@crowi/plugin-api 1.0.0-alpha.3 → 1.0.0-alpha.5

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -206,6 +206,66 @@ interface PluginLogger {
     error(message: string, ...args: unknown[]): void;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Domain events emitted by core. The full event payload shapes live in
+ * `@crowi/server`; this contract publishes only the event names so the
+ * type signature of `EventBus.on` stays type-safe at the plugin layer.
+ *
+ * `pluginHooks` are the v2.0 internal-use-only events. Community
+ * plugins should NOT subscribe — the surface is reserved while we
+ * stabilise it.
+ */
+interface PluginEvents {
+    'page:created': {
+        pageId: string;
+        path: string;
+    };
+    'page:updated': {
+        pageId: string;
+        path: string;
+    };
+    'page:deleted': {
+        pageId: string;
+        path: string;
+    };
+    'page:renamed': {
+        pageId: string;
+        oldPath: string;
+        newPath: string;
+    };
+    'comment:added': {
+        pageId: string;
+        commentId: string;
+    };
+    'comment:removed': {
+        pageId: string;
+        commentId: string;
+    };
+    'user:registered': {
+        userId: string;
+    };
+    'user:activated': {
+        userId: string;
+    };
+}
+interface EventBus {
+    on<K extends keyof PluginEvents>(event: K, listener: (payload: PluginEvents[K]) => void | Promise<void>): void;
+}
+
+/**
+ * HTML-emitting helper for renderer plugins.
+ *
+ * A renderer plugin that builds HTML from author-controlled or external
+ * strings (an OGP title, a math error message, …) must escape them, and
+ * that escape is a security primitive — a hardening change has to reach
+ * every plugin at once, not whichever local copies someone remembers.
+ * This is the SDK's single copy (`@crowi/plugin-renderer-katex` and
+ * `@crowi/plugin-renderer-link-card` each carried an identical local one
+ * before it was hoisted here).
+ */
+/** Escape `&` `<` `>` `"` `'` for interpolation into HTML text or double/single-quoted attribute values. */
+declare function escapeHtml(s: string): string;
+
 /**
  * Metadata accompanying a `put`. The runtime always provides
  * `contentType`; drivers are free to store additional fields under
@@ -417,8 +477,8 @@ type AuthVerifyResult = {
  * Auth provider driver. The login screen asks core for the list of
  * registered drivers and renders one button per driver
  * (`Sign in with Google`). Clicking redirects through the plugin's
- * registered routes (`/api/v2/plugins/<name>/oauth/start`); the
- * provider redirects back to `/api/v2/plugins/<name>/oauth/callback`,
+ * registered routes (`/api/plugins/<name>/oauth/start`); the
+ * provider redirects back to `/api/plugins/<name>/oauth/callback`,
  * which the plugin's contract handles.
  *
  * `verify` is the bridge: given whatever the plugin pulled out of the
@@ -564,52 +624,6 @@ interface MailSenderRegistry {
     register(driverName: string, driver: MailSender): void;
 }
 
-/**
- * Domain events emitted by core. The full event payload shapes live in
- * `@crowi/server`; this contract publishes only the event names so the
- * type signature of `EventBus.on` stays type-safe at the plugin layer.
- *
- * `pluginHooks` are the v2.0 internal-use-only events. Community
- * plugins should NOT subscribe — the surface is reserved while we
- * stabilise it.
- */
-interface PluginEvents {
-    'page:created': {
-        pageId: string;
-        path: string;
-    };
-    'page:updated': {
-        pageId: string;
-        path: string;
-    };
-    'page:deleted': {
-        pageId: string;
-        path: string;
-    };
-    'page:renamed': {
-        pageId: string;
-        oldPath: string;
-        newPath: string;
-    };
-    'comment:added': {
-        pageId: string;
-        commentId: string;
-    };
-    'comment:removed': {
-        pageId: string;
-        commentId: string;
-    };
-    'user:registered': {
-        userId: string;
-    };
-    'user:activated': {
-        userId: string;
-    };
-}
-interface EventBus {
-    on<K extends keyof PluginEvents>(event: K, listener: (payload: PluginEvents[K]) => void | Promise<void>): void;
-}
-
 /**
  * Renderer extension contract — type-only. Plugins contribute parse /
  * transform behaviour to the server-side markdown pipeline through
@@ -691,9 +705,64 @@ interface CodeBlockRenderer {
      * strip comments, etc.
