@crediolabs/policy-synth 0.1.17 → 0.2.0

package/dist-cjs/run/schemas.js

@@ -8,15 +8,15 @@
 // step with the TS source of truth.
 //
 // i128 amounts and other large integers are carried as base-10 decimal strings
-// end-to-end (no JS number coercion). Networks are pinned to the same closed
-// set the core defines. The discriminated union on `source` exposes BOTH
-// synthesize_policy front-ends through a single tool input.
+// end-to-end. Networks are pinned to the same closed set the core defines.
+// The discriminated union on `source` exposes BOTH synthesize_policy
+// front-ends through a single tool input.
 //
 // This module is the SINGLE source of truth for these shapes. The MCP package
 // imports them here so its tool-shape bindings stay in step; the CLI imports
 // them here so it can build the same args envelope the MCP transport builds.
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.ToolErrorSchema = exports.GetInterpreterInfoInputSchema = exports.RevokePolicyInputSchema = exports.InstallPolicyInputSchema = exports.NETWORK_PASSPHRASES = exports.DEFAULT_AUTH_VALID_UNTIL_LEDGERS = exports.RPC_URL_BY_NETWORK = exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_ADDRESS_BY_NETWORK = exports.MAINNET_RPC_URL = exports.TESTNET_RPC_URL = exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_GRAMMAR_VERSION = exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_WASM_SHA256 = exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_MAINNET_ADDRESS = exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_TESTNET_ADDRESS = exports.VerifyPolicyInputSchema = exports.SimulatePolicyInputSchema = exports.OraclePriceFixtureSchema = exports.PredicateNodeSchema = exports.PredicateLeafSchema = exports.SynthesizePolicyInputSchema = exports.SynthesizePolicyRecordingInputSchema = exports.InterpreterOptionsSchema = exports.SynthesizePolicyMandateInputSchema = exports.RecordTransactionInputSchema = exports.OzAdapterConfigSchema = exports.ComposeUserResponsesSchema = exports.MandateSpecSchema = exports.RecordedTransactionSchema = exports.ParseConfidenceSchema = exports.OnChainEventSchema = exports.TokenMovementSchema = exports.ContractInvocationSchema = exports.ScValSchema = exports.NetworkSchema = void 0;
+exports.ToolErrorSchema = exports.GetInterpreterInfoInputSchema = exports.RevokePolicyInputSchema = exports.MergePolicyInputSchema = exports.InstallPolicyInputSchema = exports.NETWORK_PASSPHRASES = exports.DEFAULT_AUTH_VALID_UNTIL_LEDGERS = exports.RPC_URL_BY_NETWORK = exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_WASM_SHA256_BY_NETWORK = exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_ADDRESS_BY_NETWORK = exports.MAINNET_RPC_URL = exports.TESTNET_RPC_URL = exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_GRAMMAR_VERSION = exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_WASM_SHA256_TESTNET = exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_WASM_SHA256 = exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_MAINNET_ADDRESS = exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_TESTNET_ADDRESS = exports.VerifyPolicyInputSchema = exports.SimulatePolicyInputSchema = exports.OraclePriceFixtureSchema = exports.PredicateNodeSchema = exports.PredicateLeafSchema = exports.SynthesizePolicyInputSchema = exports.SynthesizePolicyRecordingInputSchema = exports.InterpreterOptionsSchema = exports.SynthesizePolicyMandateInputSchema = exports.RecordTransactionInputSchema = exports.OzAdapterConfigSchema = exports.ComposeUserResponsesSchema = exports.MandateSpecSchema = exports.RecordedTransactionSchema = exports.ParseConfidenceSchema = exports.OnChainEventSchema = exports.TokenMovementSchema = exports.ContractInvocationSchema = exports.ScValSchema = exports.NetworkSchema = void 0;
 const zod_1 = require("zod");
 const address_ts_1 = require("../synth/address.js");
 /** Soroban `valid_until` is a u32 ledger sequence; a value above this cannot be
@@ -126,7 +126,21 @@ exports.MandateSpecSchema = zod_1.z
     })
         .optional(),
 })
-    .passthrough();
+    .passthrough()
+    // TS-F4/F6: a `recipients` allowlist is only meaningful against a SEP-41
+    // method whose arg 1 IS the recipient (SAC/SEP-41 `transfer(from, to,
+    // amount)` and SEP-41 `mint(to, amount)`). Without this gate the
+    // `to-ir.ts` lowering pins the allowlist to `RECIPIENT_ARG_INDEX = 1`
+    // for any contract+method, which would let a non-SEP-41 method's
+    // arg[1] (e.g. an amount, an op type, an arbitrary address payload)
+    // be silently constrained as if it were a recipient. Refusing
+    // non-SEP-41 methods at the boundary is the fail-closed shape.
