@dbx-tools/cli-tunnel 0.6.59 → 0.6.85

package/lib/src/signing-key.d.ts

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * The gate's HS256 session-signing key, persisted in AppKit's cache.
- *
- * The key decides whether a session COOKIE still verifies. Before this module the
- * fallback was `randomBytes(32)` per process, so every restart invalidated every
- * outstanding cookie and each signed-in user had to request a new code - painful
- * for a tunnel, which restarts whenever the app it wraps does. Now the key is
- * stored in the cache AppKit already configured (memory, or Lakebase when the
- * host wires a persistent `CacheStorage`), so with persistent storage a restart
- * keeps sessions alive for {@link KEY_TTL_SECONDS}.
- *
- * An explicitly configured `TUNNEL_AUTH_JWT_SECRET` still wins outright. That is
- * the right answer for a fleet: an operator-held secret needs no shared cache and
- * no convergence, and it survives a cache flush.
- *
- * ## get / generate / get
- *
- * Two instances booting at once both miss, so both would generate - and the loser
- * would sign cookies with a key the winner rejects. Resolution is a re-READ after
- * the write: whatever the cache holds afterwards is the key everyone adopts, so
- * the instances converge on ONE value instead of trusting the one they minted.
- * (`set` is not conditional in the cache API - there is no `setnx` to lean on -
- * and this runs once per process, so the extra round-trip is free.)
- *
- * A pathological interleave can still cost a key: if A writes between B's write
- * and B's re-read, B adopts A's key while A adopts its own. The cost is bounded -
- * a cookie minted in that window fails to verify and the holder signs in again -
- * and it cannot produce a key one instance TRUSTS but another rejects for longer
- * than the window itself. Set `TUNNEL_AUTH_JWT_SECRET` to remove the race
- * entirely.
- *
- * ## Forcing every session to end
- *
- * {@link resolveSessionCutoff} reads a date from `TUNNEL_AUTH_SESSION_CUTOFF` (or
- * `--session-cutoff`), and that date is part of the cache KEY. Moving it forward
- * makes every prior key unreachable, so every cookie signed against it stops
- * verifying - the log-everyone-out switch, without having to find and flush a
- * cache entry. The cutoff is also asserted against each token's `iat`, so a
- * cookie that predates it is refused even if it was signed with the key that is
- * somehow still current.
- *
- * @module
- */
-/**
- * How long a cached signing key lives: 30 days.
- *
- * This is the ceiling on how long a session cookie can stay valid across
- * restarts, so it is deliberately >= the default session TTL - a key that expired
- * before the cookies it signed would log everyone out for no reason.
- */
-export declare const KEY_TTL_SECONDS: number;
-/**
- * Resolve the force-clear cutoff as epoch MILLISECONDS, or `0` when unset.
- *
- * Accepts whatever `object.toDate` accepts - a `Date`, `2026-08-02`, an ISO
- * instant, epoch seconds or millis from `date +%s`, or a relative duration
- * (`-30d`, `7 days ago`), which is the spelling an operator reaching for this
- * usually wants: sign out everyone who signed in more than a month ago.
- *
- * An UNPARSEABLE value is ignored with a warning rather than throwing: this is
- * the switch that logs a fleet back in, and failing to boot over a typo is worse
- * than not rotating.
- */
-export declare function resolveSessionCutoff(configured?: string | number | Date): number;
-/** A resolved key plus the cutoff it is scoped to. */
-export interface SigningKey {
-    key: Uint8Array;
-    /** Force-clear cutoff in ms; `0` when unset. Tokens older than this are refused. */
-    cutoffMs: number;
-}
-/**
- * The signing key for this gate, resolved once per process.
- *
- * Resolved ONCE, so `configuredCutoff` is honoured only on the first call - the
- * plugin's `setup()` passes its resolved value there, before any request can
- * reach the lazy path.
- *
- * `TUNNEL_AUTH_JWT_SECRET` when set, else the cache-backed key. A cache that is
- * unavailable degrades to an ephemeral per-process key (the previous behaviour)
- * rather than refusing to sign: the key only validates an ALREADY-issued session,
- * so losing it costs sessions, never admission - a caller still needs a code
- * delivered to an allow-listed address.
- */
-export declare function signingKey(configuredCutoff?: string | number | Date): Promise<SigningKey>;
-/** Reset the per-process key (tests, or after changing the env in-process). */
-export declare function resetSigningKey(): void;

package/lib/src/signing-key.js

@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * The gate's HS256 session-signing key, persisted in AppKit's cache.