      */
     computeEmbedKey?(info: CodeBlockInfo): string;
+    /**
+     * Opt into a CPU-bounded admission control pool (`render-admission.ts`,
+     * `packages/api/src/renderer/core/render-admission.ts`). When present,
+     * `cachedRenderOrPending` (`packages/api/src/renderer/cache/index.ts`)
+     * and `renderCodeBlockForPreview` acquire a ticket from the named pool
+     * (keyed per `pluginName`) immediately around the `render()` call and
+     * release it on completion; when absent (the default — PlantUML /
+     * KaTeX / emoji and existing embed/URL-expansion plugins), `render()`
+     * is called directly with no admission gate, matching today's
+     * behaviour. See spec §6 for the full design (global / per-user
+     * concurrency caps + priority queue).
+     */
+    admissionControl?: AdmissionControlConfig;
+    /**
+     * Opt into server-rendering during editor live preview
+     * (`POST /pages/preview`, which runs with no `pageId`). Default
+     * `'source'` (omitted) leaves the fenced block untouched in preview —
+     * today's behaviour for every existing `CodeBlockRenderer`. Plugins
+     * that declare `'server-render'` MUST be no-I/O and deterministic:
+     * `makePreviewCodeBlockDispatch` calls them outside the persisted-
+     * cache path (`packages/api/src/renderer/core/code-block-dispatch.ts`).
+     */
+    previewPolicy?: 'source' | 'server-render';
     /** Render a single code block. */
     render(info: CodeBlockInfo, ctx: RenderContext): EmbedFragment | RenderResult | Promise<EmbedFragment | RenderResult>;
 }
+/**
+ * Per-`pluginName` admission-control pool declaration (§6). Shared by
+ * `CodeBlockRenderer` and `EmbedRenderer` — `EmbedRenderer` carries it so
+ * `code-block-dispatch.ts`'s `codeBlockAsEmbedRenderer` adaptor can copy
+ * `CodeBlockRenderer.admissionControl` straight through to the
+ * `EmbedRenderer` shape `cachedRenderOrPending` actually consumes.
+ */
+interface AdmissionControlConfig {
+    /** Process-wide concurrent `render()` calls in flight for this plugin. */
+    maxConcurrentGlobal: number;
+    /** Concurrent `render()` calls in flight for a single `actor` (kind:'user' only). */
+    maxConcurrentPerUser: number;
+    /** Max jobs allowed to wait for a slot before new requests are rejected outright. */
+    queueDepth: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Who is driving this render call. Threaded through `RenderContext` so
+ * admission control (§6) can apply a per-user concurrency cap. Today
+ * every real call site is authenticated (`createJwtAuth` has no
+ * anonymous fallback), so `'user'` is the only variant actually
+ * produced — `'anonymous'` / `'system'` are reserved for future
+ * unauthenticated-read and offline-tooling call sites and must not be
+ * synthesised speculatively.
+ */
+type RenderActor = {
+    kind: 'user';
+    userId: string;
+} | {
+    kind: 'anonymous';
+} | {
+    kind: 'system';
+};
 interface CodeBlockInfo {
     /** The language tag from the fence (the `ts` in ```` ```ts ````). */
     lang: string;
@@ -737,6 +806,41 @@ interface EmbedRenderer {
      * volatility (`?utm_*`) or (b) include external state (Accept-Language).
