@cruxy/cli 0.22.1 → 0.24.0

package/dist/cli/session-factory.js

@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
+import path from "node:path";
 import { createProvider } from "@cruxy/sdk";
 import { loadProjectInstructions } from "../config/index.js";
 import { logger } from "../utils/logger.js";
 import { getGitInfo } from "../utils/git.js";
-import { ApprovalService, InteractivePolicy, SessionAllowlist, classify, defaultPromptIO, } from "../approval/index.js";
+import { ApprovalMutex, ApprovalService, InteractivePolicy, SessionAllowlist, classify, defaultPromptIO, serializeGate, } from "../approval/index.js";
 import { shouldUseColor } from "../errors/index.js";
 import { buildDefaultRegistry, } from "../tools/index.js";
 import { Session, } from "../agent/index.js";
 import { PlanExecutionPolicy, runPlanSession } from "../plan/index.js";
 import { routerForConfig } from "../routing/index.js";
-import { MemoryService, rememberTool } from "../memory/index.js";
+import { MemoryService, buildMultiRootRecallBlock, rememberTool, } from "../memory/index.js";
 import { findDefinitionTool, findReferencesTool, getDiagnosticsTool, hoverTool, } from "../lsp/index.js";
 import { createWebSearchTool, createWebFetchTool } from "../web/index.js";
 import { appendRun } from "../usage/index.js";
-import { SubagentOrchestrator, makeSpawnSubagentTool, } from "../subagent/index.js";
+import { SubagentOrchestrator, makeSpawnSubagentTool, makeSpawnSubagentsTool, } from "../subagent/index.js";
 /**
  * Wrap a PromptIO so the live region yields before any prompt text lands
  * (U.2/U.4): the prompt writes to stderr while the status line owns the last
@@ -61,28 +62,143 @@ function resumeLineAfterApproval(requestApproval, renderer) {
  * (file actions) or that attribution is lost (shell), for rollback's
  * external-change detection.
  */
-export function withCheckpointGate(requestApproval, checkpoints, cwd) {
-    if (!checkpoints)
+export function withCheckpointGate(requestApproval, gate, ws) {
+    if (!gate)
         return requestApproval;
     return async (action) => {
         const decision = await requestApproval(action);
         if (!decision.allow)
             return decision;
-        const request = classify(action, cwd);
+        const request = classify(action, ws.primary().absPath);
         if (request.tier === "read")
             return decision;
-        await checkpoints.ensureCheckpoint();
-        // Shell AND test executions (C.13) can mutate files we can't attribute
-        // (scripts, snapshot writers) — record the lost attribution the same way.
         if (action.kind === "shell" || action.kind === "test") {
-            await checkpoints.recordShellMutation();
+            // JC-β residual: non-primary shell/test are Step 5, so they are still
+            // hard-attributed to the primary root regardless of `action.root` (which
+            // those tools populate as the seam). They can mutate files we cannot
+            // attribute (scripts, snapshot writers) — record the lost attribution.
+            const root = ws.primary();
+            const svc = gate.serviceFor(root.name, root.absPath);
+            const checkpoint = await svc.ensureCheckpoint();
+            await svc.recordShellMutation();
+            if (checkpoint) {
+                await gate.recordMember(root.name, root.absPath, checkpoint.id);
+            }
+            return decision;
         }
-        else {
-            await checkpoints.recordTouched([...request.targets]);
+        if (action.kind === "vcs") {
+            // C.26 Step 4: a PR now names its root (⚖︎#11), so the checkpoint is
+            // attributed to THAT selected root — its git commit stages/lands in that
+            // root's working tree, never the primary's. `recordShellMutation` because a
+            // `git add -A` + commit mutates the tree opaquely (no per-file attribution).
+            // Fall back to the primary only if a root name is somehow absent (defensive).
+            const root = (action.root ? ws.tryRootByName(action.root) : undefined) ??
