@de-otio/trellis 0.11.0 → 0.12.1

package/src/lambda/media-processing-worker.ts

@@ -1,71 +1,520 @@
-import type { SQSHandler } from "aws-lambda";
-import { S3Client, GetObjectCommand, PutObjectCommand } from "@aws-sdk/client-s3";
+// media-processing-worker.ts — the P0b media-processing orchestration SHELL.
+//
+// This is the imperative shell over the pure functional-core media units. It is
+// NOT itself a functional-core unit: it performs I/O (object storage, transcode,
+// transcription, moderation, DB writes). BUT all of that I/O arrives through
+// INJECTED capability seams (TranscodePort / StoragePort / TranscribePort /
+// MediaModerationProvider) and a Prisma-shaped persistence port, so the
+// orchestration logic is exercised in unit tests against the B0 in-memory Mocks
+// — no real cloud, no real encoder, no real DB.
+//
+// Per the seam discipline (see lib/media/media-ports.ts and
+// lib/media/moderation-provider.ts): CORE ships the interfaces + mocks; the
+// consuming app (Skybber) injects the concrete cloud adapters at startup via
+// `setMediaProcessingDeps()`. Until they are injected, the handler fails CLOSED
+// (throws → SQS retry), never silently approves or drops work.
+//
+// Fail-closed posture, end to end:
+//   - A key that is not a well-formed `pending/{tenant}/{upload}` key is dropped
+//     (ack) and NEVER written under — the re-trigger-loop guard.
+//   - The tenant is re-derived FROM THE ROW, and the triggering key must equal
+//     pendingKey(rowTenant, uploadId); a mismatch is a hard reject (poison →
+//     REVIEW + ack), so a forged/odd key cannot make us moderate the wrong cas/.
+//   - Over-cap duration is poison → REVIEW + ack (no transcode attempted).
+//   - The worker ONLY starts moderation jobs + persists their jobIds; it never
+//     fetches verdicts (a separate poller owns fan-in). Moderation runs on the
+//     cleaned bytes at the STAGING key, NOT the raw pending upload — and the
+//     cleaned bytes are NOT written to cas/ here. cas/ is the CDN-served prefix,
+//     so it must only ever hold APPROVED cleaned bytes; the completion worker
+//     promotes staging -> cas/ on approval ("cleaned-staging, promote-on-approval").
+//   - classifyWorkerError() splits permanent media/payload defects (poison →
+//     REVIEW + ack, no DLQ loop) from transient infra faults (retryable → throw
+//     → SQS retry → DLQ + alert backstop).
+
+import type { SQSHandler, SQSRecord, SQSBatchResponse } from "aws-lambda";
 import { Logger } from "@aws-lambda-powertools/logger";
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
 
-const logger = new Logger({ serviceName: "media-processing-worker" });
+import {
+  pendingKey,
+  casKey,
+  isCasKeyError,
+} from "../lib/media/cas-keys.js";
+import { exceedsDurationCap } from "../lib/media/duration-cap.js";
+import { classifyWorkerError } from "../lib/media/classify-worker-error.js";
+import type { Track } from "../lib/media/track-verdict.js";
+import type {
+  StoragePort,
+  TranscodePort,
+  TranscribePort,
+} from "../lib/media/media-ports.js";
+import type {
+  MediaModerationProvider,
+  S3Ref,
+} from "../lib/media/moderation-provider.js";
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Injected persistence + config seams
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * The minimal MediaFile row shape the worker reads. Re-declared (not imported
+ * from the Prisma client) so this module compiles in worktrees that have not
+ * regenerated the client, mirroring moderation-status.ts's discipline. The
+ * shell maps the real Prisma row to this shape at the persistence-port boundary.
+ */
+export interface MediaFileRow {
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly tenantId: string;
+  readonly uploadId: string | null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A copy of the operative moderation thresholds, snapshotted at job-submission
+ * time so historical decisions stay auditable after a threshold change. The
+ * shape mirrors Env.media.thresholds; the worker treats it as an opaque JSON
+ * blob and never reads individual values (no compiled threshold logic here).