- *
- * The key decides whether a session COOKIE still verifies. Before this module the
- * fallback was `randomBytes(32)` per process, so every restart invalidated every
- * outstanding cookie and each signed-in user had to request a new code - painful
- * for a tunnel, which restarts whenever the app it wraps does. Now the key is
- * stored in the cache AppKit already configured (memory, or Lakebase when the
- * host wires a persistent `CacheStorage`), so with persistent storage a restart
- * keeps sessions alive for {@link KEY_TTL_SECONDS}.
- *
- * An explicitly configured `TUNNEL_AUTH_JWT_SECRET` still wins outright. That is
- * the right answer for a fleet: an operator-held secret needs no shared cache and
- * no convergence, and it survives a cache flush.
- *
- * ## get / generate / get
- *
- * Two instances booting at once both miss, so both would generate - and the loser
- * would sign cookies with a key the winner rejects. Resolution is a re-READ after
- * the write: whatever the cache holds afterwards is the key everyone adopts, so
- * the instances converge on ONE value instead of trusting the one they minted.
- * (`set` is not conditional in the cache API - there is no `setnx` to lean on -
- * and this runs once per process, so the extra round-trip is free.)
- *
- * A pathological interleave can still cost a key: if A writes between B's write
- * and B's re-read, B adopts A's key while A adopts its own. The cost is bounded -
- * a cookie minted in that window fails to verify and the holder signs in again -
- * and it cannot produce a key one instance TRUSTS but another rejects for longer
- * than the window itself. Set `TUNNEL_AUTH_JWT_SECRET` to remove the race
- * entirely.
- *
- * ## Forcing every session to end
- *
- * {@link resolveSessionCutoff} reads a date from `TUNNEL_AUTH_SESSION_CUTOFF` (or
- * `--session-cutoff`), and that date is part of the cache KEY. Moving it forward
- * makes every prior key unreachable, so every cookie signed against it stops
- * verifying - the log-everyone-out switch, without having to find and flush a
- * cache entry. The cutoff is also asserted against each token's `iat`, so a
- * cookie that predates it is refused even if it was signed with the key that is
- * somehow still current.
- *
- * @module
- */
-import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
-import { CacheManager } from "@databricks/appkit";
-import { env, log, object } from "@dbx-tools/shared-core";
-import { JWT_SECRET_ENV, SESSION_CUTOFF_ENV } from "./env.js";
-const logger = log.logger("tunnel:signing-key");
-/**
- * How long a cached signing key lives: 30 days.
- *
- * This is the ceiling on how long a session cookie can stay valid across
- * restarts, so it is deliberately >= the default session TTL - a key that expired
- * before the cookies it signed would log everyone out for no reason.
- */
-export const KEY_TTL_SECONDS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60;
-/** Cache-key prefix for the signing key, namespaced away from other cache use. */
-const KEY_PREFIX = "tunnel:auth:signing-key:";
-/** Bytes of entropy in a generated key (256-bit, matching HS256's hash width). */
-const KEY_BYTES = 32;
-/**
- * Resolve the force-clear cutoff as epoch MILLISECONDS, or `0` when unset.
- *
- * Accepts whatever `object.toDate` accepts - a `Date`, `2026-08-02`, an ISO
- * instant, epoch seconds or millis from `date +%s`, or a relative duration
- * (`-30d`, `7 days ago`), which is the spelling an operator reaching for this
- * usually wants: sign out everyone who signed in more than a month ago.
- *
- * An UNPARSEABLE value is ignored with a warning rather than throwing: this is
- * the switch that logs a fleet back in, and failing to boot over a typo is worse
- * than not rotating.
- */
-export function resolveSessionCutoff(configured) {
-    const raw = configured ?? env.text(SESSION_CUTOFF_ENV) ?? undefined;
-    if (raw === undefined || raw === null || raw === "")
-        return 0;
-    const date = object.toDate(raw);
-    if (!date) {
-        logger.warn(`ignoring unparseable ${env.name(SESSION_CUTOFF_ENV)}`, { value: String(raw) });
-        return 0;
-    }
-    return clampToPast(date.getTime());
-}
-/**
- * Hold the cutoff at "now", because a FUTURE cutoff would refuse the sessions it
- * is about to mint as well as the old ones - an app nobody can sign in to, from a
- * mistyped year, with the fix hidden behind understanding this flag. Clamped, a
- * future date means what an operator setting it always meant: clear everything
- * outstanding, then carry on.