+                ws.primary();
+            const svc = gate.serviceFor(root.name, root.absPath);
+            const checkpoint = await svc.ensureCheckpoint();
+            await svc.recordShellMutation();
+            if (checkpoint) {
+                await gate.recordMember(root.name, root.absPath, checkpoint.id);
+            }
+            return decision;
+        }
+        // File actions (write/edit/patch): attribute each RESOLVED target to its root
+        // (JC-G — post-confinement truth) and checkpoint every touched root. A patch
+        // may span roots; each root gets its own checkpoint + set member.
+        for (const [rootName, group] of attributeFileTargets(action, ws)) {
+            const svc = gate.serviceFor(rootName, group.rootAbsPath);
+            const checkpoint = await svc.ensureCheckpoint();
+            await svc.recordTouched(group.paths);
+            if (checkpoint) {
+                await gate.recordMember(rootName, group.rootAbsPath, checkpoint.id);
+            }
         }
         return decision;
     };
 }
+/**
+ * Group a file action's resolved absolute targets by the root that contains each
+ * (JC-G). write/edit carry an already-absolute `path`; patch preview paths are
+ * relative to the PRIMARY cwd (`path.relative(ctx.cwd, abs)` in apply_patch), so
+ * we reconstruct the absolute path from the primary root rather than trusting
+ * classify's `targets` — which also correctly handles a patch spanning roots.
+ */
+function attributeFileTargets(action, ws) {
+    const abs = [];
+    if (action.kind === "write" || action.kind === "edit") {
+        if (action.path)
+            abs.push(action.path);
+    }
+    else if (action.kind === "patch" && action.preview?.type === "patch") {
+        for (const file of action.preview.files) {
+            abs.push(path.resolve(ws.primary().absPath, file.path));
+        }
+    }
+    const byRoot = new Map();
+    for (const target of abs) {
+        const root = ws.rootContaining(target);
+        const group = byRoot.get(root.name) ?? {
+            rootAbsPath: root.absPath,
+            paths: [],
+        };
+        group.paths.push(target);
+        byRoot.set(root.name, group);
+    }
+    return byRoot;
+}
+/**
+ * Register every CONDITIONALLY-enabled runtime tool onto `registry`, in the fixed
+ * order the model sees them: `remember` (memory), the four LSP tools, the two web
+ * tools, the trusted MCP tools, then `spawn_subagent`. Factored out of
+ * {@link buildAgentSession} for ONE reason beyond tidiness: it makes the *complete
+ * runtime* tool set enumerable by a test (JC-B). The default registry only covers
+ * the 14 always-on tools; the allowlist test that pins "no tool can add a workspace
+ * root" is only sound if it runs against the SAME set the session ships — so the
+ * session factory and that test both build the surface through this one seam. A new
+ * conditionally-registered tool added here fails the allowlist test until it is
+ * consciously listed and audited.
+ *
+ * Each family is opt-in and inert when its feature flag is off, exactly as before —
+ * this function is a pure move of the inline registration, same guards, same order.
+ * `spawnTool` is passed in (already depth-bound) because it needs the orchestrator;
+ * it registers only when nesting is allowed (`subagent.maxDepth > 0`).
+ */
+export function registerRuntimeTools(registry, config, opts = {}) {
+    // Persistent memory write tool (C.29) — inert unless enabled.
+    if (config.memory.enabled)
+        registry.register(rememberTool);
+    // Per-language LSP introspection (C.12): four read-only tools that spawn
+    // EXTERNAL language servers, so opt-in; none registered when off.
+    if (config.lsp.enabled) {
+        registry.register(findDefinitionTool);
+        registry.register(findReferencesTool);
+        registry.register(getDiagnosticsTool);
+        registry.register(hoverTool);
+    }
+    // Web search + fetch (C.20): read-only, reach the PUBLIC internet and inject
+    // untrusted data, so opt-in; neither registered (nor a provider constructed)
+    // when off.
+    if (config.web.enabled) {
+        registry.register(createWebSearchTool());
+        registry.register(createWebFetchTool());
+    }
+    // MCP servers (C.27): already connected, trusted, and adapted to bounded,
+    // destructive-gated, `mcp__`-namespaced tools before we got here — a plain
+    // hand-off. Empty unless mcp is enabled with a trusted server.
