@crediolabs/policy-synth 0.2.0 → 0.3.0

package/src/codegen/template.ts

@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
-// src/codegen/template.ts - deterministic Rust source generator for the OZ
-// `Policy` escape-hatch skeleton.
-//
-// SUPERSEDED. The architecture this belongs to no longer exists. A deployed
-// policy involves exactly two contracts, the OZ smart account and one
-// immutable interpreter, and the synthesiser emits policy DATA rather than
-// code. Nothing on the synthesis path reaches this module, and no install can
-// produce a contract from it. When a constraint falls outside the grammar the
-// answer is to version the synthesiser and the interpreter together, not to
-// put unaudited Rust on chain per policy.
-//
-// Deleting it is a decision nobody has taken yet, not a dependency question.
-// `compile-gate.ts` takes a Rust string and knows nothing about this module,
-// and its tests compile a hardcoded fixture, so the gate keeps working either
-// way. What deleting this would remove is the only in-repo producer of policy
-// Rust for the gate to check. Do not read its presence as the product
-// generating contracts, and do not wire it into the synthesis path.
-//
-// What follows describes the abandoned design.
-//
-// This is the LAST-RESORT tool for constraints the v1 DSL cannot express. It
-// lives OUT of the audited happy-path surface; the synthesiser never emits it
-// automatically. It mirrors Zodiac Roles' `Custom` operator: a hand-written
-// (here: scaffolded) policy the operator assumes responsibility for.
-//
-// The skeleton carries five storage invariants the user MUST preserve when
-// filling in the predicate logic:
-//   1. `smart_account.require_auth()` is invoked INSIDE `enforce`.
-//   2. Storage is keyed by the composite `(smart_account, rule_id)`.
-//   3. Chain reads use `unwrap_or_default()` so a missing key is a permitted
-//      default, not a panic.
-//   4. Storage is `persistent()` (NOT `instance()`) so the policy survives
-//      contract instance lifecycle changes.
-//   5. `uninstall` removes the stored state.
-//
-// Determinism: same `(spec, name)` -> byte-identical output. No clock, no RNG,
-// no environment reads.
-
-/** A small typed description of one uncovered constraint the v1 DSL refused
- *  to express. The synthesiser surfaces these from `CompileResult.uncovered`
- *  and the codegen escape hatch wraps them into a hand-auditable skeleton. */
-export interface EscapeHatchSpec {
-  /** Address of the policy contract the skeleton is generated for. */
-  contract: string
-  /** The trait method the predicate lives inside (default: 'enforce'). */
-  fnName?: string
-  /** Human-readable description of each construct the DSL could not cover. */
-  uncovered: string[]
-}
-
-/** Format a name for use as a Rust identifier. The input is constrained by
- *  the caller (a kebab-case policy name + alphanumeric addresses); this is a
- *  belt-and-braces sanitiser that maps anything non-identifier to '_'. */
-function asRustIdent(s: string): string {
-  let out = ''
-  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i++) {
-    const ch = s.charCodeAt(i)
-    const ok =
-      (ch >= 48 && ch <= 57) || // 0-9
-      (ch >= 65 && ch <= 90) || // A-Z
-      (ch >= 97 && ch <= 122) || // a-z
-      ch === 95 // _
-    out += ok ? s[i] : '_'
-  }
-  // Identifiers may not start with a digit.
-  if (out.length > 0 && out.charCodeAt(0) >= 48 && out.charCodeAt(0) <= 57) {
-    out = `_${out}`
-  }
-  return out || 'policy'
-}
-
-/** Render the `uncovered` list as a `//` comment block (one line per item). */
-function renderUncovered(uncovered: string[]): string {
-  if (uncovered.length === 0) {
-    return '    // (no specific uncovered constructs reported)'
-  }
-  return uncovered.map((line) => `    // - ${line}`).join('\n')
-}
-
-/** Generate a deterministic OZ `Policy` skeleton for an uncovered constraint.
- *
- *  The skeleton is NOT a finished policy; the user fills in the predicate
- *  logic in the marked TODO(user) holes and audits the result themselves.
- *
- *  Same `(spec, name)` always produces byte-identical output. */
-export function generateRust(spec: EscapeHatchSpec, name: string): string {
-  const _contract = spec.contract
-  const _fnName = spec.fnName ?? 'enforce'
-  const structName = asRustIdent(name)
-  const _dataKeyName = `${asRustIdent(name)}_data`
-  const uncoveredBlock = renderUncovered(spec.uncovered)
-
-  return `// Auto-generated by the OZ Policy Builder codegen escape hatch.
