@crewhaus/runtime-core 0.5.2 → 0.5.4

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Files changed (3) hide show
  1. package/dist/index.d.ts +46 -1
  2. package/dist/index.js +337 -18
  3. package/package.json +40 -40
package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -126,6 +126,51 @@ export type { CreateJanitorOptions, Janitor, JanitorBuiltinStepName, JanitorRese
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  export { AGENT_IDENTITY_SCHEMA_VERSION, DEFAULT_IDENTITY_DIR, IDENTITY_FILENAME, agentFingerprint, loadOrCreateAgentIdentity, } from "./identity";
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  export type { AgentIdentityFile } from "./identity";
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  export { type ApprovalDecision, type PendingApproval, type PendingApprovalStore, type PendingApprovalStoreOptions, createPendingApprovalStore, evictExpiredApprovals, generateApprovalId, hashApprovalInput, } from "@crewhaus/session-store";
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+ /**
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+ * How long after an operator's DECISION a grant may still satisfy a call the
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+ * model has re-worded. Generous enough for a resume (which follows the grant
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+ * within seconds on every surface), short enough that an unspent grant cannot
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+ * be replayed onto an unrelated turn an hour later.
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+ */
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+ export declare const REPLAYABLE_GRANT_MAX_AGE_MS: number;
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+ /**
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+ * #400 — find the grant an operator made for a call this run has since
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+ * REGENERATED differently.
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+ *
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+ * Only ever consulted after the exact-hash lookup misses, so the normal path
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+ * (a byte-identical re-issue) is untouched. Every condition below is load-
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+ * bearing; together they are what keeps a replay from becoming a standing
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+ * allow:
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+ *
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+ * - `sessionId` — a grant never leaks into another conversation.
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+ * - `toolName` — a grant for one tool never authorizes another.
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+ * - `decision === "grant"` and no `consumedAt` — one-shot means one shot.
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+ * - `runId !== <this run>` — the grant must come from a PRIOR run, i.e.
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+ * this really is a resume. Without it a run could park, be granted, and
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+ * then spend that grant on a *second, different* call inside the same
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+ * run — turning one approval into a tool-wide licence for the turn.
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+ * - `input !== undefined` — the record must actually carry what was
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+ * approved. `PendingApproval.input` is optional and unvalidated, so a
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+ * record written by an older or foreign writer has nothing to replay; the
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+ * honest answer there is to park, not to guess.
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+ *
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+ * Newest-first, so when several grants are outstanding the most recent
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+ * decision wins — the same "latest decision" posture the store's own `get`
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+ * takes.
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+ *
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+ * `list` is optional on the injected store: a caller that supplies a minimal
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+ * `{persist,get,resolve}` store simply never replays and keeps the pre-#400
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+ * behaviour, rather than failing.
164
+ */
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+ export declare function findReplayableGrant(store: Pick<PendingApprovalStore, "persist" | "get" | "resolve"> & Partial<Pick<PendingApprovalStore, "list">>, where: {
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+ readonly toolName: string;
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+ readonly sessionId: string;
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+ readonly runId: string;
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+ /** Epoch ms; the freshness window is measured from the DECISION. */
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+ readonly now?: number;
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+ /** Override the window (tests). */
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+ readonly maxAgeMs?: number;
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+ }): Promise<PendingApproval | undefined>;
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  export { type AlertBreachPayload, type AlertSink, type AttachDefaultSubscribersOptions, attachDefaultSubscribers, } from "./observability";
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  export { type AttachedSloMonitor, type AttachSloMonitorOptions, type SloBreach, type SloMitigationEvent, type SloMitigationRung, type SloMitigationSink, type SloTargets, type SloWindowMetrics, DEFAULT_SLO_WINDOW_MS, MIN_SLO_SAMPLES, SloWindow, attachSloMonitor, detectSloBreaches, } from "./slo-monitor";
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176
  export { type AttachIncidentCollectorOptions, type IncidentCapture, type IncidentTriggerKind, attachIncidentCollector, classifyIncidentTrigger, } from "./incident-collector";
@@ -1134,7 +1179,7 @@ export type RunChatLoopOptions = {
1134
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  * from the full `PendingApprovalStore` so a caller may inject a minimal
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  * store; the concrete `createPendingApprovalStore` satisfies it.
