@delopay/sdk 0.158.0 → 0.159.0

package/dist/internal.cjs

@@ -8507,12 +8507,29 @@ var CheckoutSession = class {
    * checkout payload with `card_connector_server_confirm: true`. Stripe refuses
    * a Stripe.js confirm of such an intent.
    *
-   * Send the ConfirmationToken the Payment Element (or Express Checkout
-   * Element) produced. The router judges the card's issuing country and the
-   * buyer's IP country against the shop's sell-to restrictions before Stripe
-   * authorises, and a refusal throws a `DelopayError` with code `DE_10`. When
-   * the answer's `status` is `requires_action`, run `stripe.handleNextAction`
-   * with its `client_secret`, then call this again without a token to finalize.
+   * Send the PaymentMethod `stripe.createPaymentMethod` produced from the
+   * Payment Element (or Express Checkout Element), which needs
+   * `paymentMethodCreation: 'manual'` on the Elements instance. A
+   * ConfirmationToken is refused with `400`: Stripe will not confirm such an
+   * intent with one.
+   *
+   * The router judges the card's issuing country and the buyer's IP country
+   * against the shop's sell-to restrictions before Stripe authorises, and a
+   * refusal throws a `DelopayError` with code `DE_10`. When the answer's
+   * `status` is `requires_action`, run `stripe.handleNextAction` with its
+   * `client_secret` — safe, because the intent is `confirmation_method=manual`
+   * and that secret confirms nothing without the secret key — then call this
+   * again without a payment method to finalize.
+   *
+   * A PaymentMethod rules out what `stripe.createPaymentMethod` cannot
+   * produce: Stripe names Amazon Pay and Klarna in the Express Checkout
+   * Element, which need `stripe.createConfirmationToken` instead. Neither can
+   * be paid through this route, so a caller must not offer them on a
+   * server-confirmed intent — mount the Express Checkout Element with those
+   * methods `'never'`, as DeloPay's own checkout does. The router drops only
+   * the methods its server-side confirm cannot finish at all (BLIK and ACSS
+   * pre-authorized debits) from the card form's mount, so the rest of the
+   * selection still reaches the element and is the caller's to constrain.
    *
    * `POST /payment-link/{merchantId}/{paymentId}/stripe-confirm`
    */
@@ -8523,6 +8540,27 @@ var CheckoutSession = class {
       headers: this.bearerHeaders(options?.headers)
     });
   }
+  /**
+   * Ask whether NomuPay's COPYandPAY widget may submit a card, from the
+   * form's pre-submit hook.
+   *
+   * Only for a checkout stamped `NomupayOppwaCheckoutData.submit_grant`: the
+   * card form sits beside always-shown wallet buttons of another account, and
+   * this answer closes those buttons before it allows the card. `authorized`
+   * is `false` when the payment no longer waits for a payment method, or when
+   * this is not the attempt's live card-form checkout; when a wallet beside it
+   * is already being paid, the route answers an error instead. Submit the
+   * widget only on `true`.
+   *
+   * `POST /payment-link/{merchantId}/{paymentId}/nomupay-card-authorization`
+   */
+  async nomupayCardAuthorization(params, options) {
+    return this.client.request("POST", `${this.linkBase}/nomupay-card-authorization`, {
+      body: params,
+      ...options,
+      headers: this.bearerHeaders(options?.headers)
+    });
+  }
   /**
    * The payment's current state — status polling for redirect/popup rails.
    *
@@ -9371,6 +9409,71 @@ var AdminPortal = class {
       `/admin-portal/accounts/${encodeURIComponent(merchantId)}/sell-to-restrictions`
     );
   }
+  /**
+   * The deployment's replay-masking rules: extra page elements the session
+   * recorder hides on top of the ones it always hides.
+   *
+   * `GET /admin-portal/replay-masking`
+   */
+  async getReplayMasking() {
+    return this.request("GET", "/admin-portal/replay-masking");
+  }
+  /**
+   * Replace the deployment's replay-masking rules. Additive to the recorder's
+   * built-in floor: a rule can widen what a recording leaves out and can never
+   * reveal something the recorder hides unconditionally.
+   *
+   * `PUT /admin-portal/replay-masking`
+   */
+  async updateReplayMasking(params) {
+    return this.request("PUT", "/admin-portal/replay-masking", { body: params });
+  }
+  /**
+   * One merchant's replay-masking rules.
+   *
+   * `GET /admin-portal/accounts/{merchantId}/replay-masking`
+   */
+  async getMerchantReplayMasking(merchantId) {
+    return this.request(
+      "GET",
+      `/admin-portal/accounts/${encodeURIComponent(merchantId)}/replay-masking`
+    );
+  }
+  /**
+   * Replace one merchant's replay-masking rules.
+   *
+   * `PUT /admin-portal/accounts/{merchantId}/replay-masking`
+   */
+  async updateMerchantReplayMasking(merchantId, params) {
+    return this.request(
+      "PUT",
+      `/admin-portal/accounts/${encodeURIComponent(merchantId)}/replay-masking`,
+      { body: params }
+    );
+  }
+  /**
+   * One shop's replay-masking rules.
+   *
+   * `GET /admin-portal/accounts/{merchantId}/business-profile/{profileId}/replay-masking`
+   */
+  async getShopReplayMasking(merchantId, profileId) {
+    return this.request(
+      "GET",
+      `/admin-portal/accounts/${encodeURIComponent(merchantId)}/business-profile/${encodeURIComponent(profileId)}/replay-masking`
+    );
+  }
+  /**
+   * Replace one shop's replay-masking rules.
+   *
+   * `PUT /admin-portal/accounts/{merchantId}/business-profile/{profileId}/replay-masking`
+   */
+  async updateShopReplayMasking(merchantId, profileId, params) {
+    return this.request(
+      "PUT",
+      `/admin-portal/accounts/${encodeURIComponent(merchantId)}/business-profile/${encodeURIComponent(profileId)}/replay-masking`,
+      { body: params }
+    );
+  }
   /**
    * Soft-delete a transaction of ANY merchant. Only payments whose status
    * is in the admin delete policy can be deleted; the action is audited.