@deftai/directive-core 0.69.0 → 0.70.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (38) hide show
  1. package/dist/deposit/contain.d.ts +41 -0
  2. package/dist/deposit/contain.js +113 -0
  3. package/dist/deposit/copy-tree.js +8 -2
  4. package/dist/doctor/checks.d.ts +11 -0
  5. package/dist/doctor/checks.js +75 -2
  6. package/dist/doctor/main.js +54 -1
  7. package/dist/doctor/manifest.d.ts +20 -0
  8. package/dist/doctor/manifest.js +22 -0
  9. package/dist/doctor/types.d.ts +8 -0
  10. package/dist/init-deposit/init-deposit.js +6 -0
  11. package/dist/init-deposit/refresh.js +5 -0
  12. package/dist/intake/issue-ingest.d.ts +11 -0
  13. package/dist/intake/issue-ingest.js +86 -11
  14. package/dist/policy/plan-extensions.d.ts +31 -0
  15. package/dist/policy/plan-extensions.js +45 -0
  16. package/dist/policy/wip.d.ts +2 -2
  17. package/dist/policy/wip.js +2 -2
  18. package/dist/swarm/routing.js +10 -3
  19. package/dist/triage/bulk/index.d.ts +11 -2
  20. package/dist/triage/bulk/index.js +41 -4
  21. package/dist/triage/help/registry-data.d.ts +5 -5
  22. package/dist/triage/help/registry-data.js +18 -5
  23. package/dist/triage/scope/cli.d.ts +2 -1
  24. package/dist/triage/scope/cli.js +30 -6
  25. package/dist/triage/scope/mutations.d.ts +10 -0
  26. package/dist/triage/scope/mutations.js +22 -0
  27. package/dist/triage/welcome/constants.d.ts +1 -2
  28. package/dist/triage/welcome/constants.js +1 -2
  29. package/dist/triage/welcome/index.d.ts +1 -0
  30. package/dist/triage/welcome/index.js +1 -0
  31. package/dist/triage/welcome/onboard.d.ts +35 -0
  32. package/dist/triage/welcome/onboard.js +94 -0
  33. package/dist/umbrella-current-shape/index.d.ts +25 -1
  34. package/dist/umbrella-current-shape/index.js +84 -4
  35. package/dist/vbrief-build/project-definition-io.d.ts +6 -0
  36. package/dist/vbrief-build/project-definition-io.js +7 -2
  37. package/dist/vbrief-validate/precutover.js +7 -3
  38. package/package.json +3 -3
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * contain.ts — deposit-boundary symlink-escape guard (#2305).
3
+ *
4
+ * The framework deposit derives its destination as
5
+ * `deftDir = join(projectDir, ".deft/core")` and copies the (trusted) content
6
+ * payload into it. If a malicious project repo commits `.deft` (or `.deft/core`,
7
+ * or a parent) as a symlink that escapes the tree — e.g. `.deft -> ../../evil` —
8
+ * the deposit would write/replace framework content THROUGH that symlink,
9
+ * outside the resolved project tree, under the victim's account.
10
+ *
11
+ * `assertDepositContained` refuses that: it anchors on `realpath(projectDir)`,
12
+ * walks each existing component from the project root down to `deftDir`, rejects
13
+ * any component that is a symlink escaping the project tree, and asserts the
14
+ * deepest existing ancestor of `deftDir` resolves back UNDER the project tree
15
+ * using path-SEGMENT containment (not string `startsWith`).
16
+ *
17
+ * Callers MUST invoke it BEFORE the first copy/mkdir/reconstitute so a refusal
18
+ * deposits nothing.
19
+ *
20
+ * Refs #2305.
