@cotal-ai/pi 0.30.1 → 0.31.0

package/dist/index.js

@@ -1321,7 +1321,6 @@ var OS_ENV_ALLOW = [
   "CommonProgramFiles",
   "PUBLIC"
 ];
-var SESSION_ENV_PREFIX = "COTAL_";
 var OPERATOR_ENV_KEEP = [
   "COTAL_HOME",
   "COTAL_FEEDBACK_KEY",
@@ -1344,35 +1343,24 @@ var OPERATOR_ENV_KEEP = [
   "COTAL_ORCA_BIN"
 ];
 function launchEnv(opts = {}) {
-  if (opts.envAllow !== void 0) {
-    const env2 = {};
-    const sourceKey = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-    for (const k of Object.keys(process.env))
-      sourceKey.set(k.toLowerCase(), k);
-    const copy = (name) => {
-      const src = sourceKey.get(name.toLowerCase());
-      if (src === void 0)
-        return;
-      const v2 = process.env[src];
-      if (v2 !== void 0)
-        env2[src] = v2;
-    };
-    for (const k of OS_ENV_ALLOW)
-      copy(k);
-    for (const k of [...opts.envAllow, ...opts.mcpKeys ?? []])
-      copy(k);
-    return env2;
-  }
-  const keep = new Set(OPERATOR_ENV_KEEP);
   const env = {};
-  for (const [k, v2] of Object.entries(process.env)) {
-    if (v2 === void 0)
-      continue;
-    const canon = k.toUpperCase();
-    if (canon.startsWith(SESSION_ENV_PREFIX) && !keep.has(canon))
-      continue;
-    env[k] = v2;
-  }
+  const sourceKey = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  for (const k of Object.keys(process.env))
+    sourceKey.set(k.toLowerCase(), k);
+  const copy = (name) => {
+    const src = sourceKey.get(name.toLowerCase());
+    if (src === void 0)
+      return;
+    const v2 = process.env[src];
+    if (v2 !== void 0)
+      env[src] = v2;
+  };
+  for (const k of OS_ENV_ALLOW)
+    copy(k);
+  for (const k of OPERATOR_ENV_KEEP)
+    copy(k);
+  for (const k of [...opts.providerKeys ?? [], ...opts.mcpKeys ?? [], ...opts.envAllow ?? []])
+    copy(k);
   return env;
 }
 function aclEnv(opts) {
@@ -16080,7 +16068,7 @@ import { isConcreteChannel as isConcreteChannel3, channelInAllow as channelInAll
 
 // ../connector-core/dist/docs-bundle.generated.js
 var DOCS_BUNDLE = {
-  "version": "0.30.1",
+  "version": "0.31.0",
   "generatedFrom": "docs/*.md + SPEC.md + spec/cotal-lang.md + spec/cotal.schema.json",
   "pages": [
     {
@@ -16102,7 +16090,7 @@ var DOCS_BUNDLE = {
       "title": "Architecture",
       "kind": "Concept (informative)",
       "summary": "Cotal is built as a thin waist: the normative wire contract (subjects, message schemas, presence/discovery, delivery semantics, the auth grammar) is the standard (SPEC), and everything else is a pl\u2026",
-      "body": "# Architecture\n\n> **Concept** (informative) \xB7 **For:** anyone who wants to know how Cotal is built, and why \xB7 **Normative:** [SPEC](../SPEC.md)\n\nCotal is built as a thin waist: the normative wire contract (subjects, message schemas,\npresence/discovery, delivery semantics, the auth grammar) is the standard\n([SPEC](../SPEC.md)), and everything else is a pluggable edge over existing building\nblocks. Identity, transport, storage, and discovery compose from proven pieces (NATS,\nJetStream, JWT/nkeys) rather than being reinvented. Adapters stay thin and swappable, and\nnothing adapter-specific leaks into the core.\n\n## Influences: A2A\n\nCotal reuses A2A's vocabulary and shapes so it stays interoperable rather than siloed, and\nimplements them over NATS/JetStream.\n\n**From A2A** come the *data shapes*: `AgentCard` (identity / role / tags / skills),\n`Message` / `Part` (text and data), and correlation ids (`contextId`). We do not adopt\nA2A's HTTP/JSON-RPC transport, `Task` RPCs, or its request/response server model, none of\nwhich fit lateral pub/sub.\n\nThe *addressing model* is Cotal's own: the hierarchical address `space / service / instance`\nand three delivery modes, multicast, unicast, anycast\n([presence & delivery](presence-and-delivery.md)). **Mentions** are a priority hint on a\nmulticast, not a routing target. NATS/JetStream is the data plane, adding the durability and\npresence a bare pub/sub layer leaves to the app.\n\nIdentity is an A2A `AgentCard` whose instance id is shaped to later become a **DID**\n(`did:key`) so authenticity can survive an untrusted relay ([roadmap](roadmap.md)).\n\n## One wire, mapped onto NATS\n\nThe messaging plane rides three subject kinds, with the sender encoded in the subject\nitself, where the server can police it, rather than in a self-asserted payload field\n([SPEC \xA73](../SPEC.md#3-subject-layout)); the endpoint control surface adds its own rails\n([SPEC \xA713](../SPEC.md#13-endpoint-control-surface-v04)):\n\n| Delivery | Subject |\n|---|---|\n| multicast | `cotal.<space>.chat.<owner>.<actor>.<channel\u2026>` |\n| unicast | `cotal.<space>.inst.<toOwner>.<toActor>.<owner>.<actor>` |\n| anycast | `cotal.<space>.svc.<role>.<owner>.<actor>` |\n| endpoint (control) | `cotal.<space>.ep.<one\\|all\\|inst\\|reply>.\u2026` ([\xA713.2](../SPEC.md#132-grammar)) |\n\nThe sender is a **principal**, an `owner.actor` pair: the account the agent acts on behalf\nof, then the agent's own handle under it ([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). Two\ntokens instead of one means the broker can deny cross-owner *and* same-owner cross-actor\nforgery in the subject grammar itself.\n\nBehind the subjects, each space gets three **JetStream streams** (chat / DM / task, for\nstorage, per-reader bookmarks, and history), **KV buckets** for presence and the channel\nregistry, and the endpoint control surface on its own rails and streams\n([SPEC \xA713](../SPEC.md#13-endpoint-control-surface-v04)). Rather than re-implementing delivery\nguarantees, Cotal uses the native NATS mechanisms: streams for at-least-once and late\njoin, queue groups for anycast load-balancing, KV TTL for liveness ([SPEC \xA78](../SPEC.md#8-nats--jetstream-binding);\nthe reasoning: [presence & delivery](presence-and-delivery.md)). Isolation is one NATS\n**account per space** ([spaces & channels](spaces.md)); authorization is per-agent JWT\nACLs ([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). Large artifacts are reserved for a\nper-space Object Store ([roadmap](roadmap.md)).\n\nWhether any of this *requires* NATS is answered in\n[transport vs protocol](transport.md): the contract is transport-agnostic; NATS/JetStream\nis the reference binding.\n\n## Package layout: one-way tiers\n\n```\nexamples \u2500\u2500\u2192 implementations \u2500\u2500\u2192 workspace \u2500\u2500\u2192 core \u2190(peer)\u2500\u2500 extensions\n                (interoperate at runtime over NATS, not via imports)\n```\n\n- **`@cotal-ai/core`**, the protocol: subjects, schemas, the NATS client layer, and the\n  extension contracts (`Connector`, `Command`, `Runtime`) with the `Registry` they\n  self-register into. Depends on nothing else in the repo.\n- **`@cotal-ai/workspace`**, the machine-local operator layer over `~/.cotal`: mesh\n  registry, target resolution, auth-path helpers. Not part of the wire standard, so a\n  third party can embed core without inheriting workstation plumbing.\n- **`extensions/*`**: pluggable adapters (connectors, runtimes). Each **peer-depends** on\n  core (binding to the host's single core instance) and self-registers on import; an\n  unknown agent type **throws**, no silent fallback.\n- **`implementations/*`**, opinionated surfaces over core: the CLI, the manager, the\n  delivery daemon, the web dashboard. Implementations never import each other; they meet\n  at runtime, in a shared space over NATS. A composition root (the `cotal` binary, or an\n  example) wires the pieces it wants.\n- **`examples/*`**: use-cases and composition roots, never published\n  ([examples](examples.md)). An example only configures and orchestrates; new message\n  kinds or subjects go into core, generalized, never into an example.\n\nThe published binary also loads **operator-installed extensions**: `cotal ext add\n<npm-package>` installs into a cotal-owned prefix, imports once so the package\nself-registers, then caches every contributed `kind:name`. Command metadata is cached for\n`--help`/completion; running a command or requesting a provider imports its owner lazily and\nuses the live object. Before that first import, the loader rebinds shared peers to the current\nhost under the extension-prefix lock; version skew or an unbindable peer fails loudly.\nThe repo's `@cotal-ai/web` dashboard and optional tmux/cmux/Orca/Herdr runtimes use this mechanism.\nRuntime resolution stays registry-driven and open-ended: a name with no registered/installed\nprovider fails loud (never a fallback), and a third-party runtime installs under its own package\nname. The CLI does carry a small, non-authoritative map of the first-party runtime names\n(`orca`/`tmux`/`cmux`/`herdr`) to their `@cotal-ai/*` packages, used only to print an exact `cotal ext add`\nhint for a known-but-uninstalled runtime and to list them in `cotal runtimes`; it never resolves or\nregisters a provider.\n\nMachine-local processes use the same registry. The base CLI contributes broker/control-plane\n`local-process` descriptors, while an installed package contributes its own (for example `web`).\nThat keeps `cotal down <component>` and `cotal status` extensible without teaching the base CLI\npackage-specific pidfiles. A provider process claims its declared pidfile with exclusive create;\nextension removal reserves that same path so startup cannot cross uninstall.\n\nBeyond the app-bound connectors, `@cotal-ai/pi` is a **host-native plugin**: a pi extension\nloaded into the user's own pi (CLI or SDK-embedded), placing a Cotal endpoint inside the\nsession's process and driving its run loop off the inbox \u2014 see\n[connect-pi](connect-pi.md).\n\n## Connectors: four surfaces, one runtime\n\nEvery coding-agent integration exposes the same four surfaces:\n\n| Surface | Carries |\n|---|---|\n| Outbound, ambient | lifecycle \u2192 presence and activity, automatically |\n| Outbound, deliberate | the messaging tools (`cotal_send` / `cotal_dm` / `cotal_anycast`) |\n| Inbound, pull | `cotal_inbox` |\n| Inbound, push | wake-and-inject into the live session |\n\nThe shared runtime lives in [`@cotal-ai/connector-core`](../extensions/connector-core):\nthe mesh agent, the [`cotal_*` tool surface](mcp-tools.md) (defined once in its tool\nspecs, so it cannot drift across hosts), and the delivery buffer with its attention\npolicy. Each adapter is a thin client\nover it that binds to its host's native mechanism: an installed plugin + MCP server for\n[Claude Code](connect-claude.md), an in-process plugin for\n[OpenCode](connect-opencode.md) (beta), a Python sidecar for\n[Hermes](connect-hermes.md) (alpha), a host-native extension for\n[pi](connect-pi.md) (alpha). The [connectors matrix](connectors.md) compares them\nfeature-by-feature.\n\nThe endpoint underneath self-heals: when the transport connection dies terminally, a\nsupervisor rebuilds it (rebuilds are serialized and coalesced), and unacked in-flight\nmessages redeliver on the rebound durables, so nothing is lost across the gap. A manual\n`/reconnect` is the human-invoked counterpart.\n\n## Manager: a supervisor, not an orchestrator\n\nThe CLI does not spawn agents itself; a long-lived **manager** owns their lifecycle,\nasked over the mesh. The manager is not a privileged control plane: it is an ordinary\nservice endpoint on the same `ep` rails as any other daemon\n([\xA713](../SPEC.md#13-endpoint-control-surface-v04)), holding only the capability rows its\ncallers grant it. It owns process lifecycle and config binding (start / stop / restart,\nbinding env and policy) and has no say in what work the agents do. Agents coordinate\nlaterally; the manager only births and configures them.\n\n- **Off the message hot path.** Each agent self-connects to the mesh through its own\n  connector. The manager owns processes in order to control them, but observes everything\n  through presence, so a bring-your-own-terminal agent it never spawned still shows up in\n  `ps`.\n- **Pluggable runtimes.** Spawning is abstracted behind a `Runtime` contract (like pm2 or\n  docker for agent TUIs): **`pty`** ships built-in (the manager owns a pseudo-terminal;\n  watch or type via `cotal attach`); **`tmux`**, **`cmux`**, **`orca`**, and **`herdr`** are\n  extensions that put each teammate in its own native terminal surface (explicit opt-ins\n  that throw when the extension isn't loaded, never a silent fallback); **byo** is the\n  floor (a human's own terminal, tracked via presence); **host** (Agent SDK, true mid-turn\n  interrupt) is the documented upgrade path ([roadmap](roadmap.md)).\n- **Served commands.** `spawn` (an action, below), `stop`, `ps`, `status`, `attach`,\n  `models`, `definePersona`, and `bind` are endpoint commands\n  ([\xA713.5](../SPEC.md#135-verbs)) any authorized node can send, policy-gated\n  ([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). A caller learns them off the wire with `cotal\n  describe manager`; nothing is compiled in.\n- **Spawn is an action.** Asking for an agent no longer blocks the caller while the process\n  comes up. The manager accepts a spawn **goal** ([\xA713.6](../SPEC.md#136-composites)) and\n  immediately returns the allocated identity (the agent's name, its `owner`/`actor`/`uid`\n  triple, a `goalId`, and the executor coordinate `{lifecycleUid, epoch}`); progress events\n  then report the launch until a terminal outcome. Presence within the readiness window is\n  `succeeded`, an early exit is `failed`, and the window passing with neither is\n  `uncertain`: a bounded, reconcilable outcome a later `ps` settles against the live roster,\n  never a silent hang.\n- **Bounded spawn.** A gate caps concurrent and in-flight agents and a minimum-lifetime\n  floor bounds spawn/despawn churn, so a capability-holding but compromised peer cannot\n  fork-bomb the host. The gate runs at goal acceptance, before any identity is minted or\n  process launched, so a refused spawn leaves nothing behind.\n- **Inherited env, minus Cotal's own namespace.** A spawned agent gets the operator's\n  environment, because a harness they installed and configured should behave the same way\n  under `cotal spawn` as it does in their shell. Cotal resets only its own `COTAL_*`\n  namespace, which is identity rather than preference: a connector supplies those per child\n  and does so conditionally, so an inherited value would reach an agent that was never\n  granted it. Connection material is not in the environment at all; it rides a private file.\n  An operator who wants the child confined declares `spawn.env` in the cotal config.\n- **Instance addressing.** One space can hold more than one manager. Each keeps a stable\n  logical instance id across restarts and advances its process epoch when it comes back, so\n  peers address a specific manager without caring which process currently serves it. `cotal\n  spawn <persona> --detach --on <instance>` pins one instance (`ps`, `stop` and `attach` take\n  the same flag); an untargeted spawn rides class anycast and the acceptance records which\n  instance took it. `ps` and `status` scatter across every registered instance and label a\n  non-answering one as registered with no answer within the deadline, never dropping it.\n- **A manager holds a liveness lease, and only proof ends it.** Each instance keeps its own key\n  in the space's manager bucket and refreshes it several times over inside the key's TTL. A\n  refresh that gets *no answer* is not a lost lease: it proves nothing about the key, and the\n  write may even have landed with only the acknowledgement lost. So the manager re-reads the key\n  before deciding. It keeps serving when the key is still its own, adopting whatever revision the\n  broker actually has, and shuts itself down only on proof: the key is gone, or it now holds a\n  different process. Going longer than the TTL with no refresh that *landed* is its own reason\n  to stop, and it says so in those words. That window runs from the last write that actually\n  restarted the key's TTL: a re-read that finds the key unchanged is a real answer and the\n  manager keeps serving on it, but reading a key does not refresh it, so it buys no extra time.\n  Either way that stops one instance, never the space; a sibling manager keeps serving.\n- **Attach is a mesh session.** The console and dashboard discover agents over the **mesh**\n  (presence, `ps`). `cotal attach` no longer hands back a `127.0.0.1` URL: it redeems a\n  one-use, holder-bound session offer, and the terminal bytes stream over the mesh on\n  core-NATS session subjects scoped to the two parties, with backpressure surfaced as an\n  explicit drop notice rather than silent loss. That is also how attach reaches a manager on\n  another machine \u2014 through the broker, not by dialing the manager's own socket. A late\n  attach still repaints the full screen from a replayed snapshot of a headless terminal\n  mirror (including alternate-screen TUIs). If the manager restarts, its successor refuses\n  the old session and the client surfaces \"manager restarted; re-attach\".\n- **The manager's console face is a separate, credentialed surface.** The manager still\n  serves the browser console over local HTTP: the static page plus the roster, the live feed,\n  and the route that mints the browser's own session. It binds loopback unless the operator\n  says otherwise (`cotal supervise --console-host`), and every route that carries mesh data\n  or mints a credential requires the manager's console token.\n\nThe result is that an agent can grow and shape its own team: ask for a teammate\n(`cotal_spawn`), mint a persona on the fly (`cotal_persona`), or tear one down\n(`cotal_despawn`). Every newcomer joins as a peer, not as a child of whoever requested\nit. Each managed agent runs under a durable **lifecycle**: a despawn retires it (settling\nand evicting the old incarnation) before its name frees for reuse, and a supervised restart\nrecovers the same lifecycle rather than minting a new one, so durables and credentials key\non the lifecycle, not the reusable name ([SPEC \xA713.1](../SPEC.md#131-lifecycle-identity);\n[identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). Destructive space-wide operations (history purge)\nstay operator-only.\n\n\n## Observers\n\nA watch surface is a read-only observer: an endpoint that consumes without registering\npresence (invisible to peers) while watching everyone else's. All three surfaces\n(terminal console, plain stream, web dashboard) derive from that one observer through a\nshared render-agnostic model, so no surface re-implements wire semantics. The guide is\n[watch a mesh](watch-a-mesh.md); the model is [MeshView](mesh-view.md).\n\n## Names, roles, instances\n\nThree identity layers, in increasing permanence\n([SPEC \xA72](../SPEC.md#2-identity), [\xA76](../SPEC.md#6-presence-and-discovery)):\n\n- **`name`** is a cosmetic, reusable human handle. Addressing by name is best-effort\n  convenience, with deterministic and fail-loud resolution: a unique live name resolves,\n  and a collision among live peers throws with the candidate ids rather than silently\n  picking one. The manager auto-numbers its own spawns (`reviewer` \u2192 `reviewer-2`).\n- **`role`** is the addressable service, which makes it the anycast address:\n  `svc.reviewer` reaches \"whoever is a reviewer\", so the label carries routing meaning.\n- **The instance id** is the authoritative address: the presence key, the unicast target,\n  the credential subject.\n\n**Instance continuity:** the id tracks *context* continuity, not the label. A resumed\nsession (same context window) keeps its id; presence, thread correlation, and in-flight\nDMs stay continuous. A fresh context, even reusing the name, is a **new** instance with a\nnew id: reusing an id across a discontinuous context would tell peers \"same agent, same\nmemory\" when the new session has none. One deliberate exception: OpenCode's `/new` inside\nthe same managed process keeps the mesh identity and advances only the thread correlation\nid: process continuity, not credential reuse.\n\n## Deferred\n\nSessions/moderator, signed envelopes + DID identity, instant offline, artifact delivery,\nauth-callout, and federation are designed for but not built yet; each is tracked, with\nits direction, in the [roadmap](roadmap.md).\n"
+      "body": "# Architecture\n\n> **Concept** (informative) \xB7 **For:** anyone who wants to know how Cotal is built, and why \xB7 **Normative:** [SPEC](../SPEC.md)\n\nCotal is built as a thin waist: the normative wire contract (subjects, message schemas,\npresence/discovery, delivery semantics, the auth grammar) is the standard\n([SPEC](../SPEC.md)), and everything else is a pluggable edge over existing building\nblocks. Identity, transport, storage, and discovery compose from proven pieces (NATS,\nJetStream, JWT/nkeys) rather than being reinvented. Adapters stay thin and swappable, and\nnothing adapter-specific leaks into the core.\n\n## Influences: A2A\n\nCotal reuses A2A's vocabulary and shapes so it stays interoperable rather than siloed, and\nimplements them over NATS/JetStream.\n\n**From A2A** come the *data shapes*: `AgentCard` (identity / role / tags / skills),\n`Message` / `Part` (text and data), and correlation ids (`contextId`). We do not adopt\nA2A's HTTP/JSON-RPC transport, `Task` RPCs, or its request/response server model, none of\nwhich fit lateral pub/sub.\n\nThe *addressing model* is Cotal's own: the hierarchical address `space / service / instance`\nand three delivery modes, multicast, unicast, anycast\n([presence & delivery](presence-and-delivery.md)). **Mentions** are a priority hint on a\nmulticast, not a routing target. NATS/JetStream is the data plane, adding the durability and\npresence a bare pub/sub layer leaves to the app.\n\nIdentity is an A2A `AgentCard` whose instance id is shaped to later become a **DID**\n(`did:key`) so authenticity can survive an untrusted relay ([roadmap](roadmap.md)).\n\n## One wire, mapped onto NATS\n\nThe messaging plane rides three subject kinds, with the sender encoded in the subject\nitself, where the server can police it, rather than in a self-asserted payload field\n([SPEC \xA73](../SPEC.md#3-subject-layout)); the endpoint control surface adds its own rails\n([SPEC \xA713](../SPEC.md#13-endpoint-control-surface-v04)):\n\n| Delivery | Subject |\n|---|---|\n| multicast | `cotal.<space>.chat.<owner>.<actor>.<channel\u2026>` |\n| unicast | `cotal.<space>.inst.<toOwner>.<toActor>.<owner>.<actor>` |\n| anycast | `cotal.<space>.svc.<role>.<owner>.<actor>` |\n| endpoint (control) | `cotal.<space>.ep.<one\\|all\\|inst\\|reply>.\u2026` ([\xA713.2](../SPEC.md#132-grammar)) |\n\nThe sender is a **principal**, an `owner.actor` pair: the account the agent acts on behalf\nof, then the agent's own handle under it ([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). Two\ntokens instead of one means the broker can deny cross-owner *and* same-owner cross-actor\nforgery in the subject grammar itself.\n\nBehind the subjects, each space gets three **JetStream streams** (chat / DM / task, for\nstorage, per-reader bookmarks, and history), **KV buckets** for presence and the channel\nregistry, and the endpoint control surface on its own rails and streams\n([SPEC \xA713](../SPEC.md#13-endpoint-control-surface-v04)). Rather than re-implementing delivery\nguarantees, Cotal uses the native NATS mechanisms: streams for at-least-once and late\njoin, queue groups for anycast load-balancing, KV TTL for liveness ([SPEC \xA78](../SPEC.md#8-nats--jetstream-binding);\nthe reasoning: [presence & delivery](presence-and-delivery.md)). Isolation is one NATS\n**account per space** ([spaces & channels](spaces.md)); authorization is per-agent JWT\nACLs ([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). Large artifacts are reserved for a\nper-space Object Store ([roadmap](roadmap.md)).\n\nWhether any of this *requires* NATS is answered in\n[transport vs protocol](transport.md): the contract is transport-agnostic; NATS/JetStream\nis the reference binding.\n\n## Package layout: one-way tiers\n\n```\nexamples \u2500\u2500\u2192 implementations \u2500\u2500\u2192 workspace \u2500\u2500\u2192 core \u2190(peer)\u2500\u2500 extensions\n                (interoperate at runtime over NATS, not via imports)\n```\n\n- **`@cotal-ai/core`**, the protocol: subjects, schemas, the NATS client layer, and the\n  extension contracts (`Connector`, `Command`, `Runtime`) with the `Registry` they\n  self-register into. Depends on nothing else in the repo.\n- **`@cotal-ai/workspace`**, the machine-local operator layer over `~/.cotal`: mesh\n  registry, target resolution, auth-path helpers. Not part of the wire standard, so a\n  third party can embed core without inheriting workstation plumbing.\n- **`extensions/*`**: pluggable adapters (connectors, runtimes). Each **peer-depends** on\n  core (binding to the host's single core instance) and self-registers on import; an\n  unknown agent type **throws**, no silent fallback.\n- **`implementations/*`**, opinionated surfaces over core: the CLI, the manager, the\n  delivery daemon, the web dashboard. Implementations never import each other; they meet\n  at runtime, in a shared space over NATS. A composition root (the `cotal` binary, or an\n  example) wires the pieces it wants.\n- **`examples/*`**: use-cases and composition roots, never published\n  ([examples](examples.md)). An example only configures and orchestrates; new message\n  kinds or subjects go into core, generalized, never into an example.\n\nThe published binary also loads **operator-installed extensions**: `cotal ext add\n<npm-package>` installs into a cotal-owned prefix, imports once so the package\nself-registers, then caches every contributed `kind:name`. Command metadata is cached for\n`--help`/completion; running a command or requesting a provider imports its owner lazily and\nuses the live object. Before that first import, the loader rebinds shared peers to the current\nhost under the extension-prefix lock; version skew or an unbindable peer fails loudly.\nThe repo's `@cotal-ai/web` dashboard and optional tmux/cmux/Orca/Herdr runtimes use this mechanism.\nRuntime resolution stays registry-driven and open-ended: a name with no registered/installed\nprovider fails loud (never a fallback), and a third-party runtime installs under its own package\nname. The CLI does carry a small, non-authoritative map of the first-party runtime names\n(`orca`/`tmux`/`cmux`/`herdr`) to their `@cotal-ai/*` packages, used only to print an exact `cotal ext add`\nhint for a known-but-uninstalled runtime and to list them in `cotal runtimes`; it never resolves or\nregisters a provider.\n\nMachine-local processes use the same registry. The base CLI contributes broker/control-plane\n`local-process` descriptors, while an installed package contributes its own (for example `web`).\nThat keeps `cotal down <component>` and `cotal status` extensible without teaching the base CLI\npackage-specific pidfiles. A provider process claims its declared pidfile with exclusive create;\nextension removal reserves that same path so startup cannot cross uninstall.\n\nBeyond the app-bound connectors, `@cotal-ai/pi` is a **host-native plugin**: a pi extension\nloaded into the user's own pi (CLI or SDK-embedded), placing a Cotal endpoint inside the\nsession's process and driving its run loop off the inbox \u2014 see\n[connect-pi](connect-pi.md).\n\n## Connectors: four surfaces, one runtime\n\nEvery coding-agent integration exposes the same four surfaces:\n\n| Surface | Carries |\n|---|---|\n| Outbound, ambient | lifecycle \u2192 presence and activity, automatically |\n| Outbound, deliberate | the messaging tools (`cotal_send` / `cotal_dm` / `cotal_anycast`) |\n| Inbound, pull | `cotal_inbox` |\n| Inbound, push | wake-and-inject into the live session |\n\nThe shared runtime lives in [`@cotal-ai/connector-core`](../extensions/connector-core):\nthe mesh agent, the [`cotal_*` tool surface](mcp-tools.md) (defined once in its tool\nspecs, so it cannot drift across hosts), and the delivery buffer with its attention\npolicy. Each adapter is a thin client\nover it that binds to its host's native mechanism: an installed plugin + MCP server for\n[Claude Code](connect-claude.md), an in-process plugin for\n[OpenCode](connect-opencode.md) (beta), a Python sidecar for\n[Hermes](connect-hermes.md) (alpha), a host-native extension for\n[pi](connect-pi.md) (alpha). The [connectors matrix](connectors.md) compares them\nfeature-by-feature.\n\nThe endpoint underneath self-heals: when the transport connection dies terminally, a\nsupervisor rebuilds it (rebuilds are serialized and coalesced), and unacked in-flight\nmessages redeliver on the rebound durables, so nothing is lost across the gap. A manual\n`/reconnect` is the human-invoked counterpart.\n\n## Manager: a supervisor, not an orchestrator\n\nThe CLI does not spawn agents itself; a long-lived **manager** owns their lifecycle,\nasked over the mesh. The manager is not a privileged control plane: it is an ordinary\nservice endpoint on the same `ep` rails as any other daemon\n([\xA713](../SPEC.md#13-endpoint-control-surface-v04)), holding only the capability rows its\ncallers grant it. It owns process lifecycle and config binding (start / stop / restart,\nbinding env and policy) and has no say in what work the agents do. Agents coordinate\nlaterally; the manager only births and configures them.\n\n- **Off the message hot path.** Each agent self-connects to the mesh through its own\n  connector. The manager owns processes in order to control them, but observes everything\n  through presence, so a bring-your-own-terminal agent it never spawned still shows up in\n  `ps`.\n- **Pluggable runtimes.** Spawning is abstracted behind a `Runtime` contract (like pm2 or\n  docker for agent TUIs): **`pty`** ships built-in (the manager owns a pseudo-terminal;\n  watch or type via `cotal attach`); **`tmux`**, **`cmux`**, **`orca`**, and **`herdr`** are\n  extensions that put each teammate in its own native terminal surface (explicit opt-ins\n  that throw when the extension isn't loaded, never a silent fallback); **byo** is the\n  floor (a human's own terminal, tracked via presence); **host** (Agent SDK, true mid-turn\n  interrupt) is the documented upgrade path ([roadmap](roadmap.md)).\n- **Served commands.** `spawn` (an action, below), `stop`, `ps`, `status`, `attach`,\n  `models`, `definePersona`, and `bind` are endpoint commands\n  ([\xA713.5](../SPEC.md#135-verbs)) any authorized node can send, policy-gated\n  ([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). A caller learns them off the wire with `cotal\n  describe manager`; nothing is compiled in.\n- **Spawn is an action.** Asking for an agent no longer blocks the caller while the process\n  comes up. The manager accepts a spawn **goal** ([\xA713.6](../SPEC.md#136-composites)) and\n  immediately returns the allocated identity (the agent's name, its `owner`/`actor`/`uid`\n  triple, a `goalId`, and the executor coordinate `{lifecycleUid, epoch}`); progress events\n  then report the launch until a terminal outcome. Presence within the readiness window is\n  `succeeded`, an early exit is `failed`, and the window passing with neither is\n  `uncertain`: a bounded, reconcilable outcome a later `ps` settles against the live roster,\n  never a silent hang.\n- **Bounded spawn.** A gate caps concurrent and in-flight agents and a minimum-lifetime\n  floor bounds spawn/despawn churn, so a capability-holding but compromised peer cannot\n  fork-bomb the host. The gate runs at goal acceptance, before any identity is minted or\n  process launched, so a refused spawn leaves nothing behind.\n- **Declared environment boundary.