@decidio/sdk 0.1.9 → 0.1.10

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -1,25 +1,7 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
-// @decidio/sdk CLI — the on-ramp. Run via `npx @decidio/sdk <cmd>` (or tsx in-repo).
-//   init [agentId]   sign in, register the agent, mint its API token, write .env
-//   doctor           check config + connectivity + durability readiness
-//   approvals        list pending agent approvals; `approvals approve|reject <id> [reason]`
-//   receipt <id>     download a sealed decision's Authority Receipt to a .json file
-//   dev [--target U] signal-only relay: forwards Decidio's webhook to your local agent URL
-//
-// TWO TOKEN KINDS, deliberately (self-serve design 2026-08-28): commands that ADMINISTER a
-// workspace (init's register+mint, approvals, receipt) need the owner's SESSION token — acquired
-// interactively per run or from DECIDIO_SESSION_TOKEN, held in memory, NEVER written to disk.
-// What lands in .env as DECIDIO_API_TOKEN is the floor-limited AGENT token the runtime SDK
-// needs (it can call /agent/* and nothing else). A session-capable secret must never live in
-// an agent host's .env — that was the pre-publish design's hole.
-//
-// MESSAGE DISCIPLINE (founder bar 2026-08-29, from the Codex acceptance run): every failure
-// tells the developer WHAT happened, WHY, and the EXACT next command. Every success says what
-// changed, where, and what to do next. No stack traces for expected failures; no green ✔ for a
-// no-op (the replay-approve bug: the server's idempotent alreadyResolved was reported as a
-// fresh success — an authority CLI may never dress a no-op as an action).
 import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, appendFileSync, chmodSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
 import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+import { userInfo } from "node:os";
 import { createServer } from "node:http";
 import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
 import { createInterface } from "node:readline";
@@ -35,11 +17,6 @@ const VERSION = (() => {
         return "unknown";
     }
 })();
-// ---- environment: load the CWD .env FIRST (Codex finding: init writes .env, but the next
-// command ignored it and pointed at localhost). Process env always wins — .env only fills gaps.
-// NEVER a crash: an unreadable .env (EPERM, EISDIR, a mangled volume) is that file's problem,
-// not this command's — warn on stderr and continue (round-9 catch: it was an unhandled Node
-// stack trace).
 let envWarned = false;
 function readEnvFile() {
     const out = {};
@@ -59,15 +36,9 @@ function readEnvFile() {
     }
     return out;
 }
-// OFFLINE commands never touch .env at all (round-9 catch: `verify` is cryptographically
-// offline and needs no credentials, yet the autoload coupled it to the directory's .env —
-// and the help text's "every command talks to the hosted sandbox" was wrong for it).
 const OFFLINE_CMD = ["verify", "--version", "-v", "-V", "version", "--help", "-h", "help", undefined].includes(process.argv[2]);
 if (!OFFLINE_CMD)
     for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(readEnvFile())) {
-        // NEVER autoload the session token from disk: the whole design splits session (memory-only)
-        // from the floor-limited agent token (.env). Silently honoring a parked session token would
-        // reward exactly the credential-at-rest the split exists to prevent (guard catch 2026-08-29).
         if (k === "DECIDIO_SESSION_TOKEN") {
             console.error("⚠ ignoring DECIDIO_SESSION_TOKEN found in .env — session tokens belong in your shell or CI secret store, never on disk. Remove that line; export it in the shell instead.");
             continue;
@@ -75,32 +46,22 @@ if (!OFFLINE_CMD)
         if (process.env[k] === undefined)
             process.env[k] = v;
     }
-// SANDBOX-FIRST (blind-review catch, founder-ruled): every command defaults to the hosted sandbox,
-// because that is the product people actually receive — the old localhost default was our own dev
-// environment leaking into the package, and it broke the tour's own follow-up commands the moment
-// cleanup removed .env. Explicit config (env or .env) always wins; the target host is announced on
-// stderr so no command ever talks to a server silently.
 const API = (process.env.DECIDIO_API_URL ?? "https://decidio-api.onrender.com").replace(/\/$/, "");
-// Token is read AT CALL TIME, not captured at import: init mints a fresh agent token mid-run and
-// its closing doctor must probe with THAT, not the pre-init env (round-3 Codex catch — the stale
-// capture made init's own doctor print "token: REJECTED" seconds after a successful mint).
 const TOKEN = () => process.env.DECIDIO_API_TOKEN;
 const ENV_PATH = ".env";
 const log = (...a) => console.log(...a);
-// Errors and usage guidance go to STDERR (blind-review catch: error text on stdout corrupts every
-// `--json | jq` pipeline — and any consumer of a CLI's stdout). Verdict output (verify's VALID/
-// INVALID lines) is the product and stays on stdout.
 const err = (...a) => console.error(...a);
-/** Fetch wrapper that turns transport failures into guidance instead of a stack trace. */
 let hostAnnounced = false;
 async function api(path, init = {}, bearer) {
     if (!hostAnnounced) {
         hostAnnounced = true;
-        // Once per process, on stderr: WHICH server this command talks to (sandbox-first means a
-        // missing config no longer fails loud, so the target must never be silent instead).
         err(`· decidio → ${API}${process.env.DECIDIO_API_URL ? "" : "  (default: the hosted sandbox — set DECIDIO_API_URL to point elsewhere)"}`);
     }
     const auth = bearer ?? TOKEN();
+    if (auth && /^http:[/][/]/i.test(API) && !/^http:[/][/](localhost|127.0.0.1|.::1.)([:/]|$)/i.test(API)) {
+        err(`✘ refusing to send credentials over plaintext http to ${API} — use https, or localhost for local dev. Nothing was sent.`);
+        process.exit(1);
+    }
     let res;
     try {
         res = await fetch(API + path, { ...init, headers: { "content-type": "application/json", ...(auth ? { authorization: `Bearer ${auth}` } : {}), ...(init.headers ?? {}) } });
@@ -127,32 +88,30 @@ async function api(path, init = {}, bearer) {
     }
     return { status: res.status, body };
 }
-/** Write a secrets file OWNER-ONLY (0600). `mode` applies on creation; an existing file keeps its
- *  old permissions, so chmod as well. Best-effort: Windows ignores POSIX modes (its ACLs are
- *  inherited from the directory), and a chmod failure must never lose the write. */
 function writeSecretFile(path, body) {
     writeFileSync(path, body, { mode: 0o600 });
     try {
         chmodSync(path, 0o600);
     }
-    catch { /* restricted FS — the write itself stands */ }
+    catch { }
     if (process.platform === "win32") {
-        // POSIX modes are a no-op on NTFS (round-8 verified the file kept inherited Modify ACLs).
