@crewhaus/runtime-core 0.1.3 → 0.1.5
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/cli-markdown.d.ts +56 -0
- package/dist/cli-markdown.js +164 -0
- package/dist/index.d.ts +368 -0
- package/dist/index.js +1976 -0
- package/dist/observability.d.ts +38 -0
- package/dist/observability.js +69 -0
- package/dist/project-memory.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/project-memory.js +104 -0
- package/package.json +46 -43
- package/src/cli-markdown.test.ts +0 -207
- package/src/cli-markdown.ts +0 -190
- package/src/cost-inline.test.ts +0 -58
- package/src/cost-wire-model.test.ts +0 -138
- package/src/index-coverage.test.ts +0 -1671
- package/src/index.test.ts +0 -2471
- package/src/index.ts +0 -2327
- package/src/observability-coverage.test.ts +0 -303
- package/src/observability.test.ts +0 -138
- package/src/observability.ts +0 -116
- package/src/project-memory-coverage.test.ts +0 -119
- package/src/project-memory.test.ts +0 -145
- package/src/project-memory.ts +0 -134
- package/src/tenant-isolation.test.ts +0 -80
package/src/index.ts
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import * as readline from "node:readline/promises";
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import type Anthropic from "@anthropic-ai/sdk";
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import { type AbortTree, createAbortTree } from "@crewhaus/abort-controller";
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import {
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type ProviderAdapter,
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type ProviderId,
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collectFinalMessage,
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consumeStream,
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} from "@crewhaus/adapter-anthropic";
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import type {
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CrewMailbox,
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RuntimeBridge,
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SpawnSubAgentFn,
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SubAgentDefinition,
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} from "@crewhaus/agent-context-isolation";
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import { setDefaultBoundaryLlmClassifier } from "@crewhaus/boundary-classifier";
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import { type WrappedAdapter, wrap as wrapWithCircuitBreaker } from "@crewhaus/circuit-breaker";
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import { autoCompact } from "@crewhaus/compaction-autocompact";
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import { snip } from "@crewhaus/compaction-snip";
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import {
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type EgressMatcher,
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type EgressVerdict,
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type SinkScope,
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classifyEgress,
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summarizeEgress,
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} from "@crewhaus/egress-classifier";
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import { ConfigError, RuntimeError } from "@crewhaus/errors";
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import { type EventKind, type EventLog, openEventLog } from "@crewhaus/event-log";
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import { type HookDef, type HookEvent, aggregateDecisions, runHooks } from "@crewhaus/hooks-engine";
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import { parseModelString, resolveModel } from "@crewhaus/model-router";
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import {
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BUILTIN_DEFAULT_RULES,
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type JustificationJudge,
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type PermissionMode,
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type RuleSet,
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emptyRuleSet,
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evaluateJustification,
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evaluateWithReason,
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ruleBasedJustificationJudge,
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} from "@crewhaus/permission-engine";
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import { manage as manageCacheMarkers } from "@crewhaus/prompt-cache-manager";
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import {
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buildRedactionNotice,
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classifyText,
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llmClassifierEnabled,
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} from "@crewhaus/prompt-injection-detector";
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import type { RateLimiter } from "@crewhaus/rate-limiter";
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import {
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type RecoveryState,
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advanceState,
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initialRecoveryState,
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recover,
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} from "@crewhaus/recovery-engine";
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import { type RunContext, createRunContext, tagContent } from "@crewhaus/run-context";
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import { type SessionStore, createSessionStore } from "@crewhaus/session-store";
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import { type SkillRef, formatSkillsForPrompt } from "@crewhaus/skills-registry";
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import { type SlashCommand, expand as expandSlash } from "@crewhaus/slash-commands";
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import { type Store, createStore } from "@crewhaus/state-store";
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import { executeStreaming } from "@crewhaus/streaming-tool-executor";
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import { currentTenantContext } from "@crewhaus/tenancy";
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import { TokenBudget, estimateTokens } from "@crewhaus/token-budget";
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import type { RegisteredTool } from "@crewhaus/tool-catalog";
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import { executeTool } from "@crewhaus/tool-executor";
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import { type LoopDetection, detectLoop } from "@crewhaus/tool-loop-detection";
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import { partitionToolCalls } from "@crewhaus/tool-orchestrator";
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import { storeAndPreview } from "@crewhaus/tool-result-store";
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import { TraceEventBus } from "@crewhaus/trace-event-bus";
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import {
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type ToolUseBlock as TsmToolUseBlock,
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type TurnState,
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initialState,
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transition,
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} from "@crewhaus/turn-state-machine";
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import { zodToJsonSchema } from "zod-to-json-schema";
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import {
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type StreamRenderer,
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createCliMarkdownRenderer,
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isCliMarkdownEnabled,
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} from "./cli-markdown";
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import { attachDefaultSubscribers } from "./observability";
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import { loadProjectMemory } from "./project-memory";
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/**
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* Slice-scope runtime: a multi-turn streaming chat loop with prompt
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* caching, tool execution, pre-turn context compaction, recovery taxonomy,
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* permission gating, cooperative cancellation, and a partitioned/streaming
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* tool layer. Maps to catalog R1 runtime-orchestrator + R1 recovery-engine
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* + R8 permission-engine + R1 abort-controller + R3 tool-orchestrator /
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* tool-loop-detection / tool-result-store / streaming-tool-executor, plus
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* R2 model-adapter (Anthropic only).
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*
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* Auth resolution: ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN (Claude Pro/Max OAuth) takes
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* precedence over ANTHROPIC_API_KEY (pay-per-token API key). OAuth tokens
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* are detected by the `sk-ant-oat` prefix and given the beta + identity
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* headers required to route through subscription billing.
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*
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* Tool support: when `tools` is provided, the loop forwards the tool
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* definitions (Zod → JSON Schema) to the model, runs each tool through
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* the permission engine, then executes via @crewhaus/tool-executor before
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* re-calling the model. The state machine reaches Done(no_tools) when the
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* assistant returns no further tool_use blocks for a turn.
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*
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* Tool layer enrichment (Section 8): tool execution is partitioned via
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* `@crewhaus/tool-orchestrator` so concurrency-safe read-only calls run
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* via `Promise.all` while destructive calls run serially. After each
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* batch, `@crewhaus/tool-loop-detection` scans the per-run history; on a
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* hit, a synthetic warning user message is appended (deduped per
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* signature) so the model can self-correct. Every tool result flows
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* through `@crewhaus/tool-result-store` — outputs over 10 KB are
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* persisted to `.crewhaus/tool-results/<runId>/<toolUseId>.txt` and the
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* model sees a preview pointing at the full file. Behind a
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* `streaming: true` option, the loop swaps to
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* `@crewhaus/streaming-tool-executor`, which dispatches tools mid-stream
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* via the SDK's `contentBlock` event.
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*
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* Compaction: at the start of each user turn, estimate the conversation's
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* token count against `contextLimit` (default 200_000). When usage crosses
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* `compactionThreshold` (default 0.85), apply the cheap snip first, then
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* fall back to autocompact if still over. Reactive compaction is also
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* triggered in-turn when the recovery engine returns a `compact` action.
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*
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* Recovery: every model call is wrapped in try/catch. Errors flow through
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* the `recovery-engine` taxonomy: prompt_too_long → reactive compact;
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* max_output_tokens → continue; overloaded/5xx → exponential-backoff
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* retry; invalid_request → tombstone. Budgets enforced per turn.
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*
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* Permissions: every tool_use is evaluated by `permission-engine`. In
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* default and auto modes, an `ask` decision prompts the user via stdin in
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* REPL mode (single-turn mode treats `ask` as deny — non-interactive).
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*
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* Cancellation: the `runContext.abortSignal` becomes the root of an abort
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* tree; each turn gets a child, each tool call gets a grandchild. First
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* SIGINT cancels the current turn; second SIGINT exits the process.
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*
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* Persistence (Section 10): every `runChatLoop` invocation either creates
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* a new session via `@crewhaus/session-store` or resumes an existing one
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* (`opts.resume`); the session's `.json` metadata file lives at
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* `.crewhaus/sessions/<id>.json` alongside an append-only `.jsonl`
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* transcript opened via `@crewhaus/event-log`. Every user input,
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* assistant turn, tool_use, tool_result, recovery error, and compaction
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* is appended as one JSON line. On `--resume`, the runtime walks the
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* `.jsonl` and replays `user_message` + `assistant_message` events into
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* the message history before the loop starts. A per-run
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* `@crewhaus/state-store` is also instantiated as a coordination surface
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* for hooks/skills/tools (consumed by Section 11+). Eviction: any
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* session whose `.json` mtime is older than 30 days is purged on the
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* next `sessionStore.list()` (called once at the top of every
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* `runChatLoop`).
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*/
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const DEFAULT_CONTEXT_LIMIT = 200_000;
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// Hard per-turn cap on model→tool cycles. Generous enough that no realistic
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// agentic turn reaches it, low enough to stop a runaway/injected tool loop
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// before it burns a provider quota.
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const DEFAULT_MAX_TOOL_ITERATIONS = 500;
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const DEFAULT_COMPACTION_THRESHOLD = 0.85;
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const DEFAULT_SNIP_KEEP_HEAD = 4;
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const DEFAULT_SNIP_KEEP_TAIL = 20;
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// Section 17 — `resolveAuth` / `createAnthropicClient` / `ResolvedAuth` /
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// `OAUTH_BETAS` / `CLAUDE_CODE_HEADERS` / `CLAUDE_CODE_SYSTEM_PREFIX`
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// moved into `@crewhaus/adapter-anthropic`. Re-exported here so legacy
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// importers (eval-judge fallback, downstream tests) keep compiling.
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export {
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CLAUDE_CODE_HEADERS,
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CLAUDE_CODE_SYSTEM_PREFIX,
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OAUTH_BETAS,
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createAnthropicClient,
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resolveAuth,
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} from "@crewhaus/adapter-anthropic";
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export type { ResolvedAuth } from "@crewhaus/adapter-anthropic";
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/**
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* Walk an `EventLog` and reconstruct the SDK message history. Only
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* `user_message` and `assistant_message` events contribute — `tool_use`
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* and `tool_result` events are audit-only because the same data already
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* lives inside the assistant/user message content arrays. `error` and
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* `compaction` events are observability-only and skipped.
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*
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* Exported so consumers (the `--resume` path in `apps/cli`, the T4
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* replay test, and any future inspector) can reproduce the same history
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* the runtime would build.
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*/
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export async function replayMessageHistory(log: EventLog): Promise<Anthropic.MessageParam[]> {
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const messages: Anthropic.MessageParam[] = [];
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// Crew sessions and sub-agent spawners share one append-only log.
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// Events emitted between a2a_turn_start / a2a_turn_end (Section 22)
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// or sub_agent_start / sub_agent_end (Section 13) are nested
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// transcripts that should NOT bleed into the outer role's history —
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// their `user_message` and `assistant_message` events would otherwise
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// sit between the parent's tool_use and its tool_result, breaking
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// Claude API's adjacency requirement. Track nesting depth and only
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// surface user/assistant events at depth 0.
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let depth = 0;
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for await (const ev of log.read()) {
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if (ev.kind === "a2a_turn_start" || ev.kind === "sub_agent_start") {
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depth += 1;
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continue;
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}
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if (ev.kind === "a2a_turn_end" || ev.kind === "sub_agent_end") {
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depth = Math.max(0, depth - 1);
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continue;
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}
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if (depth > 0) continue;
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if (ev.kind === "user_message") {
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const p = ev.payload as { content: Anthropic.MessageParam["content"] };
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messages.push({ role: "user", content: p.content });
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} else if (ev.kind === "assistant_message") {
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const p = ev.payload as { content: Anthropic.MessageParam["content"] };
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messages.push({ role: "assistant", content: p.content });
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}
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}
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}
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/**
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* Pillar 3 (FR-004) intent gate — the durable audit sink the justification
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* gate appends to. Structurally a subset of `@crewhaus/audit-log`'s
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* `AuditLog` (its `append({ kind, payload })`), declared here as a minimal
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* interface so runtime-core does NOT take a dependency on (or a cycle with)
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* `@crewhaus/audit-log`. The CLI/codegen passes a real `openAuditLog(...)`
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* instance; tests pass an in-memory or tmp-dir-backed one. When omitted (the
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* default for every existing caller), the gate writes nothing durable and the
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* trace-bus `permission_decision` event remains the only surface — i.e. zero
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* behaviour change unless a caller opts in.
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*
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* the AuditKind `@crewhaus/audit-log` reserves for this signal; the payload is
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* the documented verbatim shape `{ toolName, justification, verdict, reason,
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* judgeModel, confidence? }` (the justification IS the audit artifact — stored
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* verbatim, never redacted).
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*/
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export type JustificationAuditSink = {
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append(input: {
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readonly kind: "permission_justification_evaluated";
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readonly payload: unknown;
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}): Promise<unknown>;
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};
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export type RunChatLoopOptions = {
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model: string;
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instructions: string;
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maxTokens?: number;
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/**
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* Section 17 — optional override for the model used by
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* `compaction-autocompact`. When undefined, compaction reuses
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* `opts.model` (and therefore the same adapter). Set to a different
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* model string (or even a different provider via the prefix
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* conventions, e.g. `openai/gpt-4o-mini`) to route compaction
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* elsewhere.
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*/
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compactionModel?: string;
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/**
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* Test injection backdoor: pre-built ProviderAdapter that bypasses
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* the model-router. When set, `model` is still the user-facing
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* `agent.model` (used for trace events and as the `req.model` field
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* passed to the adapter), but no router lookup happens.
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*
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* Used by sub-agent-spawner.test.ts and runtime-core.test.ts to
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* inject scripted adapters; replaces the previous `client` /
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* `isOAuth` injection contract.
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*/
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_adapter?: ProviderAdapter;
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/**
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* Section 17 — same as `_adapter` but for the compaction model.
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* When omitted, defaults to `_adapter` (or the routed primary).
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*/
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_compactionAdapter?: ProviderAdapter;
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/** Override the input stream (testing). Defaults to process.stdin. */
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input?: NodeJS.ReadableStream;
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/** Tools the model may invoke. When empty/undefined, tools are not advertised. */
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tools?: ReadonlyArray<RegisteredTool>;
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/** Per-run identity, abort signal, and logger. Defaults to a fresh `createRunContext()`. */
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runContext?: RunContext;
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/** Context-window limit in tokens. Defaults to 200_000 (Claude opus/sonnet 4.x). */
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contextLimit?: number;
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/** Fraction of `contextLimit` at which compaction kicks in. Defaults to 0.85. */
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compactionThreshold?: number;
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/** Number of head messages to keep when snipping. Defaults to 4. */
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snipKeepHead?: number;
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/** Number of tail messages to keep when snipping. Defaults to 20. */
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snipKeepTail?: number;
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/**
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* Pre-loaded conversation history. In `singleTurn` mode this is the
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* entire input; the last entry must be `role: "user"`.
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*/
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seedMessages?: ReadonlyArray<Anthropic.MessageParam>;
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/**
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* Single-shot mode: run exactly one user→assistant turn (with the tool
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* inner-loop until Done) using `seedMessages`, then return the terminal
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* assistant text. Skips the stdin REPL entirely. Used by the workflow
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* target to run each step as a discrete turn.
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*/
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singleTurn?: boolean;
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/**
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* Permission mode. Defaults to "default" (ask for tools without an
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* explicit allow rule). The `bypass` mode is only legal when supplied
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* directly by the runtime caller (the CLI flag parser); the spec/config
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* loaders reject bypass at parse time.
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*/
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permissionMode?: PermissionMode;
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/** Layered rule sources. Defaults to `{ ..., builtin: BUILTIN_DEFAULT_RULES }`. */
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permissionRules?: RuleSet;
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/**
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305
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* Install a SIGINT handler that aborts the current turn on first press
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* and exits on the second. Defaults to true in REPL mode when stdin is
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* a TTY; defaults to false otherwise (singleTurn, piped input, tests).
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*/
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installSigintHandler?: boolean;
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|
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/**
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311
|
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* When true, drive the model stream with `@crewhaus/streaming-tool-executor`
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312
|
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* so tool execution starts as soon as each `tool_use` block completes
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* (mid-stream) rather than waiting for the full response. Default: false.
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*/
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streaming?: boolean;
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|
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/**
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317
|
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* Override the directory under which session metadata `.json` files and
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318
|
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* event-log `.jsonl` files live. Defaults to `.crewhaus/sessions`.
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|
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*/
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|
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sessionRootDir?: string;
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321
|
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/**
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322
|
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* Human-readable label for new sessions; persisted to the session JSON.
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|
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* Typically the spec `name`. Defaults to `(unnamed)`.
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|
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*/
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|
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sessionName?: string;
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|
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/**
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|
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* Target shape this session belongs to (`"cli"`, `"workflow"`, …); persisted
|
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|
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* to the session JSON for future filtering. Defaults to `"cli"`.