** A spawned agent receives a fixed OS allow-list (PATH/HOME/\n  locale, including PATH entries connector binaries live in), the machine-wide `COTAL_*` operator\n  knobs, connector-declared provider inputs, explicitly shared MCP references, and names\n  deliberately added through `spawn.env`. It never inherits the manager's ambient environment, so\n  host-session markers (`CLAUDE_CODE_CHILD_SESSION` and the analogous names other hosts use) and\n  unrelated capabilities cannot become properties of every seat. Connection material rides a private\n  file instead of the environment.\n- **Instance addressing.** One space can hold more than one manager. Each keeps a stable\n  logical instance id across restarts and advances its process epoch when it comes back, so\n  peers address a specific manager without caring which process currently serves it. `cotal\n  spawn <persona> --detach --on <instance>` pins one instance (`ps`, `stop` and `attach` take\n  the same flag); an untargeted spawn rides class anycast and the acceptance records which\n  instance took it. `ps` and `status` scatter across every registered instance and label a\n  non-answering one as registered with no answer within the deadline, never dropping it.\n- **A manager holds a liveness lease, and only proof ends it.** Each instance keeps its own key\n  in the space's manager bucket and refreshes it several times over inside the key's TTL. A\n  refresh that gets *no answer* is not a lost lease: it proves nothing about the key, and the\n  write may even have landed with only the acknowledgement lost. So the manager re-reads the key\n  before deciding. It keeps serving when the key is still its own, adopting whatever revision the\n  broker actually has, and shuts itself down only on proof: the key is gone, or it now holds a\n  different process. Going longer than the TTL with no refresh that *landed* is its own reason\n  to stop, and it says so in those words. That window runs from the last write that actually\n  restarted the key's TTL: a re-read that finds the key unchanged is a real answer and the\n  manager keeps serving on it, but reading a key does not refresh it, so it buys no extra time.\n  Either way that stops one instance, never the space; a sibling manager keeps serving.\n- **Attach is a mesh session.** The console and dashboard discover agents over the **mesh**\n  (presence, `ps`). `cotal attach` no longer hands back a `127.0.0.1` URL: it redeems a\n  one-use, holder-bound session offer, and the terminal bytes stream over the mesh on\n  core-NATS session subjects scoped to the two parties, with backpressure surfaced as an\n  explicit drop notice rather than silent loss. That is also how attach reaches a manager on\n  another machine \u2014 through the broker, not by dialing the manager's own socket. A late\n  attach still repaints the full screen from a replayed snapshot of a headless terminal\n  mirror (including alternate-screen TUIs). If the manager restarts, its successor refuses\n  the old session and the client surfaces \"manager restarted; re-attach\".\n- **The manager's console face is a separate, credentialed surface.** The manager still\n  serves the browser console over local HTTP: the static page plus the roster, the live feed,\n  and the route that mints the browser's own session. It binds loopback unless the operator\n  says otherwise (`cotal supervise --console-host`), and every route that carries mesh data\n  or mints a credential requires the manager's console token.\n\nThe result is that an agent can grow and shape its own team: ask for a teammate\n(`cotal_spawn`), mint a persona on the fly (`cotal_persona`), or tear one down\n(`cotal_despawn`). Every newcomer joins as a peer, not as a child of whoever requested\nit. Each managed agent runs under a durable **lifecycle**: a despawn retires it (settling\nand evicting the old incarnation) before its name frees for reuse, and a supervised restart\nrecovers the same lifecycle rather than minting a new one, so durables and credentials key\non the lifecycle, not the reusable name ([SPEC \xA713.1](../SPEC.md#131-lifecycle-identity);\n[identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). Destructive space-wide operations (history purge)\nstay operator-only.\n\n\n## Observers\n\nA watch surface is a read-only observer: an endpoint that consumes without registering\npresence (invisible to peers) while watching everyone else's. All three surfaces\n(terminal console, plain stream, web dashboard) derive from that one observer through a\nshared render-agnostic model, so no surface re-implements wire semantics. The guide is\n[watch a mesh](watch-a-mesh.md); the model is [MeshView](mesh-view.md).\n\n## Names, roles, instances\n\nThree identity layers, in increasing permanence\n([SPEC \xA72](../SPEC.md#2-identity), [\xA76](../SPEC.md#6-presence-and-discovery)):\n\n- **`name`** is a cosmetic, reusable human handle. Addressing by name is best-effort\n  convenience, with deterministic and fail-loud resolution: a unique live name resolves,\n  and a collision among live peers throws with the candidate ids rather than silently\n  picking one. The manager auto-numbers its own spawns (`reviewer` \u2192 `reviewer-2`).\n- **`role`** is the addressable service, which makes it the anycast address:\n  `svc.reviewer` reaches \"whoever is a reviewer\", so the label carries routing meaning.\n- **The instance id** is the authoritative address: the presence key, the unicast target,\n  the credential subject.\n\n**Instance continuity:** the id tracks *context* continuity, not the label. A resumed\nsession (same context window) keeps its id; presence, thread correlation, and in-flight\nDMs stay continuous. A fresh context, even reusing the name, is a **new** instance with a\nnew id: reusing an id across a discontinuous context would tell peers \"same agent, same\nmemory\" when the new session has none. One deliberate exception: OpenCode's `/new` inside\nthe same managed process keeps the mesh identity and advances only the thread correlation\nid: process continuity, not credential reuse.\n\n## Deferred\n\nSessions/moderator, signed envelopes + DID identity, instant offline, artifact delivery,\nauth-callout, and federation are designed for but not built yet; each is tracked, with\nits direction, in the [roadmap](roadmap.md).\n"
     },
     {
       "slug": "mcp-tools",
@@ -16151,21 +16139,21 @@ var DOCS_BUNDLE = {
       "title": "`cotal` CLI reference",
       "kind": "Reference: describes the TypeScript reference implementation (the `cotal` CLI), not the wire contract.",
       "summary": "cotal is the operator command line for the reference implementation: bring a mesh up, mint identities, launch agents, watch what they do, and tear it all down.",
-      "body": "# `cotal` CLI reference\n\n> **Reference**: describes the TypeScript reference implementation (the `cotal` CLI), not the wire contract. \xB7 **For:** operators \xB7 **Wire contract:** [SPEC](../SPEC.md)\n\n`cotal` is the operator command line for the reference implementation: bring a mesh up, mint\nidentities, launch agents, watch what they do, and tear it all down. It is a thin client over the\nwire contract: the normative subjects and schemas live in the [SPEC](../SPEC.md); this page is\nlookup material for the commands, not a walkthrough; if you are new, start with\n[Getting started](getting-started.md).\n\n## Running it\n\n```bash\nnpm install -g cotal-ai   # puts `cotal` on your PATH (needs Node 22+)\ncotal --help              # every command, grouped\ncotal --version           # cotal-ai version + each installed extension's (also `cotal -v`)\ncotal <command> --help    # one command's flags and usage\n```\n\n`npx cotal-ai <command>` runs it without a global install; in a dev clone, `pnpm cotal <command>`\nruns it through `tsx` with no build step. Bare `cotal` prints help. Every command generates its own\n`--help`, usage, and shell completion from its declared flags.\n\nCommands come from the surfaces the binary composes: the base mesh CLI, the manager\n(`supervise`), and the delivery daemon (`deliver`), plus any operator-installed extensions.\n`cotal ext add <npm-package>` installs any registry providers a package contributes: commands,\nruntimes, and local process lifecycle descriptors. The `web` dashboard and optional manager\nruntimes ship this way.\n\n## Commands\n\n| Area | Command | Purpose |\n|---|---|---|\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`setup`](#setup) | Guided, configure-only setup (installs, seeds personas; launches nothing) |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`update`](#update) | Reconcile first-party extensions and check or opt into a coherent CLI upgrade |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`up`](#up) | Start a local mesh (nats-server + JetStream), or boot a whole manifest with `-f` |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`down`](#down) | Stop the whole stack, selected registered components, or a manifest deploy |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`backup`](#backup-and-restore) | Create an offline full-space or registry-only artifact from a preserved cut |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`clean`](#clean) | Configurable cleanup: purge history (live), or wipe the local store / identity (stopped) |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`meshes`](#meshes-use-status) | List the running meshes on this machine |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`use`](#meshes-use-status) | Set the default mesh a bare `cotal spawn` joins |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`status`](#meshes-use-status) | Read-only diagnostics for setup, processes, and the selected mesh |\n| Agents & personas | [`spawn`](#spawn) | Launch an agent from a persona (foreground, or `--detach` via the manager) |\n| Agents & personas | [`models`](#models) | List connector model catalogs and variants from the manager |\n| Agents & personas | [`ps`](#ps-stop-attach) | List managed agents and their mesh status |\n| Agents & personas | [`stop`](#ps-stop-attach) | Ask the manager to stop a managed agent |\n| Agents & personas | [`attach`](#ps-stop-attach) | Stream and drive a managed agent's terminal (pty runtime) |\n| Agents & personas | [`input`](#input) | Type one line into a managed agent's terminal without attaching |\n| Agents & personas | [`personas`](#personas) | List, show, edit, create, or remove local personas |\n| Agents & personas | [`supervise`](#supervise) | Run a manager daemon (the agent supervisor / control plane) |\n| Agents & personas | [`runtimes`](#runtimes) | List the agent runtimes the manager can spawn through and whether each is reachable |\n| Agents & personas | [`reconcile-gate`](#reconcile-gate) | Unfreeze an issuance gate left frozen by a crashed manager restart, after verifying the holder is gone |\n| Messaging & watching | [`endpoints`](#endpoints) | List every endpoint in the live presence roster, including infrastructure |\n| Messaging & watching | [`describe` / `invoke`](#describe-invoke) | Resolve a v0.4 service's command surface off the wire; invoke one command by name |\n| Messaging & watching | [`send`](#send) | Send one message, then exit: DM a peer, post a channel, or ask a role |\n| Messaging & watching | [`channels`](#channels) | Inspect or set the channel registry |\n| Messaging & watching | [`history`](#history) | Clear retained message history |\n| Messaging & watching | [`console`](#console) | Live protocol view for a space (TUI, or `--plain` line stream) |\n| Messaging & watching | [`web`](#web) | Browser dashboard (installed as the `@cotal-ai/web` extension) |\n| Auth & meshes | [`mint`](#mint) | Mint a creds file for a space (static auth mode) |\n| Auth & meshes | [`login`](#login-logout) | Sign in to a per-user-auth mesh's IdP (once per machine) |\n| Auth & meshes | [`logout`](#login-logout) | Revoke the IdP session and clear the cached login |\n| Auth & meshes | [`actor`](#actor) | Manage a user-auth space's actor ledger (grant / revoke / list) |\n| Auth & meshes | [`doctor`](#doctor) | Credential-health diagnosis and repair (`doctor auth`) |\n| Auth & meshes | [`join`](#join) | Join a space as your own presence (interactive) |\n| Manifest | [`topology`](#manifest-deploys) | Validate and view a mesh manifest's access graph (read-only) |\n| Extensions & misc | [`ext`](#ext) | Install / remove operator CLI extensions |\n| Extensions & misc | [`completion`](#completion) | Print or install shell completion |\n| Extensions & misc | [`feedback`](#feedback) | Send feedback to the Cotal developers |\n| Extensions & misc | [`deliver`](#server-daemons) | Run the server-side Plane-3 delivery daemon |\n| Extensions & misc | [`feedback-intake`](#server-daemons) | Run a self-hosted feedback intake server |\n\nThe manifest modes of `up`, `spawn`, and `down` (`-f <cotal.yaml>`) plus `topology` are covered\ntogether under [Manifest deploys](#manifest-deploys).\n\n## setup\n\n```bash\ncotal setup [--full] [--demo] [--yes]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--full` | off | Redo the full guided flow (implies `--demo`) |\n| `--demo` | off | Also seed the guided expert team (`david`, `sven`, `me`) |\n| `--yes`, `-y` | off | Non-interactive accept-all (for agents / CI) |\n\nGuided setup is **configure-only**: it checks prerequisites, installs the Claude Code plugin, and\nseeds persona files, and it launches nothing (no mesh, no web, no manager). First run gets the\nnarrated flow; later runs print a status card. By default it seeds one `default` persona; the\n`david`/`sven`/`me` team is opt-in via `--demo`. See [Getting started](getting-started.md) and, for\nmaintainers, [setup internals](setup-internals.md).\n\n## update\n\n```bash\ncotal update [--self]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--self` | off | If a newer release exists, install that exact validated `cotal-ai` version globally and reconcile through the newly installed binary |\n\nWithout `--self`, `update` keeps the installed first-party surfaces coherent with the running\nbinary: it force-reconciles the four built-in connectors, then reinstalls other `@cotal-ai/*`\noperator extensions at the binary's exact version. Each extension runs in an isolated child, so one\nfailure cannot poison later replays. It then checks npm; a newer binary is an informational notice\nwith `cotal update --self` as the next command, not an automatic install.\n\nWith `--self`, the npm check happens first. When a newer release exists, Cotal installs the exact\nversion it validated, resolves and verifies that package in npm's global root, then launches that\nbinary to reconcile connectors and first-party extensions to the new generation. An npx or dev-clone\ninvocation therefore installs and continues through a separate global copy; it never claims the\nalready-running process changed. If the binary is current, `--self` performs the normal local\nreconcile without reinstalling it.\n\nThird-party extensions are listed with their installed version and recorded spec but are not\nauto-updated in v1. Floating third-party updates require `@cotal-ai/*` peer-range validation and are\na future follow-up. A failed connector/extension install, npm metadata check, or requested global\ninstall is reported and makes the command exit nonzero. Independent extension attempts continue so\nthe output includes every failure; an unavailable npm registry does not undo a completed local\nreconcile, but the command still exits nonzero because it could not establish that the install is\ncurrent.\n\n## up\n\n```bash\ncotal up [--detach] [--open] [--space <s>] [--server <url>] [--channels <path>] [--runtime <name>]\ncotal up --user-auth --idp <url> [--exchange-public-port <n> --exchange-public-url <https://\u2026> [--exchange-trusted-proxy]]\ncotal up --tls-cert <cert.pem> --tls-key <key.pem>   # serve broker TLS (both, or neither)\ncotal up --restore <dir> [--restore-only registry] [--accept-missing-source]\ncotal up -f <cotal.yaml> [--dry-run] [--runtime <name>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--server <url>` | auto (free local port) | Listen URL override |\n| `--host <host>` | \u2014 | Bind host override. With no `--server`, the broker URL is derived from it, so `--host <addr>` alone is enough to make a mesh reachable at that address; a `--host`/`--server` pair naming different addresses is refused. A wildcard bind (`0.0.0.0`, `::`) keeps a dialable loopback URL. Recorded on the mesh and reused by every later manager launch, so a repair or resume keeps remote [`attach`](#ps-stop-attach) working |\n| `--space <s>` | the folder's name | Space name |\n| `--store-dir <dir>` | \u2014 | JetStream store directory |\n| `--channels <path>` | `.cotal/channels.json` if present | Channel-registry seed file (JSON). An explicit path that is missing is an error |\n| `--restore <dir>` | \u2014 | Restore a completed offline backup before exposing the normal listener |\n| `--restore-only registry` | artifact selection | Restore only the registry component |\n| `--accept-missing-source` | off | Explicit disaster consent when the inode-bound preserved source is absent |\n| `--open` | off (auth) | Unauthenticated dev mesh: no JWT, no ACLs |\n| `--user-auth` | off | Per-user auth: people `cotal login`; connects are authorized against the actor ledger |\n| `--idp <url>` | \u2014 | With `--user-auth`: the IdP auth base URL to pin on first enable |\n| `--exchange-public-port <n>` | none | With `--user-auth`: add the public exchange face on this loopback port, for an HTTPS reverse proxy to forward to |\n| `--exchange-public-url <https://\u2026>` | none | With `--exchange-public-port`: advertise the reverse proxy's HTTPS URL in discovery |\n| `--exchange-trusted-proxy` | off | With `--exchange-public-port`: attribute public failure buckets to the last `X-Forwarded-For` hop. Enable only when the listener is reachable solely through a trusted proxy; otherwise the socket address is used |\n| `--detach` | off | Run in the background (stop with `cotal down`) |\n| `--tls-cert <path>` | \u2014 | PEM certificate to serve TLS with. Must be given together with `--tls-key`. The pair is validated **before** the broker starts \u2014 readability, private-key mode, that the two match, the validity window, and that the certificate covers the host clients will dial \u2014 because `nats-server` starts happily on an expired certificate and only the client then fails. The decision is recorded, so a later bare `cotal up` after a `cotal down` keeps serving TLS rather than silently reverting to cleartext |\n| `--tls-key <path>` | \u2014 | PEM private key for `--tls-cert`. Refused if group- or other-readable (tighten to `600`) |\n| `--file <cotal.yaml>`, `-f` | \u2014 | Launch a whole mesh from a manifest |\n| `--dry-run` | off | With `-f`: print the plan, mutate nothing |\n| `--runtime <name>` | `pty` (or the manifest's, with `-f`) | Agent runtime for the mesh manager (`pty` built in; others are installed extensions, explicit-only). Resolved + probed before the broker starts; an uninstalled/unreachable runtime fails loud. With `-f`, overrides the manifest's runtime |\n| `--rotate-sys` | off | Rotate the space's system account and re-mint its two `$SYS` creds. Needs a stopped mesh; refused with `--open` |\n\n`cotal up` boots a local nats-server with JetStream and, in auth mode (the default), JWT auth and\nper-agent ACLs; `--detach` records the mesh so `cotal spawn` from any directory can find it. With no\n`--server`, it auto-selects a free port if the default address is taken; an explicit `--server`\nstays fail-loud on collision. `--detach` also brings up the control plane (delivery daemon in auth\nmode, then the manager). The `-f` form is a [manifest deploy](#manifest-deploys); see\n[Run a mesh](run-a-mesh.md).\n\n`--user-auth --idp <url>` starts the space's auth service alongside the broker: the NATS\nauth callout plus its capability-gated local exchange, and optionally the closed public exchange\nface configured by the three `--exchange-*` flags above. The service is torn down with `cotal down`,\nand a re-run of `cotal up` heals a dead service on a running broker. `--user-auth` and `--open`\ncontradict each other and are refused loudly; a running broker cannot change auth mode\nwithout a `cotal down` first. See [identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\n`--rotate-sys` renews the two `$SYS` credentials (`membership-observer`, `connection-evictor`).\nThey carry a 30-day expiry and nothing re-signs them in place, because the system-account seed is\nnever persisted, so they are renewed by issuing a **new system account** under the same broker\noperator and minting fresh creds against it. A plain re-`up` does **not** do this: it reuses the\nexisting trust record, and its `$SYS` creds along with it.\n\nThe rotation is safe to run on a real space, with one operational cost. The data account, the account\nsigning key, every agent credential minted from it, and the JetStream store are all untouched; what\ndies is the retired system account, and with it any out-of-band copy of the old `$SYS` creds, on every\nbroker that loads the rotated config. The cost is that **earlier full backups stop being restorable**\n(see below), so this is not a no-consequence operation. It needs the broker to restart on the rewritten\nconfig, so it runs as part of a boot:\n\n```bash\ncotal down\ncotal up --rotate-sys --detach     # agents reconnect; nothing is re-provisioned\ncotal doctor auth                  # both $SYS creds healthy again, 30 days out\n```\n\nA rotation is a stopped, fresh boot, and anything that is not one refuses it, all for the same reason\n(the on-disk material and the broker it runs on must never end up on different generations):\n\n- a live mesh, because the running broker would keep serving the retired account;\n- an open mesh, whether that comes from `--open` or from `broker.auth: false` in a manifest, which\n  has no system account at all;\n- `--restore`, because reinstating a trust root and superseding it in one command leaves no way to\n  say which authority the mesh came up on;\n- an unfinished restore or resume attempt on this root, including one `cotal up` would recover on\n  its own, because those paths can adopt a live listener and return without booting a broker;\n- a root that hosts more than one space, because the system account lives in the shared broker\n  record and a rotation would retire every tenant's, while the root holds one `$SYS` cred pair\n  pinned to one data account.\n\nTwo things to know before you run it:\n\n- **The retirement is config-load-bound.** Old `$SYS` creds are refused by any broker that loads the\n  rotated config. A stale `nats-server` still running the *previous* config in memory would keep\n  honouring them, so stop every broker for this root first. `--rotate-sys` refuses if this root's\n  mesh is recorded as running, if anything unidentified is answering at the address it was given, or\n  if the root's pid file names a live (or unreadable) process. Those are Cotal's own ownership\n  records, not a scan of the process table: a `nats-server` you started by hand against this root's\n  `server.conf` on some other port writes none of them and will not be seen. Do not run one.\n- **It invalidates earlier full backups.** A full artifact binds to the trust chain it was taken\n  against, and that commitment covers the operator JWT and the system account. Every full backup\n  taken before a rotation refuses to restore afterwards, so take a fresh `cotal backup` once the\n  rotated mesh is up. `cotal up --restore` names this case when the data account still matches.\n\nThe commit is not atomic (a trust-record write plus two credential writes), so an interrupted\nrotation leaves the record ahead of the creds. That split is detected rather than silent: every\n`cotal up` on an auth mesh, and every `cotal doctor auth`, compares each `$SYS` cred's issuer against\nthe persisted record and names the retired account. `up` warns rather than refusing, because these\ncreds power the membership graph and live eviction, both of which degrade fail-soft; the mesh is not\nworth taking down over them. Re-running the rotation heals it, at the cost of one generation.\n\nWhile those creds are expired the mesh keeps delivering messages, but the\n[membership feed](delivery-daemon.md) and live connection eviction stay down; `cotal doctor auth`\nand the manager's log both name the credential and this repair.\n\n## down\n\n```bash\ncotal down\ncotal down --preserve-state [--store-dir <dir>]\ncotal down manager [delivery auth web nats ...]\ncotal down web [--space <name>]\ncotal down -f <cotal.yaml> | --run <id> [--dry-run]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--file <cotal.yaml>`, `-f` | \u2014 | Tear down this manifest's deploy |\n| `--run <id>` | \u2014 | Tear down one `spawn -f` run by id |\n| `--space <name>` | current mesh | With components: the mesh whose target-addressed components (e.g. `web`) to stop |\n| `--dry-run` | off | Print the manifest teardown or selected components, mutate nothing |\n| `--preserve-state` | off | Bare whole stack only: fence the manager, retain principals and durable state, stop and prove the stack down, then publish `ready` |\n| `--store-dir <dir>` | `.cotal/nats` | With `--preserve-state`: the actual store path (required for a custom store) |\n\nBare `cotal down` stops the whole local stack in dependency order. Positional component names stop\nonly those self-registered local processes; for example, `cotal down manager` leaves delivery and\nthe broker running, and `cotal down web` is available when the web extension is installed. A\ncomponent that starts target-resolved (the web dashboard) is stopped the same way: `cotal down web`\nresolves the mesh exactly like `cotal web` (registry current mesh first, `--space` to name one), so\nit works from any directory; the other components always stop under the folder you run it in. The\n`-f` / `--run` forms tear down a [manifest deploy](#manifest-deploys) without stopping the whole mesh\nand cannot be combined with component names. Stopping `nats` alone is refused while an unselected\nregistered daemon is still live; include those components or use bare `cotal down`.\n\nNormal `down` remains destructive at the logical identity/durable layer. `--preserve-state` is a\ndifferent maintenance transition: it suppresses leave/deprovision cleanup, persists the manager's\nsame-principal resume inventory, stops the entire stack without removing run/auth artifacts, and\npublishes a stable inode-bound cut only after every recorded process is proven stopped and the exact\nrecorded NATS endpoint is unreachable. A missing or stale broker pidfile never counts as stopped. The\nattempt is bound durably before the manager is fenced, the resume document and attempt-bound\n`cut-intent` are fsynced before manager commit, and the manager's commitment itself is journaled\n(`cut-committed`) before any process stops. A retry after a crash at any of those boundaries reuses\nthe exact recorded attempt and finishes the remaining stop and endpoint proofs idempotently, without\nneeding the (by then intentionally dead) manager. A partial cut never publishes `ready`. It cannot\nbe combined with component names, manifest teardown, or `--dry-run`.\n\n## clean\n\n```bash\ncotal clean <history|store|all> --force\ncotal clean restore-attempt --attempt <id> --force\ncotal clean restore-fallback --attempt <id> --force\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | `history`: target mesh |\n| `--dms` | off | `history`: also clear DM history |\n| `--store-dir <dir>` | `.cotal/nats` | `store`/`all`: JetStream store directory |\n| `--force` | \u2014 | Required: destructive, no prompting |\n| `--attempt <id>` | \u2014 | `restore-attempt`: exact stale pre-commit attempt; `restore-fallback`: matching healthy committed restore |\n\nOne configurable cleanup verb; every target requires `--force`.\n\n- `history` purges the retained message backlog on the **running** broker (channels, plus DMs\n  with `--dms`). The same operation as [`history clear`](#history), which stays as an alias.\n- `store` deletes the **stopped** mesh's JetStream store (`.cotal/nats`): streams, durable\n  consumers, and messages. This is the reset for stale on-disk broker state, e.g. durables\n  minted by an older, incompatible Cotal generation surviving a `down`/`up` cycle.\n- `all` is `store` plus the space identity (`.cotal/auth`), the local creds and markers tied to\n  it, any crash residue a normal `down` would have swept (stale pidfiles, `run/`), and the mesh's\n  registry entry; the next `cotal up` mints a fresh identity.\n\n`history` needs the mesh up; `store` and `all` refuse while any recorded mesh process is still\nalive or any same-root recorded broker endpoint remains reachable (run `cotal down` first). They\nalso refuse outright on a root that holds accounts for several spaces: the store and the broker\ntrust record are shared by every space on the broker, so both targets would take out all of them\nand no `--space` can narrow that. `down`, `backup` and `up --restore` refuse there for the same\nreason. `cotal status` lists the tenants on such a root. Personas\n(`.cotal/agents`) and logs are never touched. A custom\nstore location is not recorded anywhere, so `--store-dir` must repeat whatever the mesh was\nlaunched with. Custom cleanup targets must contain either the Cotal store-generation marker or a\nreal `jetstream/` store directory; filesystem roots, project roots, and Cotal auth/maintenance trees\nare always refused.\n\n`store` and `all` also refuse every maintenance journal state. After a healthy committed restore,\n`restore-fallback` is the only supported way to remove the recorded unchanged old-store inode; it\nnever deletes the active target, requires both the exact attempt id and `--force`, and retires the\ncompleted restore journal so a later `down --preserve-state` can start a new backup cycle.\n\n## backup and restore\n\n```bash\ncotal down --preserve-state [--store-dir <dir>]\ncotal backup create <dir> [--only full|registry] [--store-dir <dir>]\ncotal up --restore <dir> [--restore-only registry] [--accept-missing-source]\n```\n\nBackup is offline-only. It requires the stable `ready` record from `down --preserve-state`, an exact\nstore match, no live recorded process, and an unreachable exact endpoint from the recorded cut.\nThat endpoint is probed immediately before cloning, so a live broker with a missing or stale pidfile\nis still refused. It claims the cut, reflink/copies the stopped source to a\nprivate attempt clone, and opens only that clone on a random loopback bootstrap broker with an\nindependent parent/deadline watchdog. It validates the canonical stream and pull-consumer inventory,\nwrites native snapshots with consumers excluded, and stores conservative contiguous ACK-floor\ncheckpoints separately. The original store is never opened by the backup broker, and the stack is\nnot restarted implicitly. Artifact destinations must not overlap the preserved source or maintenance\nattempt tree. Restore artifacts and targets likewise cannot nest inside or contain each other, the\npreserved source, or the maintenance attempt tree.\n\n`full` is the default and indivisible: channel registry, CHAT/DM/TASK/INBOX/DLV, ACL, MEMBERS, and\nvalidated durable checkpoints. `registry` is the sole partial artifact. Presence, derived membership\nfeed, leases, native ephemeral/history consumers, credentials, keys, tokens, owner secrets, and actor\nledger files are excluded. Artifacts are exclusively created `0700`; snapshot/checkpoint files and\nthe manifest are `0600`; `manifest.json` is written last with exact sizes and SHA-256 values. The\ndirectory is trusted operator input: hashes detect corruption, not malicious rewriting.\n\nRestore validates and stages the exact allowlisted artifact bytes before moving or creating a store.