@crediolabs/policy-synth 0.1.10 → 0.1.12

package/dist/synth/evaluate.js

@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@
 // Amounts: BigInt on decimal strings (never JS `number`). Oracle errors
 // modelled by throwing (never a boolean-false that `not`/`or` could mask).
 import { literalNumericBigInt } from "./predicate-literals.js";
+/** Oracle prices normalise to this many decimals; mirrors NORMALISED_DECIMALS
+ *  in oracle.rs. A threshold on any other basis must say so. */
+const NORMALISED_DECIMALS = 9;
+/** Mirrors MAX_ORACLE_THRESHOLD_DECIMALS in dsl.rs. */
+const MAX_ORACLE_THRESHOLD_DECIMALS = 18;
 /** Internal fatal thrown by the oracle path; caught at the top of `evaluate`
  *  and converted to the matching `ORACLE_*` deny reason. NOT a
  *  boolean-false that `not` / `or` could mask. */
@@ -165,6 +170,13 @@ function evalCompare(op, left, right, ctx) {
     }
     // --- step 4b: call_arg comparison (eq / exact-vec, or an ordered numeric bound) ---
     if (left.kind === 'call_arg') {
+        // The swap's canonical form is `call_arg[out] >= call_arg_scaled(in, num, den)`.
+        // Dispatched here so the floor's dedicated reason codes (ARITHMETIC_OVERFLOW
+        // -> SLIPPAGE_FLOOR) reach the user; routing the scaled RHS through the
+        // generic `evalArgOrderedCompare` would mask overflow as ARG_MISMATCH.
+        if (right.kind === 'call_arg_scaled') {
+            return evalScaledArgCompare(op, left, right, ctx);
+        }
         const actual = ctx.args[left.index];
         // An ordered comparison (lt/lte/gt/gte) reads the arg as an integer and
         // compares it to a numeric literal via BigInt (e.g. a SoroSwap input-amount
@@ -175,6 +187,11 @@ function evalCompare(op, left, right, ctx) {
             return evalArgOrderedCompare(op, actual, right);
         return evalArgEq(op, actual, right, ctx);
     }
+    // --- step 4b': scaled leaf on the LEFT (`call_arg_scaled(in, num, den) <= call_arg[out]`).
+    // Symmetric form so a policy that phrases the floor either way works.
+    if (left.kind === 'call_arg_scaled') {
+        return evalScaledArgCompare(op, right, left, ctx);
+    }
     // --- step 4c: call_arg_len: the length of a vec-typed argument as a u32.
     // Fails closed on a non-vec arg, an absent arg, or a non-u32 literal.
     if (left.kind === 'call_arg_len') {
@@ -293,6 +310,102 @@ function evalArgEq(op, actual, right, ctx) {
         return { permit: false, reason: 'ARG_MISMATCH' };
     return { permit: false, reason: 'ARG_MISMATCH' };
 }
+/** Step 4b': slippage-floor comparison. Mirrors the Rust `eval_scaled_arg_compare`
+ *  path: the scaled leaf is `args[index] * num / den` (truncating toward
+ *  zero). On `checked_mul` / `checked_div` failure (overflow or
+ *  divide-by-zero) the comparison denies with `ARITHMETIC_OVERFLOW`. A
+ *  failed comparison denies with `SLIPPAGE_FLOOR` (the dedicated reason)
+ *  rather than the generic `ARG_MISMATCH`.
+ *
+ *  `left` is whichever side of the compare is NOT the scaled leaf. A
+ *  scaled-on-scaled compare denies `ARG_MISMATCH` (pipelining two scaled
+ *  leaves has no definable semantics). The other operand must be a
+ *  numeric shape (`call_arg` carrying a number, or a numeric literal);
+ *  anything else is `ARG_MISMATCH`. */
+function evalScaledArgCompare(op, left, right, ctx) {
+    // Identify which side is scaled, and pull the other side as a number.
+    let scaled;
+    let other;
+    let scaledOnRight;
+    if (left.kind === 'call_arg_scaled') {
+        scaled = left;
+        other = right;
+        scaledOnRight = false;
+    }
+    else if (right.kind === 'call_arg_scaled') {
+        scaled = right;
+        other = left;
+        scaledOnRight = true;
+    }
+    else {
+        // Neither side is scaled - this is a programming error in the
+        // dispatcher; the contract returns ARG_MISMATCH to fail closed.
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARG_MISMATCH' };
+    }
+    // Source `args[index]` -> BigInt. An out-of-bounds index or a
+    // non-numeric arg fails closed as ARG_MISMATCH (not SLIPPAGE_FLOOR) -
+    // a violated floor is the wrong code when the operand itself could
+    // not be read.
+    if (scaled.index >= ctx.args.length) {
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARG_MISMATCH' };
+    }
+    const input = argNumericBigInt(ctx.args[scaled.index]);
+    if (input === null)
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARG_MISMATCH' };
