@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core 0.11.5 → 0.12.0

package/dist/mcp-server/transports/http/httpTransport.js

@@ -1,16 +1,27 @@
 /**
  * @fileoverview Worker-safe Hono application factory for the HTTP MCP transport.
- * Builds the routing, auth, session, and per-request server lifecycle wiring
- * using only web-standard APIs. The Node-only `serve()` start path lives in
- * `httpServer.ts` so the Worker bundle drops `@hono/node-server` and
- * `node:http` via tree-shaking.
+ * Builds the routing, auth, session, and serving wiring using only web-standard
+ * APIs. The Node-only `serve()` start path lives in `httpServer.ts` so the
+ * Worker bundle drops `@hono/node-server` and `node:http` via tree-shaking.
  *
- * Implements MCP Specification 2025-06-18 Streamable HTTP Transport.
- * @see {@link https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/basic/transports#streamable-http | MCP Streamable HTTP Transport}
+ * Serving is split by session mode:
+ *
+ * - **stateless** — one `createMcpHandler(factory)` answers both protocol eras
+ *   per request (its default `legacy: 'stateless'` posture).
+ * - **stateful / auto** — `isLegacyRequest(request)` splits the traffic. 2025-era
+ *   requests go to a sessionful `WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport` with
+ *   one persistent `McpServer` per `Mcp-Session-Id`; 2026-07-28 requests go to a
+ *   strict (`legacy: 'reject'`) modern handler, which is per-request by
+ *   construction — that revision has no session.
+ *
+ * The sessionful arm is load-bearing rather than legacy courtesy: the SDK's
+ * multi-round-trip legacy shim needs a live session, so dropping it would break
+ * interactive tools for every 2025 client that is not on stdio.
+ *
+ * @see {@link https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/transports | MCP Transports}
  * @module src/mcp-server/transports/http/httpTransport
  */
-import { StreamableHTTPTransport } from '@hono/mcp';
-import { isJSONRPCErrorResponse, isJSONRPCRequest, isJSONRPCResultResponse, } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js';
+import { createMcpHandler, isJsonContentType, isLegacyRequest, WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport, } from '@modelcontextprotocol/server';
 import { Hono } from 'hono';
 import { cors } from 'hono/cors';
 import { config } from '../../../config/index.js';
@@ -23,151 +34,18 @@ import { protectedResourceMetadataHandler } from '../../../mcp-server/transports
 import { createRobotsTxtHandler } from '../../../mcp-server/transports/http/robotsTxt.js';
 import { createServerCardHandler } from '../../../mcp-server/transports/http/serverCard.js';
 import { generateSecureSessionId } from '../../../mcp-server/transports/http/sessionIdUtils.js';
-import { SessionStore, } from '../../../mcp-server/transports/http/sessionStore.js';
+import { closeConnection, SessionStore, } from '../../../mcp-server/transports/http/sessionStore.js';
 import { logger } from '../../../utils/internal/logger.js';
-import { requestContextService } from '../../../utils/internal/requestContext.js';
-import { createCounter, createObservableGauge } from '../../../utils/telemetry/metrics.js';
-/**
- * Extends the base StreamableHTTPTransport to include a session ID.
- */
-class McpSessionTransport extends StreamableHTTPTransport {
-    sessionStore;
-    sessionId;
-    pendingServerRequests = new Set();
-    constructor(sessionId, sessionStore) {
-        super();
-        this.sessionStore = sessionStore;
-        this.sessionId = sessionId;
-    }
-    /**
-     * Rewrites outbound server-request IDs into the durable session namespace.
-     * Every per-request SDK Server starts its request counter at zero; without
-     * this bridge concurrent elicitations collide and a response POST reaches a
-     * different Server instance than the one holding the response handler.
