@cruxy/cli 1.0.3 → 1.0.4

package/dist/constants.d.ts

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-export declare const APP_NAME = "cruxy";
-export declare const APP_PACKAGE: string;
-export declare const APP_VERSION: string;
-export declare const APP_DESCRIPTION: string;
-/** Directory/file names cruxy looks for. */
-export declare const GLOBAL_DIR_NAME = ".cruxy";
-export declare const CONFIG_FILE_NAME = "config.json";
-/** Secret store under the global dir — `0600`, never holds non-secret config. */
-export declare const CREDENTIALS_FILE_NAME = "credentials.json";
-/** Onboarding state + completion marker under the global dir (U.6). */
-export declare const ONBOARDING_FILE_NAME = "onboarding.json";
-/** Where a user creates a Cruxy gateway key (printed during onboarding). */
-export declare const CREATE_KEY_URL = "https://app.cruxy.in";
-/** Project-level config filenames, checked in order. */
-export declare const PROJECT_CONFIG_FILENAMES: string[];
-/** Project-instruction filenames, checked in order (first match wins). */
-export declare const PROJECT_INSTRUCTION_FILENAMES: string[];
-/**
- * Name of the skills subdirectory, used under the project dir
- * (`<cwd>/.cruxy/skills`), the global dir (`~/.cruxy/skills`), and the package
- * root for shipped builtins.
- */
-export declare const SKILLS_DIR_NAME = "skills";
-/** Hook definitions file, under the project dir (`<cwd>/.cruxy/hooks.json`) and
- * the global dir (`~/.cruxy/hooks.json`). Pure data, validated, never eval'd (C.19). */
-export declare const HOOKS_FILE_NAME = "hooks.json";
-/** Custom slash-command directory (`<cwd>/.cruxy/commands`, `~/.cruxy/commands`);
- * one `<name>.md` per command (frontmatter + template body), mirroring skills. */
-export declare const COMMANDS_DIR_NAME = "commands";
-/** Per-repo hook-trust record, in the GLOBAL dir only (`~/.cruxy/trust.json`) —
- * never in a repo, so cloning carries no trust (C.19 supply-chain safety). */
-export declare const TRUST_FILE_NAME = "trust.json";
-/**
- * Persistent memory (C.29). Structured entries live under the memory subdir of
- * the project dir (`<cwd>/.cruxy/memory`) and the global dir (`~/.cruxy/memory`),
- * one JSON file per scope — pure data, validated, never eval'd.
- */
-export declare const MEMORY_DIR_NAME = "memory";
-export declare const MEMORY_FILE_NAME = "entries.json";
-/** Per-repo PROJECT-memory trust record, in the GLOBAL dir only
- * (`~/.cruxy/memory-trust.json`) — its own file, independent of hook trust, so
- * cloning a repo carries zero memory trust (C.29 supply-chain safety). */
-export declare const MEMORY_TRUST_FILE_NAME = "memory-trust.json";
-/**
- * MCP server integration (C.27). Per-repo trust for configured MCP servers, in
- * the GLOBAL dir only (`~/.cruxy/mcp-trust.json`) — its own file, independent of
- * hook and memory trust, so cloning a repo carries zero MCP trust. Trusting a
- * server runs its code UNSANDBOXED with your privileges, so this decision is
- * fingerprinted and re-checked on every run (C.27 supply-chain safety).
- */
-export declare const MCP_TRUST_FILE_NAME = "mcp-trust.json";
-/**
- * Usage telemetry + cost tracking (C.22). Per-run/per-session usage records live
- * in the GLOBAL dir only (`~/.cruxy/usage/runs.json`), `0600` — LOCAL accounting
- * of your own usage, never transmitted. Pure data, validated, never eval'd.
- */
-export declare const USAGE_DIR_NAME = "usage";
-export declare const USAGE_FILE_NAME = "runs.json";
-/**
- * Absolute path of the shipped builtin skills directory (`<pkg>/skills`).