-        // Do it the Windows way: strip inheritance, grant only the current user. Best-effort — a
-        // failure never loses the write, but it is SAID, not swallowed.
         try {
-            execFileSync("icacls", [path, "/inheritance:r", "/grant:r", `${process.env.USERNAME ?? process.env.USER ?? ""}:F`], { stdio: "ignore" });
+            execFileSync("icacls", [path, "/inheritance:r", "/grant:r", `${effectiveUser()}:F`], { stdio: "ignore" });
         }
         catch {
             console.warn(`⚠ could not restrict ${path} to owner-only on this Windows volume — it keeps the directory's inherited permissions. For production, move these values to a secret manager.`);
         }
     }
 }
+function effectiveUser() {
+    try {
+        return userInfo().username;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return process.env.USERNAME ?? process.env.USER ?? "";
+    }
+}
 function upsertEnv(updates) {
-    // Update IN PLACE, never rewrite (round-2 blind catch: the merge-and-rewrite dropped every
-    // comment and blank line — "# Production database — do not touch" vanished unrecoverably,
-    // since this file is gitignored). A user's line only changes when its KEY is being updated;
-    // everything else survives byte-for-byte; new keys append.
     const remaining = { ...updates };
     const updatedKeys = new Set();
     const lines = [];
@@ -160,8 +119,6 @@ function upsertEnv(updates) {
         if (existsSync(ENV_PATH))
             for (const line of readFileSync(ENV_PATH, "utf8").split(/\r?\n/)) {
                 const m = line.match(/^\s*([A-Z_]+)=/);
-                // A hand-edited duplicate of an updated key is DROPPED, not kept (guard note: last-wins on
-                // the next read would resurrect the stale value — e.g. an old token — over the fresh one).
                 if (m && updatedKeys.has(m[1]))
                     continue;
                 if (m && m[1] in remaining) {
@@ -173,18 +130,14 @@ function upsertEnv(updates) {
                     lines.push(line);
             }
     }
-    catch { /* unreadable existing file: start fresh below — the write still lands */ }
+    catch { }
     while (lines.length && lines[lines.length - 1] === "")
         lines.pop();
     for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(remaining))
         lines.push(`${k}=${v}`);
     writeSecretFile(ENV_PATH, lines.join("\n") + "\n");
 }
-/** Keep secrets out of git without nagging: append the two entries to .gitignore when they're
- *  not already covered. Creating the file in a non-git directory is harmless. */
 function ensureGitignore() {
-    // Every file this CLI may write that can hold a private key — including the `--force` backup
-    // (.env.<agent>.bak), which git's plain `.env` pattern does NOT match.
     const entries = [".env", ".env.quickstart", ".env.*.bak", ".decidio-pending/"];
     const existing = existsSync(".gitignore") ? readFileSync(".gitignore", "utf8") : "";
     const missing = entries.filter((e) => !existing.split(/\r?\n/).some((l) => l.trim() === e || l.trim() === e.replace(/\/$/, "")));
@@ -193,29 +146,20 @@ function ensureGitignore() {
     appendFileSync(".gitignore", (existing && !existing.endsWith("\n") ? "\n" : "") + missing.join("\n") + "\n");
     log(`✔ added ${missing.join(" + ")} to .gitignore (your agent key and parked actions stay out of git)`);
 }
-// ---- interactive input (session sign-in) ---------------------------------------------------
 function ask(question, mute = false) {
     return new Promise((resolve) => {
-        const rl = createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stdout, terminal: true });
+        const rl = createInterface({ input: process.stdin, output: process.stderr, terminal: true });
         if (mute) {
-            // Hide password echo: after the prompt renders, swallow subsequent output writes.
             const anyRl = rl;
             const write = anyRl._writeToOutput?.bind(rl);
             anyRl._writeToOutput = (s) => { if (s.includes(question))
                 write?.(s); };
         }
         rl.question(question, (answer) => { rl.close(); if (mute)
-            process.stdout.write("\n"); resolve(answer.trim()); });
+            process.stderr.write("\n"); resolve(answer.trim()); });
     });
 }
-/** Owner SESSION token, memory-only. Sources in order: DECIDIO_SESSION_TOKEN env, interactive
- *  email+password (`/demo/login`), pasted sign-in link (`/demo/login-consume` — for the
- *  password-less accounts the welcome flow creates). Never persisted. */
 async function acquireSession(purpose) {
-    // TRANSPORT CHECK FIRST — before ANY credential is selected, including one already in the
-    // environment. This guard used to sit after the DECIDIO_SESSION_TOKEN shortcut, so an
-    // env-supplied session token would ride plaintext http to a remote host without ever being
-    // checked. The rule is about the WIRE, so it cannot depend on where the credential came from.
     if (/^http:\/\//i.test(API) && !/^http:\/\/(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])([:/]|$)/i.test(API)) {
         err(`✘ refusing to send workspace credentials over plaintext http to ${API}.`);
         err(`  Use https (the hosted sandbox is https://decidio-api.onrender.com) or localhost for local dev.`);
@@ -224,8 +168,6 @@ async function acquireSession(purpose) {
     if (process.env.DECIDIO_SESSION_TOKEN)
         return process.env.DECIDIO_SESSION_TOKEN;
     if (!process.stdin.isTTY) {
-        // WHOLE failure messages ride stderr (round-2 blind catch: the ✘ headline went to stderr
-        // while its remediation went to stdout — split mid-sentence for any consumer of either).
         err(`✘ ${purpose} needs a Decidio workspace sign-in, and this terminal can't prompt for one.`);
         err(`  Fix: set DECIDIO_SESSION_TOKEN and re-run. To mint one:`);
         err(`    1. Request a sign-in link from your workspace's sign-in screen (or use your welcome email).`);
@@ -263,15 +205,9 @@ async function acquireSession(purpose) {
 }
 async function cmdInit(agentId, opts = {}) {
     err(`Registering agent "${agentId}" with Decidio at ${API}…`);
-    // CLIENT-SIDE KEYGEN: generate the Ed25519 keypair LOCALLY and register only the PUBLIC
-    // did:key. The private key NEVER crosses the wire — it goes straight to this host's env.
     const existingEnv = readEnvFile();
     const existingKey = existingEnv.DECIDIO_AGENT_KEY;
     const sourceSystem = process.env.DECIDIO_SOURCE_SYSTEM || existingEnv.DECIDIO_SOURCE_SYSTEM;
-    // NEVER silently orphan a different agent's key. Registering a NEW name in a directory that
-    // already holds another agent's key would overwrite it — and keys never leave the machine that
-    // made them, so that loss is irrecoverable (it strands the old agent in init's own 409 stop).
