@decentnetwork/peer 0.1.64 → 0.1.66

package/dist/peer.d.ts

@@ -194,9 +194,6 @@ export declare class Peer {
          *  tcp-relay, discovery itself is broken — we don't even know
          *  where to send a cookie request. */
         endpointCandidatesCount: number;
-        /** The actual candidate endpoints (host:port) — lets diag see whether a
-         *  same-LAN host candidate (e.g. 10.0.0.x) was received but not adopted. */
-        endpointCandidates: string[];
         /** Last time we sent an outbound cookie request via UDP for this
          *  peer (null = never). Used to confirm Phase 1.2 retries are
          *  actually firing. */

package/dist/peer.js

@@ -82,23 +82,6 @@ const FRIEND_PING_INTERVAL_MS = readEnvInt("DECENT_FRIEND_PING_INTERVAL_MS", 400
 // slow enough not to burn CPU on idle peers. Tunable via env.
 const FRIEND_CONNECTION_LOOP_MS = readEnvInt("DECENT_FRIEND_CONNECTION_LOOP_MS", 250);
 const FRIEND_TIMEOUT_MS = readEnvInt("DECENT_FRIEND_TIMEOUT_MS", 32000);
-// Half-open breaker: if the peer proposes a NEW session key this many times over
-// this long while our session looks "alive", accept it (the peer can't decrypt
-// our current session — a desynced half-open session, observed as a flood of
-// "no session matched"). Each handshake carries a fresh cookie so these are
-// genuine attempts, not replays. Bounded so it never fires on a healthy session.
-const REHS_ACCEPT_COUNT = readEnvInt("DECENT_REHS_ACCEPT_COUNT", 4);
-const REHS_ACCEPT_MS = readEnvInt("DECENT_REHS_ACCEPT_MS", 2500);
-const REHS_WINDOW_MS = readEnvInt("DECENT_REHS_WINDOW_MS", 8000);
-// Re-handshake when we keep receiving undecryptable crypto data from a known
-// friend's endpoint (desynced sessions), rate-limited per friend.
-// Conservative: deleting a session forces a re-handshake which ROTATES our
-// ephemeral key, so doing it too eagerly turns a transient blip into a
-// rotate→desync→delete thrash. Only nuke a session that's been UNABLE to
-// decrypt anything for a long time (genuinely dead, well past any
-// establishment-transition window), and at most once per long interval.
-const REINIT_ON_DESYNC_MS = readEnvInt("DECENT_REINIT_ON_DESYNC_MS", 12000);
-const REINIT_STUCK_MS = readEnvInt("DECENT_REINIT_STUCK_MS", 20000);
 // How long a relay path stays "confirmed" (carrying bulk data on its own, no
 // tcp-relay fan-out) after the last packet received over it. The relay
 // keepalive refreshes this every ~4s on a healthy path, so a generous window
@@ -273,9 +256,6 @@ export class Peer {
     // #initiateSession every few seconds for every friend; without this
     // dedupe, lower-pubkey side floods the log with "deferring to peer".
     #initiateSkipLogged = new Set();
-    // Per-friend last time we deleted a desynced session (rate-limit; survives the
-    // session deletion, unlike a field on the session object itself).