-     */
-    async send(message, options) {
-        if (!isJSONRPCRequest(message) || !this.sessionStore) {
-            await super.send(message, options);
-            return;
-        }
-        const registration = this.sessionStore.registerServerRequest(this.sessionId, (response) => {
-            this.settleServerRequest(registration);
-            this.onmessage?.({ ...response, id: message.id });
-        });
-        if (!registration)
-            throw new Error('Cannot send a server request after its session ended.');
-        this.pendingServerRequests.add(registration);
-        try {
-            await super.send({ ...message, id: registration.requestId }, options);
-        }
-        catch (error) {
-            this.settleServerRequest(registration);
-            throw error;
-        }
-    }
-    async close() {
-        for (const registration of this.pendingServerRequests)
-            registration.unregister();
-        this.pendingServerRequests.clear();
-        await super.close();
-    }
-    /** Drops a route from both the session registry and this transport's pending set. */
-    settleServerRequest(registration) {
-        if (!registration)
-            return;
-        registration.unregister();
-        this.pendingServerRequests.delete(registration);
-    }
-}
-/** Max time (ms) we wait for per-request transport/server close to complete
- * before giving up and logging a failure. Silent hangs here accumulate
- * retained closures — bounded wait surfaces the issue as a metric. */
-const PER_REQUEST_CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
+import { requestContextService, withExtra, } from '../../../utils/internal/requestContext.js';
+import { createObservableGauge } from '../../../utils/telemetry/metrics.js';
 /** Matches loopback origins (http(s)://localhost|127.0.0.1|[::1] with optional port).
  * Used as the fail-closed default for the Origin guard when no explicit
  * MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS is configured — an unauthenticated MCP server must not
- * accept browser Origin headers from arbitrary hosts (MCP Spec 2025-06-18 DNS
- * rebinding protection). */
+ * accept browser Origin headers from arbitrary hosts (DNS rebinding
+ * protection). The SDK's `validateOriginHeader` matches bare hostnames from a
+ * fixed list and so cannot express "any loopback port", which is exactly the
+ * dev-server case this guard exists for. */
 const LOOPBACK_ORIGIN_RE = /^https?:\/\/(?:localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])(?::\d+)?$/i;
-let closeFailureCounter;
-function getCloseFailureCounter() {
-    closeFailureCounter ??= createCounter('mcp.http.close_failures', 'Per-request HTTP close failures (transport or server close threw or timed out)', '{failures}');
-    return closeFailureCounter;
-}
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Finalization-lag diagnostic (issue #50)
-//
-// The HTTP transport constructs a fresh `McpServer` + `McpSessionTransport`
-// per request (SDK 1.26 GHSA-345p-7cg4-v4c7). Production heap graphs show
-// linear growth proportional to request volume, which suggests some of
-// these per-request instances are being retained past their scope.
-//
-// Compare `mcp.http.per_request.created_total` against
-// `mcp.http.per_request.finalized_total` (both tagged with `kind`) to
-// detect retention. A persistent gap that grows with traffic is the
-// signature of the leak; a gap that closes within minutes is just GC
-// timing.
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-let perRequestCreatedCounter;
-let perRequestFinalizedCounter;
-function getPerRequestCreatedCounter() {
-    perRequestCreatedCounter ??= createCounter('mcp.http.per_request.created', 'Per-request McpServer/McpSessionTransport instances created', '{instances}');
-    return perRequestCreatedCounter;
-}
-function getPerRequestFinalizedCounter() {
-    perRequestFinalizedCounter ??= createCounter('mcp.http.per_request.finalized', 'Per-request McpServer/McpSessionTransport instances reclaimed by GC', '{instances}');
-    return perRequestFinalizedCounter;
-}
-/** Lazy so the registry only exists when HTTP transport is active. The
- * FinalizationRegistry callback itself does not run during this process's
- * exit teardown — so we deliberately don't try to drain it. */
-let perRequestFinalizationRegistry;
-function getPerRequestFinalizationRegistry() {
-    perRequestFinalizationRegistry ??= new FinalizationRegistry((kind) => {
-        getPerRequestFinalizedCounter().add(1, { kind });
-    });
-    return perRequestFinalizationRegistry;
-}
-function trackPerRequestInstance(obj, kind) {
-    getPerRequestCreatedCounter().add(1, { kind });
-    getPerRequestFinalizationRegistry().register(obj, kind);
-}
-/** Await a promise with a bounded timeout. Rejects with the timeout error
- * if the promise doesn't settle first. */
-function withTimeout(p, ms, label) {
-    let timer;
-    return Promise.race([
-        p,
-        new Promise((_, reject) => {
-            timer = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error(`${label} timed out after ${ms}ms`)), ms);
-        }),
-    ]).finally(() => {
-        if (timer !== undefined)
-            clearTimeout(timer);
-    });
-}
-/** Closes the per-request transport and server under a bounded timeout.
