@critiq/rules 0.1.0 → 0.3.0

package/rules/rust/rust.correctness.unchecked-index.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: rust.correctness.unchecked-index
+  title: Prefer fallible slice access for variable indices
+  summary: Direct indexing with a variable can panic when the index is out of bounds.
+  rationale: >-
+    Slice indexing with a non-literal index panics on bounds failure. Use `.get(index)`
+    when the index comes from a variable and handle `None` explicitly.
+  tags:
+    - correctness
+    - rust
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: stable
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - rust
+  paths:
+    include:
+      - "**/*.rs"
+    exclude:
+      - "**/tests/**"
+      - "**/test/**"
+      - "**/testdata/**"
+      - "**/examples/**"
+      - "**/benches/**"
+      - "**/*_test.rs"
+      - "**/*.spec.rs"
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: rust.correctness.unchecked-index
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: correctness.runtime
+    severity: medium
+    confidence: 0.8
+    tags:
+      - correctness
+      - rust
+  message:
+    title: Use fallible access for variable indices
+    summary: "`${captures.issue.text}` indexes a slice with a variable that may be out of bounds."
+  remediation:
+    summary: Replace direct indexing with `.get(index)` and handle the `None` case.

package/rules/rust/rust.security.actix-wildcard-cors-with-credentials.rule.yaml

@@ -7,6 +7,18 @@ metadata:
     `actix_cors` configurations must not combine `allow_any_origin` with `supports_credentials`.
   rationale: >-
     Wildcard origins with credentials violate browser CORS expectations and usually indicate a missing explicit origin allowlist.
+  detection:
+    kind: pattern
+  references:
+    - kind: cwe
+      id: CWE-942
+      title: Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains
+    - kind: owasp
+      title: Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS)
+      url: https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/CORS_OriginHeaderScrutiny
+    - kind: url
+      title: ANSSI Rust secure development guidelines
+      url: https://anssi-fr.github.io/rust-guide/01-general-principles.html
   tags:
     - security
     - rust
@@ -45,3 +57,4 @@ emit:
   remediation:
     summary: >-
       Use `allowed_origin` with explicit HTTPS origins, or disable credentials when anonymous public access is intended.
+

package/rules/rust/rust.security.axum-body-limit-disabled.rule.yaml

@@ -7,6 +7,18 @@ metadata:
     Axum apps should keep a finite `DefaultBodyLimit` (or equivalent) so request bodies cannot exhaust memory.
   rationale: >-
     `DefaultBodyLimit::disable()` removes the framework guardrail against huge bodies and is unsafe on routes that accept untrusted input.
+  detection:
+    kind: pattern
+  references:
+    - kind: cwe
+      id: CWE-16
+      title: Configuration
+    - kind: owasp
+      title: Secure Configuration Cheat Sheet
+      url: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Secure_Configuration_Cheat_Sheet.html
+    - kind: url
+      title: ANSSI Rust secure development guidelines
+      url: https://anssi-fr.github.io/rust-guide/01-general-principles.html
   tags:
     - security
     - rust
@@ -43,3 +55,4 @@ emit:
   remediation:
     summary: >-
       Set an explicit max body size with `DefaultBodyLimit::max`, add `tower_http::limit::RequestBodyLimitLayer`, or enforce limits at your edge proxy before accepting large uploads.
+

package/rules/rust/rust.security.axum-insecure-cors-with-credentials.rule.yaml

@@ -7,6 +7,18 @@ metadata:
     Do not pair wildcard or `very_permissive` origin policies with credentialed CORS or private-network access in `tower-http`.
   rationale: >-
     Browsers treat credentialed CORS as trusted cross-origin behavior; permissive origin lists undermine that contract and often hide missing explicit allowlists.
+  detection:
+    kind: pattern
+  references:
+    - kind: cwe
+      id: CWE-942
+      title: Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains
+    - kind: owasp
+      title: Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS)
+      url: https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/CORS_OriginHeaderScrutiny
+    - kind: url
+      title: ANSSI Rust secure development guidelines
+      url: https://anssi-fr.github.io/rust-guide/01-general-principles.html
   tags:
     - security
     - rust
@@ -45,3 +57,4 @@ emit:
   remediation:
     summary: >-
       Prefer explicit HTTPS `AllowOrigin` lists, avoid `CorsLayer::very_permissive` with `allow_credentials(true)`, and only enable `allow_private_network` with strict origin controls.
+