+    .refine((v) => v.recipients === undefined ||
+    v.recipients.length === 0 ||
+    v.method === 'transfer' ||
+    v.method === 'mint', {
+    message: 'recipients is only valid when method is a SEP-41 method (transfer or mint); other methods do not have a recipient at arg[1]',
+});
 /** ComposeUserResponses mirrors the core. */
 exports.ComposeUserResponsesSchema = zod_1.z
     .object({
@@ -144,6 +158,21 @@ exports.ComposeUserResponsesSchema = zod_1.z
     swapRecipientAllowlist: zod_1.z
         .array(zod_1.z.string().refine(address_ts_1.isStellarAddress, 'must be a Stellar address (G... or C...)'))
         .optional(),
+    // Per-asset oracle-price bound, one entry per asset. Reaches
+    // `compose-from-recording` and emits an `oracle_price` compare. Declared
+    // here because the object is `.passthrough()`: the field already worked
+    // undeclared, which left the accepted surface wider than the documented
+    // one. `decimals` is REQUIRED - oracle prices normalise to 9 dp and a
+    // threshold silently assumed to share that basis is what let a raw 14-dp
+    // bound permit everything.
+    oraclePriceBound: zod_1.z
+        .array(zod_1.z.object({
+        asset: zod_1.z.string().refine(address_ts_1.isStellarAddress, 'must be a Stellar address (G... or C...)'),
+        operator: zod_1.z.enum(['eq', 'lt', 'lte', 'gt', 'gte']),
+        value: zod_1.z.string().regex(/^[0-9]+$/),
+        decimals: zod_1.z.number().int().min(0).max(U32_MAX),
+    }))
+        .optional(),
 })
     .passthrough();
 /** OzAdapterConfig - the per-network OZ built-in instance addresses. */
@@ -267,7 +296,12 @@ exports.PredicateLeafSchema = zod_1.z.lazy(() => zod_1.z.union([
         windowSeconds: zod_1.z.number().int().positive(),
     }),
     zod_1.z.object({ kind: zod_1.z.literal('now') }),
-    zod_1.z.object({ kind: zod_1.z.literal('valid_until') }),
+    // `valid_until` is NOT in the public predicate grammar: the encoder +
+    // decoder already throw on it, so accepting it here would let a
+    // hand-crafted payload through the schema and only surface a 200+
+    // character internal-commentary error at encode time. Drop it - the
+    // policy's expiry is carried at the install layer (MandateSpec +
+    // validUntilLedger) instead.
     zod_1.z.object({
         kind: zod_1.z.literal('invocation_count_in_window'),
         windowSecs: zod_1.z.number().int().positive(),
@@ -427,20 +461,28 @@ const MandateSpecSchemaForRule = zod_1.z
 // install/revoke/get_info schemas live HERE (after the helper) so the const
 // reference resolves at module init. They are the new tools on top of the
 // existing four.
-/** Pinned interpreter address (testnet). Mirrors DEPLOYMENTS.md:128.
+/** Pinned interpreter address (testnet).
  *  Single source for the MCP layer; do not embed elsewhere. */
-exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_TESTNET_ADDRESS = 'CDR4NLV22STCXFGZPNKDQTEANWLF7LZ6AJLY6B7CLJXKHDZGYJWIOKGP';
-/** Pinned interpreter address (mainnet). Mirrors DEPLOYMENTS.md:18. Mainnet
- *  has now been deployed (2026-08-04); the mainnet interpreter IS the binary
- *  that was exercised on testnet (same wasm sha256, see
- *  PINNED_INTERPRETER_WASM_SHA256). The address differs because instance
- *  ids are network-scoped. UNAUDITED at the time of writing - see
- *  DEPLOYMENTS.md:29-32 for the recorded decision and what is still pending. */
+exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_TESTNET_ADDRESS = 'CALHNU4LXZRKFAXYRBODTGDANTNXHJPBTJNYGLUWLIFIP24NWSGWIE4K';
+/** Pinned interpreter address (mainnet), deployed 2026-08-04.