\nIt requires the same space and existing trust state. The whole pre-commit window holds a journaled\nliveness claim (coordinator, watchdogs, brokers, absolute deadline): ordinary `up` and a repeated\n`up --restore` refuse while the claim is live, and a stale attempt is recovered only after the\ndeadline has elapsed and every recorded owner is proven dead \u2014 automatically by a retried\n`up --restore`, or explicitly with `cotal clean restore-attempt --attempt <id> --force`. Nothing\never rolls back a live attempt. A registry-only artifact restores as registry-only whether or not\n`--restore-only registry` is passed; omitted infrastructure is always created and the exact\npost-restore stream inventory is asserted before commit intent. Ordinary `up` from a preserved cut\nresumes only the exact recorded source store and runtime; a contradicting `--store-dir` or\n`--runtime` fails in preflight. Authenticated restores validate the complete\nspace trust bundle before staging, including nkeys, seed matches, JWTs, signers, and space binding;\nfull restores commit to the validated operator, system-account, data-account, and active-signer root\nchain in addition to the static/user authority fingerprint. Because the system account is part of that\ncommitment, a [`cotal up --rotate-sys`](#up) makes every full artifact taken before it unrestorable\nagainst this root: take a fresh full backup after each rotation. The composed commitment is revalidated\nimmediately before store mutation and never includes secret seeds. Restore never creates fresh auth.\nSame-path restores atomically retain the old\nsource at the journaled fallback path; alternate targets retain it in place; a missing canonical\nsource needs explicit `--accept-missing-source`. Quarantine and target restores use current canonical\nconfigs on isolated random-loopback brokers, never expose native snapshot consumers, and publish a\ncommit-intent immediately before the normal listener starts. Archive bytes never instantiate the real\ntarget: after quarantine validation, every stream is re-snapshotted from the validated quarantine\nstate into attempt-owned sanitized files, and the target is restored solely from those. Before that boundary, failure rolls back\nthe attempt-owned target; after it, ambiguity preserves both stores and records forward-repair\nrecourse. The cooperative maintenance lock excludes Cotal commands, not arbitrary raw NATS processes.\n\nBootstrap brokers in every auth mode \u2014 including open \u2014 mount the store under a local account with\nrandom operation-specific logins only, each carrying the exact per-phase subject permission matrix;\nnormal static credentials and user-auth sentinel/bearer connections are rejected, and no auth\nservice or callout starts. Open mode differs only in its account label, never in authority. Inventory, each stream snapshot,\nrestore initiation, exact upload id, validation, and each checkpoint recreation use separate exact\nauthorities. Every checkpoint carries the source stream's message/first/last sequence state and must\nmatch its snapshot record before mutation; core then derives and validates the only allowed start\npolicy. TASK is not a CLI exception: the same core checkpoint API recreates its canonical `DeliverAll`\nWorkQueue durable because acknowledged tasks are absent from retention and NATS forbids a\nstart-sequence policy there. Registry-only restore creates every omitted canonical stream and transient\nbucket on the isolated target before the normal listener is exposed. It deliberately does not resume\nretained agents or recreate their DM/DLV/TASK/ACL state; their identity material stays retained and\nstopped rather than being reprovisioned into a partial restore.\n\nAfter listener readiness, the manager starts attempt-bound, validates retained credentials/tokens\nwithout granting or reprovisioning, and resumes the exact persisted principals under cleanup\nsuppression. Registry-only restore uses the same flow with an empty agent set. `commitResume` is an\nidempotent validation barrier only: success must be `awaitingFinalize` with an attempt-bound 64-hex\ncommit token and does not release suppression. Under the workspace lock, the CLI first fsyncs that\nexact evidence as `manager-committed` (restore) or `resume-committed` (ordinary resume), then calls\ntoken-bound `finalizeResume`; only an `active` response for the exact token releases suppression. The\nCLI records the same token in finalization evidence before a restore becomes `active`, or before an\nordinary resume retires and consumes the marker. Re-entry from either committed state skips the prior\nidempotent activation/commit phases, retries finalization with the durable token, and finishes the\nworkspace transition. Failure before finalization preserves the committed state and cleanup\nsuppression; it is not rewritten through a degraded transition. Re-entry between any two earlier\nboundaries reuses the same attempt and may retry the idempotent phases without deleting retained state. A missing or\nchanged per-agent dependency is a named fail-closed result; the journal becomes degraded and remains\navailable for forward repair. A retry from `resume-intent`,\n`resume-active`, or `resume-degraded` reuses the same attempt and inventory after the prior listener is\nproven stopped. Every normal restore listener has an unguessable attempt-bound NATS server name. The\nCLI fsyncs its exact name/nonce, canonical endpoint, process owner, and generation-bound target identity\nimmediately after spawn. Re-entry accepts a surviving listener only when its INFO server name, live PID\nrecord, endpoint, and target identity all match that proof; degraded restore repair then moves through\nthe guarded workspace transition only after manager commit. If an uncommitted bound owner is provably\ndead, recovery retires that exact proof under the maintenance lock and binds a fresh listener for the\nsame attempt, endpoint, and target with a new nonce and server name. A live foreign/mismatched listener\nor ambiguous owner is preserved and refused, never adopted by reachability alone. A reconstructed\ncommit/degraded attempt without either the exact bound proof or a durable dead-listener replacement\nrecord fails closed even when the recorded port is free. A later ordinary startup may pass an `active`\nrestore only when its details prove manager commit and its exact recorded listener is dead.\n\n## meshes, use, status\n\n```bash\ncotal meshes\ncotal meshes add                      # guided, on a terminal\ncotal meshes add <space> --server <url> [--root <dir>] [--mode auth|open|user] [--tls] [--force]\ncotal meshes add <space> --mode user (--user-auth-file <bundle.json> | --from <https url>)\ncotal meshes rm <space> [<space> \u2026] [--force]\ncotal use <space>\ncotal status [--space <s>] [--server <url>] [--components]\n```\n\n`meshes` lists the meshes this machine knows; a `*` marks the `current` default a bare\n`cotal spawn` joins.\n\nRun on a terminal with the space or `--server` missing, **`meshes add` is guided**: it asks for the\none thing that cannot be derived (the broker URL), probes it, and tells you what answered - open or\nrequiring credentials. It then offers the spaces your `--root` already holds credentials for, states\nthe mode as a fact about that broker rather than asking, and shows the exact record before writing\nanything. A broker that does not answer, or a space name already registered, becomes a choice rather\nthan an error. Anything you pass on the command line is taken as given and not asked again. Without\na terminal - a script, an agent, CI - nothing prompts and the flag form's errors stand\n(`COTAL_NO_PROMPT=1` forces that too).\n\n`cotal up` and `cotal down` maintain their own records. `meshes add` registers a mesh they cannot\nspeak for: one running on another machine, a shared broker, a hosted space. `--root` is the folder\nwhose `.cotal/auth` holds that mesh's credentials and whose `.cotal/agents` holds its personas\n(default: the project you run it in) \u2014 the registry stores that path, never a secret. `--mode`\ndefaults to `auth` when the root holds the space's account record and to `open` otherwise. The\nbroker is probed before anything is recorded, so a wrong address, or credentials that mesh will\nnot accept, fails here instead of at the first `spawn`; `--force` records without verifying (and\nreplaces an existing record).\n\nA hostname or public address is registrable only when the connection will **require TLS**: pass\n`--tls`, or use a `tls://` URL \u2014 the scheme is recorded as enforced intent, so every later dial\nthrough the record demands the handshake (and `meshes add tls://\u2026` against a plaintext broker is\nrefused at registration). Without required TLS the fence is unchanged: loopback and\nprivate-overlay literals only, and RFC1918 addresses are refused in both modes \u2014 a cafe LAN is\nprivate, not yours.\n\nA **user-auth** mesh registers from supplied pinned trust, never guessed: `--user-auth-file`\ntakes the bundle exported where the mesh runs; `--from` asks before it dials the address at all,\nthen fetches its `/.well-known/cotal-mesh` discovery document (HTTPS only), displays the pins, and\nasks again before adopting them. Neither fetch follows redirects: a 302 can move a pinned fetch\nonto plaintext or onto another host, so it is refused rather than followed, and the pinned\nexchange must itself be an `https://` URL \u2014 except for an exchange on this machine, where plain\n`http://` is accepted for a loopback *literal* (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, any spelling of them) but not\nfor `localhost`, which is a name rather than an address. Registration verifies that exchange answers `/health`\nand `/jwks` as the pinned issuer, and that the broker itself refuses a bare connect \u2014 the\nauth-required refusal is the pass. The sentinel credentials land in a 0600 file under the entry's root; the registry\nrecords only the path.\n\n`meshes rm` drops records \u2014 it never stops a mesh. For a mesh running on this machine `cotal down`\nis the right verb, and `rm` says so unless you pass `--force`. A record you added by hand is only\nremoved by something that names it \u2014 `meshes rm`, or an `add --force` replacement \u2014 or by a\n`cotal up` that actually starts the broker for that same space, server and root, which becomes that\nmesh and so takes the record over (a `cotal up` for that space anywhere else refuses instead).\nNothing that merely *infers* a record is stale touches it: an\nunreachable broker is listed `offline` and stays, and `cotal down` / `cotal clean all` leave it\nalone even when it shares a root with the project they are tearing down, because nothing on this\nmachine could write it back.\n\n`use <space>` sets that default; the selection applies from every directory,\nincluding inside another mesh's project. `status` is a read-only report: machine prerequisites\n(starting with the installed `cotal-ai` version), the installed extensions and their versions, this\nfolder's `.cotal/`, the recorded meshes, and a live snapshot of the selected mesh (roster, channels,\nmembership feed). `status` takes `--space` / `--server` to pick the mesh to inspect; it starts\nnothing.\n\n`cotal status --components` adds a fail-loud per-component health pass. It reads **each\ncomponent's own control surface**, rather than treating a PID, a lease, or a successful probe of a\nsibling as proof that the component serves. It prints one of `serving`, `absent`, `not-serving`, or\n`refused` for each component and exits `0`, `1`, `2`, or `3` respectively (the highest observed\nstate wins):\n\n- **manager** \u2014 local PID record, its liveness-lease holder and PID, then the manager's own typed\n  `status` service reachability from this host. Builds without a startup-phase report say\n  `phase not reported by this manager build`; that is never a blank green state.\n- **delivery** \u2014 local PID record, its ready lease (`ready` is the daemon's own bound-control\n  signal), and the latest `renewal.json` adoption verdict. A re-signed credential and a\n  broker-accepted adoption stay distinct facts.\n- **web** \u2014 local PID record and the dashboard's own loopback `/api/meta` response, which must name\n  the same PID and its requested port. A different process on the port, an unreadable PID command,\n  or an unrecognizable process record is `refused`, not a green default-port guess.\n- **broker** \u2014 the registered mesh URL dialed from this host with its recorded TLS requirement.\n\n`absent` means Cotal has no live local component record (or has a stale record); `not-serving`\nmeans the component record is live but its service/readiness surface did not answer or is not ready.\nThose are intentionally separate exit cases. A failed or unreadable probe is `refused`, never an\nabsent component or a clean zero.\n\n## spawn\n\n```bash\ncotal spawn [<persona>] [--detach] [--name <n>] [--agent <a>] [--model <m>] [--variant <v>] [--prompt <text>] [--cwd <dir>]\ncotal spawn -f <cotal.yaml> [--dry-run]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` | resolved mesh | Target space |\n| `--server <url>` | registry entry | Broker URL override |\n| `--creds <path>` | \u2014 | Control-caller creds for an off-registry manager (`--detach` only) |\n| `--name <n>` | persona's `name:` | Presence-name override (does not choose the persona) |\n| `--config <persona-or-path>` | \u2014 | Persona catalog name or file path; wins over the positional |\n| `--agent <a>` | `COTAL_DEFAULT_AGENT`, else `claude` | Connector type (`claude`, `opencode`, `jcode`, `hermes`, \u2026) |\n| `--role <r>` | persona's `role:` | Role override |\n| `--model <m>` | persona's `model:` | Model override |\n| `--variant <v>` | persona's `variant:` | Model variant override (connector-defined; e.g. OpenCode reasoning tiers) |\n| `--cwd <dir>` | this cwd | Working directory to root the agent at |\n| `--prompt <text>` | \u2014 | Initial prompt auto-submitted at start |\n| `--resume <id>` | \u2014 | Fork an existing session id into the mesh (claude only) |\n| `--events` / `--no-events` | off | Publish the session's structured event plane to its own event channel |\n| `--share-tools <sel>` | none | Share named operator MCP servers with the agent |\n| `--subscribe <a,b>` | persona's | Channel read-set override |\n| `--allow-subscribe <a,b>` | = subscribe | Read-ACL override |\n| `--allow-publish <a,b>` | deny | Post-ACL override |\n| `--detach`, `-d` | off | Launch via the manager into a detached PTY (reattach with `cotal attach`) |\n| `--on <instance>` | class anycast | With `--detach` only: pin the launch to one manager instance id (the whole id, as `ps` prints it). Refused on a foreground spawn (no manager to pin), with `-f` (a manifest deploy launches through the manager class queue), and when empty |\n| `--file <cotal.yaml>`, `-f` | \u2014 | Deploy a manifest onto the running mesh |\n| `--dry-run` | off | With `-f`: print the plan, mutate nothing |\n| `--allow-stale <a,b>` | \u2014 | With `-f`: waive named stale agents (apply-only) |\n| `--runtime <name>` | manifest's | With `-f`: override the manifest's runtime |\n\n`--events` turns on the session's **event plane**: a stream of structured events describing what\nthe agent did, rather than the prose it wrote, on a channel of its own. The channel is named after\nthe agent's principal, `events.<owner>.<actor>`, never after its display name, because two live\nagents are allowed to share a display name and would then share a stream. The launch grants publish\nrights on exactly that one channel, foreground and detached alike, and a connector that does not\npublish an event plane refuses the flag rather than starting a session whose events have nowhere to\ngo.\n\nThe flag and the grant are separate on purpose. Holding publish rights on a channel is not a request\nto publish to it, so writing an event channel into an agent file's `allowPublish` does not turn the\nplane on: only the launch does.\n\nThe persona (`--config` > positional > `COTAL_DEFAULT_PERSONA` > `default`) is loaded from the\ntarget mesh's `.cotal/agents/`; the launch flags override the file. Foreground runs the agent\nattached to your terminal; `--detach` hands the launch to the running manager. Both modes get the\ndurable backstop on a mesh that runs the delivery daemon; `--live-only` skips it for a foreground\nspawn (messages posted while it is disconnected are then not replayed). A foreground exit retires\nthe agent's creds and broker footprint, like a manager despawn. A `--detach` spawn is an\n**action**: the manager accepts it and returns the allocated identity at once, then the launch\nfollows to a terminal outcome rather than blocking (see [the control surface](control-surface.md)).\nSee [Connect Claude Code](connect-claude.md) and [Agent files](agent-files.md); `-f` is a\n[manifest deploy](#manifest-deploys). (`cotal start` was merged into `cotal spawn --detach`.)\n\n## models\n\n```bash\ncotal models [--agent <connector>] [--refresh]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Which manager to reach |\n| `--agent <connector>` | all registered connectors | Connector whose catalog to list |\n| `--refresh` | off | Ask the connector to refresh its provider cache |\n\nAsks the running manager for each connector's model catalog (model ids plus their variants)\nfor connectors that expose one (OpenCode today; a connector without a catalog says so). Pick a\nresult with `cotal spawn --model <provider/model> --variant <v>`.\n\n## endpoints\n\n```bash\ncotal endpoints [--space <s>] [--server <url>] [--creds <path>]\n```\n\nLists the mesh presence roster: agents, the manager, and any other protocol endpoint, with each\nendpoint's role, kind, status, and current activity. Unlike `ps`, this is a read-only presence view;\nit is not limited to child processes owned by the manager.\n\n## describe, invoke\n\n```bash\ncotal describe <endpoint>                                        [--space <s>]\ncotal invoke <endpoint> <command> [--args '<json>']              [--space <s>]\ncotal invoke <endpoint> <command> --name <agent> [--admin]       [--space <s>]\n```\n\nThe generic v0.4 service surface. `describe` resolves a registered endpoint's command set off the\nwire - the reserved `describe` command answers the registered contract digests, the schemas are\nfetched from the space's content-addressed contract store, recompiled, and verified against those\ndigests - and prints each command with its capability class and targeting shape. `invoke` calls one\ncommand by name: `--args` is a JSON object validated against the fetched input schema *before*\npublish; a targeted command takes `--name <agent>` (resolved to the agent's current principal via\n`ps`) or `--self`. `--admin` uses the admin instrument credential, whose cross-agent reach rides\nthe operator-only `any` authorization mode. Neither command has compile-time knowledge of any\nendpoint's schemas - this is the same trust chain every built-in control command now uses. Needs an\nauth mesh: the manager registers its service on both static and per-user meshes (a signed-in user\nrides their bearer; cross-agent reach needs the `admin` scope). An open mesh has no service\nregistry.\n\n## ps, stop, attach\n\n```bash\ncotal ps [--on <instance>] [--wide | --json] [--space <s>]\ncotal stop --name <n> [--on <instance>] [--space <s>]\ncotal attach --name <n> [--on <instance>] [--no-reconnect] [--space <s>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Which manager to reach |\n| `--name <n>` | \u2014 | Managed agent to stop / attach (required) |\n| `--on <instance>` | class anycast (`ps`: class scatter) | Pin to one manager instance id (multi-manager space); takes the whole id as `ps` prints it, not a prefix. An empty value (`--on \"\"`, an unset shell variable) is refused, never treated as absent |\n| `--wide` (`ps`) | off | After each seat's compact row, print the per-seat facts the manager already records: model pin (and variant), `cwd`, `pid`, spawner, lifecycle uid, and the owning manager's instance id and host. A fact the manager did not record (no model pinned, or a runtime that owns no real process) prints nothing, never a placeholder |\n| `--json` (`ps`) | off | Machine-readable: one JSON object per seat per line, exactly the row the manager sent. Instance headers and errors go to stderr, so stdout is pure rows. Mutually exclusive with `--wide` |\n| `--no-reconnect` (`attach`) | off | End the attach when its session ends, instead of re-establishing it. For scripts that want one run and one exit code |\n\nThese are operator clients over the running manager's control plane. `ps` prints two facts per\nmanaged agent, because they answer different questions: the process fact from the manager's own\nruntime handle (`running` with its uptime, or `exited` with how long it ran), and the mesh fact from\nthe roster (`idle` / `working` / `waiting` / `mesh offline`, or `not in roster` when the seat has no\npresence row at all: a seat that has not joined yet, or one that never did). A seat can be `running` and `mesh offline` at once: the process is alive and\nits presence has lapsed. On a user-auth mesh `ps` also renders each managed agent's last\ncredential-refresh outcome, fail-closed.\n\n**Mode split (chosen up front, never try-scatter-then-degrade):**\n\n- **Static / open mesh.** Bare `ps` is a **class scatter**: it freezes the live manager class from\n  the records registry, merges every registered instance's agents grouped and attributed per\n  instance, and a non-answering instance is shown as `registered, no answer within the deadline`\n  (never silently omitted). That label is the whole claim: the instance is registered and did not\n  answer. It does not say the host is down, because a dead host never deregisters itself and a\n  live one can be slow; if it is gone, deregister it.\n  `--on <instance>` pins the read to one exact instance id instead. A wrong pin fails loud\n  rather than falling through: a well-formed id that no live manager carries is reported as\n  `manager instance <id> did not answer` (nothing else is asked), and a credential without that\n  instance's rail is reported as refused by the broker, not as an unresponsive manager. A manager\n  that answers with a refusal is shown with its own cause; \"no manager reachable\" is said only when\n  nothing answered at all. If the scatter's own registry read fails (the freeze or the reconcile),\n  `ps` says the manager registry could not be read rather than pronouncing on the managers, which\n  may all be up.\n\n**`stop` and `attach` route by seat locality.** A seat can only be stopped or attached by the\nmanager actually running it, and the class queue does not know which one that is. So on a\nstatic/open mesh both verbs first ask every registered instance which one hosts the named seat, then\naddress that instance directly. You do not need `--on` for this \u2014 it happens by default.\n\n`--on <instance>` remains the override, for when you already know where the seat lives or the\nlookup itself is degraded. It is also the **only** route on a **user-auth mesh**: a ledger-scoped\nbearer does not hold the registry-read rows the lookup needs, so there the verbs stay on the class\nqueue unless you pin them yourself.\n\nIf the seat is found on no reachable instance, the error says so \u2014 how many managers answered, and\nwhich ones did not \u2014 rather than reporting a bare `no agent <name>`. That distinction matters\nbecause a single manager cannot tell \"hosted elsewhere\" from \"does not exist\": it answers\n`not-found` for both.\n- **User-auth mesh.** `cotal ps` reports what **one** manager knows about your agents (an `ep.one`\n  read against the manager's in-memory roster, owner-filtered). It does **not** report other\n  manager instances, and it cannot tell you that one is down \u2014 an unreachable manager is absent\n  from the list, not flagged. Completeness across a multi-manager user-auth space is not claimed.\n  A manager that does not answer fails the command outright (exit non-zero), rather than printing\n  an empty list that could be read as \"no agents\". Your ledger row needs the `admin` scope to\n  reach `ps` at all; `spawn` alone is refused by the broker (the ep tier boundary).\n\n`attach` streams and drives an agent's terminal on the `pty` runtime; detach with the escape key\n(Ctrl-] by default; see [`COTAL_DETACH_KEY`](config.md)). It does so over a one-use, holder-bound\nmesh session ([SPEC](../SPEC.md) \xA713.6): the manager replies with a signed session grant (never a\n`127.0.0.1` URL), the CLI redeems it once over the broker, and the browser console (`cotal console`)\ndrives the same session. `stop` and `attach` need a running manager to talk to. On a static mesh\nthey are cross-agent admin operations. On a user-auth mesh, your own agents (any agent under your\nowner) need only the `spawn` scope; another owner's agent needs `admin` on your ledger row\n([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). Launch detached agents with [`spawn --detach`](#spawn).\n\n**`attach` reconnects when the link dies.** A session lives on a network link, and a laptop that\nsleeps, a VPN that drops or a wifi handover kills it. When that happens `attach` prints\n`[cotal: connection lost, reconnecting]` on stderr and starts asking the manager for a new session:\na fresh grant, a fresh per-session credential, a fresh connection, so every attempt re-runs the same\nauthorization the first attach did. On success it prints `[cotal: reconnected]`, the manager repaints\nthe seat's current screen the way it does for any attach, and you carry on in the same terminal.\nRetries wait 1s, 2s, 5s, 10s, then 30s, for as long as the seat exists. The detach key is read the\nwhole time the loop runs, the waits and the attempts alike, so a reconnect never traps you: press it\nwhile a session is being established and the attach ends there, and a session that lands behind the\npress is handed back to the manager rather than left holding a slot. Everything else you type while\nthere is no session is dropped rather than queued, so keystrokes aimed at a terminal that turned out\nto be frozen, Ctrl-C included, are not delivered to the agent by a reconnect you did not know had\nhappened. That starts before the first session, not at the first reconnect: at a terminal, `attach`\nreads and drops what you type while it is still resolving the mesh, so a key struck at a prompt that\nhas not come up yet does not reach the agent when it does.\n\nWith stdin a **pipe** the contract is the opposite, and deliberately so. `printf 'ls\\n' | cotal\nattach --name web` is a script's input rather than an operator at a frozen screen, so it is buffered\nby the stream and delivered to the seat when the session opens, exactly as it always was. That holds\nin every window, not just before the first session: a pipe keeps buffering across a reconnect too, so\n`tail -f log | cotal attach --name web` does not lose the part of its feed written while the link was\ndown. Only a terminal gets the reader; `--no-reconnect` keeps the old behaviour on both.\n\nIt stops on its own when reconnecting cannot help, and says why: a manager that refuses the attach\nexits non-zero with the manager's own message, and a reconnect that finds the seat no longer there\n(despawned, or its agent exited while the link was down) exits cleanly with `seat <name> is gone`.\nA refusal that could still pass, such as a manager at its session ceiling, is relayed in the\nmanager's own words while the loop keeps trying, once per refusal rather than once per attempt.\nPressing the detach key, or the agent's process exiting while you are attached, ends the attach as\nit always did. `--no-reconnect` turns all of this off and restores the single-session behaviour,\nwhich is what a script wants.\n\nEach reconnect also hands the abandoned session back to the manager, over the first link that can\ncarry the message, so an attach that flaps does not eat the manager's session slots one outage at a\ntime. If that message never gets a link, the attach says so when it ends.\n\nWhich mesh `attach` resolves also decides **whose trust it redeems with**. Redeeming a session grant\nmeans minting a short-lived, session-scoped credential from the space's seed, and that seed comes\nfrom the root the mesh resolved to, never from a `.cotal` found by walking up from whichever\ndirectory you happen to be standing in. The difference is not hypothetical: `~/.cotal` exists on\nevery install because the mesh registry lives there, so a command run anywhere under your home\ndirectory but outside a project used to mint from your home directory's trust and present it to a\nbroker that trusts a different chain, which surfaced as a bare authorization failure that named\nnothing. A directory that does hold another chain for the same space is now reported on the way\npast, and not obeyed:\n\n```text\n! this directory resolves to /Users/you, whose .cotal/auth holds a DIFFERENT trust chain for space \"team\".\n  attach used /Users/you/projects/app, the root this mesh resolved to. The other one is not being used, and is worth a look.\n```\n\nWhen the resolved mesh holds no seed at all, `attach` refuses and names what it resolved, the broker\nand the root, instead of describing a directory it did not use.\n\nTerminal bytes stream over the mesh; the manager's own HTTP/WS face serves the console. That endpoint binds\n**loopback by default**, so nothing is exposed by accident; `cotal up --host <addr>` passes its bind\naddress down, which is what lets you attach to an agent whose manager runs on another machine. A\nbare `cotal supervise` and an embedded manager stay machine-local. Set it directly with\n`supervise --console-host <host>`.\n\nThat address is **recorded on the mesh** and carried forward, because it is a decision rather than\nsomething later commands can work out for themselves (a broker dial address is not a manager bind\naddress). Every later manager launch for the same mesh reuses it \u2014 a same-root `cotal up` repair,\nadopting a preserved or restored listener, a `spawn -f` manifest deploy \u2014 so a manager replacement\ndoes not quietly move a reachable attach face back to loopback. Passing `--host` again overrides it,\nso you can widen or narrow exposure whenever you like; a mesh that never asked stays loopback-only\nand records nothing.\n\nBecause that face carries terminal read and write for every managed agent, it is credentialed in two\ntiers. A mesh caller receives a **ticket** bound to the single agent the manager just authorized,\nsingle-use and short-lived, so one authorized attach can never be re-pointed at someone else's\nagent. The **console token** is the operator's own, reaches every agent, and is printed only to the\nmanager's output. The roster, the live feed, and the PTY stream all answer `401` without one; the\nstatic console shell is served openly, since it describes no agent.\n\n## input\n\n```bash\ncotal input --name <n> --text <text> [--no-enter] [--on <instance>] [--space <s>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Which manager to reach |\n| `--name <n>` | | Managed agent to type into (required) |\n| `--text <text>` | | The text to type, taken verbatim (required) |\n| `--no-enter` | off | Type the text and stop there, without pressing Enter |\n| `--on <instance>` | class anycast | Pin to one manager instance id, exactly as [`attach`](#ps-stop-attach) |\n\nTypes one line into a running agent's terminal, as if you had typed it there, and returns. This is\nthe half of [`attach`](#ps-stop-attach) that a program wants: `attach` is a live stream that holds a\nsession open and expects a terminal on your side, so a script, a cron job or a web UI cannot use it\nto send a single line. `input` is one authorized call.