@de-otio/trellis 0.11.0 → 0.12.0

package/dist/lib/exif-stripper.js

@@ -1,59 +1,119 @@
 /**
- * EXIF Stripping Utility
+ * EXIF strip verification helper (T6).
  *
- * PREPARATORY CHANGE: This utility is created now but not yet used in production.
- * It will be enabled when implementing location safety features for at-risk users.
+ * The byte-level strip is a CONSEQUENCE of T7's re-encode: sharp re-encoding
+ * without `.withMetadata()` drops all embedded metadata (EXIF, GPS, ICC,
+ * maker-notes). This module provides the POST-encode assertion that the strip
+ * actually happened — used defensively at runtime and as the verification
+ * contract in tests.
  *
- * Removes EXIF data from images for privacy.
- * Can be enabled/disabled via configuration.
+ * The old placeholder `stripEXIF()` is preserved below with a narrowed
+ * signature so existing callers compile; it delegates to the re-encode and is
+ * deprecated. New code must call `assertNoExif` after `reencodeImage`.
  *
- * FUTURE USE:
- * - When EXIF_STRIPPING_ENABLED=true, this utility will strip EXIF data from
- *   uploaded images before storing them
- * - Prevents location data, device info, and timestamps from being embedded in images
- * - Helps protect user privacy, especially for at-risk users
+ * GPS coordinates are NOT persisted: `gpsLatitude`/`gpsLongitude` columns
+ * were removed in T8's schema migration. Nothing in this file or the upload
+ * handler writes those fields.
  */
+import exifr from "exifr";
 /**
- * Strip EXIF data from image buffer
+ * Parse the EXIF/IPTC/GPS/ICC metadata embedded in `imageBytes` and return
+ * it as a flat object. Returns `undefined` when exifr finds nothing.
  *
- * FUTURE USE: This function will be called during media upload processing
- * to remove EXIF data from images before storing them in R2.
+ * Exported for use in tests (assert the object is empty/undefined after
+ * re-encode) and as an optional runtime defensive check.
+ */
+export async function parseMetadata(imageBytes) {
+    const buf = imageBytes instanceof Buffer
+        ? imageBytes
+        : Buffer.from(imageBytes instanceof ArrayBuffer
+            ? imageBytes
+            : imageBytes.buffer);
+    try {
+        // Parse all segments: EXIF (including GPS), IPTC, ICC, XMP.
+        const parsed = await exifr.parse(buf, {
+            gps: true,
+            icc: true,
+            iptc: true,
+            xmp: true,
+            makerNote: true,
+            userComment: true,
+        });
+        return parsed;
+    }
+    catch {
+        // If exifr cannot parse the buffer it throws (unknown format, truncated
+        // data, etc.). Treat as "no metadata found" — the bytes are already
+        // re-encoded clean raster pixels.
+        return undefined;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Keys that are considered benign structural PNG chunk fields — not EXIF or
+ * privacy-sensitive metadata. exifr parses these from the PNG IHDR/iCCP chunks,
+ * but they are format metadata, not user metadata.
+ */
+const PNG_STRUCTURAL_KEYS = new Set([
+    "ImageWidth",
+    "ImageHeight",
+    "BitDepth",
+    "ColorType",
+    "Compression",
+    "Filter",
+    "Interlace",
+]);
+/**
+ * Privacy-sensitive metadata keys that must NOT appear in re-encoded output.
+ * Any of these keys present after re-encode indicates `.withMetadata()` was
+ * mistakenly added or sharp is re-adding metadata.
+ */
+const SENSITIVE_EXIF_PREFIXES = [
+    "GPS", // GPS coordinates
+    "Make", // camera maker (maker-notes gateway)
+    "Model", // camera model
+    "Software",
+    "DateTime",
+    "Orientation",
+    "ExifIFD",
+    "InteropIFD",
+];
+/**
+ * Assert that `imageBytes` contains NO privacy-sensitive embedded metadata
+ * (EXIF GPS, ICC, maker-notes, camera info). Benign PNG structural fields
+ * (ImageWidth, ColorType, etc.) are excluded from this check since exifr
+ * parses them from the PNG format header, not from EXIF APP1 segments.
  *
- * NOTE: This is currently a placeholder implementation.
- * When implementing, use a library like 'piexifjs' or 'exifr' to actually
- * remove EXIF data from the image buffer.
+ * Call this on the OUTPUT of `reencodeImage` to confirm the re-encode dropped
+ * all user/device metadata. Useful both in tests and as an optional defensive
+ * runtime check.
  *
- * @param imageBuffer - Image buffer to process
- * @param config - Stripping configuration
- * @returns Processed image buffer (with EXIF removed if enabled)
+ * @throws `Error` when privacy-sensitive metadata is present.
+ */
+export async function assertNoExif(imageBytes) {
+    const metadata = await parseMetadata(imageBytes);
+    if (metadata === undefined)
+        return;
+    const sensitiveKeys = Object.keys(metadata).filter((k) => !PNG_STRUCTURAL_KEYS.has(k) &&
+        SENSITIVE_EXIF_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => k.startsWith(prefix)));
+    if (sensitiveKeys.length > 0) {
+        throw new Error(`Re-encoded image still contains privacy-sensitive metadata (keys: ${sensitiveKeys.join(", ")}). ` +
+            "Ensure reencodeImage is called without .withMetadata().");
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * @deprecated The strip now happens as a side-effect of `reencodeImage`
+ * (T7). This function is a no-op passthrough kept solely so the existing
+ * test suite compiles without change. Do not call in new code.
  */
 export async function stripEXIF(imageBuffer, config = {
     enabled: true,
     removeLocation: true,
     removeDeviceInfo: true,
-    removeTimestamp: false, // Keep timestamp for now (can be enabled later)
+    removeTimestamp: false,
 }) {
-    if (!config.enabled) {
-        return imageBuffer;
-    }
-    // TODO: Implement actual EXIF stripping using a library
-    // FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION:
-    // 1. Install library: npm install piexifjs or npm install exifr
-    // 2. Parse EXIF data from image buffer
-    // 3. Remove location data if removeLocation=true
-    // 4. Remove device info if removeDeviceInfo=true
-    // 5. Remove timestamp if removeTimestamp=true
-    // 6. Reconstruct image buffer without EXIF data
-    //
-    // Example with piexifjs:
-    // import piexif from 'piexifjs';
-    // const exifObj = piexif.load(imageBuffer);
-    // if (config.removeLocation) delete exifObj['GPS'];
-    // if (config.removeDeviceInfo) delete exifObj['0th'][piexif.ImageIFD.Make];
-    // const newBuffer = piexif.dump(exifObj);
-    // return newBuffer;
-    // For now, return buffer as-is (no breaking changes)
-    // This allows the utility to exist and be called without affecting current behavior
+    // Pass-through: the strip is done by reencodeImage (T7). The config
+    // parameter is accepted to keep the call-site signature stable.
+    void config;
     return imageBuffer;
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=exif-stripper.js.map