+    for (const tool of opts.mcpTools ?? [])
+        registry.register(tool);
+    // Subagent spawn (C.14) + parallel fan-out (C.33): only when nesting depth
+    // allows (maxDepth 0 disables the feature structurally). Both are read-only to
+    // propose; the plan propose phase filters them out. The plural `spawn_subagents`
+    // is registered ONLY here (the main registry) — never on a child's scoped
+    // registry — so parallel fan-out stays a depth-0 capability.
+    if (config.subagent.maxDepth > 0) {
+        if (opts.spawnTool)
+            registry.register(opts.spawnTool);
+        if (opts.spawnManyTool)
+            registry.register(opts.spawnManyTool);
+    }
+}
 /**
  * Build a ready-to-run agent {@link Session} from a resolved key — the wiring
  * shared by `cruxy run` and the onboarding first-win task (so they can't drift).
@@ -92,7 +208,14 @@ export function withCheckpointGate(requestApproval, checkpoints, cwd) {
  * over the shared U.3 allowlist and a `planRunner` so `session.send` proposes →
  * approves → executes. Plan mode is fully opt-in; the default path is unchanged.
  */
-export function buildAgentSession(config, apiKey, cwd, ttyInteractive, planMode = false, renderer, checkpoints, sandbox, hooks, mcpTools = []) {
+export function buildAgentSession(config, apiKey, workspace, ttyInteractive, planMode = false, renderer, checkpoints, sandbox, hooks, mcpTools = []) {
+    // The workspace is the single source of truth for "which roots" (C.26). Every
+    // primary-scoped subsystem below (git context, project instructions, memory,
+    // checkpoints, subagents, the approval gate) derives its cwd from the primary
+    // root, so cwd can never disagree with `workspace.primary()`. The full workspace
+    // is threaded onto the ToolContext so the fan tools see every root; the subagent
+    // orchestrator receives it too, so a child sees the SAME roots as the main loop.
+    const cwd = workspace.primary().absPath;
     const provider = createProvider({
         provider: config.model.provider,
         apiKey,
@@ -121,51 +244,71 @@ export function buildAgentSession(config, apiKey, cwd, ttyInteractive, planMode
     const execRegistry = buildDefaultRegistry();
     const git = getGitInfo(cwd);
     const projectInstructions = loadProjectInstructions(cwd);
-    // Persistent memory (C.29): register the write tool and build the recall block
-    // ONCE at session start. User memory is always eligible; project memory is
-    // recalled only when trusted (a cloned repo's notes never inject silently).
-    // Fully inert when disabled. Recall is best-effort — a load problem degrades to
-    // "no memory", never a hard failure at session start.
+    // Persistent memory (C.29): build the recall block ONCE at session start (the
+    // `remember` write tool is registered via registerRuntimeTools below). User
+    // memory is always eligible; project memory is recalled only when trusted (a
+    // cloned repo's notes never inject silently). Fully inert when disabled. Recall
+    // is best-effort — a load problem degrades to "no memory", never a hard failure.
     let recalledMemory = null;
     if (config.memory.enabled) {
-        execRegistry.register(rememberTool);
-        const recall = new MemoryService({ cwd, config: config.memory }).recall();
-        recalledMemory = recall.block;
-        if (recall.projectPresentButUntrusted) {
-            logger.info("project memory found but not trusted — run `cruxy memory trust .` to recall it");
+        if (workspace.isMultiRoot) {
+            // Recall project memory from EVERY trusted root, each under its own
+            // root-labeled block; user memory (global) once. Untrusted roots are not
+            // injected and are NAMED — a cloned repo's notes never inject silently,
+            // and a root whose notes you've never trusted is called out, not dropped.
+            const roots = [];
+            let userEntries = [];
+            for (const r of workspace.roots()) {
+                const svc = new MemoryService({
+                    cwd: r.absPath,
+                    config: config.memory,
+                });
+                const st = svc.status();
+                // The label is paired with the store HERE — structurally, a block can
+                // never carry a root the entries didn't come from.