      */
     computeEmbedKey?(input: EmbedInput): string;
+    /**
+     * Opt into admission control (§6). See `CodeBlockRenderer.admissionControl`
+     * for the full rationale — declared here too because `cachedRenderOrPending`
+     * (`packages/api/src/renderer/cache/index.ts`) is written against the
+     * `EmbedRenderer` shape (`code-block-dispatch.ts`'s
+     * `codeBlockAsEmbedRenderer` adaptor copies a `CodeBlockRenderer`'s
+     * declaration through unchanged). Native `EmbedRenderer` plugins
+     * (embed-tags / URL-inline-expansion) can also opt in if a future one
+     * turns out to be CPU-bound.
+     */
+    admissionControl?: AdmissionControlConfig;
+    /**
+     * Optional per-dispatch cache-bypass predicate
+     * (feature-renderer-plugin-boundary Phase 3). Checked by the generic
+     * embed-tag dispatcher (`packages/api/src/renderer/core/embed-tags.ts`)
+     * BEFORE it touches `CacheStorage` at all for this dispatch — no
+     * `get`, no `set`. When it returns `true`, the dispatcher calls
+     * `render()` directly (via the same `normalizeRenderResult` error
+     * normalisation the preview path uses) and never persists the
+     * result.
+     *
+     * This exists because a renderer whose behaviour is gated by a
+     * runtime policy toggle (e.g. link-card's admin
+     * `security:linkCardEnabled` switch) cannot enforce a literal
+     * zero-cache-access guarantee by checking the toggle only inside
+     * `render()` — a cache HIT from before the toggle flipped would
+     * short-circuit `render()` entirely and keep serving pre-toggle
+     * output (and, symmetrically, writing a toggled-off result to the
+     * cache would keep serving it for up to that entry's TTL after the
+     * toggle flips back). Declaring the check here instead makes the
+     * dispatcher skip the cache outright for that one call. Absent (the
+     * default) or returning `false` goes through the normal cached path
+     * unchanged.
+     */
+    shouldBypassCache?(input: EmbedInput): boolean;
     /** Render a single embed. */
     render(input: EmbedInput, ctx: RenderContext): RenderResult | Promise<RenderResult>;
     /**
@@ -768,9 +872,36 @@ interface EmbedInput {
  * background-refresh window (see
  * `packages/api/src/renderer/cache/index.ts:cachedRender`).
  */
+/**
+ * RFC-0023 (design doc §12) — the structured (typed) counterpart of a
+ * producer's `html` output. Additive and optional everywhere: a plugin
+ * that never sets it keeps today's behaviour byte-for-byte.
+ *
+ * `node` is the producer-shaped typed node (`type` selects the sidecar
+ * kind — `'crowiDiagram'` / `'crowiLinkCard'` / `'crowiPlaceholder'`).
+ * Deliberately loose (`Record<string, unknown>`) at this SDK layer:
+ * `@crowi/plugin-api` does not depend on `@crowi/api-contract`, so the
+ * authoritative shape lives in the api-contract sidecar schemas and the
+ * api-side dispatch mapper validates against them before stamping a
+ * sidecar onto the persisted AST (invalid payloads degrade to a plain
+ * `html` node, never poisoning what the web reads).
+ */
+interface StructuredRenderPayload {
+    node: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
 interface RenderResult {
-    /** Already-sanitised HTML the core will inline. */
+    /** Already-sanitised HTML the core will inline. Unchanged — the one and only web/legacy representation. */
     html: string;
+    /**
+     * RFC-0023 — optional structured payload paired with `html`. Both
+     * must describe the SAME render outcome: the dispatch layer stamps
+     * this (schema-validated) as a sidecar on the `html` node it splices,
+     * and the `X-Crowi-Ast-Version: 1` projection turns it into a typed
+     * node. On an `error` result, pair it with `errorHtml` when the
+     * error display carries real content (e.g. link-card's fallback
+     * card); leave it unset to get the generic structured placeholder.