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|
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*/
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|
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sessionTarget?: string;
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|
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/**
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332
|
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* Resume an existing session: load its metadata, replay its event log
|
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333
|
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* into the message history (only `user_message` + `assistant_message`
|
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334
|
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* events; tool_use/tool_result are audit-only and already nested inside
|
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335
|
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* those messages), then continue the loop. Mutually exclusive with
|
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336
|
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* `seedMessages` (the resume payload becomes the seed). When the caller
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337
|
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* supplies a `runContext`, its `sessionId` must already match
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|
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* `resume.sessionId`; otherwise the runtime reseats the sessionId in
|
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339
|
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* the run context for this run.
|
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|
-
*/
|
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341
|
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resume?: { readonly sessionId: string };
|
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342
|
-
/**
|
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343
|
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* Section 11 — lifecycle hooks discovered from `.crewhaus/settings.json`.
|
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344
|
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* The runtime fires events at key moments (session-start, pre/post tool,
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345
|
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* pre/post model, pre/post compact, pre-slash, stop). A `deny` decision
|
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346
|
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* on `pre-tool` short-circuits with the hook's reason as the result; on
|
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347
|
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* `pre-model` it appends `[blocked by hook]` and ends the turn.
|
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348
|
-
*/
|
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349
|
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hooks?: ReadonlyArray<HookDef>;
|
|
350
|
-
/**
|
|
351
|
-
* Section 11 — discovered skills, advertised in the system prompt. The
|
|
352
|
-
* caller is responsible for adding `createSkillTool(skills)` to the
|
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353
|
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* `tools` array; runtime-core only formats them into the system block.
|
|
354
|
-
*/
|
|
355
|
-
skills?: ReadonlyArray<SkillRef>;
|
|
356
|
-
/**
|
|
357
|
-
* Section 11 — slash-command registry. When the user input starts with
|
|
358
|
-
* `/<name>` and `<name>` is in this map, the body is expanded with
|
|
359
|
-
* `$ARGUMENTS` substitution before being sent to the model. Fires
|
|
360
|
-
* `pre-slash` first; deny falls through to the original input.
|
|
361
|
-
*/
|
|
362
|
-
slashCommands?: ReadonlyMap<string, SlashCommand>;
|
|
363
|
-
/**
|
|
364
|
-
* Section 13 — inline sub-agent definitions exposed via the `Task` tool.
|
|
365
|
-
* Threaded into the `RuntimeBridge` and surfaced to framework-aware
|
|
366
|
-
* tools (only `Task` today). Codegen sets this from the IR; ordinary
|
|
367
|
-
* runChatLoop callers leave it undefined.
|
|
368
|
-
*/
|
|
369
|
-
subAgents?: ReadonlyMap<string, SubAgentDefinition>;
|
|
370
|
-
/**
|
|
371
|
-
* Section 13 — sub-agent spawner injection. Codegen passes
|
|
372
|
-
* `spawnSubAgent` from `@crewhaus/sub-agent-spawner`. The runtime stamps
|
|
373
|
-
* it onto the bridge; the Task tool dispatches via it. Inverted-DI to
|
|
374
|
-
* avoid a runtime-core → sub-agent-spawner cycle (the spawner consumes
|
|
375
|
-
* runChatLoop).
|
|
376
|
-
*/
|
|
377
|
-
spawnSubAgent?: SpawnSubAgentFn;
|
|
378
|
-
/**
|
|
379
|
-
* Section 22 — crew orchestrator injection. The orchestrator
|
|
380
|
-
* implements `CrewMailbox` and threads itself in here per role-turn so
|
|
381
|
-
* the in-band Handoff and A2A SendMessage tools can record intent /
|
|
382
|
-
* make synchronous peer requests through `ctx.bridge.crewMailbox`.
|
|
383
|
-
* Inverted-DI to avoid a runtime-core → crew-orchestrator cycle (the
|
|
384
|
-
* orchestrator consumes runChatLoop).
|
|
385
|
-
*/
|
|
386
|
-
crewMailbox?: CrewMailbox;
|
|
387
|
-
/**
|
|
388
|
-
* Section 18 — set true when the bundle has wired a non-noop sandbox
|
|
389
|
-
* backend. The permission engine refuses to grant `allow` for tools
|
|
390
|
-
* with `requiresSandbox: true` unless this is set. Codegen flips this
|
|
391
|
-
* automatically when the spec lists any `requiresSandbox` tool.
|
|
392
|
-
*/
|
|
393
|
-
sandboxAvailable?: boolean;
|
|
394
|
-
/**
|
|
395
|
-
* Section 18 — when set, suspicious or malicious tool outputs are
|
|
396
|
-
* classified by an LLM after the regex/structural layers. The runtime
|
|
397
|
-
* supplies the function; the prompt-injection-detector calls it as
|
|
398
|
-
* a best-effort tier-3. When omitted (the common case), the classifier
|
|
399
|
-
* stays at tiers 1-2.
|
|
400
|
-
*/
|
|
401
|
-
promptInjectionLlmClassifier?: (
|
|
402
|
-
text: string,
|
|
403
|
-
) => Promise<{ verdict: "clean" | "suspicious" | "malicious"; rationale?: string } | undefined>;
|
|
404
|
-
/**
|
|
405
|
-
* Pillar 3 intent gate — when supplied, runtime-core wires this judge
|
|
406
|
-
* into `evaluateJustification` for every tool call whose descriptor
|
|
407
|
-
* sets `requireJustification: true`. Defaults to the rule-based judge
|
|
408
|
-
* exported by `permission-engine`. Production deployments should pass
|
|
409
|
-
* an LLM-backed judge that compares the agent's stated justification
|
|
410
|
-
* against the session goal with model-quality reasoning.
|
|
411
|
-
*/
|
|
412
|
-
justificationJudge?: JustificationJudge;
|
|
413
|
-
/**
|
|
414
|
-
* Pillar 3 (FR-004) intent gate — durable audit sink. When supplied,
|
|
415
|
-
* every justification-evaluated tool call appends a
|
|
416
|
-
* `permission_justification_evaluated` record (verbatim payload) to this
|
|
417
|
-
* hash-chained sink IN ADDITION to publishing the `permission_decision`
|
|
418
|
-
* trace event. This is the durable, tamper-evident audit artifact the
|
|
419
|
-
* `permission_justification_evaluated` AuditKind was created for; the
|
|
420
|
-
* trace-bus event is ephemeral. Omitting it leaves the trace bus as the
|
|
421
|
-
* only surface (no behaviour change for existing callers). The CLI `run`
|
|
422
|
-
* path wires a real `@crewhaus/audit-log` instance rooted at
|
|
423
|
-
* `.crewhaus/audit`.
|
|
424
|
-
*/
|
|
425
|
-
justificationAuditSink?: JustificationAuditSink;
|
|
426
|
-
/**
|
|
427
|
-
* Pillar 3 sink-side fabric (FR-006) — pluggable egress-matching
|
|
428
|
-
* strategy. When supplied, every external-scope tool call routes its
|
|
429
|
-
* payload through this matcher inside `classifyEgress` instead of the
|
|
430
|
-
* built-in `SubstringEgressMatcher`. The matcher only decides *which*
|
|
431
|
-
* tagged data-lineage entries the payload contains; the per-origin/
|
|
432
|
-
* per-sink policy and the three audit outcomes (`egress-passed |
|
|
433
|
-
* egress-warned | egress-blocked`) are unchanged. Omitting it preserves
|
|
434
|
-
* the substring default (zero behaviour change for existing callers).
|
|
435
|
-
* Production deployments that opt into semantic detection pass an
|
|
436
|
-
* instance of `@crewhaus/egress-matcher-semantic`.
|
|
437
|
-
*/
|
|
438
|
-
egressMatcher?: EgressMatcher;
|
|
439
|
-
/**
|
|
440
|
-
* Pillar 3 sink-side — classify a tool sink as `"external-configured"` (a
|
|
441
|
-
* spec-declared sink → warn on non-user content) or `"external-dynamic"` (a
|
|
442
|
-
* runtime-joined sink → block on non-user content). Defaults to treating
|
|
443
|
-
* `mcp__*` sinks as dynamic and everything else as configured (#144); wire
|
|
444
|
-
* this to mark federation-joined or other runtime-discovered sinks dynamic.
|
|
445
|
-
*/
|
|
446
|
-
resolveSinkScope?: (toolName: string) => SinkScope;
|
|
447
|
-
/**
|
|
448
|
-
* Hard cap on the number of model→tool cycles in a single turn. The loop
|
|
449
|
-
* detector is advisory (it only injects a one-time warning and is defeated
|
|
450
|
-
* by trivial argument churn), so this is the ENFORCING bound: a prompt-
|
|
451
|
-
* injected model steered into an unbounded tool loop is aborted here rather
|
|
452
|
-
* than burning tokens/tool calls until a provider quota or OOM trips.
|
|
453
|
-
* Defaults to `DEFAULT_MAX_TOOL_ITERATIONS`; set higher for genuinely long
|
|
454
|
-
* agentic turns, or lower to tighten.
|
|
455
|
-
*/
|
|
456
|
-
maxToolIterations?: number;
|
|
457
|
-
/**
|
|
458
|
-
* Section 27 — wrap the resolved primary `ProviderAdapter` in a circuit
|
|
459
|
-
* breaker before any `stream()` call. When the breaker trips, subsequent
|
|
460
|
-
* model calls reject immediately rather than hammering a degraded
|
|
461
|
-
* upstream. Set via codegen when the spec lists `circuit_breaker:` opts.
|
|
462
|
-
*/
|
|
463
|
-
circuitBreaker?: {
|
|
464
|
-
readonly failureThreshold?: number;
|
|
465
|
-
readonly windowMs?: number;
|
|
466
|
-
readonly cooldownMs?: number;
|
|
467
|
-
};
|
|
468
|
-
/**
|
|
469
|
-
* Section 27 — pre-call rate gating. The runtime calls
|
|
470
|
-
* `rateLimiter.acquire(rateLimitKeys, 1)` before each model invocation.
|
|
471
|
-
* Codegen sets `rateLimitKeys` to `[provider, tenant?]` from the
|
|
472
|
-
* spec's tools/permissions/tenancy block. Without `rateLimiter` set,
|
|
473
|
-
* gating is skipped (no allow-list error).
|
|
474
|
-
*/
|
|
475
|
-
rateLimiter?: RateLimiter;
|
|
476
|
-
/** Keys to acquire per model call. Default: `[]`. */
|
|
477
|
-
rateLimitKeys?: ReadonlyArray<{
|
|
478
|
-
readonly dimension: "tenant" | "provider" | "tool";
|
|
479
|
-
readonly id: string;
|
|
480
|
-
}>;
|
|
481
|
-
/**
|
|
482
|
-
* Section 27 — when set, the system block array goes through
|
|
483
|
-
* `prompt-cache-manager.manage()` once at run start; if a fresh marker is
|
|
484
|
-
* injected the new `lastRotatedAt` is exposed via the returned bus event.
|
|
485
|
-
* Pass `0` (or omit) to force a refresh on the first turn.
|
|
486
|
-
*/
|
|
487
|
-
promptCacheLastRotatedAt?: number;
|
|
488
|
-
};
|
|
489
|
-
|
|
490
|
-
/**
|
|
491
|
-
* Runs the streaming chat loop and returns the terminal assistant text.
|
|
492
|
-
*
|
|
493
|
-
* - REPL mode (default): reads stdin in a loop, prints assistant turns to
|
|
494
|
-
* stdout, returns `""` when the loop exits.
|
|
495
|
-
* - Single-turn mode (`singleTurn: true`): runs one turn from the seeded
|
|
496
|
-
* message history and returns the concatenated text content of the final
|
|
497
|
-
* assistant message. Does not touch stdin.
|
|
498
|
-
*/
|
|
499
|
-
/**
|
|
500
|
-
* Resolve the root directory for session + event-log persistence (and the
|
|
501
|
-
* sub-agent storage it threads onward).
|
|
502
|
-
*
|
|
503
|
-
* Tenant isolation is MANDATORY at the storage layer, not cooperative: the
|
|
504
|
-
* managed daemon wraps every gateway request in `withTenant(...)`, so when a
|
|
505
|
-
* tenant context is active we use that tenant's path-rebased `sessionRoot`
|
|
506
|
-
* and never fall back to the process-global default — one tenant's prompts
|
|
507
|
-
* and transcripts can no longer land in another tenant's directory (#142).
|
|
508
|
-
*
|
|
509
|
-
* Precedence: an explicit per-call `optsRoot` (set only by trusted callers
|
|
510
|
-
* such as a target emitter or a test) wins; then the active tenant's
|
|
511
|
-
* `sessionRoot`; then `CREWHAUS_SESSION_DIR`; otherwise `undefined` (which
|
|
512
|
-
* lets `session-store` apply its own non-tenant default). The env var and the
|
|
513
|
-
* global default are only consulted OUTSIDE any tenant scope.
|
|
514
|
-
*/
|
|
515
|
-
export function resolveSessionRootDir(optsRoot: string | undefined): string | undefined {
|
|
516
|
-
if (optsRoot !== undefined) return optsRoot;
|
|
517
|
-
const tenant = currentTenantContext()?.tenant;
|
|
518
|
-
if (tenant !== undefined) return tenant.sessionRoot;
|
|
519
|
-
return process.env["CREWHAUS_SESSION_DIR"] ?? undefined;
|
|
520
|
-
}
|
|
521
|
-
|
|
522
|
-
/**
|
|
523
|
-
* Tenant-scoped root for the tool-result spill store, mirroring
|
|
524
|
-
* resolveSessionRootDir (#150). Inside a tenant scope the tenant's rebased
|
|
525
|
-
* `toolResultRoot` is used so one tenant's persisted tool outputs never share
|
|
526
|
-
* a directory with another's; otherwise `undefined` lets tool-result-store
|
|
527
|
-
* apply its own non-tenant default.
|
|
528
|
-
*/
|
|
529
|
-
export function resolveToolResultRoot(): string | undefined {
|
|
530
|
-
return currentTenantContext()?.tenant.toolResultRoot;
|
|
531
|
-
}
|
|
532
|
-
|
|
533
|
-
/**
|
|
534
|
-
* Sinks whose DESTINATION is chosen at runtime by the (prompt-injectable)
|
|
535
|
-
* model — a fetched/navigated URL, an on-chain recipient — are effectively
|
|
536
|
-
* dynamic even though they are spec-declared built-in tools: an attacker who
|
|
537
|
-
* steers the model picks where the data goes. So non-user cross-origin content
|
|
538
|
-
* reaching them must reach the egress BLOCK tier, not merely warn. Fixed-
|
|
539
|
-
* destination sinks are intentionally NOT here: `SendMessage` replies to the
|
|
540
|
-
* operator-configured channel, `WebSearch`/`ImageGenerate` hit a fixed provider
|
|
541
|
-
* API — classifying those dynamic would block legitimate replies, so they stay
|
|
542
|
-
* `"external-configured"` (warn) and can be tightened per-deployment via the
|
|
543
|
-
* `resolveSinkScope` override or the spec's egress policy.
|
|
544
|
-
*/
|
|
545
|
-
const MODEL_DESTINATION_SINKS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
|
|
546
|
-
"Fetch",
|
|
547
|
-
"WebFetch",
|
|
548
|
-
"Navigate",
|
|
549
|
-
"EvmSendTransaction",
|
|
550
|
-
]);
|
|
551
|
-
|
|
552
|
-
/**
|
|
553
|
-
* Default egress sink-scope. Runtime-joined MCP sinks (`mcp__*`) are the
|
|
554
|
-
* canonical dynamically-discovered external sink, and the model-destination
|
|
555
|
-
* built-ins above are dynamic by virtue of their model-chosen target — both
|
|
556
|
-
* classify as `"external-dynamic"` so the egress block tier is reachable for
|
|
557
|
-
* non-user-origin payloads (#144). Other spec-declared built-in sinks stay
|
|
558
|
-
* `"external-configured"` (warn). Override via `runChatLoop({ resolveSinkScope })`
|
|
559
|
-
* to mark federation-joined or other runtime sinks dynamic too.
|
|
560
|
-
*/
|
|
561
|
-
export function defaultSinkScope(toolName: string): SinkScope {
|
|
562
|
-
if (toolName.startsWith("mcp__")) return "external-dynamic";
|
|
563
|
-
if (MODEL_DESTINATION_SINKS.has(toolName)) return "external-dynamic";
|
|
564
|
-
return "external-configured";
|
|
565
|
-
}
|
|
566
|
-
|
|
567
|
-
/**
|
|
568
|
-
* Strip the model-string provider grammar down to the wire model id
|
|
569
|
-
* (`"bedrock/us.anthropic.claude-..."` → `"us.anthropic.claude-..."`)
|
|
570
|
-
* WITHOUT loading the provider package. Used on the `_adapter` injection
|
|
571
|
-
* path where `resolveModel` is bypassed entirely; synthetic ids that
|
|
572
|
-
* don't parse (`"test-model"`) pass through verbatim so existing test
|
|
573
|
-
* stubs keep their ids untouched.
|
|
574
|
-
*/
|
|
575
|
-
function bestEffortWireModelId(modelString: string): string {
|
|
576
|
-
try {
|
|
577
|
-
return parseModelString(modelString).modelId;
|
|
578
|
-
} catch {
|
|
579
|
-
return modelString;
|
|
580
|
-
}
|
|
581
|
-
}
|
|
582
|
-
|
|
583
|
-
export async function runChatLoop(opts: RunChatLoopOptions): Promise<string> {
|
|
584
|
-
// Pillar 3 — make the model-backed Layer-3 classifier reachable at EVERY
|
|
585
|
-
// trust boundary (MCP / sub-agent / channel / federation / skill /
|
|
586
|
-
// compaction / chain / orchestrator). Boundary call sites don't thread an
|
|
587
|
-
// `llmClassifier` through, so we register the runtime's classifier as the
|
|
588
|
-
// process-wide default — gated on the same `llmClassifierEnabled` env switch
|
|
589
|
-
// as the post-tool path. Set-or-clear on each entry keeps boundary behaviour
|
|
590
|
-
// consistent with that gate; idempotent re-registration is a no-op.