-    // Checked BEFORE registering, so a refusal leaves nothing behind server-side either.
     if (existingKey && existingEnv.DECIDIO_AGENT_ID && existingEnv.DECIDIO_AGENT_ID !== agentId && !opts.force) {
         err(`✘ this directory's .env already holds the key for a DIFFERENT agent ("${existingEnv.DECIDIO_AGENT_ID}").`);
         err(`  Registering "${agentId}" here would overwrite that key — and a private key that is`);
@@ -283,8 +219,6 @@ async function cmdInit(agentId, opts = {}) {
     }
     const { did: localDid, privateKeyBase64: localKey } = generateKeypair();
     const registerBody = JSON.stringify({ agentId, did: localDid, ...(sourceSystem ? { sourceSystem } : {}) });
-    // First try whatever bearer the env already carries (the local-dev / operator path — a static
-    // admin token, or dev-open auth). On 401/403 fall through to the self-serve session flow.
     let session = null;
     let r = await api("/api/agents/register", { method: "POST", body: registerBody });
     if (r.status === 401 || r.status === 403) {
@@ -295,10 +229,6 @@ async function cmdInit(agentId, opts = {}) {
     }
     let did, privateKey;
     if (r.status === 409) {
-        // Already registered to a server-held did. WITHOUT the original private key on this machine
-        // this is a HARD STOP, not a degraded continue (round-3 Codex catch: init used to write a
-        // keyless .env and print happy-path next steps — every request then routed unproven and
-        // execution evidence silently capped at agent_asserted).
         did = r.body?.did;
         if (existingKey) {
             log(`• "${agentId}" is already registered in this workspace (did ${did}) — reusing it with the DECIDIO_AGENT_KEY already in .env.`);
@@ -325,15 +255,9 @@ async function cmdInit(agentId, opts = {}) {
         err(`  Fix the cause above and re-run — init is safe to repeat.`);
         return 1;
     }
-    // Mint the runtime credential: the floor-limited AGENT token (can call /agent/* only). This is
-    // what .env gets — the session token stays in memory and dies with this process. On boxes
-    // without the tester-lab fence (plain local dev) the mint endpoint refuses; that's fine —
-    // local dev auths with its existing env and we say so instead of failing the init.
     let agentToken, workspaceId, tokenJti;
     const mintBearer = session ?? TOKEN();
     if (mintBearer) {
-        // Right-sized lifetime, not the server's year-long default: a CLI-minted credential should
-        // expire on the horizon of the work it was minted for (--expires-days to override).
         const expiresInDays = opts.expiresDays ?? 90;
         const mint = await api("/api/workspace/agent-token", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify({ agentId, label: "sdk-cli", expiresInDays }) }, mintBearer);
         if (mint.status >= 200 && mint.status < 300 && mint.body?.token) {
@@ -341,9 +265,6 @@ async function cmdInit(agentId, opts = {}) {
             workspaceId = mint.body.workspaceId;
             tokenJti = mint.body.jti;
             log(`✔ minted the agent's API token — floor-limited: it can request authorization, poll status and report confirmation; it cannot administer the workspace or approve anything${mint.body.expiresAt ? ` (expires ${mint.body.expiresAt})` : ` (${expiresInDays} days)`}`);
-            // The server keeps ONE active token per agent, so a re-mint REVOKES the previous one — an
-            // authority event the person triggering it must see, not discover later in tokens list
-            // (round-3 blind catch: a still-valid token silently died with no mention).
             const superseded = Array.isArray(mint.body.supersededJtis) ? mint.body.supersededJtis : [];
             for (const s of superseded)
                 log(`  • this replaces the agent's previous token (jti ${s}) — now REVOKED: the server keeps one active token per agent. Anything still using it will 401.`);
@@ -364,28 +285,20 @@ async function cmdInit(agentId, opts = {}) {
     if (did)
         envOut.DECIDIO_AGENT_DID = did;
     if (privateKey)
-        envOut.DECIDIO_AGENT_KEY = privateKey; // written locally; never left this host
+        envOut.DECIDIO_AGENT_KEY = privateKey;
     if (agentToken)
-        envOut.DECIDIO_API_TOKEN = agentToken; // the FLOOR-LIMITED token — never the session
+        envOut.DECIDIO_API_TOKEN = agentToken;
     if (workspaceId)
         envOut.DECIDIO_WORKSPACE_ID = workspaceId;
-    // Revocation metadata, not a secret — parity with the quickstart env (blind-review catch: the
-    // two files disagreed, and `tokens revoke` is unusable without the jti in hand).
     if (tokenJti)
         envOut.DECIDIO_TOKEN_JTI = tokenJti;
-    // IGNORE RULE BEFORE THE SECRET: writing .env first leaves a window (however short) where a
-    // private key sits in a repo with no ignore rule covering it.
     ensureGitignore();
     if (opts.force && existingKey && existingEnv.DECIDIO_AGENT_ID && existingEnv.DECIDIO_AGENT_ID !== agentId) {
-        // --force still must not DESTROY the old key: park it beside the new one, owner-only.
         const backup = `.env.${existingEnv.DECIDIO_AGENT_ID.replace(/[^\w.-]/g, "_")}.bak`;
         writeSecretFile(backup, readFileSync(ENV_PATH, "utf8"));
         log(`✔ backed the previous agent's .env up to ${backup} (its key would otherwise be unrecoverable)`);
     }
     upsertEnv(envOut);
-    // The closing doctor (and anything else this process does) must see what init just wrote —
-    // OVERWRITE process.env with the fresh values (round-3 Codex catch: doctor probed with the
-    // stale pre-init token and reported the mint it just watched as REJECTED).
     for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(envOut))
         process.env[k] = v;
     log(`✔ wrote ${ENV_PATH} (owner-only where the OS supports it) — every decidio command reads it from this directory (your script loads it with node --env-file=.env)`);
@@ -422,38 +335,20 @@ async function cmdDoctor() {
     let ok = true;
     let warned = 0;
     const line = (good, label) => { log(`${good ? "✔" : "✘"} ${label}`); ok = ok && good; };
-    // Warnings COUNT in the summary (round-3 blind catch: "doctor: all green." directly under a ⚠
-    // line contradicts itself — green with a caveat must say so).
     const warn = (label) => { warned++; log(`⚠ ${label}`); };
-    // An unset URL is a WORKING default (the hosted sandbox), not a failure — sandbox-first ruling.
     log(`✔ API URL: ${API}${(process.env.DECIDIO_API_URL || env.DECIDIO_API_URL) ? "" : "  (default: the hosted sandbox — set DECIDIO_API_URL to point elsewhere)"}`);
     line(!!(process.env.DECIDIO_AGENT_ID || env.DECIDIO_AGENT_ID), `agent id: ${process.env.DECIDIO_AGENT_ID || env.DECIDIO_AGENT_ID || "(unset — run: npx @decidio/sdk init <agent-name>)"}`);
-    // The webhook secret is OPERATOR-ONLY transport config — a missing one must never fail doctor
-    // (blind-review catch: doctor exited 1 immediately after the product's own successful
-    // quickstart, whose env rightly omits it). Informational either way.
