@crediolabs/policy-synth 0.1.10 → 0.1.11

package/dist-cjs/registry/protocols.js

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 // fails closed: a method call whose decoded args do NOT match the ABI
 // signature is treated as unknown.
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.PROTOCOL_ABIS = exports.SOROSWAP_ABI = exports.BLEND_ABI = exports.SEP41_ABI = void 0;
+exports.PROTOCOL_ABIS = exports.OZ_ACCOUNT_ABI = exports.SOROSWAP_ABI = exports.BLEND_ABI = exports.SEP41_ABI = void 0;
 exports.getAbi = getAbi;
 /** SEP-41 token interface - pinned from the SEP-41 spec (any token). */
 exports.SEP41_ABI = {
@@ -143,10 +143,98 @@ exports.SOROSWAP_ABI = {
         ],
     },
 };
+/** OpenZeppelin smart-account ABI subset.
+ *
+ *  Why this lives in the recogniser: every user's smart account has a
+ *  different C-address, so a per-deployment pin would never cover them.
+ *  What is the same across every OpenZeppelin multisig account is the
+ *  small set of public context-rule entrypoints. A recording that
+ *  invokes `batch_add_signer(u32, vec<signer>)` on an arbitrary contract
+ *  is overwhelmingly likely to be calling the user's own OpenZeppelin
+ *  smart account (the canonical reason this product exists); we
+ *  recognise that pattern by interface, the same way SEP-41 is
+ *  recognised by interface.
+ *
+ *  SECURITY PROPERTY (load-bearing):
+ *   - Recognition claims the call TARGETS a particular protocol. We
+ *     only claim `oz_account` when the (fn, args) shape uniquely matches
+ *     one of the three entrypoints below AND the call looks like a real
+ *     context-rule operation. The match is exact: off-by-one arg count,
+ *     off-by-one arg type, or a method name close-but-wrong returns null
+ *     (fail-closed). A contract that incidentally happens to expose a
+ *     single matching fn is not sufficient - the recorder requires ALL
+ *     invocations to individually match, so a hostile contract with
+ *     exactly one matching fn would still contribute to the unknown
+ *     bucket for any other calls.
+ *   - We do NOT claim `oz_account` for unknown calls, for arg-shape
+ *     mismatches, or for calls where the recorder could not pin down
+ *     the (fn, args) shape. The freshness gate then runs at the same
+ *     1.0 threshold - lowering the gate for unknown protocols remains
+ *     a separate, opt-in production override (see RecordInput below).
+ *
+ *  ABI source: packages/policy-interpreter/tests/fixtures/multisig_account_example.wasm,
+ *  pinned from the OpenZeppelin Reloaded `multisig_account_example`
+ *  contract (commit ef82b65, fetched 2026-07-28).
+ *
+ *  SCOPE NOTE: this ABI only covers the three entrypoints whose args
+ *  map cleanly onto the normalised `AbiArgType` vocabulary (u32, vec,
+ *  ...). `add_context_rule` - the install path - takes `(Symbol,
+ *  String, Option<u32>, Vec<SignerKey>, Map<Address, Val>)`. The
+ *  `String`, `Option<u32>` (`scvVoid`), and `Map<...>` arg types are
+ *  not in the AbiArgType set today (the recogniser's `argsMatchAbi`
+ *  helper rejects `other` deliberately so a close-but-wrong call does
+ *  not slip through). Excluding `add_context_rule` is the right
+ *  trade-off for now - it never blocks OZ smart-account recognition,
+ *  because the install tx always follows a recognised
+ *  `batch_add_signer` (the demo's first-pass tx), so the
+ *  contract still ends up in `knownContracts`. Updating the Arg type
+ *  vocabulary to cover these shapes is a separate concern (and would
+ *  also lift the SEP-41 / Blend recognition in the same change).
+ */
+exports.OZ_ACCOUNT_ABI = {
+    batch_add_signer: {
+        args: [
+            {
+                name: 'context_rule_id',
+                type: 'u32',
+                meaning: 'OZ context rule id this signer is added to',
+            },
+            {
+                name: 'signers',
+                type: 'vec',
+                meaning: 'vec<SignerKey> signers to add (Delegated G-address or Account C-address)',
+            },
+        ],
+    },
+    batch_remove_signer: {
+        args: [
+            {
+                name: 'context_rule_id',
+                type: 'u32',
+                meaning: 'OZ context rule id to remove signers from',
+            },
+            {
+                name: 'signers',
+                type: 'vec',
+                meaning: 'vec<SignerKey> signers to remove from the rule',
+            },
+        ],
+    },
+    remove_context_rule: {
+        args: [
+            {
+                name: 'context_rule_id',
+                type: 'u32',
+                meaning: 'OZ context rule id to delete',
+            },
+        ],
+    },
+};
 exports.PROTOCOL_ABIS = {
     sep41: exports.SEP41_ABI,
     blend: exports.BLEND_ABI,
     soroswap: exports.SOROSWAP_ABI,
+    oz_account: exports.OZ_ACCOUNT_ABI,
 };
 function getAbi(protocol) {
     return exports.PROTOCOL_ABIS[protocol];

