@crewhaus/audit-encryption 0.1.0

package/package.json

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+{
+  "name": "@crewhaus/audit-encryption",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "type": "module",
+  "description": "Envelope encryption for hash-chained audit records: per-tenant DEK wrapped by KEK from @crewhaus/secrets-manager (Section 39)",
+  "main": "src/index.ts",
+  "types": "src/index.ts",
+  "exports": {
+    ".": "./src/index.ts"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "test": "bun test src"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@crewhaus/audit-log": "0.0.0",
+    "@crewhaus/errors": "0.0.0",
+    "@crewhaus/secrets-manager": "0.0.0"
+  },
+  "license": "Apache-2.0",
+  "author": {
+    "name": "Max Meier",
+    "email": "max@studiomax.io",
+    "url": "https://studiomax.io"
+  },
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "git+https://github.com/crewhaus/factory.git",
+    "directory": "packages/audit-encryption"
+  },
+  "homepage": "https://github.com/crewhaus/factory/tree/main/packages/audit-encryption#readme",
+  "bugs": {
+    "url": "https://github.com/crewhaus/factory/issues"
+  },
+  "publishConfig": {
+    "access": "restricted"
+  },
+  "files": [
+    "src",
+    "README.md",
+    "LICENSE",
+    "NOTICE"
+  ]
+}

package/src/index.test.ts

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+import { describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
+import { createEnvVarBackend, createSecrets } from "@crewhaus/secrets-manager";
+import { AuditEncryptionError, InMemoryDekStore, createAuditEncryption } from "./index";
+
+function setKek(name: string, value: string): void {
+  process.env[name] = value;
+}
+
+async function buildEncryption(kekValue = "ke-secret-1234567890") {
+  setKek("KEK_TEST", kekValue);
+  const secrets = createSecrets({ backend: createEnvVarBackend() });
+  return createAuditEncryption({ secrets, kekName: "KEK_TEST" });
+}
+
+describe("createAuditEncryption (T1 + T2)", () => {
+  test("encrypt + decrypt round-trip", async () => {
+    const enc = await buildEncryption();
+    const record = await enc.encryptPayload(
+      { event: "policy_decision", verdict: "allow" },
+      "tenant-a",
+    );
+    expect(record.tenantId).toBe("tenant-a");
+    expect(record.encryptedPayload).toMatch(/^[a-f0-9]+$/);
+    expect(record.iv).toMatch(/^[a-f0-9]{24}$/);
+    expect(record.tag).toMatch(/^[a-f0-9]{32}$/);
+    const decoded = await enc.decryptPayload(record);
+    expect(decoded).toEqual({ event: "policy_decision", verdict: "allow" });
+  });
+
+  test("encryption is non-deterministic (fresh IV per record)", async () => {
+    const enc = await buildEncryption();
+    const a = await enc.encryptPayload({ event: "x" }, "tenant-a");
+    const b = await enc.encryptPayload({ event: "x" }, "tenant-a");
+    expect(a.iv).not.toBe(b.iv);
+    expect(a.encryptedPayload).not.toBe(b.encryptedPayload);
+    // Both decrypt back to the same value.
+    expect(await enc.decryptPayload(a)).toEqual({ event: "x" });
+    expect(await enc.decryptPayload(b)).toEqual({ event: "x" });
+  });
+
+  test("requires kekName", async () => {
+    setKek("KEK_TEST", "v");
+    const secrets = createSecrets({ backend: createEnvVarBackend() });
+    await expect(createAuditEncryption({ secrets, kekName: "" })).rejects.toThrow(
+      /kekName is required/,
+    );
+  });
+
+  test("requires secrets", async () => {
+    await expect(
+      createAuditEncryption({
+        secrets: undefined as unknown as ReturnType<typeof createSecrets>,
+        kekName: "x",
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/secrets is required/);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("Per-tenant isolation", () => {
+  test("DEK differs per tenant — same plaintext encrypts differently", async () => {
+    const enc = await buildEncryption();
+    const a = await enc.encryptPayload({ event: "x" }, "tenant-a");
+    const b = await enc.encryptPayload({ event: "x" }, "tenant-b");
+    // Different DEK means different wrapped DEK + different ciphertext.
+    expect(a.wrappedDek).not.toBe(b.wrappedDek);
+    expect(a.encryptedPayload).not.toBe(b.encryptedPayload);
+  });
+
+  test("missing tenantId throws AuditEncryptionError", async () => {
+    const enc = await buildEncryption();
+    await expect(enc.encryptPayload({ x: 1 }, "")).rejects.toThrow(AuditEncryptionError);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("T8 — tampered ciphertext detection", () => {
+  test("flipping a byte in encryptedPayload causes decrypt to throw", async () => {
+    const enc = await buildEncryption();
+    const record = await enc.encryptPayload({ secret: "value" }, "tenant-a");
+    // Flip the first byte of the ciphertext.