+ */
+export type ThresholdSnapshot = Record<
+  string,
+  { review: number; quarantine: number }
+>;
+
+/**
+ * The persistence operations the worker needs, narrowed to exactly what it
+ * uses. Implemented in production by a thin Prisma adapter; in tests by an
+ * in-memory fake. Keeping this narrow keeps the worker testable without the
+ * generated client and documents the worker's full DB surface in one place.
+ */
+export interface MediaPersistencePort {
+  /** Load the MediaFile row for an upload session, or null if none exists. */
+  findMediaByUploadId(uploadId: string): Promise<MediaFileRow | null>;
+  /** Persist a started per-track moderation job with its threshold snapshot. */
+  createModerationJob(input: {
+    mediaId: string;
+    track: Track;
+    jobId: string;
+    thresholdSnapshot: ThresholdSnapshot;
+  }): Promise<void>;
+  /**
+   * Persist the REAL content identity of the cleaned bytes onto the MediaFile
+   * row, replacing the upload-time `uploadId` placeholder contentHash with the
+   * SHA-256 of the transcoded output and recording the future serve key. The
+   * completion worker derives the promote target (`cas/{tenant}/{hash}`) from
+   * this persisted `contentHash`, so this write MUST happen before moderation
+   * fans in — otherwise the object can never promote.
+   */
+  persistCleanedContent(
+    mediaId: string,
+    content: { contentHash: string; originalKey: string },
+  ): Promise<void>;
+  /** Drive a media object's moderationStatus to REVIEW (poison path). */
+  markMediaForReview(mediaId: string): Promise<void>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The slice of Env.media this worker consumes. Operational parameters arrive
+ * here as VALUES sourced from Env.media — never as literals in this file.
+ */
+export interface MediaProcessingConfig {
+  /** Hard duration cap (seconds). From Env.media.maxDurationSeconds. */
+  readonly maxDurationSeconds: number;
+  /** Current operative thresholds, snapshotted onto each started job. */
+  readonly thresholds: ThresholdSnapshot;
+}
+
+/**
+ * All capability seams the orchestration core binds to. The handler builds this
+ * from the injected concrete adapters; tests build it from the B0 Mocks + an
+ * in-memory persistence fake.
+ */
+export interface MediaProcessingDeps {
+  readonly storage: StoragePort;
+  readonly transcode: TranscodePort;
+  readonly transcribe: TranscribePort;
+  readonly moderation: MediaModerationProvider;
+  readonly persistence: MediaPersistencePort;
+  readonly config: MediaProcessingConfig;
+  /** The object-storage bucket handle moderation/transcription refs carry. */
+  readonly bucket: string;
+  /**
+   * Deterministic job-name factory for transcription/idempotency. Injected so
+   * the shell stays free of Date.now/Math.random in tests; production passes a
+   * uuid/time-based generator. `seed` is a stable per-call input (the cas key).
+   */
+  readonly newJobName: (seed: string) => string;
+  readonly logger: Pick<Logger, "info" | "warn" | "error">;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Per-record outcome
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * The disposition of one SQS record after orchestration.
+ *
+ * - `ack`  — remove from the queue (success, drop-non-pending, or poison routed
+ *            to REVIEW). A poison ack carries `poison: true` for observability.
+ * - `fail` — leave on the queue for SQS to retry (transient/retryable fault).
+ *            The handler maps this to a batchItemFailure.
+ */
+export type RecordOutcome =
+  | { readonly disposition: "ack"; readonly reason: string; readonly poison?: boolean }
+  | { readonly disposition: "fail"; readonly reason: string };
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Key parsing — pending/{tenantId}/{uploadId}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Parse a triggering key as a `pending/{tenantId}/{uploadId}` key, validating
+ * the FORM by round-tripping the parsed parts back through `pendingKey()`. A
+ * key only parses if rebuilding it from its parts yields the identical string —
+ * so a path-traversal payload, extra segments, or a malformed id can never pass
+ * (cas-keys.ts owns the anchored allowlists).
+ *
+ * @returns the {tenantId, uploadId} when the key is a canonical pending key,
+ *          or null for ANY other key (which the caller ack-drops; we never
+ *          write outputs under pending/, so a non-pending key is not our work).