- * Runs the two closes in parallel so one hanging close doesn't delay the
- * other, and records each failure to `mcp.http.close_failures` with
- * `surface` and `trigger` tags. */
-async function closePerRequestInstances(transport, server, sessionId, requestContext, trigger) {
-    const tasks = [['transport', () => transport.close()]];
-    if (server)
-        tasks.push(['server', () => server.close()]);
-    await Promise.all(tasks.map(async ([surface, close]) => {
-        try {
-            await withTimeout(close(), PER_REQUEST_CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS, `${surface}.close`);
-        }
-        catch (err) {
-            getCloseFailureCounter().add(1, { surface, trigger });
-            logger.warning(`Failed to close ${surface} (trigger=${trigger})`, {
-                ...requestContext,
-                sessionId,
-                error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
-            });
-        }
-    }));
-}
 /** Reads at most one stream chunk beyond `maxBytes`, cancelling as soon as the
  * limit is crossed. Fetch body chunks are not size-bounded by the consumer, so
  * the final chunk may itself be larger than the remaining allowance. */
@@ -218,10 +96,7 @@ async function readBodyWithinLimit(request, maxBytes) {
  */
 export async function createHttpApp(serverFactory, parentContext, manifest) {
     const app = new Hono();
-    const transportContext = {
-        ...parentContext,
-        component: 'HttpTransportSetup',
-    };
+    const transportContext = withExtra(parentContext, { component: 'HttpTransportSetup' });
     // Initialize session store for stateful mode.
     // 'auto' resolves to stateful for HTTP (per MCP spec conformance).
     const isStateful = config.mcpSessionMode === 'stateful' || config.mcpSessionMode === 'auto';
@@ -298,13 +173,12 @@ export async function createHttpApp(serverFactory, parentContext, manifest) {
             if (!isAllowed) {
                 const requestContext = requestContextService.createRequestContext({
                     operation: 'HttpOriginGuard',
-                    component: 'HttpTransport',
+                    additionalContext: { component: 'HttpTransport' },
                 });
-                logger.warning('Rejected request with invalid Origin header', {
-                    ...requestContext,
+                logger.warning('Rejected request with invalid Origin header', withExtra(requestContext, {
                     origin,
                     allowedOrigins: explicitOrigins ?? 'loopback-only',
-                });
+                }));
                 return c.json({ error: 'Invalid origin. DNS rebinding protection.' }, 403);
             }
         }
@@ -329,13 +203,9 @@ export async function createHttpApp(serverFactory, parentContext, manifest) {
             const rejectOversized = (bytes) => {
                 const requestContext = requestContextService.createRequestContext({
                     operation: 'HttpBodyLimit',
-                    component: 'HttpTransport',
-                });
-                logger.warning('Rejected request exceeding body size limit', {
-                    ...requestContext,
-                    bytes,
-                    maxBodyBytes,
+                    additionalContext: { component: 'HttpTransport' },
                 });
+                logger.warning('Rejected request exceeding body size limit', withExtra(requestContext, { bytes, maxBodyBytes }));
                 return c.json({
                     error: `Request body exceeds the ${maxBodyBytes}-byte limit (configurable via MCP_HTTP_MAX_BODY_BYTES).`,
                 }, 413);
@@ -488,246 +358,159 @@ export async function createHttpApp(serverFactory, parentContext, manifest) {
             subject: authInfo.subject,
         }).filter(([, v]) => v != null));
     }
-    // MCP Spec 2025-06-18: DELETE endpoint for session termination
-    // Clients SHOULD send DELETE to explicitly terminate sessions
-    // https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/basic/transports#session-management
-    app.delete(config.mcpHttpEndpointPath, (c) => {
+    // DELETE terminates a session. Ownership is validated here, before the SDK
+    // transport is allowed to tear the session down; the transport itself owns
+    // the spec-shaped response and fires `onsessionclosed`.