+    let num;
+    let den;
+    try {
+        num = BigInt(scaled.num);
+        den = BigInt(scaled.den);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARG_MISMATCH' };
+    }
+    // Install refuses `den == 0` and `num <= 0` / `den <= 0`. The runtime
+    // check is a defensive belt-and-braces - a future validator
+    // regression cannot panic the frame on a divide-by-zero.
+    if (den === 0n)
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARITHMETIC_OVERFLOW' };
+    const product = input * num;
+    // BigInt overflow is silent in JS (it does not throw on multiplication).
+    // We can detect over-range by dividing and checking the result against
+    // i128 bounds, but the more practical check is whether the result
+    // divides cleanly. We rely on BigInt's arbitrary precision and then
+    // surface ARITHMETIC_OVERFLOW if the result is outside i128.
+    let scaledValue;
+    try {
+        // BigInt division truncates toward zero (matches Rust `i128::checked_div`).
+        scaledValue = product / den;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARITHMETIC_OVERFLOW' };
+    }
+    // i128 range check: if the scaled value is outside i128, the contract
+    // would have wrapped on i128 arithmetic; surface the same deny.
+    const I128_MAX = (1n << 127n) - 1n;
+    const I128_MIN = -(1n << 127n);
+    if (scaledValue > I128_MAX || scaledValue < I128_MIN) {
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARITHMETIC_OVERFLOW' };
+    }
+    // Resolving the operand when the scaled side is on the right: the
+    // operand is `left`; the scaled value is the RHS. The AST order is
+    // `left <op> scaled`, so the comparator applies to `other <op> scaled`.
+    // When the scaled side is on the left, the order is `scaled <op> other`,
+    // i.e. `scaled <op> other_val`.
+    let otherVal;
+    if (other.kind === 'call_arg') {
+        otherVal = argNumericBigInt(ctx.args[other.index]);
+    }
+    else {
+        otherVal = literalNumericBigInt(other);
+    }
+    if (otherVal === null)
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARG_MISMATCH' };
+    const pass = scaledOnRight
+        ? bigintCmp(op, otherVal.toString(), scaledValue.toString())
+        : bigintCmp(op, scaledValue.toString(), otherVal.toString());
+    return pass ? { permit: true } : { permit: false, reason: 'SLIPPAGE_FLOOR' };
+}
 /** Ordered numeric comparison (lt/lte/gt/gte) on a `call_arg`. The interpreter
  *  reads the arg as an integer (i128 / u64 / u32 on the recorder's ScVal
  *  surface) and compares it to a numeric literal via BigInt. A non-numeric arg
@@ -389,6 +502,7 @@ function resolveLeaf(leaf, ctx) {
         case 'invocation_count_in_window':
         case 'now':
         case 'valid_until':
+        case 'call_arg_scaled':
             return undefined; // selector leaves with no ScVal projection
         case 'literal_address':
             return { type: 'address', value: leaf.value };
@@ -447,10 +561,23 @@ function evalOracleCompare(op, asset, right, ctx) {
             throw new OracleError('ORACLE_STALE');
         throw new OracleError(mapped);
     }
-    const literal = right.kind === 'literal_i128' ? right.value : null;
-    if (literal === null)
+    // Mirrors eval_oracle_compare in dsl.rs. The threshold MUST declare its
+    // decimal basis: prices are on the normalised 9-dp basis, and assuming a
+    // bare literal shares it is what let a raw 14-dp threshold permit
+    // everything. A bare literal is refused rather than assumed.
+    if (right.kind !== 'oracle_threshold')
         throw new OracleError('ORACLE_DECIMALS_MISMATCH');
-    return bigintCmp(op, entry.price, literal)
+    if (right.decimals > MAX_ORACLE_THRESHOLD_DECIMALS) {
+        throw new OracleError('ORACLE_THRESHOLD_DECIMALS_OUT_OF_RANGE');
+    }
+    // Scale BOTH sides up to the wider basis rather than dividing the threshold
+    // down: dividing truncates, and a truncated bound moves the permit boundary.
+    const decimals = BigInt(right.decimals);
+    const normalised = BigInt(NORMALISED_DECIMALS);
+    const common = decimals > normalised ? decimals : normalised;
+    const priceScaled = BigInt(entry.price) * 10n ** (common - normalised);
+    const literalScaled = BigInt(right.value) * 10n ** (common - decimals);
+    return bigintCmp(op, String(priceScaled), String(literalScaled))
         ? { permit: true }
         : { permit: false, reason: 'FN_MISMATCH' };
 }