1136
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  */
1137
- readonly store: Pick<PendingApprovalStore, "persist" | "get" | "resolve">;
1182
+ readonly store: Pick<PendingApprovalStore, "persist" | "get" | "resolve"> & Partial<Pick<PendingApprovalStore, "list">>;
1138
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  readonly notify?: (approval: PendingApproval) => Promise<void>;
1139
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  readonly surface?: string;
1140
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  };
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import { createStore } from "@crewhaus/state-store";
28
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  import { executeStreaming } from "@crewhaus/streaming-tool-executor";
29
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  import { currentTenantContext } from "@crewhaus/tenancy";
30
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  import { TokenBudget, estimateTokens } from "@crewhaus/token-budget";
31
+ import { stripJustificationField, withJustificationField } from "@crewhaus/tool-catalog";
31
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  import { executeTool } from "@crewhaus/tool-executor";
32
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  import { detectLoop } from "@crewhaus/tool-loop-detection";
33
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  import { partitionToolCalls } from "@crewhaus/tool-orchestrator";
@@ -145,6 +146,33 @@ function toAnthropicInputSchema(t) {
145
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  // Degenerate (no object type, no union): coerce to an empty object schema.
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  return { type: "object", properties: converted.properties ?? {} };
147
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  }
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+ // Pillar 3 intent gate (#386) — the advertised (model-facing) schema for one
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+ // registered tool. For `requireJustification` tools the gate reads
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+ // `input["justification"]`, but models conform tightly to advertised schemas
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+ // and never invent undeclared fields — so unless the contract is IN the
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+ // schema, every gated call is denied `justification too brief (0 chars)` and
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+ // the gate degrades into a hard-off switch (verified live: 12/12 wiki_write
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+ // calls schema-exact with the field absent even after spec instructions
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+ // taught it). `withJustificationField` injects a required, described
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+ // `justification` string property unless the tool's own schema already
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+ // declares one; `justificationInjected` tells the execute path whether to
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+ // strip the field back out before the input reaches the tool (remote MCP
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+ // servers validate against THEIR schema, which may set
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+ // `additionalProperties: false`). Augmentation runs on the COERCED object
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+ // schema (after `toAnthropicInputSchema`), so MCP verbatim schemas, flattened
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+ // unions, and degenerate schemas are all covered, and it copies rather than
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+ // mutates — `t.jsonSchema` may pass through `toAnthropicInputSchema` by
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+ // reference and is hashed elsewhere for schema-drift detection.
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+ function toAdvertisedTool(t) {
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+ const base = toAnthropicInputSchema(t);
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+ if (t.requireJustification !== true)
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+ return { inputSchema: base, justificationInjected: false };
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+ const { schema, injected } = withJustificationField(base);
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+ return {
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+ inputSchema: schema,
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+ justificationInjected: injected,
174
+ };
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+ }
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  // Merge a top-level union of object branches into a single object schema.
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  // Anthropic forbids a top-level `anyOf`, but a nested `anyOf` on an individual
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  // property is fine — so each property becomes the union of its per-branch
@@ -385,6 +413,91 @@ export { AGENT_IDENTITY_SCHEMA_VERSION, DEFAULT_IDENTITY_DIR, IDENTITY_FILENAME,
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  // build the store + input hash it passes as `RunChatLoopOptions.approvals`
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  // without depending on session-store directly.
387
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  export { createPendingApprovalStore, evictExpiredApprovals, generateApprovalId, hashApprovalInput, } from "@crewhaus/session-store";
416
+ /**
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+ * How long after an operator's DECISION a grant may still satisfy a call the
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+ * model has re-worded. Generous enough for a resume (which follows the grant
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+ * within seconds on every surface), short enough that an unspent grant cannot
420
+ * be replayed onto an unrelated turn an hour later.
421
+ */
422
+ export const REPLAYABLE_GRANT_MAX_AGE_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
423
+ /**
424
+ * #400 — find the grant an operator made for a call this run has since
425
+ * REGENERATED differently.
426
+ *
427
+ * Only ever consulted after the exact-hash lookup misses, so the normal path
428
+ * (a byte-identical re-issue) is untouched. Every condition below is load-
429
+ * bearing; together they are what keeps a replay from becoming a standing
430
+ * allow:
431
+ *
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+ * - `sessionId` — a grant never leaks into another conversation.
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+ * - `toolName` — a grant for one tool never authorizes another.
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+ * - `decision === "grant"` and no `consumedAt` — one-shot means one shot.
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+ * - `runId !== <this run>` — the grant must come from a PRIOR run, i.e.
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+ * this really is a resume. Without it a run could park, be granted, and
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+ * then spend that grant on a *second, different* call inside the same
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+ * run — turning one approval into a tool-wide licence for the turn.
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+ * - `input !== undefined` — the record must actually carry what was
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+ * approved. `PendingApproval.input` is optional and unvalidated, so a
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+ * record written by an older or foreign writer has nothing to replay; the
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+ * honest answer there is to park, not to guess.
