@cubis/foundry 0.3.63 → 0.3.65

package/workflows/workflows/agent-environment-setup/platforms/claude/skills/variant-analysis/resources/codeql/java.ql

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/**
+ * @name [VARIANT_NAME]
+ * @description Find variants of [ORIGINAL_BUG_ID]
+ * @kind path-problem
+ * @problem.severity error
+ * @tags security variant-analysis
+ */
+
+import java
+import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
+import semmle.code.java.dataflow.FlowSources
+import DataFlow::PathGraph
+
+module VariantConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
+    // HttpServletRequest.getParameter/getHeader
+    exists(MethodAccess ma |
+      ma.getMethod().getName() in ["getParameter", "getHeader", "getCookies", "getQueryString"] and
+      ma.getMethod().getDeclaringType().getASupertype*().hasQualifiedName("javax.servlet", "ServletRequest") and
+      source.asExpr() = ma
+    )
+    or
+    // Spring @RequestParam, @PathVariable
+    exists(Parameter p |
+      p.getAnAnnotation().getType().hasQualifiedName("org.springframework.web.bind.annotation", ["RequestParam", "PathVariable", "RequestBody"]) and
+      source.asParameter() = p
+    )
+  }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+    // Command injection
+    exists(MethodAccess ma |
+      ma.getMethod().hasQualifiedName("java.lang", "Runtime", "exec") and
+      sink.asExpr() = ma.getArgument(0)
+    )
+    or
+    exists(ClassInstanceExpr cie |
+      cie.getConstructedType().hasQualifiedName("java.lang", "ProcessBuilder") and
+      sink.asExpr() = cie.getArgument(0)
+    )
+    or
+    // SQL injection
+    exists(MethodAccess ma |
+      ma.getMethod().getName() in ["executeQuery", "executeUpdate", "execute"] and
+      ma.getMethod().getDeclaringType().getASupertype*().hasQualifiedName("java.sql", "Statement") and
+      sink.asExpr() = ma.getArgument(0)
+    )
+    or
+    // Path traversal
+    exists(ClassInstanceExpr cie |
+      cie.getConstructedType().hasQualifiedName("java.io", "File") and
+      sink.asExpr() = cie.getArgument(0)
+    )
+  }
+
+  predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node) {
+    exists(MethodAccess ma |
+      ma.getMethod().getName() in ["escape", "sanitize", "parseInt", "valueOf"] and
+      node.asExpr() = ma
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+module VariantFlow = TaintTracking::Global<VariantConfig>;
+import VariantFlow::PathGraph
+
+from VariantFlow::PathNode source, VariantFlow::PathNode sink
+where VariantFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
+  "Tainted data from $@ flows to dangerous sink.",
+  source.getNode(), "user input"

package/workflows/workflows/agent-environment-setup/platforms/claude/skills/variant-analysis/resources/codeql/javascript.ql

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/**
+ * @name [VARIANT_NAME]
+ * @description Find variants of [ORIGINAL_BUG_ID]
+ * @kind path-problem
+ * @problem.severity error
+ * @tags security variant-analysis
+ */
+
+import javascript
+import semmle.javascript.security.dataflow.CommandInjectionQuery
+import DataFlow::PathGraph
+
+module VariantConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
+    // Express request params
+    exists(PropAccess pa |
+      pa.getPropertyName() in ["query", "body", "params", "cookies"] and
+      source.asExpr() = pa
+    )
+    or
+    // URL/location
+    exists(PropAccess pa |
+      pa.getBase().toString() in ["window", "document", "location"] and
+      source.asExpr() = pa
+    )
+  }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+    // Command injection
+    exists(CallExpr c |
+      c.getCalleeName() in ["exec", "execSync", "spawn", "spawnSync"] and
+      sink.asExpr() = c.getArgument(0)
+    )
+    or
+    // eval/Function
+    exists(CallExpr c |
+      c.getCalleeName() in ["eval", "Function"] and
+      sink.asExpr() = c.getArgument(0)
+    )
+    or
+    // SQL queries
+    exists(CallExpr c |
+      c.getCalleeName() in ["query", "raw", "execute"] and
+      sink.asExpr() = c.getArgument(0)
+    )
+  }
+
+  predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node) {
+    exists(CallExpr c |
+      c.getCalleeName() in ["escape", "sanitize", "parseInt", "encodeURIComponent"] and
+      node.asExpr() = c
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+module VariantFlow = TaintTracking::Global<VariantConfig>;
+import VariantFlow::PathGraph
+
+from VariantFlow::PathNode source, VariantFlow::PathNode sink
+where VariantFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
+  "Tainted data from $@ flows to dangerous sink.",
+  source.getNode(), "user input"

package/workflows/workflows/agent-environment-setup/platforms/claude/skills/variant-analysis/resources/codeql/python.ql