\n\nWhat it is for is **harness commands**. A line beginning with `/` is not chat and not a message: it\nis something the agent's own harness handles, and the only way in is the keyboard.\n\n```bash\ncotal input --name reviewer --text \"/compact\"          # ask the harness to compact its context\ncotal input --name reviewer --text \"/model opus\"       # switch its model\ncotal input --name reviewer --text \"hold on that PR\"   # ordinary typing works too\n```\n\n**Quoting.** `--text` takes a value, so a payload starting with `/` survives as written. A payload\nstarting with a dash needs the `=` form, because the shell-style `--text --foo` is ambiguous and is\nrefused rather than guessed:\n\n```bash\ncotal input --name reviewer --text=--verbose          # dash-leading text: use --text=<value>\n```\n\nEnter is pressed by default, since a command typed but never submitted has not been delivered.\n`--no-enter` types the text and leaves it sitting at the prompt, which is how you stage a line and\nsend it later.\n\nNothing comes back but a delivery receipt (`\u2713 sent 9 bytes to reviewer`, counting the trailing\ncarriage return). Whatever the agent does next shows up where its output already goes: the mesh, its\ntranscript, or an `attach`.\n\n**This one is operator-only, and more narrowly than `stop` or `attach`.** Those two are granted to\nanything holding `spawn`, so an agent can stop and attach to seats under its own owner. `input` is\nnot: it is granted only to operator credentials, which on a user-auth mesh means your ledger row\nneeds the `admin` scope, the same scope [`ps`](#ps-stop-attach) already needs there. The reason is\nthat a write into a terminal is control of whatever is running in it, and on a user-auth mesh the\nown-owner rule covers every seat under you, not only the ones you launched: a `spawn`-scoped agent\ncould otherwise type into a sibling it never started. Seat locality is still resolved for you.\n\nOnly the `pty` runtime can be typed into. The external terminal runtimes (`tmux`, `cmux`, `orca`,\n`herdr`) attach to a process they do not own, so they have no input stream for it and the command\nrefuses by name rather than dropping the keystroke.\n\n## personas\n\n```bash\ncotal personas list [-v] [--running]\ncotal personas show <name>\ncotal personas edit <name>\ncotal personas new <name> (--prompt <t> | --from <f>) [--role <r>] [--model <m>]\ncotal personas rm <name> --force\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Which mesh's persona catalog |\n| `--role <r>` | \u2014 | `new`: the persona's role |\n| `--model <m>` | \u2014 | `new`: the persona's model |\n| `--prompt <t>` | \u2014 | `new`: the persona's prompt text |\n| `--from <f>` | \u2014 | `new`: seed the prompt from a file |\n| `--verbose`, `-v` | off | `list`: include role / model / description |\n| `--running` | off | `list`: mark personas live on the mesh |\n| `--force` | \u2014 | `rm`: required, delete without prompting |\n\nPersonas are the local agent files under `.cotal/agents/` that `cotal spawn` launches. See\n[Agent files](agent-files.md) for the file format.\n\n## supervise\n\n```bash\ncotal supervise [--runtime <name>] [--space <s>] [--server <url>] [--spawn <names>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` | this folder's auth space | Space to supervise |\n| `--server <url>` | hosting mesh, or matching registered mesh | Broker URL. A registered mesh supplies it when omitted; a different explicit value is refused. |\n| `--runtime <name>` | `pty` | Agent runtime (`pty` built in; extension runtimes are explicit-only) |\n| `--console-port <n>` | \u2014 | Protocol-console port |\n| `--console-host <host>` | loopback | Bind host for the console + attach endpoint. Loopback keeps it machine-local; `cotal up` passes the address it bound the broker to, which is what lets `cotal attach` reach this manager from another machine |\n| `--roster <file>` | \u2014 | Declarative roster to boot at startup |\n| `--launch <spec>` | \u2014 | Resolved manifest launch spec (from `up -f` / `spawn -f`) |\n| `--spawn <names>` | \u2014 | Comma-separated personas to pre-spawn at startup |\n\nThe manager is the agent supervisor and control plane: it answers `spawn --detach`, `stop`, `ps`,\n`attach`, and the `cotal_*` manager tools. `cotal up --detach` starts one for you; run `supervise`\ndirectly to recover a dead manager or drive a custom runtime. Default runtime is `pty`; install an\noptional provider first (`cotal ext add @cotal-ai/orca`, `@cotal-ai/tmux`, `@cotal-ai/cmux`, or `@cotal-ai/herdr`) and\nselect it explicitly. A missing provider or app fails loudly; there is no fallback. See [Deploy](deploy.md).\n\nA `meshes add --mode user` entry is a **participant** registration, not hosting authority. A\nparticipant may run `supervise` only when the host advertises the remote manager authority service\nand the signed-in actor has the dedicated `supervise` ledger scope. The CLI obtains the closed,\nloopback-only `manager-service` view; `spawn` and `admin` do not substitute for that scope. The\nhost issues the manager's public-nkey JWT material through its lifecycle-bound prepare \u2192 activate\n\u2192 renew protocol, never by handing the participant a signer or static provisioner credential.\n\nWithout that advertised host service or scope, `supervise` refuses before it starts a manager.\nRun `cotal spawn` without `--detach` to launch a foreground agent, or ask the space host to enable\nthe authority service and grant `supervise` for detached agents. If a running remote manager loses\nrenewal, it reports degraded state and refuses unsafe new starts and restarts; live agents are not\nsilently replaced. Do not run `cotal down` or `cotal up` on a participant machine to repair this\ncondition.\n\n## reconcile-gate\n\n```bash\ncotal reconcile-gate [--space <s>] [--server <url>] [--endpoint <e>] [--instance <id>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` | this folder's auth space | Space the frozen gate lives in |\n| `--server <url>` | the local mesh | Broker URL |\n| `--endpoint <e>` | `manager` | Endpoint whose gate is frozen |\n| `--instance <id>` | this folder's persisted manager instance | Instance id |\n\n**When you need this.** A manager restart killed partway through \u2014 after it began deregistering,\nbefore the new incarnation finished \u2014 leaves the endpoint's issuance gate *frozen*, held by a\nprocess that no longer exists. The next manager start refuses to proceed, which is correct: the\nfreeze is what stops two incarnations serving at once. But nothing can lift it, so every restart\nfails the same way. `cotal doctor` shows the gate as frozen; the manager's own start logs name the\ngate it could not advance.\n\nThis command is the way out. It checks that the holder really is gone, prints what it found, and\nthen finishes the dead operation exactly as the interrupted restart would have: revoke the old\ncredentials, evict their holders with verification, and reopen the gate. Start the manager\nafterwards and its normal takeover runs end to end.\n\n**It refuses far more often than it acts, on purpose**, and always says which check stopped it:\n\n| Refusal | What it means | What to do |\n|---|---|---|\n| `holder-alive` | The freeze-holder still has a live connection \u2014 a manager *is* running | Stop that process first. Reconciling would evict a live manager's credentials |\n| `holder-unknown` | The connection sweep could not prove the holder absent | Not safe to proceed: an unprovable holder is treated as a live one. Re-run once the broker answers completely |\n| `liveness-unestablishable` | The delivery daemon could not be asked at all | Start it (`cotal up` runs it) and re-run. Silence is never read as death |\n| `not-frozen` / `no-gate` | The gate is open, or there is no gate at that coordinate | Nothing to repair \u2014 check `--endpoint` / `--instance` |\n| `wrong-op-kind` | Frozen under a takeover or retirement, not a registration | Out of scope for this command; it will not reinterpret another operation's intent |\n| `eviction-unverified` | The holder looked gone but eviction could not be verified | The gate is left frozen, unchanged. Investigate the broker before retrying |\n| `raced` | A newer manager moved the gate mid-repair | Re-run `cotal doctor` and look again |\n\nThere is no `--force`, and no path that discards gate state: the only way this reopens a gate is by\nproving the holder is gone and then completing the operation properly.\n\n## deregister-instance\n\n```bash\ncotal deregister-instance [--space <s>] [--server <url>] [--endpoint <e>] [--instance <id>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` | this folder's auth space | Space the instance is registered in |\n| `--server <url>` | the local mesh | Broker URL |\n| `--endpoint <e>` | `manager` | Endpoint the instance serves |\n| `--instance <id>` | this folder's persisted manager instance | Instance id, the whole id as `cotal ps` prints it |\n\n**When you need this.** The service registry records *registration*, not liveness, and nothing in\nthe model expires a row. A manager that stops cleanly removes its own registration. One whose host\ndied without writing anything cannot, so its record goes on claiming a live instance forever: every\nclass scatter in that space freezes the dead slot in, and `cotal ps`, `stop` and `attach` each pay\ntheir whole deadline waiting for a machine that is never coming back. A laptop that was reimaged, a\ncontainer that was deleted, a box that will not be back on the network: those registrations have no\nother exit.\n\nThis command is that exit. It asks the instance first, and it removes a record only when the broker\naffirms the instance's own rail is empty: nothing subscribed there. Then it deletes the\nregistration's two records keys, each pinned to the revision it read, and prints what it removed.\n\n**Silence alone never passes.** An unanswered describe is what a dead host, a wedged process and a\nslow one all look like, and a hung process still holds its subscriptions, so the broker sees\ninterest on its rail. That instance is refused and the observation is printed. A dead process holds\nno connection and therefore no subscription, so a real corpse is still removed.\n\n**It refuses rather than guesses**, and says which check stopped it:\n\n| Refusal | What it means | What to do |\n|---|---|---|\n| `instance-answered` | The instance answered a pinned describe. It is alive | Nothing to repair. If it is wedged rather than gone, stop the process first; its own clean stop removes the record |\n| `instance-not-affirmed-gone` | It did not answer, and the broker did not report its rail empty, which is what a held subscription looks like: slow or hung, not affirmed gone | Nothing was removed. Stop the process; its record goes on its own clean stop, or re-run this once it is down |\n| `liveness-unestablishable` | The probe itself failed, so nothing was learned | Fix the probe's path (credential, broker) and re-run. A probe that could not run is never read as death |\n| `not-registered` | No registration at that coordinate | Check `--instance` and `--endpoint`. This takes the whole id, never a prefix |\n| `superseded` | The record moved between the read and the delete | Something is writing to it. Nothing was removed; re-observe before retrying |\n\nThere is no `--force` and no sweep: silence is not death, and a rule that removed rows on silence\nwould eventually remove a live instance that was merely slow. An operator names one instance, the\nbroker's verdict on its rail is what authorizes the removal, and the guard's job is to show them\nthey named a dead one. Removal is not a one way door either. The same instance re-registers over\nthe tombstone on its next start, under the same identity.\n\n## runtimes\n\n```bash\ncotal runtimes\n```\n\nLists every agent runtime the manager can spawn through: the built-in `pty`, the official providers\n(`orca`, `tmux`, `cmux`, `herdr`), and any custom provider installed via `cotal ext add`. Each installed\nprovider is probed so you can see what is actually reachable on this machine before selecting it:\n\n```\npty    built in\norca   installed \xB7 reachable   @cotal-ai/orca\ntmux   available \xB7 cotal ext add @cotal-ai/tmux\ncmux   available \xB7 cotal ext add @cotal-ai/cmux\nherdr  available \xB7 cotal ext add @cotal-ai/herdr\n```\n\n`installed \xB7 reachable` / `unreachable` is the provider's own `available()` probe; `available` means\nit is a known runtime you can add with the shown command. Selecting an unknown or uninstalled runtime\nvia `up`/`spawn --runtime <name>` fails loud and, for a known one, points at the exact `cotal ext add`\npackage \u2014 there is no silent fallback to `pty`.\n\n## send\n\n```bash\ncotal send dm <agent> \"<text>\"   [--space <s>] [--server <url>] [--creds <path>]\ncotal send msg <channel> \"<text>\"\ncotal send ask <role> \"<text>\"\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Which mesh, and (off-registry) which credential |\n\nOne-shot messaging: connect, send a single direct message (`dm`), channel post (`msg`), or role\nask/anycast (`ask`), then exit. For a running conversation, agents use the mesh tools instead\n([MCP tools](mcp-tools.md)).\n\n## channels\n\n```bash\ncotal channels list\ncotal channels set <name> [--replay | --no-replay] [--window <n>] [--desc <s>] [--instructions <s>]\ncotal channels default --replay | --no-replay\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Target mesh |\n| `--replay` / `--no-replay` | \u2014 | `set`/`default`: replay history to new joiners, or not |\n| `--window <n>` | \u2014 | `set`: replay window size |\n| `--desc <s>` | \u2014 | `set`: one-line channel description |\n| `--instructions <s>` | \u2014 | `set`: instructions shown to joiners |\n\nInspects and edits the channel registry: replay policy, description, and joiner instructions. ACL\nsemantics (who may read or post) are set at mint / provision time, not here; see\n[Channels and permissions](channels-and-permissions.md). On a user-auth mesh, `list` rides your\nown login as is; `set` and `default` edit the registry over a short-lived\nchannel-writer view, which needs ledger scope `admin` ([Identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)).\n\n\n## history\n\n```bash\ncotal history clear --force [--dms] [--space <s>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Target mesh |\n| `--dms` | off | Also clear DM history |\n| `--force` | \u2014 | Required: clear without prompting |\n\nPurges retained channel history; `--dms` extends it to direct-message history. An alias of\n[`clean history`](#clean). On a user-auth mesh the purge rides a short-lived purger view over\nyour login, which needs ledger scope `admin` ([Identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)).\n\n## console\n\n```bash\ncotal console [--plain] [--space <s>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Space to watch |\n| `--plain` | off | Line stream instead of the TUI |\n\nA live protocol view for a space: a lazygit-style TUI, or a plain line stream on `--plain`. On a\nuser-auth mesh it rides the read-only admin view over your login, which needs ledger scope\n`admin`. See [Watch a mesh](watch-a-mesh.md).\n\n## web\n\n```bash\ncotal web [--detach] [--port <n>] [--no-open] [--space <s>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Space to serve |\n| `--port <n>` | `7799` | HTTP port |\n| `--detach` | off | Run in the background; stop with `cotal down web` or bare `cotal down` |\n| `--no-open` | off | Don't open the browser |\n\nThe browser observability dashboard: presence, channels, and a live feed. It is **not** part of\n`cotal up`: it ships inside `cotal-ai` as the `@cotal-ai/web` extension, seeded automatically on first\nrun (like the built-in connectors) so it always matches your CLI version. It self-registers `cotal web`\ninto this surface and serves\n`http://cotal.localhost:7799` (loopback; `*.localhost` resolves in Chrome/Firefox/Edge; Safari may\nneed `http://127.0.0.1:7799`). On a user-auth mesh the dashboard rides the read-only admin view\nover your login, and a channel purge asks for its own channel-purger view per click; both need\nledger scope `admin`. Detached mode re-execs the current Cotal installation, writes diagnostics to\nthe mesh root's `.cotal/web.log`, and reports success only after the HTTP server answers. It requires\na recorded mesh root, but can be launched from any directory once `cotal up` has recorded the mesh.\nSee [Watch a mesh](watch-a-mesh.md).\n\n## mint\n\n```bash\ncotal mint <name> [--profile <agent|observer|admin>] [--out <path>] [--signer]\ncotal mint <name> --provision [--role <role>] [--space <s>] [--server <url>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--profile <agent\\|observer\\|admin>` | `agent` | Credential profile |\n| `--out <path>` | `.cotal/auth/creds/<name>.creds` | Output path |\n| `--signer` | off | Emit a stripped account-signing file instead |\n| `--force` | off | With `--signer`: overwrite an existing file |\n| `--allow-subscribe <a,b>` | the agent file's, else subscribe | Read-ACL override, **agent profile only**: `observer` and `admin` carry a fixed read set, and `mint` refuses this flag there rather than narrowing nothing |\n| `--allow-publish <a,b>` | the agent file's, else deny | Post-ACL override, **agent profile only** |\n| `--role <role>` | the agent file's | Agent profile: the anycast task queue the identity pulls (`svc_<role>`) |\n| `--provision` | off | Agent profile: also pre-create the identity's bind-only DM/deliver durables (and its role's task queue) on the live mesh, so the credential can consume |\n| `--space <s>`, `--server <url>` | the resolved mesh | With `--provision`: which mesh to provision on |\n\nMints a NATS creds file for a space in **static** auth mode, scoped to a profile and (optionally)\nexplicit read/post ACLs. `--signer` emits an account-signing file for delegating minting to another\nhost. A per-user-auth space refuses `mint`: agents there join under a logged-in user\n([`login`](#login-logout) + [`actor grant`](#actor)), never via a handed-out creds file. See\n[Identity and auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\nA plain mint is creds only: the identity can publish within its post ACL at once, but on an authed\nmesh its DM inbox and task queue are provisioner-pre-created and bind-only, so a **consuming**\nconnect fails until they exist. `--provision` performs that pre-create in the same command (a\nprovisioner cred is minted from the space's trust material, used, and dropped), so a long-running\nclient you start yourself can receive DMs and role anycasts like a spawned seat. The command prints\nthe identity's principal (its wire id) and lifecycle uid; a consuming client passes that uid as its\n`lifecycleUid`. Agent profile only; an open mesh needs none of this (peers self-create there). The\nmesh it provisions on must be the one this folder's auth is for - same space and same account key -\nso `--provision` can never quietly mint under another root's trust material.\n\n## login, logout\n\n```bash\ncotal login --idp <auth base URL> [--client-id <id>]\ncotal logout --idp <auth base URL>\n```\n\nSigns you in to a per-user-auth mesh's IdP (device code flow) and caches the session; run it\nonce per machine. It prints your IdP subject, the id the operator grants against. After a\nlogin, every command on that mesh works under your identity: each connect takes a fresh IdP\nproof, exchanges it locally for a short-lived bearer, and is authorized against the actor\nledger at connect time. `logout` revokes the IdP session and clears the cache. See\n[identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\n## actor\n\n```bash\n# an upsert of the WHOLE row: a flag left off is the WIDE default below, not \"unchanged\"\ncotal actor grant <actor> --sub <IdP subject> [--scope a,b] [--allow-subscribe a,b] [--allow-publish a,b] [--role <r>] [--label <l>]\ncotal actor revoke <actor> (--sub <IdP subject> | --owner <u_\u2026>)\ncotal actor list\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` | the folder's | Space whose ledger to manage |\n| `--sub <subject>` | \u2014 | The IdP subject (shown by `cotal login`) the actor belongs to |\n| `--owner <u_\u2026>` | \u2014 | The derived owner token (alternative to `--sub`) |\n| `--scope <a,b>` | `spawn,role:default` | Capability scope (`''` = none; `spawn` = may run agents; `role:<r>` = may delegate role r; `admin` = cross-agent control; `supervise` = eligible for the closed remote manager-service view when the host enables it) |\n| `--allow-subscribe <a,b>` | `>` (all channels) | Channel read ACL; the user's envelope, their agents can never read beyond it |\n| `--allow-publish <a,b>` | `>` (all channels) | Channel post ACL; also the envelope for their agents' posting |\n| `--role <r>` | \u2014 | Role (scopes the task-queue consumer) |\n| `--label <l>` | \u2014 | Display label for `actor list` (never the IdP subject) |\n\nThe actor ledger is the single authorization source of a user-auth space: no row, no access.\nA bare `grant` is the **full** envelope (all channels, may spawn); the flags narrow it. A\nre-grant **replaces the whole row**, not the one field you name, so to add a capability spell\nevery field out: the new scope plus the row's current read set, post set, role and label\n(`cotal actor list` shows what a row holds). A field left off does not stay as it was, it\nreverts to the wide default in the table above, which is how a narrow reader becomes a reader\nof every channel. `supervise` is separate from `spawn` and `admin`: it only makes a signed-in\nperson eligible for the host-provided closed remote manager-service view; it does not grant\nmanagement of another owner or a general host profile. `revoke` denies the next exchange and\nthe next connect with no restart, and evicts the principal's live connections. Managed-agent rows\n(written by the spawn path) live in a disjoint row space this command never touches. See\n[identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\n## doctor\n\n```bash\ncotal doctor auth [--fix]\n```\n\nCredential-health diagnosis and repair for this folder's mesh: renders every managed\ncredential as healthy / near-expiry / expired and ends in `healthy` or the exact next\ncommand; `--fix` applies the repairs it can. The one surface every stale-credential error\npoints at.\n\n## join\n\n```bash\ncotal join --space <s> --name <n> [--role <r>] [--channel <c>]\ncotal join --link <url> | --token <t>\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Which mesh, and which credential |\n| `--name <n>` | \u2014 | Your presence name |\n| `--role <r>` | \u2014 | Your role |\n| `--channel <c>` | \u2014 | Channel to join |\n| `--kind <k>` | `agent` | Endpoint kind |\n| `--link <url>` | \u2014 | Join link (`cotal://\u2026`) |\n| `--token <t>` | \u2014 | Join token |\n| `--lifecycle-uid <uid>` | \u2014 | Required with `--creds`: the lifecycle UID minted alongside the credential (`COTAL_LIFECYCLE_UID` works too). A credential's durable grants name exact lifecycle-keyed resources, so `join` refuses to invent one |\n| `--tls` | off | Connect over TLS |\n\nAn interactive presence: join a space under your own name and role, without launching an agent\nharness. A `--link` or `--token` supplies the where and the auth in one value. See\n[Spaces](spaces.md) and [Identity and auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\n## Manifest deploys\n\nA `cotal.yaml` manifest declares a whole mesh (channels, personas, roles, and ACLs) in one file.\nThree commands consume it, plus a read-only validator:\n\n```bash\ncotal up -f cotal.yaml         # boot a fresh mesh from the manifest\ncotal spawn -f cotal.yaml      # deploy the manifest additively onto a running mesh\ncotal down -f cotal.yaml       # tear that deploy down (or --run <id> for one run)\ncotal topology view -f cotal.yaml   # validate + view the access graph, change nothing\n```\n\n`up -f` and `spawn -f` differ in target: `up -f` brings up a new broker and applies the manifest;\n`spawn -f` requires an already-reachable mesh and applies additively (ownership-scoped). On a\nuser-auth mesh, `spawn -f` deploys over your own login (the deployer view, gated on ledger scope\n`spawn`): the manifest's agents land under your owner, a manifest claiming another owner is\nrefused, and seeding new channels additionally needs scope `admin`. Both take\n`--dry-run` to print the plan without mutating anything. `topology` validates the manifest and\nrenders its channel / role / ACL graph. See [Define a team](define-a-team.md) and the\n[manifest reference](manifest.md).\n\n## ext\n\n```bash\ncotal ext                 # same as `list`\ncotal ext add <npm-package>\ncotal ext remove <name>\ncotal ext list\ncotal ext root            # print just the install prefix (scriptable)\ncotal ext seed [--repair|--reset|--force]\n```\n\nOperator-installed extensions: `add` installs an npm package into a cotal-owned prefix and records\nevery registry provider it contributes. Commands appear in help, completion, and dispatch; runtime\nproviders are lazy-loaded by commands such as `supervise`; local process providers participate in\n`status` and selective `down`. `remove` and `list` manage them. The `@cotal-ai/web` dashboard is the\ncanonical command/process example. Installed packages and their location are described in\n[config](config.md).\n\nBare `cotal ext` lists the inventory, headed by the install prefix. That prefix is a cotal-owned npm\nroot kept **separate** from npm's own global tree, so these packages never show up in `npm list -g` \u2014\n`cotal ext` (or the Extensions section of `cotal status`) is the canonical inventory. `cotal ext root`\nprints only the path, for scripts. The versions shown are the manifest pin recorded at add time.\n\nRemoving an extension that owns a running local process is refused with the mesh root and its\n`cotal down <component>` command; stop it first so uninstalling the package never strands a process\nwhose lifecycle provider is gone.\n\n### Built-in connectors are seeded extensions\n\nThe first-party agent connectors (`claude`, `opencode`, `codex`, `hermes`, `jcode`, `pi`) are not compiled into\nthe binary. They are seeded on first run through the **same** `ext add` path a third party uses, and\nappear in `cotal ext list` like any other extension. So you can remove one you do not want\n(`cotal ext remove @cotal-ai/connector-hermes`), and a deliberately-removed connector STAYS removed\nacross upgrades. `cotal ext add <your-package>` adds a third-party connector the same way. The web\ndashboard (`@cotal-ai/web`, providing `command:web`) is the seventh built-in seeded on the same path.\n\n`cotal ext seed` is the maintenance entry for that seeding (it runs automatically on the first real\ncommand of each boot, so you rarely call it):\n\n| Flag | Meaning |\n|---|---|\n| (none) | Reconcile: seed any never-seeded built-in, refresh a seeded one whose version the binary bumped, leave a removed one removed. A no-op once current. |\n| `--repair` | Recover after an interrupted seed or a lost authority (rebuilds the interrupted connector; restores the removed-vs-never-seeded record from its durable backup). |\n| `--reset` | Discard the record and re-seed all seven built-ins (the six connectors plus the web dashboard). **Resurrects any you removed.** Rebuilds cleanly over corrupt seed state. |\n| `--force` | Re-seed the built-ins even when the version stamp is current or a downgrade. |\n\nThe default connector for a bare `cotal spawn` (no `--agent`) is `claude`; set `COTAL_DEFAULT_AGENT`\n(e.g. `opencode`) to change it. An `--agent` naming a removed connector fails loud with the exact\n`cotal ext add` to restore it. Set `COTAL_SKIP_CONNECTOR_SEED=1` to turn off the automatic first-run\nseed/refresh entirely (for a controlled or offline setup that manages connectors by hand); `cotal ext\nseed` still runs on request.\n\n## completion\n\n```bash\ncotal completion <bash|zsh|fish|powershell>   # print a stub to eval / source\ncotal completion install [shell]              # install it persistently\n```\n\nPrints or installs shell completion. Completion candidates come from each command's declared flags\nand, where useful, live mesh state (spaces, personas, managed agents) resolved offline.\n\n## feedback\n\n```bash\ncotal feedback \"<summary>\" [--type <t>] [--email <e>] [--details <text>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--type <t>` | \u2014 | `bug` \\| `idea` \\| `friction` \\| `praise` \\| `other` |\n| `--details <text>` | \u2014 | Longer free-form details |\n| `--severity <s>` | \u2014 | `low` \\| `medium` \\| `high` |\n| `--area <a>` | \u2014 | The part of Cotal this concerns |\n| `--email <e>` | git email | Contact email (required on the keyless public path) |\n| `--name <n>` | \u2014 | Your name (optional) |\n| `--url <url>` | keyed / public intake | Intake URL override |\n| `--key <k>` | `COTAL_FEEDBACK_KEY` | Feedback key |\n\nSends feedback to the Cotal developers. With a key (`--key` / `COTAL_FEEDBACK_KEY`) it routes to the\nkeyed beta intake; without one it goes to the public `cotal.ai` intake and requires a contact email\n(`--email` / `COTAL_FEEDBACK_EMAIL`, else your git email). Run a self-hosted intake with\n[`feedback-intake`](#server-daemons).\n\n## Server daemons\n\nTwo long-lived infra roles ship with the CLI. They are not part of everyday operation; the delivery\ndaemon comes up automatically with `cotal up --detach` in auth mode.\n\n```bash\ncotal deliver --space <s> [--server <url>] [--creds <file>]\ncotal auth-service --space <s> --server <url> [--port <n>] [--exchange-public-port <n>] [--exchange-public-url <https://\u2026>] [--exchange-trusted-proxy]\ncotal feedback-intake --keys <keys.json> [--port <n>] [--creds <file>]\n```\n\n`auth-service` runs a user-auth space's identity plane: the NATS auth callout, the\ncapability-gated local exchange and JWKS, and, when `--exchange-public-port` is set, the closed public\nexchange/discovery face forwarded by an HTTPS reverse proxy. `--exchange-public-url` is the proxy URL\nadvertised to clients; `--exchange-trusted-proxy` opts into last-hop `X-Forwarded-For` attribution.\n`cotal up --user-auth` starts and supervises the service for you, so you run it directly only to\nrecover one by hand.\n\n`deliver` runs the server-side Plane-3 delivery daemon: the durable backstop and membership/ACL\nauthority. It is auth-mode-only and single-instance (`--shard`/`--shards` accept only `N=1`);\n`--dev-mint` mints a scoped cred from the local signer for standalone dev. See the\n[delivery daemon](delivery-daemon.md). `feedback-intake` runs a self-hosted feedback server\n(requires `--keys` and a scoped `--creds`), announcing submissions into a space channel; flags\ninclude `--host`/`--port`, `--store`, `--space`/`--channel`, `--max-bytes`, and `--rate-limit`.\n\n## Plumbing\n\n`cotal __complete <words\u2026>` is the internal entry the shell-completion stubs call to emit candidates\nfor the current command line; you never run it directly. `cotal agent-bearer` is machine-facing\nplumbing on user-auth meshes: spawned agents exec it to print a fresh short-lived bearer from their\nspawn-time secret; you never run it directly either. Its local arm uses `--dir` to discover the\ncapability-gated loopback service. A remotely enrolled, already-granted agent instead receives\n`--exchange-url <https://base>` in its launch argv: that arm sends `{owner, actor, actorToken}` to the\npinned public exchange with no local capability, follows no redirects, and refuses every non-HTTPS\nURL because the actor token is the credential in the request body. (`cotal start` is a removed tombstone: it\nerrors and points you to `cotal spawn --detach`.)\n"