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+ *
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+ * Newest-first, so when several grants are outstanding the most recent
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+ * decision wins — the same "latest decision" posture the store's own `get`
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+ * takes.
447
+ *
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+ * `list` is optional on the injected store: a caller that supplies a minimal
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+ * `{persist,get,resolve}` store simply never replays and keeps the pre-#400
450
+ * behaviour, rather than failing.
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+ */
452
+ export async function findReplayableGrant(store, where) {
453
+ if (typeof store.list !== "function")
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+ return undefined;
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+ let all;
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+ try {
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+ all = await store.list();
458
+ }
459
+ catch {
460
+ // A read that fails must not fail the tool call: park as before.
461
+ return undefined;
462
+ }
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+ const now = where.now ?? Date.now();
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+ const maxAgeMs = where.maxAgeMs ?? REPLAYABLE_GRANT_MAX_AGE_MS;
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+ const matches = all.filter((a) => {
466
+ if (a.toolName !== where.toolName)
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+ return false;
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+ if (a.sessionId !== where.sessionId)
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+ return false;
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+ if (a.decision !== "grant")
471
+ return false;
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+ if (a.consumedAt !== undefined)
473
+ return false;
474
+ if (a.runId === where.runId)
475
+ return false;
476
+ if (a.input === undefined)
477
+ return false;
478
+ // FRESHNESS, measured from the DECISION — not from the park.
479
+ //
480
+ // Without it a grant that was never spent sits in a long-lived session
481
+ // forever and is replayed onto an unrelated later turn: the operator
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+ // asked for X an hour ago, approved it, the resume happened not to call
483
+ // the tool, and now an unrelated request runs X. Bounding from
484
+ // `decidedAt` is what makes the window track the approve→resume gap
485
+ // (seconds: the Slack button resumes immediately, and a CLI grant is
486
+ // followed by `runs resume`) rather than the park→approve gap, which is
487
+ // human-paced and may be hours.
488
+ //
489
+ // A grant older than this is not discarded — it stays a valid record for
490
+ // the EXACT-hash path, which is unbounded. Only the fuzzy replay is
491
+ // time-boxed.
492
+ const decidedAt = a.decidedAt !== undefined ? Date.parse(a.decidedAt) : Number.NaN;
493
+ if (!Number.isFinite(decidedAt))
494
+ return false;
495
+ return now - decidedAt <= maxAgeMs;
496
+ });
497
+ // `list()` is newest-first by contract, but sort defensively rather than
498
+ // trust the ordering of a store a caller injected.
499
+ return [...matches].sort((a, b) => (a.createdAt < b.createdAt ? 1 : -1))[0];
500
+ }
388
501
  // Ops item 31 — alert watchdog seams re-exported so the CLI/codegen can build
389
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  // the durable + off-box alert sink (audit append + settings.json alert hook /
390
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  // webhook) it passes as `RunChatLoopOptions.alertSink`.
@@ -1756,13 +1869,43 @@ export async function runChatLoop(opts) {
1756
1869
  }
1757
1870
  }
1758
1871
  const tools = effectiveTools;
1759
- const anthropicTools = tools.length > 0
1760
- ? tools.map((t) => ({
1761
- name: t.name,
1762
- description: t.description,
1763
- input_schema: toAnthropicInputSchema(t),
1872
+ // (#386) — advertise each tool's model-facing schema, with the intent
1873
+ // gate's `justification` contract injected for `requireJustification`
1874
+ // tools whose own schema doesn't declare it (see `toAdvertisedTool`).
1875
+ const advertisedTools = tools.map((t) => ({ tool: t, advertised: toAdvertisedTool(t) }));
1876
+ const anthropicTools = advertisedTools.length > 0
1877
+ ? advertisedTools.map(({ tool, advertised }) => ({
1878
+ name: tool.name,
1879
+ description: tool.description,
1880
+ input_schema: advertised.inputSchema,
1764
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  }))
1765
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  : undefined;
1883
+ // (#386) — tools whose advertised schema carries a RUNTIME-INJECTED
1884
+ // justification property. For exactly these, the field is gate metadata
1885
+ // rather than tool input — the underlying validator/server never declared
1886
+ // it (a remote MCP server with `additionalProperties: false` would reject
1887
+ // the call) — so every surface that reasons about WHAT THE TOOL DOES
1888
+ // consumes the OPERATIVE input (justification stripped) while the
1889
+ // surfaces that reason about WHAT THE MODEL DID keep the full input.