- * Anchored the same way as the package.json lookup above: both `dist/` and
- * `src/` sit one level below the package root, so `../skills` resolves to the
- * shipped `skills/` directory in dev, in `dist`, and when published.
- */
-export declare const BUILTIN_SKILLS_DIR: string;

package/dist/errors/boundary.d.ts

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-import { type Formatter } from "./format.js";
-import { CruxyError } from "./types.js";
-/**
- * The single top-level error boundary. {@link handleFatal} classifies any thrown
- * value into a {@link CruxyError}, formats it, writes it to stderr, and exits
- * with the error's stable exit code. Nothing escapes to a raw Node stack trace:
- * an unknown error becomes {@link internal} (CRUXY_E_INTERNAL) with a
- * bug-report hint, and the underlying stack is shown only under `--verbose`.
- */
-/**
- * Normalize any thrown value into a {@link CruxyError}:
- * - already a CruxyError → returned as-is;
- * - a Commander parse error → a usage error (CRUXY_E_USAGE);
- * - a known provider/transport error → its mapped code;
- * - anything else → CRUXY_E_INTERNAL, preserving the original as `underlying`.
- */
-export declare function fromUnknown(err: unknown): CruxyError;
-/** A Commander "error" that's actually success (`--help`, `--version`). */
-export declare function isCommanderSuccess(err: unknown): boolean;
-export interface HandleFatalOptions {
-    /** Show the underlying error/stack. Defaults to {@link isVerbose}(). */
-    verbose?: boolean;
-    /** Override the formatter (e.g. a future JSON formatter). */
-    formatter?: Formatter;
-    /** Force color on/off. Defaults to {@link shouldUseColor}(). */
-    color?: boolean;
-    /** Sink for the formatted output (default: stderr). For tests. */
-    write?: (text: string) => void;
-    /** Process exit (default: process.exit). For tests. */
-    exit?: (code: number) => never;
-}
-/**
- * Classify → format → print → exit. Install this as the *only* catch at the CLI
- * entry. `write`/`exit` are injectable so the boundary is testable without
- * touching the real process.
- */
-export declare function handleFatal(err: unknown, opts?: HandleFatalOptions): never;
-/**
- * Whether the invocation requested verbose output: `--verbose`,
- * `--log-level debug`, `DEBUG`, or `CRUXY_LOG_LEVEL=debug`. Read from argv/env so
- * it works even when a failure happens before the CLI finishes parsing flags.
- */
-export declare function isVerbose(argv?: string[], env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): boolean;

package/dist/errors/constructors.d.ts

@@ -1,411 +0,0 @@
-import { CruxyError } from "./types.js";
-/** Best-effort human message for an arbitrary thrown value. */
-export declare function messageOf(underlying: unknown): string | undefined;
-export declare function usageError(title: string, nextSteps?: string[]): CruxyError;
-/**
- * An interactive component (picker, fuzzy finder) was needed but stdin is not
- * an interactive terminal and the caller supplied no default (U.7). Never
- * silently picks an option, never blocks on a pipe — same discipline as the
- * approval/onboarding layers.
- */
-export declare function interactiveRequired(what: string, alternatives?: string[]): CruxyError;
-export declare function configKeyUnknown(key: string): CruxyError;
-export declare function providerUnsupported(provider: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A task class is routed (C.30) to a tier the gateway does not offer. A usage
- * error the user fixes in config — cruxy fails loud here rather than silently
- * substituting a different tier (which would hand a user a model they never
- * asked for). Distinct from runtime unavailability (overload/budget), which
- * stays on the U.5 api codes. Params are tier/class NAMES only — never an
- * upstream model id — so the message is gag-safe by construction (U.8).
- */
-export declare function routingTierUnavailable(tier: string, taskClass: string, offered: string[]): CruxyError;
-export declare function configParse(path: string, underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-export declare function configInvalid(issues: string, path?: string): CruxyError;
-export declare function authMissingKey(provider: string, envVar: string): CruxyError;
-export declare function authInvalid(underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A credential could not be persisted with owner-only permissions, so it was
- * NOT written (C.27c). Chiefly a Windows case: the store's ACL could not be
- * restricted to the current user (non-NTFS filesystem, `icacls`/SID
- * unavailable), and we refuse to leave a secret at inheritable permissions while
- * claiming otherwise. Provider keys point at the env-var fallback; MCP tokens
- * have no such fallback, so the message says so plainly.
