@delta-infra/cli 1.1.26 → 1.1.27

package/README.md

@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ delta-cli sandbox operation <request_id>
 | `delta-cli sandbox run-bg <id> --command "..." [--timeout <秒>] [--wait] [--cancel-on-timeout] [--format sse\|json] [--json-result] [--summary/--no-summary] [--artifacts]` | 后台运行命令；不加 `--wait` 立即返回 `{execution_id, sandbox_id}`（`--format json` 时为统一结果对象，`finished=false`）；加 `--wait` 通过 SSE 实时流跟随（默认透传原始 `data:` 帧）；`--format json` 时只输出一个与 `sandbox run --format json` 相同结构的信封。**等待超时** → `error.type=timeout`、进程**非零退出**，`error.details` 保留 `sandbox_id`/`execution_id`/`remote_state`（`not_cancelled`/`cancelled`/`cancel_failed`）以便事后查询或取消；`remote_state=not_cancelled` 表示**只是本地停止等待，远端命令可能仍在运行**。默认不取消远端命令，加 `--cancel-on-timeout` 才会下发取消（取消失败时报 `cancel_failed`） |
 | `delta-cli sandbox logs <id> --execution-id <eid> [--tail N --grep <pattern> --context N --max-bytes N]` | 查看后台日志；默认返回 `stderr_size + stderr_tail`（避免上下文爆炸）；可用 `--tail/--grep` 过滤 |
 | `delta-cli sandbox cancel <id> --execution-id <eid>` | 中断后台命令 |
-| `delta-cli sandbox read <id> --path <path> [--output <本地路径>] [--tail N] [--grep <pattern>] [--offset N] [--limit N] [--context N] [--max-bytes N] [--parse-json]` | 读取容器内文件；`--output <path>` 保存到本地；`--tail/--grep` 过滤。**整份拷贝（不带 `--tail/--grep/--offset/--limit/--max-bytes`）走分块下载通道，字节精确**（二进制安全，响应含 `byte_exact:true`/`integrity:"sha256"`/`digest_verified`）；带上述过滤参数时走文本通道（服务端按 UTF-8 解码，非法字节会被替换为 U+FFFD），此时响应含 `byte_exact:false`/`integrity:"text_decoded"` 且 stderr 给出警告——**二进制文件请用 `sandbox pull` 拷贝** |
+| `delta-cli sandbox read <id> --path <path> [--output <本地路径>] [--tail N] [--grep <pattern>] [--offset N] [--limit N] [--context N] [--max-bytes N] [--parse-json]` | 读取容器内文件；`--output <path>` 保存到本地；`--tail/--grep` 过滤。**整份拷贝（不带 `--tail/--grep/--offset/--limit/--max-bytes`）走分块下载通道，字节精确**（二进制安全，响应含 `byte_exact:true`/`integrity:"sha256"`/`digest_verified`）；带上述过滤参数时走文本通道（服务端按 UTF-8 解码，非法字节会被替换为 U+FFFD），此时响应含 `byte_exact:false`/`integrity:"text_decoded"` 且 stderr 给出警告——**二进制文件请用 `sandbox pull` 拷贝**。**直接输出到 stdout 时**，若文件不是合法 UTF-8，`content` 是有损文本，精确原始字节放在 `content_base64`（base64 解码即为原文件），并标记 `byte_exact:true`；纯文本文件不返回该字段 |
 | `delta-cli sandbox pull <id> --source <沙箱路径> --target <本地路径> [--pattern <glob>] [--concurrency N] [--no-resume] [--no-verify]` | 从沙箱拉取文件/目录到本地（mirror of `upload`，flag 方向相反：source=远程，target=本地）。**目录始终递归**（`--recursive` 已废弃，无需再加）；走**分块下载**通道：二进制安全、端到端 **sha256** 校验（响应含 `digest_verified`）、**可断点续传**（`.delta.part`）、多文件/多块**并行**传输（`--concurrency`，默认 4），因此不受单条命令 300s 超时限制。服务端公开的上限随每次响应返回（`limits`）：块大小 4 MiB（最大 16 MiB）、单文件最大 100 GiB、每块超时 120s、整文件摘要超时 600s。`--no-resume` 忽略残留的 `.delta.part`，`--no-verify` 跳过沙箱侧 sha256 比对 |
 | `delta-cli sandbox write <id> --path <path> --source <本地路径>` | 写入文件。**二进制安全**：内容按 base64 传输，CLI 同时声明 `size`/`sha256`，服务端在落盘前核对，不匹配直接拒绝；响应含 `server_sha256`/`sha256`/`size`/`size_verified`。超过 32 MiB 的 `--source` 走流式上传通道，不整份读入内存 |
 | `delta-cli sandbox write-multiple <id> --entry <远程路径>=<本地路径>` | 批量写入 |

package/checksums.txt

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@delta-infra/cli",
-  "version": "1.1.26",
+  "version": "1.1.27",
   "description": "Delta Agent Cloud CLI for sandbox compute and science tools.",
   "bin": {
     "delta-cli": "scripts/run.js"