1890
+ // Operative-input consumers: permission-rule matching (arg-scoped
1891
+ // `Tool(argGlob)` rules must keep matching the way they did before the
1892
+ // field existed), the headless approval `inputHash` (a one-shot grant must
1893
+ // be consumable by a regenerated call whose operative args are identical
1894
+ // even though the re-worded justification is not), tool-loop detection
1895
+ // history (re-worded justifications must not make identical calls hash
1896
+ // apart), the egress classifier (scan what is actually transmitted), and
1897
+ // the tool executor itself. Full-input consumers: the event log, trace
1898
+ // bus, pre-tool hooks, the approval record's display `input`, the
1899
+ // justification gate, and the justification audit sink. Tools that
1900
+ // declare the field in their own schema are NOT in this set — for them
1901
+ // the field is genuine tool input everywhere.
1902
+ // #400 — approval ids this RUN has already replayed. Claimed synchronously
1903
+ // so two concurrent tool calls cannot both spend one one-shot grant.
1904
+ const replayedApprovalIds = new Set();
1905
+ const justificationInjectedTools = new Set(advertisedTools
1906
+ .filter(({ advertised }) => advertised.justificationInjected)
1907
+ .map(({ tool }) => tool.name));
1908
+ const operativeToolInput = (name, input) => justificationInjectedTools.has(name) ? stripJustificationField(input) : input;
1766
1909
  const toolByName = new Map(tools.map((t) => [t.name, t]));
1767
1910
  // G17 — per-tool rate limiter, built once at loop start from the lowered
1768
1911
  // `agent.rate_limits` map. One token bucket per entry: `rpm` is the
@@ -1919,7 +2062,13 @@ export async function runChatLoop(opts) {
1919
2062
  * Used by both the partitioned (post-stream) path and the streaming
1920
2063
  * path so the permission/abort/store contract is uniform.
1921
2064
  */
1922
- async function executeOneToolUse(tu) {
2065
+ async function executeOneToolUse(tuAsRequested) {
2066
+ // REBINDABLE on purpose (#400): a replayed approval substitutes the
2067
+ // operator-approved input for the model's regenerated one, and every
2068
+ // consumer below — the validator, the executor, the justification gate,
2069
+ // the egress classifier, the result record — reads through `tu`. Rebinding
2070
+ // here is what makes the substitution reach all of them instead of one.
2071
+ let tu = tuAsRequested;
1923
2072
  // End the "thinking" wait — but only when no tool is already mid-flight.
1924
2073
  // The streaming executor dispatches concurrency-safe tools with overlap, so
1925
2074
  // an unconditional stop here would tear down a sibling tool's live spinner;
@@ -1953,7 +2102,30 @@ export async function runChatLoop(opts) {
1953
2102
  });
1954
2103
  const t0Tool = performance.now();
1955
2104
  const tool = toolByName.get(tu.name);
1956
- const finish = async (result) => {
2105
+ // #400 — set when this call ran the input an operator APPROVED rather
2106
+ // than the one the model regenerated. Function-scoped so `finish` (the
2107
+ // single choke point every result passes through) can tell the model,
2108
+ // whichever return path fires.
2109
+ let replayedFrom;
2110
+ const finish = async (resultIn) => {
2111
+ let result = resultIn;
2112
+ // Say so IN THE RESULT. The assistant message still shows the input the
2113
+ // model asked for, so without this the model would reason about an
2114
+ // action that did not happen — and might "correct" itself by re-issuing
2115
+ // the call it thinks failed.
2116
+ if (replayedFrom !== undefined) {
2117
+ const notice = `[approval ${replayedFrom.id} was granted for a different wording of this call; the APPROVED input was executed, not the one you just sent. Read the result as the outcome of the approved action.]`;
2118
+ // Block content (images, structured blocks) is just as capable of
2119
+ // misleading the model as a string, so the notice rides both shapes —
2120
+ // prepended as its own text block when the content is an array.
2121
+ result =
2122
+ typeof result.content === "string"
2123
+ ? { ...result, content: `${notice}\n${result.content}` }
2124
+ : {
2125
+ ...result,
2126
+ content: [{ type: "text", text: notice }, ...(result.content ?? [])],
2127
+ };
2128
+ }
1957
2129
  await logEvent("tool_result", {
1958
2130
  toolUseId: tu.id,
1959
2131
  content: typeof result.content === "string"
@@ -2011,9 +2183,16 @@ export async function runChatLoop(opts) {
2011
2183
  is_error: true,
2012
2184
  });
2013
2185
  }
2186
+ // (#386) — the operative input for this call: for tools whose advertised
2187
+ // schema carries a runtime-injected justification, the field is stripped
2188
+ // here once and every surface below that reasons about what the tool
2189
+ // DOES (rule matching, approval hashing, egress, execution) consumes
2190
+ // this; surfaces that record what the model DID keep `tu.input`. See the
2191
+ // `justificationInjectedTools` comment at loop start for the full split.
