@crawlcheck/sdk 1.0.9 → 1.2.0

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -195,8 +195,20 @@ export interface PreflightPolicy {
 export interface PreflightOptions {
     agent?: string;
     template?: string;
-    policy?: PreflightPolicy;
+    policy?: PreflightPolicy; /** 8-128 characters of A-Z a-z 0-9 . _ : - signed into the receipt (replay binding). guard() sends a fresh one when you give none. */
+    nonce?: string; /** The exact operation this decision is for (method + url, or an MCP tool); signed into the receipt. */
+    operation?: Operation;
 }
+/** What a receipt can be scoped to. Send only the keys that apply; CrawlCheck signs them back exactly as sent. https://crawlcheck.io/spec/guard#operation */
+export interface Operation {
+    method?: "GET" | "HEAD" | "POST" | "PUT" | "PATCH" | "DELETE" | "OPTIONS";
+    url?: string;
+    tool?: string;
+    tool_schema_sha256?: string;
+    scopes?: string[];
+}
+/** The operation for calling an MCP tool: its name, the sha256 of its definition (as in the lockfile) and the scopes you will use. */
+export declare function toolOperation(tool: McpTool, scopes?: string[]): Promise<Operation>;
 /** A signed crawlcheck-decision receipt. Verify it with verifyDocument (or let guard() do it). */
 export interface DecisionReceipt {
     kind: "crawlcheck-decision";
@@ -220,8 +232,61 @@ export interface GuardOptions extends PreflightOptions {
     allowWarn?: boolean;
     /** Called on "require_confirmation"; proceed only if it resolves true. Without it, require_confirmation does not proceed. */
     confirm?: (receipt: DecisionReceipt) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;
-    /** Also require the signing key to be in the published key directory (default true). */
+    /** Read the published key directory (default true). With false, pass publishedKids: a guard never accepts a receipt without checking who signed it. */
     onlineKeys?: boolean;
+    /** Pinned CrawlCheck key ids, for offline use with onlineKeys: false. */
+    publishedKids?: string[];
+    /** Testing clock (ms since epoch). Default Date.now(). */
+    now?: number;
+}
+/** The longest a receipt may stay valid, per action (seconds). A receipt that claims longer is refused. Published at https://crawlcheck.io/spec/guard */
+export declare const ACTION_MAX_LIFETIME_S: Record<string, number>;
+/** The most clock skew a receipt may claim (seconds). */
+export declare const MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_S = 300;
+export interface DecisionWant {
+    domain: string;
+    action: Action | string;
+    nonce?: string | null;
+    now?: number;
+    operation?: Operation | null;
+}
+/**
+ * Is this receipt about the operation you are about to perform? Checks the scope only (kind, domain, action, nonce,
+ * time window, per-action lifetime, known decision, resolve binding); the signature and issuer are checked by
+ * verifyDocument. guard() runs both. https://crawlcheck.io/spec/guard
+ */
+export declare function checkDecision(receipt: unknown, want: DecisionWant): {
+    ok: boolean;
+    why: string[];
+};
+export interface GuardResult {
+    proceed: boolean;
+    receipt: DecisionReceipt | null;
+    verification: (DocumentVerification & Trust) | null;
+    header: Record<string, string> | null;
+    why: string[];
+    split_view?: LogFork[];
+}
+export interface GuardedFetchOptions extends GuardOptions {
+    action?: Action;
+    init?: RequestInit;
+    maxHops?: number;
+    fetch?: typeof fetch;
+}
+export interface GuardedHop {
+    url: string;
+    domain: string;
+    proceed: boolean;
+    decision: string | null;
+    why: string[];
+    status?: number;
+}
+export interface GuardedFetchResult {
+    proceed: boolean;
+    response: Response | null;
+    url: string;
+    hops: GuardedHop[];
+    why: string[];
 }
 export interface LogHead {
     kind: "crawlcheck-log-sth";
@@ -499,14 +564,20 @@ export declare class CrawlCheck {
     preflight(domain: string, action?: Action, opts?: PreflightOptions): Promise<DecisionReceipt>;
     /** Verify a signed document here. With onlineKeys (default), its signing key must also be in the published directory. */