package/dist-cjs/review-card/builder.d.ts

@@ -12,3 +12,16 @@ export interface ReviewCardSummary {
 /** Build a deterministic review-card summary from a policy + context rule +
  *  simulation result. Pure: same inputs -> byte-identical output. */
 export declare function buildReviewCardSummary(predicate: PredicateNode | null, policyRefs: PolicyRef[], contextRule: ContextRuleDraft, simulation: SimulationResult): ReviewCardSummary;
+/** Walk every comparison / membership node of the predicate and invoke
+ *  `visit` on each. The walk is depth-first, left-to-right, so the
+ *  constraint list is stable across runs. Pure boolean nodes contribute no
+ *  constraint lines themselves; their leaf children do, via the visitor. */
+/** Every constraint sentence for one predicate, in walk order.
+ *
+ *  `buildReviewCardSummary` renders a policy the synthesiser just PRODUCED,
+ *  and needs the refs / context rule / simulation to do it. This renders a
+ *  predicate on its own, which is what a caller holding a policy already
+ *  INSTALLED on chain has: it can read the document out of the interpreter's
+ *  storage and decode it, but there is no proposal around it. Same renderers,
+ *  so an installed rule reads exactly as it did on the review card. */
+export declare function describePredicate(predicate: PredicateNode): string[];