+      "body": "# `cotal` CLI reference\n\n> **Reference**: describes the TypeScript reference implementation (the `cotal` CLI), not the wire contract. \xB7 **For:** operators \xB7 **Wire contract:** [SPEC](../SPEC.md)\n\n`cotal` is the operator command line for the reference implementation: bring a mesh up, mint\nidentities, launch agents, watch what they do, and tear it all down. It is a thin client over the\nwire contract: the normative subjects and schemas live in the [SPEC](../SPEC.md); this page is\nlookup material for the commands, not a walkthrough; if you are new, start with\n[Getting started](getting-started.md).\n\n## Running it\n\n```bash\nnpm install -g cotal-ai   # puts `cotal` on your PATH (needs Node 22+)\ncotal --help              # every command, grouped\ncotal --version           # cotal-ai version + each installed extension's (also `cotal -v`)\ncotal <command> --help    # one command's flags and usage\n```\n\n`npx cotal-ai <command>` runs it without a global install; in a dev clone, `pnpm cotal <command>`\nruns it through `tsx` with no build step. Bare `cotal` prints help. Every command generates its own\n`--help`, usage, and shell completion from its declared flags.\n\nCommands come from the surfaces the binary composes: the base mesh CLI, the manager\n(`supervise`), and the delivery daemon (`deliver`), plus any operator-installed extensions.\n`cotal ext add <npm-package>` installs any registry providers a package contributes: commands,\nruntimes, and local process lifecycle descriptors. The `web` dashboard and optional manager\nruntimes ship this way.\n\n## Commands\n\n| Area | Command | Purpose |\n|---|---|---|\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`setup`](#setup) | Guided, configure-only setup (installs, seeds personas; launches nothing) |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`update`](#update) | Reconcile first-party extensions and check or opt into a coherent CLI upgrade |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`up`](#up) | Start a local mesh (nats-server + JetStream), or boot a whole manifest with `-f` |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`down`](#down) | Stop the whole stack, selected registered components, or a manifest deploy |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`backup`](#backup-and-restore) | Create an offline full-space or registry-only artifact from a preserved cut |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`clean`](#clean) | Configurable cleanup: purge history (live), or wipe the local store / identity (stopped) |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`meshes`](#meshes-use-status) | List the running meshes on this machine |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`use`](#meshes-use-status) | Set the default mesh a bare `cotal spawn` joins |\n| Set up & lifecycle | [`status`](#meshes-use-status) | Read-only diagnostics for setup, processes, and the selected mesh |\n| Agents & personas | [`spawn`](#spawn) | Launch an agent from a persona (foreground, or `--detach` via the manager) |\n| Agents & personas | [`models`](#models) | List connector model catalogs and variants from the manager |\n| Agents & personas | [`ps`](#ps-stop-attach) | List managed agents and their mesh status |\n| Agents & personas | [`stop`](#ps-stop-attach) | Ask the manager to stop a managed agent |\n| Agents & personas | [`attach`](#ps-stop-attach) | Stream and drive a managed agent's terminal (pty runtime) |\n| Agents & personas | [`input`](#input) | Type one line into a managed agent's terminal without attaching |\n| Agents & personas | [`personas`](#personas) | List, show, edit, create, or remove local personas |\n| Agents & personas | [`supervise`](#supervise) | Run a manager daemon (the agent supervisor / control plane) |\n| Agents & personas | [`runtimes`](#runtimes) | List the agent runtimes the manager can spawn through and whether each is reachable |\n| Agents & personas | [`reconcile-gate`](#reconcile-gate) | Unfreeze an issuance gate left frozen by a crashed restart when the successor cannot boot-heal it (holder gone, complete CONNZ sweep) |\n| Messaging & watching | [`endpoints`](#endpoints) | List every endpoint in the live presence roster, including infrastructure |\n| Messaging & watching | [`describe` / `invoke`](#describe-invoke) | Resolve a v0.4 service's command surface off the wire; invoke one command by name |\n| Messaging & watching | [`send`](#send) | Send one message, then exit: DM a peer, post a channel, or ask a role |\n| Messaging & watching | [`channels`](#channels) | Inspect or set the channel registry |\n| Messaging & watching | [`history`](#history) | Clear retained message history |\n| Messaging & watching | [`console`](#console) | Live protocol view for a space (TUI, or `--plain` line stream) |\n| Messaging & watching | [`web`](#web) | Browser dashboard (installed as the `@cotal-ai/web` extension) |\n| Auth & meshes | [`mint`](#mint) | Mint a creds file for a space (static auth mode) |\n| Auth & meshes | [`login`](#login-logout) | Sign in to a per-user-auth mesh's IdP (once per machine) |\n| Auth & meshes | [`logout`](#login-logout) | Revoke the IdP session and clear the cached login |\n| Auth & meshes | [`actor`](#actor) | Manage a user-auth space's actor ledger (grant / revoke / list) |\n| Auth & meshes | [`doctor`](#doctor) | Credential-health diagnosis and repair (`doctor auth`) |\n| Auth & meshes | [`join`](#join) | Join a space as your own presence (interactive) |\n| Manifest | [`topology`](#manifest-deploys) | Validate and view a mesh manifest's access graph (read-only) |\n| Extensions & misc | [`ext`](#ext) | Install / remove operator CLI extensions |\n| Extensions & misc | [`completion`](#completion) | Print or install shell completion |\n| Extensions & misc | [`feedback`](#feedback) | Send feedback to the Cotal developers |\n| Extensions & misc | [`deliver`](#server-daemons) | Run the server-side Plane-3 delivery daemon |\n| Extensions & misc | [`feedback-intake`](#server-daemons) | Run a self-hosted feedback intake server |\n\nThe manifest modes of `up`, `spawn`, and `down` (`-f <cotal.yaml>`) plus `topology` are covered\ntogether under [Manifest deploys](#manifest-deploys).\n\n## setup\n\n```bash\ncotal setup [--full] [--demo] [--yes]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--full` | off | Redo the full guided flow (implies `--demo`) |\n| `--demo` | off | Also seed the guided expert team (`david`, `sven`, `me`) |\n| `--yes`, `-y` | off | Non-interactive accept-all (for agents / CI) |\n\nGuided setup is **configure-only**: it checks prerequisites, installs the Claude Code plugin, and\nseeds persona files, and it launches nothing (no mesh, no web, no manager). First run gets the\nnarrated flow; later runs print a status card. By default it seeds one `default` persona; the\n`david`/`sven`/`me` team is opt-in via `--demo`. See [Getting started](getting-started.md) and, for\nmaintainers, [setup internals](setup-internals.md).\n\n## update\n\n```bash\ncotal update [--self]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--self` | off | If a newer release exists, install that exact validated `cotal-ai` version globally and reconcile through the newly installed binary |\n\nWithout `--self`, `update` keeps the installed first-party surfaces coherent with the running\nbinary: it force-reconciles the four built-in connectors, then reinstalls other `@cotal-ai/*`\noperator extensions at the binary's exact version. Each extension runs in an isolated child, so one\nfailure cannot poison later replays. It then checks npm; a newer binary is an informational notice\nwith `cotal update --self` as the next command, not an automatic install.\n\nWith `--self`, the npm check happens first. When a newer release exists, Cotal installs the exact\nversion it validated, resolves and verifies that package in npm's global root, then launches that\nbinary to reconcile connectors and first-party extensions to the new generation. An npx or dev-clone\ninvocation therefore installs and continues through a separate global copy; it never claims the\nalready-running process changed. If the binary is current, `--self` performs the normal local\nreconcile without reinstalling it.\n\nThird-party extensions are listed with their installed version and recorded spec but are not\nauto-updated in v1. Floating third-party updates require `@cotal-ai/*` peer-range validation and are\na future follow-up. A failed connector/extension install, npm metadata check, or requested global\ninstall is reported and makes the command exit nonzero. Independent extension attempts continue so\nthe output includes every failure; an unavailable npm registry does not undo a completed local\nreconcile, but the command still exits nonzero because it could not establish that the install is\ncurrent.\n\n## up\n\n```bash\ncotal up [--detach] [--open] [--space <s>] [--server <url>] [--channels <path>] [--runtime <name>]\ncotal up --user-auth --idp <url> [--exchange-public-port <n> --exchange-public-url <https://\u2026> [--exchange-trusted-proxy]]\ncotal up --tls-cert <cert.pem> --tls-key <key.pem>   # serve broker TLS (both, or neither)\ncotal up --restore <dir> [--restore-only registry] [--accept-missing-source]\ncotal up -f <cotal.yaml> [--dry-run] [--runtime <name>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--server <url>` | auto (free local port) | Listen URL override |\n| `--host <host>` | \u2014 | Bind host override. With no `--server`, the broker URL is derived from it, so `--host <addr>` alone is enough to make a mesh reachable at that address; a `--host`/`--server` pair naming different addresses is refused. A wildcard bind (`0.0.0.0`, `::`) keeps a dialable loopback URL. Recorded on the mesh and reused by every later manager launch, so a repair or resume keeps remote [`attach`](#ps-stop-attach) working |\n| `--space <s>` | the folder's name | Space name |\n| `--store-dir <dir>` | \u2014 | JetStream store directory |\n| `--channels <path>` | `.cotal/channels.json` if present | Channel-registry seed file (JSON). An explicit path that is missing is an error |\n| `--restore <dir>` | \u2014 | Restore a completed offline backup before exposing the normal listener |\n| `--restore-only registry` | artifact selection | Restore only the registry component |\n| `--accept-missing-source` | off | Explicit disaster consent when the inode-bound preserved source is absent |\n| `--open` | off (auth) | Unauthenticated dev mesh: no JWT, no ACLs |\n| `--user-auth` | off | Per-user auth: people `cotal login`; connects are authorized against the actor ledger |\n| `--idp <url>` | \u2014 | With `--user-auth`: the IdP auth base URL to pin on first enable |\n| `--exchange-public-port <n>` | none | With `--user-auth`: add the public exchange face on this loopback port, for an HTTPS reverse proxy to forward to |\n| `--exchange-public-url <https://\u2026>` | none | With `--exchange-public-port`: advertise the reverse proxy's HTTPS URL in discovery |\n| `--exchange-trusted-proxy` | off | With `--exchange-public-port`: attribute public failure buckets to the last `X-Forwarded-For` hop. Enable only when the listener is reachable solely through a trusted proxy; otherwise the socket address is used |\n| `--detach` | off | Run in the background (stop with `cotal down`) |\n| `--tls-cert <path>` | \u2014 | PEM certificate to serve TLS with. Must be given together with `--tls-key`. The pair is validated **before** the broker starts \u2014 readability, private-key mode, that the two match, the validity window, and that the certificate covers the host clients will dial \u2014 because `nats-server` starts happily on an expired certificate and only the client then fails. The decision is recorded, so a later bare `cotal up` after a `cotal down` keeps serving TLS rather than silently reverting to cleartext |\n| `--tls-key <path>` | \u2014 | PEM private key for `--tls-cert`. Refused if group- or other-readable (tighten to `600`) |\n| `--file <cotal.yaml>`, `-f` | \u2014 | Launch a whole mesh from a manifest |\n| `--dry-run` | off | With `-f`: print the plan, mutate nothing |\n| `--runtime <name>` | `pty` (or the manifest's, with `-f`) | Agent runtime for the mesh manager (`pty` built in; others are installed extensions, explicit-only). Resolved + probed before the broker starts; an uninstalled/unreachable runtime fails loud. With `-f`, overrides the manifest's runtime |\n| `--rotate-sys` | off | Rotate the space's system account and re-mint its two `$SYS` creds. Needs a stopped mesh; refused with `--open` |\n\n`cotal up` boots a local nats-server with JetStream and, in auth mode (the default), JWT auth and\nper-agent ACLs; `--detach` records the mesh so `cotal spawn` from any directory can find it. With no\n`--server`, it auto-selects a free port if the default address is taken; an explicit `--server`\nstays fail-loud on collision. `--detach` also brings up the control plane (delivery daemon in auth\nmode, then the manager). The `-f` form is a [manifest deploy](#manifest-deploys); see\n[Run a mesh](run-a-mesh.md).\n\n`--user-auth --idp <url>` starts the space's auth service alongside the broker: the NATS\nauth callout plus its capability-gated local exchange, and optionally the closed public exchange\nface configured by the three `--exchange-*` flags above. The service is torn down with `cotal down`,\nand a re-run of `cotal up` heals a dead service on a running broker. `--user-auth` and `--open`\ncontradict each other and are refused loudly; a running broker cannot change auth mode\nwithout a `cotal down` first. See [identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\n`--rotate-sys` renews the two `$SYS` credentials (`membership-observer`, `connection-evictor`).\nThey carry a 30-day expiry and nothing re-signs them in place, because the system-account seed is\nnever persisted, so they are renewed by issuing a **new system account** under the same broker\noperator and minting fresh creds against it. A plain re-`up` does **not** do this: it reuses the\nexisting trust record, and its `$SYS` creds along with it.\n\nThe rotation is safe to run on a real space, with one operational cost. The data account, the account\nsigning key, every agent credential minted from it, and the JetStream store are all untouched; what\ndies is the retired system account, and with it any out-of-band copy of the old `$SYS` creds, on every\nbroker that loads the rotated config. The cost is that **earlier full backups stop being restorable**\n(see below), so this is not a no-consequence operation. It needs the broker to restart on the rewritten\nconfig, so it runs as part of a boot:\n\n```bash\ncotal down\ncotal up --rotate-sys --detach     # agents reconnect; nothing is re-provisioned\ncotal doctor auth                  # both $SYS creds healthy again, 30 days out\n```\n\nA rotation is a stopped, fresh boot, and anything that is not one refuses it, all for the same reason\n(the on-disk material and the broker it runs on must never end up on different generations):\n\n- a live mesh, because the running broker would keep serving the retired account;\n- an open mesh, whether that comes from `--open` or from `broker.auth: false` in a manifest, which\n  has no system account at all;\n- `--restore`, because reinstating a trust root and superseding it in one command leaves no way to\n  say which authority the mesh came up on;\n- an unfinished restore or resume attempt on this root, including one `cotal up` would recover on\n  its own, because those paths can adopt a live listener and return without booting a broker;\n- a root that hosts more than one space, because the system account lives in the shared broker\n  record and a rotation would retire every tenant's, while the root holds one `$SYS` cred pair\n  pinned to one data account.\n\nTwo things to know before you run it:\n\n- **The retirement is config-load-bound.** Old `$SYS` creds are refused by any broker that loads the\n  rotated config. A stale `nats-server` still running the *previous* config in memory would keep\n  honouring them, so stop every broker for this root first. `--rotate-sys` refuses if this root's\n  mesh is recorded as running, if anything unidentified is answering at the address it was given, or\n  if the root's pid file names a live (or unreadable) process. Those are Cotal's own ownership\n  records, not a scan of the process table: a `nats-server` you started by hand against this root's\n  `server.conf` on some other port writes none of them and will not be seen. Do not run one.\n- **It invalidates earlier full backups.** A full artifact binds to the trust chain it was taken\n  against, and that commitment covers the operator JWT and the system account. Every full backup\n  taken before a rotation refuses to restore afterwards, so take a fresh `cotal backup` once the\n  rotated mesh is up. `cotal up --restore` names this case when the data account still matches.\n\nThe commit is not atomic (a trust-record write plus two credential writes), so an interrupted\nrotation leaves the record ahead of the creds. That split is detected rather than silent: every\n`cotal up` on an auth mesh, and every `cotal doctor auth`, compares each `$SYS` cred's issuer against\nthe persisted record and names the retired account. `up` warns rather than refusing, because these\ncreds power the membership graph and live eviction, both of which degrade fail-soft; the mesh is not\nworth taking down over them. Re-running the rotation heals it, at the cost of one generation.\n\nWhile those creds are expired the mesh keeps delivering messages, but the\n[membership feed](delivery-daemon.md) and live connection eviction stay down; `cotal doctor auth`\nand the manager's log both name the credential and this repair.\n\n## down\n\n```bash\ncotal down\ncotal down --preserve-state [--store-dir <dir>]\ncotal down manager [delivery auth web nats ...]\ncotal down web [--space <name>]\ncotal down -f <cotal.yaml> | --run <id> [--dry-run]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--file <cotal.yaml>`, `-f` | \u2014 | Tear down this manifest's deploy |\n| `--run <id>` | \u2014 | Tear down one `spawn -f` run by id |\n| `--space <name>` | current mesh | With components: the mesh whose target-addressed components (e.g. `web`) to stop |\n| `--dry-run` | off | Print the manifest teardown or selected components, mutate nothing |\n| `--preserve-state` | off | Bare whole stack only: fence the manager, retain principals and durable state, stop and prove the stack down, then publish `ready` |\n| `--store-dir <dir>` | `.cotal/nats` | With `--preserve-state`: the actual store path (required for a custom store) |\n\nBare `cotal down` stops the whole local stack in dependency order. Positional component names stop\nonly those self-registered local processes; for example, `cotal down manager` leaves delivery and\nthe broker running, and `cotal down web` is available when the web extension is installed. A\ncomponent that starts target-resolved (the web dashboard) is stopped the same way: `cotal down web`\nresolves the mesh exactly like `cotal web` (registry current mesh first, `--space` to name one), so\nit works from any directory; the other components always stop under the folder you run it in. The\n`-f` / `--run` forms tear down a [manifest deploy](#manifest-deploys) without stopping the whole mesh\nand cannot be combined with component names. Stopping `nats` alone is refused while an unselected\nregistered daemon is still live; include those components or use bare `cotal down`.\n\nNormal `down` remains destructive at the logical identity/durable layer. `--preserve-state` is a\ndifferent maintenance transition: it suppresses leave/deprovision cleanup, persists the manager's\nsame-principal resume inventory, stops the entire stack without removing run/auth artifacts, and\npublishes a stable inode-bound cut only after every recorded process is proven stopped and the exact\nrecorded NATS endpoint is unreachable. A missing or stale broker pidfile never counts as stopped. The\nattempt is bound durably before the manager is fenced, the resume document and attempt-bound\n`cut-intent` are fsynced before manager commit, and the manager's commitment itself is journaled\n(`cut-committed`) before any process stops. A retry after a crash at any of those boundaries reuses\nthe exact recorded attempt and finishes the remaining stop and endpoint proofs idempotently, without\nneeding the (by then intentionally dead) manager. A partial cut never publishes `ready`. It cannot\nbe combined with component names, manifest teardown, or `--dry-run`.\n\n## clean\n\n```bash\ncotal clean <history|store|all> --force\ncotal clean restore-attempt --attempt <id> --force\ncotal clean restore-fallback --attempt <id> --force\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | `history`: target mesh |\n| `--dms` | off | `history`: also clear DM history |\n| `--store-dir <dir>` | `.cotal/nats` | `store`/`all`: JetStream store directory |\n| `--force` | \u2014 | Required: destructive, no prompting |\n| `--attempt <id>` | \u2014 | `restore-attempt`: exact stale pre-commit attempt; `restore-fallback`: matching healthy committed restore |\n\nOne configurable cleanup verb; every target requires `--force`.\n\n- `history` purges the retained message backlog on the **running** broker (channels, plus DMs\n  with `--dms`). The same operation as [`history clear`](#history), which stays as an alias.\n- `store` deletes the **stopped** mesh's JetStream store (`.cotal/nats`): streams, durable\n  consumers, and messages. This is the reset for stale on-disk broker state, e.g. durables\n  minted by an older, incompatible Cotal generation surviving a `down`/`up` cycle.\n- `all` is `store` plus the space identity (`.cotal/auth`), the local creds and markers tied to\n  it, any crash residue a normal `down` would have swept (stale pidfiles, `run/`), and the mesh's\n  registry entry; the next `cotal up` mints a fresh identity.\n\n`history` needs the mesh up; `store` and `all` refuse while any recorded mesh process is still\nalive or any same-root recorded broker endpoint remains reachable (run `cotal down` first). They\nalso refuse outright on a root that holds accounts for several spaces: the store and the broker\ntrust record are shared by every space on the broker, so both targets would take out all of them\nand no `--space` can narrow that. `down`, `backup` and `up --restore` refuse there for the same\nreason. `cotal status` lists the tenants on such a root. Personas\n(`.cotal/agents`) and logs are never touched. A custom\nstore location is not recorded anywhere, so `--store-dir` must repeat whatever the mesh was\nlaunched with. Custom cleanup targets must contain either the Cotal store-generation marker or a\nreal `jetstream/` store directory; filesystem roots, project roots, and Cotal auth/maintenance trees\nare always refused.\n\n`store` and `all` also refuse every maintenance journal state. After a healthy committed restore,\n`restore-fallback` is the only supported way to remove the recorded unchanged old-store inode; it\nnever deletes the active target, requires both the exact attempt id and `--force`, and retires the\ncompleted restore journal so a later `down --preserve-state` can start a new backup cycle.\n\n## backup and restore\n\n```bash\ncotal down --preserve-state [--store-dir <dir>]\ncotal backup create <dir> [--only full|registry] [--store-dir <dir>]\ncotal up --restore <dir> [--restore-only registry] [--accept-missing-source]\n```\n\nBackup is offline-only. It requires the stable `ready` record from `down --preserve-state`, an exact\nstore match, no live recorded process, and an unreachable exact endpoint from the recorded cut.\nThat endpoint is probed immediately before cloning, so a live broker with a missing or stale pidfile\nis still refused. It claims the cut, reflink/copies the stopped source to a\nprivate attempt clone, and opens only that clone on a random loopback bootstrap broker with an\nindependent parent/deadline watchdog. It validates the canonical stream and pull-consumer inventory,\nwrites native snapshots with consumers excluded, and stores conservative contiguous ACK-floor\ncheckpoints separately. The original store is never opened by the backup broker, and the stack is\nnot restarted implicitly. Artifact destinations must not overlap the preserved source or maintenance\nattempt tree. Restore artifacts and targets likewise cannot nest inside or contain each other, the\npreserved source, or the maintenance attempt tree.\n\n`full` is the default and indivisible: channel registry, CHAT/DM/TASK/INBOX/DLV, ACL, MEMBERS, and\nvalidated durable checkpoints. `registry` is the sole partial artifact. Presence, derived membership\nfeed, leases, native ephemeral/history consumers, credentials, keys, tokens, owner secrets, and actor\nledger files are excluded. Artifacts are exclusively created `0700`; snapshot/checkpoint files and\nthe manifest are `0600`; `manifest.json` is written last with exact sizes and SHA-256 values. The\ndirectory is trusted operator input: hashes detect corruption, not malicious rewriting.\n\nRestore validates and stages the exact allowlisted artifact bytes before moving or creating a store.\nIt requires the same space and existing trust state. The whole pre-commit window holds a journaled\nliveness claim (coordinator, watchdogs, brokers, absolute deadline): ordinary `up` and a repeated\n`up --restore` refuse while the claim is live, and a stale attempt is recovered only after the\ndeadline has elapsed and every recorded owner is proven dead \u2014 automatically by a retried\n`up --restore`, or explicitly with `cotal clean restore-attempt --attempt <id> --force`. Nothing\never rolls back a live attempt. A registry-only artifact restores as registry-only whether or not\n`--restore-only registry` is passed; omitted infrastructure is always created and the exact\npost-restore stream inventory is asserted before commit intent. Ordinary `up` from a preserved cut\nresumes only the exact recorded source store and runtime; a contradicting `--store-dir` or\n`--runtime` fails in preflight. Authenticated restores validate the complete\nspace trust bundle before staging, including nkeys, seed matches, JWTs, signers, and space binding;\nfull restores commit to the validated operator, system-account, data-account, and active-signer root\nchain in addition to the static/user authority fingerprint. Because the system account is part of that\ncommitment, a [`cotal up --rotate-sys`](#up) makes every full artifact taken before it unrestorable\nagainst this root: take a fresh full backup after each rotation. The composed commitment is revalidated\nimmediately before store mutation and never includes secret seeds. Restore never creates fresh auth.\nSame-path restores atomically retain the old\nsource at the journaled fallback path; alternate targets retain it in place; a missing canonical\nsource needs explicit `--accept-missing-source`. Quarantine and target restores use current canonical\nconfigs on isolated random-loopback brokers, never expose native snapshot consumers, and publish a\ncommit-intent immediately before the normal listener starts. Archive bytes never instantiate the real\ntarget: after quarantine validation, every stream is re-snapshotted from the validated quarantine\nstate into attempt-owned sanitized files, and the target is restored solely from those. Before that boundary, failure rolls back\nthe attempt-owned target; after it, ambiguity preserves both stores and records forward-repair\nrecourse. The cooperative maintenance lock excludes Cotal commands, not arbitrary raw NATS processes.\n\nBootstrap brokers in every auth mode \u2014 including open \u2014 mount the store under a local account with\nrandom operation-specific logins only, each carrying the exact per-phase subject permission matrix;\nnormal static credentials and user-auth sentinel/bearer connections are rejected, and no auth\nservice or callout starts. Open mode differs only in its account label, never in authority. Inventory, each stream snapshot,\nrestore initiation, exact upload id, validation, and each checkpoint recreation use separate exact\nauthorities. Every checkpoint carries the source stream's message/first/last sequence state and must\nmatch its snapshot record before mutation; core then derives and validates the only allowed start\npolicy. TASK is not a CLI exception: the same core checkpoint API recreates its canonical `DeliverAll`\nWorkQueue durable because acknowledged tasks are absent from retention and NATS forbids a\nstart-sequence policy there. Registry-only restore creates every omitted canonical stream and transient\nbucket on the isolated target before the normal listener is exposed. It deliberately does not resume\nretained agents or recreate their DM/DLV/TASK/ACL state; their identity material stays retained and\nstopped rather than being reprovisioned into a partial restore.\n\nAfter listener readiness, the manager starts attempt-bound, validates retained credentials/tokens\nwithout granting or reprovisioning, and resumes the exact persisted principals under cleanup\nsuppression. Registry-only restore uses the same flow with an empty agent set. `commitResume` is an\nidempotent validation barrier only: success must be `awaitingFinalize` with an attempt-bound 64-hex\ncommit token and does not release suppression. Under the workspace lock, the CLI first fsyncs that\nexact evidence as `manager-committed` (restore) or `resume-committed` (ordinary resume), then calls\ntoken-bound `finalizeResume`; only an `active` response for the exact token releases suppression. The\nCLI records the same token in finalization evidence before a restore becomes `active`, or before an\nordinary resume retires and consumes the marker. Re-entry from either committed state skips the prior\nidempotent activation/commit phases, retries finalization with the durable token, and finishes the\nworkspace transition. Failure before finalization preserves the committed state and cleanup\nsuppression; it is not rewritten through a degraded transition. Re-entry between any two earlier\nboundaries reuses the same attempt and may retry the idempotent phases without deleting retained state. A missing or\nchanged per-agent dependency is a named fail-closed result; the journal becomes degraded and remains\navailable for forward repair. A retry from `resume-intent`,\n`resume-active`, or `resume-degraded` reuses the same attempt and inventory after the prior listener is\nproven stopped. Every normal restore listener has an unguessable attempt-bound NATS server name. The\nCLI fsyncs its exact name/nonce, canonical endpoint, process owner, and generation-bound target identity\nimmediately after spawn. Re-entry accepts a surviving listener only when its INFO server name, live PID\nrecord, endpoint, and target identity all match that proof; degraded restore repair then moves through\nthe guarded workspace transition only after manager commit. If an uncommitted bound owner is provably\ndead, recovery retires that exact proof under the maintenance lock and binds a fresh listener for the\nsame attempt, endpoint, and target with a new nonce and server name. A live foreign/mismatched listener\nor ambiguous owner is preserved and refused, never adopted by reachability alone. A reconstructed\ncommit/degraded attempt without either the exact bound proof or a durable dead-listener replacement\nrecord fails closed even when the recorded port is free. A later ordinary startup may pass an `active`\nrestore only when its details prove manager commit and its exact recorded listener is dead.