     verifyDocument(doc: unknown, onlineKeys?: boolean): Promise<DocumentVerification & Trust>;
-    /** Preflight, verify the receipt, and decide. Proceeds on allow; warn only with allowWarn; require_confirmation only if confirm() says yes; block and unsupported never. */
-    guard(domain: string, action?: Action, opts?: GuardOptions): Promise<{
-        proceed: boolean;
-        receipt: DecisionReceipt;
-        verification: DocumentVerification & Trust;
-        header: Record<string, string> | null;
-        split_view?: LogFork[];
-    }>;
+    /**
+     * Preflight, verify the receipt, check it is for THIS operation, and decide. Proceeds on allow; warn only with allowWarn;
+     * require_confirmation only if confirm() says yes; block, unsupported and every failure never (fail closed: an error,
+     * an unreachable CrawlCheck, a malformed, foreign, expired, replayed or out-of-scope receipt all return proceed false
+     * with why[]). Passes the acceptance suite at https://crawlcheck.io/spec/guard
+     */
+    guard(domain: string, action?: Action, opts?: GuardOptions): Promise<GuardResult>;
+    /**
+     * fetch() with the check where the action runs: guard() before the first request, and again before every redirect hop
+     * to a new domain. The site is contacted only after its domain proceeds; a refused hop is never requested. Redirects
+     * are followed by hand (GET/HEAD only), to http(s) only, at most maxHops (10). The receipt header is sent only to the
+     * domain it names. In a browser a cross-origin redirect hides its target, so it is refused rather than followed blind.
+     */
+    guardedFetch(url: string, opts?: GuardedFetchOptions): Promise<GuardedFetchResult>;
     /** Look a domain up without sending it: only the first prefixLen hex characters of sha256(domain) leave this process. found false with ready true means no public measurement. */
     /** Make a signed lockfile for an MCP server (CrawlCheck reads tools/list; no tool is called). Save it; check with checkLock before every connect. */
     mcpLock(url: string): Promise<McpLock & JsonObject>;

package/dist/index.js

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ export function normalizeDomain(v) {
 }
 /** { "CrawlCheck-Receipt": "v=1; sha256=..." } for a decision receipt. Send it only to the domain the receipt names, before expires_at. */
 export function receiptHeader(receipt) { return { [RECEIPT_HEADER]: "v=1; sha256=" + receipt.sha256 }; }
+function randomNonce() { const b = new Uint8Array(16); globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(b); return Array.from(b, (x) => x.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join(""); }
 async function sha256Hex(s) {
     const b = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new TextEncoder().encode(s));
     return Array.from(new Uint8Array(b), (x) => x.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
@@ -64,6 +65,55 @@ export async function checkLock(lock, tools) {
     const same = lock?.tools_sha256 === now.tools_sha256 && !added.length && !removed.length && !modified.length;
     return { verdict: same ? "unchanged" : "changed", decision: same ? "connect" : "block", approved_tools_sha256: lock?.tools_sha256 ?? "", current_tools_sha256: now.tools_sha256, added, removed, modified };
 }
+/** The operation for calling an MCP tool: its name, the sha256 of its definition (as in the lockfile) and the scopes you will use. */
+export async function toolOperation(tool, scopes) { const o = { tool: String(tool?.name ?? ""), tool_schema_sha256: await lockToolHash(tool) }; if (scopes && scopes.length)
+    o.scopes = scopes.slice(); return o; }
+/** The longest a receipt may stay valid, per action (seconds). A receipt that claims longer is refused. Published at https://crawlcheck.io/spec/guard */
+export const ACTION_MAX_LIFETIME_S = { read: 86400, cite: 86400, connect: 3600, transact: 300, administer: 300 };
+/** The most clock skew a receipt may claim (seconds). */
+export const MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_S = 300;
+const DECISIONS = ["allow", "warn", "require_confirmation", "block", "unsupported"];
+/**