-// THIS OUTPUT IS THE USER'S TO COMPLETE AND AUDIT.
-// The synthesiser never emits it on the happy path; reach for it only when
-// a constraint cannot be expressed in the v1 DSL grammar (same shape as
-// Zodiac Roles' \`Custom\` operator).
-
-#![no_std]
-
-use soroban_sdk::{contract, contractimpl, contracttype, Address, Env, Vec};
-
-#[contracttype]
-pub enum DataKey {
-    /// Composite key \`(smart_account, rule_id)\` so multiple policies on
-    /// one smart account coexist without collision.
-    State(Address, u32),
-}
-
-#[contract]
-pub struct ${structName};
-
-#[contractimpl]
-impl ${structName} {
-    pub fn install(e: &Env, smart_account: Address, rule_id: u32) {
-        // TODO(user): initialise policy state for this (smart_account, rule_id).
-        // The skeleton leaves the stored value empty; the predicate body
-        // (in \`enforce\`) decides what to read.
-        e.storage().persistent().set(
-            &DataKey::State(smart_account.clone(), rule_id),
-            &(),
-        );
-    }
-
-    pub fn enforce(
-        e: &Env,
-        smart_account: Address,
-        rule_id: u32,
-        _signers: Vec<Address>,
-    ) {
-        // Invariant 1: authorise the smart account BEFORE any state read or
-        // predicate evaluation. Removing this call opens the policy to
-        // impersonation by any caller with a valid rule_id.
-        smart_account.require_auth();
-
-        // Invariant 2 + 4: read stored state through the composite key on
-        // \`persistent()\` storage. \`unwrap_or_default()\` (invariant 3)
-        // makes an empty key a permitted default rather than a panic.
-        let _state: () = e
-            .storage()
-            .persistent()
-            .get(&DataKey::State(smart_account.clone(), rule_id))
-            .unwrap_or_default();
-
-        // --- uncovered constraints the v1 DSL refused to express ---
-${uncoveredBlock}
-
-        // TODO(user): replace the placeholder below with the real predicate
-        // body. The recorded flow's \`(contract, fn_name, args)\` is the
-        // single authorised call \`Policy::enforce\` receives; match against
-        // \`e\` here.
-        let _ = (_state, &e);
-    }
-
-    pub fn uninstall(e: &Env, smart_account: Address, rule_id: u32) {
-        // Invariant 5: \`uninstall\` removes the stored state so a subsequent
-        // install starts from a clean slate (and the nonce returns to its
-        // post-uninstall value).
-        e.storage()
-            .persistent()
-            .remove(&DataKey::State(smart_account, rule_id));
-    }
-}
-`
-}

package/src/install/build-merge-policy.ts

@@ -1,219 +0,0 @@
-//! Transactions for the merge remedy.
-//!
-//! `plan-merge-policy.ts` decides WHAT should happen; this builds the XDR for
-//! the step the caller asked for. Two calls, in order, because OZ refuses to
-//! attach a policy that is already on the rule:
-//!
-//!   step 1 `detach`    -> `account.remove_policy(rule_id, policy_id)`
-//!   step 2 `reinstall` -> `account.add_policy(rule_id, interpreter, param)`
-//!
-//! The two cannot be emitted together. Simulating step 2 while the old
-//! attachment is still there hits `DuplicatePolicy`, so the second transaction
-//! is only buildable once the first has confirmed.
-//!
-//! Both calls route through the smart account and are authorised the same way
-//! as `revoke_policy`: against the deploy-time admin rule, with the recorded
-//! `rootInvocation` binding the auth payload to this exact rule and policy.
-//! Detaching runs our `uninstall`, which is master-gated, so the signer has to
-//! be a master of the rule either way.
-
-import {
-  Account,
-  Address,
-  BASE_FEE,
-  Operation,
-  rpc,
-  TransactionBuilder,
-  xdr,
-} from '@stellar/stellar-sdk'
-import { DEFAULT_GRAMMAR_VERSION, encodePolicyInstallParams } from './build-add-context-rule.ts'
-import type { InstallRpcClient } from './build-install-policy.ts'
-import {
-  accountEntry,
-  authDigest,
-  authPayload,
-  delegatedSignerEntry,
-  signaturePayload,
-} from './oz-auth.ts'
-import type { MergeStep } from './plan-merge-policy.ts'
-
-/** Matches the window the install and revoke builders use. */
-const DEFAULT_AUTH_VALID_UNTIL_LEDGERS = 100
-
-/**
- * The context rule the merge authorises AGAINST, which is not the rule being
- * merged.