\n\n## meshes, use, status\n\n```bash\ncotal meshes\ncotal meshes add                      # guided, on a terminal\ncotal meshes add <space> --server <url> [--root <dir>] [--mode auth|open|user] [--tls] [--force]\ncotal meshes add <space> --mode user (--user-auth-file <bundle.json> | --from <https url>)\ncotal meshes rm <space> [<space> \u2026] [--force]\ncotal use <space>\ncotal status [--space <s>] [--server <url>] [--components]\n```\n\n`meshes` lists the meshes this machine knows; a `*` marks the `current` default a bare\n`cotal spawn` joins.\n\nRun on a terminal with the space or `--server` missing, **`meshes add` is guided**: it asks for the\none thing that cannot be derived (the broker URL), probes it, and tells you what answered - open or\nrequiring credentials. It then offers the spaces your `--root` already holds credentials for, states\nthe mode as a fact about that broker rather than asking, and shows the exact record before writing\nanything. A broker that does not answer, or a space name already registered, becomes a choice rather\nthan an error. Anything you pass on the command line is taken as given and not asked again. Without\na terminal - a script, an agent, CI - nothing prompts and the flag form's errors stand\n(`COTAL_NO_PROMPT=1` forces that too).\n\n`cotal up` and `cotal down` maintain their own records. `meshes add` registers a mesh they cannot\nspeak for: one running on another machine, a shared broker, a hosted space. `--root` is the folder\nwhose `.cotal/auth` holds that mesh's credentials and whose `.cotal/agents` holds its personas\n(default: the project you run it in) \u2014 the registry stores that path, never a secret. `--mode`\ndefaults to `auth` when the root holds the space's account record and to `open` otherwise. The\nbroker is probed before anything is recorded, so a wrong address, or credentials that mesh will\nnot accept, fails here instead of at the first `spawn`; `--force` records without verifying (and\nreplaces an existing record).\n\nA hostname or public address is registrable only when the connection will **require TLS**: pass\n`--tls`, or use a `tls://` URL \u2014 the scheme is recorded as enforced intent, so every later dial\nthrough the record demands the handshake (and `meshes add tls://\u2026` against a plaintext broker is\nrefused at registration). Without required TLS the fence is unchanged: loopback and\nprivate-overlay literals only, and RFC1918 addresses are refused in both modes \u2014 a cafe LAN is\nprivate, not yours.\n\nA **user-auth** mesh registers from supplied pinned trust, never guessed: `--user-auth-file`\ntakes the bundle exported where the mesh runs; `--from` asks before it dials the address at all,\nthen fetches its `/.well-known/cotal-mesh` discovery document (HTTPS only), displays the pins, and\nasks again before adopting them. Neither fetch follows redirects: a 302 can move a pinned fetch\nonto plaintext or onto another host, so it is refused rather than followed, and the pinned\nexchange must itself be an `https://` URL \u2014 except for an exchange on this machine, where plain\n`http://` is accepted for a loopback *literal* (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, any spelling of them) but not\nfor `localhost`, which is a name rather than an address. Registration verifies that exchange answers `/health`\nand `/jwks` as the pinned issuer, and that the broker itself refuses a bare connect \u2014 the\nauth-required refusal is the pass. The sentinel credentials land in a 0600 file under the entry's root; the registry\nrecords only the path.\n\n`meshes rm` drops records \u2014 it never stops a mesh. For a mesh running on this machine `cotal down`\nis the right verb, and `rm` says so unless you pass `--force`. A record you added by hand is only\nremoved by something that names it \u2014 `meshes rm`, or an `add --force` replacement \u2014 or by a\n`cotal up` that actually starts the broker for that same space, server and root, which becomes that\nmesh and so takes the record over (a `cotal up` for that space anywhere else refuses instead).\nNothing that merely *infers* a record is stale touches it: an\nunreachable broker is listed `offline` and stays, and `cotal down` / `cotal clean all` leave it\nalone even when it shares a root with the project they are tearing down, because nothing on this\nmachine could write it back.\n\n`use <space>` sets that default; the selection applies from every directory,\nincluding inside another mesh's project. `status` is a read-only report: machine prerequisites\n(starting with the installed `cotal-ai` version), the installed extensions and their versions, this\nfolder's `.cotal/`, the recorded meshes, and a live snapshot of the selected mesh (roster, channels,\nmembership feed). `status` takes `--space` / `--server` to pick the mesh to inspect; it starts\nnothing.\n\n`cotal status --components` adds a fail-loud per-component health pass. It reads **each\ncomponent's own control surface**, rather than treating a PID, a lease, or a successful probe of a\nsibling as proof that the component serves. It prints one of `serving`, `absent`, `not-serving`, or\n`refused` for each component and exits `0`, `1`, `2`, or `3` respectively (the highest observed\nstate wins):\n\n- **manager** \u2014 local PID record, its liveness-lease holder and PID, then the manager's own typed\n  `status` service reachability from this host. Builds without a startup-phase report say\n  `phase not reported by this manager build`; that is never a blank green state.\n- **delivery** \u2014 local PID record, its ready lease (`ready` is the daemon's own bound-control\n  signal), and the latest `renewal.json` adoption verdict. A re-signed credential and a\n  broker-accepted adoption stay distinct facts.\n- **web** \u2014 local PID record and the dashboard's own loopback `/api/meta` response, which must name\n  the same PID and its requested port. A different process on the port, an unreadable PID command,\n  or an unrecognizable process record is `refused`, not a green default-port guess.\n- **broker** \u2014 the registered mesh URL dialed from this host with its recorded TLS requirement.\n\n`absent` means Cotal has no live local component record (or has a stale record); `not-serving`\nmeans the component record is live but its service/readiness surface did not answer or is not ready.\nThose are intentionally separate exit cases. A failed or unreadable probe is `refused`, never an\nabsent component or a clean zero.\n\n## spawn\n\n```bash\ncotal spawn [<persona>] [--detach] [--name <n>] [--agent <a>] [--model <m>] [--variant <v>] [--prompt <text>] [--cwd <dir>]\ncotal spawn -f <cotal.yaml> [--dry-run]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` | resolved mesh | Target space |\n| `--server <url>` | registry entry | Broker URL override |\n| `--creds <path>` | \u2014 | Control-caller creds for an off-registry manager (`--detach` only) |\n| `--name <n>` | persona's `name:` | Presence-name override (does not choose the persona) |\n| `--config <persona-or-path>` | \u2014 | Persona catalog name or file path; wins over the positional |\n| `--agent <a>` | `COTAL_DEFAULT_AGENT`, else `claude` | Connector type (`claude`, `opencode`, `jcode`, `hermes`, \u2026) |\n| `--role <r>` | persona's `role:` | Role override |\n| `--model <m>` | persona's `model:` | Model override |\n| `--variant <v>` | persona's `variant:` | Model variant override (connector-defined; e.g. OpenCode reasoning tiers) |\n| `--cwd <dir>` | this cwd | Working directory to root the agent at |\n| `--prompt <text>` | \u2014 | Initial prompt auto-submitted at start |\n| `--resume <id>` | \u2014 | Fork an existing session id into the mesh (claude only) |\n| `--events` / `--no-events` | off | Publish the session's structured event plane to its own event channel |\n| `--share-tools <sel>` | none | Share named operator MCP servers with the agent |\n| `--subscribe <a,b>` | persona's | Channel read-set override |\n| `--allow-subscribe <a,b>` | = subscribe | Read-ACL override |\n| `--allow-publish <a,b>` | deny | Post-ACL override |\n| `--detach`, `-d` | off | Launch via the manager into a detached PTY (reattach with `cotal attach`) |\n| `--on <instance>` | class anycast | With `--detach` only: pin the launch to one manager instance id (the whole id, as `ps` prints it). Refused on a foreground spawn (no manager to pin), with `-f` (a manifest deploy launches through the manager class queue), and when empty |\n| `--file <cotal.yaml>`, `-f` | \u2014 | Deploy a manifest onto the running mesh |\n| `--dry-run` | off | With `-f`: print the plan, mutate nothing |\n| `--allow-stale <a,b>` | \u2014 | With `-f`: waive named stale agents (apply-only) |\n| `--runtime <name>` | manifest's | With `-f`: override the manifest's runtime |\n\n`--events` turns on the session's **event plane**: a stream of structured events describing what\nthe agent did, rather than the prose it wrote, on a channel of its own. The channel is named after\nthe agent's principal, `events.<owner>.<actor>`, never after its display name, because two live\nagents are allowed to share a display name and would then share a stream. The launch grants publish\nrights on exactly that one channel, foreground and detached alike, and a connector that does not\npublish an event plane refuses the flag rather than starting a session whose events have nowhere to\ngo.\n\nThe flag and the grant are separate on purpose. Holding publish rights on a channel is not a request\nto publish to it, so writing an event channel into an agent file's `allowPublish` does not turn the\nplane on: only the launch does.\n\nThe persona (`--config` > positional > `COTAL_DEFAULT_PERSONA` > `default`) is loaded from the\ntarget mesh's `.cotal/agents/`; the launch flags override the file. Foreground runs the agent\nattached to your terminal; `--detach` hands the launch to the running manager. Both modes get the\ndurable backstop on a mesh that runs the delivery daemon; `--live-only` skips it for a foreground\nspawn (messages posted while it is disconnected are then not replayed). A foreground exit retires\nthe agent's creds and broker footprint, like a manager despawn. A `--detach` spawn is an\n**action**: the manager accepts it and returns the allocated identity at once, then the launch\nfollows to a terminal outcome rather than blocking (see [the control surface](control-surface.md)).\nSee [Connect Claude Code](connect-claude.md) and [Agent files](agent-files.md); `-f` is a\n[manifest deploy](#manifest-deploys). (`cotal start` was merged into `cotal spawn --detach`.)\n\n## models\n\n```bash\ncotal models [--agent <connector>] [--refresh]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Which manager to reach |\n| `--agent <connector>` | all registered connectors | Connector whose catalog to list |\n| `--refresh` | off | Ask the connector to refresh its provider cache |\n\nAsks the running manager for each connector's model catalog (model ids plus their variants)\nfor connectors that expose one (OpenCode today; a connector without a catalog says so). Pick a\nresult with `cotal spawn --model <provider/model> --variant <v>`.\n\n## endpoints\n\n```bash\ncotal endpoints [--space <s>] [--server <url>] [--creds <path>]\n```\n\nLists the mesh presence roster: agents, the manager, and any other protocol endpoint, with each\nendpoint's role, kind, status, and current activity. Unlike `ps`, this is a read-only presence view;\nit is not limited to child processes owned by the manager.\n\n## describe, invoke\n\n```bash\ncotal describe <endpoint>                                        [--space <s>]\ncotal invoke <endpoint> <command> [--args '<json>']              [--space <s>]\ncotal invoke <endpoint> <command> --name <agent> [--admin]       [--space <s>]\n```\n\nThe generic v0.4 service surface. `describe` resolves a registered endpoint's command set off the\nwire - the reserved `describe` command answers the registered contract digests, the schemas are\nfetched from the space's content-addressed contract store, recompiled, and verified against those\ndigests - and prints each command with its capability class and targeting shape. `invoke` calls one\ncommand by name: `--args` is a JSON object validated against the fetched input schema *before*\npublish; a targeted command takes `--name <agent>` (resolved to the agent's current principal via\n`ps`) or `--self`. `--admin` uses the admin instrument credential, whose cross-agent reach rides\nthe operator-only `any` authorization mode. Neither command has compile-time knowledge of any\nendpoint's schemas - this is the same trust chain every built-in control command now uses. Needs an\nauth mesh: the manager registers its service on both static and per-user meshes (a signed-in user\nrides their bearer; cross-agent reach needs the `admin` scope). An open mesh has no service\nregistry.\n\n## ps, stop, attach\n\n```bash\ncotal ps [--on <instance>] [--wide | --json] [--space <s>]\ncotal stop --name <n> [--on <instance>] [--space <s>]\ncotal attach --name <n> [--on <instance>] [--no-reconnect] [--space <s>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Which manager to reach |\n| `--name <n>` | \u2014 | Managed agent to stop / attach (required) |\n| `--on <instance>` | class anycast (`ps`: class scatter) | Pin to one manager instance id (multi-manager space); takes the whole id as `ps` prints it, not a prefix. An empty value (`--on \"\"`, an unset shell variable) is refused, never treated as absent |\n| `--wide` (`ps`) | off | After each seat's compact row, print the per-seat facts the manager already records: model pin (and variant), `cwd`, `pid`, spawner, lifecycle uid, and the owning manager's instance id and host. A fact the manager did not record (no model pinned, or a runtime that owns no real process) prints nothing, never a placeholder |\n| `--json` (`ps`) | off | Machine-readable: one JSON object per seat per line, exactly the row the manager sent. Instance headers and errors go to stderr, so stdout is pure rows. Mutually exclusive with `--wide` |\n| `--no-reconnect` (`attach`) | off | End the attach when its session ends, instead of re-establishing it. For scripts that want one run and one exit code |\n\nThese are operator clients over the running manager's control plane. `ps` prints two facts per\nmanaged agent, because they answer different questions: the process fact from the manager's own\nruntime handle (`running` with its uptime, or `exited` with how long it ran), and the mesh fact from\nthe roster (`idle` / `working` / `waiting` / `mesh offline`, or `not in roster` when the seat has no\npresence row at all: a seat that has not joined yet, or one that never did). A seat can be `running` and `mesh offline` at once: the process is alive and\nits presence has lapsed. On a user-auth mesh `ps` also renders each managed agent's last\ncredential-refresh outcome, fail-closed.\n\n**Mode split (chosen up front, never try-scatter-then-degrade):**\n\n- **Static / open mesh.** Bare `ps` is a **class scatter**: it freezes the live manager class from\n  the records registry, merges every registered instance's agents grouped and attributed per\n  instance, and a non-answering instance is shown as `registered, no answer within the deadline`\n  (never silently omitted). That label is the whole claim: the instance is registered and did not\n  answer. It does not say the host is down, because a dead host never deregisters itself and a\n  live one can be slow; if it is gone, deregister it.\n  `--on <instance>` pins the read to one exact instance id instead. A wrong pin fails loud\n  rather than falling through: a well-formed id that no live manager carries is reported as\n  `manager instance <id> did not answer` (nothing else is asked), and a credential without that\n  instance's rail is reported as refused by the broker, not as an unresponsive manager. A manager\n  that answers with a refusal is shown with its own cause; \"no manager reachable\" is said only when\n  nothing answered at all. If the scatter's own registry read fails (the freeze or the reconcile),\n  `ps` says the manager registry could not be read rather than pronouncing on the managers, which\n  may all be up.\n\n**`stop` and `attach` route by seat locality.** A seat can only be stopped or attached by the\nmanager actually running it, and the class queue does not know which one that is. So on a\nstatic/open mesh both verbs first ask every registered instance which one hosts the named seat, then\naddress that instance directly. You do not need `--on` for this \u2014 it happens by default.\n\n`--on <instance>` remains the override, for when you already know where the seat lives or the\nlookup itself is degraded. It is also the **only** route on a **user-auth mesh**: a ledger-scoped\nbearer does not hold the registry-read rows the lookup needs, so there the verbs stay on the class\nqueue unless you pin them yourself.\n\nIf the seat is found on no reachable instance, the error says so \u2014 how many managers answered, and\nwhich ones did not \u2014 rather than reporting a bare `no agent <name>`. That distinction matters\nbecause a single manager cannot tell \"hosted elsewhere\" from \"does not exist\": it answers\n`not-found` for both.\n- **User-auth mesh.** `cotal ps` reports what **one** manager knows about your agents (an `ep.one`\n  read against the manager's in-memory roster, owner-filtered). It does **not** report other\n  manager instances, and it cannot tell you that one is down \u2014 an unreachable manager is absent\n  from the list, not flagged. Completeness across a multi-manager user-auth space is not claimed.\n  A manager that does not answer fails the command outright (exit non-zero), rather than printing\n  an empty list that could be read as \"no agents\". Your ledger row needs the `admin` scope to\n  reach `ps` at all; `spawn` alone is refused by the broker (the ep tier boundary).\n\n`attach` streams and drives an agent's terminal on the `pty` runtime; detach with the escape key\n(Ctrl-] by default; see [`COTAL_DETACH_KEY`](config.md)). It does so over a one-use, holder-bound\nmesh session ([SPEC](../SPEC.md) \xA713.6): the manager replies with a signed session grant (never a\n`127.0.0.1` URL), the CLI redeems it once over the broker, and the browser console (`cotal console`)\ndrives the same session. `stop` and `attach` need a running manager to talk to. On a static mesh\nthey are cross-agent admin operations. On a user-auth mesh, your own agents (any agent under your\nowner) need only the `spawn` scope; another owner's agent needs `admin` on your ledger row\n([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). Launch detached agents with [`spawn --detach`](#spawn).\n\n**`attach` reconnects when the link dies.** A session lives on a network link, and a laptop that\nsleeps, a VPN that drops or a wifi handover kills it. When that happens `attach` prints\n`[cotal: connection lost, reconnecting]` on stderr and starts asking the manager for a new session:\na fresh grant, a fresh per-session credential, a fresh connection, so every attempt re-runs the same\nauthorization the first attach did. On success it prints `[cotal: reconnected]`, the manager repaints\nthe seat's current screen the way it does for any attach, and you carry on in the same terminal.\nRetries wait 1s, 2s, 5s, 10s, then 30s, for as long as the seat exists. The detach key is read the\nwhole time the loop runs, the waits and the attempts alike, so a reconnect never traps you: press it\nwhile a session is being established and the attach ends there, and a session that lands behind the\npress is handed back to the manager rather than left holding a slot. Everything else you type while\nthere is no session is dropped rather than queued, so keystrokes aimed at a terminal that turned out\nto be frozen, Ctrl-C included, are not delivered to the agent by a reconnect you did not know had\nhappened. That starts before the first session, not at the first reconnect: at a terminal, `attach`\nreads and drops what you type while it is still resolving the mesh, so a key struck at a prompt that\nhas not come up yet does not reach the agent when it does.\n\nWith stdin a **pipe** the contract is the opposite, and deliberately so. `printf 'ls\\n' | cotal\nattach --name web` is a script's input rather than an operator at a frozen screen, so it is buffered\nby the stream and delivered to the seat when the session opens, exactly as it always was. That holds\nin every window, not just before the first session: a pipe keeps buffering across a reconnect too, so\n`tail -f log | cotal attach --name web` does not lose the part of its feed written while the link was\ndown. Only a terminal gets the reader; `--no-reconnect` keeps the old behaviour on both.\n\nIt stops on its own when reconnecting cannot help, and says why: a manager that refuses the attach\nexits non-zero with the manager's own message, and a reconnect that finds the seat no longer there\n(despawned, or its agent exited while the link was down) exits cleanly with `seat <name> is gone`.\nA refusal that could still pass, such as a manager at its session ceiling, is relayed in the\nmanager's own words while the loop keeps trying, once per refusal rather than once per attempt.\nPressing the detach key, or the agent's process exiting while you are attached, ends the attach as\nit always did. `--no-reconnect` turns all of this off and restores the single-session behaviour,\nwhich is what a script wants.\n\nEach reconnect also hands the abandoned session back to the manager, over the first link that can\ncarry the message, so an attach that flaps does not eat the manager's session slots one outage at a\ntime. If that message never gets a link, the attach says so when it ends.\n\nWhich mesh `attach` resolves also decides **whose trust it redeems with**. Redeeming a session grant\nmeans minting a short-lived, session-scoped credential from the space's seed, and that seed comes\nfrom the root the mesh resolved to, never from a `.cotal` found by walking up from whichever\ndirectory you happen to be standing in. The difference is not hypothetical: `~/.cotal` exists on\nevery install because the mesh registry lives there, so a command run anywhere under your home\ndirectory but outside a project used to mint from your home directory's trust and present it to a\nbroker that trusts a different chain, which surfaced as a bare authorization failure that named\nnothing. A directory that does hold another chain for the same space is now reported on the way\npast, and not obeyed:\n\n```text\n! this directory resolves to /Users/you, whose .cotal/auth holds a DIFFERENT trust chain for space \"team\".\n  attach used /Users/you/projects/app, the root this mesh resolved to. The other one is not being used, and is worth a look.\n```\n\nWhen the resolved mesh holds no seed at all, `attach` refuses and names what it resolved, the broker\nand the root, instead of describing a directory it did not use.\n\nTerminal bytes stream over the mesh; the manager's own HTTP/WS face serves the console. That endpoint binds\n**loopback by default**, so nothing is exposed by accident; `cotal up --host <addr>` passes its bind\naddress down, which is what lets you attach to an agent whose manager runs on another machine. A\nbare `cotal supervise` and an embedded manager stay machine-local. Set it directly with\n`supervise --console-host <host>`.\n\nThat address is **recorded on the mesh** and carried forward, because it is a decision rather than\nsomething later commands can work out for themselves (a broker dial address is not a manager bind\naddress). Every later manager launch for the same mesh reuses it \u2014 a same-root `cotal up` repair,\nadopting a preserved or restored listener, a `spawn -f` manifest deploy \u2014 so a manager replacement\ndoes not quietly move a reachable attach face back to loopback. Passing `--host` again overrides it,\nso you can widen or narrow exposure whenever you like; a mesh that never asked stays loopback-only\nand records nothing.\n\nBecause that face carries terminal read and write for every managed agent, it is credentialed in two\ntiers. A mesh caller receives a **ticket** bound to the single agent the manager just authorized,\nsingle-use and short-lived, so one authorized attach can never be re-pointed at someone else's\nagent. The **console token** is the operator's own, reaches every agent, and is printed only to the\nmanager's output. The roster, the live feed, and the PTY stream all answer `401` without one; the\nstatic console shell is served openly, since it describes no agent.\n\n## input\n\n```bash\ncotal input --name <n> --text <text> [--no-enter] [--on <instance>] [--space <s>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Which manager to reach |\n| `--name <n>` | | Managed agent to type into (required) |\n| `--text <text>` | | The text to type, taken verbatim (required) |\n| `--no-enter` | off | Type the text and stop there, without pressing Enter |\n| `--on <instance>` | class anycast | Pin to one manager instance id, exactly as [`attach`](#ps-stop-attach) |\n\nTypes one line into a running agent's terminal, as if you had typed it there, and returns. This is\nthe half of [`attach`](#ps-stop-attach) that a program wants: `attach` is a live stream that holds a\nsession open and expects a terminal on your side, so a script, a cron job or a web UI cannot use it\nto send a single line. `input` is one authorized call.\n\nWhat it is for is **harness commands**. A line beginning with `/` is not chat and not a message: it\nis something the agent's own harness handles, and the only way in is the keyboard.\n\n```bash\ncotal input --name reviewer --text \"/compact\"          # ask the harness to compact its context\ncotal input --name reviewer --text \"/model opus\"       # switch its model\ncotal input --name reviewer --text \"hold on that PR\"   # ordinary typing works too\n```\n\n**Quoting.** `--text` takes a value, so a payload starting with `/` survives as written. A payload\nstarting with a dash needs the `=` form, because the shell-style `--text --foo` is ambiguous and is\nrefused rather than guessed:\n\n```bash\ncotal input --name reviewer --text=--verbose          # dash-leading text: use --text=<value>\n```\n\nEnter is pressed by default, since a command typed but never submitted has not been delivered.\n`--no-enter` types the text and leaves it sitting at the prompt, which is how you stage a line and\nsend it later.\n\nNothing comes back but a delivery receipt (`\u2713 sent 9 bytes to reviewer`, counting the trailing\ncarriage return). Whatever the agent does next shows up where its output already goes: the mesh, its\ntranscript, or an `attach`.\n\n**This one is operator-only, and more narrowly than `stop` or `attach`.** Those two are granted to\nanything holding `spawn`, so an agent can stop and attach to seats under its own owner. `input` is\nnot: it is granted only to operator credentials, which on a user-auth mesh means your ledger row\nneeds the `admin` scope, the same scope [`ps`](#ps-stop-attach) already needs there. The reason is\nthat a write into a terminal is control of whatever is running in it, and on a user-auth mesh the\nown-owner rule covers every seat under you, not only the ones you launched: a `spawn`-scoped agent\ncould otherwise type into a sibling it never started. Seat locality is still resolved for you.\n\nOnly the `pty` runtime can be typed into. The external terminal runtimes (`tmux`, `cmux`, `orca`,\n`herdr`) attach to a process they do not own, so they have no input stream for it and the command\nrefuses by name rather than dropping the keystroke.\n\n## personas\n\n```bash\ncotal personas list [-v] [--running]\ncotal personas show <name>\ncotal personas edit <name>\ncotal personas new <name> (--prompt <t> | --from <f>) [--role <r>] [--model <m>]\ncotal personas rm <name> --force\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Which mesh's persona catalog |\n| `--role <r>` | \u2014 | `new`: the persona's role |\n| `--model <m>` | \u2014 | `new`: the persona's model |\n| `--prompt <t>` | \u2014 | `new`: the persona's prompt text |\n| `--from <f>` | \u2014 | `new`: seed the prompt from a file |\n| `--verbose`, `-v` | off | `list`: include role / model / description |\n| `--running` | off | `list`: mark personas live on the mesh |\n| `--force` | \u2014 | `rm`: required, delete without prompting |\n\nPersonas are the local agent files under `.cotal/agents/` that `cotal spawn` launches. See\n[Agent files](agent-files.md) for the file format.\n\n## supervise\n\n```bash\ncotal supervise [--runtime <name>] [--space <s>] [--server <url>] [--spawn <names>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` | this folder's auth space | Space to supervise |\n| `--server <url>` | hosting mesh, or matching registered mesh | Broker URL. A registered mesh supplies it when omitted; a different explicit value is refused. |\n| `--runtime <name>` | `pty` | Agent runtime (`pty` built in; extension runtimes are explicit-only) |\n| `--console-port <n>` | \u2014 | Protocol-console port |\n| `--console-host <host>` | loopback | Bind host for the console + attach endpoint. Loopback keeps it machine-local; `cotal up` passes the address it bound the broker to, which is what lets `cotal attach` reach this manager from another machine |\n| `--roster <file>` | \u2014 | Declarative roster to boot at startup |\n| `--launch <spec>` | \u2014 | Resolved manifest launch spec (from `up -f` / `spawn -f`) |\n| `--spawn <names>` | \u2014 | Comma-separated personas to pre-spawn at startup |\n\nThe manager is the agent supervisor and control plane: it answers `spawn --detach`, `stop`, `ps`,\n`attach`, and the `cotal_*` manager tools. `cotal up --detach` starts one for you; run `supervise`\ndirectly to recover a dead manager or drive a custom runtime. Default runtime is `pty`; install an\noptional provider first (`cotal ext add @cotal-ai/orca`, `@cotal-ai/tmux`, `@cotal-ai/cmux`, or `@cotal-ai/herdr`) and\nselect it explicitly. A missing provider or app fails loudly; there is no fallback. See [Deploy](deploy.md).\n\nA `meshes add --mode user` entry is a **participant** registration, not hosting authority. A\nparticipant may run `supervise` only when the host advertises the remote manager authority service\nand the signed-in actor has the dedicated `supervise` ledger scope. The CLI obtains the closed,\nloopback-only `manager-service` view; `spawn` and `admin` do not substitute for that scope. The\nhost issues the manager's public-nkey JWT material through its lifecycle-bound prepare \u2192 activate\n\u2192 renew protocol, never by handing the participant a signer or static provisioner credential.\n\nWithout that advertised host service or scope, `supervise` refuses before it starts a manager.\nRun `cotal spawn` without `--detach` to launch a foreground agent, or ask the space host to enable\nthe authority service and grant `supervise` for detached agents. If a running remote manager loses\nrenewal, it reports degraded state and refuses unsafe new starts and restarts; live agents are not\nsilently replaced. Do not run `cotal down` or `cotal up` on a participant machine to repair this\ncondition.\n\n## reconcile-gate\n\n```bash\ncotal reconcile-gate [--space <s>] [--server <url>] [--endpoint <e>] [--instance <id>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` | this folder's auth space | Space the frozen gate lives in |\n| `--server <url>` | the local mesh | Broker URL |\n| `--endpoint <e>` | `manager` | Endpoint whose gate is frozen |\n| `--instance <id>` | this folder's persisted manager instance | Instance id |\n\n**When you need this.