+ * Is this receipt about the operation you are about to perform? Checks the scope only (kind, domain, action, nonce,
+ * time window, per-action lifetime, known decision, resolve binding); the signature and issuer are checked by
+ * verifyDocument. guard() runs both. https://crawlcheck.io/spec/guard
+ */
+export function checkDecision(receipt, want) {
+    const why = [], r = receipt;
+    if (!r || typeof r !== "object" || Array.isArray(r))
+        return { ok: false, why: ["no receipt: CrawlCheck sent " + (r === null || r === undefined ? "nothing" : typeof r)] };
+    if (r.kind !== "crawlcheck-decision" || r.v !== 1)
+        why.push("not a v1 decision receipt (kind " + r.kind + ", v " + r.v + ")");
+    const wd = normalizeDomain(want.domain);
+    if (!wd || normalizeDomain(r.domain) !== wd)
+        why.push("the receipt is for " + r.domain + ", not " + want.domain);
+    if (String(r.action) !== String(want.action))
+        why.push("the receipt is for action " + r.action + ", not " + want.action);
+    if (want.operation && canon(r.operation ?? null) !== canon(want.operation))
+        why.push(r.operation ? "the receipt is for another operation (" + canon(r.operation).slice(0, 120) + ")" : "the receipt is not scoped to an operation, and this request named one");
+    if (want.nonce && r.nonce !== want.nonce)
+        why.push(r.nonce ? "the receipt carries another request's nonce (replayed)" : "the receipt does not carry the nonce this request sent");
+    const now = want.now ?? Date.now(), skew = Math.min(Math.max(Number(r.clock_skew_s) || 0, 0), MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_S) * 1000;
+    const at = Date.parse(r.decided_at), exp = Date.parse(r.expires_at);
+    if (!isFinite(at) || !isFinite(exp))
+        why.push("decided_at or expires_at missing");
+    else {
+        if (now > exp + skew)
+            why.push("expired at " + r.expires_at);
+        if (at > now + skew)
+            why.push("decided in the future (" + r.decided_at + "): check the clock");
+        const max = ACTION_MAX_LIFETIME_S[String(want.action)];
+        if (max === undefined)
+            why.push("unknown action " + want.action);
+        else if (exp - at > max * 1000 + 1000)
+            why.push("valid for " + Math.round((exp - at) / 1000) + " s; a " + want.action + " receipt may last at most " + max + " s");
+    }
+    if (DECISIONS.indexOf(r.decision) < 0)
+        why.push("unknown decision " + r.decision);
+    if (!r.resolve || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(String(r.resolve.sha256 || "")))
+        why.push("the receipt names no resolve answer");
+    return { ok: why.length === 0, why };
+}
 export const LOG_ID = L.LOG_ID;
 /** A new, empty transparency-log store (plain JSON: persist it between runs). */
 export const newLogStore = L.newLogStore;
@@ -199,29 +249,125 @@ export class CrawlCheck {
             b.template = opts.template;
         if (opts.policy)
             b.policy = opts.policy;
+        if (opts.nonce)
+            b.nonce = opts.nonce;
+        if (opts.operation)
+            b.operation = opts.operation;
         return this.post("/api/v1/preflight", b);
     }
     /** Verify a signed document here. With onlineKeys (default), its signing key must also be in the published directory. */
     async verifyDocument(doc, onlineKeys = true) {
         return withTrust(await V.verifyDataDoc(doc), doc?.signature?.kid, onlineKeys ? await this.publishedKeyIds() : null);
     }
-    /** Preflight, verify the receipt, and decide. Proceeds on allow; warn only with allowWarn; require_confirmation only if confirm() says yes; block and unsupported never. */
+    /**
+     * Preflight, verify the receipt, check it is for THIS operation, and decide. Proceeds on allow; warn only with allowWarn;
+     * require_confirmation only if confirm() says yes; block, unsupported and every failure never (fail closed: an error,
+     * an unreachable CrawlCheck, a malformed, foreign, expired, replayed or out-of-scope receipt all return proceed false
+     * with why[]). Passes the acceptance suite at https://crawlcheck.io/spec/guard
+     */
     async guard(domain, action = "read", opts = {}) {