- */
-function clampToPast(cutoffMs) {
-    const now = Date.now();
-    if (cutoffMs <= now)
-        return cutoffMs;
-    logger.warn(`${env.name(SESSION_CUTOFF_ENV)} is in the future - clamping to now`, {
-        configured: new Date(cutoffMs).toISOString(),
-    });
-    return now;
-}
-/** The cache key for one cutoff, so moving the cutoff orphans every earlier key. */
-function cacheKey(cutoffMs) {
-    return `${KEY_PREFIX}${cutoffMs}`;
-}
-function decode(stored) {
-    return new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(stored.secret, "base64url"));
-}
-/**
- * Load the signing key for `cutoffMs` from the cache, minting and storing one
- * when absent. See the module docs for why the write is followed by a re-read.
- */
-async function loadFromCache(cutoffMs) {
-    const cache = CacheManager.getInstanceSync();
-    const key = cacheKey(cutoffMs);
-    const existing = await cache.get(key);
-    if (existing?.secret) {
-        logger.info("reusing cached signing key", { createdAt: existing.createdAt });
-        return decode(existing);
-    }
-    const minted = {
-        secret: Buffer.from(randomBytes(KEY_BYTES)).toString("base64url"),
-        createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
-    };
-    await cache.set(key, minted, { ttl: KEY_TTL_SECONDS });
-    // Re-read rather than trusting `minted`: another instance that raced this boot
-    // may have written first, and adopting whatever is stored is what makes the two
-    // converge on one key.
-    const settled = (await cache.get(key)) ?? minted;
-    logger.info("stored a new signing key", {
-        createdAt: settled.createdAt,
-        ttlSeconds: KEY_TTL_SECONDS,
-        adopted: settled.createdAt === minted.createdAt ? "own" : "concurrent-instance",
-    });
-    return decode(settled);
-}
-let pending;
-/**
- * The signing key for this gate, resolved once per process.
- *
- * Resolved ONCE, so `configuredCutoff` is honoured only on the first call - the
- * plugin's `setup()` passes its resolved value there, before any request can
- * reach the lazy path.
- *
- * `TUNNEL_AUTH_JWT_SECRET` when set, else the cache-backed key. A cache that is
- * unavailable degrades to an ephemeral per-process key (the previous behaviour)
- * rather than refusing to sign: the key only validates an ALREADY-issued session,
- * so losing it costs sessions, never admission - a caller still needs a code
- * delivered to an allow-listed address.
- */
-export function signingKey(configuredCutoff) {
-    pending ??= (async () => {
-        const cutoffMs = resolveSessionCutoff(configuredCutoff);
-        const configured = env.text(JWT_SECRET_ENV);
-        if (configured) {
-            return { key: new TextEncoder().encode(configured), cutoffMs };
-        }
-        try {
-            return { key: await loadFromCache(cutoffMs), cutoffMs };
-        }
-        catch (error) {
-            logger.warn(`no ${env.name(JWT_SECRET_ENV)} and the cache is unavailable - using an ephemeral per-process key; sessions will not survive a restart`, { error });
-            return { key: new Uint8Array(randomBytes(KEY_BYTES)), cutoffMs };
-        }
-    })();
-    return pending;
-}
-/** Reset the per-process key (tests, or after changing the env in-process). */
-export function resetSigningKey() {
-    pending = undefined;
-}
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Before this module the\n * fallback was `randomBytes(32)` per process, so every restart invalidated every\n * outstanding cookie and each signed-in user had to request a new code - painful\n * for a tunnel, which restarts whenever the app it wraps does. Now the key is\n * stored in the cache AppKit already configured (memory, or Lakebase when the\n * host wires a persistent `CacheStorage`), so with persistent storage a restart\n * keeps sessions alive for {@link KEY_TTL_SECONDS}.\n *\n * An explicitly configured `TUNNEL_AUTH_JWT_SECRET` still wins outright. That is\n * the right answer for a fleet: an operator-held secret needs no shared cache and\n * no convergence, and it survives a cache flush.\n *\n * ## get / generate / get\n *\n * Two instances booting at once both miss, so both would generate - and the loser\n * would sign cookies with a key the winner rejects. Resolution is a re-READ after\n * the write: whatever the cache holds afterwards is the key everyone adopts, so\n * the instances converge on ONE value instead of trusting the one they minted.