package/rules/rust/rust.security.bind-all-interfaces.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: rust.security.bind-all-interfaces
+  title: Avoid binding Rust services to all interfaces
+  summary: >-
+    Rust network services should avoid explicit binds to `0.0.0.0`, `::`, or `[::]` unless public exposure is intentional and controlled.
+  rationale: >-
+    Binding every interface can unintentionally expose internal services beyond expected trust boundaries.
+  detection:
+    kind: pattern
+  references:
+    - kind: cwe
+      id: CWE-668
+      title: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
+    - kind: url
+      title: CWE-668 Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
+      url: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/668.html
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - rust
+    - network
+    - exposure
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - rust
+  paths:
+    include:
+      - "**/*.rs"
+    exclude:
+      - "**/tests/**"
+      - "**/*_test.rs"
+      - "**/examples/**"
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: rust.security.bind-all-interfaces
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.network
+    severity: medium
+    confidence: 0.85
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - rust
+      - network
+      - exposure
+  message:
+    title: Restrict interface bind in `${captures.issue.text}`
+    summary: "`${captures.issue.text}` binds a service to all network interfaces."
+  remediation:
+    summary: >-
+      Prefer loopback or an explicit interface bind unless broad exposure is required and defended by network controls.
+

package/rules/rust/rust.security.insecure-ssh-host-key.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: rust.security.insecure-ssh-host-key
+  title: Verify SSH host keys before connecting
+  summary: >-
+    SSH clients must not disable host key verification.
+  rationale: >-
+    Skipping host key checks enables person-in-the-middle attacks against SSH sessions.
+  detection:
+    kind: pattern
+  references:
+    - kind: cwe
+      id: CWE-668
+      title: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
+    - kind: url
+      title: CWE-668 Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere
+      url: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/668.html
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - rust
+    - ssh
+    - network
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - rust
+  paths:
+    include:
+      - "**/*.rs"
+    exclude:
+      - "**/tests/**"
+      - "**/*_test.rs"
+      - "**/examples/**"
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: rust.security.insecure-ssh-host-key
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.network
+    severity: high
+    confidence: 0.85
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - rust
+      - ssh
+      - network
+  message:
+    title: Enable SSH host key verification near `${captures.issue.text}`
+    summary: "`${captures.issue.text}` disables SSH host key verification."
+  remediation:
+    summary: >-
+      Keep host key checking enabled and pin known host keys or use a trusted known_hosts store.
+

package/rules/rust/rust.security.insecure-ssl-protocol.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: rust.security.insecure-ssl-protocol
+  title: Reject deprecated SSL/TLS protocol versions
+  summary: >-
+    Rust code must not enable SSLv3, TLS 1.0, or TLS 1.1 in TLS configuration.
+  rationale: >-
+    These protocol versions have known weaknesses and are deprecated for secure transport.
+  detection:
+    kind: pattern
+  references:
+    - kind: cwe
+      id: CWE-319
+      title: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
+    - kind: owasp
+      title: Transport Layer Security Cheat Sheet
+      url: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - rust
+    - tls
+    - cryptography
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - rust
+  paths:
+    include:
+      - "**/*.rs"
+    exclude:
+      - "**/tests/**"
+      - "**/*_test.rs"
+      - "**/examples/**"
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: rust.security.insecure-ssl-protocol
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.cryptography
+    severity: high
+    confidence: 0.85
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - rust
+      - tls
+      - cryptography
+  message:
+    title: Remove insecure TLS protocol near `${captures.issue.text}`
+    summary: "`${captures.issue.text}` references a deprecated SSL/TLS protocol version."
+  remediation:
+    summary: >-
+      Require TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3 and remove SSLv3, TLS 1.0, and TLS 1.1 from allowed protocol lists.
+

package/rules/rust/rust.security.insecure-temp-file.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: rust.security.insecure-temp-file
+  title: Avoid predictable or permissionless temporary files
+  summary: >-
+    Temporary file creation should use secure helpers with random suffixes and restrictive permissions.
+  rationale: >-
+    Predictable temp paths and default-permission temp files enable symlink races and information disclosure.
+  detection:
+    kind: pattern
+  references:
+    - kind: cwe
+      id: CWE-434
+      title: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
+    - kind: owasp
+      title: File Upload Cheat Sheet
+      url: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/File_Upload_Cheat_Sheet.html
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - rust
+    - filesystem
+    - tempfile
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - rust
+  paths:
+    include:
+      - "**/*.rs"
+    exclude:
+      - "**/tests/**"
+      - "**/*_test.rs"
+      - "**/examples/**"
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: rust.security.insecure-temp-file
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.filesystem
+    severity: medium
+    confidence: 0.85
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - rust
+      - filesystem
+      - tempfile
+  message:
+    title: Use secure temp file creation near `${captures.issue.text}`
+    summary: "`${captures.issue.text}` creates a temporary file with an insecure pattern."
+  remediation:
+    summary: >-
+      Use `tempfile::Builder` with explicit permissions and patterns containing `*`, or `std::env::temp_dir` with random names.
+