package/dist/synth/permit-context.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+import type { PredicateNode, RecordedTransaction } from '../types.ts';
+import type { EvalContext } from './evaluate.ts';
+export interface PermitContextResponses {
+    windowSeconds: number;
+    invocationLimit?: number;
+    limitAmount?: string;
+    validUntilLedger: number;
+    oraclePriceBound?: Array<{
+        asset: string;
+        operator: string;
+        value: string;
+        decimals: number;
+    }>;
+}
+export declare function buildPermitContext(tx: RecordedTransaction, responses: PermitContextResponses, predicate: PredicateNode): EvalContext;

package/dist/synth/permit-context.js

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+// src/synth/permit-context.ts - build the EvalContext that represents the
+// recorded call being replayed.
+//
+// Extracted from the over-permissiveness harness so the same construction
+// feeds both the in-process battery and the on-chain replay
+// (scripts/verify-mutations-testnet.ts). Two callers building this
+// separately would be two chances to disagree about what "the recorded
+// call" means, which is the one thing both must share.
+import { cloneScVal } from "./deny-cases.js";
+export function buildPermitContext(tx, responses, predicate) {
+    const amountByToken = {};
+    const totals = new Map();
+    for (const m of tx.tokenMovements) {
+        const current = totals.get(m.token) ?? 0n;
+        totals.set(m.token, current + BigInt(m.amount));
+    }
+    for (const [token, total] of totals) {
+        amountByToken[token] = total.toString();
+    }
+    const topLevel = tx.invocations[0];
+    const scopeContract = topLevel?.contract ?? '';
+    const oraclePriceByAsset = {};
+    visitOracleLeaves(predicate, (asset, op, bound) => {
+        let price;
+        switch (op) {
+            case 'lt':
+                price = bound - 1n;
+                break;
+            case 'gt':
+                price = bound + 1n;
+                break;
+            default:
+                price = bound;
+        }
+        if (price < 0n)
+            price = 0n;
+        oraclePriceByAsset[asset] = { price: price.toString(), timestampSeconds: tx.fetchedAt };
+    });
+    const ctx = {
+        contract: scopeContract,
+        fn: topLevel?.fn ?? '',
+        args: (topLevel?.args ?? []).map(cloneScVal),
+        atLedger: tx.ledgerSequence,
+        nowSeconds: tx.fetchedAt,
+        amountByToken,
+        windowSpentByToken: {},
+        invocationCountByWindow: {},
+        oraclePriceByAsset,
+    };
+    if (responses.validUntilLedger !== undefined) {
+        ctx.validUntilLedger = responses.validUntilLedger;
+    }
+    return ctx;
+}
+function visitOracleLeaves(node, visit) {
+    switch (node.op) {
+        case 'and':
+        case 'or':
+            for (const child of node.children)
+                visitOracleLeaves(child, visit);
+            return;
+        case 'not':
+            visitOracleLeaves(node.child, visit);
+            return;
+        case 'eq':
+        case 'lt':
+        case 'lte':
+        case 'gt':
+        case 'gte': {
+            const leftIsOracle = node.left.kind === 'oracle_price';
+            const rightIsOracle = node.right.kind === 'oracle_price';
+            let asset;
+            let literal;