\n * (`set` is not conditional in the cache API - there is no `setnx` to lean on -\n * and this runs once per process, so the extra round-trip is free.)\n *\n * A pathological interleave can still cost a key: if A writes between B's write\n * and B's re-read, B adopts A's key while A adopts its own. The cost is bounded -\n * a cookie minted in that window fails to verify and the holder signs in again -\n * and it cannot produce a key one instance TRUSTS but another rejects for longer\n * than the window itself. Set `TUNNEL_AUTH_JWT_SECRET` to remove the race\n * entirely.\n *\n * ## Forcing every session to end\n *\n * {@link resolveSessionCutoff} reads a date from `TUNNEL_AUTH_SESSION_CUTOFF` (or\n * `--session-cutoff`), and that date is part of the cache KEY. Moving it forward\n * makes every prior key unreachable, so every cookie signed against it stops\n * verifying - the log-everyone-out switch, without having to find and flush a\n * cache entry. The cutoff is also asserted against each token's `iat`, so a\n * cookie that predates it is refused even if it was signed with the key that is\n * somehow still current.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { randomBytes } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { CacheManager } from \"@databricks/appkit\";\nimport { env, log, object } from \"@dbx-tools/shared-core\";\nimport { JWT_SECRET_ENV, SESSION_CUTOFF_ENV } from \"./env.ts\";\n\nconst logger = log.logger(\"tunnel:signing-key\");\n\n/**\n * How long a cached signing key lives: 30 days.\n *\n * This is the ceiling on how long a session cookie can stay valid across\n * restarts, so it is deliberately >= the default session TTL - a key that expired\n * before the cookies it signed would log everyone out for no reason.\n */\nexport const KEY_TTL_SECONDS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60;\n\n/** Cache-key prefix for the signing key, namespaced away from other cache use. */\nconst KEY_PREFIX = \"tunnel:auth:signing-key:\";\n\n/** Bytes of entropy in a generated key (256-bit, matching HS256's hash width). */\nconst KEY_BYTES = 32;\n\n/** What the cache stores: the key plus when it was minted, for observability. */\ninterface StoredKey {\n  /** Base64url of the raw key bytes. */\n  secret: string;\n  /** When this key was generated, ISO-8601. */\n  createdAt: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the force-clear cutoff as epoch MILLISECONDS, or `0` when unset.\n *\n * Accepts whatever `object.toDate` accepts - a `Date`, `2026-08-02`, an ISO\n * instant, epoch seconds or millis from `date +%s`, or a relative duration\n * (`-30d`, `7 days ago`), which is the spelling an operator reaching for this\n * usually wants: sign out everyone who signed in more than a month ago.\n *\n * An UNPARSEABLE value is ignored with a warning rather than throwing: this is\n * the switch that logs a fleet back in, and failing to boot over a typo is worse\n * than not rotating.\n */\nexport function resolveSessionCutoff(configured?: string | number | Date): number {\n  const raw = configured ?? env.text(SESSION_CUTOFF_ENV) ?? undefined;\n  if (raw === undefined || raw === null || raw === \"\") return 0;\n\n  const date = object.toDate(raw);\n  if (!date) {\n    logger.warn(`ignoring unparseable ${env.name(SESSION_CUTOFF_ENV)}`, { value: String(raw) });\n    return 0;\n  }\n  return clampToPast(date.getTime());\n}\n\n/**\n * Hold the cutoff at \"now\", because a FUTURE cutoff would refuse the sessions it\n * is about to mint as well as the old ones - an app nobody can sign in to, from a\n * mistyped year, with the fix hidden behind understanding this flag. Clamped, a\n * future date means what an operator setting it always meant: clear everything\n * outstanding, then carry on.\n */\nfunction clampToPast(cutoffMs: number): number {\n  const now = Date.now();\n  if (cutoffMs <= now) return cutoffMs;\n  logger.warn(`${env.name(SESSION_CUTOFF_ENV)} is in the future - clamping to now`, {\n    configured: new Date(cutoffMs).toISOString(),\n  });\n  return now;\n}\n\n/** The cache key for one cutoff, so moving the cutoff orphans every earlier key. */\nfunction cacheKey(cutoffMs: number): string {\n  return `${KEY_PREFIX}${cutoffMs}`;\n}\n\nfunction decode(stored: StoredKey): Uint8Array {\n  return new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(stored.secret, \"base64url\"));\n}\n\n/**\n * Load the signing key for `cutoffMs` from the cache, minting and storing one\n * when absent. See the module docs for why the write is followed by a re-read.