package/dist-cjs/review-card/builder.js

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 //
 //   2. The interpreter `PredicateNode`. One string per constraint leaf,
 //      rendered by enclosing-comparison kind. Templates (Task 7b):
-//        - invocation_count_in_window <= N    -> Invocations <= N per <window> seconds
+//        - invocation_count_in_window < N     -> At most N calls per <window> seconds
 //        - call_arg[i] in [list]              -> Recipient/arg must be one of [list]
 //        - eq(call_arg[i], literal_vec[...])  -> Path must be exactly [list]
 //        - oracle_price(asset) OP price       -> Only when oracle_price(asset) OP price
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 // hash. There is no clock; the hash never includes a timestamp.
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
 exports.buildReviewCardSummary = buildReviewCardSummary;
+exports.describePredicate = describePredicate;
 const node_crypto_1 = require("node:crypto");
 /** Build a deterministic review-card summary from a policy + context rule +
  *  simulation result. Pure: same inputs -> byte-identical output. */
@@ -84,6 +85,23 @@ function renderOzPrimitive(ref) {
  *  `visit` on each. The walk is depth-first, left-to-right, so the
  *  constraint list is stable across runs. Pure boolean nodes contribute no
  *  constraint lines themselves; their leaf children do, via the visitor. */
+/** Every constraint sentence for one predicate, in walk order.
+ *
+ *  `buildReviewCardSummary` renders a policy the synthesiser just PRODUCED,
+ *  and needs the refs / context rule / simulation to do it. This renders a
+ *  predicate on its own, which is what a caller holding a policy already
+ *  INSTALLED on chain has: it can read the document out of the interpreter's
+ *  storage and decode it, but there is no proposal around it. Same renderers,
+ *  so an installed rule reads exactly as it did on the review card. */
+function describePredicate(predicate) {
+    const constraints = [];
+    walkPredicate(predicate, (node) => {
+        const line = renderConstraint(node);
+        if (line !== null)
+            constraints.push(line);
+    });
+    return constraints;
+}
 function walkPredicate(node, visit) {
     switch (node.op) {
         case 'and':
@@ -171,17 +189,20 @@ function renderComparison(node) {
             return `${head} ${sep} [${right.elements.map(renderVecElement).join(', ')}]`;
         }
     }
-    // invocation_count_in_window <= N -> Invocations <= N per <window> seconds
+    // The bound is compared against the calls ALREADY made in the window, so
+    // `< N` permits N of them and `<= N` permits one more. Report how many
+    // calls the rule allows rather than restating the comparison.
     if (left.kind === 'invocation_count_in_window' && right.kind === 'literal_u32') {
-        return `Invocations <= ${right.value} per ${left.windowSecs} seconds`;
+        const allowed = node.op === 'lt' ? right.value : right.value + 1;
+        return `At most ${allowed} calls per ${left.windowSecs} seconds`;
     }
     // amount <= v -> Amount <= v
     if (left.kind === 'amount' && right.kind === 'literal_i128') {
         return `Amount <= ${right.value}`;
     }
     // oracle_price(asset) OP price -> Only when oracle_price(asset) OP price
-    if (left.kind === 'oracle_price' && right.kind === 'literal_i128') {
-        return `Only when oracle_price(${left.asset}) ${comparisonOpText(node.op)} ${right.value}`;
+    if (left.kind === 'oracle_price' && right.kind === 'oracle_threshold') {
+        return `Only when oracle_price(${left.asset}) ${comparisonOpText(node.op)} ${right.value} (${right.decimals} dp)`;
     }
     // Any other comparison shape is a structural fail-closed: do not surface
     // a misleading line. Cross-check still requires every leaf produce a
@@ -219,6 +240,7 @@ function renderVecElement(leaf) {
         case 'call_arg':
         case 'call_arg_len':
         case 'call_arg_field':
+        case 'call_arg_scaled':
         case 'amount':
         case 'window_spent':
         case 'now':
@@ -226,6 +248,11 @@ function renderVecElement(leaf) {
         case 'invocation_count_in_window':
         case 'oracle_price':
             return `<${leaf.kind}>`;
+        // Show the declared basis, not just the digits. A threshold on the wrong
+        // basis is the one policy error the contract cannot detect, so the review
+        // card is where a human has to be able to see it.
+        case 'oracle_threshold':
+            return `${leaf.value} (${leaf.decimals} dp)`;
     }
 }
 function renderHaystackElement(leaf) {

package/dist-cjs/review-card/cross-check.js

@@ -108,16 +108,19 @@ function pushComparison(left, right, op, out) {
             return;
         }
     }
+    // Mirrors the builder's wording byte-for-byte: how many calls the rule
+    // permits, since the bound counts the calls already made.
     if (left.kind === 'invocation_count_in_window' && right.kind === 'literal_u32') {
-        out.push(`Invocations <= ${right.value} per ${left.windowSecs} seconds`);
+        const allowed = op === 'lt' ? right.value : right.value + 1;
+        out.push(`At most ${allowed} calls per ${left.windowSecs} seconds`);
         return;
     }
     if (left.kind === 'amount' && right.kind === 'literal_i128') {
         out.push(`Amount <= ${right.value}`);
         return;
     }
-    if (left.kind === 'oracle_price' && right.kind === 'literal_i128') {
-        out.push(`Only when oracle_price(${left.asset}) ${comparisonOpText(op)} ${right.value}`);
+    if (left.kind === 'oracle_price' && right.kind === 'oracle_threshold') {
+        out.push(`Only when oracle_price(${left.asset}) ${comparisonOpText(op)} ${right.value} (${right.decimals} dp)`);
         return;
     }
 }
@@ -148,6 +151,7 @@ function renderVecElement(leaf) {
         case 'call_arg':
         case 'call_arg_len':
         case 'call_arg_field':
+        case 'call_arg_scaled':
         case 'amount':
         case 'window_spent':
         case 'now':
@@ -155,6 +159,11 @@ function renderVecElement(leaf) {
         case 'invocation_count_in_window':
         case 'oracle_price':
             return `<${leaf.kind}>`;
+        // Show the declared basis, not just the digits. A threshold on the wrong
+        // basis is the one policy error the contract cannot detect, so the review
+        // card is where a human has to be able to see it.
+        case 'oracle_threshold':
+            return `${leaf.value} (${leaf.decimals} dp)`;
     }
 }
 function renderHaystackElement(leaf) {