     const secret = process.env.DECIDIO_WEBHOOK_SECRET || env.DECIDIO_WEBHOOK_SECRET;
     log(secret ? "✔ webhook secret: set — operator-only transport (inactive against the hosted sandbox; the poll worker guard.worker() is the self-serve resume path)"
         : "• webhook secret: not set — only needed for the operator resume-webhook transport; the poll worker guard.worker() is the self-serve resume path (init generates one)");
-    // Signing key — REQUIRED to be ELIGIBLE for auto-approve. Whether anything auto-approves is
-    // the workspace policy's call, not this key's (Codex finding: the old wording claimed
-    // "auto-approve is in effect" while deny-by-default routed everything).
     const signing = (process.env.DECIDIO_AGENT_KEY || env.DECIDIO_AGENT_KEY) && (process.env.DECIDIO_AGENT_DID || env.DECIDIO_AGENT_DID);
     if (signing)
         log("✔ signing key: set — the agent can prove its identity, making it ELIGIBLE for policy auto-approve. Whether a rule matches is your workspace policy's decision; with no matching rule every request routes to a human (deny-by-default).");
     else
         warn("signing key: MISSING (DECIDIO_AGENT_KEY/DID) — the agent can't prove identity, so EVERY request routes to a human. Run `npx @decidio/sdk init` to generate one.");
-    // Reachability and token role are SEPARATE checks (the old probe called any <500 green, so a
-    // wrong-kind token looked healthy). /api/health is unauthenticated truth about reachability;
-    // /api/records then classifies the token.
     const h = await api("/api/health", {}, "");
     line(h.status >= 200 && h.status < 300, `connectivity: API reachable (${h.status})`);
-    // EXPIRY BEFORE IT BITES: a right-sized token is only an improvement if its end is visible in
-    // advance — otherwise a production agent simply starts 401ing one day. Read `exp` out of the
-    // token's own payload (display only; the server remains the authority on validity).
     const tok = process.env.DECIDIO_API_TOKEN || env.DECIDIO_API_TOKEN;
-    // UNSET is its own diagnosis (round-3 blind catch: a bare directory probed the server with an
-    // EMPTY credential and told a first-run user their never-existent token was "invalid or
-    // expired"). Say what is true and stop — there is nothing to probe.
     if (!tok) {
         line(false, "agent token: NOT CONFIGURED — no DECIDIO_API_TOKEN in this directory's .env or your environment. Run `npx @decidio/sdk init <agent-name>` to register an agent and mint one.");
         log(warned ? `\ndoctor: fix the ✘ items above, then re-run \`npx @decidio/sdk doctor\`. (${warned} warning${warned === 1 ? "" : "s"})` : "\ndoctor: fix the ✘ items above, then re-run `npx @decidio/sdk doctor`.");
@@ -464,11 +359,7 @@ async function cmdDoctor() {
             const payload = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(tok.split(".")[1] ?? "", "base64url").toString("utf8"));
             if (typeof payload?.exp === "number") {
                 const msLeft = payload.exp * 1000 - Date.now();
-                // A minute of grace absorbs mint-to-doctor latency so a fresh 90-day token reads "90",
-                // matching the Python doctor (round-3 blind nit: 89 vs 90 for the same expiry).
                 const days = Math.floor((msLeft + 60_000) / 86_400_000);
-                // Under a day, days-precision reads as "0 day(s)" — which looks expired while ~23h remain
-                // (blind-review catch). Switch units instead of rounding away the truth.
                 const left = msLeft < 86_400_000 ? `${Math.max(1, Math.floor(msLeft / 3_600_000))} hour(s)` : `${days} day(s)`;
                 if (msLeft < 0)
                     line(false, `agent token: EXPIRED ${-days} day(s) ago — re-run \`npx @decidio/sdk init ${env.DECIDIO_AGENT_ID ?? "<agent>"}\` to mint a fresh one.`);
@@ -478,16 +369,12 @@ async function cmdDoctor() {
                     log(`✔ agent token: valid for another ${days} days`);
             }
         }
-        catch { /* not a JWT we can read — the scope probe below is the real check */ }
+        catch { }
     }
     const rec = await api("/api/records");
     if (rec.status >= 200 && rec.status < 300)
-        log("✔ token scope: session/admin (init, approvals and receipt work from this env)");
+        warn("token scope: SESSION/ADMIN-capable — this credential can approve and administer, and it does not belong in an agent's environment (the agent runtime needs only the floor-limited token init mints). Move it to your shell/CI secret store.");
     else if (rec.status === 401) {
-        // A 401 off the agent floor could also mean an INVALID token (Codex catch: don't
-        // false-green expiry). Disambiguate with a floor probe: a valid agent token gets 404 for an
-        // unknown decision (authorized, not found); an invalid one gets 401 again. A rejection here
-        // flips the overall verdict — "all green" after a red line was round 3's other doctor bug.
         const probe = await api("/agent/status/doctor-scope-probe");
         if (probe.status === 404)
             log("✔ token scope: agent floor — correct for the runtime SDK (approvals/receipt will ask you to sign in)");
@@ -503,21 +390,14 @@ async function cmdDoctor() {
     return ok ? 0 : 1;
 }
 async function cmdApprovals(sub, id, reason, flags = {}) {
-    // Approvals are a HUMAN act on the workspace — session scope, never the agent token. If the
-    // env's token is agent-floor (401 on /api/*), sign in interactively; memory-only as always.
     const jsonMode = !!flags.json;
     const mineOnly = !!flags.mine;
     if (sub?.startsWith("--"))
         sub = undefined;
-    // USAGE BEFORE AUTH (round-8 catch): a malformed command must fail on its shape, not probe the
-    // network first — validation needs no credentials.
     if ((sub === "approve" || sub === "reject") && !id) {
         err(`usage: npx @decidio/sdk approvals ${sub} <decisionId> [reason]`);
         return 2;
     }
-    // --mine without an agent identity cannot mean anything — and quietly returning [] (exit 0)
-    // would tell a script "no pending work" when the truth is "misconfigured" (blind-review catch:
-    // it leaked "undefined" in human mode and lied with [] in JSON mode). Shape error, before auth.
     if (mineOnly && !process.env.DECIDIO_AGENT_ID) {
         err(`✘ --mine needs an agent identity, and there is no DECIDIO_AGENT_ID in this directory's .env or your environment.`);
         err(`  Run this from your agent's directory (where init wrote .env), or drop --mine for the workspace-wide list.`);
@@ -535,9 +415,6 @@ async function cmdApprovals(sub, id, reason, flags = {}) {
     if (sub === "approve" || sub === "reject") {
         const r = await api(`/api/decisions/${encodeURIComponent(decisionArg)}/${sub === "approve" ? "approve" : "reject"}`, { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify({ reason: reason ?? undefined }) }, bearer);
         if (r.status >= 200 && r.status < 300) {
-            // HONESTY over green checkmarks (Codex finding: the server resolves each decision exactly
-            // once and answers replays idempotently — a replay is a NO-OP and must read as one, never
-            // as a fresh approval). Non-zero exit so scripts can tell the difference.