- *
- * Both calls mutate the smart account itself, so they need the account's own
- * authorisation, and this builder asks rule 0 for it - the same assumption the
- * install and revoke builders make. OpenZeppelin does NOT enforce any
- * admin semantic for rule 0: it is simply the first rule the account's
- * constructor created, and OZ's reference account creates it as `Default`
- * covering every context.
- *
- * The assumption is therefore load-bearing and unverified at build time. If
- * rule 0 does not exist, does not cover `CallContract(<smart account>)`, or
- * does not list the source account as a signer, the transaction is built and
- * then fails when submitted, and the operator pays the fee for a transaction
- * that was never signable. Changing it is a wire-visible change: the id is
- * hashed into the auth digest.
- */
-export const ADMIN_CONTEXT_RULE_ID = 0
-
-export interface BuildMergePolicyArgs {
-  smartAccount: string
-  sourceAccount: string
-  networkPassphrase: string
-  ruleId: number
-  /** OZ registry id of the interpreter policy on this rule, from the plan. */
-  policyId: number
-  interpreterAddress: string
-  step: MergeStep
-  /** Only needed for `reinstall`: the merged predicate, already encoded. */
-  encodedPredicate?: string
-  predicateHash?: string
-  /** Nonce for the reinstall. Read from chain rather than assumed: a detach
-   *  whose uninstall panicked leaves the old nonce in place. */
-  installNonce?: number
-  /** Oracle bounds to carry over from the document being replaced. */
-  oracleParams?: {
-    maxStalenessSeconds?: number
-    maxDeviationBps?: number
-    maxCrossFeedDeviationBps?: number
-  }
-  rpc: InstallRpcClient
-  baseFee?: number
-  authValidUntilLedgers?: number
-}
-
-export interface BuildMergePolicyResult {
-  unsignedXdr: string
-  smartAccount: string
-  sourceAccount: string
-  step: MergeStep
-  call: { contract: string; fn: 'remove_policy' | 'add_policy'; ruleId: number }
-  authNonce: string
-  authValidUntilLedger: number
-  rootInvocationXdr: string
-}
-
-function hostFunctionFor(args: BuildMergePolicyArgs): xdr.HostFunction {
-  if (args.step === 'detach') {
-    return xdr.HostFunction.hostFunctionTypeInvokeContract(
-      new xdr.InvokeContractArgs({
-        contractAddress: new Address(args.smartAccount).toScAddress(),
-        functionName: 'remove_policy',
-        args: [xdr.ScVal.scvU32(args.ruleId), xdr.ScVal.scvU32(args.policyId)],
-      })
-    )
-  }
-
-  if (!args.encodedPredicate || !args.predicateHash) {
-    throw new Error('merge_policy: reinstall needs the merged predicate and its hash')
-  }
-  return xdr.HostFunction.hostFunctionTypeInvokeContract(
-    new xdr.InvokeContractArgs({
-      contractAddress: new Address(args.smartAccount).toScAddress(),
-      functionName: 'add_policy',
-      args: [
-        xdr.ScVal.scvU32(args.ruleId),
-        new Address(args.interpreterAddress).toScVal(),
-        // Same encoder as a fresh install: the field order is ABI-significant
-        // and it re-hashes the predicate to confirm the supplied hash.
-        encodePolicyInstallParams({
-          encodedPredicate: args.encodedPredicate,
-          predicateHash: args.predicateHash,
-          installNonce: args.installNonce ?? 1,
-          grammarVersion: DEFAULT_GRAMMAR_VERSION,
-          ...(args.oracleParams ? { oracleParams: args.oracleParams } : {}),
-        }),
-      ],
-    })
-  )
-}
-
-/**
- * Build the unsigned transaction for one step of the merge.
- *
- * The auth dance mirrors `buildRevokePolicyXdr`: simulate once to record the
- * account's auth entry, rebuild with the payload bound to that recorded
- * `rootInvocation`, then assemble. Binding to the recorded invocation rather
- * than to the input arguments is what makes the signature commit to the exact
- * rule and policy being changed.