+     */
+    structured?: StructuredRenderPayload;
     /**
      * Optional `<head>`-bound assets — Phase 4 records them on the
      * cache entry but the SSR layer does not yet inject them. Phase 7
@@ -790,19 +921,43 @@ interface RenderResult {
     ttlSec?: number;
     /**
      * When the render failed (network / auth / not_found / rate_limit /
-     * timeout / unknown), plugins should set `error` instead of building
-     * an html error frame. The core caches the error using `RENDER_ERROR_TTL`
-     * and substitutes a fixed placeholder when re-rendering the page.
+     * timeout / unknown / blocked), plugins should set `error` instead of
+     * building an html error frame. The core caches the error using
+     * `RENDER_ERROR_TTL` and, absent `errorHtml`, substitutes a fixed
+     * placeholder when re-rendering the page.
      */
     error?: RenderError;
+    /**
+     * Optional failure-display HTML, paired with `error`. When `error` is
+     * set and `errorHtml` is present, the core shows `errorHtml` instead of
+     * the generic `errorPlaceholder()` — e.g. a link-card plugin can keep
+     * its URL clickable even when the OGP fetch failed. Same trust
+     * contract as `html`: **pre-sanitised, the core does not re-escape it**.
+     *
+     * Deliberately a separate field rather than "non-empty `html` + `error`
+     * means show `html`" — that shape makes a plugin's stray/forgotten
+     * `html` leak into the error display by accident. An explicit opt-in
+     * field means a plugin that hasn't been updated for `errorHtml` keeps
+     * the current safe-by-default behaviour (placeholder).
+     *
+     * Ignored when `error` is unset.
+     */
+    errorHtml?: string;
 }
 /**
  * Error categories cached with their own per-code TTLs. See
  * `packages/api/src/renderer/cache/index.ts:RENDER_ERROR_TTL` for the
- * concrete numbers.
+ * concrete numbers. `blocked` is a policy-level permanent rejection
+ * (SSRF block, disallowed scheme, disallowed content-type) — distinct
+ * from `not_found` semantically but sharing its 1h persistent-failure
+ * TTL. `busy` is a transient renderer-admission rejection (e.g. a
+ * shared fetch/render concurrency semaphore's wait queue was full, or a
+ * queued request's wait deadline elapsed) — never a property of the
+ * embed's target, so it shares a short transient TTL with
+ * `network`/`timeout` rather than `blocked`'s persistent one.
  */
 interface RenderError {
-    code: 'auth' | 'rate_limit' | 'not_found' | 'network' | 'timeout' | 'unknown';
+    code: 'auth' | 'rate_limit' | 'not_found' | 'network' | 'timeout' | 'unknown' | 'blocked' | 'busy';
     /** Free-form text for log/debug — NOT inlined into the user-facing placeholder. */
     message?: string;
     /**
@@ -865,6 +1020,8 @@ type InlineExpansion = {
 interface EmbedFragment {
     /** Pre-sanitised HTML fragment to inline at the source position. */
     html: string;
+    /** RFC-0023 — optional structured payload paired with `html` (see `RenderResult.structured`). */
+    structured?: StructuredRenderPayload;
     /** Optional `<head>`-bound assets (CSS / JS) keyed by URL. */
     assets?: {
         css?: string[];
@@ -895,6 +1052,17 @@ interface CacheEntry {
     result: RenderResult;
     fetchedAt: Date;
     expiresAt: Date;
+    /**
+     * Present ⇔ this is a stale-if-error entry keeping a prior success on
+     * screen (see `packages/api/src/renderer/cache/index.ts:
+     * STALE_IF_ERROR_MAX_AGE_SEC`): the value is that ORIGINAL success's
+     * timestamp, carried forward unchanged across consecutive failed
+     * retries — never the failed attempt's `fetchedAt`. Success entries do
+     * not carry it (their `fetchedAt` IS the last-good time; readers use
+     * that directly, which also covers, value-identically, entries written
+     * while this field was still being set on success).
+     */
+    lastGoodFetchedAt?: Date;
 }
 /**
  * MongoDB-backed cache surface. Phase 4 ships exactly one
@@ -987,6 +1155,25 @@ interface RenderContext {
      * encrypted-config-backed implementation.