|
|
591
|
-
setDefaultBoundaryLlmClassifier(
|
|
592
|
-
opts.promptInjectionLlmClassifier !== undefined && llmClassifierEnabled(process.env)
|
|
593
|
-
? opts.promptInjectionLlmClassifier
|
|
594
|
-
: undefined,
|
|
595
|
-
);
|
|
596
|
-
// Section 17 — resolve the primary adapter via the model-router.
|
|
597
|
-
// The router lazy-loads the matching provider package; an
|
|
598
|
-
// Anthropic-only spec never pulls AWS / OpenAI / Gemini SDKs.
|
|
599
|
-
// Section 17 — resolve the primary adapter via the model-router and
|
|
600
|
-
// capture the *stripped* modelId (the form the provider expects, e.g.
|
|
601
|
-
// `openai/gpt-4o-mini` → `gpt-4o-mini`). When the caller injects an
|
|
602
|
-
// `_adapter`, still strip any provider prefix grammar (best-effort) so
|
|
603
|
-
// trace events carry the same wire model id either way — but fall back
|
|
604
|
-
// to `opts.model` verbatim for the synthetic ids tests typically pass
|
|
605
|
-
// (`"test-model"`), which the stub adapter ignores.
|
|
606
|
-
const primaryResolution = opts._adapter
|
|
607
|
-
? {
|
|
608
|
-
adapter: opts._adapter,
|
|
609
|
-
modelId: bestEffortWireModelId(opts.model),
|
|
610
|
-
providerId: opts._adapter.providerId,
|
|
611
|
-
}
|
|
612
|
-
: await resolveModel(opts.model);
|
|
613
|
-
// Section 27 — wrap the primary adapter in a circuit breaker when
|
|
614
|
-
// `circuitBreaker` opts are set (or by default in production codegen).
|
|
615
|
-
// The breaker is hung off the run-context's bus so state-change events
|
|
616
|
-
// surface for audit-log + structured-event-printer + OTel.
|
|
617
|
-
const baseAdapter: ProviderAdapter = primaryResolution.adapter;
|
|
618
|
-
let breakerWrap: WrappedAdapter | undefined;
|
|
619
|
-
const adapter: ProviderAdapter = (() => {
|
|
620
|
-
if (opts.circuitBreaker === undefined) return baseAdapter;
|
|
621
|
-
breakerWrap = wrapWithCircuitBreaker(baseAdapter, {
|
|
622
|
-
...opts.circuitBreaker,
|
|
623
|
-
adapterName: baseAdapter.providerId,
|
|
624
|
-
bus: opts.runContext?.eventBus,
|
|
625
|
-
});
|
|
626
|
-
return breakerWrap;
|
|
627
|
-
})();
|
|
628
|
-
void breakerWrap; // exposed via runtime stats once gateway/eval consumers land
|
|
629
|
-
const providerId: ProviderId = primaryResolution.providerId;
|
|
630
|
-
const wireModelId: string = primaryResolution.modelId;
|
|
631
|
-
// Section 17 — feature gate: a spec that declares tools cannot run on an
|
|
632
|
-
// adapter that doesn't speak tool use (e.g. Bedrock Llama/Mistral
|
|
633
|
-
// families). Fail with a clear ConfigError naming the model instead of
|
|
634
|
-
// letting the provider 400 (or silently drop the tools) mid-run.
|
|
635
|
-
if ((opts.tools ?? []).length > 0 && adapter.features.tool_use === false) {
|
|
636
|
-
throw new ConfigError(
|
|
637
|
-
`model "${opts.model}" (provider ${providerId}) does not support tool use — remove tools or pick a tool-capable model`,
|
|
638
|
-
);
|
|
639
|
-
}
|
|
640
|
-
let compactionAdapter: ProviderAdapter;
|
|
641
|
-
let compactionWireModelId: string;
|
|
642
|
-
if (opts._compactionAdapter !== undefined) {
|
|
643
|
-
compactionAdapter = opts._compactionAdapter;
|
|
644
|
-
compactionWireModelId = opts.compactionModel ?? wireModelId;
|
|
645
|
-
} else if (opts.compactionModel !== undefined) {
|
|
646
|
-
const c = await resolveModel(opts.compactionModel);
|
|
647
|
-
compactionAdapter = c.adapter;
|
|
648
|
-
compactionWireModelId = c.modelId;
|
|
649
|
-
} else {
|
|
650
|
-
compactionAdapter = adapter;
|
|
651
|
-
compactionWireModelId = wireModelId;
|
|
652
|
-
}
|
|
653
|
-
const maxTokens = opts.maxTokens ?? 4096;
|
|
654
|
-
|
|
655
|
-
// Mutual exclusion: resume takes priority and replaces any seedMessages
|
|
656
|
-
// in REPL mode (the resume payload becomes the seed). Section 12 carves
|
|
657
|
-
// out an exception for singleTurn + resume: the seed is the NEW inbound
|
|
658
|
-
// message, the resumed history is the prefix.
|
|
659
|
-
if (opts.resume !== undefined && opts.seedMessages !== undefined && opts.singleTurn !== true) {
|
|
660
|
-
throw new RuntimeError(
|
|
661
|
-
"runChatLoop: `resume` and `seedMessages` are mutually exclusive in REPL mode — the resume payload becomes the seed",
|
|
662
|
-
);
|
|
663
|
-
}
|
|
664
|
-
// Section 12: singleTurn + resume IS supported — used by the channel-bot
|
|
665
|
-
// session-router for "resume the thread, append the inbound message, run
|
|
666
|
-
// one turn". The seed must contain only the new turn's input (a single
|
|
667
|
-
// user message); the replayed event-log history becomes the prefix and
|
|
668
|
-
// is NOT re-logged.
|
|
669
|
-
if (
|
|
670
|
-
opts.runContext !== undefined &&
|
|
671
|
-
opts.resume !== undefined &&
|
|
672
|
-
opts.runContext.sessionId !== opts.resume.sessionId
|
|
673
|
-
) {
|
|
674
|
-
throw new RuntimeError(
|
|
675
|
-
"runChatLoop: opts.runContext.sessionId must match opts.resume.sessionId when both are supplied",
|
|
676
|
-
);
|
|
677
|
-
}
|
|
678
|
-
|
|
679
|
-
// Persistence boot: session create/resume + event log open. Runs first
|
|
680
|
-
// so the run context's sessionId — possibly carried over from a prior
|
|
681
|
-
// run — is the one the rest of the loop logs against.
|
|
682
|
-
const sessionRootDir = resolveSessionRootDir(opts.sessionRootDir);
|
|
683
|
-
const sessionStore: SessionStore = createSessionStore({ rootDir: sessionRootDir });
|
|
684
|
-
// Housekeeping side-effect: evicts any session whose mtime is older than
|
|
685
|
-
// the TTL (default 30 days). The returned list is intentionally discarded.
|
|
686
|
-
await sessionStore.list();
|
|
687
|
-
|
|
688
|
-
let sessionId: string;
|
|
689
|
-
let resumedMessages: Anthropic.MessageParam[] | undefined;
|
|
690
|
-
if (opts.resume) {
|
|
691
|
-
const existing = await sessionStore.get(opts.resume.sessionId);
|
|
692
|
-
if (existing === null) {
|
|
693
|
-
throw new RuntimeError(
|
|
694
|
-
`cannot --resume "${opts.resume.sessionId}": session not found in ${sessionRootDir ?? ".crewhaus/sessions"}`,
|
|
695
|
-
);
|
|
696
|
-
}
|
|
697
|
-
sessionId = existing.id;
|
|
698
|
-
const replayLog = await openEventLog(sessionId, { rootDir: sessionRootDir });
|
|
699
|
-
resumedMessages = await replayMessageHistory(replayLog);
|
|
700
|
-
await replayLog.close();
|
|
701
|
-
} else {
|
|
702
|
-
// If the caller supplied a runContext, honour its sessionId (already
|
|
703
|
-
// sess_<16 hex> by construction) so logs and the persisted file agree.
|
|
704
|
-
// Otherwise, let session-store mint a fresh id.
|
|
705
|
-
const created = await sessionStore.create({
|
|
706
|
-
id: opts.runContext?.sessionId,
|
|
707
|
-
name: opts.sessionName ?? "(unnamed)",
|
|
708
|
-
target: opts.sessionTarget ?? "cli",
|
|
709
|
-
model: opts.model,
|
|
710
|
-
});
|
|
711
|
-
sessionId = created.id;
|
|
712
|
-
}
|
|
713
|
-
|
|
714
|
-
// Use the supplied runContext as-is when it agrees with the resolved
|
|
715
|
-
// sessionId; otherwise build a fresh context bound to that sessionId.
|
|
716
|
-
// Tests that pass their own runContext rely on observing turnNumber on
|
|
717
|
-
// it after the loop returns, so we never silently swap it out.
|
|
718
|
-
const runContext: RunContext = opts.runContext ?? createRunContext({ sessionId });
|
|
719
|
-
|
|
720
|
-
// Section 15 — every observability subscriber (otel, metrics, printer)
|
|
721
|
-
// hangs off this single bus. The default constructor in `createRunContext`
|
|
722
|
-
// mints a no-subscriber bus; here we attach the env-gated set so a fresh
|
|
723
|
-
// run with `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT` set automatically exports.
|
|
724
|
-
const bus: TraceEventBus = runContext.eventBus;
|
|
725
|
-
void TraceEventBus; // keep type import alive for future direct constructions
|
|
726
|
-
const subscribers = await attachDefaultSubscribers(bus, runContext);
|
|
727
|
-
|
|
728
|
-
// M2.1 — CLI markdown renderer (env-gated). When CREWHAUS_CLI_MARKDOWN=1,
|
|
729
|
-
// text-delta chunks flow through a streaming markdown → ANSI transform so
|
|
730
|
-
// the user sees rendered bold/italic/headers/lists/code-fences instead of
|
|
731
|
-
// raw asterisks. The renderer is line-buffered; chunks accumulate until a
|
|
732
|
-
// `\n` arrives, then the rendered line writes to stdout. `end()` is
|
|
733
|
-
// called after the per-turn `\n` to flush any tail content.
|
|
734
|
-
const mdRenderer: StreamRenderer | undefined = isCliMarkdownEnabled()
|
|
735
|
-
? createCliMarkdownRenderer()
|
|
736
|
-
: undefined;
|
|
737
|
-
const writeText = (chunk: string): void => {
|
|
738
|
-
if (mdRenderer) mdRenderer.push(chunk);
|
|
739
|
-
else process.stdout.write(chunk);
|
|
740
|
-
};
|
|
741
|
-
const endTurn = (): void => {
|
|
742
|
-
if (mdRenderer) mdRenderer.end();
|
|
743
|
-
process.stdout.write("\n");
|
|
744
|
-
};
|
|
745
|
-
|
|
746
|
-
const eventLog: EventLog = await openEventLog(sessionId, { rootDir: sessionRootDir });
|
|
747
|
-
|
|
748
|
-
// Per-run state container — coordination surface for hooks/skills/tools
|
|
749
|
-
// landing in Section 11+. Section 10 only ships the plumbing; the
|
|
750
|
-
// underscore prefix marks the intentional non-consumer.
|
|
751
|
-
const _runState: Store<Record<string, unknown>> = createStore({});
|
|
752
|
-
void _runState;
|
|
753
|
-
|
|
754
|
-
// Section 13 — RuntimeBridge. Built once per run, handed to every
|
|
755
|
-
// tool execution through the executor's ExecutionContext. Framework-
|
|
756
|
-
// aware tools (only `Task` today) cast `ctx.bridge` to RuntimeBridge.
|
|
757
|
-
// Built lazily inside executeOneToolUse so it captures the latest
|
|
758
|
-
// permission-mode/-rules and tool list — the values themselves are
|
|
759
|
-
// stable for the run, but the closure keeps the call-site at the
|
|
760
|
-
// tool-execute boundary tidy.
|
|
761
|
-
|
|
762
|
-
// Tight helper so call sites stay one line. Errors propagate so an I/O
|
|
763
|
-
// failure on the audit trail surfaces rather than silently dropping.
|
|
764
|
-
async function logEvent(kind: EventKind, payload: unknown): Promise<void> {
|
|
765
|
-
await eventLog.append({ kind, payload });
|
|
766
|
-
}
|
|
767
|
-
|
|
768
|
-
// Section 11 — fire matching hooks for `event` and aggregate the result.
|
|
769
|
-
// No-ops when no hooks are configured. The aggregated decision exposes
|
|
770
|
-
// `allowed` / `reason` / `mutate`; v1 callers honour `mutate` only for
|
|
771
|
-
// `pre-slash` (the `expanded` field). Errors are caught and surfaced as
|
|
772
|
-
// a deny so a misbehaving hook implementation does not crash the run.
|
|
773
|
-
const hooks = opts.hooks ?? [];
|
|
774
|
-
async function fireHook(
|
|
775
|
-
event: HookEvent,
|
|
776
|
-
payload: unknown,
|
|
777
|
-
): Promise<{ allowed: boolean; reason?: string; mutate?: Record<string, unknown> }> {
|
|
778
|
-
if (hooks.length === 0) return { allowed: true };
|
|
779
|
-
try {
|
|
780
|
-
const results = await runHooks(event, payload, hooks, {
|
|
781
|
-
logger: runContext.logger,
|
|
782
|
-
eventBus: bus,
|
|
783
|
-
});
|
|
784
|
-
return aggregateDecisions(results);
|
|
785
|
-
} catch (err) {
|
|
786
|
-
runContext.logger.warn("hook firing failed", {
|
|
787
|
-
event,
|
|
788
|
-
error: (err as Error).message,
|
|
789
|
-
});
|
|
790
|
-
return { allowed: true };
|
|
791
|
-
}
|
|
792
|
-
}
|
|
793
|
-
|
|
794
|
-
// Section 11 — `session-start` fires once after the persistence + run
|
|
795
|
-
// context boot is complete. Observational only (no deny/block effect).
|
|
796
|
-
await fireHook("session-start", {
|
|
797
|
-
sessionId,
|
|
798
|
-
model: opts.model,
|
|
799
|
-
target: opts.sessionTarget ?? "cli",
|
|
800
|
-
resumed: opts.resume !== undefined,
|
|
801
|
-
});
|
|
802
|
-
|
|
803
|
-
const contextLimit = opts.contextLimit ?? DEFAULT_CONTEXT_LIMIT;
|
|
804
|
-
const compactionThreshold = opts.compactionThreshold ?? DEFAULT_COMPACTION_THRESHOLD;
|
|
805
|
-
const snipKeepHead = opts.snipKeepHead ?? DEFAULT_SNIP_KEEP_HEAD;
|
|
806
|
-
const snipKeepTail = opts.snipKeepTail ?? DEFAULT_SNIP_KEEP_TAIL;
|
|
807
|
-
const permissionMode: PermissionMode = opts.permissionMode ?? "default";
|
|
808
|
-
const permissionRules: RuleSet = opts.permissionRules ?? {
|
|
809
|
-
...emptyRuleSet,
|
|
810
|
-
builtin: BUILTIN_DEFAULT_RULES,
|
|
811
|
-
};
|
|
812
|
-
|
|
813
|
-
const userInstructions: Anthropic.TextBlockParam = {
|
|
814
|
-
type: "text",
|
|
815
|
-
text: opts.instructions,
|
|
816
|
-
cache_control: { type: "ephemeral" },
|
|
817
|
-
};
|
|
818
|
-
// Section 11 — append a "Available skills:" block to the system prompt
|
|
819
|
-
// when skills are configured. The block lists names + descriptions only;
|
|
820
|
-
// the model reaches each skill's body by calling the `Skill` tool (which
|
|
821
|
-
// the caller is responsible for adding to the tools array).
|
|
822
|
-
const skills = opts.skills ?? [];
|
|
823
|
-
const skillsText = skills.length > 0 ? formatSkillsForPrompt(skills) : "";
|
|
824
|
-
const skillsBlock: Anthropic.TextBlockParam[] =
|
|
825
|
-
skillsText.length > 0
|
|
826
|
-
? [{ type: "text", text: skillsText, cache_control: { type: "ephemeral" } }]
|
|
827
|
-
: [];
|
|
828
|
-
// M3.1 — auto-load project memory files (AGENTS.md / CLAUDE.md /
|
|
829
|
-
// CODE-COMPANION.md / AGENT.md) from cwd at session start. Follows the
|
|
830
|
-
// vendor-neutral agents.md convention; compatible with Claude Code's
|
|
831
|
-
// CLAUDE.md auto-load behaviour. Pillar 3 compliance: each file's content
|
|
832
|
-
// is classified via boundary-classifier with origin "user" inside
|
|
833
|
-
// loadProjectMemory() (the user's repo is developer-trusted).
|
|
834
|
-
const projectMemory = await loadProjectMemory();
|
|
835
|
-
const projectMemoryBlock: Anthropic.TextBlockParam[] =
|
|
836
|
-
projectMemory.prompt.length > 0
|
|
837
|
-
? [
|
|
838
|
-
{
|
|
839
|
-
type: "text",
|
|
840
|
-
text: projectMemory.prompt,
|
|
841
|
-
cache_control: { type: "ephemeral" },
|
|
842
|
-
},
|
|
843
|
-
]
|
|
844
|
-
: [];
|
|
845
|
-
if (projectMemory.files.length > 0) {
|
|
846
|
-
process.stdout.write(
|
|
847
|
-
`[memory] loaded ${projectMemory.files.length} project memory file(s): ${projectMemory.files
|
|
848
|
-
.map((f) => f.filename)
|
|
849
|
-
.join(", ")}\n`,
|
|
850
|
-
);
|
|
851
|
-
}
|
|
852
|
-
// Section 17 — runtime-core no longer prepends the Claude Code OAuth
|
|
853
|
-
// prefix; `adapter-anthropic` handles that internally so each adapter
|
|
854
|
-
// owns its provider-specific auth-shape requirements.