package/dist-cjs/review-card/index.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-export { buildReviewCardSummary, type ReviewCardSummary, } from './builder.ts';
+export { buildReviewCardSummary, describePredicate, type ReviewCardSummary, } from './builder.ts';
 export { type ConflictAnnotation, classifyConflict, type RuleRef, } from './conflict.ts';
 export { summaryCrossCheck } from './cross-check.ts';

package/dist-cjs/review-card/index.js

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 "use strict";
 // src/review-card/index.ts - re-export the deterministic review-card surface.
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.summaryCrossCheck = exports.classifyConflict = exports.buildReviewCardSummary = void 0;
+exports.summaryCrossCheck = exports.classifyConflict = exports.describePredicate = exports.buildReviewCardSummary = void 0;
 var builder_ts_1 = require("./builder.js");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "buildReviewCardSummary", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return builder_ts_1.buildReviewCardSummary; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "describePredicate", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return builder_ts_1.describePredicate; } });
 var conflict_ts_1 = require("./conflict.js");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "classifyConflict", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return conflict_ts_1.classifyConflict; } });
 var cross_check_ts_1 = require("./cross-check.js");

package/dist-cjs/run/schemas.d.ts

@@ -1093,13 +1093,13 @@ export declare const SynthesizePolicyRecordingInputSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     network: "mainnet" | "testnet";
     source: "recording";
     recordedTx: {
+        signers: string[];
         events: {
             contract: string;
             topics: string[];
             data?: unknown;
         }[];
         network: "mainnet" | "testnet";
-        signers: string[];
         invocations: unknown[];
         tokenMovements: {
             amount: string;
@@ -1158,13 +1158,13 @@ export declare const SynthesizePolicyRecordingInputSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     network: "mainnet" | "testnet";
     source: "recording";
     recordedTx: {
+        signers: string[];
         events: {
             contract: string;
             topics: string[];
             data?: unknown;
         }[];
         network: "mainnet" | "testnet";
-        signers: string[];
         invocations: unknown[];
         tokenMovements: {
             amount: string;
@@ -1750,13 +1750,13 @@ export declare const SynthesizePolicyInputSchema: z.ZodDiscriminatedUnion<"sourc
     network: "mainnet" | "testnet";
     source: "recording";
     recordedTx: {
+        signers: string[];
         events: {
             contract: string;
             topics: string[];
             data?: unknown;
         }[];
         network: "mainnet" | "testnet";
-        signers: string[];
         invocations: unknown[];
         tokenMovements: {
             amount: string;
@@ -1815,13 +1815,13 @@ export declare const SynthesizePolicyInputSchema: z.ZodDiscriminatedUnion<"sourc
     network: "mainnet" | "testnet";
     source: "recording";
     recordedTx: {
+        signers: string[];
         events: {
             contract: string;
             topics: string[];
             data?: unknown;
         }[];
         network: "mainnet" | "testnet";
-        signers: string[];
         invocations: unknown[];
         tokenMovements: {
             amount: string;

package/dist-cjs/synth/compose-from-recording.d.ts

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ export interface OraclePriceBound {
     asset: string;
     operator: IRCompOp;
     value: string;
+    /** Decimal basis `value` is written on. REQUIRED: oracle prices normalise to
+     *  9 dp, and a threshold silently assumed to share that basis is what let a
+     *  raw 14-dp bound permit everything. The author states it; we convert. */
+    decimals: number;
 }
 /** Caller-supplied answers to the ambiguity prompts. Every numeric bound the
  *  synth might apply must come from here - the recording supplies observed