+            if (leftIsOracle) {
+                asset = node.left.kind === 'oracle_price' ? node.left.asset : undefined;
+                literal = oracleThresholdNormalised(node.right);
+            }
+            else if (rightIsOracle) {
+                asset = node.right.kind === 'oracle_price' ? node.right.asset : undefined;
+                literal = oracleThresholdNormalised(node.left);
+            }
+            if (asset !== undefined && literal !== undefined) {
+                visit(asset, node.op, literal);
+            }
+            return;
+        }
+        case 'in':
+            return;
+    }
+}
+/** Oracle prices normalise to 9 decimals; mirrors NORMALISED_DECIMALS in
+ *  oracle.rs. */
+const NORMALISED_DECIMALS = 9n;
+/** A threshold restated on the normalised basis, so a derived permit price is
+ *  comparable to it. Thresholds carry their own basis, so the conversion has
+ *  to happen here - reading the digits raw would build a context off by a
+ *  factor of 10^(decimals-9). Returns undefined for any other leaf. */
+function oracleThresholdNormalised(leaf) {
+    if (leaf.kind !== 'oracle_threshold')
+        return undefined;
+    let value;
+    try {
+        value = BigInt(leaf.value);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    const decimals = BigInt(leaf.decimals);
+    if (decimals <= NORMALISED_DECIMALS) {
+        return value * 10n ** (NORMALISED_DECIMALS - decimals);
+    }
+    // Floor: a finer-grained threshold has no exact 9-dp representation. The
+    // caller only needs a price that lands on the right side of the bound, and
+    // it offsets by one from here.
+    return value / 10n ** (decimals - NORMALISED_DECIMALS);
+}

package/dist/synth/synthesize-from-recording.js

@@ -811,13 +811,25 @@ function visitOracleLeaves(node, visit) {
             return;
     }
 }
+/** An oracle threshold restated on the normalised 9-dp basis prices use.
+ *  Thresholds carry their own basis, so reading the digits raw would build a
+ *  permit context off by 10^(decimals-9) and the intended call would not
+ *  satisfy its own bound. Mirrors NORMALISED_DECIMALS in oracle.rs. */
 function oracleLiteralFromLeaf(leaf) {
-    if (leaf.kind !== 'literal_i128')
+    if (leaf.kind !== 'oracle_threshold')
         return undefined;
+    let value;
     try {
-        return BigInt(leaf.value);
+        value = BigInt(leaf.value);
     }
     catch {
         return undefined;
     }
+    const normalised = 9n;
+    const decimals = BigInt(leaf.decimals);
+    if (decimals <= normalised)
+        return value * 10n ** (normalised - decimals);
+    // Floor: a finer-grained threshold has no exact 9-dp representation; the
+    // caller offsets by one from here to land on the right side of the bound.
+    return value / 10n ** (decimals - normalised);
 }

package/dist/types.d.ts

@@ -190,6 +190,11 @@ export type PredicateLeaf = {
     index: number;
     element: number;
     field: string;
+} | {
+    kind: 'call_arg_scaled';
+    index: number;
+    num: string;
+    den: string;
 } | {
     kind: 'amount';
     token: string;
@@ -207,6 +212,10 @@ export type PredicateLeaf = {
 } | {
     kind: 'oracle_price';
     asset: string;
+} | {
+    kind: 'oracle_threshold';
+    value: string;
+    decimals: number;
 } | {
     kind: 'literal_address';
     value: string;

