@delopay/sdk 0.337.0 → 0.342.0

package/dist/index.cjs

@@ -2967,6 +2967,21 @@ var Payments = class {
     if (Object.keys(query).length === 0) return this.request("GET", path);
     return this.request("GET", path, { query });
   }
+  /**
+   * The payment's buyer risk evaluations, newest first (at most 50): each
+   * one's score from 0 to 100, its band, the action the merchant's model asks
+   * for that band and the action that was taken, the signals that fired with
+   * the points each added, and the model version it was scored with.
+   *
+   * A payment is scored at every confirm that is about to reach a processor;
+   * a payment never scored answers an empty list. A caller scoped to one shop
+   * reads only that shop's payments.
+   *
+   * `GET /payments/{paymentId}/buyer-risk`
+   */
+  async buyerRisk(paymentId, options) {
+    return this.request("GET", `/payments/${encodeURIComponent(paymentId)}/buyer-risk`, options);
+  }
   /** Product names and prices as frozen when the payment was created. */
   async productLines(paymentId) {
     return this.request("GET", `/payments/${encodeURIComponent(paymentId)}/lines`);
@@ -3130,6 +3145,12 @@ var Payments = class {
    * @param paymentId - The payment intent ID to confirm.
    * @param params - Confirmation parameters (payment method data, return URL, etc.).
    * @returns The updated payment intent.
+   *
+   * A buyer the merchant's buyer risk model refuses fails before any processor
+   * is called, with a `DelopayError` of code `DE_23` (`buyer_risk_refused`,
+   * HTTP 422). The error does not say which signal fired; read the evaluation
+   * with {@link Payments.buyerRisk}. A shop whose payments are switched off is
+   * refused with `DE_21`.
    */
   async confirm(paymentId, params) {
     return this.request("POST", `/payments/${encodeURIComponent(paymentId)}/confirm`, {
@@ -3661,6 +3682,31 @@ var Profiles = class {
       { body: { is_archived: false } }
     );
   }
+  /**
+   * Switch a shop's payments off. While they are off the shop takes no new
+   * payment: creating one, and confirming one no provider holds yet, is
+   * refused with `DE_21`, and its hosted checkout does not render. A payment a
+   * provider already holds is finished; refunds and disputes are unaffected.
+   * Needs the `ShopPaymentsSwitch` area's `Write` and a signed-in user.
+   * Repeating the same state is safe.
+   *
+   * `PUT /account/{accountId}/business-profile/{profileId}/payments-switch`
+   */
+  async disablePayments(accountId, profileId) {
+    return this.request(
+      "PUT",
+      `/account/${encodeURIComponent(accountId)}/business-profile/${encodeURIComponent(profileId)}/payments-switch`,
+      { body: { payments_disabled: true } }
+    );
+  }
+  /** Switch a shop's payments on again after {@link Profiles.disablePayments}. */
+  async enablePayments(accountId, profileId) {
+    return this.request(
+      "PUT",
+      `/account/${encodeURIComponent(accountId)}/business-profile/${encodeURIComponent(profileId)}/payments-switch`,
+      { body: { payments_disabled: false } }
+    );
+  }
   /** Archived shop identities in the caller's merchant and shop-read scope. */
   async listArchived(accountId) {
     return this.request(
@@ -4321,6 +4367,20 @@ var Routing = class {
       body: params
     });
   }
+  /**
+   * Reset one limit's usage for the window open now: what settled payments
+   * spent stops counting, so the account takes payments again. Payments still
+   * in flight keep their hold and count once they complete. The account's
+   * other limit is untouched. Offered by a router that lists `usage_reset` in
+   * `features`; refused (422) for an account with no limit in that unit.
+   *
+   * `POST /routing/connector-caps/{profileId}/reset`
+   */
+  async resetConnectorCapUsage(profileId, params) {
+    return this.request("POST", `/routing/connector-caps/${encodeURIComponent(profileId)}/reset`, {
+      body: params
+    });
+  }
   /**
    * List all routing algorithms for the current merchant.
    *
@@ -6859,12 +6919,44 @@ var BuyerBlocklist = class {
   /**
    * Block the buyer of a payment by the identifiers the payment carries:
    * its card (the Stripe fingerprint), email, IP, device or customer, in the
-   * payment's shop or in every shop.
+   * payment's shop or in every shop. With `all_ips`, also every address the
+   * buyer was seen paying from, one entry each, grouped under one
+   * `group_id`; the answer then carries `ip_snapshot`.