             if (r.body?.alreadyResolved) {
                 log(`• ${id} was already resolved — nothing changed.`);
                 log(`  Decisions are single-use: a second ${sub} can never re-execute the action (that's the replay protection working).`);
@@ -565,10 +442,9 @@ async function cmdApprovals(sub, id, reason, flags = {}) {
         return 1;
     }
     const cards = r.body?.cards ?? [];
+    if (cards.length >= 50)
+        err('⚠ this view is capped at 50 items by the server — older pending approvals may exist beyond it.');
     const pending = cards.filter((c) => c.isAgentRequest && c.status !== "sealed");
-    // FILTER FIRST, FORMAT SECOND (round-8 catch: --mine --json returned the UNFILTERED workspace
-    // list — and automation is exactly the consumer of the JSON form, so the human view and the
-    // machine view must be the same set).
     const myAgent = process.env.DECIDIO_AGENT_ID;
     const isMine = (c) => !!myAgent && typeof c.title === "string" && c.title.startsWith(`${myAgent}:`);
     const shown = mineOnly ? pending.filter(isMine) : pending;
@@ -600,8 +476,6 @@ async function cmdReceipt(id, jsonMode = false) {
         err("  Find decision ids via `npx @decidio/sdk approvals` or in your Decidio app.");
         return 2;
     }
-    // Receipts are workspace data — session scope, like approvals. (The record-detail /verify
-    // route carries the credential; the plain record route does not — Codex finding.)
     let bearer;
     let r = await api(`/api/records/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/verify`);
     if (r.status === 401 || r.status === 403) {
@@ -623,28 +497,18 @@ async function cmdReceipt(id, jsonMode = false) {
     const name = `decidio-receipt-${id.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9_-]/g, "")}.json`;
     const nextBytes = JSON.stringify(r.body.credential, null, 2) + "\n";
     if (existsSync(name)) {
-        // Never silently overwrite an audit artifact (round-6 catch). Byte-identical is fine (receipts
-        // are immutable); a DIFFERENT file at the same name is a refusal.
         if (readFileSync(name, "utf8") !== nextBytes) {
             err(`✘ ${name} already exists with DIFFERENT bytes — refusing to overwrite an audit artifact. Move it aside or delete it, then re-run.`);
             return 1;
         }
-        // In --json mode stdout is the JSON result ONLY — narrative rides stderr (stream contract).
         (jsonMode ? err : log)(`• ${name} already exists (byte-identical — receipts are immutable); leaving it in place.`);
     }
     else {
         writeFileSync(name, nextBytes);
         (jsonMode ? err : log)(`✔ wrote ${name} (downloaded from your workspace — the download is online; VERIFYING it is offline)`);
     }
-    // The credential seals at DECISION time (immutable), so execution evidence that arrived later
-    // lives on the record — surface the CURRENT tier here so the reader doesn't need a second
-    // lookup to see it (Codex catch).
     const detail = await api(`/api/records/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`, {}, bearer);
     const conf = detail.body?.record?.confirmation;
-    // The trust anchor, delivered over the AUTHENTICATED channel. Reading the issuer out of the
-    // receipt you are about to verify is circular; this value comes from the server's own verify
-    // response, so pinning it actually means something (round-7 catch: the guided flow sent people
-    // to an app panel they could not reach, leaving provenance uncompletable).
     const issuer = r.body?.issuer;
     if (jsonMode) {
         log(JSON.stringify({ file: name, decisionId: id, evidenceTier: conf?.status ?? null, confirmed: !!conf?.confirmed, issuer: issuer ?? null }, null, 2));
@@ -652,8 +516,6 @@ async function cmdReceipt(id, jsonMode = false) {
     }
     if (conf?.status)
         log(`  Sealed credential: the authority decision (its confirmation field reads "pending" forever — immutable). Current record evidence tier: ${conf.status}${conf.confirmed ? " (confirmed)" : ""}.`);
-    // Emit EXACTLY the deterministic command we document (round-4 catch: the README and this hint
-    // disagreed, and bare npx re-probes the registry) — the verifier ships INSIDE this package.
     log(`  Verify it offline — no Decidio account or network needed (the verifier is built in):`);
     log(`    npx @decidio/sdk verify ${name}`);
     if (issuer) {
@@ -667,16 +529,7 @@ async function cmdReceipt(id, jsonMode = false) {
     }
     return 0;
 }
-// ---- verify (embedded) ----------------------------------------------------------------------
-// ONE implementation, all doors (0.1.9): the dependency floor now carries `runVerify`, so the
-// strict-parse / chain / wrong-issuer local copies this door carried since 0.1.4 are DELETED —
-// the sdk door and the standalone decidio-verify CLI are literally the same function, and the
-// conformance runner's third door keeps them honest. This CLI keeps only what is CLI-shaped:
-// flag grammar, I/O-vs-verdict separation, and usage.
 function cmdVerify(argsIn) {
-    // Positional parse mirroring the standalone decidio-verify CLI: --issuer in space AND `=` form
-    // (the `=` form silently dropped was the standalone's unpinned-VALID bug — one grammar, all
-    // doors). Unknown flags never reach here (main()'s strict table refuses them first).
     let expectedIssuer;
     const files = [];
     for (let i = 0; i < argsIn.length; i++) {
@@ -707,8 +560,6 @@ function cmdVerify(argsIn) {
         err("  Verifies Authority Receipts OFFLINE — signature, content binding, and (for several files) chain order.");
         return 2;
     }
-    // An unreadable file is an I/O problem, not a cryptographic verdict (blind-review catch: a
-    // typo'd filename got the same "INVALID" a forged receipt gets).
     const texts = new Map();
     for (const f of files) {
         try {
@@ -724,13 +575,11 @@ function cmdVerify(argsIn) {
         log(l);
     return ok ? 0 : 1;
 }
-// ---- quickstart (the guided two-minute tour) ------------------------------------------------
 async function cmdQuickstart(opts = {}) {
     const t0 = Date.now();
     log("Decidio quickstart — gate an action, route it to a human, execute on approval, hold the proof.");
     log(`  Target: ${API}${process.env.DECIDIO_API_URL ? "" : "  (the hosted synthetic sandbox — set DECIDIO_API_URL to use your own)"}`);
     log("");
-    // SIDE EFFECTS UP FRONT (round-8 ask): say what the tour creates before creating any of it.