+ *  UNAUDITED at the time of writing. */
 exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_MAINNET_ADDRESS = 'CALZAMUPREIRY4TULBEXIK77AUTOEJG63XLCPUWEHHQDOVK6ZVVS7VQ2';
-/** Pinned interpreter wasm sha256 (hex). Mirrors DEPLOYMENTS.md:156-157. */
+/** Pinned interpreter wasm sha256 (hex), mainnet.
+ *
+ *  The two networks no longer run the same binary. Testnet carries the
+ *  selector-leaf minimum and the signer-set cap; mainnet predates both. Read
+ *  the hash through `PINNED_INTERPRETER_WASM_SHA256_BY_NETWORK` rather than
+ *  this constant unless mainnet is specifically what is meant, or
+ *  `get_interpreter_info` will report a hash the queried network does not
+ *  run. */
 exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_WASM_SHA256 = '6e6c13d93e197aa380303a42cd120f5ddb080dd36ef2a343ee1dbd04ca52a443';
+/** Pinned interpreter wasm sha256 (hex), testnet. Byte-identical to the
+ *  artifact built from `contracts/policy-interpreter` at the commit that
+ *  introduced errors 216 and 217, verified by fetching the deployed wasm back
+ *  off chain. */
+exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_WASM_SHA256_TESTNET = 'a4d58bc88fd82bbb8e223941ba5889db919717fae92ced13f6f55bfe583b8e22';
 /** The grammar version the interpreter enforces (matches SELF_VERSION in
- *  packages/policy-interpreter/src/version.rs). */
+ *  contracts/policy-interpreter/src/version.rs). */
 exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_GRAMMAR_VERSION = 1;
 /** Default Soroban RPC for the install / revoke / info tools. The recorder
  *  keeps its own copy in record/rpc.ts because it hands back a fetcher rather
@@ -452,14 +494,18 @@ exports.TESTNET_RPC_URL = 'https://soroban-testnet.stellar.org';
  *  RPC rather than always testnet. Public mainnet endpoint, the same one
  *  the deploy script hit during the 2026-08-04 mainnet rollout. */
 exports.MAINNET_RPC_URL = 'https://mainnet.sorobanrpc.com';
-/** Pin + RPC lookup for the gate enforcement. The interpreters' wasm sha256
- *  is identical across both networks (the same binary was uploaded both
- *  places; DEPLOYMENTS.md:25-27), so `PINNED_INTERPRETER_WASM_SHA256` stays
- *  a single constant - only the addresses and RPCs are network-scoped. */
+/** Pin + RPC lookup for the gate enforcement. Addresses, RPCs and wasm
+ *  hashes are all network-scoped: the networks diverged when the
+ *  selector-leaf and signer-cap controls were deployed to testnet ahead of
+ *  mainnet. */
 exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_ADDRESS_BY_NETWORK = {
     testnet: exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_TESTNET_ADDRESS,
     mainnet: exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_MAINNET_ADDRESS,
 };
+exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_WASM_SHA256_BY_NETWORK = {
+    testnet: exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_WASM_SHA256_TESTNET,
+    mainnet: exports.PINNED_INTERPRETER_WASM_SHA256,
+};
 exports.RPC_URL_BY_NETWORK = {
     testnet: exports.TESTNET_RPC_URL,
     mainnet: exports.MAINNET_RPC_URL,
@@ -474,13 +520,26 @@ exports.NETWORK_PASSPHRASES = {
     testnet: 'Test SDF Network ; September 2015',
     mainnet: 'Public Global Stellar Network ; September 2015',
 };
+// Stellar strkey shapes (StrKey base32, no checksum byte, version byte
+// 0x30/0x40 prefixed by the decoder, then 32 base32 chars giving a 56-char
+// total). The shared `isStellarAddress` helper accepts BOTH wallet (G...) and
+// contract (C...) addresses; the install schema has to distinguish them
+// because the smart account is a contract (C...) - a wallet address would
+// mean the rule is being installed against the WRONG account kind entirely.