21
+ */
22
+ /** Non-zero exit code for a deposit-containment refusal (needs-action). */
23
+ export declare const DEPOSIT_CONTAINMENT_REFUSED_EXIT_CODE = 2;
24
+ /** Thrown by the deposit/refresh path when the destination escapes the tree. */
25
+ export declare class DepositContainmentError extends Error {
26
+ readonly projectDir: string;
27
+ readonly deftDir: string;
28
+ readonly offendingPath: string;
29
+ constructor(message: string, details: {
30
+ projectDir: string;
31
+ deftDir: string;
32
+ offendingPath: string;
33
+ });
34
+ }
35
+ /**
36
+ * Refuse the deposit when `.deft` / `.deft/core` (or a parent) is a symlink that
37
+ * escapes the resolved project tree. Throws {@link DepositContainmentError};
38
+ * MUST be called BEFORE any deposit write so a refusal deposits nothing.
39
+ */
40
+ export declare function assertDepositContained(projectDir: string, deftDir: string): void;
41
+ //# sourceMappingURL=contain.d.ts.map
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * contain.ts — deposit-boundary symlink-escape guard (#2305).
3
+ *
4
+ * The framework deposit derives its destination as
5
+ * `deftDir = join(projectDir, ".deft/core")` and copies the (trusted) content
6
+ * payload into it. If a malicious project repo commits `.deft` (or `.deft/core`,
7
+ * or a parent) as a symlink that escapes the tree — e.g. `.deft -> ../../evil` —
8
+ * the deposit would write/replace framework content THROUGH that symlink,
9
+ * outside the resolved project tree, under the victim's account.
10
+ *
11
+ * `assertDepositContained` refuses that: it anchors on `realpath(projectDir)`,
12
+ * walks each existing component from the project root down to `deftDir`, rejects
13
+ * any component that is a symlink escaping the project tree, and asserts the
14
+ * deepest existing ancestor of `deftDir` resolves back UNDER the project tree
15
+ * using path-SEGMENT containment (not string `startsWith`).
16
+ *
17
+ * Callers MUST invoke it BEFORE the first copy/mkdir/reconstitute so a refusal
18
+ * deposits nothing.
19
+ *
20
+ * Refs #2305.
21
+ */
22
+ import { lstatSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs";
23
+ import { isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from "node:path";
24
+ /** Non-zero exit code for a deposit-containment refusal (needs-action). */
25
+ export const DEPOSIT_CONTAINMENT_REFUSED_EXIT_CODE = 2;
26
+ /** Thrown by the deposit/refresh path when the destination escapes the tree. */
27
+ export class DepositContainmentError extends Error {
28
+ projectDir;
29
+ deftDir;
30
+ offendingPath;
31
+ constructor(message, details) {
32
+ super(message);
33
+ this.name = "DepositContainmentError";
34
+ this.projectDir = details.projectDir;
35
+ this.deftDir = details.deftDir;
36
+ this.offendingPath = details.offendingPath;
37
+ }
38
+ }
39
+ /**
40
+ * Path-SEGMENT containment: is `child` equal to `parent` or nested under it?
41
+ * Uses `path.relative` so `/foo` is NOT treated as containing `/foobar`
42
+ * (`relative("/foo", "/foobar")` is `"../foobar"`, which is rejected).
43
+ */
44
+ function isContained(parent, child) {
45
+ if (parent === child) {
46
+ return true;
47
+ }
48
+ const rel = relative(parent, child);
49
+ return rel.length > 0 && !rel.startsWith("..") && !isAbsolute(rel);
50
+ }
51
+ /**
52
+ * Refuse the deposit when `.deft` / `.deft/core` (or a parent) is a symlink that
53
+ * escapes the resolved project tree. Throws {@link DepositContainmentError};
54
+ * MUST be called BEFORE any deposit write so a refusal deposits nothing.
55
+ */
56
+ export function assertDepositContained(projectDir, deftDir) {
57
+ const projectAbs = resolve(projectDir);
58
+ let projectReal;
59
+ try {
60
+ projectReal = realpathSync(projectAbs);
61
+ }
62
+ catch {
63
+ // The project directory does not exist yet (e.g. `directive init <new-path>`).
64
+ // Nothing under it can exist, so there is no pre-existing symlink to escape
65
+ // through -- the downstream init flow creates fresh, clean directories. Let
66
+ // the deposit proceed; a missing content payload / mkdir failure surfaces its
67
+ // own error later.