package/dist-cjs/adapters/interpreter/adapter.js

@@ -52,7 +52,10 @@ exports.ORACLE_DEFAULTS = {
 const CAPABILITIES = {
     supportsSpendWindow: true,
     supportsThreshold: false, // thresholds are the OZ adapter's job
-    supportsTimeExpiry: true, // via valid_until ledger expiry
+    // False for the predicate-leaf path: the interpreter refuses a `valid_until`
+    // leaf at install. Expiry is still available, but as the context rule's
+    // validUntilLedger, which the smart account enforces - not as a predicate.
+    supportsTimeExpiry: false,
     supportsOraclePrice: true,
     supportsInvocationCount: true,
     supportsGeneralPredicate: true,
@@ -220,34 +223,86 @@ function lowerRule(rule, config) {
  *  by `lowerRule` to populate `uncovered` before lowering. */
 function unsupportedConstruct(cond) {
     switch (cond.op) {
+        // Expressible: `call_arg_scaled` is exactly this construct.
+        case 'slippage_floor':
+            return null;
         case 'in':
-            return cond.selector.kind === 'calldata' || cond.selector.kind === 'value'
-                ? `EVM \`${cond.selector.kind}\` selector on allowlist (predicate DSL)`
-                : null;
+            // The oracle position rule is a hard error and must be raised before a
+            // construct can be written off as uncovered - otherwise a subtree that
+            // is BOTH misplaced-oracle and unsourceable would be silently dropped
+            // instead of rejected.
+            assertNoOracleDescendants(cond);
+            return (unsourceableSelector(cond.selector) ??
+                (cond.selector.kind === 'calldata' || cond.selector.kind === 'value'
+                    ? `EVM \`${cond.selector.kind}\` selector on allowlist (predicate DSL)`
+                    : null));
         case 'eq_seq':
-            return cond.selector.kind === 'calldata' || cond.selector.kind === 'value'
-                ? `EVM \`${cond.selector.kind}\` selector on ordered-sequence equality (predicate DSL)`
-                : null;
+            return (unsourceableSelector(cond.selector) ??
+                (cond.selector.kind === 'calldata' || cond.selector.kind === 'value'
+                    ? `EVM \`${cond.selector.kind}\` selector on ordered-sequence equality (predicate DSL)`
+                    : null));
         case 'compare': {
             const s = cond.compare.selector;
             if (s.kind === 'calldata')
                 return 'EVM calldata comparison (predicate DSL)';
             if (s.kind === 'value')
                 return 'tx.value comparison (predicate DSL)';
-            return null;
+            // The on-chain interpreter sees ONE authorized call - there is no
+            // `Context.sub_invocations` in v1 - so it cannot observe the
+            // transaction's token movements. `amount` has no value to read, and
+            // `window_spent` accumulates BY that amount, so its counter would never
+            // move. Deriving either from the call payload would quietly swap "value
+            // actually moved" for "value the caller declared" - a weaker guarantee
+            // than the review card would be claiming.
+            //
+            // Rolling spend caps belong to the OZ `spending_limit` primitive, which
+            // is already audited and which the OZ adapter emits. A per-call cap is
+            // expressible here as `arg_field`; bounding it with `invocation_count`
+            // gives an enforceable ceiling per window.
+            return unsourceableSelector(s);
         }
+        // Recurse: a nested `and`/`or`/`not` must not smuggle a selector past the
+        // pre-scan, which only sees top-level constraints.
         case 'and':
+            return cond.children.map(unsupportedConstruct).find((u) => u !== null) ?? null;
         case 'or':
+            assertNoOracleDescendants(cond);
+            return cond.children.map(unsupportedConstruct).find((u) => u !== null) ?? null;
         case 'not':
-            return null;
+            assertNoOracleDescendants(cond);
+            return unsupportedConstruct(cond.child);
     }
 }
+/** Selectors whose value the on-chain interpreter has no way to obtain. */
+function unsourceableSelector(s) {
+    if (s.kind === 'amount') {