package/rules/rust/rust.security.insecure-yaml-load.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: rust.security.insecure-yaml-load
+  title: Avoid untyped YAML deserialization
+  summary: >-
+    Untyped `serde_yaml` deserialization can instantiate arbitrary types from untrusted input.
+  rationale: >-
+    YAML loaders without strict typing enable unsafe object graphs and unexpected type coercion.
+  detection:
+    kind: pattern
+  references:
+    - kind: cwe
+      id: CWE-502
+      title: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
+    - kind: owasp
+      title: Deserialization Cheat Sheet
+      url: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Deserialization_Cheat_Sheet.html
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - rust
+    - yaml
+    - deserialization
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - rust
+  paths:
+    include:
+      - "**/*.rs"
+    exclude:
+      - "**/tests/**"
+      - "**/*_test.rs"
+      - "**/examples/**"
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: rust.security.insecure-yaml-load
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.deserialization
+    severity: high
+    confidence: 0.85
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - rust
+      - yaml
+      - deserialization
+  message:
+    title: Use typed YAML parsing near `${captures.issue.text}`
+    summary: "`${captures.issue.text}` deserializes YAML without a constrained target type."
+  remediation:
+    summary: >-
+      Deserialize into explicit structs or enums and validate input before use.
+

package/rules/rust/rust.security.jwt-without-verification.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: rust.security.jwt-without-verification
+  title: Verify JWT signatures before trusting claims
+  summary: >-
+    JWT parsing must use a verification key and must not disable signature validation.
+  rationale: >-
+    Trusting unverified JWTs allows attackers to forge tokens with arbitrary claims.
+  detection:
+    kind: pattern
+  references:
+    - kind: cwe
+      id: CWE-287
+      title: Improper Authentication
+    - kind: owasp
+      title: JSON Web Token Cheat Sheet
+      url: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/JSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheet.html
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - rust
+    - jwt
+    - authentication
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - rust
+  paths:
+    include:
+      - "**/*.rs"
+    exclude:
+      - "**/tests/**"
+      - "**/*_test.rs"
+      - "**/examples/**"
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: rust.security.jwt-without-verification
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.authentication
+    severity: high
+    confidence: 0.85
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - rust
+      - jwt
+      - authentication
+  message:
+    title: Verify JWT signature near `${captures.issue.text}`
+    summary: "`${captures.issue.text}` parses a JWT without verifying its signature."
+  remediation:
+    summary: >-
+      Pass a `DecodingKey` to `decode` and validate claims with a strict `Validation` configuration.
+

package/rules/rust/rust.security.panic-in-async-handler.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: rust.security.panic-in-async-handler
+  title: Avoid panic and unwrap in async handlers
+  summary: >-
+    Async request handlers should propagate errors instead of panicking or unwrapping Results.
+  rationale: >-
+    Panics in async handlers can abort tasks and leak error details under load.
+  detection:
+    kind: pattern
+  references:
+    - kind: cwe
+      id: CWE-16
+      title: Configuration
+    - kind: owasp
+      title: Secure Configuration Cheat Sheet
+      url: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Secure_Configuration_Cheat_Sheet.html
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - rust
+    - async
+    - reliability
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - rust
+  paths:
+    include:
+      - "**/*.rs"
+    exclude:
+      - "**/tests/**"
+      - "**/*_test.rs"
+      - "**/examples/**"
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: rust.security.panic-in-async-handler
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.reliability
+    severity: medium
+    confidence: 0.85
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - rust
+      - async
+      - reliability
+  message:
+    title: Handle errors in async handler near `${captures.issue.text}`
+    summary: "`${captures.issue.text}` panics or unwraps inside an async function."
+  remediation:
+    summary: >-
+      Return `Result` from async handlers and map errors to appropriate HTTP responses.
+

package/rules/rust/rust.security.rocket-panic-prone-request-handler.rule.yaml

@@ -7,6 +7,18 @@ metadata:
     Rocket route handlers should not `unwrap`, `expect`, or otherwise panic on values derived from the HTTP request.
   rationale: >-
     Panics become hard failures and can be abused for denial-of-service or to leak error detail; prefer `Result` and typed rejections.
+  detection:
+    kind: pattern
+  references:
+    - kind: cwe
+      id: CWE-209
+      title: Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
+    - kind: owasp
+      title: Error Handling Cheat Sheet
+      url: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Error_Handling_Cheat_Sheet.html
+    - kind: url
+      title: ANSSI Rust secure development guidelines
+      url: https://anssi-fr.github.io/rust-guide/01-general-principles.html
   tags:
     - security
     - rust
@@ -43,3 +55,4 @@ emit:
   remediation:
     summary: >-
       Return `Result`, `Option`, or `status::Custom`, map errors to HTTP responses, and reserve `unwrap` for tests or statically known invariants.
+