+ */
+export function parsePendingKey(
+  key: string,
+): { tenantId: string; uploadId: string } | null {
+  const parts = key.split("/");
+  if (parts.length !== 3 || parts[0] !== "pending") {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const tenantId = parts[1];
+  const uploadId = parts[2];
+  const rebuilt = pendingKey(tenantId, uploadId);
+  if (isCasKeyError(rebuilt) || rebuilt !== key) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  return { tenantId, uploadId };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// S3-event-over-SQS extraction
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/** Every object key referenced by one SQS record's S3 event notification. */
+export function extractObjectKeys(recordBody: string): string[] {
+  const parsed = JSON.parse(recordBody) as {
+    Records?: Array<{ s3?: { object?: { key?: string } } }>;
+  };
+  const s3Records = parsed.Records ?? [];
+  const keys: string[] = [];
+  for (const r of s3Records) {
+    const raw = r?.s3?.object?.key;
+    if (typeof raw === "string") {
+      // S3 URL-encodes keys and uses '+' for spaces in notifications.
+      keys.push(decodeURIComponent(raw.replace(/\+/g, " ")));
+    }
+  }
+  return keys;
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Typed errors the orchestration core throws internally
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/** A permanent payload defect: the key did not match the row's tenant/upload. */
+class KeyTenantMismatchError extends Error {
+  constructor() {
+    // The name is in classify-worker-error's poison fragment set ("validation").
+    super("media key/tenant validation mismatch: triggering key does not match the row");
+    this.name = "ValidationError";
+  }
+}
+
+/** A permanent payload defect: the probed duration exceeds the configured cap. */
+class DurationCapExceededError extends Error {
+  constructor() {
+    super("media duration cap exceeded");
+    this.name = "DurationCapExceeded";
+  }
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Orchestration core — testable against the B0 Mocks
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/**
+ * Orchestrate processing for ONE already-extracted object key.
+ *
+ * Steps (every uncertainty fails closed; nothing here can yield APPROVED):
+ *  1. Reject any key that is not a canonical `pending/{tenant}/{upload}` key —
+ *     ack-drop it; outputs are NEVER written under pending/.
+ *  2. Load the MediaFile row by uploadId; re-derive tenant FROM THE ROW and
+ *     assert pendingKey(rowTenant, uploadId) === the triggering key. Mismatch
+ *     (or missing/uploadId-less row) is a hard reject → REVIEW + ack.
+ *  3. Probe duration; over-cap ⇒ poison ⇒ REVIEW + ack (no transcode).
+ *  4. Transcode-and-discard ⇒ cleaned bytes at the STAGING key (read back from
+ *     the cleaned key). The cleaned bytes are NOT written to cas/ here — cas/ is
+ *     the CDN-served prefix and must hold only APPROVED bytes (promotion happens
+ *     in the completion worker).
+ *  5. Hash the cleaned bytes ⇒ realHash; PERSIST {contentHash: realHash,
+ *     originalKey: casKey(tenant, realHash)} onto the row, replacing the
+ *     upload-time uploadId placeholder so the completion worker can derive the
+ *     promote target.
+ *  6. START moderation on the cleaned STAGING object (NOT the raw pending upload,
+ *     NOT a cas/ key) — moderation must run on EXACTLY the bytes that will be
+ *     served: provider.startVideoModeration ⇒ persist VISUAL job (+ threshold
+ *     snapshot); transcribe.startTranscription ⇒ persist AUDIO job (+ snapshot).
+ *     The worker only STARTS jobs + persists jobIds; it never fetches verdicts.
+ */
+export async function processObjectKey(
+  triggeringKey: string,
+  deps: MediaProcessingDeps,
+): Promise<RecordOutcome> {
+  try {
+    // --- 1. Pending-key form gate (re-trigger-loop guard). ---
+    const parsed = parsePendingKey(triggeringKey);
+    if (parsed === null) {
+      deps.logger.info("Dropping non-pending key (not our work)", {
+        key: triggeringKey,
+      });
+      return { disposition: "ack", reason: "non-pending-key" };
+    }
+    const { uploadId } = parsed;
+
+    // --- 2. Load row; re-derive tenant FROM THE ROW; assert key match. ---
+    const row = await deps.persistence.findMediaByUploadId(uploadId);
+    if (row === null || row.uploadId === null) {
+      // No row, or a row that lost its upload session — cannot certify this
+      // object. Permanent w.r.t. these bytes: fail closed to human review.