     log("  This tour will: register one synthetic agent · mint a 7-DAY floor-limited token ·");
     log("  write .env (or .env.quickstart) + .gitignore entries · create one synthetic decision");
     log("  and its sealed record (records are permanent by design). Cleanup offer at the end.");
@@ -738,9 +587,6 @@ async function cmdQuickstart(opts = {}) {
     const session = await acquireSession("The quickstart");
     if (!session)
         return 1;
-    // 1. A collision-proof agent, registered fresh every run (round-4 ask: idempotent sample
-    //    registration). Key generated locally; floor-limited token minted; .env written so the
-    //    take-away snippet works in this directory afterward.
     const agentId = `quickstart-${randomBytes(2).toString("hex")}`;
     log(`① Registering agent "${agentId}" (fresh name each run — no collisions)…`);
     const { did, privateKeyBase64 } = generateKeypair();
@@ -749,33 +595,21 @@ async function cmdQuickstart(opts = {}) {
         err(`✘ registration failed (${reg.status}): ${JSON.stringify(reg.body)}`);
         return 1;
     }
-    // A tour credential should outlive the tour and not much else — 7 days, disclosed.
     const mint = await api("/api/workspace/agent-token", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify({ agentId, label: "quickstart", expiresInDays: 7 }) }, session);
     if (!(mint.status >= 200 && mint.status < 300) || !mint.body?.token) {
         err(`✘ token mint failed (${mint.status}): ${JSON.stringify(mint.body)}`);
         return 1;
     }
-    // No webhook secret here (round-8 catch): the sandbox tour never uses the webhook transport,
-    // and inheriting the .env's existing secret duplicated one agent's secret into another's file.
-    // DECIDIO_TOKEN_JTI is revocation METADATA (not a secret) — it is what `quickstart cleanup`
-    // and `tokens revoke` need to kill the token later.
     const envOut = {
         DECIDIO_API_URL: API, DECIDIO_AGENT_ID: agentId, DECIDIO_AGENT_DID: reg.body?.did ?? did,
         DECIDIO_AGENT_KEY: privateKeyBase64, DECIDIO_API_TOKEN: mint.body.token,
         DECIDIO_WORKSPACE_ID: mint.body.workspaceId ?? "",
         ...(mint.body.jti ? { DECIDIO_TOKEN_JTI: mint.body.jti } : {}),
     };
-    // NEVER clobber a real agent's key (guard catch: keys never leave this machine — overwriting
-    // .env's DECIDIO_AGENT_KEY orphans that agent irrecoverably). A directory that already holds
-    // one gets a TOUR-SCOPED env file instead — through the SAME secure writer as .env (round-8
-    // catch: this path used plain writeFileSync).
     let envFile = ENV_PATH;
     if (readEnvFile().DECIDIO_AGENT_KEY) {
         envFile = ".env.quickstart";
         ensureGitignore();
-        // A THIRD tour in the same directory would otherwise overwrite the previous tour agent's
-        // private key — unrecoverable, same class as the .env clobber init refuses (blind-review
-        // catch). Same remedy: back the old file up first, owner-only.
         if (existsSync(envFile)) {
             const prev = readFileSync(envFile, "utf8");
             const prevId = prev.match(/^DECIDIO_AGENT_ID=(.+)$/m)?.[1];
@@ -794,9 +628,6 @@ async function cmdQuickstart(opts = {}) {
     }
     log(`  ✔ key generated locally (public half registered) · 7-day floor-limited token minted${mint.body.expiresAt ? ` (expires ${mint.body.expiresAt})` : ""} · ${envFile} written`);
     log("");
-    // 2. Gate a demo action. Show the ACTUAL wrap the tour runs (round-6 catch: the printed line
-    //    differed from the code — this tour uses blocking mode; the bare guard.protect default is
-    //    durable and needs a worker/webhook, which the README covers).
     log(`② Gating a demo action — the tour runs this (blocking mode: watch it live):`);
     log("");
     log(`     const payInvoice = guard.protect(payInvoiceRaw,`);
@@ -812,9 +643,6 @@ async function cmdQuickstart(opts = {}) {
     };
     const payInvoice = withApproval(async (inv) => ({ paid: true, id: inv.id }), (inv) => ({ action: "payInvoice", amount: inv.amount, scope: "Invoice" }), cfg);
     const running = payInvoice({ id: "INV-2026-001", amount: 86_000 });
-    // An EARLY rejection (before routing) must be diagnosed as ITSELF, not as a routing timeout
-    // (round-2 blind catch: the sandbox's per-hour action cap surfaced here as "check
-    // connectivity", and doctor then corroborated the wrong suspect with "all green").
     let earlyError;
     running.catch((e) => { earlyError = e; });
     const waitStart = Date.now();
@@ -837,10 +665,6 @@ async function cmdQuickstart(opts = {}) {
     log(`  ✔ $86,000 payInvoice ROUTED to a human (decision ${decisionId}) — this agent has no auto-approve rule,`);
     log(`    so deny-by-default sends everything to a person. Nothing executes until someone decides.`);
     log("");
-    // 3. The human moment — and it must BE one. The tour's whole claim is "routes it to YOU,
-    //    executes on your yes"; a headless run that approves itself has no discrete yes (round-8
-    //    catch: "headless quickstart breaks the central story"). So headless STOPS here unless
-    //    --auto-approve-demo was passed explicitly, and that path is labeled automated authority.
     const interactive = process.stdin.isTTY;
     if (interactive) {
         await ask(`③ YOU are the approver. Press Enter to approve it here (or approve it in your Decidio queue first, then Enter): `);
@@ -851,14 +675,16 @@ async function cmdQuickstart(opts = {}) {
     }
     else {
         log("③ This terminal can't put a human in the loop, and an approval IS a human act — the tour");
-        log("   stops here rather than approve its own request. The decision is routed and waiting:");
+        log("   stops here rather than approve its own request. The decision is routed and waiting —");
+        log("   but note: this BLOCKING demo process is about to exit, so approving later resolves the");
+        log("   RECORD only; the demo function itself cannot run afterwards (durable mode is what");
+        log("   survives a process exit — the README's worker section shows it):");
         log("");
         log(`     npx @decidio/sdk approvals approve ${decisionId}     (or approve it in your Decidio app)`);
         log("");
         log("   Then re-run the quickstart interactively to watch the whole loop — or, for CI, re-run");
         log("   with --auto-approve-demo to let the tour approve itself under that explicit label.");
         log(`   Tidy up this tour's agent + token any time: npx @decidio/sdk quickstart cleanup`);
-        // The blocking poll keeps the event loop alive; the tour is over, so leave cleanly.
         process.exit(0);
     }
     const ap = await api(`/api/decisions/${encodeURIComponent(decisionId)}/approve`, { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify({ reason: opts.autoApproveDemo && !interactive ? "quickstart --auto-approve-demo (automated)" : "quickstart" }) }, session);
@@ -867,7 +693,6 @@ async function cmdQuickstart(opts = {}) {
         return 1;
     }
     log(`  ✔ approved${ap.body?.alreadyResolved ? " (it was already approved from your app — even better)" : ""}`);
-    // 4. The blocking wrapper wakes and runs the agent's own function.