\n */\nasync function loadFromCache(cutoffMs: number): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const cache = CacheManager.getInstanceSync();\n  const key = cacheKey(cutoffMs);\n\n  const existing = await cache.get<StoredKey>(key);\n  if (existing?.secret) {\n    logger.info(\"reusing cached signing key\", { createdAt: existing.createdAt });\n    return decode(existing);\n  }\n\n  const minted: StoredKey = {\n    secret: Buffer.from(randomBytes(KEY_BYTES)).toString(\"base64url\"),\n    createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  };\n  await cache.set(key, minted, { ttl: KEY_TTL_SECONDS });\n\n  // Re-read rather than trusting `minted`: another instance that raced this boot\n  // may have written first, and adopting whatever is stored is what makes the two\n  // converge on one key.\n  const settled = (await cache.get<StoredKey>(key)) ?? minted;\n  logger.info(\"stored a new signing key\", {\n    createdAt: settled.createdAt,\n    ttlSeconds: KEY_TTL_SECONDS,\n    adopted: settled.createdAt === minted.createdAt ? \"own\" : \"concurrent-instance\",\n  });\n  return decode(settled);\n}\n\n/** A resolved key plus the cutoff it is scoped to. */\nexport interface SigningKey {\n  key: Uint8Array;\n  /** Force-clear cutoff in ms; `0` when unset. Tokens older than this are refused. */\n  cutoffMs: number;\n}\n\nlet pending: Promise<SigningKey> | undefined;\n\n/**\n * The signing key for this gate, resolved once per process.\n *\n * Resolved ONCE, so `configuredCutoff` is honoured only on the first call - the\n * plugin's `setup()` passes its resolved value there, before any request can\n * reach the lazy path.\n *\n * `TUNNEL_AUTH_JWT_SECRET` when set, else the cache-backed key. A cache that is\n * unavailable degrades to an ephemeral per-process key (the previous behaviour)\n * rather than refusing to sign: the key only validates an ALREADY-issued session,\n * so losing it costs sessions, never admission - a caller still needs a code\n * delivered to an allow-listed address.\n */\nexport function signingKey(configuredCutoff?: string | number | Date): Promise<SigningKey> {\n  pending ??= (async () => {\n    const cutoffMs = resolveSessionCutoff(configuredCutoff);\n    const configured = env.text(JWT_SECRET_ENV);\n    if (configured) {\n      return { key: new TextEncoder().encode(configured), cutoffMs };\n    }\n    try {\n      return { key: await loadFromCache(cutoffMs), cutoffMs };\n    } catch (error) {\n      logger.warn(\n        `no ${env.name(JWT_SECRET_ENV)} and the cache is unavailable - using an ephemeral per-process key; sessions will not survive a restart`,\n        { error },\n      );\n      return { key: new Uint8Array(randomBytes(KEY_BYTES)), cutoffMs };\n    }\n  })();\n  return pending;\n}\n\n/** Reset the per-process key (tests, or after changing the env in-process). */\nexport function resetSigningKey(): void {\n  pending = undefined;\n}\n"]}

package/src/allowlist.ts

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Unified access allow-list matching for the email-OTP gate.
- *
- * Each pattern in the configured list is one of three shapes:
- *
- *   - **domain shortcut** - `example.com` or `@example.com`: matches any
- *     address whose domain equals it. This is the gate's OWN semantic (a bare
- *     value means "the domain", not "the whole address"), so it is handled here.
- *   - **glob** - contains `*` or `?`, e.g. `*@example.com`: matched against the
- *     WHOLE address with shell-style wildcards.
- *   - **regex** - wrapped in slashes, `/.../ [flags]`: tested against the whole
- *     address. An invalid regex never matches (it is skipped with a warning
- *     rather than throwing).
- *
- * Only the first shape is this module's business: the glob and regex shapes are
- * delegated to `@dbx-tools/shared-core`'s {@link pattern.toPattern}, which is
- * where that compilation lives for every allow-list in the repo (the tunnel's
- * inbound-header policy uses the same one). Matching is case-insensitive
- * throughout.
- *
- * An EMPTY list matches nobody (fail closed): an app that enables the gate but
- * configures no patterns lets no one in, which is the safe default.