+    // https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/transports
+    app.delete(config.mcpHttpEndpointPath, async (c, next) => {
         const requestContext = requestContextService.createRequestContext({
             operation: 'HttpSessionTermination',
-            component: 'HttpTransport',
+            additionalContext: { component: 'HttpTransport' },
         });
         const sessionId = c.req.header('mcp-session-id');
+        // Stateless mode has no session to terminate — the stateless handler
+        // answers with the spec's 405.
+        if (!sessionStore)
+            return await next();
         if (!sessionId) {
             logger.warning('DELETE request without session ID', requestContext);
             return c.json({ error: 'Mcp-Session-Id header required' }, 400);
         }
-        logger.info('Session termination requested', {
-            ...requestContext,
-            sessionId,
-        });
-        // For stateless mode or if session management is disabled, return 405
-        if (config.mcpSessionMode === 'stateless' || !sessionStore) {
-            return c.json({ error: 'Session termination not supported in stateless mode' }, 405);
-        }
-        // SECURITY: Validate session ownership before termination
-        const sessionIdentity = extractSessionIdentity();
-        if (!sessionStore.isValidForIdentity(sessionId, sessionIdentity)) {
+        logger.info('Session termination requested', { ...requestContext, sessionId });
+        // SECURITY: validate session ownership before termination.
+        if (!sessionStore.isValidForIdentity(sessionId, extractSessionIdentity())) {
             logger.warning('Session termination rejected - ownership validation failed', {
                 ...requestContext,
                 sessionId,
-                requestTenant: sessionIdentity?.tenantId,
-                requestClient: sessionIdentity?.clientId,
             });
             return c.json({ error: 'Session not found or access denied' }, 404);
         }
-        // Terminate the session in the store
-        sessionStore.terminate(sessionId);
-        logger.info('Session terminated successfully', {
-            ...requestContext,
-            sessionId,
-        });
-        return c.json({ status: 'terminated', sessionId }, 200);
+        const connection = sessionStore.getConnection(sessionId);
+        if (!connection) {
+            // Identity-valid but no live connection (already torn down). Drop the
+            // record and answer exactly as the transport does below — one status and
+            // one body shape for one operation.
+            await sessionStore.terminate(sessionId);
+            return c.body(null, 200);
+        }
+        return await connection.transport.handleRequest(c.req.raw);
     });
+    // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
     // JSON-RPC over HTTP (Streamable)
+    // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+    /** Validated auth info for pass-through to the SDK's `ctx.http.authInfo`. */
+    const currentAuthInfo = () => authContext.getStore()?.authInfo;
+    // The modern (2026-07-28) leg. In stateless mode the same handler also serves
+    // 2025-era traffic per request (`legacy: 'stateless'`, the default); in
+    // stateful mode it is strict and the sessionful arm below owns 2025.
+    const handler = createMcpHandler(serverFactory, {
+        ...(isStateful && { legacy: 'reject' }),
+        onerror: (error) => {
+            logger.debug(`MCP handler reported: ${error.message}`, transportContext);
+        },
+    });
+    /** Serves one 2025-era request on the sessionful arm. */
+    const handleLegacySessionful = async (store, request, parsedBody, requestContext) => {
+        const authInfo = currentAuthInfo();
+        const identity = extractSessionIdentity();
+        const providedSessionId = request.headers.get('mcp-session-id') ?? undefined;
+        const options = {
+            ...(parsedBody !== undefined && { parsedBody }),
+            ...(authInfo && { authInfo }),
+        };
+        if (providedSessionId) {
+            // SECURITY: identity binding is checked before the session is reachable,
+            // so a stolen session ID alone cannot resume someone else's session.
