@critiq/rules 0.0.2 → 0.1.0

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.apollo-server-csrf-disabled.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.apollo-server-csrf-disabled
+  title: Keep Apollo Server CSRF protections enabled
+  summary: Apollo Server should not explicitly disable CSRF prevention for browser-accessible endpoints.
+  rationale: GraphQL POST endpoints are vulnerable to cross-site writes when CSRF defenses are turned off.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - graphql
+    - apollo
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.apollo-server-csrf-disabled
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.misconfiguration
+    severity: high
+    confidence: 0.88
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - graphql
+  message:
+    title: Re-enable Apollo Server CSRF prevention
+    summary: Apollo Server sets `csrfPrevention` to false.
+  remediation:
+    summary: >-
+      Remove `csrfPrevention: false` or replace it with an equivalent POST-only plus preflight strategy documented by Apollo.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.apollo-server-graphql-dev-tooling-exposure.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.apollo-server-graphql-dev-tooling-exposure
+  title: Avoid shipping GraphQL dev landing or playground plugins without a production guard
+  summary: Apollo Server dev landing pages, sandbox UIs, and GraphQL Playground-style plugins should not load unconditionally in production builds.
+  rationale: Interactive GraphQL explorers widen attack surface and often expose schema details beyond what production APIs should advertise by default.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - graphql
+    - apollo
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.apollo-server-graphql-dev-tooling-exposure
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.misconfiguration
+    severity: medium
+    confidence: 0.78
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - graphql
+  message:
+    title: Gate GraphQL dev tooling away from production
+    summary: Apollo Server registers dev-oriented landing or playground plugins without an obvious environment guard in the same plugin expression.
+  remediation:
+    summary: >-
+      Load sandbox or local landing plugins only outside production, prefer `ApolloServerPluginLandingPageProductionDefault`, or disable interactive explorers behind authentication at the edge.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.apollo-server-introspection-exposure.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.apollo-server-introspection-exposure
+  title: Avoid unconditional GraphQL introspection
+  summary: Apollo Server should not hard-enable introspection without environment guards.
+  rationale: Introspection aids attackers in mapping schemas on production deployments.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - graphql
+    - apollo
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.apollo-server-introspection-exposure
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.information-exposure
+    severity: medium
+    confidence: 0.84
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - graphql
+  message:
+    title: Gate GraphQL introspection away from production
+    summary: Apollo Server enables introspection with a literal `true` flag.
+  remediation:
+    summary: Bind introspection to non-production environments or protect the endpoint behind authenticated tooling.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.apollo-server-missing-query-limits.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.apollo-server-missing-query-limits
+  title: Add GraphQL query depth or complexity controls
+  summary: Apollo Server bootstrap should declare validation rules or plugins that bound query cost.
+  rationale: Without depth, complexity, persisted operations, or gateway limits, GraphQL endpoints are easier to abuse with expensive queries.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - graphql
+    - apollo
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.apollo-server-missing-query-limits
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.misconfiguration
+    severity: medium
+    confidence: 0.72
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - graphql
+  message:
+    title: Layer defenses against expensive GraphQL queries
+    summary: Apollo Server is constructed without recognizable validation rules or protective plugins.
+  remediation:
+    summary: Add depth limits, query complexity rules, persisted operations, rate limits, or terminate behind a gateway/WAF that enforces GraphQL policies.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.astro-vite-public-secret-define.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.astro-vite-public-secret-define
+  title: Do not inline secrets into Astro PUBLIC import meta defines
+  summary: >-
+    Astro and Vite define entries for import.meta.env.PUBLIC_* must not map to high-risk process.env secrets.
+  rationale: >-
+    PUBLIC_* keys are intended for browser-visible configuration; wiring database passwords or API secrets through vite.define exposes them to client bundles.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - astro
+    - vite
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.astro-vite-public-secret-define
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.misconfiguration
+    severity: high
+    confidence: 0.83
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - astro
+  message:
+    title: Remove secret process.env wiring from ${captures.issue.text}
+    summary: >-
+      vite.define maps ${captures.issue.text} to a process.env value that looks like a secret.
+  remediation:
+    summary: >-
+      Keep secrets on the server, use private server-only env vars, and reserve PUBLIC_* keys for intentionally public identifiers such as analytics IDs.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.debug-statement-in-source.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.debug-statement-in-source
+  title: "Remove leftover `console.trace` calls from production paths"
+  summary: "`console.trace()` calls should not ship in production code outside an explicit dev-only branch."
+  rationale: "`console.trace` dumps a stack trace to stdout/stderr and is almost always leftover developer instrumentation. Stack traces in shipped output disclose internal call structure and inflate logs."
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - logging
+    - diagnostics
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: stable
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.debug-statement-in-source
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.privacy
+    severity: low
+    confidence: 0.9
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - logging
+      - diagnostics
+  message:
+    title: Remove `${captures.issue.text}` before shipping
+    summary: "`${captures.issue.text}` is leftover developer instrumentation that ships a stack trace to stdout or stderr."
