@cursor/july 0.1.2 → 0.1.4

package/src/types.ts

@@ -206,7 +206,9 @@ export interface AgentHostingOptions {
    * Lowercase hostnames with at least two labels and an alphabetic TLD;
    * max 20. `agentkit deploy` sends these as `egressAllowedDomains`
    * (unioned with any `--allow-domain` flags). Only valid on repo-backed
-   * deployments.
+   * deployments. Deployment-scoped like {@link secretNames}: not capped by
+   * the team's Cloud Agent egress allowlist. The platform still merges a
+   * bootstrap set (npm, Slack, Cursor API) at provision time.
    */
   egressDomains?: string[];
   /**
@@ -588,6 +590,11 @@ export interface ActionCall {
   callId: string;
   toolName: string;
   args?: unknown;
+  /**
+   * When set, this tool call belongs to a nested subagent turn whose
+   * parent `task` tool call id is `parentCallId`.
+   */
+  parentCallId?: string;
 }
 
 /** Human decision for a parked {@link ToolConfig.needsApproval} tool call. */
@@ -622,14 +629,30 @@ export type SessionEventPayload =
   | { type: "turn.started"; data: Record<string, never> }
   | { type: "step.started"; data: { stepId: number } }
   | { type: "step.completed"; data: { stepId: number; durationMs: number } }
-  | { type: "reasoning.appended"; data: { delta: string; text: string } }
-  | { type: "reasoning.completed"; data: { durationMs?: number } }
-  | { type: "message.appended"; data: { delta: string; text: string } }
+  | {
+      type: "reasoning.appended";
+      data: { delta: string; text: string; parentCallId?: string };
+    }
+  | {
+      type: "reasoning.completed";
+      data: { durationMs?: number; parentCallId?: string };
+    }
+  | {
+      type: "message.appended";
+      data: { delta: string; text: string; parentCallId?: string };
+    }
   | {
       type: "message.completed";
-      data: { text: string; finishReason: "stop" | "tool_call" };
+      data: {
+        text: string;
+        finishReason: "stop" | "tool_call";
+        parentCallId?: string;
+      };
+    }
+  | {
+      type: "actions.requested";
+      data: { calls: ActionCall[]; parentCallId?: string };
     }
-  | { type: "actions.requested"; data: { calls: ActionCall[] } }
   | {
       /**
        * A server tool with {@link ToolConfig.needsApproval} is parked until
@@ -641,6 +664,7 @@ export type SessionEventPayload =
         callId: string;
         toolName: string;
         args?: unknown;
+        parentCallId?: string;
       };
     }
   | {
@@ -650,6 +674,7 @@ export type SessionEventPayload =
         toolName: string;
         decision: ApprovalDecision;
         by?: string;
+        parentCallId?: string;
       };
     }
   | {
@@ -659,6 +684,7 @@ export type SessionEventPayload =
         toolName: string;
         output?: unknown;
         isError: boolean;
+        parentCallId?: string;
       };
     }
   | {
@@ -1551,7 +1577,10 @@ export interface ResolvedAgent {
   name: string;
   description?: string;
   model?: ModelSetting;
-  /** Composed system prompt (instructions.md / instructions.ts / agent.ts). */
+  /**
+   * Composed system prompt: identity preamble from {@link name}, then
+   * authored `instructions.md` / `.ts` / dir (or inline `agent.ts`).
+   */
   instructions?: string;
   /** Execution runtime. Root agents default to `"local"`. */
   runtime: AgentRuntime;
@@ -1776,6 +1805,15 @@ export interface ServeOptions {
    * {@link authToken}. Authored `auth` arrays still win.
    */
   allowAnonymous?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * Allow {@link allowAnonymous} together with
+   * `githubChannel({ cursorAccount })`. Without this opt-in, `serve` refuses
+   * to start because every admitted anonymous caller could drive sessions
+   * that hold the signed-in account's repo-scoped GitHub credential. Set it
+   * only when the network boundary already authenticates callers (e.g. an
+   * SSO/Okta proxy in front of the host).
+   */
+  allowAnonymousCursorGithub?: boolean;
   /**
    * Public base URL where this server is reachable from outside the host
    * (e.g. `https://agents.example.com`). Used to resolve peer