-    #lastDesyncDeleteMs = new Map();
     // Cached server-reflexive (public) UDP endpoint of our #udp socket,
     // learned via STUN. Cone-NAT mappings are stable for the socket
     // lifetime, so we only re-probe every ~60s. Used to tell friends where
@@ -1082,7 +1062,6 @@ export class Peer {
             ourLocalUdpPort: this.#udp?.localPort() ?? null,
             friendUdpEndpoint: friendUdp,
             endpointCandidatesCount: s.endpointCandidates?.length ?? 0,
-            endpointCandidates: (s.endpointCandidates ?? []).map((c) => `${c.host}:${c.port}`),
             cookieRequestSentMs: s.cookieRequestSentMs ?? null,
         };
     }
@@ -1456,30 +1435,12 @@ export class Peer {
                 const lastAlive = state.lastPingRecvMs ?? state.sessionEstablishedAtMs;
                 const currentSessionAlive = Date.now() - lastAlive < FRIEND_TIMEOUT_MS;
                 if (sinceEstablished > 1000 && currentSessionAlive) {
-                    // Half-open breaker. Our session looks alive — but "alive" only means
-                    // WE are receiving (possibly only over the relay). If the peer KEEPS
-                    // proposing a new key, THEIR side can't decrypt our packets: a desynced
-                    // half-open session (observed snoopy↔mac on one LAN as 288k "no session
-                    // matched"). Rejecting forever deadlocks. So count sustained attempts
-                    // and, past the threshold, accept the new key to re-converge. Bounded
-                    // to sustained attempts so it never disturbs a healthy session.
-                    const now = Date.now();
-                    if (state.rehsFirstMs === undefined || now - (state.rehsLastMs ?? 0) > REHS_WINDOW_MS) {
-                        state.rehsFirstMs = now;
-                        state.rehsCount = 0;
-                    }
-                    state.rehsLastMs = now;
-                    state.rehsCount = (state.rehsCount ?? 0) + 1;
-                    const stuck = state.rehsCount >= REHS_ACCEPT_COUNT && now - state.rehsFirstMs >= REHS_ACCEPT_MS;
-                    if (!stuck) {
-                        this.#debugVerboseLog(`hs_recv ignored friend=${friendId} (new session pubkey on live session, attempt ${state.rehsCount}, ${sinceEstablished}ms after establish)`);
-                        return;
-                    }
-                    this.#debugLog(`hs_recv accepting re-handshake friend=${friendId} (half-open breaker: ${state.rehsCount} new-key attempts over ${now - state.rehsFirstMs}ms — peer can't decrypt our session)`);
+                    // Verbose only — peers retransmit handshakes aggressively, so
+                    // this line fires dozens of times per minute on a stuck pair
+                    // and drowns out signal. Visible with DECENT_DEBUG_VERBOSE=1.
+                    this.#debugVerboseLog(`hs_recv ignored friend=${friendId} (new session pubkey on live established session, ${sinceEstablished}ms after establish)`);
+                    return;
                 }
-                // Converging on a fresh session — clear the breaker counter.
-                state.rehsCount = 0;
-                state.rehsFirstMs = undefined;
                 this.#debugLog(`hs_recv accepting re-handshake friend=${friendId} (current session wedged/dead, ` +
                     `lastPingRecv=${state.lastPingRecvMs ? Date.now() - state.lastPingRecvMs + "ms ago" : "never"})`);
             }
@@ -1509,21 +1470,13 @@ export class Peer {
             this.#debugLog(`hs_recv friend=${friendId} initiated=${weInitiated ? 1 : 0} remote=${remote.address}:${remote.port}`);
             if (!wasEstablished) {
                 this.#debugLog(`friend_connected friend=${friendId} remote=${remote.address}:${remote.port}`);
-                // Send our UDP endpoint offer (public srflx + LAN host candidate)
-                // whenever the current path isn't already a same-LAN direct one:
-                //  - relay-only sessions need it to bootstrap a direct UDP path; and
-                //  - sessions that came up over a PUBLIC UDP endpoint (internet
-                //    hairpin) when both peers are actually on the SAME LAN — without
-                //    the offer they never learn each other's 10.x/192.168.x address and
-                //    stay stuck on the public path, which a symmetric / hairpin NAT
-                //    breaks one-way (observed: two boxes on one LAN where each only saw
-                //    the other one-directionally). The peer's same-subnet filter drops
-                //    the LAN candidate when it doesn't apply, so offering is always safe.