|
|
855
|
-
let systemBlocks: Anthropic.TextBlockParam[] = [
|
|
856
|
-
userInstructions,
|
|
857
|
-
...projectMemoryBlock,
|
|
858
|
-
...skillsBlock,
|
|
859
|
-
];
|
|
860
|
-
|
|
861
|
-
// Section 27 — rotate cache markers on the system block array if the
|
|
862
|
-
// last refresh is older than the rotation interval. Skips automatically
|
|
863
|
-
// when the adapter doesn't support explicit caching (OpenAI / Bedrock
|
|
864
|
-
// Llama / Mistral). This keeps long-running CHN/MGD/RES daemons under
|
|
865
|
-
// Anthropic's 30-day TTL.
|
|
866
|
-
if (adapter.features.caching === "explicit") {
|
|
867
|
-
const cacheManaged = manageCacheMarkers(
|
|
868
|
-
systemBlocks.map((b) => ({
|
|
869
|
-
type: "text" as const,
|
|
870
|
-
text: b.text,
|
|
871
|
-
...(b.cache_control !== undefined ? { cache_control: b.cache_control } : {}),
|
|
872
|
-
})),
|
|
873
|
-
{
|
|
874
|
-
features: adapter.features,
|
|
875
|
-
...(opts.promptCacheLastRotatedAt !== undefined
|
|
876
|
-
? { lastRotatedAt: opts.promptCacheLastRotatedAt }
|
|
877
|
-
: {}),
|
|
878
|
-
},
|
|
879
|
-
);
|
|
880
|
-
if (cacheManaged.rotated) {
|
|
881
|
-
systemBlocks = cacheManaged.blocks.map((b) => ({
|
|
882
|
-
type: "text",
|
|
883
|
-
text: b.text,
|
|
884
|
-
...(b.cache_control !== undefined ? { cache_control: b.cache_control } : {}),
|
|
885
|
-
})) as Anthropic.TextBlockParam[];
|
|
886
|
-
}
|
|
887
|
-
}
|
|
888
|
-
|
|
889
|
-
const tools = opts.tools ?? [];
|
|
890
|
-
const anthropicTools: Anthropic.Tool[] | undefined =
|
|
891
|
-
tools.length > 0
|
|
892
|
-
? tools.map((t) => ({
|
|
893
|
-
name: t.name,
|
|
894
|
-
description: t.description,
|
|
895
|
-
input_schema: (t.jsonSchema ??
|
|
896
|
-
zodToJsonSchema(t.inputSchema, {
|
|
897
|
-
$refStrategy: "none",
|
|
898
|
-
})) as Anthropic.Tool.InputSchema,
|
|
899
|
-
}))
|
|
900
|
-
: undefined;
|
|
901
|
-
const toolByName = new Map(tools.map((t) => [t.name, t]));
|
|
902
|
-
|
|
903
|
-
// Root abort tree for the whole run; each turn gets a child.
|
|
904
|
-
const runAbort = createAbortTree(runContext.abortSignal);
|
|
905
|
-
// Per-turn abort tree, replaced at the start of each turn so a SIGINT
|
|
906
|
-
// during turn N doesn't leave turn N+1 born-aborted.
|
|
907
|
-
let turnAbort: AbortTree = runAbort.child();
|
|
908
|
-
// Latest error captured from a model call, fed to recover() on entry to NeedRecovery.
|
|
909
|
-
let lastErrorForRecovery: unknown = undefined;
|
|
910
|
-
|
|
911
|
-
// Permission-ask prompter. Set in REPL mode after the readline interface
|
|
912
|
-
// exists; remains undefined in single-turn mode (where ask collapses to deny).
|
|
913
|
-
// The initial assignment makes the second assignment legal under biome's
|
|
914
|
-
// `useConst` rule (which fires on exactly-one-assignment lets).
|
|
915
|
-
let askApproval: ((toolName: string, input: unknown) => Promise<boolean>) | undefined = undefined;
|
|
916
|
-
|
|
917
|
-
// Per-run state for tool-loop detection and warning de-dup. Both span
|
|
918
|
-
// turns within a single `runChatLoop` invocation so cross-turn loops
|
|
919
|
-
// (e.g. "keep running date") get caught and warned at most once per
|
|
920
|
-
// signature.
|
|
921
|
-
const toolUseHistory: TsmToolUseBlock[] = [];
|
|
922
|
-
const warnedLoopSignatures = new Set<string>();
|
|
923
|
-
|
|
924
|
-
/**
|
|
925
|
-
* Execute one tool_use block end-to-end: permission gate → executeTool
|
|
926
|
-
* with the per-tool abort signal → wrap large output through
|
|
927
|
-
* `tool-result-store`. Returns a fully-formed `ToolResultBlockParam`
|
|
928
|
-
* suitable for appending to message history.
|
|
929
|
-
*
|
|
930
|
-
* Used by both the partitioned (post-stream) path and the streaming
|
|
931
|
-
* path so the permission/abort/store contract is uniform.
|
|
932
|
-
*/
|
|
933
|
-
async function executeOneToolUse(tu: TsmToolUseBlock): Promise<Anthropic.ToolResultBlockParam> {
|
|
934
|
-
process.stdout.write(`[tool: ${tu.name}]\n`);
|
|
935
|
-
await logEvent("tool_use", { id: tu.id, name: tu.name, input: tu.input });
|
|
936
|
-
const inputBytes = Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(tu.input ?? null), "utf8");
|
|
937
|
-
const toolStartEnvelope = bus.envelope();
|
|
938
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
939
|
-
...toolStartEnvelope,
|
|
940
|
-
kind: "tool_call_start",
|
|
941
|
-
toolUseId: tu.id,
|
|
942
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
943
|
-
inputBytes,
|
|
944
|
-
});
|
|
945
|
-
const t0Tool = performance.now();
|
|
946
|
-
const tool = toolByName.get(tu.name);
|
|
947
|
-
const finish = async (
|
|
948
|
-
result: Anthropic.ToolResultBlockParam,
|
|
949
|
-
): Promise<Anthropic.ToolResultBlockParam> => {
|
|
950
|
-
await logEvent("tool_result", {
|
|
951
|
-
toolUseId: tu.id,
|
|
952
|
-
content:
|
|
953
|
-
typeof result.content === "string"
|
|
954
|
-
? result.content
|
|
955
|
-
: summariseNonStringContent(
|
|
956
|
-
result.content as Exclude<
|
|
957
|
-
Anthropic.ToolResultBlockParam["content"],
|
|
958
|
-
string | undefined
|
|
959
|
-
>,
|
|
960
|
-
),
|
|
961
|
-
isError: result.is_error === true,
|
|
962
|
-
});
|
|
963
|
-
const outputContent = result.content;
|
|
964
|
-
const outputBytes =
|
|
965
|
-
typeof outputContent === "string"
|
|
966
|
-
? Buffer.byteLength(outputContent, "utf8")
|
|
967
|
-
: Buffer.byteLength(JSON.stringify(outputContent ?? null), "utf8");
|
|
968
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
969
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
970
|
-
spanId: toolStartEnvelope.spanId,
|
|
971
|
-
kind: "tool_call_end",
|
|
972
|
-
toolUseId: tu.id,
|
|
973
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
974
|
-
isError: result.is_error === true,
|
|
975
|
-
outputBytes,
|
|
976
|
-
durationMs: performance.now() - t0Tool,
|
|
977
|
-
});
|
|
978
|
-
// Section 11 — fire post-tool after the result is captured. Decision
|
|
979
|
-
// is observational here: a deny on post-tool logs a warning but does
|
|
980
|
-
// not rewrite the result (the model has already received it once on
|
|
981
|
-
// the prior turn in some streaming scenarios).
|
|
982
|
-
const post = await fireHook("post-tool", {
|
|
983
|
-
id: tu.id,
|
|
984
|
-
name: tu.name,
|
|
985
|
-
isError: result.is_error === true,
|
|
986
|
-
});
|
|
987
|
-
if (!post.allowed) {
|
|
988
|
-
runContext.logger.warn("post-tool hook denied", {
|
|
989
|
-
tool: tu.name,
|
|
990
|
-
reason: post.reason,
|
|
991
|
-
});
|
|
992
|
-
}
|
|
993
|
-
return result;
|
|
994
|
-
};
|
|
995
|
-
if (!tool) {
|
|
996
|
-
return finish({
|
|
997
|
-
type: "tool_result",
|
|
998
|
-
tool_use_id: tu.id,
|
|
999
|
-
content: `unknown tool "${tu.name}"`,
|
|
1000
|
-
is_error: true,
|
|
1001
|
-
});
|
|
1002
|
-
}
|
|
1003
|
-
|
|
1004
|
-
// Section 11 — pre-tool hook: short-circuit with the hook's reason
|
|
1005
|
-
// when any matching hook returns deny/block.
|
|
1006
|
-
const preHook = await fireHook("pre-tool", { id: tu.id, name: tu.name, input: tu.input });
|
|
1007
|
-
if (!preHook.allowed) {
|
|
1008
|
-
return finish({
|
|
1009
|
-
type: "tool_result",
|
|
1010
|
-
tool_use_id: tu.id,
|
|
1011
|
-
content: `[blocked by hook] ${preHook.reason ?? "denied"}`,
|
|
1012
|
-
is_error: true,
|
|
1013
|
-
});
|
|
1014
|
-
}
|
|
1015
|
-
|
|
1016
|
-
const decisionDetails = evaluateWithReason(
|
|
1017
|
-
{
|
|
1018
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
1019
|
-
input: tu.input,
|
|
1020
|
-
readOnly: tool.readOnly,
|
|
1021
|
-
destructive: tool.destructive,
|
|
1022
|
-
requiresSandbox: tool.requiresSandbox,
|
|
1023
|
-
},
|
|
1024
|
-
permissionMode,
|
|
1025
|
-
permissionRules,
|
|
1026
|
-
{ sandboxAvailable: opts.sandboxAvailable === true },
|
|
1027
|
-
);
|
|
1028
|
-
const decision = decisionDetails.decision;
|
|
1029
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
1030
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
1031
|
-
kind: "permission_decision",
|
|
1032
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
1033
|
-
decision,
|
|
1034
|
-
mode: permissionMode,
|
|
1035
|
-
...(decisionDetails.reason !== undefined ? { reason: decisionDetails.reason } : {}),
|
|
1036
|
-
});
|
|
1037
|
-
let approved = decision === "allow";
|
|
1038
|
-
let denialMessage: string | undefined;
|
|
1039
|
-
if (decision === "deny") {
|
|
1040
|
-
denialMessage = decisionDetails.reason ?? "tool denied by permission policy";
|
|
1041
|
-
} else if (decision === "ask") {
|
|
1042
|
-
if (askApproval !== undefined) {
|
|
1043
|
-
approved = await askApproval(tu.name, tu.input);
|
|
1044
|
-
if (!approved) denialMessage = "tool denied by user";
|
|
1045
|
-
} else {
|
|
1046
|
-
denialMessage =
|
|
1047
|
-
`tool denied: \`${tu.name}\` defaulted to "ask" and single-turn mode has no interactive surface to prompt on. ` +
|
|
1048
|
-
`Add an explicit rule to permissions.rules in your spec, e.g. \`{ type: alwaysAllow, pattern: ${tu.name} }\`, or run in REPL mode where "ask" can prompt.`;
|
|
1049
|
-
}
|
|
1050
|
-
}
|
|
1051
|
-
if (!approved) {
|
|
1052
|
-
return finish({
|
|
1053
|
-
type: "tool_result",
|
|
1054
|
-
tool_use_id: tu.id,
|
|
1055
|
-
content: denialMessage ?? "tool denied",
|
|
1056
|
-
is_error: true,
|
|
1057
|
-
});
|
|
1058
|
-
}
|
|
1059
|
-
|
|
1060
|
-
// Pillar 3 intent gate — when the tool descriptor demands a justification,
|
|
1061
|
-
// require the model to include one in the input and evaluate it via the
|
|
1062
|
-
// configured judge (rule-based by default; runtime callers can pass an
|
|
1063
|
-
// LLM-backed judge for production). The justification is captured to
|
|
1064
|
-
// audit-log verbatim. The session goal we compare against is the spec's
|
|
1065
|
-
// `instructions` field — fixed at compile time, not influenced by runtime
|
|
1066
|
-
// input, so an attacker who controls the user prompt cannot also
|
|
1067
|
-
// re-define the goal under which their justification gets scored.
|
|
1068
|
-
if (tool.requireJustification === true) {
|
|
1069
|
-
const input = tu.input as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
|
|
1070
|
-
const rawJustification = input?.["justification"];
|
|
1071
|
-
const justification = typeof rawJustification === "string" ? rawJustification : "";
|
|
1072
|
-
const judge = opts.justificationJudge ?? ruleBasedJustificationJudge;
|
|
1073
|
-
const verdict = await evaluateJustification(
|
|
1074
|
-
{
|
|
1075
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
1076
|
-
justification,
|
|
1077
|
-
sessionGoal: opts.instructions ?? "",
|
|
1078
|
-
input: tu.input,
|
|
1079
|
-
},
|
|
1080
|
-
judge,
|
|
1081
|
-
);
|
|
1082
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
1083
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
1084
|
-
kind: "permission_decision",
|
|
1085
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
1086
|
-
decision: verdict.allow ? "allow" : "deny",
|
|
1087
|
-
mode: permissionMode,
|
|
1088
|
-
reason: `justification: ${verdict.reason} [judge=${verdict.judgeModel}]`,
|
|
1089
|
-
// FR-004 — promote the judge identity (and confidence) to
|
|
1090
|
-
// first-class fields on the canonical permission_decision event so
|
|
1091
|
-
// the `permission_justification_evaluated` audit story records WHO
|
|
1092
|
-
// judged, not just an embedded substring of `reason`. Absent on
|
|
1093
|
-
// ordinary (non-justification) permission decisions.
|
|
1094
|
-
judgeModel: verdict.judgeModel,
|
|
1095
|
-
...(verdict.confidence !== undefined
|
|
1096
|
-
? { justificationConfidence: verdict.confidence }
|
|
1097
|
-
: {}),
|
|
1098
|
-
});
|
|
1099
|
-
runContext.logger.info("justification evaluated", {
|
|
1100
|
-
toolUseId: tu.id,
|
|
1101
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
1102
|
-
allow: verdict.allow,
|
|
1103
|
-
judgeModel: verdict.judgeModel,
|
|
1104
|
-
confidence: verdict.confidence,
|
|
1105
|
-
});
|
|
1106
|
-
// FR-004 — emit the durable `permission_justification_evaluated` audit
|
|
1107
|
-
// record. The trace event above is ephemeral; THIS is the hash-chained,
|
|
1108
|
-
// tamper-evident artifact the AuditKind was created for. We append one
|
|
1109
|
-
// record per justification-evaluated call (allow OR deny — the audit
|
|
1110
|
-
// trail must capture denials too), storing the justification VERBATIM
|
|
1111
|
-
// alongside the verdict and the judge identity, exactly the payload
|
|
1112
|
-
// shape `@crewhaus/audit-log` documents for this kind. Best-effort but
|
|
1113
|
-
// surfaced: an I/O failure on the audit trail is logged and swallowed so
|
|
1114
|
-
// a full audit disk does not crash a governed run, mirroring how the
|
|
1115
|
-
// egress fabric treats its own audit surface. Absent sink → no-op.
|
|
1116
|
-
if (opts.justificationAuditSink !== undefined) {
|
|
1117
|
-
try {
|
|
1118
|
-
await opts.justificationAuditSink.append({
|
|
1119
|
-
kind: "permission_justification_evaluated",
|
|
1120
|
-
payload: {
|
|
1121
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
1122
|
-
justification,
|
|
1123
|
-
verdict: verdict.allow ? "allow" : "deny",
|
|
1124
|
-
reason: verdict.reason,
|
|
1125
|
-
judgeModel: verdict.judgeModel,
|
|
1126
|
-
...(verdict.confidence !== undefined ? { confidence: verdict.confidence } : {}),
|
|
1127
|
-
},
|
|
1128
|
-
});
|
|
1129
|
-
} catch (err) {
|
|
1130
|
-
runContext.logger.warn("justification audit append failed", {
|
|
1131
|
-
toolUseId: tu.id,
|
|
1132
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
1133
|
-
error: (err as Error).message,
|
|
1134
|
-
});
|
|
1135
|
-
}
|
|
1136
|
-
}
|
|
1137
|
-
if (!verdict.allow) {
|
|
1138
|
-
return finish({
|
|
1139
|
-
type: "tool_result",
|
|
1140
|
-
tool_use_id: tu.id,
|
|
1141
|
-
content: `[justification denied] ${verdict.reason}. Reformulate the call with a justification that ties to the session's declared goal, or omit this tool from the call.`,
|
|
1142
|
-
is_error: true,
|
|
1143
|
-
});
|
|
1144
|
-
}
|
|
1145
|
-
}
|
|
1146
|
-
|
|
1147
|
-
// Pillar 3 sink-side fabric — for tools that transmit to an external
|
|
1148
|
-
// sink, scan the input payload against the run-context's data-lineage
|
|
1149
|
-
// map. A `block` verdict means the payload contains content that was
|
|
1150
|
-
// tagged from a non-`"user"` origin and policy disallows transmission;
|
|
1151
|
-
// we deny the call before it fires. `warn` logs but proceeds.
