing the raw `message` (or the result
+ * of `console.error(err)`, which includes it) into shared log sinks
+ * without a redaction step.
+ */
+class OAuthFlowError extends Error {
+    /** Discriminator for programmatic handling. */
+    code;
+    /** Structured metadata carried alongside the error, if any. */
+    details;
+    constructor(code, message, options = {}) {
+        super(message, { cause: options.cause });
+        this.name = "OAuthFlowError";
+        this.code = code;
+        this.details = options.details;
+    }
+}
+exports.OAuthFlowError = OAuthFlowError;

package/dist/oauth/index.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@
 export { startCallbackServer } from "./callbackServer";
 export type { CallbackServerOptions, CallbackServerHandle, CallbackResult, } from "./callbackServer";
-export { OAuthCallbackError } from "./errors";
-export type { OAuthCallbackErrorCode, OAuthCallbackErrorOptions, } from "./errors";
+export { OAuthCallbackError, OAuthFlowError } from "./errors";
+export type { OAuthCallbackErrorCode, OAuthCallbackErrorOptions, OAuthFlowErrorCode, OAuthFlowErrorOptions, } from "./errors";
+export { authorize } from "./authorize";
+export type { AuthorizeOptions } from "./authorize";
+export type { TokenSet } from "./tokenExchange";
+export { KeyringTokenStore, STORED_BLOB_VERSION } from "./tokenStore";
+export type { TokenStore, LoadResult, KeyringEntry, KeyringEntryFactory, } from "./tokenStore";
+export { discoverOIDC } from "./discoverOIDC";
+export type { OIDCConfiguration, DiscoverOIDCOptions } from "./discoverOIDC";