-                const r = state.remote;
-                const remoteIsSameLan = !!r && isPrivateAddress(r.host) && !isCgnatAddress(r.host) &&
-                    getPhysicalLanSubnets().some((s) => isInIpv4Subnet(r.host, s));
-                const haveLanToOffer = getPhysicalLanAddresses().some((ip) => isPrivateAddress(ip) && !isCgnatAddress(ip));
-                if ((state.hasTcpRoute && !r) || (!remoteIsSameLan && haveLanToOffer)) {
+                // If we only have a TCP-relay path, immediately tell the peer our
+                // public UDP endpoint so they can hole-punch — don't wait for the
+                // 15s UDP-retry loop, which can miss a flapping relay session's
+                // short-lived establishment window. Both sides do this on every
+                // (re)establishment, so a brief tcp-relay window is enough to
+                // bootstrap the direct UDP path. See docs/UDP-DIRECT-PLAN.md.
+                if (state.hasTcpRoute && !state.remote) {
                     void this.#sendUdpEndpointOffer(friendId).catch(() => undefined);
                 }
             }
@@ -1645,50 +1598,34 @@ export class Peer {
                     innerKind === PACKET_ID_FILE_SENDREQUEST ||
                     innerKind === PACKET_ID_FILE_CONTROL ||
                     innerKind === PACKET_ID_FILE_DATA;
-                // Confirm the transport path + liveness for EVERY decrypted packet —
-                // INCLUDING a dual-send duplicate. Receiving over this transport proves
-                // it works, so this MUST run BEFORE the dedup drop below. Otherwise the
-                // duplicate UDP copy (the relay copy already advanced the buffer) is
-                // dropped without ever marking the direct-UDP path live → lastUdpRecvMs
-                // stays unset → udpFresh false → bulk data (files) never ride the LAN
-                // even when LAN UDP is flowing both ways (the snoopy slow-file bug).
+                if (!isSingleTransportKind && opened.packetNumber < (state.receiveBufferStart ?? 0)) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                state.peerBaseNonce[state.peerBaseNonce.length - 2] = packet[1];
+                state.peerBaseNonce[state.peerBaseNonce.length - 1] = packet[2];
+                incrementNonce(state.peerBaseNonce);
                 state.lastPingRecvMs = Date.now();
+                // Same TCP-vs-UDP rule as the handshake handlers: don't poison
+                // the UDP send-back endpoint when this packet came in via TCP.
                 if (this.#remoteIsTcp(remote)) {
                     state.hasTcpRoute = true;
                 }
                 else if (viaRelay) {
+                    // Arrived over the TURN relay. Track relay freshness separately;
+                    // do NOT set state.remote (that's the direct endpoint). The relay
+                    // address it came from is already in state.relayRemote.
                     if (!state.lastRelayRecvMs) {
                         this.#debugLog(`relay_confirmed friend=${friendId} via=${remote.address}:${remote.port} (TURN relay path live)`);
                     }
                     state.lastRelayRecvMs = Date.now();
                 }
                 else {
-                    // Adopt the source as our send endpoint — but NEVER downgrade from a
-                    // same-LAN (physical) path to a non-LAN source (a hairpin packet via
-                    // the peer's public / Tailscale-exit endpoint must not knock us off
-                    // the direct LAN path, which is strictly better).
-                    const cur = state.remote?.host;
-                    const onSameLanAlready = !!cur && !cur.startsWith("tcp:") && isPrivateAddress(cur) && !isCgnatAddress(cur) &&
-                        getPhysicalLanSubnets().some((s) => isInIpv4Subnet(cur, s));
-                    const incomingSameLan = isPrivateAddress(remote.address) && !isCgnatAddress(remote.address) &&
-                        getPhysicalLanSubnets().some((s) => isInIpv4Subnet(remote.address, s));
-                    if (incomingSameLan || !onSameLanAlready) {
-                        state.remote = { host: remote.address, port: remote.port };
-                    }
+                    state.remote = { host: remote.address, port: remote.port };
                     if (!state.lastUdpRecvMs) {
                         this.#debugLog(`udp_confirmed friend=${friendId} via=${remote.address}:${remote.port} (direct UDP path live)`);
                     }
                     state.lastUdpRecvMs = Date.now();
                 }
-                // De-duplicate: skip the DISPATCH + nonce advance for an already-seen
-                // packet number. The transport confirmation above already ran, so a
-                // duplicate still keeps the path fresh.