      */
     auth?: AuthContext;
+    /**
+     * Who is driving this render. Required so admission control (§6) can
+     * apply its per-user concurrency cap end-to-end — every entry point
+     * (`Renderer.run`/`runMetadata`/`runRender`, `packages/api/src/renderer/
+     * index.ts`) requires callers to supply this. See `RenderActor`'s doc
+     * comment for which variant real call sites actually produce today.
+     */
+    actor: RenderActor;
+    /**
+     * Optional cancellation signal, propagated from the originating HTTP
+     * request (`c.req.raw.signal` on `POST /pages/preview`). A waiting
+     * (not-yet-running) admission-control job is removed from its queue
+     * the instant this fires; an already-running child-process render is
+     * NOT force-killed (§6 — the cost of killing/respawning a worker
+     * outweighs letting an already-cheap render finish and discarding the
+     * result). Absent on the save / read call sites, which have no
+     * request to cancel against.
+     */
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
 }
 /**
  * The registry handed to every plugin's `registerRenderer(scope, ctx)`.
@@ -1002,6 +1189,10 @@ interface RenderContext {
  *
  * Phase 4 stubs (warn-noop):
  *   - `addCodeBlockRenderer` (Phase 6 lights this up)
+ *
+ * feature-renderer-plugin-boundary Phase 1 adds `addStylesheet(path)` —
+ * the boot-time CSS-manifest extension point (see that method's own doc
+ * comment).
  */
 interface RendererRegistry {
     /**
@@ -1040,6 +1231,35 @@ interface RendererRegistry {
      * preserved; the first match that returns `'replaced'` wins.
      */
     addUrlInlineExpander(rule: UrlInlineExpansionRule): void;
+    /**
+     * Declare a static CSS asset the plugin needs the browser to load
+     * (e.g. KaTeX's ~30KB math stylesheet). `path` MUST be an
+     * API-relative absolute path confined to the plugin's own
+     * `registerRoutes` namespace — `/api/plugins/<this plugin's
+     * name>/<…>` — the same prefix `PluginRouterScope.route(...)` mounts
+     * that plugin's HTTP routes under. A URL scheme, protocol-relative
+     * `//host`, backslash, `..` traversal segment, or a path outside the
+     * plugin's own namespace all throw synchronously (boot-time reject —
+     * this is not an operator-configurable external URL; see spec
+     * §2.1's "不採用案"). During the `feature-api-v2-path-removal`
+     * migration period the legacy `/api/v2/plugins/<name>/<…>` prefix is
+     * also accepted and silently normalised to the canonical `/api/plugins/`
+     * form before publication — a plugin package that hasn't bumped its own
+     * `addStylesheet(...)` call site yet still gets a working manifest
+     * entry; this dual-accept is transitional, not a permanent alias.
+     *
+     * The call only stages the path in a per-plugin pending set: it is
+     * published to the public `GET /api/app/info` `rendererStylesheets`
+     * manifest ONLY after this plugin's OWN `registerRoutes(scope, ctx)`
+     * completes without throwing (so the manifest never advertises a path
+     * whose route failed to mount). A plugin with no `registerRoutes` at
+     * all, or whose `registerRoutes` throws, never gets its pending
+     * stylesheets committed — dropped wholesale, not partially. Query /
+     * fragment are allowed; duplicate calls with the same path are a
+     * no-op. Call this from `registerRenderer`, not `registerRoutes` —
+     * commit timing depends on this method having already run.
+     */
+    addStylesheet(path: string): void;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1080,7 +1300,7 @@ interface PluginRouteOptions {
 /**
  * Scope passed to `registerRoutes(scope, ctx)`. Lets a plugin contribute
  * HTTP routes that the runtime mounts at
- * `/api/v2/plugins/<plugin-name>/<path>` — the `<plugin-name>` path
+ * `/api/plugins/<plugin-name>/<path>` — the `<plugin-name>` path
  * segment guarantees that core endpoints and other plugins cannot
  * collide (RFC-0013 §4).
