@crediolabs/policy-synth 0.3.0 → 0.4.0

package/dist/install/authority-overlap.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+import type { PredicateNode, SignerDraft } from '../types.ts';
+/** Wildcard component of a `Selector`: the predicate does not pin this half. */
+export declare const ANY = "*";
+/** A (contract, function) pair a predicate may permit. `ANY` in either half
+ *  means unconstrained, so `{contract: ANY, fn: ANY}` is "any call at all". */
+export interface Selector {
+    contract: string;
+    fn: string;
+}
+export type ContextType = {
+    kind: 'default';
+} | {
+    kind: 'call_contract';
+    contract: string;
+} | {
+    kind: 'create_contract';
+    wasmHash: string;
+};
+/** How much can be said about a neighbouring rule.
+ *  - `interpreter`: policed by our interpreter and the predicate was readable,
+ *    so its authority is known exactly.
+ *  - `foreign`: policed by some other contract. The address is visible, the
+ *    semantics are not, so it needs review by hand.
+ *  - `unpoliced`: no policy at all. Whatever its context type allows, its
+ *    signers may do without constraint. */
+export type RuleClass = 'interpreter' | 'foreign' | 'unpoliced';
+export interface ObservedRule {
+    id: number;
+    contextType: ContextType;
+    signers: SignerDraft[];
+    /** Policy contract addresses attached to the rule, in OZ's order. */
+    policyAddresses: string[];
+    /** Decoded predicate. Present only when the rule is policed by OUR
+     *  interpreter and the stored document was readable. */
+    predicate?: PredicateNode;
+}
+export interface IntendedInstall {
+    /** Rule the predicate is being installed onto. A re-install onto the same
+     *  id REPLACES its predicate rather than adding a second source of
+     *  authority, so that id is skipped. */
+    ruleId: number;
+    contextType: ContextType;
+    signers: SignerDraft[];
+    predicate: PredicateNode;
+}
+export type OverlapSeverity = 
+/** A neighbouring rule imposes no constraint at all on the shared calls. */
+'bypass'
+/** A neighbouring policy exists but what it permits cannot be read. */
+ | 'unknown'
+/** Both rules are ours. The new rule will not restrict the shared calls,
+ *  because the signer names whichever is more permissive. */
+ | 'not-restricting';
+export interface AuthorityOverlap {
+    ruleId: number;
+    ruleClass: RuleClass;
+    severity: OverlapSeverity;
+    /** Signers present in BOTH rules. An overlap is only reachable by a signer
+     *  who can name both, so a rule sharing no signer is not a collision. */
+    sharedSigners: SignerDraft[];
+    /** The selectors both rules can serve. Non-empty by construction. */
+    sharedSelectors: Selector[];
+    advice: string;
+}
+/** Canonical key for signer equality. Mirrors OZ's `Signer` enum: a delegated
+ *  signer is its address, an external signer is the verifier plus the key
+ *  bytes, since one verifier may hold many keys. */
+export declare function signerKey(s: SignerDraft): string;
+/** Intersection of two selector SETS: every compatible pairing survives. */
+export declare function intersectSelectors(a: Selector[], b: Selector[]): Selector[];
+/**
+ * The set of `(contract, fn)` selectors a predicate may permit.
+ *
+ * A deliberate OVER-approximation: every call the predicate actually permits is
+ * covered by some returned selector, and unrecognised structure widens to the
+ * wildcard rather than narrowing. That direction is what makes the emptiness
+ * test sound. A call carries exactly one `(contract, fn)`, so if two
+ * predicates' over-approximations do not intersect, no single call can be
+ * routed to either and the rules provably cannot collide.
+ *
+ * Narrowing instead would be the fail-OPEN direction: it would let this report
+ * "no overlap" for rules that do collide.
+ */
+export declare function permittedSelectors(node: PredicateNode): Selector[];
+/** Selectors a context type admits, before the predicate narrows them. */
+export declare function selectorsForContextType(ct: ContextType): Selector[];
+/** What a rule can actually authorise: its context type narrowed by its
+ *  predicate. An unpoliced or unreadable rule contributes no narrowing. */
+export declare function effectiveSelectors(rule: ObservedRule): Selector[];
+/**
+ * Every existing rule a signer of the intended install could name instead.
+ *
+ * A rule collides when it shares at least one signer AND at least one selector.
+ * Both are needed for the signer to have a choice: same signer but disjoint
+ * calls means no call can be rerouted, and same calls but no shared signer
+ * means nobody can reroute them.
+ */
+export declare function findAuthorityOverlaps(args: {
+    intended: IntendedInstall;
+    existing: ObservedRule[];
+}): AuthorityOverlap[];