package/dist-cjs/synth/compose-from-recording.js

@@ -108,11 +108,17 @@ function composeFromRecording(facts, scopeContract, topLevel, opts) {
                         value: limit,
                     },
                 };
-                if (!interpreterEnabled || token === scopeContract) {
-                    ozConstraints.push(spendCond);
-                }
-                else {
-                    interpreterConstraints.push(spendCond);
+                // A rolling spend cap always goes to OZ, whose `spending_limit` is the
+                // audited implementation. The interpreter is NOT a fallback for the
+                // token != scopeContract case: on chain it sees one authorized call,
+                // not the transaction's token movements, so it has no per-call amount
+                // to accumulate and the counter would never move. OZ reports the case
+                // it cannot cover (it pins the limit to the context contract), which
+                // is the honest outcome - the old fallback produced an interpreter
+                // predicate that silently never bound.
+                ozConstraints.push(spendCond);
+                if (interpreterEnabled && token !== scopeContract) {
+                    warnings.push(`rolling spend cap on ${token} cannot be enforced on chain: OZ spending_limit pins the limit to the context contract, and the interpreter cannot observe token movements. Bound the per-call value with an argument cap plus an invocation-count limit instead.`);
                 }
             }
         }
@@ -137,7 +143,10 @@ function composeFromRecording(facts, scopeContract, topLevel, opts) {
                 op: 'compare',
                 compare: {
                     selector: { kind: 'invocation_count', windowSeconds },
-                    operator: 'lte',
+                    // `lt`, not `lte`: the leaf reports the calls ALREADY made in the
+                    // window, so `< N` is what permits N of them. With `lte` a limit
+                    // of N let an N+1th call through.
+                    operator: 'lt',
                     value: String(invocationLimit),
                 },
             };
@@ -168,6 +177,7 @@ function composeFromRecording(facts, scopeContract, topLevel, opts) {
                     selector: { kind: 'oracle_price', asset: b.asset },
                     operator: b.operator,
                     value: b.value,
+                    valueDecimals: b.decimals,
                 },
             };
             if (interpreterEnabled) {
@@ -303,8 +313,15 @@ function appendProtocolSpecificConstraints(ozConstraints, interpreterConstraints
             });
             for (let i = 0; i < elements.length; i++) {
                 const element = elements[i];
-                if (!element || element.type !== 'map')
+                // An element we cannot bind leaves that request's action, asset and
+                // amount free while the length pin makes the policy LOOK total. The
+                // length pin still stays (it is a real restriction, and dropping it
+                // would only widen the policy) - what must not happen is dropping the
+                // element quietly.
+                if (element?.type !== 'map') {
+                    warnings.push(`Blend submit requests element ${i} is not a Request map (recorded as ${element?.type ?? 'nothing'}): its request_type, address and amount are NOT pinned, so any action on any asset for any amount is permitted in that position`);
                     continue;
+                }
                 const fields = element.value;
                 const fieldValue = (name, scalarType) => {
                     const entry = fields.find((e) => e.key === name);
@@ -321,8 +338,17 @@ function appendProtocolSpecificConstraints(ozConstraints, interpreterConstraints
                 const address = fieldValue('address', 'address');
                 const amount = fieldValue('amount', 'i128');
                 const requestType = fieldValue('request_type', 'u32');
-                if (address === null || amount === null || requestType === null)
+                if (address === null || amount === null || requestType === null) {
+                    const missing = [
+                        requestType === null ? 'request_type (u32)' : null,
+                        address === null ? 'address' : null,
+                        amount === null ? 'amount (i128)' : null,
+                    ].filter((f) => f !== null);
+                    // Partial pins are deliberately NOT emitted (see the note above): a
+                    // half-pinned request reads as a bound one on the review card.
+                    warnings.push(`Blend submit requests element ${i} could not be bound: ${missing.join(', ')} missing or of an unexpected type. That request's request_type, address and amount are NOT pinned, so any action on any asset for any amount is permitted in that position`);
                     continue;
+                }
                 interpreterConstraints.push({
                     op: 'compare',
                     compare: {

