@deepseek-ai/dsh-client-connection 0.0.1-rc.1

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package/LICENSE ADDED
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+ BSD 3-Clause License
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+
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+ Copyright (c) 2026, DeepSeek
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+
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+ Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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+ modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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+
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+ 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
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+ list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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+
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+ 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
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+ this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
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+ and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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+
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+ 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its
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+ contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
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+ this software without specific prior written permission.
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+
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+ THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
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+ AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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+ IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
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+ DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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+ FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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+ DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
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+ SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
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+ CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
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+ OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
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+ OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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+ # Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
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+ # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
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+ # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
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+ # pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/client/connection/README.md
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+ README.md: 85ff46052ba2f032ee6a95b16c396d45e766d3ba
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+ README.zh.md: 89cbb19a984d88e09b7af0890f57ecd15d46d3a5
package/README.md ADDED
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+ # @deepseek-ai/dsh-client-connection
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+
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+ English | [中文](README.zh.md)
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+
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+ Wire consumer layer: the client plugin's apply mounts `ctx.connection` (shared api client + current-page loopback state + single-consumer stream-loop starter); the export face carries the wire contract types, the `AbstractApiClient` abstraction, and the loop's sink/config types. The browser carrier uses HTTP POST for unary and respond operations and opens one downlink-only WebSocket each for `events.mux` and `events.host`; the in-process carrier satisfies the same two-stream abstraction. The Host half owns the single `/api` route and its Fetch bridge; a registered TypeRT interceptor claims its Remote endpoints before the API Proxy fallback. Loopback hostname classification stays package-internal: the `/api` Host fence and WebSocket upgrades use it directly, while other client plugins consume the derived `ctx.connection.isLoopback` state. The node half's `/api` route pins the privileged method set (`host.pickDirectory`, `host.openPath`, and the whole configuration plane — `settings.describe`/`openDocument`/`update`/`replace`/`mutate` and `credentials.describe`/`set`/`unset`; reads and native actions included, since describing returns the exposed configuration, opening acts on the Host desktop, and probing an arbitrary reference reports where a credential comes from — and the agent-preset authoring plane, `agentPreset.read`/`copy`/`openDocument`/`remove`, since a composition names the plugins a session runs, so reading one is reconnaissance, and copy/remove/openDocument manage the roster and drive the host desktop (authoring is copy-only, so none of them accepts composition text or a path); `agentPreset.list` and `agentPreset.select` stay out — the roster carries only ids and trust, and choosing a preset grants nothing `session.create`'s own `agentPreset` did not, over a default that already carries bash) to loopback by passing the trust fence with an empty trust list — a declared `trustedHosts` authority reaches every other method, while these stay loopback-local until a real authentication layer exists. The platform carriers and ConnectionController loop are package-internal; apply selects and drives them. The downlink boundary is documented in the [WebSocket downlink carrier Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-08-04-websocket-downlink-carrier.md).
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+
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+ ## /api browser-trust fence
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+
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+ The node half guards every entry under `/api` before bridging or upgrading (`src/api-request-trust.ts`). Every request — browser-marked or not — must present a `Host` that is a loopback authority or matches a `trustedHosts` entry: exact on `host:port` entries, any port on port-less entries, both sides compared through WHATWG normalization (DNS-rebinding defense). There is deliberately no shortcut for unmarked HTTP requests: over plain HTTP a browser attaches neither `Origin` nor Fetch-Metadata to image and navigation reads, so an unmarked request may still be a rebound browser read with a readable response, and Host is the one header rebinding cannot forge; a browser WebSocket handshake carries `Origin` and passes the same comparison. Non-browser clients pass the same fence via loopback, the CLI-derived LAN IP literals, or a declared authority. When markers are present, an attached `Origin` must equal the Host authority, and an explicit `sec-fetch-site: cross-site` marker is refused. A `trustedHosts` entry that is not a bare, canonical `host[:port]` authority — one WHATWG parsing reads back exactly as written — fails the plugin load loudly: parsing would otherwise quietly authorize the hostname inside `harness.internal/path`, or broaden a dangling-colon or zero-padded port to an any-port grant. HTTP failures answer plain 403 before any RPC dispatch; upgrade failures reject the handshake before any event stream starts. A non-loopback (`--host 0.0.0.0`) deployment therefore needs its serving authorities trusted: the dsh CLI derives the machine's LAN IP literals itself and its `--trusted-host` flag declares named ones, so `trustedHosts` in cordis.yml is for compositions the CLI does not boot. The fence is a reachability policy, not authentication; the Web carrier provides no authentication layer. Decision record: [the api browser-trust boundary Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md).
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+
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+ ## `/api` WebSocket downlinks
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+
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+ `/api/events.mux` and `/api/events.host` each accept a WebSocket upgrade and send only the corresponding `ServerRequest` text messages to the browser; the client sends no application data over these sockets. If either socket ends, the current connection generation fails and rebuilds both streams; readiness still requires both sockets to be open and the `host.describe` HTTP call to succeed. Host teardown terminates both sockets, aborts their sources, and waits for source cleanup before returning. Ordinary network GETs to these paths return 426 with no SSE fallback; `toFetchHandler`'s SSE codec serves only the isomorphic in-process carrier.
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+
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+ ## Model Experience
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+ None, as the wire consumer layer moves already-composed messages between browser and host; nothing here reaches a model request.
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+
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+ #### KV Cache effect
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+
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+ None; this package neither assembles nor sends a provider request.