+      throw new KeyTenantMismatchError();
+    }
+    const rowTenant = row.tenantId;
+    const expectedKey = pendingKey(rowTenant, uploadId);
+    if (isCasKeyError(expectedKey) || expectedKey !== triggeringKey) {
+      // The triggering key's tenant segment disagrees with the owning tenant,
+      // OR the row's tenant is itself malformed. Either way: hard reject.
+      throw new KeyTenantMismatchError();
+    }
 
-const s3 = new S3Client({ region: process.env.AWS_REGION });
+    // --- 3. Duration cap (probe BEFORE transcoding — cost + abuse guard). ---
+    const probed = await deps.transcode.probeDurationSeconds(triggeringKey);
+    if (exceedsDurationCap(probed, deps.config.maxDurationSeconds)) {
+      throw new DurationCapExceededError();
+    }
+
+    // --- 4. Transcode-and-discard ⇒ cleaned bytes. ---
+    // The cleaned output is written to a transient staging key OUTSIDE pending/
+    // (so re-uploading the cleaned bytes can never re-trigger this worker).
+    const cleanedStagingKey = `processing/${rowTenant}/${uploadId}`;
+    const posterStagingKey = `processing/${rowTenant}/${uploadId}.poster`;
+    const transcodeResult = await deps.transcode.transcodeVideo({
+      inputPath: triggeringKey,
+      outputPath: cleanedStagingKey,
+      posterPath: posterStagingKey,
+      maxDurationSeconds: deps.config.maxDurationSeconds,
+    });
+    const cleanedStagingKeyOut = transcodeResult.cleanedPath;
+    const cleanedBytes = await deps.storage.getObject(cleanedStagingKeyOut);
+
+    // --- 5. Hash the CLEANED bytes ⇒ real content identity; persist it. ---
+    // We do NOT write the cleaned bytes to cas/ here: they already live at the
+    // STAGING key, and cas/ (the CDN-served prefix) must only ever hold APPROVED
+    // bytes. We persist the real hash + future serve key so the completion
+    // worker can promote staging -> cas/ on approval.
+    const contentHash = createHash("sha256").update(cleanedBytes).digest("hex");
+    const cleanedCasKey = casKey(rowTenant, contentHash);
+    if (isCasKeyError(cleanedCasKey)) {
+      // The hash/tenant failed the CAS allowlist — a permanent defect in our own
+      // derivation inputs (e.g. a malformed tenant that slipped the row check).
+      // Fail closed: route to review rather than serve un-addressable bytes.
+      throw new KeyTenantMismatchError();
+    }
+    // Replace the upload-time uploadId placeholder contentHash with the REAL
+    // hash and record the future serve key (cas/{tenant}/{hash}).
+    await deps.persistence.persistCleanedContent(row.id, {
+      contentHash,
+      originalKey: cleanedCasKey,
+    });
 
-export const handler: SQSHandler = async (event) => {
-  const failedIds: string[] = [];
+    // --- 6. START moderation on the CLEANED STAGING object (the exact bytes ---
+    // that will be served), NOT the raw pending upload and NOT a cas/ key.
+    const stagingRef: S3Ref = { bucket: deps.bucket, key: cleanedStagingKeyOut };
 
+    const visual = await deps.moderation.startVideoModeration(stagingRef);
+    await deps.persistence.createModerationJob({
+      mediaId: row.id,
+      track: "VISUAL",
+      jobId: visual.jobId,
+      // Snapshot the CURRENT operative thresholds onto the job at submission.