- */
-export declare function credentialsUnprotected(kind: "provider" | "mcp", path: string, underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-export declare function gatewayUnreachable(underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-export declare function apiError(underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-export declare function apiRateLimit(underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-export declare function apiOverloaded(underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-export declare function budgetExhausted(underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-export declare function fileNotFound(path: string, underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-export declare function permissionDenied(path: string, underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-export declare function indexEmbedderUnavailable(underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-/**
- * The fastembed module loaded, but the model could not be brought up at runtime
- * — the first-run download/decompress of bge-small-en-v1.5, or the ONNX-runtime
- * init, failed. This is the COMMON first-run failure (offline, the model bucket
- * is unreachable, a corporate proxy blocks it), and it is deliberately kept
- * distinct from both {@link indexEmbedderUnavailable} (a module *load* failure)
- * and the generic {@link indexFailed} ("re-run --verbose") so the cause is
- * actionable rather than a shrug.
- *
- * Fail-loud, not degrade: there is no fallback to the lexical hashing embedder
- * (a silent quality loss). `cruxy index` treats this as fatal — the user
- * explicitly asked to build the index, so a silent no-op index would be the
- * exact "reads like success, isn't" trap C.17 forbids. The `search_codebase`
- * tool instead surfaces it as a tool error and points the model at `grep_files`.
- */
-export declare function indexEmbedderDownloadFailed(underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-export declare function indexStoreUnavailable(underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-export declare function indexFailed(underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-/**
- * Sandboxing was requested (`--sandbox` / `sandbox.enabled`) but no container
- * runtime is available — docker isn't installed, or its daemon isn't running.
- * THE CRITICAL RULE: this is fatal. A user who turned on the sandbox must never
- * be silently dropped back onto un-sandboxed host execution, so we fail loud
- * here rather than run the command anyway.
- */
-export declare function sandboxUnavailable(runtime?: string, underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-/**
- * The pinned sandbox base image could not be made available (the first-run
- * pull failed, or the image does not exist). Fatal — without the image there
- * is nothing to execute inside, and we never substitute another image.
- */
-export declare function sandboxImage(image: string, underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-/**
- * The container itself failed to start or run (a docker-level failure — bad
- * flags, daemon error, `docker run` exit 125), as opposed to the command
- * inside exiting non-zero (which is an ordinary result). Fatal: a sandbox that
- * can't launch is never papered over with a host run.
- */
-export declare function sandboxExec(underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A blocking hook failed (non-zero exit, gate-declined, or errored). The action
- * that fired it is aborted fail-closed — a failing pre-check must stop, never
- * proceed. Advisory hooks report but never raise this.
- */
-export declare function hookFailed(name: string, reason: string, underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A project (a cloned/opened repo) defines hooks that have not been trusted for
- * this machine. Cruxy NEVER runs another author's hooks silently — trust is an
- * explicit, per-repo decision recorded in your home, not in the repo.
- */
-export declare function hookUntrusted(root: string, count: number): CruxyError;
-/** A malformed hook definition — excluded from the catalog, never eval'd. */
-export declare function hookInvalid(reason: string, source?: string): CruxyError;
-/** A malformed custom slash-command definition — excluded and surfaced. */
-export declare function slashInvalid(reason: string, source?: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A side-effecting action needs approval but cruxy can't ask (non-interactive,
- * no policy). Default-deny — never auto-approve. A distinct exit code (10) so CI
- * can tell "needed approval" apart from a usage error.
- */
-export declare function approvalRequired(summary: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * No forge token could be resolved (PR generation, C.15). The chain is env →
- * `gh auth token` → fail. We never prompt for, store, or persist a token, so the
- * fix is always to provide one in the environment.