- *
- * @module
- */
-
-import { pattern } from "@dbx-tools/shared-core";
-
-/** True when `email` matches a single allow-list `pattern`. */
-function matchesPattern(email: string, entry: string): boolean {
-  const trimmed = entry.trim();
-  if (!trimmed) return false;
-  const address = email.trim().toLowerCase();
-
-  // A bare value with no wildcard and no regex delimiters is a DOMAIN shortcut,
-  // the one shape shared-core cannot infer: there it would mean whole-string
-  // equality against the address, which is never what an operator writing
-  // `example.com` in an access list intends.
-  if (!trimmed.startsWith("/") && !trimmed.includes("*") && !trimmed.includes("?")) {
-    const domain = trimmed.replace(/^@/, "").toLowerCase();
-    const at = address.lastIndexOf("@");
-    return at >= 0 && address.slice(at + 1) === domain;
-  }
-
-  return pattern.toPattern(trimmed)?.(address) ?? false;
-}
-
-/**
- * True when `email` is allowed by ANY pattern in `patterns`. An empty (or
- * missing) list allows nobody - the gate fails closed.
- */
-export function matchesAllowlist(email: string, patterns: readonly string[] | undefined): boolean {
-  if (!email || !patterns || patterns.length === 0) return false;
-  return patterns.some((entry) => matchesPattern(email, entry));
-}
-
-/** Rough shape check so a clearly-invalid address is rejected before any work. */
-export function looksLikeEmail(value: string): boolean {
-  return /^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/.test(value.trim());
-}

package/src/env.ts

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Environment-variable names the tunnel reads.
- *
- * Every setting is `TUNNEL_`-prefixed, matching the repo convention of naming a
- * variable after the package that owns it (`MASTRA_*`, `TEAMS_*`,
- * `WEB_SEARCH_*`). The gate's original names were unprefixed (`AUTH_SUBJECT`,
- * `PUBLIC_DOMAIN`, ...), which is a real hazard for a package that runs as a
- * WRAPPER: the tunnel and the app it wraps share one environment, so a generic
- * name is one the wrapped app may already use for something else, and
- * `PUBLIC_DOMAIN` in particular reads like an app-wide setting rather than a
- * portr detail. `EMAIL_AUTH_ALLOW` was worse than generic - it sat in
- * `@dbx-tools/email`'s `EMAIL_*` namespace while configuring the gate, not email.
- *
- * Each entry is an {@link EnvKey} list, EARLIEST-WINS, whose first element is the
- * current name and whose remaining elements are the deprecated originals. A
- * deployment set up against the old names keeps working; nothing needs a
- * coordinated rename. Read them through `env.string` / `env.positiveInt` /
- * `env.list`, which accept the list directly.
- *
- * Not renamed:
- *
- *   - `DATABRICKS_APP_PORT` - the Databricks Apps runtime contract. The platform
- *     sets it; the gate honours it.
- *   - `PORTR_TOKEN` / `PORTR_SERVER` / `PORTR_AUTO_ADD_PATH` - upstream
- *     [portr](https://github.com/amalshaji/portr)'s own namespace, and
- *     `PORTR_AUTO_ADD_PATH` is passed straight to that binary. Renaming these
- *     would rename someone else's contract.
- *
- * @module
- */
-
-import type { EnvKey } from "@dbx-tools/shared-core";
-
-/** Access allow-list patterns (domain / glob / `/regex/`). */
-export const ALLOW_ENV: EnvKey = ["TUNNEL_AUTH_ALLOW", "EMAIL_AUTH_ALLOW"];
-
-/** Subject line for the code email. */
-export const SUBJECT_ENV: EnvKey = ["TUNNEL_AUTH_SUBJECT", "AUTH_SUBJECT"];
-
-/** Display name used in the code email copy. */
-export const BRAND_NAME_ENV: EnvKey = ["TUNNEL_AUTH_BRAND_NAME", "AUTH_BRAND_NAME"];
-
-/** Line shown immediately above the code in the email. */
-export const MESSAGE_ENV: EnvKey = ["TUNNEL_AUTH_MESSAGE", "AUTH_MESSAGE"];
-
-/** Session lifetime, in seconds. */
-export const SESSION_TTL_ENV: EnvKey = ["TUNNEL_AUTH_SESSION_TTL", "AUTH_SESSION_TTL"];
-
-/** One-time-code lifetime, in seconds. */
-export const CODE_TTL_ENV: EnvKey = ["TUNNEL_AUTH_CODE_TTL", "AUTH_CODE_TTL"];
-
-/** HS256 signing secret for the session JWT. */
-export const JWT_SECRET_ENV: EnvKey = ["TUNNEL_AUTH_JWT_SECRET", "AUTH_JWT_SECRET"];
-
-/**
- * Force-clear cutoff: every session issued BEFORE it stops verifying. Anything
- * `object.toDate` accepts - a date, an ISO instant, epoch seconds/millis, or a
- * relative duration (`-30d`, `7 days ago`).