- */
-export async function buildMergePolicyXdr(
-  args: BuildMergePolicyArgs
-): Promise<BuildMergePolicyResult> {
-  const fn = args.step === 'detach' ? 'remove_policy' : 'add_policy'
-  const source = await args.rpc.getAccount(args.sourceAccount)
-  const hostFunction = hostFunctionFor(args)
-  const makeOperation = (auth: xdr.SorobanAuthorizationEntry[] = []) =>
-    Operation.invokeHostFunction({ func: hostFunction, auth })
-  const baseFee = args.baseFee !== undefined ? String(args.baseFee) : BASE_FEE
-
-  const buildTx = (op: xdr.Operation) =>
-    new TransactionBuilder(new Account(args.sourceAccount, source.sequenceNumber()), {
-      fee: baseFee,
-      networkPassphrase: args.networkPassphrase,
-    })
-      .addOperation(op)
-      .setTimeout(0)
-      .build()
-
-  const recorded = await args.rpc.simulateTransaction(buildTx(makeOperation()))
-  if (rpc.Api.isSimulationError(recorded)) {
-    // Short and stable, like the other builders: the SDK's full error carries
-    // host and URL detail that has no business in a user-facing message.
-    throw new Error(`merge_policy: ${fn} simulateTransaction failed`)
-  }
-  const original = (recorded.result?.auth ?? []).find(
-    (entry) =>
-      entry.credentials().switch().name === 'sorobanCredentialsAddress' &&
-      Address.fromScAddress(entry.credentials().address().address()).toString() ===
-        args.smartAccount
-  )
-  if (!original) {
-    throw new Error(
-      `merge_policy: no Soroban auth entry for smart account ${args.smartAccount}; this call does not route through the smart account`
-    )
-  }
-
-  const validUntilLedger =
-    (await args.rpc.getLatestLedger()).sequence +
-    (args.authValidUntilLedgers ?? DEFAULT_AUTH_VALID_UNTIL_LEDGERS)
-  const contextRuleIds = [ADMIN_CONTEXT_RULE_ID]
-  const digest = authDigest(
-    signaturePayload(
-      args.networkPassphrase,
-      original.credentials().address().nonce(),
-      validUntilLedger,
-      original.rootInvocation()
-    ),
-    contextRuleIds
-  )
-  const authEntries = [
-    accountEntry(
-      original,
-      validUntilLedger,
-      authPayload([args.sourceAccount], contextRuleIds, () => Buffer.alloc(0))
-    ),
-    ...contextRuleIds.map(() => delegatedSignerEntry(args.smartAccount, digest)),
-  ]
-  const txWithAuth = buildTx(makeOperation(authEntries))
-  const enforcing = await args.rpc.simulateTransaction(txWithAuth)
-  if (rpc.Api.isSimulationError(enforcing)) {
-    throw new Error(`merge_policy: ${fn} auth simulateTransaction failed`)
-  }
-  const finalTx = rpc.assembleTransaction(txWithAuth, enforcing).build()
-
-  return {
-    unsignedXdr: finalTx.toEnvelope().toXDR().toString('base64'),
-    smartAccount: args.smartAccount,
-    sourceAccount: args.sourceAccount,
-    step: args.step,
-    call: { contract: args.smartAccount, fn, ruleId: args.ruleId },
-    authNonce: original.credentials().address().nonce().toString(),
-    authValidUntilLedger: validUntilLedger,
-    rootInvocationXdr: original.rootInvocation().toXDR().toString('base64'),
-  }
-}

package/src/install/plan-merge-policy.ts

@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-//! Planning the merge remedy for a cross-rule authority overlap.
-//!
-//! When two rules our interpreter polices can serve the same calls, the
-//! tightening remedy is to replace one rule's predicate with the conjunction
-//! of both (see `authority-overlap.ts`). Carrying that out against an OZ smart
-//! account is not one call, and the reasons are worth stating because they
-//! shape the whole tool:
-//!
-//!   1. A Soroban transaction carries exactly ONE operation - "smart contract
-//!      transactions can only have one operation per transaction" - so the
-//!      detach and the re-attach cannot be bundled even though the host would
-//!      run them in order happily. And `add_policy` panics `DuplicatePolicy`
-//!      while the policy is still attached (`smart_account/storage.rs`
-//!      `add_policy`), so the second transaction cannot even be simulated
-//!      until the first has confirmed.
-//!   2. `remove_policy` calls `try_uninstall` and DISCARDS the result
-//!      (`smart_account/storage.rs`: `let _ = ...try_uninstall(...)`), so the
-//!      policy is detached whether or not our `uninstall` succeeded. When it
-//!      succeeded the document, nonce, signer hash, master set and counters
-//!      are gone and the re-install is a fresh install at nonce 1. When it
-//!      panicked - our `uninstall` panics `MissingState` if the master set has
-//!      been archived - the nonce SURVIVES, and re-installing at 1 would be
-//!      refused on chain as a replay, leaving the rule stuck unpoliced. The
-//!      nonce is therefore READ at reinstall time rather than assumed.