+// `sourceAccount` is the signing wallet (G...).
+const STELLAR_CONTRACT_ADDRESS = /^C[2-7A-Z]{55}$/;
+const STELLAR_ACCOUNT_ADDRESS = /^G[2-7A-Z]{55}$/;
 exports.InstallPolicyInputSchema = zod_1.z
     .object({
     /** The smart account contract address (C...) that will receive the rule. */
-    smartAccount: zod_1.z.string(),
+    smartAccount: zod_1.z
+        .string()
+        .regex(STELLAR_CONTRACT_ADDRESS, 'smartAccount must be a Stellar contract address (C...)'),
     /** The signer that authorises the install (G... wallet). Used only for
      *  sequence number + auth nonce simulation; never persisted, never signed. */
-    sourceAccount: zod_1.z.string(),
+    sourceAccount: zod_1.z
+        .string()
+        .regex(STELLAR_ACCOUNT_ADDRESS, 'sourceAccount must be a Stellar account address (G...)'),
     /** Target network for the install. Selects which interpreter pin and
      *  which RPC URL are valid by default. Defaults to `testnet` so the
      *  pre-mainnet callers keep working: they were always pointing at
@@ -510,21 +569,63 @@ exports.InstallPolicyInputSchema = zod_1.z
      *  everything. Selecting `network: 'mainnet'` is NOT an opt-in -
      *  the mainnet pin is its own deny-by-default anchor. */
     allowUnpinnedInterpreter: zod_1.z.boolean().optional(),
+    /** Opt-in to installing when a signer of this rule can already reach the
+     *  same calls through a context rule that has NO policy attached. OZ lets
+     *  the signer choose which rule authorises a call and enforces only that
+     *  rule's policies, so an unpoliced rule covering the same calls makes
+     *  this policy decorative. Default-deny, because the caller almost
+     *  certainly believes they are restricting something. */
+    allowAuthorityOverlap: zod_1.z.boolean().optional(),
+    /** Skip the cross-rule authority scan entirely. The scan costs one RPC
+     *  read per rule on the account; skipping it means the response carries
+     *  no statement about what the signers can already do. */
+    skipAuthorityScan: zod_1.z.boolean().optional(),
     /** Base fee in stroops; defaults to BASE_FEE (100). */
     baseFee: zod_1.z.number().int().positive().optional(),
 })
     .refine((v) => Boolean(v.smartAccount) && Boolean(v.sourceAccount), {
     message: 'smartAccount and sourceAccount are required',
 });
+/** `merge_policy` input.
+ *
+ *  The tightening remedy for a cross-rule overlap: replace a rule's predicate
+ *  with the conjunction of it and a new one. Two transactions, in order,
+ *  because OZ refuses to re-attach a policy already on the rule - so the
+ *  caller runs `detach`, waits for it to confirm, then runs `reinstall`. */
+exports.MergePolicyInputSchema = zod_1.z
+    .object({
+    smartAccount: zod_1.z
+        .string()
+        .regex(STELLAR_CONTRACT_ADDRESS, 'smartAccount must be a Stellar contract address (C...)'),
+    sourceAccount: zod_1.z
+        .string()
+        .regex(STELLAR_ACCOUNT_ADDRESS, 'sourceAccount must be a Stellar account address (G...)'),
+    /** The rule whose predicate is being tightened. */
+    ruleId: zod_1.z.number().int().nonnegative(),
+    /** The predicate to conjoin, base64 canonical ScVal, as emitted by
+     *  `synthesize_policy`. */
+    incomingPredicateBlobBase64: zod_1.z.string().min(1),
+    /** Which half of the remedy to build. */
+    step: zod_1.z.enum(['detach', 'reinstall']),
+    network: exports.NetworkSchema.optional(),
+    rpcUrl: zod_1.z.string().url().optional(),
+    allowUnpinnedRpcUrl: zod_1.z.boolean().optional(),
+    baseFee: zod_1.z.number().int().positive().optional(),
+})
+    .strict();
 exports.RevokePolicyInputSchema = zod_1.z
     .object({
     /** The smart account contract address (C...). */
-    smartAccount: zod_1.z.string(),
+    smartAccount: zod_1.z
+        .string()
+        .regex(STELLAR_CONTRACT_ADDRESS, 'smartAccount must be a Stellar contract address (C...)'),