** A manager restart killed partway through \u2014 after it began deregistering,\nbefore the new incarnation finished \u2014 leaves the endpoint's issuance gate *frozen*, held by a\nprocess that no longer exists. The freeze is what stops two incarnations serving at once, which is\ncorrect. The successor manager now completes that dead registration itself on boot, using the same\nguard this command uses: it acts only when the freeze-holder is affirmatively gone under a complete\nCONNZ sweep (`gone` and `sweepComplete=true`), then abort-reopens the gate at generation+1 with\nprocessEpoch unchanged and continues the normal takeover. Live, unknown, unestablishable, and\nwrong-op-kind still refuse; there is no TTL.\n\nUse this command when that boot path cannot run \u2014 the delivery daemon is down, you are repairing a\nnon-manager endpoint, or you want to lift the freeze without starting a manager. It checks that the\nholder really is gone, prints what it found, and then finishes the dead operation exactly as the\ninterrupted restart would have: revoke the old credentials, evict their holders with verification,\nand reopen the gate.\n\n**It refuses far more often than it acts, on purpose**, and always says which check stopped it:\n\n| Refusal | What it means | What to do |\n|---|---|---|\n| `holder-alive` | The freeze-holder still has a live connection \u2014 a manager *is* running | Stop that process first. Reconciling would evict a live manager's credentials |\n| `holder-unknown` | The connection sweep could not prove the holder absent | Not safe to proceed: an unprovable holder is treated as a live one. Re-run once the broker answers completely |\n| `liveness-unestablishable` | The delivery daemon could not be asked at all | Start it (`cotal up` runs it) and re-run. Silence is never read as death |\n| `not-frozen` / `no-gate` | The gate is open, or there is no gate at that coordinate | Nothing to repair \u2014 check `--endpoint` / `--instance` |\n| `wrong-op-kind` | Frozen under a takeover or retirement, not a registration | Out of scope for this command; it will not reinterpret another operation's intent |\n| `eviction-unverified` | The holder looked gone but eviction could not be verified | The gate is left frozen, unchanged. Investigate the broker before retrying |\n| `raced` | A newer manager moved the gate mid-repair | Re-run `cotal doctor` and look again |\n\nThere is no `--force`, and no path that discards gate state: the only way this reopens a gate is by\nproving the holder is gone and then completing the operation properly.\n\n## deregister-instance\n\n```bash\ncotal deregister-instance [--space <s>] [--server <url>] [--endpoint <e>] [--instance <id>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` | this folder's auth space | Space the instance is registered in |\n| `--server <url>` | the local mesh | Broker URL |\n| `--endpoint <e>` | `manager` | Endpoint the instance serves |\n| `--instance <id>` | this folder's persisted manager instance | Instance id, the whole id as `cotal ps` prints it |\n\n**When you need this.** The service registry records *registration*, not liveness, and nothing in\nthe model expires a row. A manager that stops cleanly removes its own registration. One whose host\ndied without writing anything cannot, so its record goes on claiming a live instance forever: every\nclass scatter in that space freezes the dead slot in, and `cotal ps`, `stop` and `attach` each pay\ntheir whole deadline waiting for a machine that is never coming back. A laptop that was reimaged, a\ncontainer that was deleted, a box that will not be back on the network: those registrations have no\nother exit.\n\nThis command is that exit. It asks the instance first, and it removes a record only when the broker\naffirms the instance's own rail is empty: nothing subscribed there. Then it deletes the\nregistration's two records keys, each pinned to the revision it read, and prints what it removed.\n\n**Silence alone never passes.** An unanswered describe is what a dead host, a wedged process and a\nslow one all look like, and a hung process still holds its subscriptions, so the broker sees\ninterest on its rail. That instance is refused and the observation is printed. A dead process holds\nno connection and therefore no subscription, so a real corpse is still removed.\n\n**It refuses rather than guesses**, and says which check stopped it:\n\n| Refusal | What it means | What to do |\n|---|---|---|\n| `instance-answered` | The instance answered a pinned describe. It is alive | Nothing to repair. If it is wedged rather than gone, stop the process first; its own clean stop removes the record |\n| `instance-not-affirmed-gone` | It did not answer, and the broker did not report its rail empty, which is what a held subscription looks like: slow or hung, not affirmed gone | Nothing was removed. Stop the process; its record goes on its own clean stop, or re-run this once it is down |\n| `liveness-unestablishable` | The probe itself failed, so nothing was learned | Fix the probe's path (credential, broker) and re-run. A probe that could not run is never read as death |\n| `not-registered` | No registration at that coordinate | Check `--instance` and `--endpoint`. This takes the whole id, never a prefix |\n| `superseded` | The record moved between the read and the delete | Something is writing to it. Nothing was removed; re-observe before retrying |\n\nThere is no `--force` and no sweep: silence is not death, and a rule that removed rows on silence\nwould eventually remove a live instance that was merely slow. An operator names one instance, the\nbroker's verdict on its rail is what authorizes the removal, and the guard's job is to show them\nthey named a dead one. Removal is not a one way door either. The same instance re-registers over\nthe tombstone on its next start, under the same identity.\n\n## runtimes\n\n```bash\ncotal runtimes\n```\n\nLists every agent runtime the manager can spawn through: the built-in `pty`, the official providers\n(`orca`, `tmux`, `cmux`, `herdr`), and any custom provider installed via `cotal ext add`. Each installed\nprovider is probed so you can see what is actually reachable on this machine before selecting it:\n\n```\npty    built in\norca   installed \xB7 reachable   @cotal-ai/orca\ntmux   available \xB7 cotal ext add @cotal-ai/tmux\ncmux   available \xB7 cotal ext add @cotal-ai/cmux\nherdr  available \xB7 cotal ext add @cotal-ai/herdr\n```\n\n`installed \xB7 reachable` / `unreachable` is the provider's own `available()` probe; `available` means\nit is a known runtime you can add with the shown command. Selecting an unknown or uninstalled runtime\nvia `up`/`spawn --runtime <name>` fails loud and, for a known one, points at the exact `cotal ext add`\npackage \u2014 there is no silent fallback to `pty`.\n\n## send\n\n```bash\ncotal send dm <agent> \"<text>\"   [--space <s>] [--server <url>] [--creds <path>]\ncotal send msg <channel> \"<text>\"\ncotal send ask <role> \"<text>\"\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Which mesh, and (off-registry) which credential |\n\nOne-shot messaging: connect, send a single direct message (`dm`), channel post (`msg`), or role\nask/anycast (`ask`), then exit. For a running conversation, agents use the mesh tools instead\n([MCP tools](mcp-tools.md)).\n\n## channels\n\n```bash\ncotal channels list\ncotal channels set <name> [--replay | --no-replay] [--window <n>] [--desc <s>] [--instructions <s>]\ncotal channels default --replay | --no-replay\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Target mesh |\n| `--replay` / `--no-replay` | \u2014 | `set`/`default`: replay history to new joiners, or not |\n| `--window <n>` | \u2014 | `set`: replay window size |\n| `--desc <s>` | \u2014 | `set`: one-line channel description |\n| `--instructions <s>` | \u2014 | `set`: instructions shown to joiners |\n\nInspects and edits the channel registry: replay policy, description, and joiner instructions. ACL\nsemantics (who may read or post) are set at mint / provision time, not here; see\n[Channels and permissions](channels-and-permissions.md). On a user-auth mesh, `list` rides your\nown login as is; `set` and `default` edit the registry over a short-lived\nchannel-writer view, which needs ledger scope `admin` ([Identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)).\n\n\n## history\n\n```bash\ncotal history clear --force [--dms] [--space <s>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Target mesh |\n| `--dms` | off | Also clear DM history |\n| `--force` | \u2014 | Required: clear without prompting |\n\nPurges retained channel history; `--dms` extends it to direct-message history. An alias of\n[`clean history`](#clean). On a user-auth mesh the purge rides a short-lived purger view over\nyour login, which needs ledger scope `admin` ([Identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)).\n\n## console\n\n```bash\ncotal console [--plain] [--space <s>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Space to watch |\n| `--plain` | off | Line stream instead of the TUI |\n\nA live protocol view for a space: a lazygit-style TUI, or a plain line stream on `--plain`. On a\nuser-auth mesh it rides the read-only admin view over your login, which needs ledger scope\n`admin`. See [Watch a mesh](watch-a-mesh.md).\n\n## web\n\n```bash\ncotal web [--detach] [--port <n>] [--no-open] [--space <s>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Space to serve |\n| `--port <n>` | `7799` | HTTP port |\n| `--detach` | off | Run in the background; stop with `cotal down web` or bare `cotal down` |\n| `--no-open` | off | Don't open the browser |\n\nThe browser observability dashboard: presence, channels, and a live feed. It is **not** part of\n`cotal up`: it ships inside `cotal-ai` as the `@cotal-ai/web` extension, seeded automatically on first\nrun (like the built-in connectors) so it always matches your CLI version. It self-registers `cotal web`\ninto this surface and serves\n`http://cotal.localhost:7799` (loopback; `*.localhost` resolves in Chrome/Firefox/Edge; Safari may\nneed `http://127.0.0.1:7799`). On a user-auth mesh the dashboard rides the read-only admin view\nover your login, and a channel purge asks for its own channel-purger view per click; both need\nledger scope `admin`. Detached mode re-execs the current Cotal installation, writes diagnostics to\nthe mesh root's `.cotal/web.log`, and reports success only after the HTTP server answers. It requires\na recorded mesh root, but can be launched from any directory once `cotal up` has recorded the mesh.\nSee [Watch a mesh](watch-a-mesh.md).\n\n## mint\n\n```bash\ncotal mint <name> [--profile <agent|observer|admin>] [--out <path>] [--signer]\ncotal mint <name> --provision [--role <role>] [--space <s>] [--server <url>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--profile <agent\\|observer\\|admin>` | `agent` | Credential profile |\n| `--out <path>` | `.cotal/auth/creds/<name>.creds` | Output path |\n| `--signer` | off | Emit a stripped account-signing file instead |\n| `--force` | off | With `--signer`: overwrite an existing file |\n| `--allow-subscribe <a,b>` | the agent file's, else subscribe | Read-ACL override, **agent profile only**: `observer` and `admin` carry a fixed read set, and `mint` refuses this flag there rather than narrowing nothing |\n| `--allow-publish <a,b>` | the agent file's, else deny | Post-ACL override, **agent profile only** |\n| `--role <role>` | the agent file's | Agent profile: the anycast task queue the identity pulls (`svc_<role>`) |\n| `--provision` | off | Agent profile: also pre-create the identity's bind-only DM/deliver durables (and its role's task queue) on the live mesh, so the credential can consume |\n| `--space <s>`, `--server <url>` | the resolved mesh | With `--provision`: which mesh to provision on |\n\nMints a NATS creds file for a space in **static** auth mode, scoped to a profile and (optionally)\nexplicit read/post ACLs. `--signer` emits an account-signing file for delegating minting to another\nhost. A per-user-auth space refuses `mint`: agents there join under a logged-in user\n([`login`](#login-logout) + [`actor grant`](#actor)), never via a handed-out creds file. See\n[Identity and auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\nA plain mint is creds only: the identity can publish within its post ACL at once, but on an authed\nmesh its DM inbox and task queue are provisioner-pre-created and bind-only, so a **consuming**\nconnect fails until they exist. `--provision` performs that pre-create in the same command (a\nprovisioner cred is minted from the space's trust material, used, and dropped), so a long-running\nclient you start yourself can receive DMs and role anycasts like a spawned seat. The command prints\nthe identity's principal (its wire id) and lifecycle uid; a consuming client passes that uid as its\n`lifecycleUid`. Agent profile only; an open mesh needs none of this (peers self-create there). The\nmesh it provisions on must be the one this folder's auth is for - same space and same account key -\nso `--provision` can never quietly mint under another root's trust material.\n\n## login, logout\n\n```bash\ncotal login --idp <auth base URL> [--client-id <id>]\ncotal logout --idp <auth base URL>\n```\n\nSigns you in to a per-user-auth mesh's IdP (device code flow) and caches the session; run it\nonce per machine. It prints your IdP subject, the id the operator grants against. After a\nlogin, every command on that mesh works under your identity: each connect takes a fresh IdP\nproof, exchanges it locally for a short-lived bearer, and is authorized against the actor\nledger at connect time. `logout` revokes the IdP session and clears the cache. See\n[identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\n## actor\n\n```bash\n# an upsert of the WHOLE row: a flag left off is the WIDE default below, not \"unchanged\"\ncotal actor grant <actor> --sub <IdP subject> [--scope a,b] [--allow-subscribe a,b] [--allow-publish a,b] [--role <r>] [--label <l>]\ncotal actor revoke <actor> (--sub <IdP subject> | --owner <u_\u2026>)\ncotal actor list\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` | the folder's | Space whose ledger to manage |\n| `--sub <subject>` | \u2014 | The IdP subject (shown by `cotal login`) the actor belongs to |\n| `--owner <u_\u2026>` | \u2014 | The derived owner token (alternative to `--sub`) |\n| `--scope <a,b>` | `spawn,role:default` | Capability scope (`''` = none; `spawn` = may run agents; `role:<r>` = may delegate role r; `admin` = cross-agent control; `supervise` = eligible for the closed remote manager-service view when the host enables it) |\n| `--allow-subscribe <a,b>` | `>` (all channels) | Channel read ACL; the user's envelope, their agents can never read beyond it |\n| `--allow-publish <a,b>` | `>` (all channels) | Channel post ACL; also the envelope for their agents' posting |\n| `--role <r>` | \u2014 | Role (scopes the task-queue consumer) |\n| `--label <l>` | \u2014 | Display label for `actor list` (never the IdP subject) |\n\nThe actor ledger is the single authorization source of a user-auth space: no row, no access.\nA bare `grant` is the **full** envelope (all channels, may spawn); the flags narrow it. A\nre-grant **replaces the whole row**, not the one field you name, so to add a capability spell\nevery field out: the new scope plus the row's current read set, post set, role and label\n(`cotal actor list` shows what a row holds). A field left off does not stay as it was, it\nreverts to the wide default in the table above, which is how a narrow reader becomes a reader\nof every channel. `supervise` is separate from `spawn` and `admin`: it only makes a signed-in\nperson eligible for the host-provided closed remote manager-service view; it does not grant\nmanagement of another owner or a general host profile. `revoke` denies the next exchange and\nthe next connect with no restart, and evicts the principal's live connections. Managed-agent rows\n(written by the spawn path) live in a disjoint row space this command never touches. See\n[identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\n## doctor\n\n```bash\ncotal doctor auth [--fix]\n```\n\nCredential-health diagnosis and repair for this folder's mesh: renders every managed\ncredential as healthy / near-expiry / expired and ends in `healthy` or the exact next\ncommand; `--fix` applies the repairs it can. The one surface every stale-credential error\npoints at.\n\n## join\n\n```bash\ncotal join --space <s> --name <n> [--role <r>] [--channel <c>]\ncotal join --link <url> | --token <t>\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--space <s>` / `--server <url>` / `--creds <path>` | resolved mesh | Which mesh, and which credential |\n| `--name <n>` | \u2014 | Your presence name |\n| `--role <r>` | \u2014 | Your role |\n| `--channel <c>` | \u2014 | Channel to join |\n| `--kind <k>` | `agent` | Endpoint kind |\n| `--link <url>` | \u2014 | Join link (`cotal://\u2026`) |\n| `--token <t>` | \u2014 | Join token |\n| `--lifecycle-uid <uid>` | \u2014 | Required with `--creds`: the lifecycle UID minted alongside the credential (`COTAL_LIFECYCLE_UID` works too). A credential's durable grants name exact lifecycle-keyed resources, so `join` refuses to invent one |\n| `--tls` | off | Connect over TLS |\n\nAn interactive presence: join a space under your own name and role, without launching an agent\nharness. A `--link` or `--token` supplies the where and the auth in one value. See\n[Spaces](spaces.md) and [Identity and auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\n## Manifest deploys\n\nA `cotal.yaml` manifest declares a whole mesh (channels, personas, roles, and ACLs) in one file.\nThree commands consume it, plus a read-only validator:\n\n```bash\ncotal up -f cotal.yaml         # boot a fresh mesh from the manifest\ncotal spawn -f cotal.yaml      # deploy the manifest additively onto a running mesh\ncotal down -f cotal.yaml       # tear that deploy down (or --run <id> for one run)\ncotal topology view -f cotal.yaml   # validate + view the access graph, change nothing\n```\n\n`up -f` and `spawn -f` differ in target: `up -f` brings up a new broker and applies the manifest;\n`spawn -f` requires an already-reachable mesh and applies additively (ownership-scoped). On a\nuser-auth mesh, `spawn -f` deploys over your own login (the deployer view, gated on ledger scope\n`spawn`): the manifest's agents land under your owner, a manifest claiming another owner is\nrefused, and seeding new channels additionally needs scope `admin`. Both take\n`--dry-run` to print the plan without mutating anything. `topology` validates the manifest and\nrenders its channel / role / ACL graph. See [Define a team](define-a-team.md) and the\n[manifest reference](manifest.md).\n\n## ext\n\n```bash\ncotal ext                 # same as `list`\ncotal ext add <npm-package>\ncotal ext remove <name>\ncotal ext list\ncotal ext root            # print just the install prefix (scriptable)\ncotal ext seed [--repair|--reset|--force]\n```\n\nOperator-installed extensions: `add` installs an npm package into a cotal-owned prefix and records\nevery registry provider it contributes. Commands appear in help, completion, and dispatch; runtime\nproviders are lazy-loaded by commands such as `supervise`; local process providers participate in\n`status` and selective `down`. `remove` and `list` manage them. The `@cotal-ai/web` dashboard is the\ncanonical command/process example. Installed packages and their location are described in\n[config](config.md).\n\nBare `cotal ext` lists the inventory, headed by the install prefix. That prefix is a cotal-owned npm\nroot kept **separate** from npm's own global tree, so these packages never show up in `npm list -g` \u2014\n`cotal ext` (or the Extensions section of `cotal status`) is the canonical inventory. `cotal ext root`\nprints only the path, for scripts. The versions shown are the manifest pin recorded at add time.\n\nRemoving an extension that owns a running local process is refused with the mesh root and its\n`cotal down <component>` command; stop it first so uninstalling the package never strands a process\nwhose lifecycle provider is gone.\n\n### Built-in connectors are seeded extensions\n\nThe first-party agent connectors (`claude`, `opencode`, `codex`, `hermes`, `jcode`, `pi`) are not compiled into\nthe binary. They are seeded on first run through the **same** `ext add` path a third party uses, and\nappear in `cotal ext list` like any other extension. So you can remove one you do not want\n(`cotal ext remove @cotal-ai/connector-hermes`), and a deliberately-removed connector STAYS removed\nacross upgrades. `cotal ext add <your-package>` adds a third-party connector the same way. The web\ndashboard (`@cotal-ai/web`, providing `command:web`) is the seventh built-in seeded on the same path.\n\n`cotal ext seed` is the maintenance entry for that seeding (it runs automatically on the first real\ncommand of each boot, so you rarely call it):\n\n| Flag | Meaning |\n|---|---|\n| (none) | Reconcile: seed any never-seeded built-in, refresh a seeded one whose version the binary bumped, leave a removed one removed. A no-op once current. |\n| `--repair` | Recover after an interrupted seed or a lost authority (rebuilds the interrupted connector; restores the removed-vs-never-seeded record from its durable backup). |\n| `--reset` | Discard the record and re-seed all seven built-ins (the six connectors plus the web dashboard). **Resurrects any you removed.** Rebuilds cleanly over corrupt seed state. |\n| `--force` | Re-seed the built-ins even when the version stamp is current or a downgrade. |\n\nThe default connector for a bare `cotal spawn` (no `--agent`) is `claude`; set `COTAL_DEFAULT_AGENT`\n(e.g. `opencode`) to change it. An `--agent` naming a removed connector fails loud with the exact\n`cotal ext add` to restore it. Set `COTAL_SKIP_CONNECTOR_SEED=1` to turn off the automatic first-run\nseed/refresh entirely (for a controlled or offline setup that manages connectors by hand); `cotal ext\nseed` still runs on request.\n\n## completion\n\n```bash\ncotal completion <bash|zsh|fish|powershell>   # print a stub to eval / source\ncotal completion install [shell]              # install it persistently\n```\n\nPrints or installs shell completion. Completion candidates come from each command's declared flags\nand, where useful, live mesh state (spaces, personas, managed agents) resolved offline.\n\n## feedback\n\n```bash\ncotal feedback \"<summary>\" [--type <t>] [--email <e>] [--details <text>]\n```\n\n| Flag | Default | Meaning |\n|---|---|---|\n| `--type <t>` | \u2014 | `bug` \\| `idea` \\| `friction` \\| `praise` \\| `other` |\n| `--details <text>` | \u2014 | Longer free-form details |\n| `--severity <s>` | \u2014 | `low` \\| `medium` \\| `high` |\n| `--area <a>` | \u2014 | The part of Cotal this concerns |\n| `--email <e>` | git email | Contact email (required on the keyless public path) |\n| `--name <n>` | \u2014 | Your name (optional) |\n| `--url <url>` | keyed / public intake | Intake URL override |\n| `--key <k>` | `COTAL_FEEDBACK_KEY` | Feedback key |\n\nSends feedback to the Cotal developers. With a key (`--key` / `COTAL_FEEDBACK_KEY`) it routes to the\nkeyed beta intake; without one it goes to the public `cotal.ai` intake and requires a contact email\n(`--email` / `COTAL_FEEDBACK_EMAIL`, else your git email). Run a self-hosted intake with\n[`feedback-intake`](#server-daemons).\n\n## Server daemons\n\nTwo long-lived infra roles ship with the CLI. They are not part of everyday operation; the delivery\ndaemon comes up automatically with `cotal up --detach` in auth mode.\n\n```bash\ncotal deliver --space <s> [--server <url>] [--creds <file>]\ncotal auth-service --space <s> --server <url> [--port <n>] [--exchange-public-port <n>] [--exchange-public-url <https://\u2026>] [--exchange-trusted-proxy]\ncotal feedback-intake --keys <keys.json> [--port <n>] [--creds <file>]\n```\n\n`auth-service` runs a user-auth space's identity plane: the NATS auth callout, the\ncapability-gated local exchange and JWKS, and, when `--exchange-public-port` is set, the closed public\nexchange/discovery face forwarded by an HTTPS reverse proxy. `--exchange-public-url` is the proxy URL\nadvertised to clients; `--exchange-trusted-proxy` opts into last-hop `X-Forwarded-For` attribution.\n`cotal up --user-auth` starts and supervises the service for you, so you run it directly only to\nrecover one by hand.\n\n`deliver` runs the server-side Plane-3 delivery daemon: the durable backstop and membership/ACL\nauthority. It is auth-mode-only and single-instance (`--shard`/`--shards` accept only `N=1`);\n`--dev-mint` mints a scoped cred from the local signer for standalone dev. See the\n[delivery daemon](delivery-daemon.md). `feedback-intake` runs a self-hosted feedback server\n(requires `--keys` and a scoped `--creds`), announcing submissions into a space channel; flags\ninclude `--host`/`--port`, `--store`, `--space`/`--channel`, `--max-bytes`, and `--rate-limit`.\n\n## Plumbing\n\n`cotal __complete <words\u2026>` is the internal entry the shell-completion stubs call to emit candidates\nfor the current command line; you never run it directly. `cotal agent-bearer` is machine-facing\nplumbing on user-auth meshes: spawned agents exec it to print a fresh short-lived bearer from their\nspawn-time secret; you never run it directly either. Its local arm uses `--dir` to discover the\ncapability-gated loopback service. A remotely enrolled, already-granted agent instead receives\n`--exchange-url <https://base>` in its launch argv: that arm sends `{owner, actor, actorToken}` to the\npinned public exchange with no local capability, follows no redirects, and refuses every non-HTTPS\nURL because the actor token is the credential in the request body. (`cotal start` is a removed tombstone: it\nerrors and points you to `cotal spawn --detach`.)\n"
     },
     {
       "slug": "config",
       "title": "Configuration & environment",
       "kind": "Reference: describes the TypeScript reference implementation (the `cotal` CLI and connectors), not the wire contract.",
       "summary": "Three things configure a Cotal workstation: the config file (per-connector settings, notably which of your MCP servers get shared with spawned agents), a set of COTAL environment variables, and the\u2026",
-      "body": '# Configuration & environment\n\n> **Reference**: describes the TypeScript reference implementation (the `cotal` CLI and connectors), not the wire contract. \xB7 **For:** operators \xB7 **Wire contract:** [SPEC](../SPEC.md)\n\nThree things configure a Cotal workstation: the **config file** (per-connector settings, notably\nwhich of your MCP servers get shared with spawned agents), a set of **`COTAL_*` environment\nvariables**, and the **on-disk layout** under a project\'s `.cotal/` and your machine\'s `~/.cotal`.\nNone of these are part of the wire contract; they configure the reference implementation only.\n\n## The config file\n\nThe cotal config file carries per-connector launch settings. It is layered from two locations,\nmost-specific-wins:\n\n| Layer | Path | Scope |\n|---|---|---|\n| Base | `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/cotal/config.json` (else `~/.config/cotal/config.json`; `%APPDATA%\\Cotal\\config.json` on Windows) | Operator-level, every space |\n| Override | `<project-root>/.cotal/config.json` | Space-local |\n\nThey merge per connector and per server name: a server in the space-local file replaces the\nsame-named server in the operator-level file; connectors or servers present in only one side are\nkept. A missing file is empty (valid); malformed JSON or a non-object top level is a loud error.\n\nIt carries two things: which of your personal MCP servers a connector should **share** with the\nagents it spawns, and an optional `spawn.env` allow-list that confines what a spawned agent\'s\nprocess environment contains (see [Environment variables](#environment-variables) below; the default\nis that the agent inherits yours).\n\nThe sharing half: By default a spawned agent gets none: the Claude connector launches with\n`--strict-mcp-config`, dropping every ambient MCP server (they are heavy and useless to a meshed\nteammate). This file is the explicit opt-in.\n\n```json\n{\n  "connectors": {\n    "claude": {\n      "mcpServers": {\n        "github": {\n          "command": "npx",\n          "args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],\n          "env": { "GITHUB_TOKEN": "${GITHUB_TOKEN}" }\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\nEach server is written in the de-facto `.mcp.json` shape, so you can copy an entry straight out of\nyour own Claude / VS Code / Cursor config. Secrets ride as **`${VAR}` references** (also\n`${VAR:-default}`), resolved from your environment at launch and forwarded to the child **by name**\n(never as literals) so the file stays safe to keep in `~/.config` or a gitignored `.cotal/`. Only\n`command`, `args`, `env`, `url`, and `headers` are expanded; any other key passes through verbatim.\n\n**`--share-tools` interplay**. The per-spawn selection narrows what this config declares:\n\n| `--share-tools` | Result |\n|---|---|\n| (flag absent) | Every server declared for the connector |\n| `none` or empty | Nothing |\n| `a,b` | Only those named: each **must** be declared, or the spawn fails (no silent drop) |\n\nToday only the `claude` connector consumes shared MCP servers; OpenCode inherits config through its\nown merge layer and Hermes has no MCP. See [Connect Claude Code](connect-claude.md) for the full\nsharing model.\n\n## Environment variables\n\nThese are the operator-facing variables. Most of the connector-session ones (space, name, role, \u2026)\nare set **for you** by `cotal spawn` / the manager when they launch an agent; you set them by hand\nonly when you drive a connector session yourself (e.g. your own `claude` with the plugin) or a custom\nlauncher. Comma-separated lists are trimmed.\n\n| Variable | Consumed by | Meaning | Default |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `COTAL_SPACE` | connector session | Space to join | `demo` (or the join link\'s) |\n| `COTAL_NAME` | connector session | Presence name / identity | required (or via `COTAL_AGENT_FILE` / `COTAL_LINK`) |\n| `COTAL_ROLE` | connector session | Role | agent file\'s `role:`, else none |\n| `COTAL_SERVERS` | connector session | Broker URL(s). Hand-driven sessions only: a launcher-spawned seat gets this in its launch material instead (see below) | the default local broker (or the link\'s) |\n| `COTAL_CREDS` | connector session | Path to a NATS creds file (auth mode). Hand-driven sessions only, same as above | none (open mode) |\n| `COTAL_LINK` | connector session | `cotal://token@host/space` join link: supplies server, auth, space | none |\n| `COTAL_AGENT_FILE` | connector session | Path to a persona file: supplies name, role, kind, channels | none |\n| `COTAL_SUBSCRIBE` | connector session | Active channel read set | agent file / link, else `general` |\n| `COTAL_ALLOW_SUBSCRIBE` | connector session | Read ACL (channels the agent *may* read) | = `COTAL_SUBSCRIBE` |\n| `COTAL_ALLOW_PUBLISH` | connector session | Post ACL (channels the agent *may* post to) | deny (empty) |\n| `COTAL_MODEL` | connector session | Model label (display metadata) | agent file\'s `model:`, else none |\n| `COTAL_KIND` | connector session | Endpoint kind | `agent` |\n| `COTAL_TLS` | connector session | Connect over TLS (`1`) | off |\n| `COTAL_TOKEN` | connector session | Auth token (token / open modes) | none |\n| `COTAL_CAPABILITIES` | connector session | Control-plane capabilities (e.g. `spawn`) that gate manager tools | agent file\'s `capabilities:` |\n| `COTAL_QUIET` / `COTAL_MUTED` | connector session | Per-channel attention defaults (never-wake / drop-on-receive) | agent file\'s, else none |\n| `COTAL_CHANNEL` | Claude connector | Force channel wake-nudges on (`1`) / off; set to `1` by the Claude launcher | auto-detect |\n| `COTAL_EVENTS` | connector session | Arm this session\'s event plane (`1`); set by the launcher for `--events` spawns | off |\n| `COTAL_EVENTS_DEFAULT` | manager | Default event plane for managed spawns (`1`) | off |\n| `COTAL_DEFAULT_AGENT` | `cotal spawn` | Default connector type for a bare spawn | `claude` |\n| `COTAL_DEFAULT_PERSONA` | `cotal spawn` | Default persona for a bare spawn | `default` |\n| `COTAL_SKIP_CONNECTOR_SEED` | boot gate | Skip the automatic built-in-connector seed/refresh on a command (`1`); `cotal ext seed` still works | off |\n| `COTAL_DETACH_KEY` | `cotal attach` | Detach escape key (`ctrl-<char>` / `^<char>`) | `ctrl-]` |\n| `COTAL_FEEDBACK_KEY` | `feedback`, connector | Beta feedback key \u2192 keyed intake | none (public intake) |\n| `COTAL_FEEDBACK_EMAIL` | `feedback`, connector | Contact email for the keyless public intake | your git email |\n| `COTAL_FEEDBACK_URL` | `feedback`, connector | Intake URL override (self-hosted) | keyed / public intake |\n| `COTAL_SKIP_ASSIST` | `setup` | Disable the interactive Claude handoff on a failed step (`1`; for CI) | off |\n| `COTAL_COMPLETE_DEBUG` | `completion` | Print completion-resolution errors to stderr | off |\n| `COTAL_SERVE_HEADLESS` | OpenCode runtime | Run the OpenCode server without a foreground TUI (`1`) | off |\n| `COTAL_HOME` | workspace | Override the machine-home dir for the **mesh registry only** (`meshes/`, `current-mesh`, onboard marker). Does **not** redirect project-root paths (`findCotalRoot` / `.cotal/broker-policy.json`, NATS store, manager/delivery state, auth). Tests that run `cotal up` must also use a temp project root with its own `.cotal/` as `cwd` | `~/.cotal` |\n\n> `--console-port` is a `cotal supervise` flag, not an environment variable; there is no\n> `COTAL_CONSOLE_PORT`.