package/dist/install/authority-overlap.js

@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+// src/install/authority-overlap.ts - cross-rule authority analysis.
+//
+// An OZ smart account selects a context rule by CALLER DECLARATION and enforces
+// only the policies of the rule that was named. A signer belonging to several
+// rules therefore picks which one applies, so for any given call their
+// authority is the MAXIMUM over the matching rules, never the intersection.
+//
+// The consequence is the one that catches people: installing a second, tighter
+// rule restricts nothing. A key that also sits on an unpoliced rule is not
+// constrained at all - it names that rule and the predicate never runs. This
+// module detects that at install time, before the caller acts on a policy that
+// looks binding and is not.
+//
+// Not theoretical. Proven on chain 2026-08-22: the same key, the same account
+// and the same forbidden call was denied `#100` naming the policed rule and
+// PERMITTED naming an unpoliced one. It happened in this project's own end-to-
+// end harness, written by the author of the grammar, and was caught by review
+// rather than by tooling - which is why the tooling now exists.
+//
+// Adapted to grammar 3 from the version published in `@crediolabs/policy-synth`
+// 0.2.0, which came from the `octogate` repository and was lost when the npm
+// lineage moved here. `or` and `not` are gone from the grammar, so the cases
+// handling them are gone too; oracle bounds are gone from the stored document.
+//
+// Pure: no network. The caller supplies the account's rules.
+/** Wildcard component of a `Selector`: the predicate does not pin this half. */
+export const ANY = '*';
+// ---- signer identity ----
+/** Canonical key for signer equality. Mirrors OZ's `Signer` enum: a delegated
+ *  signer is its address, an external signer is the verifier plus the key
+ *  bytes, since one verifier may hold many keys. */
+export function signerKey(s) {
+    return s.kind === 'delegated' ? `delegated:${s.address}` : `external:${s.verifier}:${s.keyBytes}`;
+}
+function sharedSigners(a, b) {
+    const bKeys = new Set(b.map(signerKey));
+    return a.filter((s) => bKeys.has(signerKey(s)));
+}
+// ---- selector extraction ----
+const WILDCARD = { contract: ANY, fn: ANY };
+function selectorKey(s) {
+    return `${s.contract} ${s.fn}`;
+}
+function dedupe(sels) {
+    const seen = new Map();
+    for (const s of sels)
+        seen.set(selectorKey(s), s);
+    return [...seen.values()];
+}
+/** Intersect one pair. `ANY` absorbs, equal literals survive, and two
+ *  different literals cannot both hold for a single call. */
+function intersectOne(a, b) {
+    const contract = a.contract === ANY
+        ? b.contract
+        : b.contract === ANY
+            ? a.contract
+            : a.contract === b.contract
+                ? a.contract
+                : null;
+    if (contract === null)
+        return null;
+    const fn = a.fn === ANY ? b.fn : b.fn === ANY ? a.fn : a.fn === b.fn ? a.fn : null;
+    if (fn === null)
+        return null;
+    return { contract, fn };
+}
+/** Intersection of two selector SETS: every compatible pairing survives. */
+export function intersectSelectors(a, b) {
+    const out = [];
+    for (const x of a) {
+        for (const y of b) {
+            const hit = intersectOne(x, y);
+            if (hit)
+                out.push(hit);
+        }
+    }
+    return dedupe(out);
+}
+function literalAddress(leaf) {
+    return leaf.kind === 'literal_address' ? leaf.value : null;
+}
+function literalSymbol(leaf) {
+    return leaf.kind === 'literal_symbol' ? leaf.value : null;
+}
+/** Selector pinned by a single `eq`, whichever side the literal sits on. */
+function selectorFromEq(left, right) {
+    if (left.kind === 'call_contract') {
+        const addr = literalAddress(right);
+        return addr === null ? null : { contract: addr, fn: ANY };
+    }
+    if (right.kind === 'call_contract') {
+        const addr = literalAddress(left);
+        return addr === null ? null : { contract: addr, fn: ANY };
+    }
+    if (left.kind === 'call_fn') {
+        const sym = literalSymbol(right);
+        return sym === null ? null : { contract: ANY, fn: sym };
+    }
+    if (right.kind === 'call_fn') {
+        const sym = literalSymbol(left);
+        return sym === null ? null : { contract: ANY, fn: sym };
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+/**
+ * The set of `(contract, fn)` selectors a predicate may permit.
+ *
+ * A deliberate OVER-approximation: every call the predicate actually permits is
+ * covered by some returned selector, and unrecognised structure widens to the
+ * wildcard rather than narrowing. That direction is what makes the emptiness
+ * test sound. A call carries exactly one `(contract, fn)`, so if two
+ * predicates' over-approximations do not intersect, no single call can be
+ * routed to either and the rules provably cannot collide.
+ *
+ * Narrowing instead would be the fail-OPEN direction: it would let this report
+ * "no overlap" for rules that do collide.
+ */