    * `POST /buyer-blocklist/from-payment`
    */
   async createFromPayment(params) {
     return this.request("POST", "/buyer-blocklist/from-payment", { body: params });
   }
+  /**
+   * The addresses an "all IPs" block of a payment's buyer would take: the
+   * payment's own, then those its device, email or card were seen at in the
+   * last 90 days, newest first, at most 20. An address shared with two or
+   * more other buyers is offered but not preselected. Writes nothing; needs
+   * the same permissions as the block.
+   * `POST /buyer-blocklist/from-payment/preview`
+   */
+  async previewFromPayment(params) {
+    return this.request("POST", "/buyer-blocklist/from-payment/preview", { body: params });
+  }
+  /**
+   * An entry's recorded refusals, newest first, with where each happened and
+   * which identifier matched. A caller scoped to one shop reaches only its own
+   * shop's entries.
+   * `GET /buyer-blocklist/{entry_id}/events`
+   */
+  async listEvents(entryId, params) {
+    return this.request("GET", `/buyer-blocklist/${encodeURIComponent(entryId)}/events`, {
+      query: params
+    });
+  }
+  /**
+   * Which classes of network an `ip_class` entry can be judged by on this
+   * deployment now, and by which sources.
+   * `GET /buyer-blocklist/capabilities`
+   */
+  async capabilities() {
+    return this.request("GET", "/buyer-blocklist/capabilities");
+  }
   /**
    * Retry now every failed or pending Radar sync of an entry.
    * `POST /buyer-blocklist/{entry_id}/sync/retry`
@@ -14952,7 +15044,9 @@ var CheckoutSession = class {
    * The methods the buyer may pick for a subscription that waits for the
    * choice (`method_choice_pending`), judged for the buyer. Call it from the
    * buyer's browser: the sell-to country is read from this request's own
-   * connection. Authenticated with the subscription's client secret.
+   * connection. A cancelled subscription answers 400, and one that already
+   * bills on an account answers 409 (`DE_20`). Authenticated with the
+   * subscription's client secret.
    *
    * `GET /subscriptions/method-options/{merchantId}/{subscriptionId}`
    */
@@ -14972,8 +15066,11 @@ var CheckoutSession = class {
    * again from this request; afterwards
    * {@link CheckoutSession.fetchSubscriptionData} describes the bound
    * subscription (Stripe's Payment Element for `card`, `confirmSubscription`
-   * for the others). A subscription that no longer waits answers 409
-   * (`DE_20`). Authenticated with the subscription's client secret.
+   * for the others). Picking the same method again answers the bound
+   * subscription. A subscription bound to another method already, or whose
+   * billing account changed meanwhile, answers 409 (`DE_20`); a method not
+   * offered to this buyer, or a cancelled subscription, answers 400.
+   * Authenticated with the subscription's client secret.
    *
    * `POST /subscriptions/select-method/{merchantId}/{subscriptionId}`
    */
@@ -15263,7 +15360,8 @@ var CheckoutSession = class {
    * competing flow receives `false` and must reload; an unresolved provider
    * outcome stays reserved, regardless of elapsed time. A buyer-blocklist
    * refusal throws a `DelopayError` with code `DE_14`; a shop whose payments
-   * DeloPay stopped is refused with `DE_22`.
+   * DeloPay stopped is refused with `DE_22`, and a shop whose payments the
+   * merchant switched off with `DE_21`.
    *
    * `POST /payment-link/{merchantId}/{paymentId}/browser-card-claim`
    */
@@ -15289,8 +15387,11 @@ var CheckoutSession = class {
    * against the shop's sell-to restrictions before Stripe authorises, and a
    * refusal throws a `DelopayError` with code `DE_10`. A buyer on the
    * merchant's buyer blocklist is refused before any Stripe call with code
-   * `DE_14` (`buyer_blocked`, 422), which names no entry, and a shop whose
-   * payments DeloPay stopped with `DE_22`. When the answer's
+   * `DE_14` (`buyer_blocked`, 422), which names no entry, a shop whose
+   * payments DeloPay stopped with `DE_22`, and a shop whose payments the
+   * merchant switched off with `DE_21`. A buyer the merchant's buyer risk
+   * model refuses fails with `DE_23` (`buyer_risk_refused`, 422), which says
+   * nothing about the signals. When the answer's
    * `status` is `requires_action`, run `stripe.handleNextAction` with its
    * `client_secret` — safe, because the intent is `confirmation_method=manual`
    * and that secret confirms nothing without the secret key — then call this