2192
+ let operativeInput = operativeToolInput(tu.name, tu.input);
2014
2193
  const decisionDetails = evaluateWithReason({
2015
2194
  toolName: tu.name,
2016
- input: tu.input,
2195
+ input: operativeInput,
2017
2196
  readOnly: tool.readOnly,
2018
2197
  destructive: tool.destructive,
2019
2198
  requiresSandbox: tool.requiresSandbox,
@@ -2041,9 +2220,55 @@ export async function runChatLoop(opts) {
2041
2220
  }
2042
2221
  else if (approvals !== undefined && askMode === "pause") {
2043
2222
  // G11 headless parking/resume. Consult the store for a prior decision
2044
- // on this exact (toolName, inputHash).
2045
- const inputHash = hashApprovalInput(tu.name, tu.input);
2046
- const existing = await approvals.store.get(tu.name, inputHash);
2223
+ // on this exact (toolName, inputHash). The hash keys on the OPERATIVE
2224
+ // input (#386): a runtime-injected justification is re-worded by the
2225
+ // model on every regeneration, so hashing it would make a granted
2226
+ // approval unconsumable — the rerun would park a fresh approval
2227
+ // forever. The persisted record still carries the full `tu.input`
2228
+ // below so the approving operator SEES the justification.
2229
+ const inputHash = hashApprovalInput(tu.name, operativeInput);
2230
+ let existing = await approvals.store.get(tu.name, inputHash);
2231
+ // #400 — THE RESUMED CALL IS NOT THE PARKED CALL.
2232
+ //
2233
+ // A grant is keyed on whole-input equality, which silently assumes the
2234
+ // resumed run re-issues a byte-identical tool call. It does not: resume
2235
+ // re-drives the turn, the model regenerates the call, and
2236
+ // `sanitizeOrphanToolUses` has stripped the parked `tool_use` from the
2237
+ // replayed transcript — so the model is generating it FRESH and may
2238
+ // word any field differently. One re-worded argument moves the hash,
2239
+ // `get` misses, and the run parks AGAIN under a new id. Approve →
2240
+ // regenerate → re-park, forever: a plain one-shot grant could never
2241
+ // satisfy a model-driven tool, leaving `--always` (a STANDING allow on
2242
+ // a quota-spending or irreversible tool) as the only thing that landed
2243
+ // a single call.
2244
+ //
2245
+ // So when the exact key misses, look for the grant the operator
2246
+ // actually made — same session, same tool, still unspent — and run THE
2247
+ // INPUT THEY APPROVED rather than the one the model just regenerated.
2248
+ // Substituting is what keeps the security property intact: the
2249
+ // operator authorized a specific action shown to them on the approval
2250
+ // card, and that action is what executes. Honouring the grant for the
2251
+ // regenerated input instead would let a re-worded `place_call` dial a
2252
+ // different number under an approval for the first.
2253
+ if (existing === null) {
2254
+ const replay = await findReplayableGrant(approvals.store, {
2255
+ toolName: tu.name,
2256
+ sessionId,
2257
+ runId: bus.runId,
2258
+ now: Date.now(),
2259
+ });
2260
+ // CLAIM IT SYNCHRONOUSLY. The lookup reads and the consuming
2261
+ // `persist` writes, and up to `maxConcurrentTools` ask-gated calls
2262
+ // run through this gate at once — so without a claim two parallel
2263
+ // calls both find the same unconsumed grant and both execute. The
2264
+ // set is per-run and in-process, which is where that race is;
2265
+ // across processes the store's `consumedAt` remains the authority.
2266
+ if (replay !== undefined && !replayedApprovalIds.has(replay.id)) {
2267
+ replayedApprovalIds.add(replay.id);
2268
+ replayedFrom = replay;
2269
+ existing = replay;
2270
+ }
2271
+ }
2047
2272
  if (existing?.decision === "grant") {
2048
2273
  // One-shot allow: consume the grant so a later identical call
2049
2274
  // re-asks. A STANDING grant (#383, `existing.always`) is consumed
@@ -2054,7 +2279,86 @@ export async function runChatLoop(opts) {
2054
2279
  // revokes the standing allow (no unconsumed record lingers to
2055
2280
  // pre-approve the parked input until the TTL sweep).