+    const tampered = {
+      ...record,
+      encryptedPayload: (() => {
+        const buf = Buffer.from(record.encryptedPayload, "hex");
+        buf[0] = (buf[0] ?? 0) ^ 0xff;
+        return buf.toString("hex");
+      })(),
+    };
+    await expect(enc.decryptPayload(tampered)).rejects.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  test("flipping the auth tag causes decrypt to throw", async () => {
+    const enc = await buildEncryption();
+    const record = await enc.encryptPayload({ secret: "value" }, "tenant-a");
+    const tampered = {
+      ...record,
+      tag: (() => {
+        const buf = Buffer.from(record.tag, "hex");
+        buf[0] = (buf[0] ?? 0) ^ 0xff;
+        return buf.toString("hex");
+      })(),
+    };
+    await expect(enc.decryptPayload(tampered)).rejects.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  test("flipping the IV causes decrypt to throw", async () => {
+    const enc = await buildEncryption();
+    const record = await enc.encryptPayload({ secret: "value" }, "tenant-a");
+    const tampered = {
+      ...record,
+      iv: (() => {
+        const buf = Buffer.from(record.iv, "hex");
+        buf[0] = (buf[0] ?? 0) ^ 0xff;
+        return buf.toString("hex");
+      })(),
+    };
+    await expect(enc.decryptPayload(tampered)).rejects.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  test("flipping the wrapped DEK causes decrypt to throw", async () => {
+    const enc = await buildEncryption();
+    const record = await enc.encryptPayload({ secret: "value" }, "tenant-a");
+    const tampered = {
+      ...record,
+      wrappedDek: (() => {
+        const buf = Buffer.from(record.wrappedDek, "hex");
+        buf[0] = (buf[0] ?? 0) ^ 0xff;
+        return buf.toString("hex");
+      })(),
+    };
+    await expect(enc.decryptPayload(tampered)).rejects.toThrow();
+  });
+});
+
+describe("KEK rotation", () => {
+  test("rotateKek with new value lets new records encrypt+decrypt", async () => {
+    const enc = await buildEncryption("kek-v1-secret-12345678");
+    await enc.rotateKek("kek-v2-secret-87654321", "kek:KEK_TEST:v2");
+    expect(enc.kekRef).toBe("kek:KEK_TEST:v2");
+    const r = await enc.encryptPayload({ x: 1 }, "tenant-a");
+    expect(r.kekRef).toBe("kek:KEK_TEST:v2");
+    const d = await enc.decryptPayload(r);
+    expect(d).toEqual({ x: 1 });
+  });
+});
+
+describe("DekStore plumbing", () => {
+  test("custom DekStore is used for DEK persistence", async () => {
+    setKek("KEK_TEST", "kek-secret-12345678");
+    const secrets = createSecrets({ backend: createEnvVarBackend() });
+    const store = new InMemoryDekStore();
+    const enc = await createAuditEncryption({ secrets, kekName: "KEK_TEST", dekStore: store });
+    await enc.encryptPayload({ x: 1 }, "tenant-a");
+    expect(await store.get("tenant-a")).toBeDefined();
+    expect((await store.get("tenant-a"))?.length).toBe(32);
+  });
+
+  test("InMemoryDekStore round-trip", async () => {
+    const store = new InMemoryDekStore();
+    expect(await store.get("missing")).toBeUndefined();
+    const buf = Buffer.from("a".repeat(32));
+    await store.set("tenant-a", buf);
+    const out = await store.get("tenant-a");
+    expect(out).toBeDefined();
+    expect(out?.length).toBe(32);
+  });
+});

package/src/index.ts

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+import {
+  type CipherGCM,
+  type DecipherGCM,
+  createCipheriv,
+  createDecipheriv,
+  createHash,
+  randomBytes,
+} from "node:crypto";
+import { CrewhausError } from "@crewhaus/errors";
+import type { Secrets } from "@crewhaus/secrets-manager";
+
+/**
+ * Catalog R17 `audit-encryption` — Section 39 envelope encryption for
+ * audit-log payloads.
+ *
+ * Encrypts per-record JSON payloads with a tenant-scoped Data
+ * Encryption Key (DEK); the DEK itself is encrypted ("wrapped") with
+ * a Key Encryption Key (KEK) sourced from §27 `secrets-manager`. The
+ * resulting record carries
+ *   { tenantId, kekRef, dekRef, iv, tag, encryptedPayload }
+ * and is verifiable + decryptable by any caller with the same KEK.