+export function permittedSelectors(node) {
+    switch (node.op) {
+        case 'and': {
+            // Every conjunct must hold at once, so the permitted set is the
+            // intersection. Intersecting over-approximations stays one.
+            let acc = [WILDCARD];
+            for (const child of node.children)
+                acc = intersectSelectors(acc, permittedSelectors(child));
+            return acc;
+        }
+        case 'eq': {
+            const sel = selectorFromEq(node.left, node.right);
+            return sel === null ? [WILDCARD] : [sel];
+        }
+        case 'in': {
+            // Set membership over the selector halves: `call_fn in {a, b}` permits
+            // both. A haystack element that is not the matching literal kind makes
+            // the node uninformative rather than narrower.
+            if (node.needle.kind === 'call_contract') {
+                const addrs = node.haystack.map(literalAddress);
+                if (addrs.some((a) => a === null))
+                    return [WILDCARD];
+                return dedupe(addrs.map((a) => ({ contract: a, fn: ANY })));
+            }
+            if (node.needle.kind === 'call_fn') {
+                const syms = node.haystack.map(literalSymbol);
+                if (syms.some((s) => s === null))
+                    return [WILDCARD];
+                return dedupe(syms.map((s) => ({ contract: ANY, fn: s })));
+            }
+            return [WILDCARD];
+        }
+        default:
+            // `lte` binds an amount, never the selector.
+            return [WILDCARD];
+    }
+}
+/** Selectors a context type admits, before the predicate narrows them. */
+export function selectorsForContextType(ct) {
+    switch (ct.kind) {
+        case 'default':
+            return [WILDCARD];
+        case 'call_contract':
+            return [{ contract: ct.contract, fn: ANY }];
+        case 'create_contract':
+            // A contract-creation context is a different `Context` shape. The
+            // interpreter refuses anything that is not `Context::Contract`, and a
+            // creation rule can never serve a call, so it shares no selector.
+            return [];
+    }
+}
+/** What a rule can actually authorise: its context type narrowed by its
+ *  predicate. An unpoliced or unreadable rule contributes no narrowing. */
+export function effectiveSelectors(rule) {
+    const fromType = selectorsForContextType(rule.contextType);
+    if (!rule.predicate)
+        return fromType;
+    return intersectSelectors(fromType, permittedSelectors(rule.predicate));
+}
+function classifyRule(rule) {
+    if (rule.policyAddresses.length === 0)
+        return 'unpoliced';
+    return rule.predicate ? 'interpreter' : 'foreign';
+}
+function adviceFor(cls, ruleId) {
+    switch (cls) {
+        case 'unpoliced':
+            return `rule ${ruleId} has no policy attached, so a shared signer may make these calls with no constraint at all - the predicate you are installing will never run for them. Remove the shared signer from rule ${ruleId}, or attach a policy to it.`;
+        case 'foreign':
+            return `rule ${ruleId} is policed by a contract this tool cannot decode, so its authority over these calls is unknown. Review it by hand before relying on the new rule.`;
+        case 'interpreter':
+            return `a shared signer may name rule ${ruleId} instead, so the new rule will not restrict these calls. To TIGHTEN, edit rule ${ruleId} itself rather than adding a second rule. To ADD a separate capability, keep both and expect neither to constrain the other.`;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Every existing rule a signer of the intended install could name instead.
+ *
+ * A rule collides when it shares at least one signer AND at least one selector.
+ * Both are needed for the signer to have a choice: same signer but disjoint
+ * calls means no call can be rerouted, and same calls but no shared signer
+ * means nobody can reroute them.
+ */
+export function findAuthorityOverlaps(args) {
+    const intendedSelectors = intersectSelectors(selectorsForContextType(args.intended.contextType), permittedSelectors(args.intended.predicate));
+    const out = [];
+    for (const rule of args.existing) {
+        if (rule.id === args.intended.ruleId)
+            continue;
+        const shared = sharedSigners(args.intended.signers, rule.signers);
+        if (shared.length === 0)
+            continue;
+        const sharedSelectors = intersectSelectors(intendedSelectors, effectiveSelectors(rule));
+        if (sharedSelectors.length === 0)
+            continue;
+        const ruleClass = classifyRule(rule);
+        out.push({
+            ruleId: rule.id,
+            ruleClass,
+            severity: ruleClass === 'unpoliced'
+                ? 'bypass'
+                : ruleClass === 'foreign'
+                    ? 'unknown'
+                    : 'not-restricting',
+            sharedSigners: shared,
+            sharedSelectors,
+            advice: adviceFor(ruleClass, rule.id),
+        });
+    }
+    return out;
+}