-        const receipt = await this.preflight(domain, action, opts);
-        if (this.log.forks.length) { // the log has shown this client two contradicting histories: no answer from it is trusted for action
-            const verification = await this.verifyDocument(receipt, opts.onlineKeys ?? true);
-            return { proceed: false, receipt, verification, header: null, split_view: this.log.forks.slice() };
+        const nonce = opts.nonce || randomNonce();
+        const no = (why, receipt = null, verification = null) => ({ proceed: false, receipt, verification, header: null, why });
+        let receipt;
+        try {
+            receipt = await this.preflight(domain, action, Object.assign({}, opts, { nonce }));
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            return no(["CrawlCheck did not give a decision: " + (e?.message || e)]);
         }
-        const verification = await this.verifyDocument(receipt, opts.onlineKeys ?? true);
-        if (!verification.accepted && (opts.onlineKeys ?? true))
-            return { proceed: false, receipt, verification, header: null };
-        if (!verification.verified)
-            return { proceed: false, receipt, verification, header: null };
+        if (this.log.forks.length)
+            return Object.assign(no(["the transparency log has shown this client two histories (split view)"], receipt), { split_view: this.log.forks.slice() });
+        const scope = checkDecision(receipt, { domain, action, nonce, now: opts.now, operation: opts.operation });
+        if (!receipt || typeof receipt !== "object")
+            return no(scope.why);
+        const online = opts.onlineKeys ?? true;
+        if (!online && !(Array.isArray(opts.publishedKids) && opts.publishedKids.length))
+            return no(["onlineKeys is false and no publishedKids were pinned: the signer cannot be checked"], receipt);
+        let verification;
+        try {
+            verification = withTrust(await V.verifyDataDoc(receipt), receipt?.signature?.kid, online ? await this.publishedKeyIds() : opts.publishedKids);
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            return no(["the receipt could not be verified: " + (e?.message || e)].concat(scope.why), receipt);
+        }
+        const why = scope.why.slice();
+        if (!verification.integrity_valid)
+            why.push("integrity failed: " + verification.checks.filter((c) => c.ok === false).map((c) => c.id).join(", "));
+        if (verification.issuer_trusted !== true)
+            why.push("signed by a key that is not in CrawlCheck's published key directory");
+        if (why.length)
+            return no(why, receipt, verification);
         const d = receipt.decision;
         let proceed = d === "allow" || (d === "warn" && !!opts.allowWarn);
-        if (d === "require_confirmation" && opts.confirm)
-            proceed = !!(await opts.confirm(receipt));
-        return { proceed, receipt, verification, header: proceed ? receiptHeader(receipt) : null };
+        if (d === "require_confirmation") {
+            if (opts.confirm) {
+                try {
+                    proceed = (await opts.confirm(receipt)) === true;
+                }
+                catch {
+                    proceed = false;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (!proceed)
+            why.push(d === "warn" ? "decision is warn and allowWarn is not set" : d === "require_confirmation" ? (opts.confirm ? "a human did not confirm" : "decision is require_confirmation and no confirm() was given") : "decision is " + d);
+        return { proceed, receipt, verification, header: proceed ? receiptHeader(receipt) : null, why };
+    }
+    /**
+     * fetch() with the check where the action runs: guard() before the first request, and again before every redirect hop
+     * to a new domain. The site is contacted only after its domain proceeds; a refused hop is never requested. Redirects
+     * are followed by hand (GET/HEAD only), to http(s) only, at most maxHops (10). The receipt header is sent only to the
+     * domain it names. In a browser a cross-origin redirect hides its target, so it is refused rather than followed blind.