|
|
1152
|
-
//
|
|
1153
|
-
// Resolve the sink-scope so the egress block tier is actually reachable
|
|
1154
|
-
// (#144): runtime-joined MCP sinks default to `"external-dynamic"` (block
|
|
1155
|
-
// non-user-origin content), while spec-declared sinks stay
|
|
1156
|
-
// `"external-configured"` (warn). Callers can override via
|
|
1157
|
-
// `opts.resolveSinkScope` to mark federation-joined or other dynamic sinks.
|
|
1158
|
-
if (tool.scope === "external") {
|
|
1159
|
-
const payload = JSON.stringify(tu.input ?? null);
|
|
1160
|
-
const sinkScope = (opts.resolveSinkScope ?? defaultSinkScope)(tu.name);
|
|
1161
|
-
const egress = await classifyEgress(payload, runContext, {
|
|
1162
|
-
sinkId: tu.name,
|
|
1163
|
-
sinkScope,
|
|
1164
|
-
// FR-006: forward the caller-selected matcher when present. Absent
|
|
1165
|
-
// (every existing caller) → classifyEgress defaults to the
|
|
1166
|
-
// substring matcher, so the scope gate / sinkScope / policy fold
|
|
1167
|
-
// below are byte-for-byte unchanged.
|
|
1168
|
-
...(opts.egressMatcher !== undefined ? { matcher: opts.egressMatcher } : {}),
|
|
1169
|
-
});
|
|
1170
|
-
const egressOutcome =
|
|
1171
|
-
egress.verdict === "pass"
|
|
1172
|
-
? "egress-passed"
|
|
1173
|
-
: egress.verdict === "warn"
|
|
1174
|
-
? "egress-warned"
|
|
1175
|
-
: "egress-blocked";
|
|
1176
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
1177
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
1178
|
-
kind: "permission_decision",
|
|
1179
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
1180
|
-
decision: egress.verdict === "block" ? "deny" : "allow",
|
|
1181
|
-
mode: permissionMode,
|
|
1182
|
-
outcome: egressOutcome,
|
|
1183
|
-
...(egress.originsFound.length > 0 ? { reason: `egress: ${summarizeEgress(egress)}` } : {}),
|
|
1184
|
-
});
|
|
1185
|
-
if (egress.verdict !== "pass") {
|
|
1186
|
-
runContext.logger.warn("egress classification non-clean", {
|
|
1187
|
-
toolUseId: tu.id,
|
|
1188
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
1189
|
-
verdict: egress.verdict satisfies EgressVerdict,
|
|
1190
|
-
originsFound: egress.originsFound,
|
|
1191
|
-
matchCount: egress.matchCount,
|
|
1192
|
-
});
|
|
1193
|
-
}
|
|
1194
|
-
if (egress.verdict === "block") {
|
|
1195
|
-
return finish({
|
|
1196
|
-
type: "tool_result",
|
|
1197
|
-
tool_use_id: tu.id,
|
|
1198
|
-
content:
|
|
1199
|
-
"[egress denied] outbound payload contains content tagged from a non-user origin under a strict-policy sink. " +
|
|
1200
|
-
"Inspect the prior tool/sub-agent results that fed this call's input; the egress classifier's `dataLineage` records which boundary site introduced the flagged substring.",
|
|
1201
|
-
is_error: true,
|
|
1202
|
-
});
|
|
1203
|
-
}
|
|
1204
|
-
}
|
|
1205
|
-
|
|
1206
|
-
const toolAbort = turnAbort.child();
|
|
1207
|
-
// Build the bridge for this call. Built on EVERY run (#160 follow-up):
|
|
1208
|
-
// it carries `runContext`, which Pillar-3 boundary-site tools (tool-mcp,
|
|
1209
|
-
// skills-registry) read to tag their external content's provenance under
|
|
1210
|
-
// the precise "mcp"/"skill" origin. Previously the bridge was skipped
|
|
1211
|
-
// unless `spawnSubAgent`/`crewMailbox` was injected, so a plain top-level
|
|
1212
|
-
// run gave those tools no RunContext and their content fell back to the
|
|
1213
|
-
// coarse "tool" origin. The Task-tool-only fields (`spawnSubAgent`,
|
|
1214
|
-
// `crewMailbox`, `subAgents`) stay conditional — they're omitted when not
|
|
1215
|
-
// wired, and the Task tool already checks for undefined before using them.
|
|
1216
|
-
const bridge: RuntimeBridge = {
|
|
1217
|
-
runContext,
|
|
1218
|
-
eventLog,
|
|
1219
|
-
permissionMode,
|
|
1220
|
-
permissionRules,
|
|
1221
|
-
tools,
|
|
1222
|
-
model: opts.model,
|
|
1223
|
-
maxTokens,
|
|
1224
|
-
...(sessionRootDir !== undefined ? { sessionRootDir } : {}),
|
|
1225
|
-
hooks,
|
|
1226
|
-
...(opts.subAgents !== undefined ? { subAgents: opts.subAgents } : {}),
|
|
1227
|
-
...(opts.spawnSubAgent !== undefined ? { spawnSubAgent: opts.spawnSubAgent } : {}),
|
|
1228
|
-
...(opts.crewMailbox !== undefined ? { crewMailbox: opts.crewMailbox } : {}),
|
|
1229
|
-
};
|
|
1230
|
-
const raw = await executeTool(tool, tu.input, {
|
|
1231
|
-
toolUseId: tu.id,
|
|
1232
|
-
signal: toolAbort.signal,
|
|
1233
|
-
// #160 follow-up — the bridge (built on every run, above) carries
|
|
1234
|
-
// `runContext`, which boundary-site tools (tool-mcp, skills-registry)
|
|
1235
|
-
// read to tag their external content under the precise "mcp"/"skill"
|
|
1236
|
-
// origin. `tool-executor` forwards `bridge` verbatim; those tools read
|
|
1237
|
-
// `ctx.runContext` first and fall back to `ctx.bridge.runContext`, so
|
|
1238
|
-
// the bridge is what activates the precise tag today. (Threading
|
|
1239
|
-
// `runContext` as a first-class field on this call would also require
|
|
1240
|
-
// adding it to `tool-executor`'s `ExecutionContext`, which is owned
|
|
1241
|
-
// elsewhere; the bridge path needs no such change.)
|
|
1242
|
-
bridge,
|
|
1243
|
-
// Section 18 — runtime-core wires this so streaming tools
|
|
1244
|
-
// (`tool-code-execution`) can publish `tool_stream_chunk` events as
|
|
1245
|
-
// they pipe stdout/stderr from the sandbox container.
|
|
1246
|
-
onStreamChunk: (stream, chunk) => {
|
|
1247
|
-
bus.publish(
|
|
1248
|
-
{
|
|
1249
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
1250
|
-
spanId: toolStartEnvelope.spanId,
|
|
1251
|
-
kind: "tool_stream_chunk",
|
|
1252
|
-
toolUseId: tu.id,
|
|
1253
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
1254
|
-
stream,
|
|
1255
|
-
bytes: Buffer.byteLength(chunk, "utf8"),
|
|
1256
|
-
},
|
|
1257
|
-
{ ephemeral: true },
|
|
1258
|
-
);
|
|
1259
|
-
},
|
|
1260
|
-
});
|
|
1261
|
-
const toolResultRoot = resolveToolResultRoot();
|
|
1262
|
-
const stored = await storeAndPreview(
|
|
1263
|
-
{ toolUseId: raw.toolUseId, content: raw.content, isError: raw.isError },
|
|
1264
|
-
{
|
|
1265
|
-
runId: runContext.runId,
|
|
1266
|
-
toolUseId: tu.id,
|
|
1267
|
-
...(toolResultRoot !== undefined ? { rootDir: toolResultRoot } : {}),
|
|
1268
|
-
},
|
|
1269
|
-
);
|
|
1270
|
-
if (stored.persisted) {
|
|
1271
|
-
runContext.logger.info("tool result persisted", {
|
|
1272
|
-
toolUseId: tu.id,
|
|
1273
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
1274
|
-
fullPath: stored.fullPath,
|
|
1275
|
-
});
|
|
1276
|
-
}
|
|
1277
|
-
// Section 18 — post-tool prompt-injection classifier. Runs after the
|
|
1278
|
-
// tool result has been stored but before the model sees it. On a
|
|
1279
|
-
// malicious verdict the previewContent is replaced with a redaction
|
|
1280
|
-
// notice; on suspicious it's kept but the trace event records a
|
|
1281
|
-
// warning. Tools opt out by setting `classifyOutput: false` (only the
|
|
1282
|
-
// in-process Task wrapper does today).
|
|
1283
|
-
const finalPreview = await applyInjectionClassification(tool, tu, stored.previewContent);
|
|
1284
|
-
// Pillar 3 sink-side fabric — tag the (post-classification) tool result
|
|
1285
|
-
// into run-context's dataLineage so the egress classifier can detect
|
|
1286
|
-
// exfiltration of this content on a subsequent external-tool call.
|
|
1287
|
-
// Skipped for the in-process Task wrapper (`classifyOutput: false`)
|
|
1288
|
-
// because the sub-agent's finalMessage is already tagged at the
|
|
1289
|
-
// sub-agent-spawner boundary with the more-specific "subagent" origin.
|
|
1290
|
-
// MCP tools additionally tag their FULL response under the more-precise
|
|
1291
|
-
// "mcp" origin inside tool-mcp; since #160 follow-up the runtime threads
|
|
1292
|
-
// a RunContext (via `bridge`/`ctx.runContext`) on EVERY run, so that
|
|
1293
|
-
// precise tag now fires unconditionally. This coarse "tool" tag of the
|
|
1294
|
-
// (possibly truncated) preview still fires for them as a redundant
|
|
1295
|
-
// backstop so the content has lineage even if the precise tag is missed.
|
|
1296
|
-
// ERROR results are tagged too: an `is_error` tool result is just as
|
|
1297
|
-
// attacker-controllable and just as exfiltratable as a successful one, so
|
|
1298
|
-
// it must carry lineage (the `!raw.isError` skip here used to let the
|
|
1299
|
-
// egress fabric lose track of error-sourced content entirely).
|
|
1300
|
-
if (tool.classifyOutput !== false) {
|
|
1301
|
-
const taggable =
|
|
1302
|
-
typeof finalPreview === "string"
|
|
1303
|
-
? finalPreview
|
|
1304
|
-
: finalPreview.map((b) => (b.type === "text" ? b.text : "")).join("\n");
|
|
1305
|
-
if (taggable.length > 0) {
|
|
1306
|
-
tagContent(runContext, taggable, "tool");
|
|
1307
|
-
}
|
|
1308
|
-
}
|
|
1309
|
-
return finish({
|
|
1310
|
-
type: "tool_result",
|
|
1311
|
-
tool_use_id: tu.id,
|
|
1312
|
-
// Section 14 — pass non-string content (image content arrays) through
|
|
1313
|
-
// verbatim so the model sees the image. Anthropic's ToolResultBlockParam
|
|
1314
|
-
// already accepts string | Array<TextBlockParam | ImageBlockParam>.
|
|
1315
|
-
content:
|
|
1316
|
-
typeof finalPreview === "string"
|
|
1317
|
-
? finalPreview
|
|
1318
|
-
: (finalPreview as ReadonlyArray<
|
|
1319
|
-
Anthropic.TextBlockParam | Anthropic.ImageBlockParam
|
|
1320
|
-
> as Anthropic.ToolResultBlockParam["content"]),
|
|
1321
|
-
is_error: raw.isError,
|
|
1322
|
-
});
|
|
1323
|
-
}
|
|
1324
|
-
|
|
1325
|
-
/**
|
|
1326
|
-
* Section 18 — classify the previewContent we are about to hand to the
|
|
1327
|
-
* model. Returns the (possibly rewritten) content. Publishes
|
|
1328
|
-
* `permission_decision { outcome }` for any non-clean classification so
|
|
1329
|
-
* the audit trail records exactly what was redacted/warned.
|
|
1330
|
-
*/
|
|
1331
|
-
let injectionWarningEmitted = false;
|
|
1332
|
-
async function applyInjectionClassification(
|
|
1333
|
-
tool: RegisteredTool,
|
|
1334
|
-
tu: TsmToolUseBlock,
|
|
1335
|
-
previewContent: string | ReadonlyArray<Anthropic.TextBlockParam | Anthropic.ImageBlockParam>,
|
|
1336
|
-
): Promise<string | ReadonlyArray<Anthropic.TextBlockParam | Anthropic.ImageBlockParam>> {
|
|
1337
|
-
// Runs on ALL tool results, including `is_error` ones: an error preview is
|
|
1338
|
-
// just as prompt-injectable as a successful one (e.g. an MCP error string),
|
|
1339
|
-
// so it must be scrubbed before the model sees it.
|
|
1340
|
-
if (tool.classifyOutput === false) return previewContent;
|
|
1341
|
-
// Concatenate text-only content for classification. Image blocks are
|
|
1342
|
-
// never injection vectors at the byte level we examine here.
|
|
1343
|
-
const textForClassification =
|
|
1344
|
-
typeof previewContent === "string"
|
|
1345
|
-
? previewContent
|
|
1346
|
-
: previewContent.map((b) => (b.type === "text" ? b.text : "")).join("\n");
|
|
1347
|
-
if (textForClassification.length === 0) return previewContent;
|
|
1348
|
-
|
|
1349
|
-
const llmEnabled =
|
|
1350
|
-
opts.promptInjectionLlmClassifier !== undefined && llmClassifierEnabled(process.env);
|
|
1351
|
-
const verdict = await classifyText(
|
|
1352
|
-
textForClassification,
|
|
1353
|
-
llmEnabled ? { llmClassifier: opts.promptInjectionLlmClassifier } : {},
|
|
1354
|
-
);
|
|
1355
|
-
if (verdict.classification === "clean") return previewContent;
|
|
1356
|
-
|
|
1357
|
-
const ruleIds = [...new Set(verdict.hits.map((h) => h.rule))];
|
|
1358
|
-
if (verdict.classification === "malicious") {
|
|
1359
|
-
const notice = buildRedactionNotice(verdict.hits);
|
|
1360
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
1361
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
1362
|
-
kind: "permission_decision",
|
|
1363
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
1364
|
-
decision: "allow",
|
|
1365
|
-
mode: permissionMode,
|
|
1366
|
-
outcome: "redacted",
|
|
1367
|
-
rules: ruleIds,
|
|
1368
|
-
reason: `prompt injection in tool output (${ruleIds.slice(0, 3).join(", ")})`,
|
|
1369
|
-
});
|
|
1370
|
-
runContext.logger.warn("tool output redacted (prompt injection detected)", {
|
|
1371
|
-
toolUseId: tu.id,
|
|
1372
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
1373
|
-
rules: ruleIds,
|
|
1374
|
-
});
|
|
1375
|
-
return notice;
|
|
1376
|
-
}
|
|
1377
|
-
// suspicious — keep content but emit a once-per-session warning.
|
|
1378
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
1379
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
1380
|
-
kind: "permission_decision",
|
|
1381
|
-
toolName: tu.name,
|
|
1382
|
-
decision: "allow",
|
|
1383
|
-
mode: permissionMode,
|
|
1384
|
-
outcome: "warned",
|
|
1385
|
-
rules: ruleIds,
|
|
1386
|
-
reason: `suspicious tool output (${ruleIds.slice(0, 3).join(", ")})`,
|
|
1387
|
-
});
|
|
1388
|
-
if (!injectionWarningEmitted) {
|
|
1389
|
-
injectionWarningEmitted = true;
|
|
1390
|
-
runContext.logger.warn(
|
|
1391
|
-
"suspicious tool output — kept but flagged (further suspicious outputs in this session will not be re-warned)",
|
|
1392
|
-
{ toolUseId: tu.id, toolName: tu.name, rules: ruleIds },
|
|
1393
|
-
);
|
|
1394
|
-
}
|
|
1395
|
-
return previewContent;
|
|
1396
|
-
}
|
|
1397
|
-
|
|
1398
|
-
/**
|
|
1399
|
-
* Section 14 — short summary used in the audit-log payload when a tool
|
|
1400
|
-
* returns a non-string content array (e.g. ReadImage's image block). The
|
|
1401
|
-
* full content still reaches the model via tool_result.content above; the
|
|
1402
|
-
* audit log just gets a length-aware tag.
|
|
1403
|
-
*/
|
|
1404
|
-
// Takes the non-string member of ToolResultBlockParam["content"] — the
|
|
1405
|
-
// sole caller (`finish`) only invokes this on the non-string branch of a
|
|
1406
|
-
// `typeof result.content === "string"` ternary, so the string/undefined
|
|
1407
|
-
// case is statically excluded here and no dead guard is needed.
|
|
1408
|
-
function summariseNonStringContent(
|
|
1409
|
-
content: Exclude<Anthropic.ToolResultBlockParam["content"], string | undefined>,
|
|
1410
|
-
): string {
|
|
1411
|
-
let images = 0;
|
|
1412
|
-
let texts = 0;
|
|
1413
|
-
let other = 0;
|
|
1414
|
-
let totalChars = 0;
|
|
1415
|
-
for (const block of content) {
|
|
1416
|
-
if (block.type === "image") {
|
|
1417
|
-
images++;
|
|
1418
|
-
if (block.source.type === "base64") totalChars += block.source.data.length;
|
|
1419
|
-
} else if (block.type === "text") {
|
|
1420
|
-
texts++;
|
|
1421
|
-
totalChars += block.text.length;
|
|
1422
|
-
} else {
|
|
1423
|
-
other++;
|
|
1424
|
-
}
|
|
1425
|
-
}
|
|
1426
|
-
const parts: string[] = [];
|
|
1427
|
-
if (images > 0) parts.push(`${images} image block${images > 1 ? "s" : ""}`);
|
|
1428
|
-
if (texts > 0) parts.push(`${texts} text block${texts > 1 ? "s" : ""}`);
|
|
1429
|
-
if (other > 0) parts.push(`${other} other block${other > 1 ? "s" : ""}`);
|
|
1430
|
-
return `[${parts.join(", ")}, ${totalChars} chars]`;
|
|
1431
|
-
}
|
|
1432
|
-
|
|
1433
|
-
/**
|
|
1434
|
-
* Run a list of tool calls honouring the orchestrator's partition:
|
|
1435
|
-
* concurrent-safe batches via `Promise.all`, then serial calls one at
|
|
1436
|
-
* a time. Results are returned in the original `toolUses` order so
|
|
1437
|
-
* they line up with the assistant turn's tool_use blocks.