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/**
+ * @name [VARIANT_NAME]
+ * @description Find variants of [ORIGINAL_BUG_ID]
+ * @kind path-problem
+ * @problem.severity error
+ * @precision high
+ * @tags security
+ *       variant-analysis
+ */
+
+import python
+import semmle.python.dataflow.new.DataFlow
+import semmle.python.dataflow.new.TaintTracking
+import semmle.python.ApiGraphs
+
+module VariantConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  // Sources: where untrusted data originates
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
+    // Flask request parameters
+    source = API::moduleImport("flask").getMember("request")
+             .getMember(["args", "form", "json", "data"])
+             .getAUse()
+    or
+    // Environment variables
+    exists(Call c |
+      c.getFunc().(Attribute).getObject().(Name).getId() = "os" and
+      c.getFunc().(Attribute).getName() in ["getenv", "environ"] and
+      source.asExpr() = c
+    )
+  }
+
+  // Sinks: where tainted data becomes dangerous
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+    // os.system()
+    exists(Call c |
+      c.getFunc().(Attribute).getObject().(Name).getId() = "os" and
+      c.getFunc().(Attribute).getName() = "system" and
+      sink.asExpr() = c.getArg(0)
+    )
+    or
+    // subprocess with shell=True
+    exists(Call c |
+      c.getFunc().(Attribute).getName() in ["call", "run", "Popen"] and
+      c.getArgByName("shell").(NameConstant).getValue() = true and
+      sink.asExpr() = c.getArg(0)
+    )
+  }
+
+  // Barriers: sanitization functions
+  predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node) {
+    exists(Call c |
+      c.getFunc().(Attribute).getObject().(Name).getId() = "shlex" and
+      c.getFunc().(Attribute).getName() = "quote" and
+      node.asExpr() = c
+    )
+    or
+    exists(Call c |
+      c.getFunc().(Name).getId() in ["sanitize", "escape", "validate"] and
+      node.asExpr() = c
+    )
+  }
+
+  // Custom flow steps (optional)
+  predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
+    exists(Call c |
+      c.getFunc().(Attribute).getName() = "format" and
+      pred.asExpr() = c.getFunc().(Attribute).getObject() and
+      succ.asExpr() = c
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+module VariantFlow = TaintTracking::Global<VariantConfig>;
+import VariantFlow::PathGraph
+
+from VariantFlow::PathNode source, VariantFlow::PathNode sink
+where VariantFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
+  "Potential variant: tainted data from $@ flows to dangerous sink.",
+  source.getNode(), "user-controlled input"

package/workflows/workflows/agent-environment-setup/platforms/claude/skills/variant-analysis/resources/semgrep/cpp.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+rules:
+  - id: variant-taint-cpp
+    message: "Potential variant: user input flows to dangerous sink"
+    severity: ERROR
+    languages: [c, cpp]
+    mode: taint
+
+    pattern-sources:
+      # Command line
+      - pattern: argv[$IDX]
+      # Standard input
+      - pattern: gets(...)
+      - pattern: fgets($BUF, $SIZE, stdin)
+      - pattern: scanf(...)
+      - pattern: fscanf(...)
+      - pattern: getenv(...)
+      # Network
+      - pattern: recv($SOCK, $BUF, ...)
+      - pattern: recvfrom(...)
+      - pattern: read($FD, $BUF, ...)
+
+    pattern-sinks:
+      # Command injection
+      - pattern: system($SINK)
+      - pattern: popen($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: execl($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: execlp($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: execv($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: execvp($SINK, ...)
+      # Buffer overflow
+      - pattern: strcpy($DST, $SINK)
+      - pattern: strcat($DST, $SINK)
+      - pattern: sprintf($DST, $FMT, ..., $SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: gets($SINK)
+      # Format string
+      - pattern: printf($SINK)
+      - pattern: fprintf($FILE, $SINK)
+      - pattern: sprintf($BUF, $SINK)
+      - pattern: syslog($PRI, $SINK)
+      # Memory
+      - pattern: malloc($SINK)
+      - pattern: calloc($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: realloc($PTR, $SINK)
+      - pattern: alloca($SINK)
+      # File operations
+      - pattern: fopen($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: open($SINK, ...)
+
+    pattern-sanitizers:
+      - pattern: strncpy($DST, $SRC, $N)
+      - pattern: strncat($DST, $SRC, $N)
+      - pattern: snprintf($BUF, $SIZE, ...)
+      - pattern: strlcpy(...)
+      - pattern: strlcat(...)
+
+    paths:
+      exclude:
+        - "**/test/**"
+        - "**/*_test.c"
+        - "**/*_test.cpp"
+
+  - id: unsafe-functions-cpp
+    message: "Use of unsafe function - consider bounded alternative"
+    severity: WARNING
+    languages: [c, cpp]
+    pattern-either:
+      - pattern: gets(...)
+      - pattern: strcpy(...)
+      - pattern: strcat(...)
+      - pattern: sprintf(...)
+      - pattern: vsprintf(...)
+
+  - id: format-string-cpp
+    message: "Potential format string vulnerability"
+    severity: ERROR
+    languages: [c, cpp]
+    patterns:
+      - pattern-either:
+          - pattern: printf($VAR)
+          - pattern: fprintf($F, $VAR)
+          - pattern: sprintf($B, $VAR)
+          - pattern: snprintf($B, $S, $VAR)
+      - pattern-not: printf("...")
+      - pattern-not: fprintf($F, "...")
+      - pattern-not: sprintf($B, "...")
+      - pattern-not: snprintf($B, $S, "...")
+
+  - id: integer-overflow-cpp
+    message: "Potential integer overflow before memory allocation"
+    severity: WARNING
+    languages: [c, cpp]
+    patterns:
+      - pattern: |
+          $SIZE = $X * $Y;
+          ...
+          malloc($SIZE)
+      - pattern: malloc($X * $Y)
+      - pattern: calloc($X * $Y, ...)