+     */
+    async guardedFetch(url, opts = {}) {
+        const action = opts.action ?? "read", max = opts.maxHops ?? 10, f = opts.fetch ? opts.fetch.bind(globalThis) : this.f;
+        const init = Object.assign({}, opts.init || {}), method = String(init.method || "GET").toUpperCase();
+        const hops = [], seen = new Map();
+        let cur = url;
+        for (let n = 0; n <= max; n++) {
+            let u;
+            try {
+                u = new URL(cur);
+            }
+            catch {
+                return { proceed: false, response: null, url: cur, hops, why: ["not a URL: " + cur] };
+            }
+            if (u.protocol !== "https:" && u.protocol !== "http:")
+                return { proceed: false, response: null, url: cur, hops, why: ["refused a " + u.protocol + " URL"] };
+            const dom = normalizeDomain(u.hostname);
+            if (!dom)
+                return { proceed: false, response: null, url: cur, hops, why: ["not a public domain name: " + u.hostname] };
+            const op = { method: method, url: cur }; // op1: each hop's receipt names that exact request
+            let g = seen.get(method + " " + cur);
+            if (!g) {
+                g = await this.guard(dom, action, Object.assign({}, opts, { operation: op }));
+                seen.set(method + " " + cur, g);
+            }
+            const hop = { url: cur, domain: dom, proceed: g.proceed, decision: g.receipt ? String(g.receipt.decision) : null, why: g.why };
+            hops.push(hop);
+            if (!g.proceed)
+                return { proceed: false, response: null, url: cur, hops, why: [dom + ": " + (g.why.join("; ") || "refused")] };
+            const h = new Headers(init.headers || {});
+            if (g.header)
+                for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(g.header))
+                    h.set(k, v);
+            const res = await f(cur, Object.assign({}, init, { headers: h, redirect: "manual" }));
+            hop.status = res.status;
+            if (res.type === "opaqueredirect")
+                return { proceed: false, response: null, url: cur, hops, why: ["the runtime hid the redirect target, so it cannot be checked"] };
+            const loc = res.headers.get("location");
+            if (![301, 302, 303, 307, 308].includes(res.status) || !loc)
+                return { proceed: true, response: res, url: cur, hops, why: [] };
+            if (method !== "GET" && method !== "HEAD")
+                return { proceed: true, response: res, url: cur, hops, why: ["redirect not followed for " + method] };
+            try {
+                cur = new URL(loc, cur).toString();
+            }
+            catch {
+                return { proceed: false, response: null, url: cur, hops, why: ["unreadable redirect target " + loc] };
+            }
+        }
+        return { proceed: false, response: null, url: cur, hops, why: ["more than " + max + " redirects"] };
     }
     /** Look a domain up without sending it: only the first prefixLen hex characters of sha256(domain) leave this process. found false with ready true means no public measurement. */
     /** Make a signed lockfile for an MCP server (CrawlCheck reads tools/list; no tool is called). Save it; check with checkLock before every connect. */

package/dist/mcp.js

@@ -64,7 +64,8 @@ export function mcpPreflight(cc, opts = {}) {
         state.decidedAt = Date.now();
         if (!g.proceed) {
             const d = g.receipt && g.receipt.decision;
-            const why = g.split_view ? "the transparency log showed two histories; no answer is trusted" : !g.verification.verified ? "the decision receipt did not verify" : g.verification.accepted === false ? "the receipt was signed with a key CrawlCheck does not publish" : d === "require_confirmation" ? "a human must confirm and none did" : d === "warn" ? "warn without allowWarn" : d === "unsupported" ? "nothing vouches for a connection to " + host + " (" + ((g.receipt.steps || [])[0] || {}).why + ")" : "decision " + d + (g.receipt.steps && g.receipt.steps[0] ? " (" + g.receipt.steps[0].why + ")" : "");
+            const decisionOnly = (g.why || []).every(function (w) { return /^decision is|a human did not confirm|no confirm\(\) was given|allowWarn is not set/.test(w); });
+            const why = g.split_view ? "the transparency log showed two histories; no answer is trusted" : !g.verification ? ((g.why || []).join("; ") || "no decision") : !g.verification.verified ? "the decision receipt did not verify" : g.verification.accepted === false ? "the receipt was signed with a key CrawlCheck does not publish" : !decisionOnly ? g.why.join("; ") : !g.verification.verified ? "the decision receipt did not verify" : g.verification.accepted === false ? "the receipt was signed with a key CrawlCheck does not publish" : d === "require_confirmation" ? "a human must confirm and none did" : d === "warn" ? "warn without allowWarn" : d === "unsupported" ? "nothing vouches for a connection to " + host + " (" + ((g.receipt.steps || [])[0] || {}).why + ")" : "decision " + d + (g.receipt.steps && g.receipt.steps[0] ? " (" + g.receipt.steps[0].why + ")" : "");
             throw new McpPreflightRefused("connect", why, { receipt: g.receipt, verification: g.verification });
         }
         return g;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@crawlcheck/sdk",
-  "version": "1.0.9",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
   "description": "Typed client for the CrawlCheck API (generated from its OpenAPI document) and the zero-dependency offline verifier for evidence bundles and remediation receipts.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",
@@ -42,5 +42,6 @@
   ],
   "scripts": {
     "test": "node --test test/*.test.js"
-  }
+  },
+  "license": "MIT"
 }