2056
2281
  approved = true;
2057
- await approvals.store.persist({ ...existing, consumedAt: new Date().toISOString() });
2282
+ if (replayedFrom !== undefined) {
2283
+ // Run WHAT WAS APPROVED. `tu.input` is the model's regenerated
2284
+ // wording; the record carries the input the operator saw and said
2285
+ // yes to, and that is the one with an authorization behind it.
2286
+ const approvedInput = replayedFrom.input;
2287
+ const approvedOperative = operativeToolInput(tu.name, approvedInput);
2288
+ // Re-evaluate POLICY against what will actually run. The approved
2289
+ // input passed these rules in the run that parked it, but the
2290
+ // rules are read fresh each loop and an operator may have tightened
2291
+ // them since — and a grant is permission from a human, not an
2292
+ // exemption from the spec. A rule that now DENIES wins.
2293
+ const recheck = evaluateWithReason({
2294
+ toolName: tu.name,
2295
+ input: approvedOperative,
2296
+ readOnly: tool.readOnly,
2297
+ destructive: tool.destructive,
2298
+ requiresSandbox: tool.requiresSandbox,
2299
+ }, permissionMode, permissionRules, { sandboxAvailable: opts.sandboxAvailable === true });
2300
+ if (recheck.decision === "deny") {
2301
+ approved = false;
2302
+ denialMessage =
2303
+ `tool denied: approval ${replayedFrom.id} was granted, but \`${tu.name}\` is now denied by permission policy` +
2304
+ `${recheck.reason !== undefined ? ` (${recheck.reason})` : ""}.`;
2305
+ // The grant is NOT spent on a call that never ran, and the
2306
+ // result must not claim an approved input executed.
2307
+ replayedFrom = undefined;
2308
+ }
2309
+ else {
2310
+ tu = { ...tu, input: approvedInput };
2311
+ operativeInput = approvedOperative;
2312
+ // The `pre-tool` hook already judged the input the MODEL sent,
2313
+ // several steps above. A hook that can deny must judge what will
2314
+ // actually RUN, so re-fire it against the substituted input.
2315
+ const replayHook = await fireHook("pre-tool", {
2316
+ id: tu.id,
2317
+ name: tu.name,
2318
+ input: tu.input,
2319
+ });
2320
+ if (!replayHook.allowed) {
2321
+ approved = false;
2322
+ denialMessage = `[blocked by hook] ${replayHook.reason ?? "denied"}`;
2323
+ replayedFrom = undefined;
2324
+ }
2325
+ }
2326
+ }
2327
+ if (approved) {
2328
+ // Consume only once the call is really going to run: a replay the
2329
+ // policy or a hook then refused must leave the operator's grant
2330
+ // unspent, or they have to approve the same action twice.
2331
+ await approvals.store.persist({
2332
+ ...existing,
2333
+ consumedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
2334
+ });
2335
+ }
2336
+ if (replayedFrom !== undefined && approved) {
2337
+ bus.publish({
2338
+ ...bus.envelope(),
2339
+ kind: "permission_decision",
2340
+ toolName: tu.name,
2341
+ decision: "allow",
2342
+ mode: permissionMode,
2343
+ reason: `approval ${replayedFrom.id} replayed: executing the APPROVED input, not the regenerated one`,
2344
+ });
2345
+ runContext.logger.info("tool approval replayed", {
2346
+ approvalId: replayedFrom.id,
2347
+ toolName: tu.name,
2348
+ detail: "the resumed turn regenerated a different input; the operator-approved input was executed instead",
2349
+ });
2350
+ // The durable `tool_use` record holds what the MODEL asked for —
2351
+ // correct, that is what the model did — but nothing yet recorded
2352
+ // what RAN, and an audit trail showing only the discarded input is
2353
+ // worse than one showing both.
2354
+ await logEvent("tool_use", {
2355
+ id: tu.id,
2356
+ name: tu.name,
2357
+ input: replayedFrom.input,
2358
+ approvalReplayedFrom: replayedFrom.id,
2359
+ requestedInput: tuAsRequested.input,
2360
+ });
2361
+ }
2058
2362
  }
2059
2363
  else if (existing?.decision === "deny") {
2060
2364
  approved = false;
@@ -2221,7 +2525,7 @@ export async function runChatLoop(opts) {
2221
2525
  return finish({
2222
2526
  type: "tool_result",
2223
2527
  tool_use_id: tu.id,
2224
- content: `[justification denied] ${verdict.reason}. Reformulate the call with a justification that ties to the session's declared goal, or omit this tool from the call.`,
2528
+ content: `[justification denied] ${verdict.reason}. Reformulate the call with a \`justification\` string field in the tool input that ties to the session's declared goal, or omit this tool from the call.`,
2225
2529
  is_error: true,
2226
2530
  });
2227
2531
  }
@@ -2238,7 +2542,9 @@ export async function runChatLoop(opts) {
2238
2542
  // `"external-configured"` (warn). Callers can override via
2239
2543
  // `opts.resolveSinkScope` to mark federation-joined or other dynamic sinks.