|
|
1438
|
-
*/
|
|
1439
|
-
async function runToolBatch(
|
|
1440
|
-
toolUses: ReadonlyArray<TsmToolUseBlock>,
|
|
1441
|
-
): Promise<Anthropic.ToolResultBlockParam[]> {
|
|
1442
|
-
const partition = partitionToolCalls(toolUses, (n) => toolByName.get(n));
|
|
1443
|
-
runContext.logger.debug("tool partition", {
|
|
1444
|
-
concurrent: partition.concurrent.map((b) => b.length),
|
|
1445
|
-
serial: partition.serial.length,
|
|
1446
|
-
});
|
|
1447
|
-
// Map each tool_use's identity to its slot in the original order so
|
|
1448
|
-
// results can be placed back in order regardless of the
|
|
1449
|
-
// concurrent/serial execution shape. `partitionToolCalls` is total —
|
|
1450
|
-
// every input block lands in exactly one partition bucket — and
|
|
1451
|
-
// `executeOneToolUse` always resolves to a result, so every slot is
|
|
1452
|
-
// filled; there is no missing-result case to defend against.
|
|
1453
|
-
const indexByBlock = new Map<TsmToolUseBlock, number>();
|
|
1454
|
-
toolUses.forEach((tu, idx) => indexByBlock.set(tu, idx));
|
|
1455
|
-
const results = new Array<Anthropic.ToolResultBlockParam>(toolUses.length);
|
|
1456
|
-
for (const batch of partition.concurrent) {
|
|
1457
|
-
const settled = await Promise.all(batch.map((tu) => executeOneToolUse(tu)));
|
|
1458
|
-
batch.forEach((tu, i) => {
|
|
1459
|
-
// biome-ignore lint/style/noNonNullAssertion: every block came from toolUses, so its index is registered.
|
|
1460
|
-
results[indexByBlock.get(tu)!] = settled[i] as Anthropic.ToolResultBlockParam;
|
|
1461
|
-
});
|
|
1462
|
-
}
|
|
1463
|
-
for (const tu of partition.serial) {
|
|
1464
|
-
// biome-ignore lint/style/noNonNullAssertion: every block came from toolUses, so its index is registered.
|
|
1465
|
-
results[indexByBlock.get(tu)!] = await executeOneToolUse(tu);
|
|
1466
|
-
}
|
|
1467
|
-
return results;
|
|
1468
|
-
}
|
|
1469
|
-
|
|
1470
|
-
/**
|
|
1471
|
-
* Convert a freshly-detected loop into a synthetic user message that
|
|
1472
|
-
* nudges the model to break the cycle. Returns `null` if no loop is
|
|
1473
|
-
* currently detected, or if this signature has already produced a
|
|
1474
|
-
* warning earlier in the run.
|
|
1475
|
-
*/
|
|
1476
|
-
function maybeBuildLoopWarning(): Anthropic.MessageParam | null {
|
|
1477
|
-
const detection: LoopDetection | null = detectLoop(toolUseHistory);
|
|
1478
|
-
if (detection === null) return null;
|
|
1479
|
-
if (warnedLoopSignatures.has(detection.signature)) return null;
|
|
1480
|
-
warnedLoopSignatures.add(detection.signature);
|
|
1481
|
-
runContext.logger.warn("tool loop detected", {
|
|
1482
|
-
signature: detection.signature,
|
|
1483
|
-
toolName: detection.toolName,
|
|
1484
|
-
count: detection.count,
|
|
1485
|
-
});
|
|
1486
|
-
return {
|
|
1487
|
-
role: "user",
|
|
1488
|
-
content: `[runtime] possible loop detected: tool "${detection.toolName}" has been called ${detection.count} times with the same input within the last ${detection.windowSize} calls. Reconsider before repeating; respond with a different approach or final text.`,
|
|
1489
|
-
};
|
|
1490
|
-
}
|
|
1491
|
-
|
|
1492
|
-
/**
|
|
1493
|
-
* Run one user→assistant turn through the state machine. Mutates
|
|
1494
|
-
* `messages` in place (pushes the assistant turn and any tool_results).
|
|
1495
|
-
* Returns the final assistant content blocks so callers can extract
|
|
1496
|
-
* text. Closes over client/model/maxTokens/etc.
|
|
1497
|
-
*/
|
|
1498
|
-
async function runOneTurn(
|
|
1499
|
-
messages: Anthropic.MessageParam[],
|
|
1500
|
-
): Promise<{ terminalContent: Anthropic.ContentBlock[] }> {
|
|
1501
|
-
let state: TurnState = initialState;
|
|
1502
|
-
let terminalContent: Anthropic.ContentBlock[] = [];
|
|
1503
|
-
let recovery: RecoveryState = initialRecoveryState;
|
|
1504
|
-
const maxToolIterations = opts.maxToolIterations ?? DEFAULT_MAX_TOOL_ITERATIONS;
|
|
1505
|
-
let toolIterations = 0;
|
|
1506
|
-
|
|
1507
|
-
while (state.kind !== "Done") {
|
|
1508
|
-
if (turnAbort.signal.aborted) {
|
|
1509
|
-
state = transition(state, { kind: "Aborted" });
|
|
1510
|
-
continue;
|
|
1511
|
-
}
|
|
1512
|
-
|
|
1513
|
-
switch (state.kind) {
|
|
1514
|
-
case "NeedModel": {
|
|
1515
|
-
process.stdout.write("agent> ");
|
|
1516
|
-
// Section 11 — pre-model hook. Deny short-circuits the turn with
|
|
1517
|
-
// a synthetic "[blocked by hook]" assistant message so the loop
|
|
1518
|
-
// exits cleanly (state transitions through ModelReturnedText →
|
|
1519
|
-
// Done(no_tools)).
|
|
1520
|
-
const preModel = await fireHook("pre-model", {
|
|
1521
|
-
model: opts.model,
|
|
1522
|
-
streaming: opts.streaming === true,
|
|
1523
|
-
messageCount: messages.length,
|
|
1524
|
-
});
|
|
1525
|
-
if (!preModel.allowed) {
|
|
1526
|
-
const blockedText = `[blocked by hook] ${preModel.reason ?? "denied"}`;
|
|
1527
|
-
process.stdout.write(`${blockedText}\n`);
|
|
1528
|
-
const blockedBlock: Anthropic.TextBlock = {
|
|
1529
|
-
type: "text",
|
|
1530
|
-
text: blockedText,
|
|
1531
|
-
citations: null,
|
|
1532
|
-
};
|
|
1533
|
-
messages.push({ role: "assistant", content: [blockedBlock] });
|
|
1534
|
-
await logEvent("assistant_message", { content: [blockedBlock] });
|
|
1535
|
-
terminalContent = [blockedBlock];
|
|
1536
|
-
state = transition(state, { kind: "ModelReturnedText" });
|
|
1537
|
-
break;
|
|
1538
|
-
}
|
|
1539
|
-
try {
|
|
1540
|
-
// Section 27 — rate-limit the model call before opening the
|
|
1541
|
-
// stream. The keys are caller-configured (typically
|
|
1542
|
-
// `[provider, tenant?]`); a missing bucket fails closed and
|
|
1543
|
-
// surfaces the RateLimitError up to recovery-engine.
|
|
1544
|
-
if (opts.rateLimiter && opts.rateLimitKeys && opts.rateLimitKeys.length > 0) {
|
|
1545
|
-
await opts.rateLimiter.acquire(opts.rateLimitKeys, 1);
|
|
1546
|
-
}
|
|
1547
|
-
const modelStartEnv = bus.envelope();
|
|
1548
|
-
// Section 27 — `model` carries the WIRE model id (the stripped
|
|
1549
|
-
// form the provider bills against, e.g. `bedrock/us.anthropic.…`
|
|
1550
|
-
// → `us.anthropic.…`) so cost-tracker pricing lookups and the
|
|
1551
|
-
// OTel `gen_ai.request.model` attribute match; the original
|
|
1552
|
-
// spec string rides along as `specModel` when it differs.
|
|
1553
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
1554
|
-
...modelStartEnv,
|
|
1555
|
-
kind: "model_request",
|
|
1556
|
-
model: wireModelId,
|
|
1557
|
-
...(opts.model !== wireModelId ? { specModel: opts.model } : {}),
|
|
1558
|
-
provider: providerId,
|
|
1559
|
-
messageCount: messages.length,
|
|
1560
|
-
toolCount: anthropicTools?.length ?? 0,
|
|
1561
|
-
streaming: opts.streaming === true,
|
|
1562
|
-
});
|
|
1563
|
-
const t0Model = performance.now();
|
|
1564
|
-
let streamChunkIndex = 0;
|
|
1565
|
-
|
|
1566
|
-
// Section 17 — `adapter.stream(req)` returns
|
|
1567
|
-
// `AsyncIterable<StreamEvent>`; we accumulate via
|
|
1568
|
-
// `consumeStream` (callbacks for stdout streaming + token
|
|
1569
|
-
// telemetry) and pull the final canonical message at the
|
|
1570
|
-
// end. The canonical content blocks are wire-compatible
|
|
1571
|
-
// with `Anthropic.ContentBlock` so existing message-history
|
|
1572
|
-
// bookkeeping continues to work.
|
|
1573
|
-
// Note: `messages` is `Anthropic.MessageParam[]` whose
|
|
1574
|
-
// content union is structurally a superset of canonical
|
|
1575
|
-
// (it includes `document`, deprecated `tool_result`
|
|
1576
|
-
// shapes, etc.). Cast to the canonical surface — the
|
|
1577
|
-
// bookkeeping is wire-compatible for the block kinds we
|
|
1578
|
-
// actually consume (text / image / tool_use / tool_result
|
|
1579
|
-
// / thinking).
|
|
1580
|
-
const reqStream = adapter.stream({
|
|
1581
|
-
model: wireModelId,
|
|
1582
|
-
system: systemBlocks.map((b) => ({
|
|
1583
|
-
type: "text" as const,
|
|
1584
|
-
text: b.text,
|
|
1585
|
-
...(b.cache_control !== undefined ? { cache_control: b.cache_control } : {}),
|
|
1586
|
-
})),
|
|
1587
|
-
messages: messages as Parameters<ProviderAdapter["stream"]>[0]["messages"],
|
|
1588
|
-
tools:
|
|
1589
|
-
anthropicTools !== undefined
|
|
1590
|
-
? anthropicTools.map((t) => ({
|
|
1591
|
-
name: t.name,
|
|
1592
|
-
description: t.description ?? "",
|
|
1593
|
-
input_schema: t.input_schema as Record<string, unknown>,
|
|
1594
|
-
}))
|
|
1595
|
-
: undefined,
|
|
1596
|
-
maxTokens,
|
|
1597
|
-
signal: turnAbort.signal,
|
|
1598
|
-
});
|
|
1599
|
-
|
|
1600
|
-
if (opts.streaming) {
|
|
1601
|
-
// Streaming path: dispatch tools mid-stream via the
|
|
1602
|
-
// refactored streaming-tool-executor (now consumes
|
|
1603
|
-
// AsyncIterable<StreamEvent> directly).
|
|
1604
|
-
void modelStartEnv;
|
|
1605
|
-
const onTextDelta = (chunk: string): void => {
|
|
1606
|
-
writeText(chunk);
|
|
1607
|
-
bus.publish(
|
|
1608
|
-
{
|
|
1609
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
1610
|
-
kind: "model_stream_token",
|
|
1611
|
-
chunkIndex: streamChunkIndex++,
|
|
1612
|
-
deltaChars: chunk.length,
|
|
1613
|
-
},
|
|
1614
|
-
{ ephemeral: true },
|
|
1615
|
-
);
|
|
1616
|
-
};
|
|
1617
|
-
const { finalContent, toolResults, stopReason, usage } = await executeStreaming(
|
|
1618
|
-
reqStream,
|
|
1619
|
-
{
|
|
1620
|
-
toolByName,
|
|
1621
|
-
abortSignal: turnAbort.signal,
|
|
1622
|
-
onTextDelta,
|
|
1623
|
-
runTool: (block) =>
|
|
1624
|
-
executeOneToolUse({
|
|
1625
|
-
id: block.id,
|
|
1626
|
-
name: block.name,
|
|
1627
|
-
input: block.input,
|
|
1628
|
-
}),
|
|
1629
|
-
onEvent: (e) => {
|
|
1630
|
-
runContext.logger.debug("streaming-tool", { ...e });
|
|
1631
|
-
},
|
|
1632
|
-
},
|
|
1633
|
-
);
|
|
1634
|
-
endTurn();
|
|
1635
|
-
|
|
1636
|
-
messages.push({
|
|
1637
|
-
role: "assistant",
|
|
1638
|
-
content: finalContent as Anthropic.MessageParam["content"],
|
|
1639
|
-
});
|
|
1640
|
-
await logEvent("assistant_message", { content: finalContent });
|
|
1641
|
-
terminalContent = [...finalContent] as Anthropic.ContentBlock[];
|
|
1642
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
1643
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
1644
|
-
spanId: modelStartEnv.spanId,
|
|
1645
|
-
kind: "model_response",
|
|
1646
|
-
// Wire model id, NOT the spec string — cost-tracker resolves
|
|
1647
|
-
// pricing on this field (see the model_request publish above).
|
|
1648
|
-
model: wireModelId,
|
|
1649
|
-
...(opts.model !== wireModelId ? { specModel: opts.model } : {}),
|
|
1650
|
-
provider: providerId,
|
|
1651
|
-
stopReason: stopReason ?? "end_turn",
|
|
1652
|
-
usage,
|
|
1653
|
-
durationMs: performance.now() - t0Model,
|
|
1654
|
-
});
|
|
1655
|
-
await fireHook("post-model", {
|
|
1656
|
-
streaming: true,
|
|
1657
|
-
contentBlocks: finalContent.length,
|
|
1658
|
-
});
|
|
1659
|
-
|
|
1660
|
-
const toolUses = finalContent.filter(
|
|
1661
|
-
(b): b is Extract<typeof b, { type: "tool_use" }> => b.type === "tool_use",
|
|
1662
|
-
);
|
|
1663
|
-
if (toolUses.length === 0) {
|
|
1664
|
-
state = transition(state, { kind: "ModelReturnedText" });
|
|
1665
|
-
break;
|
|
1666
|
-
}
|
|
1667
|
-
|
|
1668
|
-
for (const tu of toolUses) {
|
|
1669
|
-
toolUseHistory.push({ id: tu.id, name: tu.name, input: tu.input });
|
|
1670
|
-
}
|
|
1671
|
-
messages.push({ role: "user", content: [...toolResults] });
|
|
1672
|
-
await logEvent("user_message", { content: [...toolResults] });
|
|
1673
|
-
const warning = maybeBuildLoopWarning();
|
|
1674
|
-
if (warning !== null) {
|
|
1675
|
-
messages.push(warning);
|
|
1676
|
-
await logEvent("user_message", { content: warning.content });
|
|
1677
|
-
}
|
|
1678
|
-
|
|
1679
|
-
// Synthesize the two transitions the state machine expects:
|
|
1680
|
-
// tools have already executed during the stream so we
|
|
1681
|
-
// collapse ModelReturnedToolUse → ToolsExecuted into a
|
|
1682
|
-
// single hop back to NeedModel.
|
|
1683
|
-
const tsmBlocks: TsmToolUseBlock[] = toolUses.map((t) => ({
|
|
1684
|
-
id: t.id,
|
|
1685
|
-
name: t.name,
|
|
1686
|
-
input: t.input,
|
|
1687
|
-
}));
|
|
1688
|
-
state = transition(state, { kind: "ModelReturnedToolUse", toolUses: tsmBlocks });
|
|
1689
|
-
state = transition(state, { kind: "ToolsExecuted" });
|
|
1690
|
-
break;
|
|
1691
|
-
}
|
|
1692
|
-
|
|
1693
|
-
// Non-streaming path: drain the AsyncIterable into a final
|
|
1694
|
-
// `ProviderMessage` while emitting text deltas to stdout.
|
|
1695
|
-
const final = await consumeStream(reqStream, {
|
|
1696
|
-
onTextDelta: (chunk) => {
|
|
1697
|
-
writeText(chunk);
|
|
1698
|
-
bus.publish(
|
|
1699
|
-
{
|
|
1700
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
1701
|
-
kind: "model_stream_token",
|
|
1702
|
-
chunkIndex: streamChunkIndex++,
|
|
1703
|
-
deltaChars: chunk.length,
|
|
1704
|
-
},
|
|
1705
|
-
{ ephemeral: true },
|
|
1706
|
-
);
|
|
1707
|
-
},
|
|
1708
|
-
});
|
|
1709
|
-
endTurn();
|
|
1710
|
-
|
|
1711
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
1712
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
1713
|
-
spanId: modelStartEnv.spanId,
|
|
1714
|
-
kind: "model_response",
|
|
1715
|
-
// Wire model id, NOT the spec string — cost-tracker resolves
|
|
1716
|
-
// pricing on this field (see the model_request publish above).