package/dist/install/index.d.ts

@@ -1 +1,2 @@
+export { ANY, type AuthorityOverlap, type ContextType, effectiveSelectors, findAuthorityOverlaps, type IntendedInstall, intersectSelectors, type ObservedRule, type OverlapSeverity, permittedSelectors, type RuleClass, type Selector, selectorsForContextType, signerKey, } from './authority-overlap.ts';
 export { ADD_CONTEXT_RULE_SYMBOL, type AddContextRuleArgs, type BuildAddContextRuleArgs, buildAddContextRuleArgs, DEFAULT_GRAMMAR_VERSION, } from './build-add-context-rule.ts';

package/dist/install/index.js

@@ -12,4 +12,8 @@
 // Exported here rather than from the package root to keep the root surface
 // about synthesis, and because these are transaction-building primitives whose
 // callers should know they are reaching for them.
+// Cross-rule authority analysis. Exported because the check has to happen
+// wherever an install is BUILT, and a client that assembles its own
+// `add_context_rule` call never reaches `runInstallPolicy`.
+export { ANY, effectiveSelectors, findAuthorityOverlaps, intersectSelectors, permittedSelectors, selectorsForContextType, signerKey, } from "./authority-overlap.js";
 export { ADD_CONTEXT_RULE_SYMBOL, buildAddContextRuleArgs, DEFAULT_GRAMMAR_VERSION, } from "./build-add-context-rule.js";