     /** The wallet that will sign the removal. The ACCOUNT decides whether it
      *  accepts that signer; this schema does not assert a rule it cannot
      *  verify, since the account's source is not in this repo. Proven on
      *  testnet: the account's deployer can revoke. */
-    sourceAccount: zod_1.z.string(),
+    sourceAccount: zod_1.z
+        .string()
+        .regex(STELLAR_ACCOUNT_ADDRESS, 'sourceAccount must be a Stellar account address (G...)'),
     /** Target network for the revoke. Same `testnet`-default as install,
      *  so pre-mainnet callers keep working without an explicit flag. */
     network: exports.NetworkSchema.optional(),
@@ -546,8 +647,15 @@ exports.GetInterpreterInfoInputSchema = zod_1.z.object({
     /** When true, perform an optional live `grammar_version()` RPC call to
      *  verify the deployed contract matches the pin. */
     verifyLive: zod_1.z.boolean().optional(),
-    /** Optional RPC URL override. */
+    /** Optional RPC URL override. When `verifyLive` is true, the URL must
+     *  equal the pinned RPC for the selected network unless
+     *  `allowUnpinnedRpcUrl: true` is also set (same opt-in shape as
+     *  install/revoke - the live grammar_version() answer binds to whichever
+     *  RPC returned it). */
     rpcUrl: zod_1.z.string().url().optional(),
+    /** Opt-in to using a non-pinned RPC URL when `verifyLive` is true. Same
+     *  semantics as install/revoke: the caller accepts the trust shift. */
+    allowUnpinnedRpcUrl: zod_1.z.boolean().optional(),
 });
 // ===== Error envelope (canonical) =====
 //

package/dist-cjs/synth/compose-from-recording.d.ts

@@ -28,28 +28,23 @@ export interface ComposeUserResponses {
      *  invocation_count bound; absent -> FREQUENCY_BOUND_MISSING. */
     invocationLimit?: number;
     /** Per-asset oracle-price bound(s). Each entry lowers to a single
-     *  `oracle_price(asset) OP value` compare in the interpreter IR. Multiple
-     *  entries on the same asset emit multiple leaves. */
+     *  `oracle_price(asset) OP value` compare in the interpreter IR. */
     oraclePriceBound?: OraclePriceBound[];
     /** Minimum acceptable swap output per unit of input, as `num/den` (e.g.
-     *  `{num:'95',den:'100'}` = accept losing at most 5%). Emitted as a
-     *  slippage floor bounding the output arg against the input arg of the same
-     *  call.
-     *
-     *  REQUIRED to be supplied by the caller: it is never derived from the
-     *  recording. The recorded in/out pair is a price at one moment, and
-     *  freezing it as policy would deny ordinary trades as soon as the rate
-     *  moves. Absent, no floor is emitted and the existing unbounded-output
-     *  warning stands. */
+     *  `{num:'95',den:'100'}` = accept losing at most 5%). REQUIRED to be
+     *  supplied by the caller: never derived from the recording (the recorded
+     *  in/out pair is a price at one moment, and freezing it as policy would
+     *  deny ordinary trades as soon as the rate moves). Absent, no floor is
+     *  emitted and the existing unbounded-output warning stands. */
     swapMinOutRatio?: {
         num: string;
         den: string;
     };
     /** Recipient allowlist for a swap (call_arg[3] on SoroSwap's
-     *  swap_exact_tokens_for_tokens). When supplied, it REPLACES the default
-     *  pin. Absent -> the recipient is pinned to the recorded value (mirroring
-     *  SEP-41) and RECIPIENT_ALLOWLIST_EMPTY is surfaced as informational, never
-     *  a silent free pass. */
+     *  swap_exact_tokens_for_tokens). When supplied, REPLACES the default pin.
+     *  Absent -> recipient is pinned to the recorded value (mirroring SEP-41)
+     *  and RECIPIENT_ALLOWLIST_EMPTY surfaces as informational, never a silent
+     *  free pass. */
     swapRecipientAllowlist?: string[];
 }
 /** Composition options. */