package/dist/lib/exif-stripper.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"exif-stripper.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/lib/exif-stripper.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AAEH,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;AAE1B;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,aAAa,CACjC,UAA6C;IAE7C,MAAM,GAAG,GACP,UAAU,YAAY,MAAM;QAC1B,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU;QACZ,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CACT,UAAU,YAAY,WAAW;YAC/B,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU;YACZ,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,MAAM,CACtB,CAAC;IAER,IAAI,CAAC;QACH,4DAA4D;QAC5D,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE;YACpC,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI;YACT,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI;YACT,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI;YACV,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI;YACT,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI;YACf,WAAW,EAAE,IAAI;SAClB,CAAC,CAAC;QACH,OAAO,MAA6C,CAAC;IACvD,CAAC;IAAC,MAAM,CAAC;QACP,wEAAwE;QACxE,oEAAoE;QACpE,kCAAkC;QAClC,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;IACnB,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC;IAClC,YAAY;IACZ,aAAa;IACb,UAAU;IACV,WAAW;IACX,aAAa;IACb,QAAQ;IACR,WAAW;CACZ,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG;IAC9B,KAAK,EAAK,kBAAkB;IAC5B,MAAM,EAAI,qCAAqC;IAC/C,OAAO,EAAG,eAAe;IACzB,UAAU;IACV,UAAU;IACV,aAAa;IACb,SAAS;IACT,YAAY;CACb,CAAC;AAEF;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,YAAY,CAChC,UAA6C;IAE7C,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;IACjD,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,SAAS;QAAE,OAAO;IAEnC,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAChD,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CACJ,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC3B,uBAAuB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CACjE,CAAC;IAEF,IAAI,aAAa,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7B,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,qEAAqE,aAAa,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK;YAChG,yDAAyD,CAC5D,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AAgBD;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,SAAS,CAC7B,WAAwB,EACxB,SAA6B;IAC3B,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI;IACb,cAAc,EAAE,IAAI;IACpB,gBAAgB,EAAE,IAAI;IACtB,eAAe,EAAE,KAAK;CACvB;IAED,oEAAoE;IACpE,gEAAgE;IAChE,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC;IACZ,OAAO,WAAW,CAAC;AACrB,CAAC"}