2240
2544
  if (tool.scope === "external") {
2241
- const payload = JSON.stringify(tu.input ?? null);
2545
+ // (#386) — scan the OPERATIVE payload: for injected-justification
2546
+ // tools this is what `executeTool` actually transmits to the sink.
2547
+ const payload = JSON.stringify(operativeInput ?? null);
2242
2548
  const sinkScope = (opts.resolveSinkScope ?? defaultSinkScope)(tu.name);
2243
2549
  const egress = await classifyEgress(payload, runContext, {
2244
2550
  sinkId: tu.name,
@@ -2385,7 +2691,7 @@ export async function runChatLoop(opts) {
2385
2691
  // every gate (permission/justification/egress) so it never overlaps the
2386
2692
  // approval prompt, and torn down in `.finally` on success or throw.
2387
2693
  beginToolWork(tu.name);
2388
- const raw = await executeTool(tool, tu.input, {
2694
+ const raw = await executeTool(tool, operativeInput, {
2389
2695
  toolUseId: tu.id,
2390
2696
  signal: toolAbort.signal,
2391
2697
  // #160 follow-up — the bridge (built on every run, above) carries
@@ -3105,7 +3411,15 @@ export async function runChatLoop(opts) {
3105
3411
  // Item 26 — accrue this turn's tool_use count (next-turn tier signal).
3106
3412
  thisTurnToolUseCount += toolUses.length;
3107
3413
  for (const tu of toolUses) {
3108
- toolUseHistory.push({ id: tu.id, name: tu.name, input: tu.input });
3414
+ // (#386) — loop detection compares OPERATIVE inputs: a
3415
+ // runtime-injected justification is re-worded every call, so
3416
+ // recording it would make identical gated calls hash apart
3417
+ // and hide exactly the loops the detector exists to catch.
3418
+ toolUseHistory.push({
3419
+ id: tu.id,
3420
+ name: tu.name,
3421
+ input: operativeToolInput(tu.name, tu.input),
3422
+ });
3109
3423
  }
3110
3424
  messages.push({ role: "user", content: [...toolResults] });
3111
3425
  await logEvent("user_message", { content: [...toolResults] });
@@ -3250,8 +3564,13 @@ export async function runChatLoop(opts) {
3250
3564
  name: t.name,
3251
3565
  input: t.input,
3252
3566
  }));
3253
- for (const tu of tsmBlocks)
3254
- toolUseHistory.push(tu);
3567
+ // (#386) — history records the OPERATIVE input (injected
3568
+ // justification stripped) so re-worded justifications don't
3569
+ // hide loops; `tsmBlocks` itself stays full-input because it
3570
+ // flows on to `executeOneToolUse`, whose gate reads the field.
3571
+ for (const tu of tsmBlocks) {
3572
+ toolUseHistory.push({ ...tu, input: operativeToolInput(tu.name, tu.input) });
3573
+ }
3255
3574
  // Item 7 — the response fully drained (usage known) before these
3256
3575
  // calls dispatch in `NeedTools`, so the split IS computable here:
3257
3576
  // split the priceable response cost evenly across its tool_use
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@crewhaus/runtime-core",
3
- "version": "0.5.2",
3
+ "version": "0.5.4",
4
4
  "type": "module",
5
5
  "description": "Minimal runtime imported by generated harness bundles",
6
6
  "main": "dist/index.js",
@@ -16,45 +16,45 @@
16
16
  },
17
17
  "dependencies": {
18
18
  "@anthropic-ai/sdk": "^0.96.0",
19
- "@crewhaus/abort-controller": "0.5.2",
20
- "@crewhaus/adapter-anthropic": "0.5.2",
21
- "@crewhaus/agent-context-isolation": "0.5.2",
22
- "@crewhaus/boundary-classifier": "0.5.2",
