@declaw/sdk 1.2.0 → 1.2.2

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,32 @@ All notable changes to the Declaw TypeScript / JavaScript SDK are documented in
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## [1.2.2]
+
+_Higher default connection ceiling._
+
+### Performance
+
+- Raised the default connection-pool ceiling from 64 to 512 so a
+  high-concurrency workload from a single client process is no longer queued
+  behind the connection cap. Still overridable via `DECLAW_SDK_CONNECTIONS`.
+  No public API change.
+
+## [1.2.1]
+
+_HTTP/2 burst performance._
+
+### Performance
+
+- Unblocked HTTP/2 multiplexing on burst create: removed `pipelining: 1`
+  from the undici Agent, which was capping each H2 connection to a single
+  in-flight stream and silently defeating `allowH2` — a 100-concurrent burst
+  queued ~36 requests behind the connection cap. Also: eagerly initialize the
+  undici dispatcher at module load (the lazy `import('undici')` was blocking
+  the first burst), cache the resolved dispatcher synchronously (skips a
+  per-request microtask yield), and lower the retry backoff base from 0.5s to
+  0.1s. No public API change (#359).
+
 ## [1.2.0]
 
 _2026-06 train: file-granular volumes, OPA governance._

package/dist/index.cjs

@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ __export(index_exports, {
   createToxicityConfig: () => createToxicityConfig,
   createTransformationRule: () => createTransformationRule,
   domainMatches: () => domainMatches,
+  fullInjectionDefensePolicy: () => fullInjectionDefensePolicy,
   getSharedClient: () => getSharedClient,
   invisibleTextConfigToJSON: () => invisibleTextConfigToJSON,
   isSensitive: () => isSensitive,
@@ -254,6 +255,8 @@ var CommandExitError = class extends SandboxError {
 
 // src/api/client.ts
 var _dispatcherPromise;
+var _resolvedDispatcher;
+var _dispatcherResolved = false;
 function getDispatcher() {
   if (_dispatcherPromise) return _dispatcherPromise;
   _dispatcherPromise = (async () => {
@@ -266,7 +269,7 @@ function getDispatcher() {
       }
       const undici = await import("undici");
       const connOverride = parseInt(process.env.DECLAW_SDK_CONNECTIONS || "", 10);
-      const connections = Number.isFinite(connOverride) && connOverride > 0 ? connOverride : 64;
+      const connections = Number.isFinite(connOverride) && connOverride > 0 ? connOverride : 512;
       const streamsOverride = parseInt(process.env.DECLAW_SDK_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS || "", 10);
       const maxConcurrentStreams = Number.isFinite(streamsOverride) && streamsOverride > 0 ? streamsOverride : 1e3;
       return new undici.Agent({
@@ -278,7 +281,12 @@ function getDispatcher() {
         maxConcurrentStreams,
         keepAliveTimeout: 3e4,
         keepAliveMaxTimeout: 6e4,
-        pipelining: 1,
+        // NOTE: do NOT set `pipelining` here. undici applies it to H2 sessions
+        // too, where `pipelining: 1` caps each connection to ONE in-flight
+        // stream — silently defeating the H2 multiplexing that allowH2 enables.
+        // Omitted, H2 sessions default to unlimited concurrent streams (capped
+        // by maxConcurrentStreams) and H1.1 fallback defaults to 1 (safe, no
+        // head-of-line risk on non-idempotent POSTs).
         allowH2: true,
         connect: { keepAlive: true, keepAliveInitialDelay: 5e3 }
       });
@@ -286,8 +294,13 @@ function getDispatcher() {
       return void 0;
     }
   })();
+  void _dispatcherPromise.then((d) => {
+    _resolvedDispatcher = d;
+    _dispatcherResolved = true;
+  });
   return _dispatcherPromise;
 }
+void getDispatcher();
 var STATUS_ERROR_MAP = {
   400: InvalidArgumentError,
   401: AuthenticationError,
@@ -307,7 +320,7 @@ var ApiClient = class {
   constructor(config, opts) {
     this.config = config ?? new ConnectionConfig();
     this.maxRetries = opts?.maxRetries ?? 3;
-    this.retryDelay = opts?.retryDelay ?? 0.5;
+    this.retryDelay = opts?.retryDelay ?? 0.1;
     this.abortController = new AbortController();
   }
   /** Send a GET request and return parsed JSON. */
@@ -401,7 +414,7 @@ var ApiClient = class {
           signals.push(AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs));
         }
         const signal = signals.length === 1 ? signals[0] : AbortSignal.any(signals);
-        const dispatcher = await getDispatcher();
+        const dispatcher = _dispatcherResolved ? _resolvedDispatcher : await getDispatcher();
         const fetchOpts = {
           method,
           headers,
@@ -627,7 +640,9 @@ function createInjectionDefenseConfig(opts) {
     sensitivity: opts?.sensitivity ?? "medium" /* Medium */,
     action: opts?.action ?? "log_only" /* LogOnly */,
     threshold: opts?.threshold ?? 0.8,
-    domains: opts?.domains
+    domains: opts?.domains,
+    judge: opts?.judge,
+    injectionMode: opts?.injectionMode
   };
   if (!VALID_SENSITIVITIES.has(config.sensitivity)) {
     throw new InvalidArgumentError(
@@ -652,7 +667,9 @@ function parseInjectionDefenseConfig(data) {
     sensitivity: data.sensitivity ?? "medium" /* Medium */,
     action: data.action ?? "log_only" /* LogOnly */,
     threshold: data.threshold ?? 0.8,
-    domains: data.domains
+    domains: data.domains,
+    judge: data.judge ? { enabled: data.judge.enabled ?? false, always: data.judge.always, policy: data.judge.policy } : void 0,
+    injectionMode: data.injection_mode ?? data.injectionMode
   };
 }
 