-                if (!isSingleTransportKind && opened.packetNumber < (state.receiveBufferStart ?? 0)) {
-                    continue;
-                }
-                state.peerBaseNonce[state.peerBaseNonce.length - 2] = packet[1];
-                state.peerBaseNonce[state.peerBaseNonce.length - 1] = packet[2];
-                incrementNonce(state.peerBaseNonce);
                 state.receiveBufferStart = Math.max(state.receiveBufferStart ?? 0, (opened.packetNumber + 1) >>> 0);
                 const kind = opened.payload[0];
                 const inner = opened.payload.slice(1);
@@ -1841,44 +1778,7 @@ export class Peer {
                 this.#debugVerboseLog(`unknown messenger packet kind ${kind} from ${friendId}`);
                 return;
             }
-            // We received crypto data we can't decrypt from a KNOWN friend: our two
-            // sessions are desynced (different keys) and both are "established", so
-            // neither re-handshakes (#initiateSession no-ops on an established session,
-            // and the lower-pubkey side defers entirely). DELETE the stale session so
-            // the connection loop re-establishes cleanly via the single-initiator path
-            // (higher pubkey initiates a fresh cookie chain, lower responds, both
-            // derive the SAME key). This covers BOTH transports — the desync shows up
-            // over the TCP relay (remote = tcp:<friendId>:0) as well as direct UDP.
-            let desyncedFid;
-            if (this.#remoteIsTcp(remote)) {
-                const m = /^tcp:([A-Za-z0-9]+)/.exec(remote.address);
-                if (m && this.#friendSessions.has(m[1]))
-                    desyncedFid = m[1];
-            }
-            else if (!viaRelay) {
-                for (const [fid, st] of this.#friendSessions.entries()) {
-                    if ((st.remote?.host === remote.address && st.remote?.port === remote.port) ||
-                        (st.endpointCandidates ?? []).some((c) => c.host === remote.address && c.port === remote.port)) {
-                        desyncedFid = fid;
-                        break;
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-            if (desyncedFid) {
-                const st = this.#friendSessions.get(desyncedFid);
-                // Only a GENUINELY stuck session (no successful decrypt for a while) —
-                // never nuke a healthy one on a stray/late undecryptable packet — and
-                // rate-limited via a map that survives the delete.
-                const working = st.lastPingRecvMs !== undefined && Date.now() - st.lastPingRecvMs < REINIT_STUCK_MS;
-                const lastDel = this.#lastDesyncDeleteMs.get(desyncedFid) ?? 0;
-                if (!working && Date.now() - lastDel > REINIT_ON_DESYNC_MS) {
-                    this.#lastDesyncDeleteMs.set(desyncedFid, Date.now());
-                    this.#debugLog(`no-session-matched from ${remote.address} (friend ${desyncedFid}) — desynced, deleting session for clean re-handshake`);
-                    this.#friendSessions.delete(desyncedFid);
-                    void this.#initiateSession(desyncedFid).catch(() => undefined);
-                }
-            }
-            this.#debugVerboseLog(`crypto data received from ${remote.address}:${remote.port} but no session matched`);
+            this.#debugLog(`crypto data received from ${remote.address}:${remote.port} but no session matched`);
             return;
         }
         if (packet[0] === NET_PACKET_ONION_DATA_RESPONSE && this.#announceDataKey) {
@@ -3277,13 +3177,11 @@ export class Peer {
                             resolve();
                         });
                     });
-                    // CRITICAL: a persistent 'error' listener. A TURN send to an
-                    // unresolvable host (DNS NXDOMAIN — e.g. tokyo.fi.chat on a box whose
-                    // resolver doesn't know it) emits an 'error' on this dgram socket;
-                    // with no listener, Node re-throws it as an uncaught exception and
-                    // CRASHES THE ENTIRE DAEMON (observed: snoopy repeatedly dying on
-                    // "getaddrinfo ENOTFOUND tokyo.fi.chat", which churned every session).