+        return `per-call amount comparison on ${s.token} - the interpreter cannot observe token movements; express a per-call cap with arg_field, or a rolling cap with the OZ spending_limit primitive`;
+    }
+    if (s.kind === 'window_spent') {
+        return `rolling spend cap on ${s.token} over ${s.windowSeconds}s - not enforceable by the interpreter; use the OZ spending_limit primitive, or bound per-call value with arg_field plus invocation_count`;
+    }
+    return null;
+}
 /** Lower one IR condition to a PredicateNode. Enforces the oracle position
  *  rule (oracle_price leaves must sit directly under the top-level `and`) and
  *  the self-call rule (`in` allowlist / `compare eq` vs the smart account
  *  address -> SCOPE_SELF_CALL). */
 function lowerCondition(cond, config) {
     switch (cond.op) {
+        // `out >= in * num/den`. The contract refuses den == 0 or a non-positive
+        // ratio at install, so a malformed floor fails loudly rather than
+        // silently inverting the comparison.
+        case 'slippage_floor':
+            return {
+                op: 'gte',
+                left: { kind: 'call_arg', index: cond.outArgIndex },
+                right: {
+                    kind: 'call_arg_scaled',
+                    index: cond.inArgIndex,
+                    num: cond.num,
+                    den: cond.den,
+                },
+            };
         case 'and':
             return { op: 'and', children: cond.children.map((c) => lowerCondition(c, config)) };
         case 'or':
@@ -316,10 +371,13 @@ function lowerSelector(s) {
             return { kind: 'call_arg_len', index: s.argIndex };
         case 'arg_field':
             return { kind: 'call_arg_field', index: s.argIndex, element: s.element, field: s.field };
+        // `amount` / `window_spent` are filtered out by `unsupportedConstruct`
+        // before lowering - the interpreter cannot source either on chain. Reaching
+        // here means the pre-scan was bypassed, so fail loudly rather than emit a
+        // leaf the contract will refuse.
         case 'amount':
-            return { kind: 'amount', token: s.token };
         case 'window_spent':
-            return { kind: 'window_spent', token: s.token, windowSeconds: s.windowSeconds };
+            throw new Error(`interpreter adapter cannot lower \`${s.kind}\`: it should have been reported as uncovered`);
         case 'invocation_count':
             return { kind: 'invocation_count_in_window', windowSecs: s.windowSeconds };
         case 'now':
@@ -346,6 +404,16 @@ function lowerSelector(s) {
  *    - invocation_count -> u32 (counts are small non-negative integers)
  *    - now / valid_until -> u64 (unix timestamps in seconds) */
 function literalFromIRCompare(c) {
+    // An oracle comparand is not a bare literal: the interpreter refuses one,
+    // because assuming it shares the normalised 9-dp basis is what made a raw
+    // 14-dp threshold permit everything it was written to deny.
+    if (c.selector.kind === 'oracle_price') {
+        if (c.valueDecimals === undefined) {
+            throw toolError('ORACLE_THRESHOLD_BASIS_REQUIRED', 'An oracle price bound must declare the decimal basis of its threshold ' +
+                '(oracle prices normalise to 9 decimals).');
+        }
+        return { kind: 'oracle_threshold', value: c.value, decimals: c.valueDecimals };
+    }
     const scalarType = selectorScalarType(c.selector);
     return literalFromScalar(c.value, scalarType);
 }
@@ -412,6 +480,8 @@ function assertNoOracleDescendants(node) {
 }
 function containsOracle(node) {
     switch (node.op) {
+        case 'slippage_floor':
+            return false;
         case 'compare':
             return node.compare.selector.kind === 'oracle_price';
         case 'in':
@@ -450,6 +520,8 @@ function assertOracleParamsTighten(params) {
  *  express. Mirrors the OZ adapter's `describeCondition` for parity. */
 function describeCondition(cond) {
     switch (cond.op) {
+        case 'slippage_floor':
+            return `slippage floor: arg[${cond.outArgIndex}] >= arg[${cond.inArgIndex}] * ${cond.num}/${cond.den}`;
         case 'in':
             return `value allowlist on ${describeSelector(cond.selector)} (predicate DSL)`;
         case 'eq_seq':