@@ -955,6 +972,15 @@ function invisibleTextConfigToJSON(config) {
 }
 
 // src/security/customPolicy.ts
+function createCustomPolicyConfig(opts) {
+  return {
+    enabled: opts?.enabled ?? false,
+    inlineRego: opts?.inlineRego,
+    inlineModules: opts?.inlineModules,
+    policyRef: opts?.policyRef,
+    defaultDeny: opts?.defaultDeny ?? false
+  };
+}
 function parseCustomPolicyConfig(data) {
   return {
     enabled: data.enabled ?? false,
@@ -1013,6 +1039,23 @@ function createSecurityPolicy(opts) {
     customPolicy: opts?.customPolicy
   };
 }
+function fullInjectionDefensePolicy(opts) {
+  return createSecurityPolicy({
+    injectionDefense: createInjectionDefenseConfig({
+      enabled: true,
+      action: opts?.action ?? "block",
+      threshold: opts?.threshold ?? 0.8,
+      domains: opts?.domains,
+      injectionMode: opts?.mode ?? "balanced",
+      judge: { enabled: true, always: opts?.alwaysJudge ?? false, policy: opts?.agentPolicy ?? "" }
+    }),
+    customPolicy: createCustomPolicyConfig({
+      enabled: true,
+      policyRef: "prompt-injection@v2",
+      defaultDeny: false
+    })
+  });
+}
 function parseSecurityPolicy(data) {
   const injDef = data.injection_defense ?? data.injectionDefense;
   const auditData = data.audit;
@@ -1052,6 +1095,15 @@ function securityPolicyToJSON(policy) {
   if (injDefConfig.domains !== void 0) {
     injDef.domains = injDefConfig.domains;
   }
+  if (injDefConfig.injectionMode !== void 0) {
+    injDef.injection_mode = injDefConfig.injectionMode;
+  }
+  if (injDefConfig.judge !== void 0) {
+    const j = { enabled: injDefConfig.judge.enabled };
+    if (injDefConfig.judge.always) j.always = true;
+    if (injDefConfig.judge.policy) j.policy = injDefConfig.judge.policy;
+    injDef.judge = j;
+  }
   const auditConfig = typeof policy.audit === "boolean" ? createAuditConfig({ enabled: policy.audit }) : policy.audit;
   const audit = {
     enabled: auditConfig.enabled
@@ -3535,6 +3587,7 @@ var Governance = class {
   createToxicityConfig,
   createTransformationRule,
   domainMatches,
+  fullInjectionDefensePolicy,
   getSharedClient,
   invisibleTextConfigToJSON,
   isSensitive,