+            if (!store.isValidForIdentity(providedSessionId, identity)) {
+                logger.warning('Session validation failed - invalid or hijacked session', {
+                    ...requestContext,
+                    sessionId: providedSessionId,
+                });
+                return Response.json({ error: 'Session not found or expired' }, { status: 404 });
+            }
+            const connection = store.getConnection(providedSessionId);
+            if (!connection) {
+                return Response.json({ error: 'Session not found or expired' }, { status: 404 });
+            }
+            return await connection.transport.handleRequest(request, options);
+        }
+        // No session yet: this is an `initialize` (anything else is rejected by the
+        // SDK transport with the spec's 400). Capacity is checked before the
+        // instance is built so a saturated server never allocates one.
+        store.assertCapacity();
+        const server = await serverFactory({
+            era: 'legacy',
+            ...(authInfo && { authInfo }),
+            requestInfo: request,
+        });
+        const transport = new WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport({
+            sessionIdGenerator: generateSecureSessionId,
+            onsessioninitialized: (sessionId) => {
+                store.register(sessionId, { server, transport }, identity);
+                logger.debug('Session initialized', { ...requestContext, sessionId });
+            },
+            onsessionclosed: (sessionId) => store.terminate(sessionId),
+        });
+        await server.connect(transport);
+        try {
+            const response = await transport.handleRequest(request, options);
+            // A handshake the transport refused never mints a session, so the
+            // instance pair it would have owned has no owner — close it here.
+            if (!transport.sessionId)
+                await closeConnection({ server, transport });
+            return response;
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            await closeConnection({ server, transport });
+            throw error;
+        }
+    };
     app.all(config.mcpHttpEndpointPath, async (c) => {
         const requestContext = requestContextService.createRequestContext({
             operation: 'HttpRpcRequest',
-            component: 'HttpTransport',
-        });
-        const protocolVersion = c.req.header('mcp-protocol-version') ?? '2025-03-26';
-        logger.debug('Handling MCP request.', {
-            ...requestContext,
-            path: c.req.path,
-            method: c.req.method,
-            protocolVersion,
+            additionalContext: { component: 'HttpTransport' },
         });
-        // Per MCP Spec 2025-06-18: MCP-Protocol-Version header MUST be validated
-        // Server MUST respond with 400 Bad Request for unsupported versions
-        // We default to 2025-03-26 for backward compatibility if not provided
-        const supportedVersions = manifest.protocol.supportedVersions;
-        if (!supportedVersions.includes(protocolVersion)) {
-            logger.warning('Unsupported MCP protocol version requested.', {
-                ...requestContext,
-                protocolVersion,
-                supportedVersions,
-            });
-            return c.json({
-                error: 'Unsupported MCP protocol version',
-                protocolVersion,
-                supportedVersions,
-            }, 400);
+        logger.debug('Handling MCP request.', withExtra(requestContext, { path: c.req.path, method: c.req.method }));
+        // Media type before body: a POST whose Content-Type is not JSON is a 415,
+        // not a parse error, and the SDK answers it that way. Parsing first turns
+        // even a well-formed body into a misleading `-32700`, so hand those
+        // straight to the handler and let it produce the canonical response.
+        if (c.req.method === 'POST' && !isJsonContentType(c.req.header('content-type'))) {
+            const authInfo = currentAuthInfo();
+            return await handler.fetch(c.req.raw, { ...(authInfo && { authInfo }) });
         }
-        const providedSessionId = c.req.header('mcp-session-id');
-        // Parse once for the small amount of protocol state the per-request SDK
-        // server cannot retain itself. Hono caches body parsing, so the transport
-        // still receives the same body below. Malformed JSON remains the SDK's job.
-        let parsedRpcBody;
-        let rpcMessages = [];
+        // Read the POST body once, from the cache the body-limit guard may have
+        // seeded. Every downstream consumer takes it as `parsedBody` because the raw
+        // stream is not guaranteed re-readable after that guard runs.
+        let parsedBody;
         if (c.req.method === 'POST') {
             try {
-                const rawBody = await c.req.json();
-                parsedRpcBody = rawBody;
-                const messages = Array.isArray(rawBody) ? rawBody : [rawBody];
-                rpcMessages = messages.filter((message) => typeof message === 'object' && message !== null);
+                parsedBody = await c.req.json();
             }
             catch {
-                // Malformed body — let the SDK surface the parse error downstream.