68
+ return;
69
+ }
70
+ const deftAbs = resolve(deftDir);
71
+ const rel = relative(projectAbs, deftAbs);
72
+ if (rel.length === 0 || rel.startsWith("..") || isAbsolute(rel)) {
73
+ throw new DepositContainmentError(`deposit refused: deposit target ${deftAbs} is not nested under the project tree ${projectAbs}`, { projectDir: projectAbs, deftDir: deftAbs, offendingPath: deftAbs });
74
+ }
75
+ const segments = rel.split(/[\\/]+/).filter((segment) => segment.length > 0);
76
+ let current = projectAbs;
77
+ let deepestExistingReal = projectReal;
78
+ for (const segment of segments) {
79
+ current = join(current, segment);
80
+ let info;
81
+ try {
82
+ info = lstatSync(current);
83
+ }
84
+ catch {
85
+ // This component does not exist yet; nothing below it can exist either.
86
+ break;
87
+ }
88
+ if (info.isSymbolicLink()) {
89
+ let linkReal;
90
+ try {
91
+ linkReal = realpathSync(current);
92
+ }
93
+ catch {
94
+ throw new DepositContainmentError(`deposit refused: ${current} is a broken/dangling symlink on the deposit path`, { projectDir: projectAbs, deftDir: deftAbs, offendingPath: current });
95
+ }
96
+ if (!isContained(projectReal, linkReal)) {
97
+ throw new DepositContainmentError(`deposit refused: ${current} is a symlink escaping the project tree ` +
98
+ `(resolves to ${linkReal}, outside ${projectReal})`, { projectDir: projectAbs, deftDir: deftAbs, offendingPath: current });
99
+ }
100
+ deepestExistingReal = linkReal;
101
+ }
102
+ else {
103
+ deepestExistingReal = realpathSync(current);
104
+ }
105
+ }
106
+ // Defense-in-depth: the deepest EXISTING ancestor of deftDir must resolve back
107
+ // under the project tree (segment containment, not string startsWith).
108
+ if (!isContained(projectReal, deepestExistingReal)) {
109
+ throw new DepositContainmentError(`deposit refused: deposit path escapes the project tree ` +
110
+ `(${deepestExistingReal} is outside ${projectReal})`, { projectDir: projectAbs, deftDir: deftAbs, offendingPath: deepestExistingReal });
111
+ }
112
+ }
113
+ //# sourceMappingURL=contain.js.map
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
8
8
  * Refs #1942 S1, #1477.
9
9
  */
10
10
  import { createReadStream, createWriteStream } from "node:fs";
11
- import { chmod, mkdir, readdir, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
11
+ import { chmod, lstat, mkdir, readdir, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
12
12
  import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
13
13
  import { pipeline } from "node:stream/promises";
14
14
  const DEFAULT_FILE_MODE = 0o644;
@@ -34,7 +34,13 @@ async function copyDirContents(src, dst) {
34
34
  for (const entry of entries) {
35
35
  const srcPath = join(src, entry.name);
36
36
  const dstPath = join(dst, entry.name);
37
- const srcStat = await stat(srcPath);
37
+ // #2305: lstat (not stat) so a symlinked entry is NOT followed silently.
38
+ // The deposit copies regular files/dirs only; a symlink in the (trusted)
39
+ // payload is skipped rather than dereferenced.
40
+ const srcStat = await lstat(srcPath);
41
+ if (srcStat.isSymbolicLink()) {
42
+ continue;
43
+ }
38
44
  if (srcStat.isDirectory()) {
39
45
  await copyDirContents(srcPath, dstPath);
40
46
  }
@@ -19,6 +19,17 @@ export declare function checkLegacyLayout(projectRoot: string, seams?: CheckSeam
19
19
  * been stamped npm-managed. Local-only (no network).
20
20
  */
21
21
  export declare function checkCanonicalVendoredNpmSignpost(projectRoot: string, seams?: CheckSeams): CheckResult;
22
+ /**
23
+ * #2294: report whether the located install manifest can surface a version.