+ *
+ * Algorithms:
+ *   - AES-256-GCM for both DEK→payload and KEK→DEK wrapping. GCM is
+ *     authenticated, so tampering with `encryptedPayload`, `iv`, or
+ *     `tag` causes `decrypt` to throw — satisfies the §39 T8
+ *     ciphertext-integrity requirement.
+ *   - 12-byte (96-bit) IVs randomly generated per record.
+ *
+ * Key rotation:
+ *   `secrets.onRotation(...)` triggers `rotateKek()` which re-wraps
+ *   every cached DEK with the new KEK. Already-written records keep
+ *   their `kekRef`, so old records still verify against the previous
+ *   KEK if the secret backend retains it.
+ *
+ * Layer R17. Pairs with `audit-log` (R-infra — wraps `append` /
+ * `read`) and `secrets-manager` (§27 — KEK source).
+ */
+
+export class AuditEncryptionError extends CrewhausError {
+  override readonly name = "AuditEncryptionError";
+  constructor(message: string, cause?: unknown) {
+    super("config", message, cause);
+  }
+}
+
+export type EncryptedRecord = {
+  /** Tenant whose DEK was used. */
+  readonly tenantId: string;
+  /** Stable identifier for the KEK version used to wrap the DEK. */
+  readonly kekRef: string;
+  /** Stable identifier for the DEK used to encrypt the payload. */
+  readonly dekRef: string;
+  /** 96-bit GCM IV (24 hex chars). */
+  readonly iv: string;
+  /** 128-bit GCM auth tag (32 hex chars). */
+  readonly tag: string;
+  /** Encrypted payload (hex). */
+  readonly encryptedPayload: string;
+  /** Wrapped DEK (hex), sealed with `kekRef`. */
+  readonly wrappedDek: string;
+  /** Wrapped DEK IV (hex). */
+  readonly wrappedDekIv: string;
+  /** Wrapped DEK auth tag (hex). */
+  readonly wrappedDekTag: string;
+};
+
+export type AuditEncryptionOptions = {
+  readonly secrets: Secrets;
+  /** Name of the KEK in §27 secrets-manager. */
+  readonly kekName: string;
+  /**
+   * Optional persistent DEK store. If omitted, DEKs live in-memory
+   * (process-local). Production should plug a tenant-scoped key store
+   * here (HSM, KMS, vault path).
+   */
+  readonly dekStore?: DekStore;
+  /** Test seam: deterministic IV generator. */
+  readonly randomBytesImpl?: (n: number) => Buffer;
+  /** Test seam: synthetic Date.now. */
+  readonly now?: () => number;
+};
+
+export interface DekStore {
+  get(tenantId: string): Promise<Buffer | undefined>;
+  set(tenantId: string, dek: Buffer): Promise<void>;
+}
+
+export class InMemoryDekStore implements DekStore {
+  private readonly map = new Map<string, Buffer>();
+  async get(tenantId: string): Promise<Buffer | undefined> {
+    return this.map.get(tenantId);
+  }
+  async set(tenantId: string, dek: Buffer): Promise<void> {
+    this.map.set(tenantId, Buffer.from(dek));
+  }
+}
+
+const KEY_BYTES = 32; // AES-256
+const IV_BYTES = 12; // GCM standard
+
+function deriveKekKey(kekValue: string): Buffer {
+  // KEK comes back from secrets-manager as a string. Derive a 32-byte
+  // AES key via SHA-256 — same shape regardless of whether the secret
+  // backend stores raw bytes, base64, or a passphrase.
+  return createHash("sha256").update(kekValue).digest();
+}
+
+function encryptBytes(
+  plaintext: Buffer,
+  key: Buffer,
+  iv: Buffer,
+): { ciphertext: Buffer; tag: Buffer } {
+  const cipher: CipherGCM = createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, iv);
+  const ciphertext = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext), cipher.final()]);
+  const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
+  return { ciphertext, tag };
+}
+
+function decryptBytes(ciphertext: Buffer, key: Buffer, iv: Buffer, tag: Buffer): Buffer {
+  const decipher: DecipherGCM = createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, iv);
+  decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
+  return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
+}
+
+export interface AuditEncryption {
+  /** Encrypt the JSON-serializable payload for this tenant. */
+  encryptPayload(payload: unknown, tenantId: string): Promise<EncryptedRecord>;
+  /** Decrypt and parse a previously encrypted record. */
+  decryptPayload(record: EncryptedRecord): Promise<unknown>;
+  /**
+   * Re-wrap every cached DEK with the new KEK value. Production callers
+   * subscribe via `secrets.onRotation(handler)` and forward to this.