-            }
-        }
-        const initializeMessage = rpcMessages.find((message) => message.method === 'initialize');
-        const declaredCapabilities = initializeMessage?.params?.capabilities;
-        const initializeCapabilities = typeof declaredCapabilities === 'object' && declaredCapabilities !== null
-            ? declaredCapabilities
-            : undefined;
-        // Extract identity from auth context (if auth is enabled)
-        // This MUST happen before session validation for security
-        const sessionIdentity = extractSessionIdentity();
-        // MCP Spec 2025-06-18: Return 404 for invalid/terminated sessions
-        // https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/basic/transports#session-management
-        // SECURITY: Validate session WITH identity binding to prevent hijacking
-        if (sessionStore &&
-            providedSessionId &&
-            !sessionStore.isValidForIdentity(providedSessionId, sessionIdentity)) {
-            logger.warning('Session validation failed - invalid or hijacked session', {
-                ...requestContext,
-                sessionId: providedSessionId,
-                requestTenant: sessionIdentity?.tenantId,
-                requestClient: sessionIdentity?.clientId,
-            });
-            return c.json({ error: 'Session not found or expired' }, 404);
-        }
-        // MCP Spec 2025-06-18: stateful sessions require Mcp-Session-Id on all
-        // non-initialize requests. Without this gate, the SDK processes the RPC
-        // on a fresh per-request McpServer (no protocol state to reject against)
-        // and the session store mints an uninitialized session on response.ok.
-        if (sessionStore && !providedSessionId && !initializeMessage) {
-            logger.warning('Rejected non-initialize request without session in stateful mode', {
-                ...requestContext,
-                method: c.req.method,
-            });
-            return c.json({
-                error: 'Bad Request: Mcp-Session-Id header is required. Send an initialize request first.',
-            }, 400);
-        }
-        const sessionId = providedSessionId ?? generateSecureSessionId();
-        // A response to a server-initiated request arrives on a new POST and would
-        // otherwise be delivered to a fresh SDK Server with no matching response
-        // handler. Route recognized responses through the durable session registry
-        // and strip them before normal SDK dispatch. An emptied batch still goes to
-        // the transport rather than short-circuiting here: it owns the Accept and
-        // Content-Type checks, and returns the same 202 every other
-        // response/notification POST does.
-        let transportBody = parsedRpcBody;
-        if (sessionStore && parsedRpcBody !== undefined) {
-            const messages = Array.isArray(parsedRpcBody) ? parsedRpcBody : [parsedRpcBody];
-            const unrouted = messages.filter((message) => {
-                if (!isJSONRPCResultResponse(message) && !isJSONRPCErrorResponse(message))
-                    return true;
-                return !sessionStore.routeServerResponse(sessionId, message);
-            });
-            if (unrouted.length !== messages.length)
-                transportBody = unrouted;
-        }
-        // The cancellation notification is handled by a different SDK Server
-        // instance than the original request. Mirror it into the durable session
-        // registry before passing it to the SDK so the original handler's merged
-        // `ctx.signal` is aborted without sharing Server instances across clients.
-        if (sessionStore) {
-            for (const message of rpcMessages) {
-                if (message.method !== 'notifications/cancelled')
-                    continue;
-                const params = message.params;
-                const requestId = params?.requestId;
-                if (typeof requestId !== 'string' && typeof requestId !== 'number')
-                    continue;
-                const reason = params?.reason;
-                sessionStore.cancelRequest(sessionId, requestId, typeof reason === 'string' ? reason : undefined);
-            }
-        }
-        const transport = new McpSessionTransport(sessionId, sessionStore);
-        trackPerRequestInstance(transport, 'transport');
-        let server;
-        let closePromise;
-        const closeOnce = (trigger) => {
-            closePromise ??= closePerRequestInstances(transport, server, sessionId, requestContext, trigger);
-            return closePromise;
-        };
-        const handleRpc = async () => {
-            // SDK 1.26.0: Protocol.connect() throws if already connected.