package/dist/lib/media/cas-keys.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/**
+ * Canonical tenant-scoped CAS key builder.
+ *
+ * Provides the ONE canonical key scheme (D18) for content-addressed storage,
+ * replacing multiple conflicting schemes. All storage paths MUST go through
+ * these builders — never hand-roll a key string elsewhere.
+ *
+ * Keys are pure functions: no I/O, no clock, no external dependencies.
+ */
+/**
+ * Allowed derivative presets for a CAS object.
+ * Only values in this union are accepted by casKey(); all other strings are rejected.
+ */
+export type CasPreset = "thumbnail" | "optimized";
+export type CasKeyError = {
+    kind: "invalid_hash";
+    raw: string;
+} | {
+    kind: "invalid_tenant_id";
+    raw: string;
+} | {
+    kind: "invalid_upload_id";
+    raw: string;
+} | {
+    kind: "invalid_preset";
+    raw: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Validate and lowercase-normalize an inbound content hash.
+ *
+ * Used at BOTH the upload boundary AND the serve entry point before any key
+ * construction or DB lookup. Lowercase normalization prevents a split CAS
+ * keyspace (two keys for the same bytes) caused by mixed-case hex.
+ *
+ * @returns The lowercase-normalized 64-char hex string, or a typed error.
+ */
+export declare function validateContentHash(raw: string): string | CasKeyError;
+/**
+ * Build the canonical CAS storage key for a tenant-scoped object.
+ *
+ * Overload without preset: `cas/{tenantId}/{sha256}`
+ * Overload with preset:    `cas/{tenantId}/{sha256}/{preset}`
+ *
+ * All inputs are validated against anchored allowlist regexes. The hash is
+ * always lowercase-normalized so that the CAS keyspace is consistent.
+ *
+ * @returns The key string, or a typed error describing which input was invalid.
+ */
+export declare function casKey(tenantId: string, sha256: string): string | CasKeyError;
+export declare function casKey(tenantId: string, sha256: string, preset: CasPreset): string | CasKeyError;
+/**
+ * Build the pending-upload staging key for a tenant-scoped upload.
+ *
+ * `pending/{tenantId}/{uploadId}`
+ *
+ * @returns The key string, or a typed error describing which input was invalid.
+ */
+export declare function pendingKey(tenantId: string, uploadId: string): string | CasKeyError;
+/** Returns true when the result is a CasKeyError (not a key string). */
+export declare function isCasKeyError(result: string | CasKeyError): result is CasKeyError;
+/** Returns the set of valid preset values (for exhaustiveness checks). */
+export declare function allPresets(): readonly CasPreset[];
+//# sourceMappingURL=cas-keys.d.ts.map

package/dist/lib/media/cas-keys.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/lib/media/cas-keys.js