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+
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+ ## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
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+
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+ - **History resumes an unattached session** — opening history may create the host-side agent and add latency to the first open; there is no persistence-only read path.
package/README.zh.md ADDED
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+ # @deepseek-ai/dsh-client-connection
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+
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+ [English](README.md) | 中文
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+
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+ 协议消费层:客户端插件的 apply 会挂载 `ctx.connection`(共享 API 客户端 + 当前页面的 loopback 状态 + 单消费方流循环启动器);导出表层携带协议约定类型、`AbstractApiClient` 抽象,以及循环的 sink/配置类型。浏览器载体以 HTTP POST 发送 unary/respond,并为 `events.mux` 与 `events.host` 各开一条只下行的 WebSocket;进程内载体满足同一双流抽象。Host half 持有唯一 `/api` route 及其 Fetch bridge;已注册的 TypeRT interceptor 会先认领自己的 Remote endpoint,未认领请求再回退 API Proxy。Loopback hostname 判定逻辑留在包内部:`/api` Host fence 与 WebSocket upgrade 会直接使用它,其他客户端插件则消费派生的 `ctx.connection.isLoopback` 状态。node 半侧的 `/api` 路由让特权方法集(`host.pickDirectory`、`host.openPath`,以及整个配置面——`settings.describe`/`openDocument`/`update`/`replace`/`mutate` 与 `credentials.describe`/`set`/`unset`;读取与原生操作也在内,因为 describe 会返回已暴露的配置、打开操作会作用于 Host 桌面,而探测任意引用会报出某条凭据来自何处——以及 agent preset 的创作面 `agentPreset.read`/`copy`/`openDocument`/`remove`,因为组装指明了一个会话所运行的插件,读取它是侦察,而 copy/remove/openDocument 管理名单并驱动宿主桌面(创作只有复制一种写入,因此这些方法都不接收组装文本或路径);`agentPreset.list` 与 `agentPreset.select` 不在其中——名单只携带 id 与信任级别,而选择一个 preset 并不比 `session.create` 自带的 `agentPreset` 多给任何能力,何况默认 preset 本就带着 bash)以空信任表过信任 fence,从而钉在回环——已声明的 `trustedHosts` 授权可达其余全部方法,而这些方法在真正的认证层出现之前仍只限回环本机。平台载体与 ConnectionController 循环属于包内部;apply 负责选择并驱动它们。下行边界见 [WebSocket 下行载体 Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-08-04-websocket-downlink-carrier.md)。
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+ ## /api 浏览器信任栅栏
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+ node 半侧在桥接或 upgrade 前守卫 `/api` 下的每个入口(`src/api-request-trust.ts`)。每个请求——无论是否带浏览器标记——`Host` 都必须是回环地址权威,或与某个 `trustedHosts` 条目匹配:带端口的 `host:port` 条目精确匹配,不带端口的条目匹配任意端口,两侧均经 WHATWG 归一化后比较(DNS rebinding 防御)。刻意不为无浏览器标记的 HTTP 请求开捷径:明文 HTTP 下浏览器的图片与导航读取既不带 `Origin` 也不带 Fetch-Metadata,因此无标记请求仍可能是被重绑页面发起的、响应可被读走的读取,而 Host 是重绑唯一伪造不了的请求头;WebSocket 浏览器握手会带 `Origin` 并通过同一道比较。非浏览器客户端经由回环地址、CLI 推导的 LAN IP 字面量或已声明的权威通过同一道栅栏。当标记存在时,`Origin` 必须与 Host 权威完全一致;显式的 `sec-fetch-site: cross-site` 标记一律拒绝。不是纯的、规范形 `host[:port]` 权威的 `trustedHosts` 条目——即 WHATWG 解析读回后与原文不完全一致的——会让插件加载明确报错:否则解析会悄悄授权 `harness.internal/path` 这类笔误里的 hostname,或把悬空冒号、补零端口放大成任意端口授权。HTTP 失败在任何 RPC 分发之前以纯 403 应答,upgrade 失败在启动任何 event stream 前拒绝握手。因此非回环(`--host 0.0.0.0`)部署需要让自己的服务权威被信任:dsh CLI 会自行推导本机的 LAN IP 字面量,其 `--trusted-host` flag 用于声明具名权威,所以 cordis.yml 中的 `trustedHosts` 面向 CLI 不参与引导的组合。这道栅栏是可达性策略,而不是认证;Web 载体不提供认证层。决策记录:[api 浏览器信任边界 Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-api-browser-trust-boundary.md)。
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+ ## `/api` WebSocket 下行
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+ `/api/events.mux` 与 `/api/events.host` 各接受一条 WebSocket upgrade,并只向浏览器发送对应的 `ServerRequest` text message;客户端不会在这些 socket 上发送业务数据。任一 socket 结束都会使当前 connection generation 失败并重建两条流,连接就绪仍要求两条 socket open 且 `host.describe` HTTP 调用成功。Host teardown 会终止两条 socket、中止各自的 source,并等待 source 清理完成后再返回。普通网络 GET 这些路径会返回 426,不保留 SSE 回退;`toFetchHandler` 的 SSE 编解码只服务进程内同构载体。
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+ ## 模型体验
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+ 无。协议消费层只在浏览器与主机之间搬运已经组合好的消息;这里没有任何内容进入模型请求。
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+ #### KV Cache 影响
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+ 无;该包既不组装也不发送提供方请求。
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+
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+ ## 已知限制与暂缓事项
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+ - **History 会恢复未附加的会话**:打开 history 可能创建宿主侧 agent,并增加首次打开的延迟;没有仅从持久化读取的路径。