|
|
1717
|
-
model: wireModelId,
|
|
1718
|
-
...(opts.model !== wireModelId ? { specModel: opts.model } : {}),
|
|
1719
|
-
provider: providerId,
|
|
1720
|
-
stopReason: final.stopReason,
|
|
1721
|
-
usage: final.usage,
|
|
1722
|
-
durationMs: performance.now() - t0Model,
|
|
1723
|
-
});
|
|
1724
|
-
|
|
1725
|
-
// Persist the assistant turn with the FULL content-block array;
|
|
1726
|
-
// tool_use blocks must survive into history so subsequent
|
|
1727
|
-
// tool_result references resolve.
|
|
1728
|
-
messages.push({
|
|
1729
|
-
role: "assistant",
|
|
1730
|
-
content: final.content as Anthropic.MessageParam["content"],
|
|
1731
|
-
});
|
|
1732
|
-
await logEvent("assistant_message", { content: final.content });
|
|
1733
|
-
terminalContent = [...final.content] as Anthropic.ContentBlock[];
|
|
1734
|
-
await fireHook("post-model", {
|
|
1735
|
-
streaming: false,
|
|
1736
|
-
stopReason: final.stopReason,
|
|
1737
|
-
contentBlocks: final.content.length,
|
|
1738
|
-
});
|
|
1739
|
-
|
|
1740
|
-
// Synthetic max_output_tokens recovery: stop_reason "max_tokens"
|
|
1741
|
-
// means the model was cut off mid-reply. Route through the
|
|
1742
|
-
// recovery state machine so we ask it to continue.
|
|
1743
|
-
if (final.stopReason === "max_tokens") {
|
|
1744
|
-
lastErrorForRecovery = {
|
|
1745
|
-
name: "MaxTokensError",
|
|
1746
|
-
error: { type: "max_output_tokens" },
|
|
1747
|
-
message: "stop_reason: max_tokens",
|
|
1748
|
-
};
|
|
1749
|
-
state = transition(state, {
|
|
1750
|
-
kind: "RecoverableError",
|
|
1751
|
-
error: { name: "MaxTokensError", message: "stop_reason: max_tokens" },
|
|
1752
|
-
});
|
|
1753
|
-
break;
|
|
1754
|
-
}
|
|
1755
|
-
|
|
1756
|
-
const toolUses = final.content.filter(
|
|
1757
|
-
(b): b is Extract<typeof b, { type: "tool_use" }> => b.type === "tool_use",
|
|
1758
|
-
);
|
|
1759
|
-
if (toolUses.length === 0) {
|
|
1760
|
-
state = transition(state, { kind: "ModelReturnedText" });
|
|
1761
|
-
} else {
|
|
1762
|
-
const tsmBlocks: TsmToolUseBlock[] = toolUses.map((t) => ({
|
|
1763
|
-
id: t.id,
|
|
1764
|
-
name: t.name,
|
|
1765
|
-
input: t.input,
|
|
1766
|
-
}));
|
|
1767
|
-
for (const tu of tsmBlocks) toolUseHistory.push(tu);
|
|
1768
|
-
state = transition(state, { kind: "ModelReturnedToolUse", toolUses: tsmBlocks });
|
|
1769
|
-
}
|
|
1770
|
-
} catch (err) {
|
|
1771
|
-
if (isAbortError(err)) {
|
|
1772
|
-
state = transition(state, { kind: "Aborted" });
|
|
1773
|
-
break;
|
|
1774
|
-
}
|
|
1775
|
-
lastErrorForRecovery = err;
|
|
1776
|
-
const errObj = err as { name?: unknown; message?: unknown };
|
|
1777
|
-
const errorName = typeof errObj.name === "string" ? errObj.name : "Error";
|
|
1778
|
-
const errorMessage = typeof errObj.message === "string" ? errObj.message : String(err);
|
|
1779
|
-
await logEvent("error", { name: errorName, message: errorMessage });
|
|
1780
|
-
state = transition(state, {
|
|
1781
|
-
kind: "RecoverableError",
|
|
1782
|
-
error: { name: errorName, message: errorMessage },
|
|
1783
|
-
});
|
|
1784
|
-
}
|
|
1785
|
-
break;
|
|
1786
|
-
}
|
|
1787
|
-
|
|
1788
|
-
case "NeedTools": {
|
|
1789
|
-
toolIterations += 1;
|
|
1790
|
-
if (toolIterations > maxToolIterations) {
|
|
1791
|
-
// Enforcing loop bound — the advisory loop-detector can't stop a
|
|
1792
|
-
// runaway tool loop (it only warns and is defeated by argument
|
|
1793
|
-
// churn), so fail closed here.
|
|
1794
|
-
await logEvent("error", {
|
|
1795
|
-
name: "ToolLoopLimit",
|
|
1796
|
-
message: `aborting turn: exceeded maxToolIterations (${maxToolIterations}) — possible runaway tool loop`,
|
|
1797
|
-
});
|
|
1798
|
-
runContext.logger.error("tool-iteration cap exceeded — aborting turn", {
|
|
1799
|
-
maxToolIterations,
|
|
1800
|
-
});
|
|
1801
|
-
state = transition(state, { kind: "Aborted" });
|
|
1802
|
-
break;
|
|
1803
|
-
}
|
|
1804
|
-
const toolResults = await runToolBatch(state.toolUses);
|
|
1805
|
-
messages.push({ role: "user", content: toolResults });
|
|
1806
|
-
await logEvent("user_message", { content: toolResults });
|
|
1807
|
-
const warning = maybeBuildLoopWarning();
|
|
1808
|
-
if (warning !== null) {
|
|
1809
|
-
messages.push(warning);
|
|
1810
|
-
await logEvent("user_message", { content: warning.content });
|
|
1811
|
-
}
|
|
1812
|
-
state = transition(state, { kind: "ToolsExecuted" });
|
|
1813
|
-
break;
|
|
1814
|
-
}
|
|
1815
|
-
|
|
1816
|
-
// NOTE: there is no `case "NeedCompaction"` here, and it is
|
|
1817
|
-
// unreachable by construction: the turn-state-machine only enters
|
|
1818
|
-
// `NeedCompaction` on a `BudgetExceeded` event, and this loop never
|
|
1819
|
-
// emits one — pre-turn compaction runs outside the state machine (see
|
|
1820
|
-
// `maybeCompact`) and in-turn reactive compaction is handled inline by
|
|
1821
|
-
// the `compact` recovery action below. If a future change starts
|
|
1822
|
-
// emitting `BudgetExceeded` from `runOneTurn`, restore a
|
|
1823
|
-
// `NeedCompaction` → `CompactionDone` arm (and cover it) here.
|
|
1824
|
-
|
|
1825
|
-
case "NeedRecovery": {
|
|
1826
|
-
const action = recover(lastErrorForRecovery, recovery);
|
|
1827
|
-
recovery = advanceState(recovery, action);
|
|
1828
|
-
runContext.logger.info("recovery.action", {
|
|
1829
|
-
kind: action.kind,
|
|
1830
|
-
errorName: state.error.name,
|
|
1831
|
-
recoveryDepth: recovery.retryCount + recovery.compactCount + recovery.continueCount,
|
|
1832
|
-
});
|
|
1833
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
1834
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
1835
|
-
kind: "error_recovered",
|
|
1836
|
-
action: action.kind,
|
|
1837
|
-
errorName: state.error.name,
|
|
1838
|
-
depth: recovery.retryCount + recovery.compactCount + recovery.continueCount,
|
|
1839
|
-
});
|
|
1840
|
-
switch (action.kind) {
|
|
1841
|
-
case "compact": {
|
|
1842
|
-
const before = messages.length;
|
|
1843
|
-
await fireHook("pre-compact", { kind: "reactive", before });
|
|
1844
|
-
const compacted = await forceCompact({
|
|
1845
|
-
messages,
|
|
1846
|
-
adapter: compactionAdapter,
|
|
1847
|
-
model: compactionWireModelId,
|
|
1848
|
-
snipKeepHead,
|
|
1849
|
-
snipKeepTail,
|
|
1850
|
-
logger: runContext.logger,
|
|
1851
|
-
});
|
|
1852
|
-
messages.length = 0;
|
|
1853
|
-
messages.push(...compacted);
|
|
1854
|
-
await logEvent("compaction", {
|
|
1855
|
-
kind: "reactive",
|
|
1856
|
-
before,
|
|
1857
|
-
after: messages.length,
|
|
1858
|
-
});
|
|
1859
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
1860
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
1861
|
-
kind: "compaction_fired",
|
|
1862
|
-
subKind: "reactive",
|
|
1863
|
-
before,
|
|
1864
|
-
after: messages.length,
|
|
1865
|
-
phase: "reactive",
|
|
1866
|
-
});
|
|
1867
|
-
await fireHook("post-compact", {
|
|
1868
|
-
kind: "reactive",
|
|
1869
|
-
before,
|
|
1870
|
-
after: messages.length,
|
|
1871
|
-
});
|
|
1872
|
-
state = transition(state, { kind: "RecoveryDone" });
|
|
1873
|
-
break;
|
|
1874
|
-
}
|
|
1875
|
-
case "retry":
|
|
1876
|
-
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, action.delayMs));
|
|
1877
|
-
state = transition(state, { kind: "RecoveryDone" });
|
|
1878
|
-
break;
|
|
1879
|
-
case "continue": {
|
|
1880
|
-
const continueMsg = "Please continue from where you left off.";
|
|
1881
|
-
messages.push({ role: "user", content: continueMsg });
|
|
1882
|
-
await logEvent("user_message", { content: continueMsg });
|
|
1883
|
-
state = transition(state, { kind: "RecoveryDone" });
|
|
1884
|
-
break;
|
|
1885
|
-
}
|
|
1886
|
-
case "tombstone": {
|
|
1887
|
-
// A tombstone fires on an `invalid_request` from the model call.
|
|
1888
|
-
// The model stream is atomic with respect to history: it either
|
|
1889
|
-
// fully succeeds (pushing exactly one assistant message, after
|
|
1890
|
-
// which the turn transitions to Done/NeedTools — never into
|
|
1891
|
-
// recovery) or it throws before pushing anything. So when we
|
|
1892
|
-
// reach here the tail is never a dangling assistant turn, and
|
|
1893
|
-
// there is nothing to pop — we just append the retry nudge.
|
|
1894
|
-
const tombstoneMsg =
|
|
1895
|
-
"[previous assistant turn was rejected as invalid; please retry]";
|
|
1896
|
-
messages.push({ role: "user", content: tombstoneMsg });
|
|
1897
|
-
await logEvent("user_message", { content: tombstoneMsg });
|
|
1898
|
-
state = transition(state, { kind: "RecoveryDone" });
|
|
1899
|
-
break;
|
|
1900
|
-
}
|
|
1901
|
-
case "fail":
|
|
1902
|
-
throw new RuntimeError(`recovery failed: ${action.reason}`);
|
|
1903
|
-
}
|
|
1904
|
-
break;
|
|
1905
|
-
}
|
|
1906
|
-
}
|
|
1907
|
-
}
|
|
1908
|
-
|
|
1909
|
-
return { terminalContent };
|
|
1910
|
-
}
|
|
1911
|
-
|
|
1912
|
-
// Single-shot path used by the workflow target and (Section 12) the
|
|
1913
|
-
// channel-bot session router. Runs one user→assistant turn (with the tool
|
|
1914
|
-
// inner-loop until Done), persists the transcript, returns the terminal
|
|
1915
|
-
// assistant text. Never reads stdin.
|
|
1916
|
-
if (opts.singleTurn) {
|
|
1917
|
-
const seed = opts.seedMessages ?? [];
|
|
1918
|
-
const last = seed[seed.length - 1];
|
|
1919
|
-
if (!last || last.role !== "user") {
|
|
1920
|
-
throw new RuntimeError(
|
|
1921
|
-
'runChatLoop({ singleTurn: true }) requires `seedMessages` to end with a `role: "user"` entry',
|
|
1922
|
-
);
|
|
1923
|
-
}
|
|
1924
|
-
try {
|
|
1925
|
-
// When resuming, the replayed event-log history becomes the prefix
|
|
1926
|
-
// (already on disk — never re-logged). The seed is the new turn's
|
|
1927
|
-
// input, appended at the end. Without resume (workflow target), the
|
|
1928
|
-
// seed IS the entire turn and is logged through.
|
|
1929
|
-
const replayed = resumedMessages ?? [];
|
|
1930
|
-
let messages: Anthropic.MessageParam[] = [...replayed, ...seed];
|
|
1931
|
-
for (const m of seed) {
|
|
1932
|
-
if (m.role === "user") {
|
|
1933
|
-
await logEvent("user_message", { content: m.content });
|
|
1934
|
-
} else if (m.role === "assistant") {
|
|
1935
|
-
await logEvent("assistant_message", { content: m.content });
|
|
1936
|
-
}
|
|
1937
|
-
}
|
|
1938
|
-
runContext.turnNumber += 1;
|
|
1939
|
-
bus.setTurnNumber(runContext.turnNumber);
|
|
1940
|
-
const t0SingleTurn = performance.now();
|
|
1941
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
1942
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
1943
|
-
kind: "turn_start",
|
|
1944
|
-
turn: runContext.turnNumber,
|
|
1945
|
-
messageCount: messages.length,
|
|
1946
|
-
});
|
|
1947
|
-
runContext.logger.debug("turn start (single)", {
|
|
1948
|
-
turn: runContext.turnNumber,
|
|
1949
|
-
messages: messages.length,
|
|
1950
|
-
});
|
|
1951
|
-
|
|
1952
|
-
messages = await maybeCompact(
|
|
1953
|
-
{
|
|
1954
|
-
messages,
|
|
1955
|
-
adapter: compactionAdapter,
|
|
1956
|
-
model: compactionWireModelId,
|
|
1957
|
-
contextLimit,
|
|
1958
|
-
compactionThreshold,
|
|
1959
|
-
snipKeepHead,
|
|
1960
|
-
snipKeepTail,
|
|
1961
|
-
logger: runContext.logger,
|
|
1962
|
-
},
|
|
1963
|
-
async (info) => {
|
|
1964
|
-
await logEvent("compaction", info);
|
|
1965
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
1966
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
1967
|
-
kind: "compaction_fired",
|
|
1968
|
-
subKind: info.kind,
|
|
1969
|
-
before: info.before,
|
|
1970
|
-
after: info.after,
|
|
1971
|
-
phase: "pre-turn",
|
|
1972
|
-
});
|
|
1973
|
-
// Fire one pre-compact (info has the before-count from the work
|
|
1974
|
-
// that just ran) followed by post-compact. Pre-compact in this
|
|
1975
|
-
// path is observational — by the time onCompaction fires the
|
|
1976
|
-
// step has already happened — but the pair lets hooks see both
|
|
1977
|
-
// events for symmetry with the reactive path.
|
|
1978
|
-
await fireHook("pre-compact", { ...info, phase: "pre-turn" });
|
|
1979
|
-
await fireHook("post-compact", { ...info, phase: "pre-turn" });
|
|
1980
|
-
},
|
|
1981
|
-
);
|
|
1982
|
-
|
|
1983
|
-
const { terminalContent } = await runOneTurn(messages);
|
|
1984
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
1985
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
1986
|
-
kind: "turn_end",
|
|
1987
|
-
turn: runContext.turnNumber,
|
|
1988
|
-
durationMs: performance.now() - t0SingleTurn,
|
|
1989
|
-
});
|
|
1990
|
-
return terminalContent
|
|
1991
|
-
.filter((b): b is Anthropic.TextBlock => b.type === "text")
|
|
1992
|
-
.map((b) => b.text)
|
|
1993
|
-
.join("");
|
|
1994
|
-
} finally {
|
|
1995
|
-
await fireHook("stop", {
|
|
1996
|
-
sessionId,
|
|
1997
|
-
turnCount: runContext.turnNumber,
|
|
1998
|
-
reason: "complete",
|
|
1999
|
-
});
|
|
2000
|
-
await subscribers.flushAll();
|
|
2001
|
-
await subscribers.shutdownAll();
|
|
2002
|
-
await sessionStore
|
|
2003
|
-
.update(sessionId, { lastTurnIndex: runContext.turnNumber })
|
|
2004
|
-
.catch((err) => {
|
|
2005
|
-
runContext.logger.warn("session-store: lastTurnIndex update failed", {
|
|
2006
|
-
error: (err as Error).message,
|
|
2007
|
-
});
|
|
2008
|
-
});
|
|
2009
|
-
await eventLog.close();
|
|
2010
|
-
}
|
|
2011
|
-
}
|
|
2012
|
-
|
|
2013
|
-
// REPL mode (existing behavior). When resuming, the prior session's
|
|
2014
|
-
// transcript becomes the seed; otherwise honour any caller-supplied
|
|
2015
|
-
// seedMessages.
|
|
2016
|
-
let messages: Anthropic.MessageParam[] = resumedMessages
|
|
2017
|
-
? [...resumedMessages]
|
|
2018
|
-
: opts.seedMessages
|
|
2019
|
-
? [...opts.seedMessages]
|
|
2020
|
-
: [];
|
|
2021
|
-
|
|
2022
|
-
const rl = readline.createInterface({
|
|
2023
|
-
input: opts.input ?? process.stdin,
|
|
2024
|
-
output: process.stdout,
|
|
2025
|
-
});
|
|
2026
|
-
|
|
2027
|
-
// EOF on stdin (e.g. when input is piped in non-interactively) auto-closes
|
|
2028
|
-
// the readline interface. The next `rl.question` call would then crash with
|
|
2029
|
-
// ERR_USE_AFTER_CLOSE, so race each prompt against the close event and
|
|
2030
|
-
// also catch the post-close throw — close can fire either before we issue
|
|
2031
|
-
// the next prompt or while we're already awaiting one.