-            // Create a fresh McpServer per request to prevent cross-client data leaks.
-            // See GHSA-345p-7cg4-v4c7.
-            server = await serverFactory(sessionStore?.createProtocolSessionHooks(sessionId));
-            trackPerRequestInstance(server, 'server');
-            await server.connect(transport);
-            const response = await transport.handleRequest(c, transportBody);
-            if (response) {
-                // Only register the session in the store AFTER a successful response.
-                // This avoids minting sessions for requests that fail protocol
-                // validation (e.g. tools/list without prior initialize).
-                if (sessionStore && response.ok) {
-                    sessionStore.getOrCreate(sessionId, sessionIdentity);
-                    if (initializeCapabilities) {
-                        sessionStore.setClientCapabilities(sessionId, initializeCapabilities);
-                    }
-                }
-                // MCP Spec 2025-06-18: For stateful sessions, return Mcp-Session-Id header
-                // in InitializeResponse (and all subsequent responses).
-                // 'auto' resolves to stateful for HTTP, matching the SessionStore creation above.
-                if (isStateful && response.ok) {
-                    response.headers.set('Mcp-Session-Id', sessionId);
-                    logger.debug('Added Mcp-Session-Id header to response', {
-                        ...requestContext,
-                        sessionId,
-                    });
-                }
-                // Non-SSE responses (POST/202): close immediately via queueMicrotask.
-                // SSE streams must stay open until the client disconnects — closing now
-                // would abort the ReadableStream before Hono can write to it (see
-                // GHSA-345p-7cg4-v4c7 above) — so cleanup is bound to the request's
-                // AbortSignal instead. `@hono/mcp` `stream.onAbort` only clears its
-                // internal stream map; it never fires `transport.close()` or `onclose`,
-                // and real clients almost always disconnect ungracefully (no DELETE).
-                // Without this hook every SSE GET leaks its per-request McpServer +
-                // Transport pair (issue #50). `c.req.raw.signal` aborts on client
-                // disconnect across runtimes (`@hono/node-server`, modern Bun, Workers).
-                const isSSE = response.headers.get('content-type')?.includes('text/event-stream');
-                if (!isSSE) {
-                    queueMicrotask(() => {
-                        void closeOnce('success');
-                    });
-                }
-                else {
-                    const sseCleanup = () => {
-                        void closeOnce('sse-abort');
-                    };
-                    const reqSignal = c.req.raw.signal;
-                    if (reqSignal.aborted) {
-                        queueMicrotask(sseCleanup);
-                    }
-                    else {
-                        reqSignal.addEventListener('abort', sseCleanup, { once: true });
-                    }
-                }
-                return response;
+                // Malformed JSON never reaches classification — answer the spec's parse
+                // error directly rather than letting an unreadable body reach a transport.
+                return c.json({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: null, error: { code: -32700, message: 'Parse error' } }, 400);
             }
-            queueMicrotask(() => {
-                void closeOnce('success');
-            });
-            return c.body(null, 204);
-        };
-        // Auth context is already populated by the middleware's authContext.run().
-        // ALS propagates through all async continuations in this handler.
-        try {
-            return await handleRpc();
         }
-        catch (err) {
-            // Close every surface that was successfully created. The idempotent
-            // closure also protects against any cleanup already scheduled elsewhere.
-            await closeOnce('error');
-            throw err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err));
+        if (sessionStore && (await isLegacyRequest(c.req.raw, parsedBody))) {
+            return await handleLegacySessionful(sessionStore, c.req.raw, parsedBody, requestContext);
         }
+        const authInfo = currentAuthInfo();
+        return await handler.fetch(c.req.raw, {
+            ...(parsedBody !== undefined && { parsedBody }),
+            ...(authInfo && { authInfo }),
+        });
     });
     logger.info('Hono application setup complete.', transportContext);
-    return { app, sessionStore };
+    return {
+        app,
+        handler,
+        sessionStore,
+        close: async () => {
+            await handler.close();
+            await sessionStore?.destroy();
+        },
+    };
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=httpTransport.js.map