-//!   3. Because of (2), any rate-limit or spend window on that rule is reset
-//!      by the merge. A signer who had consumed most of a window gets a clean
-//!      one. That is a real cost of tightening this way and the caller has to
-//!      be told, not discover it.
-//!   4. So the caller performs step 1, waits for it to confirm, then asks for
-//!      step 2.
-//!
-//! This module is pure. It decides what should happen and why; the XDR is
-//! built by `build-merge-policy.ts`.
-
-import type { PredicateNode } from '../types.ts'
-import type { ObservedRule } from './authority-overlap.ts'
-import { type MergeResult, mergeIntoAnd } from './authority-overlap.ts'
-
-export type MergeStep = 'detach' | 'reinstall'
-
-export interface MergePlanRefused {
-  ok: false
-  /** Why the merge cannot proceed, in terms the caller can act on. */
-  reason: string
-}
-
-export interface MergePlanAccepted {
-  ok: true
-  /** The conjunction to install in step 2. */
-  predicate: PredicateNode
-  /** OZ registry id of the interpreter policy on this rule, for
-   *  `remove_policy`. */
-  policyId: number
-  /** Oracle bounds to re-install with the merged predicate. Carried from the
-   *  document being replaced: they are tighten-only overrides against the wasm
-   *  defaults, so omitting them would quietly widen the policy while the
-   *  operator believed they were tightening it. */
-  oracleParams?: {
-    maxStalenessSeconds?: number
-    maxDeviationBps?: number
-    maxCrossFeedDeviationBps?: number
-  }
-  /** Consequences the caller must see BEFORE signing step 1, because step 1 is
-   *  the destructive one. */
-  warnings: string[]
-  /** What the caller should do after the requested step confirms. */
-  followUp: string
-}
-
-export type MergePlan = MergePlanRefused | MergePlanAccepted
-
-/** The interpreter's registry id on a rule, or null when it is not attached
- *  or the ids were not readable. */
-export function interpreterPolicyId(rule: ObservedRule, interpreterAddress: string): number | null {
-  const index = rule.policyAddresses.indexOf(interpreterAddress)
-  if (index < 0) return null
-  const id = rule.policyIds?.[index]
-  return typeof id === 'number' ? id : null
-}
-
-/**
- * Decide whether the merge can proceed, and say what it will cost.
- *
- * Refuses rather than guesses whenever the account is not in the shape the
- * remedy assumes: the rule must be policed by our interpreter, its predicate
- * must have been readable, and the ids needed to detach it must be present. A
- * merge built on a predicate we could not read would silently replace a rule
- * with something narrower or wider than its author wrote.
- */
-export function planMergePolicy(args: {
-  rule: ObservedRule
-  interpreterAddress: string
-  incoming: PredicateNode
-  step: MergeStep
-}): MergePlan {
-  const policyId = interpreterPolicyId(args.rule, args.interpreterAddress)
-  if (policyId === null) {
-    return {
-      ok: false,
-      reason: `rule ${args.rule.id} is not policed by the interpreter at ${args.interpreterAddress}, or its policy ids could not be read, so there is nothing to merge into and no id to detach. The merge hard-pins to that interpreter and has no opt-out: the auth digest it builds binds to the audited deployment. A rule installed against a different interpreter has to be replaced rather than merged.`,
-    }
-  }
-
-  const existing = args.rule.predicate
-  if (!existing) {
-    return {
-      ok: false,
-      reason: `the predicate installed on rule ${args.rule.id} could not be read, so it cannot be conjoined; merging against an unknown predicate would replace the rule with something other than what its author wrote`,
-    }
-  }
-
-  const merged: MergeResult = mergeIntoAnd(existing, args.incoming)
-  if (!merged.ok || !merged.predicate) {
-    return { ok: false, reason: merged.reason ?? 'the two predicates cannot be conjoined' }
-  }
-
-  const warnings = [
-    `detaching the policy uninstalls it, which removes every counter on rule ${args.rule.id}: any rate limit or spend window there restarts from zero after the merge`,
-    'the rule is unpoliced between the two transactions, so a signer of it is unconstrained by this policy until step 2 confirms',
-  ]
-
-  return {
-    ok: true,
-    predicate: merged.predicate,
-    policyId,
-    ...(args.rule.oracleBounds ? { oracleParams: args.rule.oracleBounds } : {}),
-    warnings,
-    followUp:
-      args.step === 'detach'
-        ? "sign and submit this transaction, wait for it to confirm, then call again with step: 'reinstall' to install the merged predicate"
-        : 'sign and submit this transaction; the merged predicate is then the only policy governing this rule',
-  }
-}