package/rules/rust/rust.security.rocket-unsafe-template-output.rule.yaml

@@ -7,6 +7,18 @@ metadata:
     Do not wrap request-sourced strings in `RawHtml` (or similar) without escaping in Rocket handlers.
   rationale: >-
     Raw HTML bypasses Rocket's escaping defaults and is a common XSS footgun when fed from path, query, or body inputs.
+  detection:
+    kind: pattern
+  references:
+    - kind: cwe
+      id: CWE-79
+      title: Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
+    - kind: owasp
+      title: Cross Site Scripting Prevention Cheat Sheet
+      url: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
+    - kind: url
+      title: ANSSI Rust secure development guidelines
+      url: https://anssi-fr.github.io/rust-guide/01-general-principles.html
   tags:
     - security
     - rust
@@ -45,3 +57,4 @@ emit:
   remediation:
     summary: >-
       Prefer typed templates with auto-escaping, sanitize with a vetted HTML policy crate, or return plain text/JSON instead of `RawHtml`.
+

package/rules/rust/rust.security.shell-command-spawn.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: rust.security.shell-command-spawn
+  title: Avoid shell invocation via Command
+  summary: >-
+    Spawning `/bin/sh` or `bash` with `-c` enables shell metacharacter injection.
+  rationale: >-
+    Shell interpretation expands attacker-controlled input into arbitrary command execution.
+  detection:
+    kind: pattern
+  references:
+    - kind: cwe
+      id: CWE-78
+      title: OS Command Injection
+    - kind: owasp
+      title: OS Command Injection Defense Cheat Sheet
+      url: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/OS_Command_Injection_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - rust
+    - command-injection
+    - shell
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - rust
+  paths:
+    include:
+      - "**/*.rs"
+    exclude:
+      - "**/tests/**"
+      - "**/*_test.rs"
+      - "**/examples/**"
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: rust.security.shell-command-spawn
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.command-injection
+    severity: high
+    confidence: 0.85
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - rust
+      - command-injection
+      - shell
+  message:
+    title: Avoid shell spawn near `${captures.issue.text}`
+    summary: "`${captures.issue.text}` spawns a shell with `-c`, enabling command injection."
+  remediation:
+    summary: >-
+      Invoke binaries directly with explicit arguments instead of routing through a shell.
+

package/rules/rust/rust.security.sqlx-diesel-raw-interpolated-query.rule.yaml

@@ -7,6 +7,18 @@ metadata:
     Do not pass `format!(...)` (or equivalent string concatenation) into `sqlx::query` or `diesel::sql_query` sinks.
   rationale: >-
     Interpolated SQL is the primary SQL injection pattern in Rust ORMs; compile-time macros and bind parameters keep queries safe.
+  detection:
+    kind: pattern
+  references:
+    - kind: cwe
+      id: CWE-89
+      title: SQL Injection
+    - kind: owasp
+      title: SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
+      url: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
+    - kind: url
+      title: ANSSI Rust secure development guidelines
+      url: https://anssi-fr.github.io/rust-guide/01-general-principles.html
   tags:
     - security
     - rust
@@ -45,3 +57,4 @@ emit:
   remediation:
     summary: >-
       Prefer `sqlx::query!` / `query_as!`, use `.bind(...)` on typed query builders, or Diesel's query DSL with bound parameters instead of raw interpolated strings.
+

package/rules/rust/rust.security.template-unescaped-request-value.rule.yaml

@@ -7,6 +7,15 @@ metadata:
     Tera, Maud, and similar engines should not insert request-sourced strings into contexts or `PreEscaped`/`raw` sinks without sanitization.
   rationale: >-
     Template `safe`/raw sinks disable escaping; feeding path, query, form, or JSON extractors there is a direct XSS vector.
+  detection:
+    kind: pattern
+  references:
+    - kind: cwe
+      id: CWE-79
+      title: Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
+    - kind: owasp
+      title: Cross Site Scripting Prevention Cheat Sheet
+      url: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
   tags:
     - security
     - rust
@@ -45,3 +54,4 @@ emit:
   remediation:
     summary: >-
       HTML-escape with a vetted policy (for example `ammonia::clean`), keep auto-escaping on, and avoid `PreEscaped`/`Markup::raw` for untrusted strings.
+