+  remediation:
+    summary: Remove the call or guard it behind an explicit dev-only check (`process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production'`, `import.meta.env.DEV`, or `__DEV__`).

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.electron-dangerous-webpreferences.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.electron-dangerous-webpreferences
+  title: Harden Electron webPreferences
+  summary: Electron renderers should not run with unsafe webPreferences that weaken isolation or transport protection.
+  rationale: Options such as nodeIntegration, contextIsolation, and webSecurity directly control whether renderer compromise becomes host compromise.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - electron
+    - desktop
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: stable
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.electron-dangerous-webpreferences
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.misconfiguration
+    severity: high
+    confidence: 0.94
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - electron
+  message:
+    title: "Harden Electron ${captures.issue.text}"
+    summary: "${captures.issue.text} weakens Electron renderer isolation or transport protection."
+  remediation:
+    summary: Keep contextIsolation and webSecurity enabled, disable nodeIntegration and enableRemoteModule, and prefer sandbox true.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.electron-insecure-local-state.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.electron-insecure-local-state
+  title: Avoid storing secrets in Electron local stores without hardening
+  summary: electron-store writes that look like credentials should use OS-level secret storage instead.
+  rationale: Local JSON stores are readable by other processes and backups unless encrypted with platform APIs.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - electron
+    - storage
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: stable
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.electron-insecure-local-state
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.data-exposure
+    severity: medium
+    confidence: 0.82
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - electron
+  message:
+    title: "Harden Electron store usage in ${captures.issue.text}"
+    summary: "${captures.issue.text} persists sensitive-looking data through electron-store."
+  remediation:
+    summary: Prefer OS keychains, encrypted vaults, or short-lived session material instead of long-lived plaintext secrets on disk.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.electron-missing-ipc-origin-check.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.electron-missing-ipc-origin-check
+  title: Validate IPC sender origins in Electron
+  summary: Privileged ipcMain handlers should validate event.sender origins before acting.
+  rationale: Missing origin checks let any loaded renderer invoke privileged main-process behavior.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - electron
+    - ipc
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: stable
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.electron-missing-ipc-origin-check
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.authentication
+    severity: high
+    confidence: 0.86
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - electron
+  message:
+    title: "Add origin checks to ${captures.issue.text}"
+    summary: "${captures.issue.text} handles privileged IPC without validating the sender frame origin."
+  remediation:
+    summary: Assert trusted origins or channels before running privileged logic and reject unexpected senders early.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.electron-shell-open-external-unvalidated.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.electron-shell-open-external-unvalidated
+  title: Do not open external URLs from request data in Electron
+  summary: shell.openExternal should not receive request-controlled URLs without validation.
+  rationale: Open redirects and SSRF-style flows in the main process can pivot to arbitrary system browsers or handlers.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - electron
+    - open-redirect
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: stable
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.electron-shell-open-external-unvalidated
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.open-redirect
+    severity: high
+    confidence: 0.83
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - electron
+  message:
+    title: "Validate target URL for ${captures.issue.text}"
+    summary: "${captures.issue.text} opens a URL derived from request-controlled input."
+  remediation:
+    summary: Allowlist URL schemes and hosts, normalize targets, and block private IP ranges before calling openExternal.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.express-error-handler-information-disclosure.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.express-error-handler-information-disclosure
+  title: Avoid returning raw errors from Express error middleware
+  summary: Express error handlers should not send the err object directly to clients in production paths.
+  rationale: Returning raw errors leaks stack traces, internal identifiers, and implementation details to attackers.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - express
+    - information-disclosure
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: stable
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.express-error-handler-information-disclosure
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.information-disclosure
+    severity: medium
+    confidence: 0.8
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - express
+  message:
+    title: "Sanitize error responses from ${captures.issue.text}"
+    summary: "${captures.issue.text} forwards the caught error directly to res.send or res.json."
+  remediation:
+    summary: Log detailed errors server-side and return stable, generic client responses with correlation identifiers.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.express-static-dotfiles-allow.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.express-static-dotfiles-allow
+  title: Do not allow dotfiles in Express static middleware
+  summary: express.static should not serve dotfiles from disk unless explicitly required and reviewed.
+  rationale: Allowing dotfiles can expose hidden configuration and secrets through the static file middleware.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - express
+    - filesystem
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: stable
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.express-static-dotfiles-allow
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.misconfiguration
+    severity: medium
+    confidence: 0.84
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - express
+  message:
+    title: "Restrict dotfiles for ${captures.issue.text}"
+    summary: "${captures.issue.text} is configured with dotfiles allow, which can leak hidden files."
+  remediation:
+    summary: Use the default dotfiles ignore behavior or serve dotfiles from a tightly scoped directory with access controls.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.express-unbounded-body-parser.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.express-unbounded-body-parser
+  title: Set explicit Express body parser and multer size limits
+  summary: Express and Body Parser middleware plus Multer should declare explicit payload limits.
+  rationale: Default limits drift across frameworks and deployments; explicit caps reduce oversized-request abuse.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - express
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.express-unbounded-body-parser
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.misconfiguration
+    severity: medium
+    confidence: 0.78
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - express
+  message:
+    title: Declare explicit payload limits for body parsers and uploads
+    summary: "`${captures.issue.text}` runs without visible size limits."