package/workflows/workflows/agent-environment-setup/platforms/claude/skills/variant-analysis/resources/semgrep/go.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+rules:
+  - id: variant-taint-go
+    message: "Potential variant: user input flows to dangerous sink"
+    severity: ERROR
+    languages: [go]
+    mode: taint
+
+    pattern-sources:
+      # net/http
+      - pattern: $REQ.URL.Query().Get(...)
+      - pattern: $REQ.FormValue(...)
+      - pattern: $REQ.PostFormValue(...)
+      - pattern: $REQ.Header.Get(...)
+      # Gin
+      - pattern: $CTX.Query(...)
+      - pattern: $CTX.Param(...)
+      - pattern: $CTX.PostForm(...)
+      - pattern: $CTX.GetHeader(...)
+      # Echo
+      - pattern: $CTX.QueryParam(...)
+      - pattern: $CTX.FormValue(...)
+      # os.Args
+      - pattern: os.Args[$IDX]
+      - pattern: os.Getenv(...)
+
+    pattern-sinks:
+      # Command injection
+      - pattern: exec.Command($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: exec.CommandContext($CTX, $SINK, ...)
+      # SQL injection
+      - pattern: $DB.Query($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: $DB.QueryRow($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: $DB.Exec($SINK, ...)
+      # Path traversal
+      - pattern: os.Open($SINK)
+      - pattern: os.OpenFile($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: os.ReadFile($SINK)
+      - pattern: ioutil.ReadFile($SINK)
+      # Template injection
+      - pattern: template.HTML($SINK)
+
+    pattern-sanitizers:
+      - pattern: strconv.Atoi($X)
+      - pattern: strconv.ParseInt($X, ...)
+      - pattern: filepath.Clean($X)
+      - pattern: filepath.Base($X)
+      - pattern: html.EscapeString($X)
+
+    paths:
+      exclude:
+        - "**/*_test.go"
+        - "**/test/**"
+        - "**/vendor/**"
+
+  - id: variant-pattern-go
+    message: "Suspicious pattern matching known vulnerability"
+    severity: WARNING
+    languages: [go]
+    patterns:
+      - pattern-either:
+          - pattern: exec.Command(...)
+          - pattern: $DB.Query($Q, ...)
+      - pattern-not: exec.Command("...")