package/dist/record/freshness.d.ts

@@ -16,15 +16,21 @@ export declare function isBelowThreshold(c: ParseConfidence): boolean;
  *  under-confidence recording.
  *
  *  The remediation text branches on which diagnostic bucket is non-empty:
- *    - unknownContracts only -> user MUST supply an ABI (or re-capture
- *      against a known protocol version). The contract is real, the
- *      recorder just cannot decode it.
- *    - opaqueScVals only -> the recorder encountered a value shape it
- *      should support but did not decode. The user cannot supply an ABI
- *      to fix a decoder bug; the guidance explicitly says so and points at
- *      re-running after a tool upgrade / reporting the path.
- *    - both -> list both diagnostics AND chain the right remediation for
- *      each (the user supplies an ABI AND reports the decoder gap).
- *    - neither (the "denom === 0" path) -> unchanged from the pre-fix
- *      text; the user did not actually hit a code-level barrier. */
+ *    - unknownContracts only -> the contract is not in the compiled-in
+ *      registry. NOT "the contract has no interface": most Soroban
+ *      contracts publish a typed spec on chain, this package just never
+ *      reads one. The reason code stays `no-abi` because it is a published
+ *      enum value, so the TEXT has to carry the correction.
+ *    - opaqueScVals only -> the recorder met a value shape it should
+ *      support but did not decode. That is a decoder bug, and the guidance
+ *      says so rather than implying the caller can fix it.
+ *    - both -> list both diagnostics and chain the right remediation.
+ *    - neither (the "denom === 0" path) -> the caller did not actually hit
+ *      a code-level barrier.
+ *
+ *  Do NOT tell the caller to supply an ABI. There is no input for one:
+ *  recognition runs off the compiled-in registry plus a known-contract set
+ *  that no public tool boundary exposes. The old text named an action
+ *  nobody could take and sent users looking for a file they do not have and
+ *  would not need. */
 export declare function buildLowConfidenceQuestion(c: ParseConfidence): string;

package/dist/record/freshness.js

@@ -39,17 +39,23 @@ export function isBelowThreshold(c) {
  *  under-confidence recording.
  *
  *  The remediation text branches on which diagnostic bucket is non-empty:
- *    - unknownContracts only -> user MUST supply an ABI (or re-capture
- *      against a known protocol version). The contract is real, the
- *      recorder just cannot decode it.
- *    - opaqueScVals only -> the recorder encountered a value shape it
- *      should support but did not decode. The user cannot supply an ABI
- *      to fix a decoder bug; the guidance explicitly says so and points at
- *      re-running after a tool upgrade / reporting the path.
- *    - both -> list both diagnostics AND chain the right remediation for
- *      each (the user supplies an ABI AND reports the decoder gap).
- *    - neither (the "denom === 0" path) -> unchanged from the pre-fix
- *      text; the user did not actually hit a code-level barrier. */
+ *    - unknownContracts only -> the contract is not in the compiled-in
+ *      registry. NOT "the contract has no interface": most Soroban
+ *      contracts publish a typed spec on chain, this package just never
+ *      reads one. The reason code stays `no-abi` because it is a published
+ *      enum value, so the TEXT has to carry the correction.