  *
@@ -1091,9 +1311,9 @@ interface PluginRouteOptions {
 interface PluginRouterScope {
     /**
      * Mount `handler` for `method` at `<path>` under this plugin's
-     * namespace. `path` is relative to `/api/v2/plugins/<plugin-name>` and
+     * namespace. `path` is relative to `/api/plugins/<plugin-name>` and
      * should start with `/` (e.g. `route('POST', '/events', handler, {
-     * auth: 'public' })` → `POST /api/v2/plugins/<name>/events`).
+     * auth: 'public' })` → `POST /api/plugins/<name>/events`).
      *
      * Pass `{ auth: 'public' }` to bypass Crowi auth entirely for self-
      * authenticating inbound webhooks, `{ auth: 'admin' }` to require
@@ -1267,7 +1487,7 @@ interface CrowiPlugin {
     registerHooks?: (events: EventBus, ctx: PluginContext) => void;
     /**
      * HTTP routes the plugin contributes, mounted at
-     * `/api/v2/plugins/<name>/<path>` (the `<name>` path segment guarantees
+     * `/api/plugins/<name>/<path>` (the `<name>` path segment guarantees
      * that core endpoints and other plugins cannot collide). Used for
      * inbound webhooks (Slack events / slash / interactivity), "Test
      * connection" buttons, `@action` targets, OAuth callbacks, etc.
@@ -1347,7 +1567,7 @@ declare const SENSITIVE_FIELD_MARKER = "@sensitive";
  *
  * The admin form renders a button with the given label that calls the
  * plugin's contributed endpoint at the given verb / path (relative to
- * `/api/v2/plugins/<name>/`). Useful for "Test connection",
+ * `/api/plugins/<name>/`). Useful for "Test connection",
  * "Authorise with Google", etc. without forcing every plugin to ship
  * its own React component.
  */
@@ -1367,7 +1587,7 @@ interface ActionAnnotation {
     label: string;
     /** HTTP verb of the plugin endpoint to call. */
     method: PluginRouteMethod;
-    /** Path relative to `/api/v2/plugins/<name>/`, with leading slash. */
+    /** Path relative to `/api/plugins/<name>/`, with leading slash. */
     path: string;
 }
 /**
@@ -1387,4 +1607,126 @@ interface ActionAnnotation {
  */
 declare function getActionAnnotation(field: z.ZodTypeAny): ActionAnnotation | null;
 
-export { ACTION_FIELD_MARKER, type AppInfo, type AuthContext, type AuthDriver, type AuthProfile, type AuthRegistry, type AuthVerifyResult, type CacheEntry, type CacheKey, type CacheStorage, type CodeBlockInfo, type CodeBlockRenderer, type CrowiPlugin, type EmailMessage, type EmbedFragment, type EmbedInput, type EmbedRenderer, type EventBus, type InlineExpansion, type MailSender, type MailSenderRegistry, type NodeRenderer, type NotificationPayload, type NotifierDriver, type NotifierRegistry, type PageMetadataAccessor, type PluginContext, type PluginEvents, type PluginLogger, type PluginRouteHandler, type PluginRouteMethod, type PluginRouteOptions, type PluginRouterScope, type RenderContext, type RenderError, type RenderPhase, type RenderResult, type RendererRegistry, type Reservation, SENSITIVE_FIELD_MARKER, type ScopedCacheStorage, type SearchDriver, type SearchHit, type SearchHits, type SearchPageType, type SearchQuery, type SearchQueryGrants, type SearchQueryViewer, type SearchRegistry, type SearchableDoc, type StateCell, type StorageDriver, type StoragePutMeta, type StoragePutResult, type StorageRegistry, type UrlInlineExpansionRule, getActionAnnotation, isSensitiveField };
+/**
+ * Parses a root `<svg>` element's `viewBox` (`minX minY width height`) to
+ * derive intrinsic pixel dimensions. Shared by
+ * `@crowi/plugin-renderer-mermaid` (its original home — the `<img>`
+ * `width`/`height` intrinsic-size fix) and, since RFC-0023,
+ * `@crowi/plugin-renderer-plantuml`'s SVG sidecar path — both need the
+ * same derivation and both already bundle this package, so it lives
+ * here rather than being copied per plugin.