- */
-export declare function forgeAuth(host?: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A commit/push was attempted on a protected branch (`main`/`master`/configured).
- * The PR flow must branch off first; this is the last-line guard.
- */
-export declare function gitProtectedBranch(branch: string): CruxyError;
-/** The forge REST API returned an error (non-auth) while opening a PR. */
-export declare function forgeApi(title: string, underlying?: unknown, meta?: Record<string, unknown>): CruxyError;
-/**
- * The `origin` remote of the acting root resolved to a DIFFERENT `owner/repo`
- * between the U.3 preview (what the human approved) and the moment the pull-request
- * API call is made — a concurrent `git remote set-url` on a mutable `.git/config`
- * (C.26 Step 4). The PR is NOT opened: we refuse rather than warn-and-proceed,
- * because opening it would target a repo the human never saw. Both targets are
- * named so the discrepancy is legible. `owner/repo` are already-parsed identifiers
- * (never an upstream model id), so the message is gag-safe by construction (U.8).
- */
-export declare function vcsRemoteChanged(approved: {
-    host: string;
-    owner: string;
-    repo: string;
-}, current: {
-    host: string;
-    owner: string;
-    repo: string;
-}, rootName: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A pull request was requested for one declared root while a SIBLING declared root
- * shares the same git working tree — two non-overlapping roots inside one repo
- * (e.g. `packages/a` + `packages/b` under one `.git`), which filesystem-overlap
- * refusal does not catch (C.26 Step 4). A commit there `git add -A`s the sibling's
- * changes too, so the PR would span both roots. A PR is a single-repo artifact, so
- * we refuse (naming both) rather than silently PR one half.
- */
-export declare function vcsCrossRoot(root: string, sibling: string, repoPath: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * `git push` failed — most often the husky `pre-push` verify hook (build ·
- * typecheck · lint · test) or a rejected non-fast-forward. We never `--force` or
- * `--no-verify`, so the underlying reason is surfaced verbatim.
- */
-export declare function gitPushFailed(branch: string, stderr?: string): CruxyError;
-/** The agent's proposed plan was missing or malformed (plan mode, C.31). */
-export declare function planInvalid(reason: string): CruxyError;
-/** The plan was rejected too many times without converging (plan mode, C.31). */
-export declare function planRevisionLimit(limit: number): CruxyError;
-/**
- * Plan mode needs interactive approval but cruxy is running non-interactively.
- * Default-deny — a plan is never auto-approved. Distinct code (exit 10) so CI can
- * tell it apart from a per-action approval requirement.
- */
-export declare function planApprovalRequired(): CruxyError;
-/**
- * Creating, reading, or restoring a working-tree checkpoint failed (C.32).
- * Fail-loud by design: an agent run never mutates files without its undo
- * protection unless the user explicitly disables it.
- */
-export declare function checkpointFailed(reason: string, underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-/** The requested checkpoint id doesn't exist (or no checkpoints exist at all). */
-export declare function checkpointNotFound(id?: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * Rollback needs interactive approval but cruxy is running non-interactively.
- * Restoring is destructive and deliberate — there is no auto-rollback path, ever.
- */
-export declare function rollbackApprovalRequired(): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A path/selector names a workspace root that is not in the declared set — an
- * unknown root name, or an absolute path that lands in no declared root. Fail-loud
- * by design and NEVER fuzzy-matched to a nearby root (R1): a silent near-match is
- * a cross-root misfire. Refused before any FS access.
- */
-export declare function rootUnknown(ref: string, known: readonly string[]): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A path is ambiguous across the declared root set: an absolute path inside ≥2
- * declared roots, or a mutating tool given no root when there is no unambiguous
- * choice. Writes fail closed rather than guess which repo to touch.
- */
-export declare function rootAmbiguous(ref: string, candidates: string[]): CruxyError;
-/**
- * Declaration-time: a declared root nests inside / overlaps another. Refused at
- * session start — overlap makes "which root owns this path" ambiguous and lets two
- * checkpoints/grants fight over the same bytes.