package/dist-cjs/adapters/oz/adapter.js

@@ -212,6 +212,10 @@ function matchSpendingLimit(c) {
  *  cannot express, used to populate `uncovered`. */
 function describeCondition(cond) {
     switch (cond.op) {
+        case 'slippage_floor':
+            // The OZ primitives bound a value against a constant; this bounds one
+            // call argument against another, which none of them can express.
+            return `slippage floor on arg[${cond.outArgIndex}] (OZ built-ins cannot bound one argument against another)`;
         case 'in':
             return `value allowlist on ${describeSelector(cond.selector)} (arg allowlist)`;
         case 'eq_seq':

package/dist-cjs/errors.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-export type ErrorCode = 'RECORDING_FAILED' | 'RECORDING_VALIDATION_FAILED' | 'SCOPE_UNRESOLVED' | 'SYNTHESIS_ERROR' | 'MALFORMED_PREDICATE' | 'SIMULATION_ERROR' | 'VERIFICATION_FAILED' | 'DENY_CASE_FAILURE' | 'PERMIT_CASE_FAILED' | 'SUMMARY_DRIFT' | 'INSTALL_BUILD_FAILED' | 'INSTALL_CONFIRM_MISSING' | 'INSTALL_CONFIRM_EXPIRED' | 'REVOKE_BUILD_FAILED' | 'REVOKE_CONFIRM_MISSING' | 'USER_REJECTED_SIGN' | 'WALLET_TIMEOUT' | 'WALLET_UNAVAILABLE' | 'PREDICATE_TOO_LARGE' | 'PREDICATE_TOO_DEEP' | 'TOO_MANY_LEAVES' | 'IN_OPERAND_LIMIT' | 'PREDICATE_ORACLE_OVER_LIMIT' | 'POLICY_CAP_EXCEEDED' | 'WASM_TOO_LARGE' | 'MASTER_AUTH_REQUIRED' | 'NONCE_REPLAY' | 'VERSION_MISMATCH' | 'ARITHMETIC_OVERFLOW' | 'AMOUNT_OVERFLOW' | 'RULE_SIGNERS_CHANGED' | 'SCOPE_SELF_CALL' | 'ORACLE_STALE' | 'ORACLE_MISSING' | 'ORACLE_DEVIATION_EXCEEDED' | 'ORACLE_MALFORMED_HISTORY' | 'ORACLE_FINGERPRINT_DRIFT' | 'ORACLE_PAUSED' | 'ORACLE_LEAF_INVALID_POSITION' | 'ORACLE_PARAMS_OUT_OF_RANGE' | 'ORACLE_DECIMALS_MISMATCH' | 'COMPILE_OK' | 'COMPILE_GATE_FAILED';
+export type ErrorCode = 'RECORDING_FAILED' | 'RECORDING_VALIDATION_FAILED' | 'SCOPE_UNRESOLVED' | 'SYNTHESIS_ERROR' | 'MALFORMED_PREDICATE' | 'SIMULATION_ERROR' | 'VERIFICATION_FAILED' | 'DENY_CASE_FAILURE' | 'PERMIT_CASE_FAILED' | 'SUMMARY_DRIFT' | 'INSTALL_BUILD_FAILED' | 'INSTALL_CONFIRM_MISSING' | 'INSTALL_CONFIRM_EXPIRED' | 'REVOKE_BUILD_FAILED' | 'REVOKE_CONFIRM_MISSING' | 'USER_REJECTED_SIGN' | 'WALLET_TIMEOUT' | 'WALLET_UNAVAILABLE' | 'PREDICATE_TOO_LARGE' | 'PREDICATE_TOO_DEEP' | 'TOO_MANY_LEAVES' | 'IN_OPERAND_LIMIT' | 'PREDICATE_ORACLE_OVER_LIMIT' | 'POLICY_CAP_EXCEEDED' | 'WASM_TOO_LARGE' | 'MASTER_AUTH_REQUIRED' | 'NONCE_REPLAY' | 'VERSION_MISMATCH' | 'ARITHMETIC_OVERFLOW' | 'AMOUNT_OVERFLOW' | 'RULE_SIGNERS_CHANGED' | 'SCOPE_SELF_CALL' | 'ARG_MISMATCH' | 'CONTRACT_SCOPE' | 'UNSUPPORTED_NODE' | 'STATEFUL_BOUND' | 'NOT_IN_ALLOWLIST' | 'FREQUENCY' | 'SLIPPAGE_FLOOR' | 'ORACLE_STALE' | 'ORACLE_MISSING' | 'ORACLE_NO_CONFIRMATION' | 'ORACLE_DEVIATION_EXCEEDED' | 'ORACLE_MALFORMED_HISTORY' | 'ORACLE_FINGERPRINT_DRIFT' | 'ORACLE_PAUSED' | 'ORACLE_LEAF_INVALID_POSITION' | 'ORACLE_PARAMS_OUT_OF_RANGE' | 'ORACLE_DECIMALS_MISMATCH' | 'ORACLE_THRESHOLD_DECIMALS_OUT_OF_RANGE' | 'ORACLE_THRESHOLD_BASIS_REQUIRED' | 'COMPILE_OK' | 'COMPILE_GATE_FAILED';
 export interface ToolError {
     code: ErrorCode;
     message: string;