24
+ * A legacy `deft-install` deposit made without a release pin writes empty
25
+ * `tag`/`ref` and only a short `sha`, leaving the framework version silently
26
+ * unreportable. Since the Go installer is a frozen legacy bridge (#1912) and
27
+ * the Python/Go rails are retired (#1933/#2022/#2068), the fix is doctor-side:
28
+ * turn the silent blank into a visible, actionable finding. Advisory only --
29
+ * exit-code-exempt like `canonical-vendored-npm-signpost` -- because a sha-only
30
+ * deposit is still a working install, just an unpinned one.
31
+ */
32
+ export declare function checkManifestVersionReportable(projectRoot: string, installRoot: string | null, seams?: CheckSeams): CheckResult;
22
33
  export declare function deriveExitCode(checks: readonly CheckResult[], errors: readonly string[]): number;
23
34
  export declare function runChecksImpl(projectRoot: string, seams?: CheckSeams & {
24
35
  isDir?: (p: string) => boolean;
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { detectCanonicalVendoredManifest, isNpmManaged, NPM_MANAGED_SENTINEL_KEY
4
4
  import { resolveLifecycleRoot } from "../layout/resolve.js";
5
5
  import { findSkillPathsInText } from "../text/redos-safe.js";
6
6
  import { CANONICAL_UPGRADE_COMMAND, GO_BRIDGE_RELEASES_URL, UPGRADING_DOC_URL, } from "./constants.js";
7
- import { isDeprecationRedirectStub, locateManifest, manifestCandidatePaths, manifestTagToVersion, parseInstallManifest, parseInstallRootFromAgentsMd, parseManifest, } from "./manifest.js";
7
+ import { isDeprecationRedirectStub, locateManifest, manifestCandidatePaths, manifestReportableVersion, manifestTagToVersion, parseInstallManifest, parseInstallRootFromAgentsMd, parseManifest, } from "./manifest.js";
8
8
  import { readTextSafe } from "./paths.js";
9
9
  function readText(path, seams) {
10
10
  return (seams.readText ?? readTextSafe)(path);
@@ -366,11 +366,82 @@ export function checkCanonicalVendoredNpmSignpost(projectRoot, seams = {}) {
366
366
  },
367
367
  };
368
368
  }
369
+ /**
370
+ * #2294: report whether the located install manifest can surface a version.
371
+ * A legacy `deft-install` deposit made without a release pin writes empty
372
+ * `tag`/`ref` and only a short `sha`, leaving the framework version silently
373
+ * unreportable. Since the Go installer is a frozen legacy bridge (#1912) and
374
+ * the Python/Go rails are retired (#1933/#2022/#2068), the fix is doctor-side:
375
+ * turn the silent blank into a visible, actionable finding. Advisory only --
376
+ * exit-code-exempt like `canonical-vendored-npm-signpost` -- because a sha-only
377
+ * deposit is still a working install, just an unpinned one.
378
+ */
379
+ export function checkManifestVersionReportable(projectRoot, installRoot, seams = {}) {
380
+ const isFile = seams.isFile ?? ((p) => readText(p, seams) !== null);
381
+ const manifestPath = locateManifest(projectRoot, installRoot, isFile);
382
+ if (manifestPath === null) {
383
+ return {
384
+ name: "manifest-version-reportable",
385
+ status: "skip",
386
+ detail: "No install manifest found; no framework version to report.",
387
+ data: { manifest_path: null },
388
+ };
389
+ }
390
+ const text = readText(manifestPath, seams);
391
+ if (text === null) {
392
+ return {
393
+ name: "manifest-version-reportable",
394
+ status: "skip",
395
+ detail: `Install manifest at ${manifestPath} is unreadable.`,
396
+ data: { manifest_path: manifestPath },
397
+ };
398
+ }
399
+ const manifest = parseInstallManifest(text);
400
+ const reportable = manifestReportableVersion(manifest);
401
+ if (reportable.version !== null) {
402
+ return {
403
+ name: "manifest-version-reportable",
404
+ status: "pass",
405
+ detail: `Framework version resolves to ${reportable.version} (from manifest ${reportable.source}) at ${manifestPath}.`,
406
+ data: {
407
+ manifest_path: manifestPath,
408
+ version: reportable.version,
409
+ source: reportable.source,
410
+ },
411
+ };
412
+ }
413
+ if (reportable.sha !== null) {
414
+ const shortSha = reportable.sha.slice(0, 8);