- */
-export declare function multirootWriteDeferred(root: string, primary: string): CruxyError;
-export declare function rootOverlap(a: string, b: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * An interactive add-root was refused: no TTY to confirm, or the user declined the
- * confirm/trust prompt. The root set only ever grows by an explicit human act —
- * never the model, never a repo-local config.
- */
-export declare function rootAddRefused(reason: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A multi-root rollback set references a member checkpoint that is missing or
- * corrupt, or a touched root has no member. Loud — a partial rollback must never
- * masquerade as success.
- */
-export declare function checkpointSetIncomplete(runId: string, reason: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A multi-root rollback failed mid-apply (R3): it restored some roots and not
- * others, and it STOPPED rather than continue best-effort. Carries the exact
- * restored-vs-not split; re-running rollback is idempotent and safe.
- */
-export declare function checkpointSetPartial(runId: string, restored: string[], notRestored: string[], underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A subagent spawn was attempted past the configured nesting cap (C.14). The
- * spawn tool is structurally withheld at the cap, so reaching this means the
- * orchestrator seam was driven directly — fail loud, never spawn.
- */
-export declare function subagentDepthExceeded(depth: number, maxDepth: number): CruxyError;
-/** One workspace root claimed by two-or-more WRITING children of a single
- * `spawn_subagents` call — the unit of a disjoint-scope violation (C.33). */
-export interface ScopeConflict {
-    /** The root name both children declared write scope on. */
-    root: string;
-    /** The task labels of every writing child that claimed `root` (always ≥2). */
-    tasks: string[];
-}
-/**
- * A parallel fan-out (C.33) declared children with overlapping write scope — two
- * or more target the SAME workspace root while both hold mutating tools. The
- * ENTIRE batch is refused BEFORE any child is dispatched, so concurrent siblings
- * can never race on one root's files or checkpoint. Every colliding group is
- * named (the conflicting task pairs, per root) so the model can fix all of them
- * at once. Surfaced as a tool error to correct (assign distinct roots, or drop
- * write tools on all but one child per root).
- *
- * THE HONEST LIMIT, stated in the message: the check is on DECLARED scope — the
- * tools + root each child was granted — NOT the files actually written. Two
- * children could still touch disjoint paths under one root; cruxy refuses anyway
- * rather than let two potential writers race on that root's single checkpoint.
- */
-export declare function subagentScopeOverlap(conflicts: readonly ScopeConflict[]): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A subagent run failed outright (provider error, tool crash) before producing
- * a result. Normally folded into the structured `SubagentResult` the parent
- * reasons over; thrown only when the orchestrator itself cannot proceed.
- */
-export declare function subagentFailed(underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A `run_in_background` dispatch was refused because the session already holds
- * `jobs.maxJobs` live jobs (queued + running + paused). The MODEL corrects it, so
- * this is a coded tool error, not a silent drop: wait for a job to finish (or
- * cancel one) and retry, or run the work in the foreground.
- */
-export declare function jobLimitExceeded(maxJobs: number, live: number): CruxyError;
-/**
- * `cruxy cancel/logs/rollback <id>` named a job that does not exist in this
- * session. Jobs are session-scoped (NOT a daemon), so an id from a prior session
- * is legitimately gone — fail loud with the id rather than a silent no-op.
- */
-export declare function jobNotFound(id: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A background-jobs command was used while the feature is disabled. Surfaced with
- * how to enable it rather than pretending there are simply no jobs.
- */
-export declare function jobsDisabled(): CruxyError;
-/**
- * No test command could be detected and none is configured (C.13). cruxy never
- * invents a test command — the fix is always to declare one.
- */
-export declare function testCommandNotFound(): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A memory write was refused because the content matched a known secret shape
- * (C.29). Secrets are NEVER persisted to memory — the fix is to remember a
- * non-secret description, not the secret itself.
- */
-export declare function memorySecretRefused(kind: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A repo's project memory is present but has not been trusted on this machine
- * (C.29). It is never recalled into the model's context silently — a cloned repo
- * cannot inject notes until you review and trust them.