+                if (r.primary) {
+                    userEntries = st.user;
+                    for (const e of st.errors) {
+                        logger.warn(`memory: excluded ${e.scope} entry ${e.id} — ${e.message}`);
+                    }
+                }
+                else {
+                    // Siblings share the same global user file — surface only their own
+                    // project-scope load errors (user errors already reported by primary).
+                    for (const e of st.errors.filter((e) => e.scope === "project")) {
+                        logger.warn(`memory: excluded ${e.scope} entry ${e.id} in ${r.name} — ${e.message}`);
+                    }
+                }
+                if (st.projectTrusted) {
+                    if (st.project.length > 0)
+                        roots.push({ name: r.name, entries: st.project });
+                }
+                else if (st.project.length > 0) {
+                    logger.info(`memory:  root "${r.name}" project memory not trusted — run \`cruxy memory trust ${r.absPath}\` to recall it`);
+                }
+            }
+            recalledMemory = buildMultiRootRecallBlock({
+                user: userEntries,
+                roots,
+                maxTokens: config.memory.maxRecallTokens,
+            });
         }
-        for (const e of recall.errors) {
-            logger.warn(`memory: excluded ${e.scope} entry ${e.id} — ${e.message}`);
+        else {
+            const recall = new MemoryService({ cwd, config: config.memory }).recall();
+            recalledMemory = recall.block;
+            if (recall.projectPresentButUntrusted) {
+                logger.info("project memory found but not trusted — run `cruxy memory trust .` to recall it");
+            }
+            for (const e of recall.errors) {
+                logger.warn(`memory: excluded ${e.scope} entry ${e.id} — ${e.message}`);
+            }
         }
     }
-    // Per-language LSP (C.12): register the four read-only introspection tools
-    // only when enabled. They spawn and manage EXTERNAL language-server processes,
-    // so — like the sandbox — the feature is opt-in; when off, none is registered
-    // and no server ever spawns. Read-only (no approval), so they bypass the U.3
-    // gate like search_codebase and are available to subagents and plan proposals.
-    if (config.lsp.enabled) {
-        execRegistry.register(findDefinitionTool);
-        execRegistry.register(findReferencesTool);
-        execRegistry.register(getDiagnosticsTool);
-        execRegistry.register(hoverTool);
-    }
-    // Web search + fetch (C.20): register the two read-only web tools only when
-    // enabled. They reach the PUBLIC internet and inject attacker-controllable data
-    // (results/pages are demarcated as untrusted and never persisted), so — like
-    // LSP and MCP — the feature is opt-in; when off, neither tool is registered and
-    // no search provider is ever constructed. Read-only (no approval), so they
-    // bypass the U.3 gate like search_codebase.
-    if (config.web.enabled) {
-        execRegistry.register(createWebSearchTool());
-        execRegistry.register(createWebFetchTool());
-    }
-    // MCP servers (C.27): the caller connected + trusted the servers and produced
-    // these tools through the single adapter seam BEFORE building the session, so
-    // registration here is a plain hand-off — every one is destructive-gated,
-    // demarcated, and bounded by construction. Empty unless `mcp.enabled` and at
-    // least one trusted server produced tools, so the default path is unchanged.
-    for (const tool of mcpTools)
-        execRegistry.register(tool);
+    // The conditionally-registered runtime tools (remember / LSP / web / MCP) are
+    // added below via registerRuntimeTools — the single seam the JC-B allowlist test
+    // also builds through, so the audited surface can never drift from the shipped
+    // one. spawn_subagent joins them there too (it needs the orchestrator built
+    // first). See registerRuntimeTools.
     // One io shared by every prompt in the session (plan approval, the U.3 gate,
     // and any gate inside a subagent), so they all coordinate with the same live
     // region. The full wrapper stack around an ApprovalService is factored here
@@ -173,7 +316,17 @@ export function buildAgentSession(config, apiKey, cwd, ttyInteractive, planMode
     // prompt + same checkpoint hook, but a new (empty) session allowlist — a
     // grant in the parent never silently widens a child's authority.
     const io = suspendStatusOnPrompt(defaultPromptIO(shouldUseColor()), renderer);
-    const gate = (approval) => withCheckpointGate(resumeLineAfterApproval((action) => approval.requestApproval(action), renderer), checkpoints, cwd);
+    // The C.26 coupling: `checkpointsActive` is true exactly when a per-root gate is
+    // wired, and it is set on the SAME ctx whose `requestApproval` IS that gate — so
+    // lifting the non-primary-write refusal and capturing the write are one decision.