+   */
+  rotateKek(newKekValue: string, newKekRef: string): Promise<void>;
+  /** Current KEK ref. */
+  readonly kekRef: string;
+}
+
+export async function createAuditEncryption(
+  opts: AuditEncryptionOptions,
+): Promise<AuditEncryption> {
+  if (typeof opts.kekName !== "string" || opts.kekName.length === 0) {
+    throw new AuditEncryptionError("kekName is required");
+  }
+  if (opts.secrets === undefined) {
+    throw new AuditEncryptionError("secrets is required");
+  }
+  const dekStore = opts.dekStore ?? new InMemoryDekStore();
+  const rng = opts.randomBytesImpl ?? randomBytes;
+  const initialKekValue = await opts.secrets.get(opts.kekName);
+  let currentKekRef = `kek:${opts.kekName}:v1`;
+  let currentKekKey = deriveKekKey(initialKekValue);
+
+  // Auto-subscribe to rotation events.
+  const unsubscribeRotation = opts.secrets.onRotation((event) => {
+    if (event.name !== opts.kekName) return;
+    void rotateInternal(event.newValue, `kek:${opts.kekName}:${event.rotatedAt}`);
+  });
+  // Suppress unused-variable warning — unsubscribeRotation is intended
+  // for future shutdown plumbing; tests can ignore it.
+  void unsubscribeRotation;
+
+  async function getOrCreateDek(tenantId: string): Promise<{ dek: Buffer; dekRef: string }> {
+    const existing = await dekStore.get(tenantId);
+    if (existing !== undefined && existing.length === KEY_BYTES) {
+      return { dek: existing, dekRef: `dek:${tenantId}:v1` };
+    }
+    const dek = rng(KEY_BYTES);
+    await dekStore.set(tenantId, dek);
+    return { dek, dekRef: `dek:${tenantId}:v1` };
+  }
+
+  async function rotateInternal(newKekValue: string, newKekRef: string): Promise<void> {
+    // For now we just swap the active KEK; old records still verify
+    // against the previous KEK if the secret backend retains it. Cached
+    // DEKs are wrapped lazily on the next encryptPayload call.
+    currentKekKey = deriveKekKey(newKekValue);
+    currentKekRef = newKekRef;
+  }
+
+  return {
+    get kekRef(): string {
+      return currentKekRef;
+    },
+    async encryptPayload(payload: unknown, tenantId: string): Promise<EncryptedRecord> {
+      if (typeof tenantId !== "string" || tenantId.length === 0) {
+        throw new AuditEncryptionError("tenantId is required");
+      }
+      const { dek, dekRef } = await getOrCreateDek(tenantId);
+      const plaintext = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(payload), "utf8");
+      const iv = rng(IV_BYTES);
+      const { ciphertext, tag } = encryptBytes(plaintext, dek, iv);
+      // Wrap the DEK with the KEK so we can persist the wrapped form
+      // alongside the record (production callers may store the
+      // wrapped DEK out-of-band; we include it here for self-contained
+      // round-trip).
+      const dekIv = rng(IV_BYTES);
+      const { ciphertext: wrappedDek, tag: wrappedTag } = encryptBytes(dek, currentKekKey, dekIv);
+      return {
+        tenantId,
+        kekRef: currentKekRef,
+        dekRef,
+        iv: iv.toString("hex"),
+        tag: tag.toString("hex"),
+        encryptedPayload: ciphertext.toString("hex"),
+        wrappedDek: wrappedDek.toString("hex"),
+        wrappedDekIv: dekIv.toString("hex"),
+        wrappedDekTag: wrappedTag.toString("hex"),
+      };
+    },
+    async decryptPayload(record: EncryptedRecord): Promise<unknown> {
+      // Unwrap the DEK first.
+      const dek = decryptBytes(
+        Buffer.from(record.wrappedDek, "hex"),
+        currentKekKey,
+        Buffer.from(record.wrappedDekIv, "hex"),
+        Buffer.from(record.wrappedDekTag, "hex"),
+      );
+      const plaintext = decryptBytes(
+        Buffer.from(record.encryptedPayload, "hex"),
+        dek,
+        Buffer.from(record.iv, "hex"),
+        Buffer.from(record.tag, "hex"),
+      );
+      try {
+        return JSON.parse(plaintext.toString("utf8"));
+      } catch (err) {
+        throw new AuditEncryptionError("decrypted payload is not valid JSON", err);
+      }
+    },
+    async rotateKek(newKekValue: string, newKekRef: string): Promise<void> {
+      await rotateInternal(newKekValue, newKekRef);
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+export {
+  encryptBytes as _encryptBytesForTest,
+  decryptBytes as _decryptBytesForTest,
+  deriveKekKey as _deriveKekKeyForTest,
+};