- */
-export declare function memoryUntrusted(root: string): CruxyError;
-/** A malformed memory entry was rejected (C.29) — excluded, never eval'd. */
-export declare function memoryInvalid(detail: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * The local usage store (`~/.cruxy/usage/runs.json`) is corrupt or unreadable
- * (C.22). Never fatal: usage accounting is best-effort, so the read is SKIPPED
- * and this is surfaced. The fix is always to reset the file — its only content
- * is your own local usage history, so deleting it loses nothing but history.
- */
-export declare function usageRead(path: string, reason: string, underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-/**
- * No language server is available for a query: either no server is configured
- * for the file's language, or the configured/default binary is not installed.
- * THE CORE HONESTY RULE for C.12: this is a coded, actionable failure — it must
- * NEVER collapse into an empty result, because "no server" would then read as
- * "no references found". `installHint` carries the concrete next step.
- */
-export declare function lspServerNotFound(language: string, reason: "no-spec" | "binary-missing", detail?: {
-    command?: string;
-    installHint?: string;
-}): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A language server's `initialize` handshake or a single request exceeded its
- * timeout. The process is killed (startup) or the request rejected (per-request)
- * — cruxy never hangs waiting on an unresponsive server.
- */
-export declare function lspTimeout(language: string, phase: "startup" | "request", timeoutMs: number): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A language server crashed (its process exited unexpectedly) and could not be
- * recovered — the single automatic restart also died. Distinct from a server
- * that answered with zero results (that is an ordinary, non-error outcome).
- */
-export declare function lspCrashed(language: string, detail?: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A project configures MCP servers that this repo has not trusted, and cruxy is
- * running non-interactively so it cannot ask. Fail closed BEFORE any server is
- * spawned: trusting a server runs its code UNSANDBOXED with the user's full
- * privileges (a stdio server's own side effects can't be contained by the shell
- * sandbox), so an untrusted config must never connect silently. The wording says
- * this plainly — it is a real escalation, not a "gated shell in a box".
- */
-export declare function mcpUntrusted(root: string, servers: string[]): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A trusted MCP server could not be reached — spawn failed, the `initialize`
- * handshake errored/timed out, or `tools/list` failed. That server simply
- * contributes no tools (the run continues); the coded reason is surfaced so a
- * misconfigured server is visible, not a silent absence. External server text is
- * gag-scrubbed (U.8) before it reaches the user-facing cause.
- */
-export declare function mcpConnect(server: string, underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A network (`url`) MCP server was REFUSED for a security reason (SSRF address
- * block, a non-https/non-loopback scheme, or an endpoint redirect) — distinct
- * from a transient connect failure. `reason` is our own guard's message (not
- * server-controlled), but it is still scrubbed for symmetry with `mcpConnect`.
- */
-export declare function mcpBlocked(server: string, reason: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A network (`url`) MCP server's CREDENTIAL failed (C.27c) — either the endpoint
- * REJECTED it (401/403) or the configured `credentialRef` names no token in the
- * `~/.cruxy` store. Distinct from `mcpConnect` (the server was reachable) and from
- * `mcpBlocked` (a security refusal before connect). The token is NEVER included in
- * this error — only the server name and the credential NAME appear.
- */
-export declare function mcpAuth(server: string, detail: {
-    kind: "rejected";
-    status: number;
-} | {
-    kind: "missing";
-    ref: string;
-}): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A project-scope config tried to set raw `headers` on an MCP server (C.27c). A
- * live header value is a secret, and project scope is a possibly-cloned repo, so
- * this is REFUSED at load — never silently dropped (a silent drop would let a repo
- * believe auth is configured when it is not). The repo may only NAME a credential
- * via `credentialRef`; the value lives solely in the user's `~/.cruxy` store.
- */
-export declare function mcpProjectHeaders(server: string, file: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * `web.enabled` is on but no usable search provider is configured — the API-key
- * environment variable is unset (or the provider is unknown). THE HONESTY RULE:
- * this is a coded, actionable failure, never an empty result — "no provider"
- * must not read as "the web had no results". `apiKeyEnv` names the variable to set.