- */
-export const SESSION_CUTOFF_ENV: EnvKey = [
-  "TUNNEL_AUTH_SESSION_CUTOFF",
-  "TUNNEL_AUTH_SESSION_EPOCH",
-];
-
-/** The public `<subdomain>.<server>` portr should serve on. */
-export const PUBLIC_DOMAIN_ENV: EnvKey = ["TUNNEL_PUBLIC_DOMAIN", "PUBLIC_DOMAIN"];
-
-/** Run the tunnel OPEN, with no gate. Ignored unless truthy. */
-export const INSECURE_ENV: EnvKey = "TUNNEL_INSECURE";
-
-/** Extra `x-` request headers tunnel traffic may forward. */
-export const FORWARD_HEADERS_ENV: EnvKey = "TUNNEL_FORWARD_HEADERS";

package/src/headers.ts

@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Inbound header policy for tunnel traffic.
- *
- * Everything the gate forwards arrives from the PUBLIC internet through the
- * portr client, so every header on it is attacker-controlled. The headers an app
- * trusts are precisely the ones a caller must not be able to write, because the
- * app cannot tell a header the Databricks front door set from one a browser
- * typed.
- *
- * ## Policy shape: strip by default, allow by pattern
- *
- * Enumerating what to remove is a losing game - a deny-list is only correct until
- * the platform adds a header or a library starts trusting another one - so the
- * policy is inverted. EVERY `x-`-prefixed request header is dropped from tunnel
- * traffic unless it matches a configured pattern. That fails CLOSED: a header
- * nobody thought about is removed rather than trusted.
- *
- * The allow-list is zero-to-many literals, globs, or `/regex/`es, compiled by
- * shared-core's {@link pattern.toPatternMatcher}, and is UNIONED with
- * {@link DEFAULT_FORWARD_HEADERS} so extending it never silently breaks the
- * built-in surfaces. Configure it with `forwardHeaders` /
- * `TUNNEL_FORWARD_HEADERS`.
- *
- * Non-`x-` headers are untouched. Standard ones (`content-type`, `accept`,
- * `authorization`, `cookie`, ...) are the app's normal input and the gate has no
- * business rewriting them.
- *
- * ## The headers no pattern can forward
- *
- * {@link PROTECTED_HEADERS} is stripped BEFORE the allow-list is consulted, so a
- * permissive pattern (`x-*`, or a careless `*`) cannot re-open impersonation:
- *
- * | Header                           | What an app does with it        | Why spoofing it matters |
- * | -------------------------------- | ------------------------------- | ----------------------- |
- * | `x-forwarded-access-token`       | OBO auth (AppKit `asUser`)      | Paste any workspace token and every call runs as its owner. The gate's verified email says nothing about who a pasted credential belongs to. |
- * | `x-forwarded-user`               | Caller identity                 | Impersonate another user. The gate sets this itself, from a verified session. |
- * | `x-forwarded-email`              | Caller identity                 | Same. |
- * | `x-forwarded-preferred-username` | Display name from the IdP       | Same. |
- * | `x-forwarded-host`               | The originally-requested host    | Poison absolute URLs the app builds (the classic reset-link attack). |
- * | `x-forwarded-proto` / `-port`    | Original scheme / port          | Convince the app a plaintext request arrived over TLS. |
- * | `x-forwarded-for`                | Client IP                       | Forge the audit trail, and fan out per-IP rate-limit keys (see below). |
- * | `x-real-ip`                      | Client IP                       | Same. |
- * | `x-request-id`                   | Request correlation UUID        | Forge or collide trace ids, making logs unreliable. |
- *
- * The identity four are AppKit's OBO contract; the rest are the `X-Forwarded-*`
- * set the Databricks Apps reverse proxy documents passing to an app
- * ({@link https://docs.databricks.com/aws/en/dev-tools/databricks-apps/http-headers}),
- * plus the conventional `x-forwarded-proto`/`-port`/`x-real-ip` an app or one of
- * its libraries may read even though the table omits them.