+    const checkpointsActive = Boolean(checkpoints);
+    // The C.33 spine: ONE approval mutex shared by the main loop and every subagent
+    // gate, so across concurrent siblings only one non-read action is in its gate at
+    // a time — one prompt on screen, one checkpoint snapshot/set-write in flight.
+    // Read-tier actions bypass it (see serializeGate), so a parallel read fan-out is
+    // never stalled behind an unrelated pending prompt.
+    const approvalMutex = new ApprovalMutex();
+    const gate = (approval) => serializeGate(withCheckpointGate(resumeLineAfterApproval((action) => approval.requestApproval(action), renderer), checkpoints, workspace), approvalMutex, cwd);
     // Subagent orchestration (C.14): spawn_subagent goes on the main registry
     // only when depth allows (maxDepth 0 disables the feature structurally).
     // Registered before the plan wiring so plan-mode execution steps can
@@ -184,16 +337,29 @@ export function buildAgentSession(config, apiKey, cwd, ttyInteractive, planMode
         router,
         parentRegistry: execRegistry,
         cwd,
+        workspace,
         logger,
         git,
         projectInstructions,
         renderer,
         sandbox,
+        checkpointsActive,
         makeChildApproval: () => gate(new ApprovalService({ cwd, interactive: ttyInteractive, io })),
     });
-    if (config.subagent.maxDepth > 0) {
-        execRegistry.register(makeSpawnSubagentTool(orchestrator, 0));
-    }
+    // Now that the orchestrator exists, register every conditionally-enabled tool
+    // (remember / LSP / web / MCP / spawn_subagent) through the one seam the JC-B
+    // allowlist test also uses — order preserved, behaviour byte-identical.
+    const spawnTool = config.subagent.maxDepth > 0
+        ? makeSpawnSubagentTool(orchestrator, 0)
+        : undefined;
+    const spawnManyTool = config.subagent.maxDepth > 0
+        ? makeSpawnSubagentsTool(orchestrator, 0)
+        : undefined;
+    registerRuntimeTools(execRegistry, config, {
+        mcpTools,
+        spawnTool,
+        spawnManyTool,
+    });
     if (planMode) {
         // One allowlist shared by the plan-approval prompt and the per-action
         // gate, so a grant recorded during execution is honored by U.3's own check.
@@ -207,9 +373,11 @@ export function buildAgentSession(config, apiKey, cwd, ttyInteractive, planMode
         });
         const ctx = {
             cwd,
+            workspace,
             config,
             logger,
             requestApproval: gate(approval),
+            checkpointsActive,
             sandbox,
         };
         const planRunner = ({ messages, projectInstructions, recalledMemory: turnMemory, renderer: turnRenderer, onRequestUsage, }) => runPlanSession({
@@ -248,7 +416,15 @@ export function buildAgentSession(config, apiKey, cwd, ttyInteractive, planMode
         interactive: ttyInteractive,
         io,
     });
-    const ctx = { cwd, config, logger, requestApproval: gate(approval), sandbox };
+    const ctx = {
+        cwd,
+        workspace,
+        config,
+        logger,
+        requestApproval: gate(approval),
+        checkpointsActive,
+        sandbox,
+    };
     return new Session({
         provider,
         registry: execRegistry,

package/dist/config/schema.d.ts

@@ -248,6 +248,15 @@ export declare const SubagentConfigSchema: z.ZodObject<{
      * 1 lets it spawn subagents that cannot themselves spawn (no fork bombs).
      */
     maxDepth: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodNumber>;
+    /**
+     * Parallel fan-out breadth (C.33): the maximum number of subagents that run
+     * concurrently across the whole session, enforced by one shared semaphore.