|
|
2032
|
-
const STDIN_CLOSED = Symbol("stdin-closed");
|
|
2033
|
-
const closedSignal = new Promise<typeof STDIN_CLOSED>((resolve) => {
|
|
2034
|
-
rl.once("close", () => resolve(STDIN_CLOSED));
|
|
2035
|
-
});
|
|
2036
|
-
|
|
2037
|
-
// Wire the permission-ask prompter once the readline interface exists.
|
|
2038
|
-
// Treats a closed stdin as "deny" so a piped non-interactive input does
|
|
2039
|
-
// not stall on the approval prompt.
|
|
2040
|
-
askApproval = async (toolName: string, input: unknown): Promise<boolean> => {
|
|
2041
|
-
const inputPreview = JSON.stringify(input).slice(0, 200);
|
|
2042
|
-
try {
|
|
2043
|
-
const result = await Promise.race([
|
|
2044
|
-
rl.question(`approve ${toolName} ${inputPreview} [y/N] > `),
|
|
2045
|
-
closedSignal,
|
|
2046
|
-
]);
|
|
2047
|
-
if (result === STDIN_CLOSED) return false;
|
|
2048
|
-
const normalized = result.trim().toLowerCase();
|
|
2049
|
-
return normalized === "y" || normalized === "yes";
|
|
2050
|
-
} catch (err) {
|
|
2051
|
-
if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "ERR_USE_AFTER_CLOSE") return false;
|
|
2052
|
-
throw err;
|
|
2053
|
-
}
|
|
2054
|
-
};
|
|
2055
|
-
|
|
2056
|
-
const providerNote = providerId === "anthropic" ? "" : ` [${providerId}]`;
|
|
2057
|
-
process.stdout.write(`agent ready (model: ${opts.model})${providerNote}. type "exit" to quit.\n`);
|
|
2058
|
-
|
|
2059
|
-
// M3.2 — plan-mode UX indicator. When `permissions.mode: plan` is
|
|
2060
|
-
// active, the LLM-policy permission engine is the gate; show the
|
|
2061
|
-
// user it's on so they know destructive tools will be pushed back on.
|
|
2062
|
-
if (permissionMode === "plan") {
|
|
2063
|
-
process.stdout.write(
|
|
2064
|
-
"\x1b[1m\x1b[33m[plan mode]\x1b[0m destructive tools (Write, Edit, Bash) gate through LLM policy; type a request to plan, then approve before execution.\n",
|
|
2065
|
-
);
|
|
2066
|
-
} else if (permissionMode === "auto") {
|
|
2067
|
-
process.stdout.write(
|
|
2068
|
-
"\x1b[1m\x1b[35m[auto mode]\x1b[0m all rules apply, no prompts — the agent acts under your declared permissions.\n",
|
|
2069
|
-
);
|
|
2070
|
-
} else if (permissionMode === "bypass") {
|
|
2071
|
-
process.stdout.write(
|
|
2072
|
-
"\x1b[1m\x1b[31m[BYPASS mode]\x1b[0m all permission rules are disabled. Use only on isolated machines.\n",
|
|
2073
|
-
);
|
|
2074
|
-
}
|
|
2075
|
-
|
|
2076
|
-
// SIGINT handler: first press during a turn aborts the turn; second
|
|
2077
|
-
// press exits. Counter resets at the start of each new turn. Default-on
|
|
2078
|
-
// whenever the runtime owns process.stdin (i.e. the test option
|
|
2079
|
-
// `opts.input` is unset). Tests that supply their own input stream skip
|
|
2080
|
-
// installation so they don't interfere with the test runner's signals.
|
|
2081
|
-
const shouldInstallSigint = opts.installSigintHandler ?? opts.input === undefined;
|
|
2082
|
-
let sigintPresses = 0;
|
|
2083
|
-
const sigintHandler = (): void => {
|
|
2084
|
-
sigintPresses += 1;
|
|
2085
|
-
if (sigintPresses === 1) {
|
|
2086
|
-
process.stdout.write("\n[turn aborted; press Ctrl-C again to exit]\n");
|
|
2087
|
-
turnAbort.abort();
|
|
2088
|
-
} else {
|
|
2089
|
-
process.stdout.write("\n[exiting]\n");
|
|
2090
|
-
process.exit(130);
|
|
2091
|
-
}
|
|
2092
|
-
};
|
|
2093
|
-
if (shouldInstallSigint) {
|
|
2094
|
-
process.on("SIGINT", sigintHandler);
|
|
2095
|
-
}
|
|
2096
|
-
|
|
2097
|
-
try {
|
|
2098
|
-
while (true) {
|
|
2099
|
-
if (runAbort.signal.aborted) break;
|
|
2100
|
-
|
|
2101
|
-
// Fresh turn-abort tree so a previous turn's abort doesn't bleed in.
|
|
2102
|
-
turnAbort = runAbort.child();
|
|
2103
|
-
sigintPresses = 0;
|
|
2104
|
-
|
|
2105
|
-
let userInput: string;
|
|
2106
|
-
try {
|
|
2107
|
-
const result = await Promise.race([rl.question("\nyou> "), closedSignal]);
|
|
2108
|
-
if (result === STDIN_CLOSED) break;
|
|
2109
|
-
userInput = result.trim();
|
|
2110
|
-
} catch (err) {
|
|
2111
|
-
if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "ERR_USE_AFTER_CLOSE") break;
|
|
2112
|
-
throw err;
|
|
2113
|
-
}
|
|
2114
|
-
if (userInput === "") continue;
|
|
2115
|
-
if (userInput === "exit" || userInput === "quit") break;
|
|
2116
|
-
|
|
2117
|
-
// Section 11 — slash-command expansion. When the user input matches
|
|
2118
|
-
// a registered slash command, the markdown body (with $ARGUMENTS
|
|
2119
|
-
// substitution) becomes the effective user message. A `pre-slash`
|
|
2120
|
-
// hook fires first; deny falls through with the original input,
|
|
2121
|
-
// mutate.expanded overrides the substituted text.
|
|
2122
|
-
let effectiveInput = userInput;
|
|
2123
|
-
if (opts.slashCommands && opts.slashCommands.size > 0) {
|
|
2124
|
-
const slash = expandSlash(userInput, opts.slashCommands);
|
|
2125
|
-
if (slash.handled) {
|
|
2126
|
-
const decision = await fireHook("pre-slash", {
|
|
2127
|
-
name: slash.command?.name,
|
|
2128
|
-
arguments: slash.arguments,
|
|
2129
|
-
expanded: slash.expanded,
|
|
2130
|
-
});
|
|
2131
|
-
if (decision.allowed) {
|
|
2132
|
-
const override = decision.mutate?.["expanded"];
|
|
2133
|
-
effectiveInput = typeof override === "string" ? override : slash.expanded;
|
|
2134
|
-
} else {
|
|
2135
|
-
runContext.logger.info("pre-slash hook denied", {
|
|
2136
|
-
name: slash.command?.name,
|
|
2137
|
-
reason: decision.reason,
|
|
2138
|
-
});
|
|
2139
|
-
}
|
|
2140
|
-
}
|
|
2141
|
-
}
|
|
2142
|
-
|
|
2143
|
-
messages.push({ role: "user", content: effectiveInput });
|
|
2144
|
-
await logEvent("user_message", { content: effectiveInput });
|
|
2145
|
-
runContext.turnNumber += 1;
|
|
2146
|
-
bus.setTurnNumber(runContext.turnNumber);
|
|
2147
|
-
const t0Turn = performance.now();
|
|
2148
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
2149
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
2150
|
-
kind: "turn_start",
|
|
2151
|
-
turn: runContext.turnNumber,
|
|
2152
|
-
messageCount: messages.length,
|
|
2153
|
-
});
|
|
2154
|
-
runContext.logger.debug("turn start", {
|
|
2155
|
-
turn: runContext.turnNumber,
|
|
2156
|
-
messages: messages.length,
|
|
2157
|
-
});
|
|
2158
|
-
|
|
2159
|
-
// Pre-turn budget check: snip first (free), then autocompact if still over.
|
|
2160
|
-
messages = await maybeCompact(
|
|
2161
|
-
{
|
|
2162
|
-
messages,
|
|
2163
|
-
adapter: compactionAdapter,
|
|
2164
|
-
model: compactionWireModelId,
|
|
2165
|
-
contextLimit,
|
|
2166
|
-
compactionThreshold,
|
|
2167
|
-
snipKeepHead,
|
|
2168
|
-
snipKeepTail,
|
|
2169
|
-
logger: runContext.logger,
|
|
2170
|
-
},
|
|
2171
|
-
async (info) => {
|
|
2172
|
-
await logEvent("compaction", info);
|
|
2173
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
2174
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
2175
|
-
kind: "compaction_fired",
|
|
2176
|
-
subKind: info.kind,
|
|
2177
|
-
before: info.before,
|
|
2178
|
-
after: info.after,
|
|
2179
|
-
phase: "pre-turn",
|
|
2180
|
-
});
|
|
2181
|
-
await fireHook("pre-compact", { ...info, phase: "pre-turn" });
|
|
2182
|
-
await fireHook("post-compact", { ...info, phase: "pre-turn" });
|
|
2183
|
-
},
|
|
2184
|
-
);
|
|
2185
|
-
|
|
2186
|
-
try {
|
|
2187
|
-
await runOneTurn(messages);
|
|
2188
|
-
} catch (err) {
|
|
2189
|
-
if (isAbortError(err)) {
|
|
2190
|
-
// Already-handled abort; loop back to the prompt.
|
|
2191
|
-
process.stdout.write("\n[turn aborted]\n");
|
|
2192
|
-
} else {
|
|
2193
|
-
throw err;
|
|
2194
|
-
}
|
|
2195
|
-
}
|
|
2196
|
-
|
|
2197
|
-
bus.publish({
|
|
2198
|
-
...bus.envelope(),
|
|
2199
|
-
kind: "turn_end",
|
|
2200
|
-
turn: runContext.turnNumber,
|
|
2201
|
-
durationMs: performance.now() - t0Turn,
|
|
2202
|
-
});
|
|
2203
|
-
runContext.logger.debug("turn end", {
|
|
2204
|
-
turn: runContext.turnNumber,
|
|
2205
|
-
});
|
|
2206
|
-
}
|
|
2207
|
-
} finally {
|
|
2208
|
-
await fireHook("stop", {
|
|
2209
|
-
sessionId,
|
|
2210
|
-
turnCount: runContext.turnNumber,
|
|
2211
|
-
reason: runAbort.signal.aborted ? "abort" : "exit",
|
|
2212
|
-
});
|
|
2213
|
-
await subscribers.flushAll();
|
|
2214
|
-
await subscribers.shutdownAll();
|
|
2215
|
-
if (shouldInstallSigint) {
|
|
2216
|
-
process.removeListener("SIGINT", sigintHandler);
|
|
2217
|
-
}
|
|
2218
|
-
rl.close();
|
|
2219
|
-
await sessionStore.update(sessionId, { lastTurnIndex: runContext.turnNumber }).catch((err) => {
|
|
2220
|
-
runContext.logger.warn("session-store: lastTurnIndex update failed", {
|
|
2221
|
-
error: (err as Error).message,
|
|
2222
|
-
});
|
|
2223
|
-
});
|
|
2224
|
-
await eventLog.close();
|
|
2225
|
-
}
|
|
2226
|
-
|
|
2227
|
-
return "";
|
|
2228
|
-
}
|
|
2229
|
-
|
|
2230
|
-
function isAbortError(err: unknown): boolean {
|
|
2231
|
-
// Section 17 — runtime-core no longer imports the Anthropic SDK at
|
|
2232
|
-
// runtime, so we name-match instead of `instanceof`. The provider
|
|
2233
|
-
// adapters preserve the SDK error names through their normalisation
|
|
2234
|
-
// layers, so this catches both Anthropic and OpenAI/Gemini/Bedrock
|
|
2235
|
-
// abort errors uniformly.
|
|
2236
|
-
const name = (err as { name?: unknown }).name;
|
|
2237
|
-
return typeof name === "string" && (name === "AbortError" || name === "APIUserAbortError");
|
|
2238
|
-
}
|
|
2239
|
-
|
|
2240
|
-
type CompactionInfo = {
|
|
2241
|
-
readonly kind: "snip" | "autocompact";
|
|
2242
|
-
readonly before: number;
|
|
2243
|
-
readonly after: number;
|
|
2244
|
-
};
|
|
2245
|
-
|
|
2246
|
-
type CompactArgs = {
|
|
2247
|
-
messages: Anthropic.MessageParam[];
|
|
2248
|
-
adapter: ProviderAdapter;
|
|
2249
|
-
model: string;
|
|
2250
|
-
contextLimit: number;
|
|
2251
|
-
compactionThreshold: number;
|
|
2252
|
-
snipKeepHead: number;
|
|
2253
|
-
snipKeepTail: number;
|
|
2254
|
-
logger: RunContext["logger"];
|
|
2255
|
-
};
|
|
2256
|
-
|
|
2257
|
-
type OnCompaction = (info: CompactionInfo) => Promise<void>;
|
|
2258
|
-
|
|
2259
|
-
/**
|
|
2260
|
-
* Pre-turn compaction ladder: estimate → snip → re-estimate → autocompact.
|
|
2261
|
-
* Returns the (possibly replaced) messages array. Pure with respect to
|
|
2262
|
-
* the input array; callers reassign. The optional `onCompaction` callback
|
|
2263
|
-
* fires once per applied step so the runtime can append a `compaction`
|
|
2264
|
-
* event to the session log without duplicating the cost-estimation logic.
|
|
2265
|
-
*/
|
|
2266
|
-
async function maybeCompact(
|
|
2267
|
-
args: CompactArgs,
|
|
2268
|
-
onCompaction?: OnCompaction,
|
|
2269
|
-
): Promise<Anthropic.MessageParam[]> {
|
|
2270
|
-
const {
|
|
2271
|
-
messages,
|
|
2272
|
-
adapter,
|
|
2273
|
-
model,
|
|
2274
|
-
contextLimit,
|
|
2275
|
-
compactionThreshold,
|
|
2276
|
-
snipKeepHead,
|
|
2277
|
-
snipKeepTail,
|
|
2278
|
-
logger,
|
|
2279
|
-
} = args;
|
|
2280
|
-
|
|
2281
|
-
const initialBudget = new TokenBudget(contextLimit);
|
|
2282
|
-
initialBudget.add(estimateTokens(messages), 0);
|
|
2283
|
-
if (!initialBudget.isApproachingLimit(compactionThreshold)) {
|
|
2284
|
-
return messages;
|
|
2285
|
-
}
|
|
2286
|
-
|
|
2287
|
-
const snipped = snip(messages, snipKeepHead, snipKeepTail);
|
|
2288
|
-
logger.info("snip applied", { before: messages.length, after: snipped.length });
|
|
2289
|
-
if (onCompaction !== undefined) {
|
|
2290
|
-
await onCompaction({ kind: "snip", before: messages.length, after: snipped.length });
|
|
2291
|
-
}
|
|
2292
|
-
|
|
2293
|
-
const postSnipBudget = new TokenBudget(contextLimit);
|
|
2294
|
-
postSnipBudget.add(estimateTokens(snipped), 0);
|
|
2295
|
-
if (!postSnipBudget.isApproachingLimit(compactionThreshold)) {
|
|
2296
|
-
return snipped;
|
|
2297
|
-
}
|
|
2298
|
-
|
|
2299
|
-
logger.info("autocompact triggered", { tokensAfterSnip: postSnipBudget.used });
|
|
2300
|
-
const after = await autoCompact(snipped, adapter, model);
|
|
2301
|
-
if (onCompaction !== undefined) {
|
|
2302
|
-
await onCompaction({ kind: "autocompact", before: snipped.length, after: after.length });
|
|
2303
|
-
}
|
|
2304
|
-
return after;
|
|
2305
|
-
}
|
|
2306
|
-
|
|
2307
|
-
type ForceCompactArgs = {
|
|
2308
|
-
messages: Anthropic.MessageParam[];
|
|
2309
|
-
adapter: ProviderAdapter;
|
|
2310
|
-
model: string;
|
|
2311
|
-
snipKeepHead: number;
|
|
2312
|
-
snipKeepTail: number;
|
|
2313
|
-
logger: RunContext["logger"];
|
|
2314
|
-
};
|
|
2315
|
-
|
|
2316
|
-
/**
|
|
2317
|
-
* Reactive compaction triggered by the recovery engine on a prompt_too_long
|
|
2318
|
-
* error. Unlike pre-turn `maybeCompact`, this one runs unconditionally:
|
|
2319
|
-
* snip first, then autocompact (whose model summary reliably trims the
|
|
2320
|
-
* largest blob).
|
|
2321
|
-
*/
|
|
2322
|
-
async function forceCompact(args: ForceCompactArgs): Promise<Anthropic.MessageParam[]> {
|
|
2323
|
-
const { messages, adapter, model, snipKeepHead, snipKeepTail, logger } = args;
|
|
2324
|
-
const snipped = snip(messages, snipKeepHead, snipKeepTail);
|
|
2325
|
-
logger.info("reactive snip applied", { before: messages.length, after: snipped.length });
|
|
2326
|
-
return await autoCompact(snipped, adapter, model);
|
|
2327
|
-
}
|