23
- "@crewhaus/circuit-breaker": "0.5.2",
24
- "@crewhaus/compaction-autocompact": "0.5.2",
25
- "@crewhaus/compaction-curator": "0.5.2",
26
- "@crewhaus/compaction-snip": "0.5.2",
27
- "@crewhaus/cost-tracker": "0.5.2",
28
- "@crewhaus/egress-classifier": "0.5.2",
29
- "@crewhaus/errors": "0.5.2",
30
- "@crewhaus/event-log": "0.5.2",
31
- "@crewhaus/hooks-engine": "0.5.2",
32
- "@crewhaus/model-router": "0.5.2",
33
- "@crewhaus/permission-engine": "0.5.2",
34
- "@crewhaus/prompt-cache-manager": "0.5.2",
35
- "@crewhaus/prompt-injection-detector": "0.5.2",
36
- "@crewhaus/rate-limiter": "0.5.2",
37
- "@crewhaus/recovery-engine": "0.5.2",
38
- "@crewhaus/routing-store": "0.5.2",
39
- "@crewhaus/run-context": "0.5.2",
40
- "@crewhaus/session-store": "0.5.2",
41
- "@crewhaus/skills-registry": "0.5.2",
42
- "@crewhaus/slash-commands": "0.5.2",
43
- "@crewhaus/state-store": "0.5.2",
44
- "@crewhaus/tenancy": "0.5.2",
45
- "@crewhaus/token-budget": "0.5.2",
46
- "@crewhaus/tool-catalog": "0.5.2",
47
- "@crewhaus/tool-executor": "0.5.2",
48
- "@crewhaus/tool-loop-detection": "0.5.2",
49
- "@crewhaus/tool-orchestrator": "0.5.2",
50
- "@crewhaus/tool-result-store": "0.5.2",
51
- "@crewhaus/streaming-tool-executor": "0.5.2",
52
- "@crewhaus/turn-state-machine": "0.5.2",
53
- "@crewhaus/trace-event-bus": "0.5.2",
54
- "@crewhaus/worker-runtime": "0.5.2",
55
- "@crewhaus/structured-event-printer": "0.5.2",
56
- "@crewhaus/metrics-collector": "0.5.2",
57
- "@crewhaus/otel-exporter": "0.5.2",
19
+ "@crewhaus/abort-controller": "0.5.4",
20
+ "@crewhaus/adapter-anthropic": "0.5.4",
21
+ "@crewhaus/agent-context-isolation": "0.5.4",
22
+ "@crewhaus/boundary-classifier": "0.5.4",
23
+ "@crewhaus/circuit-breaker": "0.5.4",
24
+ "@crewhaus/compaction-autocompact": "0.5.4",
25
+ "@crewhaus/compaction-curator": "0.5.4",
26
+ "@crewhaus/compaction-snip": "0.5.4",
27
+ "@crewhaus/cost-tracker": "0.5.4",
28
+ "@crewhaus/egress-classifier": "0.5.4",
29
+ "@crewhaus/errors": "0.5.4",
30
+ "@crewhaus/event-log": "0.5.4",
31
+ "@crewhaus/hooks-engine": "0.5.4",
32
+ "@crewhaus/model-router": "0.5.4",
33
+ "@crewhaus/permission-engine": "0.5.4",
34
+ "@crewhaus/prompt-cache-manager": "0.5.4",
35
+ "@crewhaus/prompt-injection-detector": "0.5.4",
36
+ "@crewhaus/rate-limiter": "0.5.4",
37
+ "@crewhaus/recovery-engine": "0.5.4",
38
+ "@crewhaus/routing-store": "0.5.4",
39
+ "@crewhaus/run-context": "0.5.4",
40
+ "@crewhaus/session-store": "0.5.4",
41
+ "@crewhaus/skills-registry": "0.5.4",
42
+ "@crewhaus/slash-commands": "0.5.4",
43
+ "@crewhaus/state-store": "0.5.4",
44
+ "@crewhaus/tenancy": "0.5.4",
45
+ "@crewhaus/token-budget": "0.5.4",
46
+ "@crewhaus/tool-catalog": "0.5.4",
47
+ "@crewhaus/tool-executor": "0.5.4",
48
+ "@crewhaus/tool-loop-detection": "0.5.4",
49
+ "@crewhaus/tool-orchestrator": "0.5.4",
50
+ "@crewhaus/tool-result-store": "0.5.4",
51
+ "@crewhaus/streaming-tool-executor": "0.5.4",
52
+ "@crewhaus/turn-state-machine": "0.5.4",
53
+ "@crewhaus/trace-event-bus": "0.5.4",
54
+ "@crewhaus/worker-runtime": "0.5.4",
55
+ "@crewhaus/structured-event-printer": "0.5.4",
56
+ "@crewhaus/metrics-collector": "0.5.4",
57
+ "@crewhaus/otel-exporter": "0.5.4",
58
58
  "zod-to-json-schema": "^3.23.5"
59
59
  },
60
60
  "devDependencies": {