415
+ return {
416
+ name: "manifest-version-reportable",
417
+ status: "fail",
418
+ detail: `Install manifest at ${manifestPath} carries no semver tag/ref (sha ${shortSha} only), ` +
419
+ "so the framework version is unreportable. This happens on legacy `deft-install` deposits " +
420
+ `made without a release pin (#2294). Run \`${CANONICAL_UPGRADE_COMMAND}\` then \`directive update\` ` +
421
+ `to obtain a pinned npm-managed manifest. See ${UPGRADING_DOC_URL}.`,
422
+ data: {
423
+ manifest_path: manifestPath,
424
+ version: null,
425
+ source: reportable.source,
426
+ sha: reportable.sha,
427
+ upgrade_command: CANONICAL_UPGRADE_COMMAND,
428
+ upgrading_doc_url: UPGRADING_DOC_URL,
429
+ },
430
+ };
431
+ }
432
+ return {
433
+ name: "manifest-version-reportable",
434
+ status: "skip",
435
+ detail: `Install manifest at ${manifestPath} has neither a semver tag/ref nor a sha; no provenance to report.`,
436
+ data: { manifest_path: manifestPath, version: null, sha: null, source: reportable.source },
437
+ };
438
+ }
369
439
  export function deriveExitCode(checks, errors) {
440
+ const exitExempt = new Set(["canonical-vendored-npm-signpost", "manifest-version-reportable"]);
370
441
  if (errors.length > 0 || checks.some((c) => c.status === "error")) {
371
442
  return 2;
372
443
  }
373
- if (checks.some((c) => c.status === "fail" && c.name !== "canonical-vendored-npm-signpost")) {
444
+ if (checks.some((c) => c.status === "fail" && !exitExempt.has(c.name))) {
374
445
  return 1;
375
446
  }
376
447
  return 0;
@@ -402,6 +473,7 @@ export function runChecksImpl(projectRoot, seams = {}) {
402
473
  data: { agents_md_path: agentsMdPath },
403
474
  });
404
475
  checks.push(checkManifestAgreement(projectRoot, null, seams));
476
+ checks.push(checkManifestVersionReportable(projectRoot, null, seams));
405
477
  checks.push(checkLegacyLayout(projectRoot, seams));
406
478
  checks.push(checkCanonicalVendoredNpmSignpost(projectRoot, seams));
407
479
  return {
@@ -415,6 +487,7 @@ export function runChecksImpl(projectRoot, seams = {}) {
415
487
  checks.push(checkQuickStartResolves(projectRoot, installRoot, seams));
416
488
  checks.push(checkSkillPathsResolve(projectRoot, agentsMdText, seams));
417
489
  checks.push(checkManifestAgreement(projectRoot, installRoot, seams));
490
+ checks.push(checkManifestVersionReportable(projectRoot, installRoot, seams));
418
491
  checks.push(checkInstallPathConsistency(projectRoot, installRoot, seams));
419
492
  checks.push(checkLegacyLayout(projectRoot, seams));
420
493
  checks.push(checkCanonicalVendoredNpmSignpost(projectRoot, seams));
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ import { existsSync, readFileSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
2
2
  import { join, resolve } from "node:path";
3
3
  import { evaluate as evaluateAgentsMdAdvisory } from "../agents-md-advisory/evaluate.js";
4
4
  import { contentRoot } from "../content-root.js";
5
+ import { describeShadowedPlanExtension, detectShadowedPlanExtensions, } from "../policy/plan-extensions.js";
6
+ import { loadProjectDefinition } from "../policy/resolve.js";
5
7
  import { checkLocalEngineIntegrity, classify, detectPackageManager, evaluateSkew, reconcileVersions, plan as resolvePlan, } from "../resolution/index.js";
6
8
  import { resolveUserMdPath } from "../user-config/resolve-user-md.js";
7
9
  import { agentsRefreshPlan, hasV3ManagedMarker } from "./agents-md.js";
@@ -257,6 +259,11 @@ export function cmdDoctor(args, seams = {}) {
257
259
  if (!jsonMode) {
258
260
  sink.blank();
259
261
  }
262
+ sink.info("Checking plan.policy namespacing (shadowed bare keys)...");
263
+ runPlanExtensionShadowCheck(projectRoot, sink, addFinding, seams);
264
+ if (!jsonMode) {
265
+ sink.blank();
266
+ }
260
267
  sink.info("Checking optional root Taskfile.yml include...");
261
268
  runTaskfileIncludeCheck(projectRoot, fixMode, jsonMode, sink, addFinding, seams);
262
269
  let resolution = null;
@@ -364,7 +371,9 @@ function runInstallIntegrityChecks(projectRoot, sink, addFinding, seams) {