+ *
+ * Reads attributes off the sanitized SVG source string only — never
+ * decodes any `data:` payload.
+ */
+declare function extractSvgDimensions(svg: string): {
+    width: number;
+    height: number;
+} | null;
+
+/**
+ * Renderer-specific knobs for `sanitizeSvg`. The sanitizer itself is a
+ * single shared implementation (`sanitize.ts`) — per-renderer differences
+ * are expressed as parameters here, never as a second copy of the DOM
+ * walk (spec §9: "実装自体をrenderer間で複製しない").
+ */
+interface SanitizeSvgPolicy {
+    /**
+     * When `true`, `href` / `xlink:href` values pointing at an `https:`
+     * URL are preserved (PlantUML's existing "preserves href to a safe
+     * URL" behaviour, consumed starting Phase 3). When `false`, every
+     * `href` / `xlink:href` is stripped unless it is a local fragment
+     * reference (`#id`) — Mermaid's strict policy (spec §1 layer 1 already
+     * disables Mermaid's own click callbacks, so no link should survive
+     * either).
+     *
+     * Regardless of this flag, `javascript:`, `data:`, and
+     * protocol-relative (`//host/...`) URLs are ALWAYS stripped — no
+     * policy may re-allow those.
+     */
+    allowSafeHref: boolean;
+}
+
+type SanitizeSvgResult = {
+    ok: true;
+    svg: string;
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    reason: string;
+};
+/**
+ * DOM-based SVG sanitizer shared by `@crowi/plugin-renderer-mermaid` and
+ * (from Phase 3) `@crowi/plugin-renderer-plantuml`. Spec §2 layer 2 / §9.
+ *
+ * Design: allowlist-first for elements (unknown/unexpected element names
+ * are dropped with their whole subtree — safer than trying to enumerate
+ * every dangerous tag), then a small set of attribute-level rules that
+ * apply uniformly to every surviving element. This is a from-scratch DOM
+ * walk, not a regex pass (`packages/plugin-renderer-plantuml/src/
+ * sanitize.ts`'s existing implementation is explicitly documented there
+ * as "not a substitute for DOMPurify" — this package is the replacement
+ * both renderers converge on, PlantUML starting Phase 3).
+ *
+ * What gets removed:
+ *   - Any element not in `ALLOWED_ELEMENTS` (`script`, `foreignObject`,
+ *     `iframe`, `object`, `embed`, SMIL `animate*`/`set`/`discard`, ...) —
+ *     dropped together with its entire subtree.
+ *   - `on*` event-handler attributes (any casing).
+ *   - The `style` attribute (inline styles). Mermaid/PlantUML's real
+ *     styling lives in the `<style>` *element* (class-based), which is
+ *     sanitized separately below rather than dropped — dropping inline
+ *     `style=""` is a deliberate hardening tradeoff (removes a CSS-value
+ *     injection vector) the regression tests confirm does not break
+ *     either renderer's *structural* output.
+ *   - `@import` at-rules and non-local-fragment `url(...)` function
+ *     values inside `<style>` element text content (external stylesheet
+ *     / font / image loads) — see `sanitizeStyleText` below for why the
+ *     element itself is not dropped wholesale.
+ *   - `xmlns` / `xmlns:*` declarations on any non-root element (namespace
+ *     declarations only ever legitimately live on the root `<svg>`).
+ *   - Any root-level `xmlns:*` declaration other than a correctly-bound
+ *     `xmlns:xlink` (see `isEssentialRootNamespaceDeclaration`). These are
+ *     already functionally inert under the strict unprefixed-SVG-element
+ *     invariant enforced elsewhere in this file, but are dropped anyway
+ *     as defence-in-depth against relying on that invariant alone.
