@delta-agentcloud/cli 1.1.32 → 1.1.34

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package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ delta-cli sandbox operation <request_id>
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  | `delta-cli sandbox run-bg <id> --command "..." [--timeout <sec>] [--wait] [--cancel-on-timeout] [--format sse\|json] [--json-result] [--summary/--no-summary] [--artifacts]` | Run a command in the background; without `--wait` it returns `{execution_id, sandbox_id}` immediately (with `--format json`, the unified result object with `finished=false`); with `--wait` it follows via SSE (raw `data:` frames to stdout, no trailing envelope); `--format json` prints exactly one envelope with the same structure as `sandbox run --format json`. **On a wait timeout** → `error.type=timeout` and a **non-zero** process exit code, with `error.details` keeping `sandbox_id`/`execution_id`/`remote_state` (`not_cancelled`/`cancelled`/`cancel_failed`) so the command can be queried or cancelled afterwards; `remote_state=not_cancelled` means only the local wait stopped and **the remote command may still be running**. The remote command is left running by default — add `--cancel-on-timeout` to cancel it (a failed cancel is reported as `cancel_failed`) |
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  | `delta-cli sandbox logs <id> --execution-id <eid> [--tail N --grep <pattern> --context N --max-bytes N]` | Show background logs; returns `stderr_size + stderr_tail` by default (avoids context blow-up); filter with `--tail/--grep` |
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  | `delta-cli sandbox cancel <id> --execution-id <eid>` | Interrupt a background command |
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- | `delta-cli sandbox read <id> --path <path> [--output <local path>] [--tail N] [--grep <pattern>] [--offset N] [--limit N] [--context N] [--max-bytes N] [--parse-json]` | Read a file in the container; `--output <path>` saves locally; filter with `--tail/--grep`. **A full copy (without `--tail/--grep/--offset/--limit/--max-bytes`) is byte-exact**: it goes through the chunked download path (binary-safe, sha256-verified — the envelope reports `byte_exact:true`, `integrity:"sha256"`, `digest_verified`); with any range filter it falls back to the text channel, where the server decodes as UTF-8 and replaces invalid bytes with U+FFFD, so the envelope then reports `byte_exact:false` / `integrity:"text_decoded"` and a warning is printed to stderr — **use `sandbox pull` to copy a binary file**. When the result is printed inline and the file is not valid UTF-8, `content` is the lossy text and the **exact original bytes** are in `content_base64` (base64-decode it); the envelope is marked `byte_exact:true`. Text files carry no `content_base64` |
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+ | `delta-cli sandbox read <id> --path <path> [--output <local path>] [--tail N] [--grep <pattern>] [--offset N] [--limit N] [--context N] [--max-bytes N] [--parse-json]` | Read a file in the container; `--output <path>` saves it locally; `--tail`/`--grep` filter the output. **A full copy (no `--tail`/`--grep`/`--offset`/`--limit`/`--max-bytes`) is byte-exact**: it goes through the chunked download path (binary-safe, sha256-verified — the envelope reports `byte_exact:true`, `integrity:"sha256"`, `digest_verified`). With a range filter the filter is applied to the **exact bytes**, so the copy is a byte-exact slice of the original (`byte_exact:true`, `integrity:"sha1"`). Printed inline, a text file gives `content` (strictly decoded, `byte_exact:true`) while a **non-UTF-8 file gives no `content` at all** — the exact original bytes are in `content_base64` (base64-decode it) and the envelope is marked `byte_exact:true`. Only a server that does not support that negotiation returns the lossy text (`integrity:"text_decoded"`, with a warning on stderr). |
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  | `delta-cli sandbox pull <id> --source <sandbox path> --target <local path> [--pattern <glob>] [--concurrency N] [--no-resume] [--no-verify]` | Pull files/dirs from the sandbox to local (mirror of `upload`; flag direction reversed: source=remote, target=local). **Directories are always pulled recursively** (`--recursive` is deprecated and no longer needed); the transfer uses the **chunked download** path: binary-safe, end-to-end **sha256** verified (`digest_verified`), **resumable** (a partial `<target>.delta.part` is reused), and **parallel** across files and chunks (`--concurrency`, default 4) — so a large file is not bound by a single command timeout. The server publishes its limits with every response (`limits`): 4 MiB chunks (16 MiB max), 100 GiB max per file, 120 s per chunk, 600 s for the whole-file digest. `--no-resume` ignores a leftover `.delta.part`; `--no-verify` skips the sandbox-side sha256 comparison. **The payload moves as raw bytes** (the server's binary endpoint, so it is not inflated by base64; older servers fall back automatically), and **the chunks must tile the whole file**: a gap or an interrupted transfer is reported as a failure, never as a successful download |
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  | `delta-cli sandbox write <id> --path <path> --source <local path>` | Write a file. **Binary-safe**: the content travels as raw bytes (the server's binary endpoint, with a base64 fallback for older servers) and the CLI declares its `size`/`sha256`, which the server verifies before writing (a mismatch is rejected); the response carries `server_sha256`/`sha256`/`size`/`size_verified`. A `--source` above 32 MiB goes through the streaming upload path instead of being read into memory |
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  | `delta-cli sandbox write-multiple <id> --entry <remote path>=<local path>` | Write multiple files |
package/checksums.txt CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@delta-agentcloud/cli",
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- "version": "1.1.32",
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+ "version": "1.1.34",
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  "description": "Delta Agent Cloud CLI for sandbox compute and science tools.",
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  "bin": {
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  "delta-cli": "scripts/run.js"
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ The reason is that, after running a command, this skill reads `log_file` from th