package/dist-cjs/synth/deny-cases.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import type { PredicateNode } from '../types.ts';
+import type { PredicateNode, ScVal } from '../types.ts';
 import type { EvalContext } from './evaluate.ts';
 export interface DenyCase {
     dimension: string;
@@ -20,3 +20,6 @@ export { ORIGINAL_DIMENSIONS, OVERPERMISSIVE_DIMENSIONS };
  *                     are emitted. The synth pipeline passes ORIGINAL_DIMENSIONS so
  *                     existing fixtures do not regress. */
 export declare function generateCases(predicate: PredicateNode, permitCtx: EvalContext, dimensions?: string[]): GeneratedCases;
+/** Deep-copy an ScVal so a mutation cannot alias the recorded call.
+ *  Exported so the permit-context builder shares this one implementation. */
+export declare function cloneScVal(value: ScVal, depth?: number): ScVal;

package/dist-cjs/synth/deny-cases.js

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
 exports.OVERPERMISSIVE_DIMENSIONS = exports.ORIGINAL_DIMENSIONS = void 0;
 exports.generateCases = generateCases;
+exports.cloneScVal = cloneScVal;
 const types_ts_1 = require("../types.js");
 const predicate_literals_ts_1 = require("./predicate-literals.js");
 const ORACLE_CASES = [
@@ -481,6 +482,8 @@ function cloneContext(ctx) {
         cloned.signerWeights = { ...ctx.signerWeights };
     return cloned;
 }
+/** Deep-copy an ScVal so a mutation cannot alias the recorded call.
+ *  Exported so the permit-context builder shares this one implementation. */
 function cloneScVal(value, depth = 0) {
     // Recursion is bounded by MAX_SCVAL_CLONE_DEPTH so a hand-crafted nested-vec
     // payload cannot RangeError the JS stack during deny-case mutation. Over-depth