- */
-export declare function webUnavailable(provider: string, apiKeyEnv: string): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A web search did not complete — the provider returned an HTTP error, the network
- * failed, or the request timed out. Distinct from a search that ran and found
- * nothing (that stays an ordinary `ok:true` empty result). External provider text
- * is gag-scrubbed (U.8) before it reaches the user-facing cause.
- */
-export declare function webSearchFailed(underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A `web_fetch` failed to retrieve a page: network error, timeout, an oversize or
- * non-text body, or too many redirects. Distinct from a page that was fetched but
- * held no readable text (an ordinary `ok:true` empty result). External response
- * text is gag-scrubbed (U.8) before it reaches the user-facing cause.
- */
-export declare function webFetchFailed(url: string, underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A `web_fetch` was REFUSED before any request went out (SSRF guard): a non-http(s)
- * scheme, or a host that resolves into a private/loopback/link-local range
- * (127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254 cloud metadata, 10.x, internal DNS, …). A security
- * stop kept distinct from an ordinary fetch failure — the request is never
- * dispatched. `web.allowPrivateHosts` is the deliberate escape hatch.
- */
-export declare function webBlockedHost(url: string, reason: string): CruxyError;
-export declare function internal(underlying?: unknown): CruxyError;
-/**
- * A one-shot `cruxy run` ended without completing: the agent loop hit a hard stop
- * — the iteration cap (`max_iterations`) or a token budget (`budget`) — or was
- * cancelled (`aborted`). We fail loud with a non-zero exit so CI never reads a
- * gave-up run as success; the partial work already streamed to stdout is preserved
- * and the specific reason is named. `stop` is taken as a plain string so this
- * (low-level) module needn't depend on the agent's result type.
- */
-export declare function agentIncomplete(info: {
-    stop: string;
-    iterations: number;
-    /** The loop's stopReason (the concrete budget message), when `stop === "budget"`. */
-    reason?: string;
-    /** The turn ceiling in force, surfaced for `max_iterations`. */
-    maxIterations?: number;
-}): CruxyError;
-/**
- * Map a known provider/transport error (from `@cruxy/sdk`) to a typed
- * {@link CruxyError}, or `null` if it isn't one. Order matters: specific
- * subclasses before the `ApiError` base.
- */
-export declare function classifyProviderError(underlying: unknown): CruxyError | null;

package/dist/errors/format.d.ts

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-import { CruxyError } from "./types.js";
-/**
- * Rendering for {@link CruxyError}, kept separate from the data so it's testable
- * and swappable. {@link TerminalFormatter} renders the human, 4-part terminal
- * form; a `JsonFormatter` for headless output can drop in behind the same
- * {@link Formatter} interface later (out of scope here — this is the seam).
- */
-export interface FormatOptions {
-    /** Append the underlying error's stack/message (hidden by default). */
-    verbose: boolean;
-    /** Emit ANSI color. Resolve with {@link shouldUseColor}. */
-    color: boolean;
-}
-export interface Formatter {
-    format(err: CruxyError, opts: FormatOptions): string;
-}
-/**
- * Decide whether to colorize: honor `NO_COLOR` (disable) and `FORCE_COLOR`
- * (enable), otherwise color only when writing to a TTY.
- */
-export declare function shouldUseColor(stream?: {
-    isTTY?: boolean;
-}, env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): boolean;
-/** The default terminal formatter: title, cause, next steps, code (+ verbose). */
-export declare class TerminalFormatter implements Formatter {
-    format(err: CruxyError, opts: FormatOptions): string;
-}
-/** The shared default instance. */
-export declare const terminalFormatter: TerminalFormatter;
-/** Convenience: render with the default terminal formatter. */
-export declare function formatError(err: CruxyError, opts: FormatOptions): string;

package/dist/errors/index.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-export * from "./types.js";
-export * from "./format.js";
-export * from "./constructors.js";
-export * from "./boundary.js";