     let result;
     try {
         result = await running;
@@ -878,7 +703,6 @@ async function cmdQuickstart(opts = {}) {
     }
     log(`  ✔ your function executed AFTER approval: ${JSON.stringify(result)}`);
     log("");
-    // 5. The proof: download the receipt and verify it offline, all in-process.
     log("④ Downloading the sealed Authority Receipt and verifying it OFFLINE…");
     const rec = await api(`/api/records/${encodeURIComponent(decisionId)}/verify`, {}, session);
     if (!(rec.status >= 200 && rec.status < 300) || !rec.body?.credential) {
@@ -887,8 +711,6 @@ async function cmdQuickstart(opts = {}) {
     }
     const fname = `decidio-receipt-${decisionId.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9_-]/g, "")}.json`;
     writeFileSync(fname, JSON.stringify(rec.body.credential, null, 2) + "\n");
-    // Verify PINNED to the issuer the server just told us over the authenticated channel — an
-    // unpinned VALID only proves self-consistency, and the tour should demonstrate the real thing.
     const issuer = rec.body?.issuer;
     const v = verifyReceipt(rec.body.credential, issuer);
     log(`  ${v.valid ? "✔ VALID" : "✘ INVALID"} — ${fname} (signature + content binding, offline${issuer ? `, PINNED to your workspace issuer ${issuer}` : "; issuer unpinned"})`);
@@ -908,9 +730,6 @@ async function cmdQuickstart(opts = {}) {
     log(`  // production is DURABLE mode (default) + one worker: guard.worker();  // README has the full pattern`);
     log("");
     log(`Your workspace + queue: ${API.replace("decidio-api.onrender.com", "app.decidioai.com")}  ·  Next: the README's 7-step quickstart (durable, workers, adapters).`);
-    // 6. Leave nothing behind unless asked to (round-8 ask: each tour left a live 7-day token and
-    //    local credentials with no cleanup path). Interactive: offer, default KEEP (they may want
-    //    to build on it). Automated (--auto-approve-demo): default CLEANUP unless --keep-agent.
     let doCleanup = false;
     if (interactive) {
         const answer = await ask(`\nKeep this agent for development? [Enter = keep · c + Enter = clean up now]: `);
@@ -926,9 +745,6 @@ async function cmdQuickstart(opts = {}) {
         await quickstartCleanup(session, envFile);
     return v.valid ? 0 : 1;
 }
-/** Revoke the tour's token and remove its local credential file. Honest about what remains:
- *  sealed records are PERMANENT by design, and the agent's registration row stays (there is no
- *  deregistration endpoint yet) — but with its token revoked and its key deleted it is inert. */
 async function quickstartCleanup(session, envFile) {
     const env = (() => {
         const out = {};
@@ -952,10 +768,6 @@ async function quickstartCleanup(session, envFile) {
     else {
         log(`  ⚠ no DECIDIO_TOKEN_JTI in ${envFile} (older tour) — revoke by hand: npx @decidio/sdk tokens list, then tokens revoke <jti>. It expires on its own within 7 days.`);
     }
-    // Remove ONLY what the tour wrote (guard catch: in a project directory the tour MERGES into an
-    // existing .env, so deleting the whole file would destroy the project's own variables — a
-    // cleanup must never remove anything it didn't create). The file itself goes only when nothing
-    // else lives in it.
     if (existsSync(envFile)) {
         const TOUR_KEYS = new Set(["DECIDIO_API_URL", "DECIDIO_AGENT_ID", "DECIDIO_AGENT_DID", "DECIDIO_AGENT_KEY", "DECIDIO_API_TOKEN", "DECIDIO_WORKSPACE_ID", "DECIDIO_TOKEN_JTI"]);
         const kept = readFileSync(envFile, "utf8").split(/\r?\n/).filter((line) => {
@@ -971,9 +783,6 @@ async function quickstartCleanup(session, envFile) {
             log(`  ✔ tour credentials removed from ${envFile} — its ${kept.length} other line${kept.length === 1 ? "" : "s"} untouched (the agent's local key is gone — the registered agent is now inert)`);
         }
     }
-    // HONEST ACCOUNTING includes the queue (blind-review catch: a headless-stopped tour leaves its
-    // routed decision pending in the SHARED workspace queue, and cleanup said nothing about it).
-    // Listing is a read; clearing it stays a human act — we print the command, we don't run it.
     const tourAgent = env.DECIDIO_AGENT_ID;
     if (tourAgent) {
         const cards = await api("/api/decisions/cards", {}, session);
@@ -987,7 +796,6 @@ async function quickstartCleanup(session, envFile) {
     log(`    and the agent's registration row (inert without key or token; server-side deregistration is on the roadmap).`);
     return 0;
 }
-/** tokens list [--mine] / tokens revoke <jti> — the workspace's agent-token lifecycle. */
 async function cmdTokens(sub, jti, mineOnly = false) {
     if (sub !== "list" && sub !== "revoke") {
         err("usage: npx @decidio/sdk tokens list [--mine]");
@@ -999,9 +807,6 @@ async function cmdTokens(sub, jti, mineOnly = false) {
         err("usage: npx @decidio/sdk tokens revoke <jti>   (find the jti with: npx @decidio/sdk tokens list)");
         return 2;
     }
-    // Same grammar and same shape-error as approvals --mine (round-9 catch: a first run in the
-    // SHARED sandbox listed 138 workspace-wide rows — accurate, documented, and still terrible
-    // isolation optics with no way to narrow).
     if (mineOnly && !process.env.DECIDIO_AGENT_ID) {
         err(`✘ --mine needs an agent identity, and there is no DECIDIO_AGENT_ID in this directory's .env or your environment.`);
         err(`  Run this from your agent's directory (where init wrote .env), or drop --mine for the workspace-wide list.`);
@@ -1020,9 +825,6 @@ async function cmdTokens(sub, jti, mineOnly = false) {
     if (sub === "revoke") {
         const rev = await api(`/api/workspace/agent-token/${encodeURIComponent(jti)}`, { method: "DELETE" }, bearer);
         if (rev.status >= 200 && rev.status < 300) {
-            // Replay honesty (blind-review catch + the SDK's own contract): revoking an already-revoked
-            // token changes nothing and must read as a no-op, not a fresh kill. The server says which
-            // via `changed`.
             if (rev.body?.changed === false) {
                 log(`• ${jti} was already revoked — nothing changed.`);
                 log(`  Revocation is permanent; there is no re-revoke. See it: npx @decidio/sdk tokens list`);
@@ -1049,16 +851,11 @@ async function cmdTokens(sub, jti, mineOnly = false) {
         log(mineOnly ? `No agent tokens for "${myAgent}"${all.length ? ` (${all.length} elsewhere in this workspace — drop --mine to see them)` : ""}.` : "No agent tokens in this workspace.");
         return 0;
     }
-    // Status is derived per row, revoked first — a list that showed revoked tokens as "Active" made
-    // the revocation audit surface unable to confirm its own revocations (blind-review catch).