+      thresholdSnapshot: deps.config.thresholds,
+    });
+
+    const audio = await deps.transcribe.startTranscription({
+      key: cleanedStagingKeyOut,
+      jobName: deps.newJobName(cleanedStagingKeyOut),
+    });
+    await deps.persistence.createModerationJob({
+      mediaId: row.id,
+      track: "AUDIO",
+      jobId: audio.jobId,
+      thresholdSnapshot: deps.config.thresholds,
+    });
+
+    deps.logger.info("Started per-track moderation jobs", {
+      mediaId: row.id,
+      stagingKey: cleanedStagingKeyOut,
+      casKey: cleanedCasKey,
+      visualJobId: visual.jobId,
+      audioJobId: audio.jobId,
+    });
+
+    return { disposition: "ack", reason: "started-moderation" };
+  } catch (err) {
+    // Single classification point: poison ⇒ REVIEW + ack; retryable ⇒ fail.
+    const klass = classifyWorkerError(err);
+    if (klass === "poison") {
+      // Best-effort route to REVIEW. If we can identify the row, mark it; if we
+      // cannot (e.g. the failure was the row lookup itself), there is nothing to
+      // mark and the ack simply drops a message that would loop forever.
+      const reviewReason = await routePoisonToReview(triggeringKey, deps, err);
+      return { disposition: "ack", reason: reviewReason, poison: true };
+    }
+    deps.logger.error("Retryable media-processing fault — letting SQS retry", {
+      key: triggeringKey,
+      error: err,
+    });
+    return { disposition: "fail", reason: "retryable" };
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Best-effort: drive the owning MediaFile to REVIEW for a poison failure. Never
+ * throws — a failure to mark must not convert a poison ack into an infinite
+ * retry. Returns an observability reason string.
+ */
+async function routePoisonToReview(
+  triggeringKey: string,
+  deps: MediaProcessingDeps,
+  cause: unknown,
+): Promise<string> {
+  deps.logger.warn("Poison media — routing to REVIEW + ack", {
+    key: triggeringKey,
+    error: cause,
+  });
+  const parsed = parsePendingKey(triggeringKey);
+  if (parsed === null) {
+    return "poison-no-row";
+  }
+  try {
+    const row = await deps.persistence.findMediaByUploadId(parsed.uploadId);
+    if (row === null) {
+      return "poison-no-row";
+    }
+    await deps.persistence.markMediaForReview(row.id);
+    return "poison-review";
+  } catch (markErr) {
+    deps.logger.error("Failed to mark poison media for REVIEW (acking anyway)", {
+      key: triggeringKey,
+      error: markErr,
+    });
+    return "poison-mark-failed";
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Process one SQS record (which may carry several S3 object keys). The record
+ * fails (SQS retry) iff ANY of its keys produced a retryable fault; otherwise
+ * it is acked. Per-key poison is acked, never failed.
+ */
+export async function processRecord(
+  record: SQSRecord,
+  deps: MediaProcessingDeps,
+): Promise<RecordOutcome> {
+  let keys: string[];
+  try {
+    keys = extractObjectKeys(record.body);
+  } catch (err) {
+    // A body we cannot even parse is a permanent payload defect (poison): a
+    // retry re-parses the same bytes to the same failure. Ack to avoid a loop.
+    deps.logger.warn("Unparseable SQS record body — acking as poison", {
+      messageId: record.messageId,
+      error: err,
+    });
+    return { disposition: "ack", reason: "unparseable-body", poison: true };
+  }
+
+  for (const key of keys) {
+    const outcome = await processObjectKey(key, deps);
+    if (outcome.disposition === "fail") {
+      // First retryable key fails the whole record; SQS redelivers it. Already-
+      // started keys are idempotent on the dedupe path (deriveDedupeKey).
+      return outcome;
+    }
+  }
+  return { disposition: "ack", reason: "record-complete" };
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Deps injection seam (consuming app wires concrete adapters at startup)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+let injectedDeps: MediaProcessingDeps | undefined;
+
+/**
+ * Inject the concrete media-processing seams. The consuming app (Skybber) calls
+ * this once at Lambda cold start with its ffmpeg/MediaConvert TranscodePort, S3
+ * StoragePort, Transcribe TranscribePort, injected MediaModerationProvider, and
+ * a Prisma-backed MediaPersistencePort. Core ships NO concrete adapters.