-                    // Swallow it — the relay simply won't allocate/relay over this server.
+                    // CRITICAL: persistent 'error' listener. A TURN send to an unresolvable
+                    // host (transient DNS NXDOMAIN, e.g. tokyo.fi.chat) emits an 'error' on
+                    // this dgram socket; with no listener Node re-throws it as an uncaught
+                    // exception and CRASHES THE WHOLE DAEMON (every session dropped, mass
+                    // re-handshake churn). Swallow it — the relay just won't allocate here.
                     sock.on("error", (e) => this.#debugLog(`turn socket error (${srv.host}): ${e.message}`));
                     const client = new TurnClient({
                         sock,
@@ -3453,19 +3351,8 @@ export class Peer {
                     if (++ln >= 6)
                         clearInterval(lanTimer);
                 }, 120);
-                // The physical LAN is strictly better than ANY public path — direct, no
-                // NAT, no relay, and crucially no Tailscale-exit hairpin (a peer whose
-                // internet egresses via Tailscale advertises its exit's public IP as
-                // its srflx, so the "direct" public path actually loops out through
-                // Tailscale and back). So adopt the LAN candidate as session.remote even
-                // when we already have a public "real UDP" remote — UNLESS we're already
-                // on a same-LAN address (don't flap between two LAN candidates). Without
-                // this the session stuck to the public/Tailscale endpoint and never sent
-                // over the LAN (observed: session.remote stayed public, data on relay).
-                const cur = session.remote?.host;
-                const onSameLanAlready = !!cur && !cur.startsWith("tcp:") && isPrivateAddress(cur) && !isCgnatAddress(cur) &&
-                    getPhysicalLanSubnets().some((s) => isInIpv4Subnet(cur, s));
-                if (!onSameLanAlready) {
+                const haveRealUdp = session.remote && !session.remote.host?.startsWith("tcp:") && session.remote.port !== 0;
+                if (!haveRealUdp) {
                     session.remote = { host: lanHost, port: lanPort };
                 }
                 if (session.established) {
@@ -3502,14 +3389,7 @@ export class Peer {
         // upgrading the path to direct UDP in both directions with no new
         // handshake. If UDP never works, the periodic offer re-punches.
         const haveRealUdp = session.remote && !session.remote.host?.startsWith("tcp:") && session.remote.port !== 0;
-        // NEVER point the session at the public srflx when we know a same-LAN
-        // candidate for this peer: the physical LAN is strictly better, and letting
-        // the srflx win here caused a LAN↔public FLAP (the LAN block above set
-        // remote=LAN, then this overwrote it with the Tailscale-exit public IP),
-        // so the direct LAN path never stabilised and udpRecv never confirmed.
-        const haveLanCandidate = (session.endpointCandidates ?? []).some((c) => isPrivateAddress(c.host) && !isCgnatAddress(c.host) &&
-            getPhysicalLanSubnets().some((s) => isInIpv4Subnet(c.host, s)));
-        if (!haveRealUdp && !haveLanCandidate) {
+        if (!haveRealUdp) {
             session.remote = { host, port };
         }
         // Nudge a keepalive out immediately so the upgrade doesn't wait for
@@ -4087,39 +3967,6 @@ export class Peer {
             if (!node.isTcp)
                 void this.#sendDhtPing(node);
         }
-        // 4. LAN-direct upgrade. Re-offer our endpoint (public srflx + LAN host
-        //    candidate) to any established friend whose current path is NOT already
-        //    a same-LAN address, as long as we have a LAN address to advertise. This
-        //    upgrades sessions that came up over a public UDP endpoint (internet
-        //    hairpin) to the direct LAN path even without a re-establish, and self-
-        //    stops once the path becomes same-LAN. The peer's same-subnet filter
-        //    drops the candidate when it doesn't apply, so this is always safe.