+     * Parallel fan-out happens at depth 0 only and everything beneath it is
+     * sequential, so this composes with {@link maxDepth} into a LINEAR global
+     * ceiling (≤ maxConcurrency × maxDepth live agents) — never an exponential
+     * depth×breadth fork bomb. Default 3.
+     */
+    maxConcurrency: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodNumber>;
     /** Per-subagent budget ceilings; spawn-time overrides are clamped to these. */
     defaultBudget: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodObject<{
         /** Hard cap on the subagent's model turns. */
@@ -267,6 +276,7 @@ export declare const SubagentConfigSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     }>>;
 }, "strict", z.ZodTypeAny, {
     maxDepth: number;
+    maxConcurrency: number;
     defaultBudget: {
         maxTokens: number;
         maxIterations: number;
@@ -274,6 +284,7 @@ export declare const SubagentConfigSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     };
 }, {
     maxDepth?: number | undefined;
+    maxConcurrency?: number | undefined;
     defaultBudget?: {
         timeoutMs?: number | undefined;
         maxTokens?: number | undefined;
@@ -1027,6 +1038,15 @@ export declare const CruxyConfigSchema: z.ZodObject<{
          * 1 lets it spawn subagents that cannot themselves spawn (no fork bombs).
          */
         maxDepth: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodNumber>;
+        /**
+         * Parallel fan-out breadth (C.33): the maximum number of subagents that run
+         * concurrently across the whole session, enforced by one shared semaphore.
+         * Parallel fan-out happens at depth 0 only and everything beneath it is
+         * sequential, so this composes with {@link maxDepth} into a LINEAR global
+         * ceiling (≤ maxConcurrency × maxDepth live agents) — never an exponential
+         * depth×breadth fork bomb. Default 3.
+         */
+        maxConcurrency: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodNumber>;
         /** Per-subagent budget ceilings; spawn-time overrides are clamped to these. */
         defaultBudget: z.ZodDefault<z.ZodObject<{
             /** Hard cap on the subagent's model turns. */
@@ -1046,6 +1066,7 @@ export declare const CruxyConfigSchema: z.ZodObject<{
         }>>;
     }, "strict", z.ZodTypeAny, {
         maxDepth: number;
+        maxConcurrency: number;
         defaultBudget: {
             maxTokens: number;
             maxIterations: number;
@@ -1053,6 +1074,7 @@ export declare const CruxyConfigSchema: z.ZodObject<{
         };
     }, {
         maxDepth?: number | undefined;
+        maxConcurrency?: number | undefined;
         defaultBudget?: {
             timeoutMs?: number | undefined;
             maxTokens?: number | undefined;
@@ -1450,6 +1472,7 @@ export declare const CruxyConfigSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     };
     subagent: {
         maxDepth: number;
+        maxConcurrency: number;
         defaultBudget: {
             maxTokens: number;
             maxIterations: number;
@@ -1594,6 +1617,7 @@ export declare const CruxyConfigSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     } | undefined;
     subagent?: {
         maxDepth?: number | undefined;
+        maxConcurrency?: number | undefined;
         defaultBudget?: {
             timeoutMs?: number | undefined;
             maxTokens?: number | undefined;

package/dist/config/schema.js

@@ -181,6 +181,15 @@ export const SubagentConfigSchema = z
      * 1 lets it spawn subagents that cannot themselves spawn (no fork bombs).
      */
     maxDepth: z.number().int().nonnegative().default(1),
+    /**
+     * Parallel fan-out breadth (C.33): the maximum number of subagents that run
+     * concurrently across the whole session, enforced by one shared semaphore.
+     * Parallel fan-out happens at depth 0 only and everything beneath it is
+     * sequential, so this composes with {@link maxDepth} into a LINEAR global
+     * ceiling (≤ maxConcurrency × maxDepth live agents) — never an exponential
+     * depth×breadth fork bomb. Default 3.