package/skills/delta-sandbox/SKILL.md

@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ The reason is that, after running a command, this skill reads `log_file` from th
 | List active tunnels | `sandbox exposes <id>` — list the public tunnels currently active for this sandbox |
 | Reclaim a tunnel | `sandbox dispose <id> --port N` — explicitly reclaim a single tunnel (stop frpc and release the public port); killing the sandbox also reclaims all its tunnels |
 | **File operations** | |
-| Read a file | `sandbox read <id> --path <path> [--output <local-path> --tail N --grep <pattern> --offset N --limit N --context N --max-bytes N --parse-json]` — **a full copy is byte-exact** (chunked download, sha256-verified); with `--tail`/`--grep`/`--offset`/`--limit` it uses the text channel and the envelope reports `byte_exact:false` — use `sandbox pull` for binary files |
+| Read a file | `sandbox read <id> --path <path> [--output <local-path> --tail N --grep <pattern> --offset N --limit N --context N --max-bytes N --parse-json]` — **a full copy is byte-exact** (chunked download, sha256-verified); with `--tail`/`--grep`/`--offset`/`--limit` it uses the text channel and the envelope reports `byte_exact:false` — use `sandbox pull` for binary files. Printed inline, a non-UTF-8 file puts the **exact bytes** in `content_base64` (`content` is the lossy text) |
 | Pull a file/directory | `sandbox pull <id> --source <sandbox-path> --target <local-path> [--pattern <glob>] [--concurrency N] [--no-resume] [--no-verify]` — pull a single file or **recursively** pull a directory (directories are always recursive), over the **chunked** path: binary-safe, sha256-verified, resumable and parallel (the reverse of upload: source=remote, target=local) |
 | View the working directory | `sandbox working-directory <id>` (returns `data.path`, such as `/workspace/{user_id}/{sandbox_id}`) |
 | Write a file | `sandbox write <id> --source <filename>` (without `--path`, writes to the working directory by default); **every sandbox-side path** — `--path`, the remote part of `write-multiple --entry`, `upload --target`, `pull --source`, `run`/`run-bg --log-file` — is prefixed with the working directory when relative, while an absolute path is used as given. The content is **binary-safe** (base64) and the server verifies the declared `size`/`sha256` before writing, so the response's `server_sha256`/`size_verified` can be compared with the local file |

package/skills/delta-sandbox/references/commands.md

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 
 | Command | Description |
 |------|------|
-| `sandbox read <id> --path <path> [--output <local-path>] [--tail N] [--grep <pattern>] [--offset N] [--limit N] [--context N] [--max-bytes N] [--parse-json]` | Read a file; returns `content` + `size` + `content_length`. `--output <path>` saves it locally; `--tail`/`--grep` filter the output. **A full copy (no `--tail`/`--grep`/`--offset`/`--limit`/`--max-bytes`) is byte-exact**: it goes through the chunked download path (binary-safe, sha256-verified — the envelope reports `byte_exact:true`, `integrity:"sha256"`, `digest_verified`). With any range filter it falls back to the text channel, where the server decodes as UTF-8 and replaces invalid bytes with U+FFFD; the envelope then reports `byte_exact:false` / `integrity:"text_decoded"` and a warning is printed to stderr. **Use `sandbox pull` to copy a binary file.** |
+| `sandbox read <id> --path <path> [--output <local-path>] [--tail N] [--grep <pattern>] [--offset N] [--limit N] [--context N] [--max-bytes N] [--parse-json]` | Read a file; returns `content` + `size` + `content_length`. `--output <path>` saves it locally; `--tail`/`--grep` filter the output. **A full copy (no `--tail`/`--grep`/`--offset`/`--limit`/`--max-bytes`) is byte-exact**: it goes through the chunked download path (binary-safe, sha256-verified — the envelope reports `byte_exact:true`, `integrity:"sha256"`, `digest_verified`). With any range filter it falls back to the text channel, where the server decodes as UTF-8 and replaces invalid bytes with U+FFFD; the envelope then reports `byte_exact:false` / `integrity:"text_decoded"` and a warning is printed to stderr. **Use `sandbox pull` to copy a binary file.** When the result is printed inline and the file is not valid UTF-8, `content` is the lossy text and the **exact original bytes** are in `content_base64` (base64-decode it); the envelope is marked `byte_exact:true`. Text files carry no `content_base64`. |
 | `sandbox working-directory <id>` | Get the sandbox's current working directory (absolute path `/workspace/{user_id}/{sandbox_id}`). |
 | `sandbox write <id> [--path <path>] --source <filename>` | Write a file (recommended). If `--path` is omitted, write to the working directory (`<working-directory>/<filename>`); a relative `--path` is also resolved under the working directory. An absolute `--path` is used as-is (but the `/workspace/<filename>` root path is outside the OSS sync scope and is not recommended). **Binary-safe**: the content travels as base64 and the CLI declares its `size`/`sha256`, which the server verifies before writing (a mismatch is rejected). The response carries `server_sha256`/`sha256`/`size`/`size_verified`. |
 | `sandbox write <id> --path <absolute-path> --data "..."` | Write a small amount of inline content (`--data` has no source filename, so `--path` must be specified explicitly). |