-        const haveLan = getPhysicalLanAddresses().some((ip) => isPrivateAddress(ip) && !isCgnatAddress(ip));
-        if (haveLan) {
-            for (const [friendId, session] of this.#friendSessions.entries()) {
-                if (!session.established)
-                    continue;
-                const r = session.remote;
-                const remoteIsSameLan = !!r && isPrivateAddress(r.host) && !isCgnatAddress(r.host) &&
-                    getPhysicalLanSubnets().some((s) => isInIpv4Subnet(r.host, s));
-                if (!remoteIsSameLan) {
-                    // If we ALREADY hold a same-LAN candidate for this peer (learned from
-                    // an earlier offer), switch the session onto it NOW — don't wait to
-                    // receive yet another offer at exactly the right moment. That delay is
-                    // what kept sessions stuck on the public/Tailscale-hairpin path after
-                    // the staggered restarts. Then send a keepalive over the LAN so the
-                    // peer learns our LAN source and replies over it; the downgrade guard
-                    // keeps us there once it sticks.
-                    const lanCand = (session.endpointCandidates ?? []).find((c) => isPrivateAddress(c.host) && !isCgnatAddress(c.host) &&
-                        getPhysicalLanSubnets().some((s) => isInIpv4Subnet(c.host, s)));
-                    if (lanCand) {
-                        session.remote = { host: lanCand.host, port: lanCand.port };
-                        void this.#sendMessengerPacket(friendId, PACKET_ID_ALIVE, new Uint8Array()).catch(() => undefined);
-                    }
-                    void this.#sendUdpEndpointOffer(friendId).catch(() => undefined);
-                }
-            }
-        }
     }
     /**
      * Send an onion DHT-PK announcement to a friend so they learn our DHT
@@ -5052,15 +4899,7 @@ function isInIpv4Subnet(host, subnet) {
 // path onto the overlay or loops into our own mesh, then silently falls back to
 // the relay — the snoopy/lili "lastUdpRecv=never -> bufferbloat" path. (lili
 // runs Tailscale; that's exactly this.)
-// Names of interfaces that are NOT a real physical LAN — overlays (tailscale,
-// zerotier, wireguard, the agentnet TUN), and especially container/VM bridges.
-// Docker creates `docker0` AND per-network `br-<hash>` bridges (172.x); libvirt
-// `virbr0`; k8s `cni0`/`flannel`/`kube`. These were leaking their 172.x address
-// into the LAN host-candidate offer, so a peer on a real 10.x LAN advertised a
-// Docker-bridge IP its LAN partner could never match → LAN-direct never engaged
-// (observed: two boxes on one 10.0.0.0/24 stuck hairpinning through the public
-// internet). `^bridge` did NOT cover `br-…`.
-const VIRTUAL_IFACE_RE = /^(utun|tun|tap|wg|tailscale|zt|ham|agentnet|awdl|llw|gif|stf|bridge|br-|virbr|cni|flannel|weave|kube|vnet|vnic|vmnet|veth|docker)/i;
+const VIRTUAL_IFACE_RE = /^(utun|tun|tap|wg|tailscale|zt|ham|agentnet|awdl|llw|gif|stf|bridge|vnic|vmnet|veth|docker)/i;
 /** True for RFC 6598 carrier-grade-NAT space 100.64.0.0/10 (Tailscale's range). */
 function isCgnatAddress(host) {
     const o = host.split(".");

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@decentnetwork/peer",
-  "version": "0.1.64",
+  "version": "0.1.66",
   "description": "Pure TypeScript port of Elastos Carrier (toxcore-derived) P2P messaging. DHT, onion routing, TCP relay, FlatBuffers app payloads, Express offline relay. Wire-compatible with iOS Beagle and the Carrier C SDK.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",