- *
- * Stripping the `x-forwarded-*` transport trio is safe because `http-proxy-3` is
- * configured with `xfwd: true` and re-adds them AFTER this policy runs - from the
- * real socket, not from the caller's claim. The app therefore sees the honest
- * (loopback) values instead of whatever the internet asserted. The gate reads the
- * client IP for rate limiting from the raw inbound headers BEFORE stripping, and
- * takes the RIGHTMOST `x-forwarded-for` entry, which is the only one a proxy
- * appended rather than a client supplied.
- *
- * @module
- */
-
-import { pattern, token, type Predicate } from "@dbx-tools/shared-core";
-
-/**
- * Headers the gate strips UNCONDITIONALLY, before the allow-list is consulted -
- * the platform-shaped set documented in this module's table.
- *
- * These answer WHO a request is and WHERE it came from, and on tunnel traffic
- * only the gate may answer that: it injects {@link token.USER_ID_HEADER} /
- * {@link token.USER_EMAIL_HEADER} itself after verifying a session, and the proxy
- * re-derives the transport headers from the real socket.
- *
- * The identity names come from the shared `token` constants, so a renamed wire
- * contract cannot leave a stale spelling here. `x-forwarded-preferred-username`
- * has no constant because nothing in this repo READS it - it is listed precisely
- * so a host app that does read it cannot be fed one.
- */
-export const PROTECTED_HEADERS: readonly string[] = [
-  token.ACCESS_TOKEN_HEADER,
-  token.USER_ID_HEADER,
-  token.USER_EMAIL_HEADER,
-  "x-forwarded-preferred-username",
-  "x-forwarded-host",
-  "x-forwarded-proto",
-  "x-forwarded-port",
-  "x-forwarded-for",
-  "x-real-ip",
-  "x-request-id",
-];
-
-/**
- * The `x-` headers forwarded when a deployment configures nothing.
- *
- * These are the header NAMESPACES this repo's own UI sends and its own server
- * reads - Mastra thread/model routing (`x-mastra-thread-id`, `x-mastra-model`)
- * and MLflow trace correlation (`x-mlflow-trace-id`) - so a dbx-tools app keeps
- * working behind the tunnel with no configuration.
- *
- * Deliberately GLOBS rather than the exact constants from
- * `@dbx-tools/shared-mastra`: importing them would make the gate - a
- * transport-level component that has no other opinion about Mastra - depend on
- * an agent package for three strings, and a namespace glob also covers the next
- * header those packages add. The namespaces are the stable part of the contract.
- */
-export const DEFAULT_FORWARD_HEADERS: readonly string[] = [
-  "x-mastra-*",
-  "x-mlflow-*",
-  // Sent by fetch/XHR wrappers to mark an AJAX request; harmless and widely read.
-  "x-requested-with",
-];
-
-/** A compiled inbound-header policy. Build one with {@link toHeaderPolicy}. */
-export interface HeaderPolicy {
-  /** The allow-list entries backing this policy (for diagnostics and tests). */
-  readonly patterns: readonly string[];
-  /** Whether `name` survives on tunnel traffic. */
-  forwards(name: string): boolean;
-  /**
-   * Delete every disallowed header from a mutable Node header bag, returning the
-   * lower-cased names removed (for debug logging).
-   */
-  apply(headers: Record<string, unknown>): string[];
-}
-
-/**
- * Compile the inbound-header policy. `configured` entries are UNIONED with
- * {@link DEFAULT_FORWARD_HEADERS}; each may be a literal name, a glob
- * (`x-myapp-*`), or a `/regex/`. Matching is case-insensitive.
- */
-export function toHeaderPolicy(configured: readonly string[] = []): HeaderPolicy {
-  const patterns = [...DEFAULT_FORWARD_HEADERS, ...configured];
-  const allowed: Predicate<string> = pattern.toPatternMatcher(patterns);
-  const protectedNames = new Set(PROTECTED_HEADERS);
-
-  const forwards = (name: string): boolean => {
-    const lower = name.toLowerCase();
-    if (protectedNames.has(lower)) return false;
-    if (!lower.startsWith("x-")) return true;
-    return allowed(lower);
-  };
-
-  return {
-    patterns,
-    forwards,
-    apply: (headers) => {
-      const removed: string[] = [];
-      for (const name of Object.keys(headers)) {
-        if (forwards(name)) continue;
-        delete headers[name];
-        removed.push(name.toLowerCase());
-      }
-      return removed;
-    },
-  };
-}