     const status = (t) => t.revokedAt ? `REVOKED ${String(t.revokedAt).slice(0, 10)}`
         : (t.expiresAt && Date.parse(t.expiresAt) < Date.now()) ? "expired" : "active";
     log(`Agent tokens (${tokens.length}${mineOnly ? ` for "${myAgent}"` : ""})${!mineOnly && myAgent ? ` — workspace-wide (a shared workspace shows every member's agents; --mine narrows to this directory's agent, ${myAgent})` : ""}:`);
     for (const t of tokens)
         log(`  ${t.jti}  ${status(t)}  agent=${t.agentId ?? "?"}  label=${t.label ?? ""}  expires=${t.expiresAt ?? "?"}`);
-    // The governed-action allowance rides the same response — showing it here is what keeps the
-    // per-hour cap from ever being a surprise 429 (round-2 blind catch: the cap was undocumented
-    // and its refusal untyped).
     const al = r.body?.allowance;
     if (al?.limit != null)
         log(`\nGoverned-action allowance: ${al.remaining}/${al.limit} remaining this hour${al.resetAt ? ` (resets ${al.resetAt})` : ""}.`);
@@ -1066,8 +863,6 @@ async function cmdTokens(sub, jti, mineOnly = false) {
     return 0;
 }
 function cmdDev(target, port) {
-    // Signal-only relay: receive Decidio's webhook here (a stable URL) and forward it to
-    // your local agent's resume listener. Useful when the agent isn't directly reachable.
     log(`decidio dev relay on http://localhost:${port}/decidio/resume → forwarding to ${target}`);
     createServer((req, res) => {
         if (req.method !== "POST") {
@@ -1132,7 +927,8 @@ fully offline — it touches no network and reads no .env.
 Exit codes: 0 success · 1 failure or honest no-op (e.g. replay refused) · 2 usage error.
 Errors, and usage shown on ERROR paths, go to stderr; stdout carries results only (safe to
 pipe). Asked-for help — including this bare invocation — IS a result, so it prints here.
-Docs: the README that shipped with this package (quickstart, durable resume, adapters).`;
+Docs: the README that shipped with this package — node_modules/@decidio/sdk/README.md
+(quickstart, durable resume, workers, adapters).`;
 async function main(argv) {
     const [cmd, a, b, ...rest] = argv.slice(2);
     const wantsHelp = (s) => s === "help" || s === "--help" || s === "-h";
@@ -1148,9 +944,6 @@ async function main(argv) {
         log(USAGE);
         return 0;
     }
-    // STRICT FLAGS (round-8 catch: `verify --strict` was silently ignored — a security CLI must
-    // fail closed on options it doesn't understand, BEFORE any auth or network). Each command
-    // whitelists its flags; anything else exits 2. Value-taking flags name themselves.
     const argsIn = argv.slice(3);
     const KNOWN = {
         quickstart: { flags: ["--auto-approve-demo", "--keep-agent"] },
@@ -1175,19 +968,14 @@ async function main(argv) {
             if (valued.includes(a)) {
                 i++;
                 continue;
-            } // its value is consumed
+            }
             if (valued.some((v) => a.startsWith(v + "=")))
-                continue; // --flag=value form
+                continue;
             if (!spec.flags.includes(a)) {
                 err(`✘ unknown option "${a}" for \`${cmd}\` — refusing to guess (a flag you meant to matter must never be silently ignored).\n\n${USAGE}`);
                 return 2;
             }
         }
-        // POSITIONAL arity is part of the same contract (round-2 blind catch: `tokens revoke jti1
-        // jti2` revoked only the first and reported unqualified success — silent false success on a
-        // security control). Anything beyond what the command reads is refused, not dropped.
-        // approvals approve/reject take a free-text reason, so their tail is exempt; verify takes
-        // any number of files.
         const MAX_POS = { quickstart: 1, init: 1, doctor: 0, receipt: 1, tokens: 2, dev: 0 };
         const exemptTail = (cmd === "approvals" && (positionals[0] === "approve" || positionals[0] === "reject")) || cmd === "verify";
         if (!exemptTail && cmd === "approvals" && positionals.length > 0) {
@@ -1210,7 +998,6 @@ async function main(argv) {
     switch (cmd) {
         case "quickstart": {
             if (argsIn.includes("cleanup")) {
-                // Standalone cleanup: prefer the tour-scoped file; fall back to a tour-created .env.
                 const envFile = existsSync(".env.quickstart") ? ".env.quickstart"
                     : (readEnvFile().DECIDIO_AGENT_ID ?? "").startsWith("quickstart-") ? ENV_PATH : undefined;
                 if (!envFile) {
@@ -1226,9 +1013,6 @@ async function main(argv) {
         }
         case "init": {
             const unique = argsIn.includes("--unique");
-            // BOTH forms (guard catch: the strict table's generic `=` allowance let --expires-days=30
-            // pass the gate while this parser read only the space form — a silently-ignored
-            // credential-LIFETIME flag, the exact class the verifier doors just fixed).
             const expIdx = argsIn.indexOf("--expires-days");
             const expEq = argsIn.find((x) => x.startsWith("--expires-days="));
             const expRaw = expIdx >= 0 ? argsIn[expIdx + 1] : expEq ? expEq.slice("--expires-days=".length) : undefined;
@@ -1262,8 +1046,6 @@ async function main(argv) {
                 return eq ? eq.slice(name.length + 1) : undefined;
             };
             const target = flag("--target") || process.env.DECIDIO_AGENT_RESUME_URL || "http://localhost:4100/decidio/resume";
-            // Validate on shape, before binding anything (blind-review catch: `--port abc` printed
-            // localhost:NaN and died with a raw internal error).
             const portRaw = flag("--port") || process.env.DECIDIO_DEV_PORT || "4099";
             if (!/^\d+$/.test(portRaw) || Number(portRaw) < 1 || Number(portRaw) > 65535) {
                 err(`✘ --port needs a number between 1 and 65535 (got "${portRaw}").`);
@@ -1276,10 +1058,6 @@ async function main(argv) {
             return cmdDev(target, Number(portRaw));
         }
         default:
-            // Exit 2, not 1: an unknown command is a USAGE error, and the help text promised that
-            // contract (round-8 catch).
-            // A flag in command position gets a NAMED fix, not just a refusal (round-3 blind nit:
-            // `--json approvals` earned "unknown command" with no hint that flags follow the command).
             if (cmd.startsWith("-"))
                 err(`✘ unknown command "${cmd}" — flags go AFTER the command (e.g. npx @decidio/sdk approvals ${cmd}).\n\n${USAGE}`);
             else