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  | List active tunnels | `sandbox exposes <id>` — list the public tunnels currently active for this sandbox |
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  | Reclaim a tunnel | `sandbox dispose <id> --port N` — explicitly reclaim a single tunnel (stop frpc and release the public port); killing the sandbox also reclaims all its tunnels |
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  | **File operations** | |
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- | Read a file | `sandbox read <id> --path <path> [--output <local-path> --tail N --grep <pattern> --offset N --limit N --context N --max-bytes N --parse-json]` — **a full copy is byte-exact** (chunked download, sha256-verified); with `--tail`/`--grep`/`--offset`/`--limit` it uses the text channel and the envelope reports `byte_exact:false` — use `sandbox pull` for binary files. Printed inline, a non-UTF-8 file puts the **exact bytes** in `content_base64` (`content` is the lossy text) |
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+ | Read a file | `sandbox read <id> --path <path> [--output <local-path> --tail N --grep <pattern> --offset N --limit N --context N --max-bytes N --parse-json]` — **byte-exact**: a full copy goes through the chunked download (sha256-verified) and a filtered copy is a byte-exact slice of the original. Printed inline, a text file gives `content`; a **non-UTF-8 file gives no `content`** — the exact bytes are in `content_base64` |
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  | Pull a file/directory | `sandbox pull <id> --source <sandbox-path> --target <local-path> [--pattern <glob>] [--concurrency N] [--no-resume] [--no-verify]` — pull a single file or **recursively** pull a directory (directories are always recursive), over the **chunked** path: bytes move verbatim (no base64 inflation), binary-safe, sha256-verified, resumable and parallel (the reverse of upload: source=remote, target=local) |
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  | View the working directory | `sandbox working-directory <id>` (returns `data.path`, such as `/workspace/{user_id}/{sandbox_id}`) |
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  | Write a file | `sandbox write <id> --source <filename>` (without `--path`, writes to the working directory by default); **every sandbox-side path** — `--path`, the remote part of `write-multiple --entry`, `upload --target`, `pull --source`, `run`/`run-bg --log-file` — is prefixed with the working directory when relative, while an absolute path is used as given. The content is **binary-safe** (raw bytes, with a base64 fallback for older servers) and the server verifies the declared `size`/`sha256` before writing, so the response's `server_sha256`/`size_verified` can be compared with the local file |
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
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  | Command | Description |
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  |------|------|
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- | `sandbox read <id> --path <path> [--output <local-path>] [--tail N] [--grep <pattern>] [--offset N] [--limit N] [--context N] [--max-bytes N] [--parse-json]` | Read a file; returns `content` + `size` + `content_length`. `--output <path>` saves it locally; `--tail`/`--grep` filter the output. **A full copy (no `--tail`/`--grep`/`--offset`/`--limit`/`--max-bytes`) is byte-exact**: it goes through the chunked download path (binary-safe, sha256-verified — the envelope reports `byte_exact:true`, `integrity:"sha256"`, `digest_verified`). With any range filter it falls back to the text channel, where the server decodes as UTF-8 and replaces invalid bytes with U+FFFD; the envelope then reports `byte_exact:false` / `integrity:"text_decoded"` and a warning is printed to stderr. **Use `sandbox pull` to copy a binary file.** When the result is printed inline and the file is not valid UTF-8, `content` is the lossy text and the **exact original bytes** are in `content_base64` (base64-decode it); the envelope is marked `byte_exact:true`. Text files carry no `content_base64`. |
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+ | `sandbox read <id> --path <path> [--output <local-path>] [--tail N] [--grep <pattern>] [--offset N] [--limit N] [--context N] [--max-bytes N] [--parse-json]` | Read a file; returns `content` + `size` + `content_length`. `--output <path>` saves it locally; `--tail`/`--grep` filter the output. **A full copy (no `--tail`/`--grep`/`--offset`/`--limit`/`--max-bytes`) is byte-exact**: it goes through the chunked download path (binary-safe, sha256-verified — the envelope reports `byte_exact:true`, `integrity:"sha256"`, `digest_verified`). With a range filter the filter is applied to the **exact bytes**, so the copy is a byte-exact slice of the original (`byte_exact:true`, `integrity:"sha1"`). Printed inline, a text file gives `content` (strictly decoded, `byte_exact:true`) while a **non-UTF-8 file gives no `content` at all** — the exact original bytes are in `content_base64` (base64-decode it) and the envelope is marked `byte_exact:true`. Only a server that does not support that negotiation returns the lossy text (`integrity:"text_decoded"`, with a warning on stderr). |
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  | `sandbox working-directory <id>` | Get the sandbox's current working directory (absolute path `/workspace/{user_id}/{sandbox_id}`). |
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  | `sandbox write <id> [--path <path>] --source <filename>` | Write a file (recommended). If `--path` is omitted, write to the working directory (`<working-directory>/<filename>`); a relative `--path` is also resolved under the working directory. An absolute `--path` is used as-is (but the `/workspace/<filename>` root path is outside the OSS sync scope and is not recommended). **Binary-safe**: the content travels as raw bytes (the server's binary endpoint, with a base64 fallback for older servers) and the CLI declares its `size`/`sha256`, which the server verifies before writing (a mismatch is rejected). The response carries `server_sha256`/`sha256`/`size`/`size_verified`. |
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  | `sandbox write <id> --path <absolute-path> --data "..."` | Write a small amount of inline content (`--data` has no source filename, so `--path` must be specified explicitly). |