364
371
  sink.info(`${name}: skip -- ${detail}`);
365
372
  continue;
366
373
  }
367
- if ((name === "legacy-layout" || name === "canonical-vendored-npm-signpost") &&
374
+ if ((name === "legacy-layout" ||
375
+ name === "canonical-vendored-npm-signpost" ||
376
+ name === "manifest-version-reportable") &&
368
377
  status === "fail") {
369
378
  sink.warn(`${name}: ${detail}`);
370
379
  addFinding({
@@ -618,6 +627,50 @@ function runUserMdResolutionCheck(projectRoot, sink, addFinding, seams) {
618
627
  });
619
628
  return result;
620
629
  }
630
+ /**
631
+ * Loud shadow diagnostic (#2301): flag every plan-extension key whose bare form
632
+ * (e.g. `plan.policy`) coexists with the namespaced form (`plan.x-directive/policy`).
633
+ * Because the reader is namespace-first, the bare block is silently ignored --
634
+ * the exact "edit takes no effect, no warning" trap behind #2295. Emits a
635
+ * `warning` finding per shadowed key; never an `error`, so `deft doctor` stays
636
+ * green on a merely-legibility issue. A clean project reports a `skip` finding.
637
+ */
638
+ function runPlanExtensionShadowCheck(projectRoot, sink, addFinding, seams) {
639
+ const checkName = "plan-extension-shadow";
640
+ const detect = seams.detectPlanExtensionShadows ??
641
+ ((root) => {
642
+ const [data] = loadProjectDefinition(root);
643
+ return data === null ? [] : detectShadowedPlanExtensions(data.plan);
644
+ });
645
+ try {
646
+ const shadows = detect(projectRoot);
647
+ if (shadows.length === 0) {
648
+ const cleanMessage = `${checkName}: no shadowed bare plan keys`;
649
+ sink.success(cleanMessage);
650
+ addFinding({ severity: "skip", message: cleanMessage, check: checkName, status: "clean" });
651
+ return;
652
+ }
653
+ for (const shadow of shadows) {
654
+ const message = `plan.policy shadow -- ${describeShadowedPlanExtension(shadow)}`.replace(/\r?\n/g, " ");
655
+ sink.warn(message);
656
+ addFinding({
657
+ severity: "warning",
658
+ message,
659
+ check: checkName,
660
+ status: "shadowed",
661
+ namespaced_key: shadow.namespacedKey,
662
+ legacy_key: shadow.legacyKey,
663
+ shadowed_sub_keys: [...shadow.shadowedSubKeys],
664
+ });
665
+ }
666
+ }
667
+ catch (exc) {
668
+ const detail = `${exc instanceof Error ? exc.name : "Error"}: ${exc}`.replace(/\r?\n/g, " ");
669
+ const message = `${checkName}: probe failed -- ${detail}`;
670
+ sink.warn(message);
671
+ addFinding({ severity: "warning", message, check: checkName });
672
+ }
673
+ }
621
674
  /**
622
675
  * Never emit a bare `task ...` remediation in a project without Taskfile wiring
623
676
  * (#2267). The `directive` surface always works; `task deft:X` is optional and
@@ -2,6 +2,26 @@ import { readTextSafe } from "./paths.js";
2
2
  export declare function parseManifest(text: string): Record<string, string>;
3
3
  export declare function parseInstallManifest(text: string): Record<string, string>;
4
4
  export declare function manifestTagToVersion(manifest: Record<string, string>): string | null;
5
+ /** Reportability classes for an install manifest's version provenance (#2294). */
6
+ export type ManifestVersionSource = "tag" | "ref" | "sha" | "none";
7
+ export interface ReportableVersion {
8
+ /** Semver derived from `tag`/`ref` (leading `v` stripped), else null. */
9
+ readonly version: string | null;
10
+ /** Recorded commit `sha`, trimmed, else null. */
11
+ readonly sha: string | null;
12
+ /** Where a reportable identity was found. */
13
+ readonly source: ManifestVersionSource;
14
+ }
15
+ /**
16
+ * Classify what a manifest can report as its version (#2294). A legacy
17
+ * `deft-install` deposit made without a release pin writes empty `tag`/`ref`
18
+ * and only a short `sha`; `manifestTagToVersion` then returns null and the
19
+ * version is silently unreportable. This helper distinguishes a pinned
20
+ * semver (`tag`/`ref`) from a sha-only deposit from a manifest with no
21
+ * provenance at all, so callers can surface an actionable signal instead of a
22
+ * blank.