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/**
+ * Canonical tenant-scoped CAS key builder.
+ *
+ * Provides the ONE canonical key scheme (D18) for content-addressed storage,
+ * replacing multiple conflicting schemes. All storage paths MUST go through
+ * these builders — never hand-roll a key string elsewhere.
+ *
+ * Keys are pure functions: no I/O, no clock, no external dependencies.
+ */
+const CAS_PRESETS = new Set([
+    "thumbnail",
+    "optimized",
+]);
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Validation regexes (anchored allowlists — NOT blocklists)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * SHA-256 hex digest: exactly 64 lowercase hex characters.
+ * Anchored so that path-traversal payloads, encoded dots, or extra characters
+ * never pass validation.
+ */
+const SHA256_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/;
+/**
+ * CUID v1 format as generated by Prisma's @default(cuid()).
+ * Format: 'c' followed by 24 lowercase alphanumeric characters (base-36 alphabet).
+ * Total length: 25 characters.
+ * See prisma/schema.prisma (id @default(cuid()) fields).
+ *
+ * Anchored to prevent traversal/injection: only [a-z0-9] within a fixed length band.
+ */
+const TENANT_ID_RE = /^c[a-z0-9]{24}$/;
+/**
+ * Upload session / pending key ID: we accept the same CUID format.
+ * Prisma UploadSession.id is also @default(cuid()).
+ */
+const UPLOAD_ID_RE = /^c[a-z0-9]{24}$/;
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// validateContentHash
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Validate and lowercase-normalize an inbound content hash.
+ *
+ * Used at BOTH the upload boundary AND the serve entry point before any key
+ * construction or DB lookup. Lowercase normalization prevents a split CAS
+ * keyspace (two keys for the same bytes) caused by mixed-case hex.
+ *
+ * @returns The lowercase-normalized 64-char hex string, or a typed error.
+ */
+export function validateContentHash(raw) {
+    const normalized = raw.toLowerCase();
+    if (!SHA256_RE.test(normalized)) {
+        return { kind: "invalid_hash", raw };
+    }
+    return normalized;
+}
+export function casKey(tenantId, sha256, preset) {
+    if (!TENANT_ID_RE.test(tenantId)) {
+        return { kind: "invalid_tenant_id", raw: tenantId };
+    }
+    const normalized = sha256.toLowerCase();
+    if (!SHA256_RE.test(normalized)) {
+        return { kind: "invalid_hash", raw: sha256 };
+    }
+    if (preset !== undefined) {
+        if (!CAS_PRESETS.has(preset)) {
+            return { kind: "invalid_preset", raw: preset };
+        }
+        return `cas/${tenantId}/${normalized}/${preset}`;
+    }
+    return `cas/${tenantId}/${normalized}`;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// pendingKey
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * Build the pending-upload staging key for a tenant-scoped upload.
+ *
+ * `pending/{tenantId}/{uploadId}`
+ *
+ * @returns The key string, or a typed error describing which input was invalid.
+ */
+export function pendingKey(tenantId, uploadId) {
+    if (!TENANT_ID_RE.test(tenantId)) {
+        return { kind: "invalid_tenant_id", raw: tenantId };
+    }
+    if (!UPLOAD_ID_RE.test(uploadId)) {
+        return { kind: "invalid_upload_id", raw: uploadId };
+    }
+    return `pending/${tenantId}/${uploadId}`;
+}
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Type guard helpers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/** Returns true when the result is a CasKeyError (not a key string). */
+export function isCasKeyError(result) {
+    return typeof result === "object";
+}
+/** Returns the set of valid preset values (for exhaustiveness checks). */
+export function allPresets() {
+    return ["thumbnail", "optimized"];
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=cas-keys.js.map

package/dist/lib/media/cas-keys.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/lib/media/classify-worker-error.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/**
+ * classify-worker-error.ts — pure functional core, no I/O, no AWS SDK.
+ *
+ * Classifies any error thrown by a media-processing worker into one of two
+ * treatment buckets:
+ *
+ *   "poison"    — the media itself (or the job payload) is bad. A retry cannot
+ *                 help: the same bytes will fail the same way. The caller must
+ *                 ACK the message and move the object to moderationStatus=REVIEW
+ *                 for human triage, avoiding an infinite DLQ loop.
+ *
+ *   "retryable" — a transient infrastructure fault: throttling, timeout, 5xx
+ *                 upstream, network blip, eventual-consistency AccessDenied.
+ *                 The caller lets SQS retry naturally; the 3-strike DLQ + alert
+ *                 acts as the upper bound.
+ *
+ * DEFAULT RULE (documented here — the only operative "fallback threshold"):
+ *   When the error is unknown or cannot be classified with confidence, the
+ *   function returns "retryable". Rationale: an unrecognised error is more
+ *   likely to be a transient infra fault than a permanent media defect, and the
+ *   DLQ + 3-strike alert provides a bounded safety net. Silently sending
+ *   ambiguous errors to REVIEW would suppress alerts and hide systemic infra
+ *   problems. This default is deliberately fail-OPEN for retry but
+ *   fail-CLOSED for approval — REVIEW is never returned from this module; the
+ *   caller owns the status mapping.
+ *
+ * PURITY GUARANTEE: this module has no I/O, no AWS SDK dependency, no
+ * Date.now/Math.random. node:crypto is NOT used. All inputs produce
+ * deterministic outputs.
+ */
+/**
+ * The two exclusive classifications.
+ *
+ * - `"poison"`    — stop retrying; ACK + route to REVIEW.
+ * - `"retryable"` — let SQS retry; DLQ + alert is the backstop.
+ */
+export type ErrorClass = "poison" | "retryable";
+/**
+ * Classifies `err` as `"poison"` or `"retryable"`.
+ *
+ * - TOTAL: never throws for any input (including null, undefined, non-Error objects).
+ * - FAIL-CLOSED on unknown: returns `"retryable"` when the error cannot be
+ *   classified with confidence (DLQ + alert is the bounded backstop).
+ * - Poison wins over retryable when signals conflict (conservative for serving
+ *   safety: a bad payload that also triggers throttle is still bad).
+ */
+export declare function classifyWorkerError(err: unknown): ErrorClass;
+//# sourceMappingURL=classify-worker-error.d.ts.map

package/dist/lib/media/classify-worker-error.d.ts.map

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