package/dist-cjs/synth/evaluate.js

@@ -32,6 +32,11 @@
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
 exports.evaluate = evaluate;
 const predicate_literals_ts_1 = require("./predicate-literals.js");
+/** Oracle prices normalise to this many decimals; mirrors NORMALISED_DECIMALS
+ *  in oracle.rs. A threshold on any other basis must say so. */
+const NORMALISED_DECIMALS = 9;
+/** Mirrors MAX_ORACLE_THRESHOLD_DECIMALS in dsl.rs. */
+const MAX_ORACLE_THRESHOLD_DECIMALS = 18;
 /** Internal fatal thrown by the oracle path; caught at the top of `evaluate`
  *  and converted to the matching `ORACLE_*` deny reason. NOT a
  *  boolean-false that `not` / `or` could mask. */
@@ -168,6 +173,13 @@ function evalCompare(op, left, right, ctx) {
     }
     // --- step 4b: call_arg comparison (eq / exact-vec, or an ordered numeric bound) ---
     if (left.kind === 'call_arg') {
+        // The swap's canonical form is `call_arg[out] >= call_arg_scaled(in, num, den)`.
+        // Dispatched here so the floor's dedicated reason codes (ARITHMETIC_OVERFLOW
+        // -> SLIPPAGE_FLOOR) reach the user; routing the scaled RHS through the
+        // generic `evalArgOrderedCompare` would mask overflow as ARG_MISMATCH.
+        if (right.kind === 'call_arg_scaled') {
+            return evalScaledArgCompare(op, left, right, ctx);
+        }
         const actual = ctx.args[left.index];
         // An ordered comparison (lt/lte/gt/gte) reads the arg as an integer and
         // compares it to a numeric literal via BigInt (e.g. a SoroSwap input-amount
@@ -178,6 +190,11 @@ function evalCompare(op, left, right, ctx) {
             return evalArgOrderedCompare(op, actual, right);
         return evalArgEq(op, actual, right, ctx);
     }
+    // --- step 4b': scaled leaf on the LEFT (`call_arg_scaled(in, num, den) <= call_arg[out]`).
+    // Symmetric form so a policy that phrases the floor either way works.
+    if (left.kind === 'call_arg_scaled') {
+        return evalScaledArgCompare(op, right, left, ctx);
+    }
     // --- step 4c: call_arg_len: the length of a vec-typed argument as a u32.
     // Fails closed on a non-vec arg, an absent arg, or a non-u32 literal.
     if (left.kind === 'call_arg_len') {
@@ -296,6 +313,102 @@ function evalArgEq(op, actual, right, ctx) {
         return { permit: false, reason: 'ARG_MISMATCH' };
     return { permit: false, reason: 'ARG_MISMATCH' };
 }
+/** Step 4b': slippage-floor comparison. Mirrors the Rust `eval_scaled_arg_compare`
+ *  path: the scaled leaf is `args[index] * num / den` (truncating toward
+ *  zero). On `checked_mul` / `checked_div` failure (overflow or
+ *  divide-by-zero) the comparison denies with `ARITHMETIC_OVERFLOW`. A
+ *  failed comparison denies with `SLIPPAGE_FLOOR` (the dedicated reason)
+ *  rather than the generic `ARG_MISMATCH`.
+ *
+ *  `left` is whichever side of the compare is NOT the scaled leaf. A
+ *  scaled-on-scaled compare denies `ARG_MISMATCH` (pipelining two scaled
+ *  leaves has no definable semantics). The other operand must be a
+ *  numeric shape (`call_arg` carrying a number, or a numeric literal);
+ *  anything else is `ARG_MISMATCH`. */
+function evalScaledArgCompare(op, left, right, ctx) {
+    // Identify which side is scaled, and pull the other side as a number.
+    let scaled;
+    let other;
+    let scaledOnRight;
+    if (left.kind === 'call_arg_scaled') {
+        scaled = left;
+        other = right;
+        scaledOnRight = false;
+    }
+    else if (right.kind === 'call_arg_scaled') {
+        scaled = right;
+        other = left;
+        scaledOnRight = true;
+    }
+    else {
+        // Neither side is scaled - this is a programming error in the
+        // dispatcher; the contract returns ARG_MISMATCH to fail closed.
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARG_MISMATCH' };
+    }
+    // Source `args[index]` -> BigInt. An out-of-bounds index or a
+    // non-numeric arg fails closed as ARG_MISMATCH (not SLIPPAGE_FLOOR) -
+    // a violated floor is the wrong code when the operand itself could
+    // not be read.
+    if (scaled.index >= ctx.args.length) {
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARG_MISMATCH' };
+    }
+    const input = argNumericBigInt(ctx.args[scaled.index]);
+    if (input === null)
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARG_MISMATCH' };
+    let num;
+    let den;
+    try {
+        num = BigInt(scaled.num);
+        den = BigInt(scaled.den);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARG_MISMATCH' };
+    }
+    // Install refuses `den == 0` and `num <= 0` / `den <= 0`. The runtime
+    // check is a defensive belt-and-braces - a future validator
+    // regression cannot panic the frame on a divide-by-zero.