package/workflows/workflows/agent-environment-setup/platforms/claude/skills/variant-analysis/resources/semgrep/java.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+rules:
+  - id: variant-taint-java
+    message: "Potential variant: user input flows to dangerous sink"
+    severity: ERROR
+    languages: [java]
+    mode: taint
+
+    pattern-sources:
+      # Servlet
+      - pattern: (HttpServletRequest $REQ).getParameter(...)
+      - pattern: (HttpServletRequest $REQ).getHeader(...)
+      - pattern: (HttpServletRequest $REQ).getCookies()
+      - pattern: (HttpServletRequest $REQ).getQueryString()
+      - pattern: (HttpServletRequest $REQ).getInputStream()
+      # Spring
+      - pattern: "@RequestParam $TYPE $VAR"
+      - pattern: "@PathVariable $TYPE $VAR"
+      - pattern: "@RequestBody $TYPE $VAR"
+
+    pattern-sinks:
+      # Command injection
+      - pattern: Runtime.getRuntime().exec($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: new ProcessBuilder($SINK, ...)
+      # SQL injection
+      - pattern: (Statement $S).executeQuery($SINK)
+      - pattern: (Statement $S).executeUpdate($SINK)
+      - pattern: (Statement $S).execute($SINK)
+      - pattern: (Connection $C).prepareStatement($SINK)
+      # Path traversal
+      - pattern: new File($SINK)
+      - pattern: new FileInputStream($SINK)
+      - pattern: new FileOutputStream($SINK)
+      - pattern: Paths.get($SINK, ...)
+      # XXE
+      - pattern: (DocumentBuilder $DB).parse($SINK)
+      # Deserialization
+      - pattern: (ObjectInputStream $OIS).readObject()
+
+    pattern-sanitizers:
+      - pattern: Integer.parseInt($X)
+      - pattern: Integer.valueOf($X)
+      - pattern: StringEscapeUtils.escapeHtml4($X)
+      - pattern: ESAPI.encoder().encodeForSQL(...)
+
+    paths:
+      exclude:
+        - "**/test/**"
+        - "**/*Test.java"
+
+  - id: variant-pattern-java
+    message: "Suspicious pattern matching known vulnerability"
+    severity: WARNING
+    languages: [java]
+    patterns:
+      - pattern-either:
+          - pattern: Runtime.getRuntime().exec(...)
+          - pattern: new ProcessBuilder(...)
+      - pattern-inside: |
+          $RET $METHOD(..., HttpServletRequest $REQ, ...) {
+            ...
+          }

package/workflows/workflows/agent-environment-setup/platforms/claude/skills/variant-analysis/resources/semgrep/javascript.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+rules:
+  - id: variant-taint-js
+    message: "Potential variant: user input flows to dangerous sink"
+    severity: ERROR
+    languages: [javascript, typescript]
+    mode: taint
+
+    pattern-sources:
+      # Express
+      - pattern: req.query.$PARAM
+      - pattern: req.body.$PARAM
+      - pattern: req.params.$PARAM
+      - pattern: req.cookies.$PARAM
+      # URL/Location
+      - pattern: window.location.$PROP
+      - pattern: document.location.$PROP
+      - pattern: location.search
+      - pattern: location.hash
+
+    pattern-sinks:
+      # Command injection
+      - pattern: child_process.exec($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: child_process.execSync($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: child_process.spawn($SINK, ...)
+      # Code execution
+      - pattern: eval($SINK)
+      - pattern: Function($SINK)
+      - pattern: setTimeout($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: setInterval($SINK, ...)
+      # SQL
+      - pattern: $DB.query($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: $DB.raw($SINK)
+      # XSS
+      - pattern: $EL.innerHTML = $SINK
+      - pattern: document.write($SINK)
+
+    pattern-sanitizers:
+      - pattern: parseInt($X, ...)
+      - pattern: encodeURIComponent($X)
+      - pattern: escape($X)
+      - pattern: $DB.escape($X)
+
+    paths:
+      exclude:
+        - "**/*.test.js"
+        - "**/*.spec.js"
+        - "**/test/**"
+        - "**/node_modules/**"
+
+  - id: variant-pattern-js
+    message: "Suspicious pattern matching known vulnerability"
+    severity: WARNING
+    languages: [javascript, typescript]
+    patterns:
+      - pattern-either:
+          - pattern: eval(...)
+          - pattern: Function(...)
+          - pattern: child_process.exec(...)
+      - pattern-not: eval("...")
+      - pattern-not: Function("...")

