@delopay/sdk 0.99.0 → 0.100.0

package/dist/index.cjs

@@ -3248,6 +3248,45 @@ var Users = class {
   async deleteRole(roleId) {
     return this.request("DELETE", `/user/role/${encodeURIComponent(roleId)}`);
   }
+  /**
+   * Read which individual connector accounts a role may see.
+   *
+   * `GET /user/role/{roleId}/connectors`
+   *
+   * **Check `restricted` before reading `connectors`.** An empty list is
+   * ambiguous by itself, so the backend states which case it is: `false` means
+   * the role holds no grant and sees whatever its entity and profile scope
+   * already allowed. Rendering an empty `connectors` array as "this role sees
+   * nothing" inverts the meaning.
+   *
+   * Requires the permission that *edits a role*, not a connector permission.
+   */
+  async getRoleConnectors(roleId) {
+    return this.request("GET", `/user/role/${encodeURIComponent(roleId)}/connectors`);
+  }
+  /**
+   * Replace the set of connector accounts a role may see.
+   *
+   * `PUT /user/role/{roleId}/connectors`
+   *
+   * The call **replaces** the whole set rather than adding to it, so send the
+   * complete list every time. An empty `merchant_connector_ids` clears the
+   * grant and returns the role to unrestricted.
+   *
+   * The backend refuses an id that is not a connector account of the caller's
+   * own merchant, an `Organization`-scoped role (a connector account belongs to
+   * exactly one merchant, so an org-spanning role cannot hold one coherently),
+   * and any predefined role (one static entry shared by every tenant).
+   *
+   * Editing a grant invalidates the role cache and blacklists tokens minted
+   * before the edit, so **users holding this role must sign in again**. Worth
+   * saying in the UI before the save, not after.
+   */
+  async updateRoleConnectors(roleId, params) {
+    return this.request("PUT", `/user/role/${encodeURIComponent(roleId)}/connectors`, {
+      body: params
+    });
+  }
 };
 
 // src/resources/verification.ts