+    if (den === 0n)
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARITHMETIC_OVERFLOW' };
+    const product = input * num;
+    // BigInt overflow is silent in JS (it does not throw on multiplication).
+    // We can detect over-range by dividing and checking the result against
+    // i128 bounds, but the more practical check is whether the result
+    // divides cleanly. We rely on BigInt's arbitrary precision and then
+    // surface ARITHMETIC_OVERFLOW if the result is outside i128.
+    let scaledValue;
+    try {
+        // BigInt division truncates toward zero (matches Rust `i128::checked_div`).
+        scaledValue = product / den;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARITHMETIC_OVERFLOW' };
+    }
+    // i128 range check: if the scaled value is outside i128, the contract
+    // would have wrapped on i128 arithmetic; surface the same deny.
+    const I128_MAX = (1n << 127n) - 1n;
+    const I128_MIN = -(1n << 127n);
+    if (scaledValue > I128_MAX || scaledValue < I128_MIN) {
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARITHMETIC_OVERFLOW' };
+    }
+    // Resolving the operand when the scaled side is on the right: the
+    // operand is `left`; the scaled value is the RHS. The AST order is
+    // `left <op> scaled`, so the comparator applies to `other <op> scaled`.
+    // When the scaled side is on the left, the order is `scaled <op> other`,
+    // i.e. `scaled <op> other_val`.
+    let otherVal;
+    if (other.kind === 'call_arg') {
+        otherVal = argNumericBigInt(ctx.args[other.index]);
+    }
+    else {
+        otherVal = (0, predicate_literals_ts_1.literalNumericBigInt)(other);
+    }
+    if (otherVal === null)
+        return { permit: false, reason: 'ARG_MISMATCH' };
+    const pass = scaledOnRight
+        ? bigintCmp(op, otherVal.toString(), scaledValue.toString())
+        : bigintCmp(op, scaledValue.toString(), otherVal.toString());
+    return pass ? { permit: true } : { permit: false, reason: 'SLIPPAGE_FLOOR' };
+}
 /** Ordered numeric comparison (lt/lte/gt/gte) on a `call_arg`. The interpreter
  *  reads the arg as an integer (i128 / u64 / u32 on the recorder's ScVal
  *  surface) and compares it to a numeric literal via BigInt. A non-numeric arg
@@ -392,6 +505,7 @@ function resolveLeaf(leaf, ctx) {
         case 'invocation_count_in_window':
         case 'now':
         case 'valid_until':
+        case 'call_arg_scaled':
             return undefined; // selector leaves with no ScVal projection
         case 'literal_address':
             return { type: 'address', value: leaf.value };
@@ -450,10 +564,23 @@ function evalOracleCompare(op, asset, right, ctx) {
             throw new OracleError('ORACLE_STALE');
         throw new OracleError(mapped);
     }
-    const literal = right.kind === 'literal_i128' ? right.value : null;
-    if (literal === null)
+    // Mirrors eval_oracle_compare in dsl.rs. The threshold MUST declare its
+    // decimal basis: prices are on the normalised 9-dp basis, and assuming a
+    // bare literal shares it is what let a raw 14-dp threshold permit
+    // everything. A bare literal is refused rather than assumed.
+    if (right.kind !== 'oracle_threshold')
         throw new OracleError('ORACLE_DECIMALS_MISMATCH');
-    return bigintCmp(op, entry.price, literal)
+    if (right.decimals > MAX_ORACLE_THRESHOLD_DECIMALS) {
+        throw new OracleError('ORACLE_THRESHOLD_DECIMALS_OUT_OF_RANGE');
+    }
+    // Scale BOTH sides up to the wider basis rather than dividing the threshold
+    // down: dividing truncates, and a truncated bound moves the permit boundary.
+    const decimals = BigInt(right.decimals);
+    const normalised = BigInt(NORMALISED_DECIMALS);
+    const common = decimals > normalised ? decimals : normalised;
+    const priceScaled = BigInt(entry.price) * 10n ** (common - normalised);
+    const literalScaled = BigInt(right.value) * 10n ** (common - decimals);
+    return bigintCmp(op, String(priceScaled), String(literalScaled))
         ? { permit: true }
         : { permit: false, reason: 'FN_MISMATCH' };
 }

package/dist-cjs/synth/permit-context.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+import type { PredicateNode, RecordedTransaction } from '../types.ts';
+import type { EvalContext } from './evaluate.ts';
+export interface PermitContextResponses {
+    windowSeconds: number;
+    invocationLimit?: number;
+    limitAmount?: string;
+    validUntilLedger: number;
+    oraclePriceBound?: Array<{
+        asset: string;
+        operator: string;
+        value: string;
+        decimals: number;
+    }>;
+}
+export declare function buildPermitContext(tx: RecordedTransaction, responses: PermitContextResponses, predicate: PredicateNode): EvalContext;