+ *    - opaqueScVals only -> the recorder met a value shape it should
+ *      support but did not decode. That is a decoder bug, and the guidance
+ *      says so rather than implying the caller can fix it.
+ *    - both -> list both diagnostics and chain the right remediation.
+ *    - neither (the "denom === 0" path) -> the caller did not actually hit
+ *      a code-level barrier.
+ *
+ *  Do NOT tell the caller to supply an ABI. There is no input for one:
+ *  recognition runs off the compiled-in registry plus a known-contract set
+ *  that no public tool boundary exposes. The old text named an action
+ *  nobody could take and sent users looking for a file they do not have and
+ *  would not need. */
 export function buildLowConfidenceQuestion(c) {
     const hasUnknown = c.unknownContracts.length > 0;
     const hasOpaque = c.opaqueScVals.length > 0;
@@ -62,16 +68,20 @@ export function buildLowConfidenceQuestion(c) {
     }
     const why = reasons.length === 0 ? 'no diagnostic reason available' : reasons.join('; ');
     const header = `Recording refused: parseConfidence ${c.overall.toFixed(3)} is below the threshold ${c.thresholdUsed.toFixed(3)}. Diagnostic: ${why}.`;
-    // The two remediation branches are explicit so the user (or the agent)
-    // can dispatch on the verb. The "unknown contract" branch is the only
-    // one that asks for an ABI; the "opaque ScVal" branch asks the user to
-    // report the path and re-run after a tool upgrade.
+    // The remediation branches are explicit so the user (or the agent) can
+    // dispatch on the verb. Neither branch asks for an ABI: there is no input
+    // that accepts one, and for the unknown-contract branch the contract's
+    // own spec is usually on chain already - it is this package that does not
+    // read it.
+    const unknownAdvice = `The contract is not in this package's built-in registry - "no-abi" means unrecognised here, not that the contract lacks an interface. ` +
+        `You cannot supply one: the registry is compiled in. Either build the policy without deriving it from this transaction, or re-capture against a protocol the registry covers. ` +
+        `Passing confidenceOverride accepts the recording as it stands, including the arguments this tool could not attribute - do that only if you have checked them yourself.`;
     if (hasUnknown && hasOpaque) {
-        return (`${header} Supply an ABI for the unknown contract(s) or re-capture the transaction against a known protocol version; ` +
-            `also file the opaque ScVal path against the recorder (decoder limitation) and re-run record_transaction after a tool upgrade.`);
+        return (`${header} ${unknownAdvice} Separately, file the opaque ScVal path against the recorder (a decoder limitation) ` +
+            `and re-run record_transaction after a tool upgrade.`);
     }
     if (hasUnknown) {
-        return `${header} Supply an ABI for the unknown contract(s) or re-capture the transaction against a known protocol version, then re-run record_transaction.`;
+        return `${header} ${unknownAdvice}`;
     }
     if (hasOpaque) {
         return `${header} This is a recorder decoder limitation (the value shape is supported in principle but not yet decoded) - the agent cannot fix it by supplying an ABI. Report the opaque ScVal path above against the recorder and re-run record_transaction after a tool upgrade.`;