+  remediation:
+    summary: Pass `limit` options to JSON/urlencoded/raw/text parsers and `limits.fileSize` (or equivalent) to Multer.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.express-user-controlled-static-mount.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.express-user-controlled-static-mount
+  title: Avoid request-controlled Express static mount paths
+  summary: The path prefix for express.static should not be derived directly from request objects.
+  rationale: User-controlled mount paths can collapse routing assumptions and expose unintended directories.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - express
+    - path
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: stable
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.express-user-controlled-static-mount
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.path-traversal
+    severity: high
+    confidence: 0.8
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - express
+  message:
+    title: "Fix static mount path in ${captures.issue.text}"
+    summary: "${captures.issue.text} mounts express.static under a request-derived URL prefix."
+  remediation:
+    summary: Use fixed, reviewed path prefixes and map external identifiers to internal paths through an allowlist.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.fastify-excessive-body-limit.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.fastify-excessive-body-limit
+  title: Avoid excessive Fastify body limits
+  summary: Fastify applications should not disable body limits or configure unusually large defaults without compensating controls.
+  rationale: Oversized bodies amplify denial-of-service risk on services without upstream buffering limits.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - fastify
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.fastify-excessive-body-limit
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.misconfiguration
+    severity: medium
+    confidence: 0.76
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - fastify
+  message:
+    title: Reduce Fastify bodyLimit or add upstream limiting
+    summary: Fastify is configured with an oversized or disabled bodyLimit.
+  remediation:
+    summary: Lower `bodyLimit`, enforce route-specific caps, or terminate traffic behind an API gateway or proxy that caps body size.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.fastify-public-bind-without-trust-proxy.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.fastify-public-bind-without-trust-proxy
+  title: Enable trust proxy for publicly bound Fastify servers
+  summary: >-
+    Fastify instances listening on all interfaces should enable trustProxy or terminate behind a reverse proxy you register in code.
+  rationale: >-
+    Without trustProxy, client IP and protocol metadata from an edge proxy are easy to misread, and public binds amplify exposure when the process is not intentionally perimeter-hardened.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - fastify
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.fastify-public-bind-without-trust-proxy
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.misconfiguration
+    severity: medium
+    confidence: 0.74
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - fastify
+  message:
+    title: Set trustProxy or proxy middleware before binding Fastify publicly
+    summary: >-
+      Fastify listens on a public host without trustProxy enabled and without @fastify/http-proxy or @fastify/proxy in this file.
+  remediation:
+    summary: >-
+      Set trustProxy when running behind a reverse proxy, prefer non-public bind addresses in development, or register an explicit Fastify proxy plugin so client metadata and TLS termination assumptions stay correct.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.graphql-upload-without-csrf-guard.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.graphql-upload-without-csrf-guard
+  title: Pair GraphQL multipart uploads with CSRF-safe server posture
+  summary: Legacy GraphQL multipart upload helpers should not run alongside Apollo Server configurations that disable CSRF protections.
+  rationale: Multipart GraphQL requests complicate browser CSRF defenses; when Apollo CSRF prevention is explicitly disabled, upload middleware is a high-risk combination for cross-site writes.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - graphql
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: experimental
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.graphql-upload-without-csrf-guard
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.misconfiguration
+    severity: high
+    confidence: 0.8
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - graphql
+  message:
+    title: Re-enable Apollo CSRF defenses or remove GraphQL upload middleware from this bootstrap
+    summary: >-
+      GraphQL upload middleware is registered while Apollo Server disables csrfPrevention, or no Apollo bootstrap with safe CSRF defaults is present.
+  remediation:
+    summary: >-
+      Keep Apollo csrfPrevention enabled (default in supported releases), add an explicit preflight header policy, or move uploads behind authenticated, non-browser APIs.

package/rules/typescript/ts.security.iframe-missing-sandbox-attribute.rule.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+apiVersion: critiq.dev/v1alpha1
+kind: Rule
+metadata:
+  id: ts.security.iframe-missing-sandbox-attribute
+  title: Add a sandbox attribute to iframes
+  summary: Intrinsic iframe elements should declare a sandbox attribute to reduce blast radius.
+  rationale: Sandboxed iframes limit scripts, forms, and top-level navigation when embedded third-party content is compromised.
+  tags:
+    - security
+    - react
+    - xss
+    - rules-catalog
+  stability: stable
+  appliesTo: block
+scope:
+  languages:
+    - typescript
+    - javascript
+match:
+  fact:
+    kind: security.iframe-missing-sandbox-attribute
+    bind: issue
+emit:
+  finding:
+    category: security.misconfiguration
+    severity: low
+    confidence: 0.75
+    tags:
+      - security
+      - react
+  message:
+    title: "Add sandbox to ${captures.issue.text}"
+    summary: "${captures.issue.text} is missing a sandbox attribute."
+  remediation:
+    summary: Add the most restrictive sandbox token set that still allows required behavior, and combine with a strict CSP.