package/workflows/workflows/agent-environment-setup/platforms/claude/skills/variant-analysis/resources/semgrep/python.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+rules:
+  - id: variant-taint-analysis
+    message: >-
+      Potential variant: user-controlled data flows to dangerous sink.
+      Original bug: [DESCRIBE_ORIGINAL_BUG]
+    severity: ERROR
+    languages: [python]
+    mode: taint
+
+    pattern-sources:
+      # Flask
+      - pattern: request.args.get(...)
+      - pattern: request.args[...]
+      - pattern: request.form.get(...)
+      - pattern: request.form[...]
+      - pattern: request.json
+      - pattern: request.data
+      # Django (uncomment if needed)
+      # - pattern: request.GET.get(...)
+      # - pattern: request.POST.get(...)
+      # General
+      - pattern: os.environ.get(...)
+      - pattern: input(...)
+
+    pattern-sinks:
+      # Command injection
+      - pattern: os.system($SINK)
+      - pattern: os.popen($SINK)
+      - pattern: subprocess.call($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: subprocess.run($SINK, ...)
+      - pattern: subprocess.Popen($SINK, ...)
+      # Code execution
+      - pattern: eval($SINK)
+      - pattern: exec($SINK)
+      # SQL (uncomment if needed)
+      # - pattern: $CURSOR.execute($SINK)
+      # Path traversal (uncomment if needed)
+      # - pattern: open($SINK, ...)
+
+    pattern-sanitizers:
+      - pattern: shlex.quote(...)
+      - pattern: os.path.basename(...)
+      - pattern: int(...)
+      - pattern: sanitize(...)
+      - pattern: escape(...)
+      - pattern: validate(...)
+
+    paths:
+      exclude:
+        - "*_test.py"
+        - "test_*.py"
+        - "tests/"
+        - "**/test/**"
+
+    metadata:
+      category: security
+      confidence: HIGH
+
+  # Simple pattern matching variant (non-taint)
+  - id: variant-pattern-match
+    message: "Suspicious pattern matching known vulnerability signature"
+    severity: WARNING
+    languages: [python]
+    patterns:
+      - pattern-either:
+          - pattern: dangerous_func($USER_DATA)
+          - pattern: risky_operation(..., $USER_DATA, ...)
+      - pattern-not: dangerous_func("...")
+    paths:
+      exclude:
+        - "tests/"
+        - "*_test.py"

package/workflows/workflows/agent-environment-setup/platforms/claude/skills/variant-analysis/resources/variant-report-template.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+# Variant Analysis Report
+
+## Summary
+
+| Field | Value |
+|-------|-------|
+| **Original Bug** | [BUG_ID / CVE] |
+| **Analysis Date** | [DATE] |
+| **Codebase** | [REPO/PROJECT] |
+| **Variants Found** | [COUNT] |
+
+## Original Vulnerability
+
+**Root Cause:** [e.g., "User input reaches SQL query without parameterization"]
+
+**Location:** `[path/to/file.py:LINE]` in `function_name()`
+
+```python
+# Vulnerable code
+```
+
+## Search Methodology
+
+| Version | Pattern | Tool | Matches | TP | FP |
+|---------|---------|------|---------|----|----|
+| v1 | [exact] | ripgrep | 1 | 1 | 0 |
+| v2 | [abstract] | semgrep | N | N | N |
+
+**Final Pattern:**
+```yaml
+# Pattern used
+```
+
+## Findings
+
+### Variant #1: [BRIEF_TITLE]
+
+| Severity | Confidence | Status |
+|----------|------------|--------|
+| High | High | Confirmed |
+
+**Location:** `[path/to/file.py:LINE]`
+
+```python
+# Vulnerable code
+```
+
+**Analysis:** [Why this is a true/false positive]
+
+**Exploitability:**
+- [ ] Reachable from external input
+- [ ] User-controlled data
+- [ ] No sanitization
+
+---
+
+<!-- Copy variant template above for additional findings -->
+
+## False Positive Patterns
+
+| Pattern | Count | Reason |
+|---------|-------|--------|
+| [pattern] | N | [why safe] |
+
+## Recommendations
+
+### Immediate
+1. Fix variant in [location]
+
+### Preventive
+1. Add Semgrep rule to CI
+
+```yaml
+# CI-ready rule
+```

package/workflows/workflows/agent-environment-setup/platforms/claude/skills/vercel-ai/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+---
+name: vercel-ai
+description: "Canonical Vercel AI skill covering AI Gateway and AI SDK integration, routing, resilience, and observability."
+metadata:
+  deprecated: false
+  replaced_by: null
+  removal_target: null
+---
+
+# Vercel AI
+
+## Purpose
+
+Implement Vercel AI workloads with a single operating model across AI Gateway and AI SDK: provider routing, fallback resilience, secure key handling, streaming UX, and usage observability.
+
+## Use This For
+
+- AI Gateway provider routing and fallback chains
+- BYOK/auth strategy and OpenAI-compatible endpoints
+- AI SDK integration for chat/completions/streaming
+- AI request telemetry and cost/usage controls
+
+## Decision Flow
+
+1. Select provider topology and fallback policy.
+2. Define auth and secret boundaries.
+3. Implement SDK streaming/UI contract.
+4. Validate latency/cost/error behavior with telemetry.
+
+## Verification
+
+- Gateway routes and fallback logic are deterministic.
+- SDK streaming path is stable under provider failure.
+- Token usage and error rates are observable per route/model.
+
+## Related Skills
+
+- `vercel-platform`
+- `prompt-engineer`
+- `vercel-observability`