package/dist-cjs/install/build-add-context-rule.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+import { xdr } from '@stellar/stellar-sdk';
+import { type ContextRuleDraft, type PolicyRef, type SignerDraft } from '../types.ts';
+/** Inputs for `buildAddContextRuleArgs`. The fields are the ones the contract
+ *  validates at install; everything else is downstream. */
+export interface BuildAddContextRuleArgs {
+    /** The auth-context rule signers to attach - `Vec<Signer>` wire form.
+     *  These are the SIGNERS the new rule authorises, not the deployer's
+     *  admin session. The deployer signs the install call via the admin rule
+     *  already on the account, which is separate from this list. */
+    signers: SignerDraft[];
+    /** The policy(ies) to attach to the new rule. Only `interpreter` refs
+     *  reach the wire today; `oz_builtin` is reserved for Phase 06 follow-ups. */
+    policies: PolicyRef[];
+    /** Per-policy install nonce; 1 for a fresh install. */
+    installNonce: number;
+    /** Already-encoded (base64) canonical ScVal of the predicate. The builder
+     *  decodes it to bytes for the `predicate` field and re-hashes to confirm
+     *  the caller-supplied `predicateHash` matches. */
+    encodedPredicate: string;
+    /** Hex sha256 of the canonical predicate XDR bytes. */
+    predicateHash: string;
+    /** Per-policy oracle overrides. Absent on any key uses the wasm default. */
+    oracleParams?: {
+        maxStalenessSeconds?: number;
+        maxDeviationBps?: number;
+        /** Bound between the primary and secondary feeds. Tighten-only against
+         *  the wasm default, like the other two. */
+        maxCrossFeedDeviationBps?: number;
+    };
+    /** Hard pin to the interpreter's wasm grammar. Refusing here fails closed
+     *  before the chain does; the contract will refuse a mismatch again. */
+    grammarVersion?: number;
+}
+export declare const DEFAULT_GRAMMAR_VERSION: 1;
+/** The verb `add_context_rule` takes on the wire. */
+export declare const ADD_CONTEXT_RULE_SYMBOL: "add_context_rule";
+/** Tuple of `ScVal` arguments to pass to `Operation.invokeHostFunction` for
+ *  `add_context_rule`. Order matches the OZ trait signature. */
+export type AddContextRuleArgs = readonly [
+    contextType: xdr.ScVal,
+    name: xdr.ScVal,
+    validUntil: xdr.ScVal,
+    signers: xdr.ScVal,
+    policies: xdr.ScVal
+];
+/** Build the `add_context_rule` invocation args. Throws a `ToolError`-shaped
+ *  error on limit breaches or malformed input. */
+export declare function buildAddContextRuleArgs(draft: ContextRuleDraft, args: BuildAddContextRuleArgs): AddContextRuleArgs;