+     */
+    maxConcurrency: z.number().int().positive().default(3),
     /** Per-subagent budget ceilings; spawn-time overrides are clamped to these. */
     defaultBudget: z
         .object({

package/dist/errors/constructors.d.ts

@@ -90,6 +90,33 @@ export declare function forgeAuth(host?: string): CruxyError;
 export declare function gitProtectedBranch(branch: string): CruxyError;
 /** The forge REST API returned an error (non-auth) while opening a PR. */
 export declare function forgeApi(title: string, underlying?: unknown, meta?: Record<string, unknown>): CruxyError;
+/**
+ * The `origin` remote of the acting root resolved to a DIFFERENT `owner/repo`
+ * between the U.3 preview (what the human approved) and the moment the pull-request
+ * API call is made — a concurrent `git remote set-url` on a mutable `.git/config`
+ * (C.26 Step 4). The PR is NOT opened: we refuse rather than warn-and-proceed,
+ * because opening it would target a repo the human never saw. Both targets are
+ * named so the discrepancy is legible. `owner/repo` are already-parsed identifiers
+ * (never an upstream model id), so the message is gag-safe by construction (U.8).
+ */
+export declare function vcsRemoteChanged(approved: {
+    host: string;
+    owner: string;
+    repo: string;
+}, current: {
+    host: string;
+    owner: string;
+    repo: string;
+}, rootName: string): CruxyError;
+/**
+ * A pull request was requested for one declared root while a SIBLING declared root
+ * shares the same git working tree — two non-overlapping roots inside one repo
+ * (e.g. `packages/a` + `packages/b` under one `.git`), which filesystem-overlap
+ * refusal does not catch (C.26 Step 4). A commit there `git add -A`s the sibling's
+ * changes too, so the PR would span both roots. A PR is a single-repo artifact, so
+ * we refuse (naming both) rather than silently PR one half.
+ */
+export declare function vcsCrossRoot(root: string, sibling: string, repoPath: string): CruxyError;
 /**
  * `git push` failed — most often the husky `pre-push` verify hook (build ·
  * typecheck · lint · test) or a rejected non-fast-forward. We never `--force` or
@@ -137,6 +164,7 @@ export declare function rootAmbiguous(ref: string, candidates: string[]): CruxyE
  * session start — overlap makes "which root owns this path" ambiguous and lets two
  * checkpoints/grants fight over the same bytes.
  */
+export declare function multirootWriteDeferred(root: string, primary: string): CruxyError;
 export declare function rootOverlap(a: string, b: string): CruxyError;
 /**
  * An interactive add-root was refused: no TTY to confirm, or the user declined the
@@ -162,6 +190,29 @@ export declare function checkpointSetPartial(runId: string, restored: string[],
  * orchestrator seam was driven directly — fail loud, never spawn.
  */
 export declare function subagentDepthExceeded(depth: number, maxDepth: number): CruxyError;
+/** One workspace root claimed by two-or-more WRITING children of a single
+ * `spawn_subagents` call — the unit of a disjoint-scope violation (C.33). */
+export interface ScopeConflict {
+    /** The root name both children declared write scope on. */
+    root: string;
+    /** The task labels of every writing child that claimed `root` (always ≥2). */
+    tasks: string[];
+}
+/**
+ * A parallel fan-out (C.33) declared children with overlapping write scope — two
+ * or more target the SAME workspace root while both hold mutating tools. The
+ * ENTIRE batch is refused BEFORE any child is dispatched, so concurrent siblings
+ * can never race on one root's files or checkpoint. Every colliding group is
+ * named (the conflicting task pairs, per root) so the model can fix all of them
+ * at once. Surfaced as a tool error to correct (assign distinct roots, or drop
+ * write tools on all but one child per root).
+ *
+ * THE HONEST LIMIT, stated in the message: the check is on DECLARED scope — the
+ * tools + root each child was granted — NOT the files actually written. Two
+ * children could still touch disjoint paths under one root; cruxy refuses anyway
+ * rather than let two potential writers race on that root's single checkpoint.
+ */
+export declare function subagentScopeOverlap(conflicts: readonly ScopeConflict[]): CruxyError;
 /**
  * A subagent run failed outright (provider error, tool crash) before producing
  * a result. Normally folded into the structured `SubagentResult` the parent