23
+ */
24
+ export declare function manifestReportableVersion(manifest: Record<string, string>): ReportableVersion;
5
25
  export declare function manifestCandidatePaths(projectRoot: string, installRoot: string | null): string[];
6
26
  export declare function locateManifest(projectRoot: string, installRoot: string | null, isFile?: (p: string) => boolean): string | null;
7
27
  export declare function parseInstallRootFromAgentsMd(text: string): string | null;
@@ -43,6 +43,28 @@ export function manifestTagToVersion(manifest) {
43
43
  }
44
44
  return null;
45
45
  }
46
+ /**
47
+ * Classify what a manifest can report as its version (#2294). A legacy
48
+ * `deft-install` deposit made without a release pin writes empty `tag`/`ref`
49
+ * and only a short `sha`; `manifestTagToVersion` then returns null and the
50
+ * version is silently unreportable. This helper distinguishes a pinned
51
+ * semver (`tag`/`ref`) from a sha-only deposit from a manifest with no
52
+ * provenance at all, so callers can surface an actionable signal instead of a
53
+ * blank.
54
+ */
55
+ export function manifestReportableVersion(manifest) {
56
+ const version = manifestTagToVersion(manifest);
57
+ if (version !== null) {
58
+ const tag = typeof manifest.tag === "string" ? manifest.tag.trim() : "";
59
+ return { version, sha: readSha(manifest), source: tag ? "tag" : "ref" };
60
+ }
61
+ const sha = readSha(manifest);
62
+ return { version: null, sha, source: sha !== null ? "sha" : "none" };
63
+ }
64
+ function readSha(manifest) {
65
+ const raw = typeof manifest.sha === "string" ? manifest.sha.trim() : "";
66
+ return raw || null;
67
+ }
46
68
  export function manifestCandidatePaths(projectRoot, installRoot) {
47
69
  const raw = [];
48
70
  if (installRoot) {
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
1
1
  import type { AdvisoryEvaluateResult } from "../agents-md-advisory/evaluate.js";
2
+ import type { ShadowedPlanExtension } from "../policy/plan-extensions.js";
2
3
  import type { EngineProbeResult } from "../resolution/classify.js";
3
4
  import type { ResolutionMode } from "../resolution/index.js";
4
5
  import type { ResolveUserMdResult } from "../user-config/resolve-user-md.js";
@@ -127,5 +128,12 @@ export interface DoctorSeams {
127
128
  * first-hit-wins resolver scoped to the project root.
128
129
  */
129
130
  readonly resolveUserMd?: (projectRoot: string) => ResolveUserMdResult;
131
+ /**
132
+ * Plan-extension shadow detector seam (#2301). Injected so the doctor
133
+ * shadow-diagnostic surface stays deterministic + offline in tests. Defaults
134
+ * to loading PROJECT-DEFINITION and running `detectShadowedPlanExtensions` on
135
+ * its `plan` object; returns [] when no project definition is present.