package/dist/record/index.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import type { ToolResponse } from '../errors.ts';
+import { type SpecFetcher } from '../registry/on-chain-spec.ts';
 import type { Network, RecordedTransaction } from '../types.ts';
 import { type RpcFetcher } from './rpc.ts';
 /** Public input shape. The brief pins:
@@ -27,6 +28,15 @@ export interface RecordInput {
      *  automatically; tests can pass a deterministic stub. */
     crossNetworkFetcher?: RpcFetcher;
     confidenceOverride?: number;
+    /** Read a contract's own interface off chain when the compiled-in registry
+     *  does not recognise it. Default ON: the registry covers the protocols we
+     *  pinned by hand, and refusing everything else reported `no-abi` for
+     *  contracts that publish a full typed spec. Set false to record against
+     *  the registry alone (no extra RPC). */
+    resolveContractSpecs?: boolean;
+    /** Test seam for the spec lookup. Unset in production, where it is built
+     *  from the network's pinned RPC URL. */
+    specFetcher?: SpecFetcher;
 }
 export type RecordResult = ToolResponse<RecordedTransaction>;
 export declare function recordTransaction(input: RecordInput): Promise<RecordResult>;

package/dist/record/index.js

@@ -16,11 +16,40 @@
 //
 // Returns ToolResponse<RecordedTransaction> per the canonical envelope
 // defined in src/errors.ts.
+import { Networks } from '@stellar/stellar-sdk';
+import { resolveContractsByOnChainSpec, specFetcherFromRpc, } from "../registry/on-chain-spec.js";
 import { contractEventsToOnChainEvents, DecodeError, decodeEnvelope, decodeEnvelopeXdr, transactionEventsToOnChainEvents, } from "./decode.js";
 import { buildLowConfidenceQuestion, computeParseConfidence, isBelowThreshold, } from "./freshness.js";
 import { extractTokenMovements } from "./movements.js";
-import { createRpcServer } from "./rpc.js";
+import { createRpcServer, PUBLIC_RPC_URLS } from "./rpc.js";
 import { validateAgainstEvents } from "./validate.js";
+/** Second pass over the contracts the compiled-in registry did not recognise.
+ *
+ *  Each candidate's own interface is read off chain and every call it received
+ *  is checked against it; the ones that verify are fed back through the decoder
+ *  as known. Re-decoding rather than patching the first result keeps ONE code
+ *  path computing parseConfidence - a hand-adjusted count here would be a
+ *  second implementation of the gate, free to drift from the real one.
+ *
+ *  Only ever ADDS recognition. A missing spec, an unreachable RPC or a call the
+ *  interface does not describe all leave the recording exactly as it was. */
+async function resolveByOnChainSpec(input, decoded, redecode) {
+    if (input.resolveContractSpecs === false)
+        return decoded;
+    if (decoded.unknownContracts.length === 0)
+        return decoded;
+    const fetcher = input.specFetcher ??
+        specFetcherFromRpc(PUBLIC_RPC_URLS[input.network], input.network === 'mainnet' ? Networks.PUBLIC : Networks.TESTNET);
+    let resolved;
+    try {
+        resolved = await resolveContractsByOnChainSpec(decoded.invocations, decoded.unknownContracts.map((u) => u.contract), fetcher);
+    }
+    catch {
+        // A lookup failure must not fail the recording that already succeeded.
+        return decoded;
+    }
+    return resolved.size === 0 ? decoded : redecode(resolved);
+}
 export async function recordTransaction(input) {
     if (!input.network) {
         return err('RECORDING_FAILED', 'network required', false);
@@ -76,6 +105,7 @@ export async function recordTransaction(input) {
                 return err('RECORDING_FAILED', e.message, false);
             throw e;
         }
+        decoded = await resolveByOnChainSpec(input, decoded, (known) => decodeEnvelope(fetched.envelopeXdr, events, [], fetched.ledger, known, input.network));
         return finish(input.network, decoded, input.confidenceOverride);
     }
     // XDR mode has no raw on-chain events, so the events-based cross-check is
@@ -93,6 +123,7 @@ export async function recordTransaction(input) {
             return err('RECORDING_FAILED', e.message, false);
         return err('RECORDING_FAILED', `failed to decode base64 envelope XDR: ${e.message}`, false);
     }
+    decoded = await resolveByOnChainSpec(input, decoded, (known) => decodeEnvelopeXdr(xdrStr, [], [], 0, known, input.network));
     return finish(input.network, decoded, input.confidenceOverride);
 }
 function combineEvents(raw) {

package/dist/record/rpc.d.ts

@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ export interface SorobanTxResponse {
     events: rpc.Api.TransactionEvents;
 }
 export type RpcFetcher = (hash: string) => Promise<SorobanTxResponse | null>;
+/** Exported so the on-chain spec lookup reads from the SAME endpoint the
+ *  recorder fetched the transaction from. Two different endpoints could
+ *  disagree about what a contract is. */
+export declare const PUBLIC_RPC_URLS: Record<Network, string>;
 /** Build a fetcher backed by the public Soroban RPC for the given network.
  *  Injectable by tests via the `fetcher` parameter to `recordTransaction`. */
 export declare function createRpcServer(network: Network): RpcFetcher;

package/dist/record/rpc.js

@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@
 // Unit tests inject a fetcher so they never hit the network; the integration test
 // uses the real Soroban RPC through `createRpcServer`.
 import { rpc } from '@stellar/stellar-sdk';
-const PUBLIC_RPC_URLS = {
+/** Exported so the on-chain spec lookup reads from the SAME endpoint the
+ *  recorder fetched the transaction from. Two different endpoints could
+ *  disagree about what a contract is. */
+export const PUBLIC_RPC_URLS = {
     testnet: 'https://soroban-testnet.stellar.org',
     // The brief pins testnet; mainnet is left to the caller via injection. We keep
     // a public default that matches the brief's note ("e.g. https://mainnet.sorobanrpc.com").