+ *   - `xml:base` on any element (root or descendant). Left in place, it
+ *     would silently change the base URI every *local-fragment* `href` /
+ *     `xlink:href` / `url(#id)` reference in its subtree resolves
+ *     against — turning an in-document `#id` reference into an external
+ *     `https://evil.example/#id` fetch some SVG consumers follow,
+ *     defeating the local-fragment-only guarantees above even though
+ *     every individual `href`/`url()` value still looks safe in
+ *     isolation.
+ *   - `ProcessingInstruction` nodes anywhere in the tree
+ *     (`<?xml-stylesheet ...?>` etc).
+ *   - `href` / `xlink:href` values that are not a local fragment
+ *     reference (`#id`) and not allowed by `policy.allowSafeHref`.
+ *     `javascript:`, `data:`, and protocol-relative (`//...`) values are
+ *     ALWAYS stripped regardless of policy.
+ *   - `url(...)` references inside SVG *presentation attributes* that
+ *     accept a `<FuncIRI>` (`fill`, `stroke`, `filter`, `clip-path`,
+ *     `mask`, `cursor`, `marker-start`, `marker-mid`, `marker-end`) when
+ *     the reference target is not a local fragment (`#id`) — e.g.
+ *     `fill="url(https://evil.example/paint.svg)"` or
+ *     `filter="url(data:image/svg+xml;base64,...)"`. These are the same
+ *     class of external-resource load as `href`/`style` but reachable via
+ *     a different attribute name, so they get the same href-style
+ *     drop-the-attribute treatment. `url(#localId)` references (the
+ *     normal way Mermaid/PlantUML wire arrowhead markers and gradients)
+ *     are always preserved.
+ *
+ * What is explicitly preserved:
+ *   - `href` / `xlink:href` local fragment references (`#id`) — legitimate
+ *     internal `<use>` / gradient / clip-path wiring.
+ *   - `https:` `href` values when `policy.allowSafeHref` is `true`.
+ *   - `url(#id)` local fragment references in presentation attributes
+ *     (`fill="url(#gradient)"`, `marker-end="url(#arrowhead)"`, ...).
+ *
+ * A parse failure (malformed XML) or a sanitized result whose root is not
+ * a single `<svg>` element both return `{ ok: false }` — callers must
+ * treat that as "invalid output" (spec §2 layer 2), never fall back to
+ * the unsanitized input.
+ */
+declare function sanitizeSvg(input: string, policy: SanitizeSvgPolicy): SanitizeSvgResult;
+
+export { ACTION_FIELD_MARKER, type AdmissionControlConfig, type AppInfo, type AuthContext, type AuthDriver, type AuthProfile, type AuthRegistry, type AuthVerifyResult, type CacheEntry, type CacheKey, type CacheStorage, type CodeBlockInfo, type CodeBlockRenderer, type CrowiPlugin, type EmailMessage, type EmbedFragment, type EmbedInput, type EmbedRenderer, type EventBus, type InlineExpansion, type MailSender, type MailSenderRegistry, type NodeRenderer, type NotificationPayload, type NotifierDriver, type NotifierRegistry, type PageMetadataAccessor, type PluginContext, type PluginEvents, type PluginLogger, type PluginRouteHandler, type PluginRouteMethod, type PluginRouteOptions, type PluginRouterScope, type RenderActor, type RenderContext, type RenderError, type RenderPhase, type RenderResult, type RendererRegistry, type Reservation, SENSITIVE_FIELD_MARKER, type SanitizeSvgPolicy, type SanitizeSvgResult, type ScopedCacheStorage, type SearchDriver, type SearchHit, type SearchHits, type SearchPageType, type SearchQuery, type SearchQueryGrants, type SearchQueryViewer, type SearchRegistry, type SearchableDoc, type StateCell, type StorageDriver, type StoragePutMeta, type StoragePutResult, type StorageRegistry, type StructuredRenderPayload, type UrlInlineExpansionRule, escapeHtml, extractSvgDimensions, getActionAnnotation, isSensitiveField, sanitizeSvg };