+ */
+export function setMediaProcessingDeps(deps: MediaProcessingDeps): void {
+  injectedDeps = deps;
+}
+
+/** Test helper: clear injected deps between cases. */
+export function __resetMediaProcessingDeps(): void {
+  injectedDeps = undefined;
+}
+
+const logger = new Logger({ serviceName: "media-processing-worker" });
+
+/**
+ * The SQS entry point. Preserves `reportBatchItemFailures` semantics: only the
+ * messageIds whose records produced a retryable fault are returned as batch
+ * item failures; everything else (success / drop / poison→REVIEW) is acked by
+ * omission.
+ *
+ * If no concrete deps were injected, the handler fails CLOSED: it throws, so the
+ * whole batch is retried rather than silently dropped. An un-wired worker must
+ * never ack-drop real uploads.
+ */
+export const handler: SQSHandler = async (event): Promise<SQSBatchResponse> => {
+  if (injectedDeps === undefined) {
+    // Fail closed: no backend wired ⇒ retry the batch, never drop. The
+    // consuming app must call setMediaProcessingDeps() at startup.
+    logger.error(
+      "media-processing-worker invoked with no injected deps — refusing to" +
+        " process. Call setMediaProcessingDeps() at cold start.",
+    );
+    throw new Error("media-processing-worker: deps not injected");
+  }
+  const deps = injectedDeps;
+
+  const batchItemFailures: { itemIdentifier: string }[] = [];
   for (const record of event.Records) {
+    let outcome: RecordOutcome;
     try {
-      // S3 event notification comes via SQS
-      const s3Event = JSON.parse(record.body);
-      const s3Records = s3Event.Records || [];
-
-      for (const s3Record of s3Records) {
-        const bucket = s3Record.s3.bucket.name;
-        const key = decodeURIComponent(s3Record.s3.object.key.replace(/\+/g, " "));
-
-        if (!key.startsWith("originals/")) continue;
-
-        // Get original
-        const original = await s3.send(new GetObjectCommand({ Bucket: bucket, Key: key }));
-        const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
-        for await (const chunk of original.Body as AsyncIterable<Uint8Array>) {
-          chunks.push(chunk);
-        }
-        const buffer = Buffer.concat(chunks);
-
-        // Process with Sharp (must be installed as ARM64 binary)
-        // dynamic import to avoid bundling issues
-        const sharp = (await import("sharp")).default;
-        const hash = key.split("/").pop()!.replace(/\.[^.]+$/, "");
-
-        // Thumbnail: 300px WebP
-        const thumbnail = await sharp(buffer)
-          .resize(300, 300, { fit: "cover" })
-          .webp({ quality: 80 })
-          .toBuffer();
-
-        // Optimized: 1200px WebP
-        const optimized = await sharp(buffer)
-          .resize(1200, 1200, { fit: "inside", withoutEnlargement: true })
-          .webp({ quality: 85 })
-          .toBuffer();
-
-        await Promise.all([
-          s3.send(new PutObjectCommand({
-            Bucket: bucket, Key: `thumbnails/${hash}.webp`,
-            Body: thumbnail, ContentType: "image/webp",
-          })),
-          s3.send(new PutObjectCommand({
-            Bucket: bucket, Key: `optimized/${hash}.webp`,
-            Body: optimized, ContentType: "image/webp",
-          })),
-        ]);
-
-        logger.info("Media processed", { key, hash });
-      }
+      outcome = await processRecord(record, deps);
     } catch (err) {
-      logger.error("Media processing failed", { error: err, messageId: record.messageId });
-      failedIds.push(record.messageId);
+      // Defensive: processRecord is designed not to throw, but if it does, treat
+      // it as retryable (fail closed for retry; DLQ + alert is the backstop).
+      logger.error("Unexpected throw from processRecord — retrying record", {
+        messageId: record.messageId,
+        error: err,
+      });
+      batchItemFailures.push({ itemIdentifier: record.messageId });
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (outcome.disposition === "fail") {
+      batchItemFailures.push({ itemIdentifier: record.messageId });
     }
   }
 
-  if (failedIds.length > 0) {
-    return { batchItemFailures: failedIds.map((id) => ({ itemIdentifier: id })) };
-  }
+  return { batchItemFailures };
 };