package/dist/registry/identify.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import type { ScVal } from '../types.ts';
-import type { ProtocolId } from './protocols.ts';
+import type { AbiArg, ProtocolId } from './protocols.ts';
 export interface IdentifiedProtocol {
     protocol: ProtocolId;
     fn: string;
@@ -9,3 +9,12 @@ export interface IdentifiedProtocol {
  *  off, or unknown method on a pinned address). The caller MUST keep the
  *  null path fail-closed. */
 export declare function identifyProtocol(contract: string, method: string, args: ScVal[], network?: 'mainnet' | 'testnet'): IdentifiedProtocol | null;
+/** Compare the decoded args against the ABI signature. Returns true only when
+ *  the arg count matches AND every arg's ScVal subset type matches the ABI's
+ *  declared type. `other` is intentionally NOT a valid ABI match - it means
+ *  the decoder couldn't classify the value, which is exactly the signal
+ *  fail-closed should refuse. */
+/** Exported so the on-chain-spec path checks a call the SAME way a pinned
+ *  protocol does. Reimplementing it there would let the two drift, and a
+ *  looser copy would be the fail-OPEN direction. */
+export declare function argsMatchAbi(expected: AbiArg[], actual: ScVal[]): boolean;

package/dist/registry/identify.js

@@ -88,7 +88,10 @@ export function identifyProtocol(contract, method, args, network) {
  *  declared type. `other` is intentionally NOT a valid ABI match - it means
  *  the decoder couldn't classify the value, which is exactly the signal
  *  fail-closed should refuse. */
-function argsMatchAbi(expected, actual) {
+/** Exported so the on-chain-spec path checks a call the SAME way a pinned
+ *  protocol does. Reimplementing it there would let the two drift, and a
+ *  looser copy would be the fail-OPEN direction. */
+export function argsMatchAbi(expected, actual) {
     if (expected.length !== actual.length)
         return false;
     for (let i = 0; i < expected.length; i += 1) {

package/dist/registry/on-chain-spec.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+import { contract as sdkContract } from '@stellar/stellar-sdk';
+import type { ContractInvocation } from '../types.ts';
+import type { AbiArgType, ProtocolAbi } from './protocols.ts';
+/** Map an XDR spec type to the ScVal subset vocabulary the matcher uses.
+ *
+ *  Returns null for a type the recorder's ScVal subset cannot represent. That
+ *  is deliberate: an argument we cannot type is an argument we cannot check,
+ *  and claiming a match on it would be the fail-OPEN direction. A function
+ *  with any such argument is dropped from the derived ABI, so a call to it
+ *  stays unrecognised rather than being waved through. */
+export declare function abiTypeFromSpecType(specTypeName: string): AbiArgType | null;
+/** The RPC surface this module needs. Narrowed to one method so a test can
+ *  supply a stub without standing up a server, and so the recorder's existing
+ *  RPC client can be passed straight in. */
+export interface SpecFetcher {
+    contractSpec(contractId: string): Promise<sdkContract.Spec | null>;
+}
+/** Build a `SpecFetcher` over the SDK's contract client. */
+export declare function specFetcherFromRpc(rpcUrl: string, networkPassphrase: string): SpecFetcher;
+/** Convert a fetched spec into the ABI shape `identifyProtocol` already
+ *  matches against. Functions with an argument outside the ScVal subset are
+ *  OMITTED rather than partially typed. */
+export declare function abiFromSpec(spec: sdkContract.Spec): ProtocolAbi;
+/** Fetch and convert in one step. Returns null when no usable interface was
+ *  obtained, which the caller must treat as "unrecognised". */
+export declare function fetchContractAbi(contractId: string, fetcher: SpecFetcher): Promise<ProtocolAbi | null>;
+/** Contracts whose EVERY recorded call matches their own published interface.
+ *
+ *  All-or-nothing per contract, deliberately. A contract where one call
+ *  verifies and another does not is a contract we do not understand, and
+ *  marking it recognised would raise confidence on the strength of the call
+ *  we happened to check. The unverified call is the one that matters.
+ *
+ *  A contract with no fetchable spec, or a call naming a function absent from
+ *  it, simply stays unknown - this only ever ADDS recognition, so a failure
+ *  here degrades to today's behaviour rather than to a wrong answer. */
+export declare function resolveContractsByOnChainSpec(invocations: ReadonlyArray<ContractInvocation>, candidates: ReadonlyArray<string>, fetcher: SpecFetcher): Promise<Set<string>>;