136
+ */
137
+ readonly detectPlanExtensionShadows?: (projectRoot: string) => readonly ShadowedPlanExtension[];
130
138
  }
131
139
  //# sourceMappingURL=types.d.ts.map
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
8
8
  import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
9
9
  import { homedir, platform } from "node:os";
10
10
  import { join, resolve } from "node:path";
11
+ import { assertDepositContained } from "../deposit/contain.js";
11
12
  import { copyTree } from "../deposit/copy-tree.js";
12
13
  import { prunePythonArtifactsFromDeposit } from "../deposit/python-free.js";
13
14
  import { resolveInstalledContentRoot } from "../deposit/resolve-content.js";
@@ -124,6 +125,11 @@ export async function runInitDeposit(args, io, seams = {}) {
124
125
  if (legacy.legacy) {
125
126
  throw new LegacyLayoutRefusedError(legacy);
126
127
  }
128
+ // #2305: refuse a symlink-escaping deposit boundary BEFORE the first
129
+ // copy/reconstitute/mkdir, so a malicious `.deft`/`.deft/core` symlink cannot
130
+ // redirect the deposit outside the resolved project tree. Deposits nothing on
131
+ // refusal.
132
+ assertDepositContained(projectDir, deftDir);
127
133
  const resolveContent = seams.resolveContentRoot ?? resolveInstalledContentRoot;
128
134
  const copyContent = seams.copyContent ?? copyTree;
129
135
  const contentRoot = await resolveContent();
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
10
10
  import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
11
11
  import { platform as osPlatform } from "node:os";
12
12
  import { join, resolve } from "node:path";
13
+ import { assertDepositContained } from "../deposit/contain.js";
13
14
  import { copyTree } from "../deposit/copy-tree.js";
14
15
  import { prunePythonArtifactsFromDeposit } from "../deposit/python-free.js";
15
16
  import { resolveInstalledContentRoot } from "../deposit/resolve-content.js";
@@ -335,6 +336,10 @@ export async function runRefreshDeposit(args, io, seams = {}) {
335
336
  if (legacy.legacy) {
336
337
  throw new LegacyLayoutRefusedError(legacy);
337
338
  }
339
+ // #2305: refuse a symlink-escaping deposit boundary BEFORE the first copy so a
340
+ // malicious `.deft`/`.deft/core` symlink cannot redirect the refresh outside
341
+ // the resolved project tree. Writes nothing on refusal.
342
+ assertDepositContained(projectDir, deftDir);
338
343
  const resolveContent = seams.resolveContentRoot ?? resolveInstalledContentRoot;
339
344
  const copyContent = seams.copyContent ?? copyTree;
340
345
  const readEngine = seams.readEngineVersion ?? readCorePackageVersion;
@@ -1,7 +1,18 @@
1
+ import { type ScanFlag } from "../cache/scanner.js";
1
2
  import { LEGACY_ARTIFACT_SUFFIX, LEGACY_INFO_ROOT_KEY, MIGRATED_ARTIFACT_SUFFIX, MIGRATED_INFO_ROOT_KEY } from "../xbrief-migrate/constants.js";
2
3
  import { type ScmCallFn } from "./reconcile-issues.js";
3
4
  export declare const INGEST_STATUSES: readonly ["proposed", "pending", "active"];
4
5
  export type IngestStatus = (typeof INGEST_STATUSES)[number];
6
+ /**
7
+ * Thrown when the quarantine scanner hard-fails (credential-shaped content) on
8
+ * an ingested issue body/comment thread (#2306). Ingest MUST fail closed: emit
9
+ * nothing and propagate a non-zero exit rather than persisting the xBRIEF.
10
+ */
11
+ export declare class ScannerHardFailError extends Error {
12
+ readonly issueNumber: number;
13
+ readonly flags: readonly ScanFlag[];
14
+ constructor(issueNumber: number, flags: readonly ScanFlag[]);
15
+ }
5
16
  /** GitHub issue comment thread entry (REST `repos/.../issues/N/comments`). */
6
17
  export interface IssueComment {
7
18
  readonly id?: number;