\n\n### Set by the launcher, not by you\n\nThese are wired into a spawned child\'s environment by the connector / launcher and read back inside\nthe session. They are not operator knobs; listed so you recognize them in a process listing.\n\n| Variable | Purpose |\n|---|---|\n| `COTAL_ID` | Stable agent id chosen by the launcher (static meshes) |\n| `COTAL_LIFECYCLE_UID` | The incarnation\'s lifecycle UID, minted once per spawn; the session binds its lifecycle-keyed DM/delivery/history consumers by it (its credential pins the same names). Required for an authed launch (`COTAL_CREDS` or user-mode); config parsing fails loud without it. Open mode omits it (the endpoint self-mints per session) |\n| `COTAL_OWNER` / `COTAL_ACTOR` / `COTAL_SENTINEL_CREDS` / `COTAL_BEARER_CMD` | User-auth launch identity: the agent\'s principal, its sentinel creds path, and the exec-able bearer command; all four together, mutually exclusive with `COTAL_CREDS`. A launcher-spawned seat carries them in its launch material instead of its environment. A remote enrollment\'s bearer argv uses `agent-bearer --exchange-url <https://base>`; the token never falls back to a local service file |\n| `COTAL_LAUNCH_MATERIAL` | Path to this launch\'s private 0600 material file (see [Launch material](#launch-material) below). Carries the broker URL, the creds path, the auth token, the user-auth identity, and the control token. A PATH, never a secret |\n| `COTAL_CONTROL_SOCKET` | The session\'s local control endpoint path. The MCP server listens on it and the lifecycle hooks connect to it; the token that authenticates the first frame rides the launch material, not the environment |\n| `COTAL_BRIDGE_SOCKET` / `COTAL_TOOLS_FILE` / `COTAL_PARENT_PID` | Hermes sidecar plumbing (bridge socket, generated tool descriptors, launcher pid to watch) |\n| `OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT` | Inline OpenCode config (the injected cotal plugin, highest merge layer) |\n| `OPENCODE_DB` / `OPENCODE_HOME` / `OPENCODE_PORT` / `OPENCODE_SERVER_URL` / `COTAL_OPENCODE_*` | OpenCode server plumbing (home, port, DB, server URL) |\n\nA spawned agent inherits **your environment**, so a harness you already configured resolves its\nmodel and provider the same way it does when you run it yourself. Cotal resets its own `COTAL_*`\nnames before the child starts, keeping the machine-wide ones (`COTAL_HOME`, the `COTAL_FEEDBACK_*`\nset, `COTAL_DEFAULT_AGENT` / `COTAL_DEFAULT_PERSONA`, the `*_BIN` overrides and the timing knobs).\nThat reset is not a preference setting: a connector supplies the per-session names for each child\nand does so conditionally, so an inherited one would never be overwritten and would hand an agent\nanother agent\'s credential path, ACL, or lifecycle uid. Connection material is not in the\nenvironment at all (see [identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)).\n\nTo confine a spawned agent instead, declare `spawn.env` in the config file:\n\n```json\n{ "spawn": { "env": ["MY_PROVIDER_API_KEY"] } }\n```\n\nThe child then gets a fixed OS allow-list (PATH, HOME, TERM, locale, XDG/Windows config dirs) plus\nexactly the names you list, plus any `${VAR}` a shared MCP server references. An empty array is a\nreal policy, meaning the OS allow-list alone. A space-local `spawn` block replaces the\noperator-level one outright rather than merging, so the narrower file stays narrow.\n\nThree states that look alike are not: no `spawn` block means no allow-list and the agent inherits\nyour environment; `"spawn": { "env": [] }` means the OS allow-list alone; and `"spawn": {}` in a\nspace-local file replaces the operator-level block with nothing, so that space inherits even when\nyour machine-wide file confines. The last one is how a space opts out of machine-wide containment,\nwhich is worth knowing before you write it by accident.\n\nBe honest with yourself about what this buys: `HOME` is forwarded either way, so an agent with a\nshell reads `~/.aws`, `~/.ssh` and `~/.config` regardless. `spawn.env` protects what a file on disk\ncannot hand over anyway, and that is more than a list of secret values. Some variables are **capability\nhandles**: they do not contain a secret, they name a live process that will act on your behalf.\n`SSH_AUTH_SOCK` is the sharp one. Inherit it and the agent can ask your `ssh-agent` to sign, which\nmeans it can reach any host or sign any commit that key authorises, and it keeps that power even\nif the private key file is not on disk at all. Nothing under `~/.ssh` has to exist for it to work,\nso "a shell reads `~/.ssh` regardless" does not cover this case. The same shape covers a\n`gpg-agent` socket and the desktop and cloud credential brokers. So `spawn.env` protects two things:\nsecrets that live **only** in the environment, such as an `aws-vault exec` or `op run` shell or\nCI-injected values, and the capability handles above, which it removes along with everything else\nit does not name. Real containment is still a sandbox or a VM.\n\nModel discovery is the exception, and it is deliberate rather than an oversight. When the `codex` or\n`opencode` connector enumerates a model catalog (`cotal models`, and the manager\'s selector), it runs\nthat harness with your environment minus Cotal\'s own `COTAL_*`, and it does **not** consult\n`spawn.env`. Those probes are short-lived catalog reads rather than agent seats, so an allow-list\nthat confines a seat does not confine them.\n\n### Launch material\n\nA process environment is inherited by every descendant. A seat launched with its credential, its\nbroker URL and its control token in the environment hands all three to the build it runs, the linter,\nthe third-party CLI, the test suite that reads its broker from the environment. Nothing in that chain\nasked for any of it.\n\nSo a launcher-spawned seat does not get them in its environment. The launcher writes them to a single\n**0600 file inside a 0700 private directory** and exports only its path, as `COTAL_LAUNCH_MATERIAL`.\nThe session reads the file once at startup. This is the same shape `cotal agent-bearer` already uses\nfor its spawn-time secret: the material rides a file, never argv (which is visible in a process\nlisting) and never the ambient environment (which is inherited).\n\nThree connectors drop the path once they have read it, so the shells and tools those seats run\ninherit no reference at all: **pi** and **codex**, whose sessions run in the seat process, and\n**OpenCode**, whose seat process is a shim that starts `opencode serve` (the plugin runs in that\nserver, which is also what executes the session\'s tool calls). Those three also **delete the file**\nat the same moment, along with the private directory that held it. Nothing reads it again, so leaving\nit on disk would only extend how long a copy of the material exists. The directory is only removed\nwhen it is provably the one the launcher wrote: the right filename inside, the launcher\'s prefix on\nthe directory, the directory sitting directly in the OS temp root, and a non-recursive removal that\nfails rather than deletes if anything else is in there.\n\nTwo keep it, and for the same reason in both cases: a process that starts LATER has to read it.\n**Claude**\'s readers are short-lived children, the MCP server and one process per lifecycle hook,\nwhich begin after the session is already running. **Hermes**\' launcher starts a gateway child that\nneeds the control token. For those two, a shell the seat runs still inherits a path to the material\nfile, though not the material itself.\n\nWhat this does: the values are out of every descendant\'s environment, so an `env` dump, a CI log, a\nsuite that defaults its broker from the environment, or a tool handed a credential it never asked\nfor, all stop seeing them. What it does not do: hide the material from a process running as the same\nuser that deliberately opens the file. No environment-level control can, and the same is already true\nof `~/.cotal/auth/creds`. What changes is that reaching the material is a deliberate act rather than\nan inheritance nobody chose.\n\nDriving a connector session **by hand** still works the documented way: set `COTAL_CREDS` /\n`COTAL_SERVERS` (and the user-auth quartet) yourself, and no material file is involved. Setting both\na material file and any of them is refused rather than resolved by precedence: one launch carries one\nidentity plane. `COTAL_LINK` counts as one of them, because a join link carries the server, the auth\nand the space in a single string.\n\nThe control endpoint is a pair, and **half a pair is refused**. A launch with a control socket path\nand no resolvable token, or a token and no socket path, does not fall back to running without a\ncontrol plane: it fails with a sentence naming which half is missing. The one exception is the\nlifecycle hook relay, which catches that refusal, writes a single warning to stderr naming no values,\nand then does nothing, because a hook that throws is a hook that blocked the session. Failing open is\ndeliberate; failing open silently is not.\n\n## On-disk layout\n\n### Project: `.cotal/`\n\nA project\'s state lives in `.cotal/` at the mesh root (found by walking up from the cwd, like `.git`).\n**It is gitignored**; it holds secrets and machine-local process state.\n\n| Path | What it is |\n|---|---|\n| `auth/broker.json` | Broker trust material: the operator seed and the system account (secret; the system-account signing seed is stripped before writing). One per broker, shared by every space on it |\n| `auth/account.<key>.json` | One space\'s own NATS data account and signing seed (secret). One file per space, all signed by the broker above; `<key>` is a stable, case-safe hex encoding of the space name (never the raw name, so two case-differing spaces can\'t collide) |\n| `auth/space.<key>/` | One space\'s user-auth state (IdP pin, issuer keys, owner secret, callout account), present only when that space enables per-user auth. Keyed by the same case-safe hex encoding; pre-hex layouts (`auth/<space>/`) are renamed here on first touch |\n| `auth/creds/<name>.creds` | Per-agent minted NATS credentials |\n| `auth/server.conf` | Generated nats-server config for the broker. The core renderer accepts every space on the broker; `cotal up` currently orchestrates one space per root, so it renders that one space\'s account |\n| `broker-policy.json` | Durable broker **launch** policy (TLS-required cert/key path references, or plaintext). Survives `cotal down` so a bare re-`up` cannot silently drop TLS. Under the project root \u2014 **not** under `COTAL_HOME` |\n| `agents/<name>.md` | Persona / agent files ([Agent files](agent-files.md)) |\n| `manifests/<hash>.json` | Manifest-deploy ledger (records of `up -f` / `spawn -f` runs) |\n| `config.json` | Space-local connector config (the override layer above) |\n| `nats.pid` \xB7 `nats.log` | Background nats-server pid + log |\n| `manager.pid` \xB7 `manager.log` | Manager (supervisor) pid + log; `manager.delivery-aware` marks a delivery-aware build. The manager writes the pid itself, whatever started it, and removes it on a clean stop only while it still names that process. A reader treats the record as a running manager only if the pid is alive **and** the process is a supervisor: a recycled pid belonging to something else is reported as a stale record, never signalled |\n| `delivery.pid` \xB7 `delivery.log` \xB7 `delivery.creds` | Delivery daemon pid, log, and scoped cred (auth mode) |\n| `web.pid` \xB7 `web.log` | Web dashboard pid + log |\n| `membership.json` \xB7 `membership-*.creds` | Membership feed state + its scoped creds |\n| `setup.log` | Last `cotal setup` run |\n\n### Machine: `~/.cotal`\n\nCross-project machine state, so a `cotal spawn` from any directory can find a running mesh. Location:\n`~/.cotal` on POSIX, `%LOCALAPPDATA%\\Cotal` on Windows; overridable with `COTAL_HOME`.\n\n`COTAL_HOME` overrides **this tree only** (registry + current pointer + onboard marker). It is not a\nfull workstation sandbox. Broker launch policy, the JetStream store, pidfiles, and auth live under\nthe **project** `.cotal/` found by walking up from the cwd ([Project: `.cotal/`](#project-cotal)\nabove, including `broker-policy.json` on TLS meshes). A probe that sets `COTAL_HOME` alone and runs\n`cotal up --tls-cert \u2026` from a directory whose walked root is the operator home still writes those\nproject paths on the live machine.\n\n| Path | What it is |\n|---|---|\n| `meshes/space.<key>.json` | Registry of running meshes: one file per broker `cotal up` started (server URL, root path, mode, TLS-required client intent when recorded); `<key>` is the same case-safe hex encoding of the space name, and the record\'s own `space` field is authoritative |\n| `current-mesh` | Default space a bare `cotal spawn` joins (set by `cotal use`) |\n| `onboarded.json` | First-run marker (with `ONBOARD_VERSION`) that flips setup between first-run and status-card |\n| the Claude plugin marketplace | The installed `cotal-mesh` plugin assets |\n\n### Config dir: `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/cotal`\n\nDistinct from `~/.cotal`. Location: `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/cotal`, else `~/.config/cotal` on POSIX, or\n`%APPDATA%\\Cotal` on Windows.\n\n| Path | What it is |\n|---|---|\n| `config.json` | Operator-level connector config (the base layer above) |\n| `extensions/` | `cotal ext` install prefix: its own npm root (`node_modules`) plus an `extensions.json` provider/command-display cache. Built-in connectors install here too, seeded on first run |\n| `seed/` | Built-in-connector seeding state: the `ever-seeded` authority (+ durable backup), the init witness, the version stamp, the crash cursor, and `store/<version>/<name>` (the stable payloads `ext add --install-links` reifies each seeded connector from) |\n\nBoth `extensions/` and `seed/store/` are operator-global: shared by every space, project directory, and\ncheckout on the machine, and moved only by `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME` (a fresh project dir isolates `.cotal/`,\nnot these). Running `cotal up`, or any command that seeds, from a tree that is not a released install\nre-seeds `seed/store/<version>` with that tree\'s packages under the same version key, so every later\nmesh on the machine materializes those bytes while `cotal ext ls` still reports the published version.\nTo keep the machine-wide store untouched when running from a non-released checkout, point\n`$XDG_CONFIG_HOME` at an isolated dir (on Windows, `%APPDATA%` relocates them). The reconcile names on\nstderr both the store payloads it writes and any old generation it removes, so a machine-wide re-seed\nor cleanup is visible when it happens. Those lines are provenance output: a run whose stderr is closed\nor redirected away keeps the write and loses the line.\n\nFor how `cotal setup` populates the machine state and the plugin, and how the built-in connectors are\nseeded as removable extensions, see [setup internals](setup-internals.md).\n'
+      "body": '# Configuration & environment\n\n> **Reference**: describes the TypeScript reference implementation (the `cotal` CLI and connectors), not the wire contract. \xB7 **For:** operators \xB7 **Wire contract:** [SPEC](../SPEC.md)\n\nThree things configure a Cotal workstation: the **config file** (per-connector settings, notably\nwhich of your MCP servers get shared with spawned agents), a set of **`COTAL_*` environment\nvariables**, and the **on-disk layout** under a project\'s `.cotal/` and your machine\'s `~/.cotal`.\nNone of these are part of the wire contract; they configure the reference implementation only.\n\n## The config file\n\nThe cotal config file carries per-connector launch settings. It is layered from two locations,\nmost-specific-wins:\n\n| Layer | Path | Scope |\n|---|---|---|\n| Base | `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/cotal/config.json` (else `~/.config/cotal/config.json`; `%APPDATA%\\Cotal\\config.json` on Windows) | Operator-level, every space |\n| Override | `<project-root>/.cotal/config.json` | Space-local |\n\nThey merge per connector and per server name: a server in the space-local file replaces the\nsame-named server in the operator-level file; connectors or servers present in only one side are\nkept. A missing file is empty (valid); malformed JSON or a non-object top level is a loud error.\n\nIt carries two things: which of your personal MCP servers a connector should **share** with the\nagents it spawns, and optional `spawn.env` names that deliberately add environment capability to a\nspawned agent (see [Environment variables](#environment-variables) below).\n\nThe sharing half: By default a spawned agent gets none: the Claude connector launches with\n`--strict-mcp-config`, dropping every ambient MCP server (they are heavy and useless to a meshed\nteammate). This file is the explicit opt-in.\n\n```json\n{\n  "connectors": {\n    "claude": {\n      "mcpServers": {\n        "github": {\n          "command": "npx",\n          "args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],\n          "env": { "GITHUB_TOKEN": "${GITHUB_TOKEN}" }\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\nEach server is written in the de-facto `.mcp.json` shape, so you can copy an entry straight out of\nyour own Claude / VS Code / Cursor config. Secrets ride as **`${VAR}` references** (also\n`${VAR:-default}`), resolved from your environment at launch and forwarded to the child **by name**\n(never as literals) so the file stays safe to keep in `~/.config` or a gitignored `.cotal/`. Only\n`command`, `args`, `env`, `url`, and `headers` are expanded; any other key passes through verbatim.\n\n**`--share-tools` interplay**. The per-spawn selection narrows what this config declares:\n\n| `--share-tools` | Result |\n|---|---|\n| (flag absent) | Every server declared for the connector |\n| `none` or empty | Nothing |\n| `a,b` | Only those named: each **must** be declared, or the spawn fails (no silent drop) |\n\nToday only the `claude` connector consumes shared MCP servers; OpenCode inherits config through its\nown merge layer and Hermes has no MCP. See [Connect Claude Code](connect-claude.md) for the full\nsharing model.\n\n## Environment variables\n\nThese are the operator-facing variables. Most of the connector-session ones (space, name, role, \u2026)\nare set **for you** by `cotal spawn` / the manager when they launch an agent; you set them by hand\nonly when you drive a connector session yourself (e.g. your own `claude` with the plugin) or a custom\nlauncher. Comma-separated lists are trimmed.\n\n| Variable | Consumed by | Meaning | Default |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `COTAL_SPACE` | connector session | Space to join | `demo` (or the join link\'s) |\n| `COTAL_NAME` | connector session | Presence name / identity | required (or via `COTAL_AGENT_FILE` / `COTAL_LINK`) |\n| `COTAL_ROLE` | connector session | Role | agent file\'s `role:`, else none |\n| `COTAL_SERVERS` | connector session | Broker URL(s). Hand-driven sessions only: a launcher-spawned seat gets this in its launch material instead (see below) | the default local broker (or the link\'s) |\n| `COTAL_CREDS` | connector session | Path to a NATS creds file (auth mode). Hand-driven sessions only, same as above | none (open mode) |\n| `COTAL_LINK` | connector session | `cotal://token@host/space` join link: supplies server, auth, space | none |\n| `COTAL_AGENT_FILE` | connector session | Path to a persona file: supplies name, role, kind, channels | none |\n| `COTAL_SUBSCRIBE` | connector session | Active channel read set | agent file / link, else `general` |\n| `COTAL_ALLOW_SUBSCRIBE` | connector session | Read ACL (channels the agent *may* read) | = `COTAL_SUBSCRIBE` |\n| `COTAL_ALLOW_PUBLISH` | connector session | Post ACL (channels the agent *may* post to) | deny (empty) |\n| `COTAL_MODEL` | connector session | Model label (display metadata) | agent file\'s `model:`, else none |\n| `COTAL_KIND` | connector session | Endpoint kind | `agent` |\n| `COTAL_TLS` | connector session | Connect over TLS (`1`) | off |\n| `COTAL_TOKEN` | connector session | Auth token (token / open modes) | none |\n| `COTAL_CAPABILITIES` | connector session | Control-plane capabilities (e.g. `spawn`) that gate manager tools | agent file\'s `capabilities:` |\n| `COTAL_QUIET` / `COTAL_MUTED` | connector session | Per-channel attention defaults (never-wake / drop-on-receive) | agent file\'s, else none |\n| `COTAL_CHANNEL` | Claude connector | Force channel wake-nudges on (`1`) / off; set to `1` by the Claude launcher | auto-detect |\n| `COTAL_EVENTS` | connector session | Arm this session\'s event plane (`1`); set by the launcher for `--events` spawns | off |\n| `COTAL_EVENTS_DEFAULT` | manager | Default event plane for managed spawns (`1`) | off |\n| `COTAL_DEFAULT_AGENT` | `cotal spawn` | Default connector type for a bare spawn | `claude` |\n| `COTAL_DEFAULT_PERSONA` | `cotal spawn` | Default persona for a bare spawn | `default` |\n| `COTAL_SKIP_CONNECTOR_SEED` | boot gate | Skip the automatic built-in-connector seed/refresh on a command (`1`); `cotal ext seed` still works | off |\n| `COTAL_DETACH_KEY` | `cotal attach` | Detach escape key (`ctrl-<char>` / `^<char>`) | `ctrl-]` |\n| `COTAL_FEEDBACK_KEY` | `feedback`, connector | Beta feedback key \u2192 keyed intake | none (public intake) |\n| `COTAL_FEEDBACK_EMAIL` | `feedback`, connector | Contact email for the keyless public intake | your git email |\n| `COTAL_FEEDBACK_URL` | `feedback`, connector | Intake URL override (self-hosted) | keyed / public intake |\n| `COTAL_SKIP_ASSIST` | `setup` | Disable the interactive Claude handoff on a failed step (`1`; for CI) | off |\n| `COTAL_COMPLETE_DEBUG` | `completion` | Print completion-resolution errors to stderr | off |\n| `COTAL_SERVE_HEADLESS` | OpenCode runtime | Run the OpenCode server without a foreground TUI (`1`) | off |\n| `COTAL_HOME` | workspace | Override the machine-home dir for the **mesh registry only** (`meshes/`, `current-mesh`, onboard marker). Does **not** redirect project-root paths (`findCotalRoot` / `.cotal/broker-policy.json`, NATS store, manager/delivery state, auth). Tests that run `cotal up` must also use a temp project root with its own `.cotal/` as `cwd` | `~/.cotal` |\n\n> `--console-port` is a `cotal supervise` flag, not an environment variable; there is no\n> `COTAL_CONSOLE_PORT`.\n\n### Set by the launcher, not by you\n\nThese are wired into a spawned child\'s environment by the connector / launcher and read back inside\nthe session. They are not operator knobs; listed so you recognize them in a process listing.\n\n| Variable | Purpose |\n|---|---|\n| `COTAL_ID` | Stable agent id chosen by the launcher (static meshes) |\n| `COTAL_LIFECYCLE_UID` | The incarnation\'s lifecycle UID, minted once per spawn; the session binds its lifecycle-keyed DM/delivery/history consumers by it (its credential pins the same names). Required for an authed launch (`COTAL_CREDS` or user-mode); config parsing fails loud without it. Open mode omits it (the endpoint self-mints per session) |\n| `COTAL_OWNER` / `COTAL_ACTOR` / `COTAL_SENTINEL_CREDS` / `COTAL_BEARER_CMD` | User-auth launch identity: the agent\'s principal, its sentinel creds path, and the exec-able bearer command; all four together, mutually exclusive with `COTAL_CREDS`. A launcher-spawned seat carries them in its launch material instead of its environment. A remote enrollment\'s bearer argv uses `agent-bearer --exchange-url <https://base>`; the token never falls back to a local service file |\n| `COTAL_LAUNCH_MATERIAL` | Path to this launch\'s private 0600 material file (see [Launch material](#launch-material) below). Carries the broker URL, the creds path, the auth token, the user-auth identity, and the control token. A PATH, never a secret |\n| `COTAL_CONTROL_SOCKET` | The session\'s local control endpoint path. The MCP server listens on it and the lifecycle hooks connect to it; the token that authenticates the first frame rides the launch material, not the environment |\n| `COTAL_BRIDGE_SOCKET` / `COTAL_TOOLS_FILE` / `COTAL_PARENT_PID` | Hermes sidecar plumbing (bridge socket, generated tool descriptors, launcher pid to watch) |\n| `OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT` | Inline OpenCode config (the injected cotal plugin, highest merge layer) |\n| `OPENCODE_DB` / `OPENCODE_HOME` / `OPENCODE_PORT` / `OPENCODE_SERVER_URL` / `COTAL_OPENCODE_*` | OpenCode server plumbing (home, port, DB, server URL) |\n\nA spawned agent receives a fixed OS execution allow-list (PATH, HOME, TERM, locale, and\nXDG/Windows config directories), the machine-wide `COTAL_*` operator knobs (`COTAL_HOME`, the\nfeedback set, the default-agent pair, the `*_BIN` overrides, the timing knobs), the provider inputs\nits connector declares, and `${VAR}` names an explicitly shared MCP server requires. It does not\ninherit the manager\'s ambient environment. This keeps host-session markers such as\n`CLAUDE_CODE_CHILD_SESSION` / `CLAUDECODE` (and the analogous names other hosts use to mark a nested\nsession), unrelated service secrets, and environment-only capabilities out of seats unless\ndeliberately supplied. A seat\'s transcript/resume behaviour is a property of the seat, never of how\nmany layers up someone once ran `cotal up` inside an agent. Connection material is not in the\nenvironment at all (see [identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)).\n\nPATH is forwarded whole, including entries such as `~/.local/bin` where connector binaries live, so\na seat can still launch after the strip. There is no inherit mode and no opt-in-to-containment flag:\nthe allow-list is the only path.\n\nTo deliberately add an environment name for a spawned agent, declare `spawn.env` in the config file:\n\n```json\n{ "spawn": { "env": ["MY_PROVIDER_API_KEY"] } }\n```\n\nThe listed names are added to the fixed boundary. That is also the opt-in for a host-session marker\na persona has chosen to receive (`CLAUDE_CODE_CHILD_SESSION` and friends). An empty array adds\nnothing. A space-local `spawn` block replaces the operator-level one outright rather than merging,\nso a local list stays exactly local. No `spawn` block, `"spawn": { "env": [] }`, and `"spawn": {}`\nall add no names.\n\nBe honest with yourself about what this buys: `HOME` is forwarded, so an agent with a shell reads\n`~/.aws`, `~/.ssh` and `~/.config` regardless. The boundary protects what a file on disk cannot hand\nover anyway, and that is more than a list of secret values. Some variables are **capability\nhandles**: they do not contain a secret, they name a live process that will act on your behalf.\n`SSH_AUTH_SOCK` is the sharp one. Inherit it and the agent can ask your `ssh-agent` to sign, which\nmeans it can reach any host or sign any commit that key authorises, and it keeps that power even\nif the private key file is not on disk at all. Nothing under `~/.ssh` has to exist for it to work,\nso "a shell reads `~/.ssh` regardless" does not cover this case. The same shape covers a\n`gpg-agent` socket and the desktop and cloud credential brokers. So the default boundary protects:\nsecrets that live **only** in the environment, such as an `aws-vault exec` or `op run` shell or\nCI-injected values, and the capability handles above, which it removes along with everything else\nit does not name. Real containment is still a sandbox or a VM.\n\nModel discovery is the exception, and it is deliberate rather than an oversight. When the `codex` or\n`opencode` connector enumerates a model catalog (`cotal models`, and the manager\'s selector), it runs\nthat harness with your environment minus Cotal\'s own `COTAL_*`, and it does **not** consult\n`spawn.env`. Those probes are short-lived catalog reads rather than agent seats, so an allow-list\nthat confines a seat does not confine them.\n\n### Launch material\n\nA process environment is inherited by every descendant. A seat launched with its credential, its\nbroker URL and its control token in the environment hands all three to the build it runs, the linter,\nthe third-party CLI, the test suite that reads its broker from the environment. Nothing in that chain\nasked for any of it.\n\nSo a launcher-spawned seat does not get them in its environment. The launcher writes them to a single\n**0600 file inside a 0700 private directory** and exports only its path, as `COTAL_LAUNCH_MATERIAL`.\nThe session reads the file once at startup. This is the same shape `cotal agent-bearer` already uses\nfor its spawn-time secret: the material rides a file, never argv (which is visible in a process\nlisting) and never the ambient environment (which is inherited).\n\nThree connectors drop the path once they have read it, so the shells and tools those seats run\ninherit no reference at all: **pi** and **codex**, whose sessions run in the seat process, and\n**OpenCode**, whose seat process is a shim that starts `opencode serve` (the plugin runs in that\nserver, which is also what executes the session\'s tool calls). Those three also **delete the file**\nat the same moment, along with the private directory that held it. Nothing reads it again, so leaving\nit on disk would only extend how long a copy of the material exists. The directory is only removed\nwhen it is provably the one the launcher wrote: the right filename inside, the launcher\'s prefix on\nthe directory, the directory sitting directly in the OS temp root, and a non-recursive removal that\nfails rather than deletes if anything else is in there.\n\nTwo keep it, and for the same reason in both cases: a process that starts LATER has to read it.\n**Claude**\'s readers are short-lived children, the MCP server and one process per lifecycle hook,\nwhich begin after the session is already running. **Hermes**\' launcher starts a gateway child that\nneeds the control token. For those two, a shell the seat runs still inherits a path to the material\nfile, though not the material itself.\n\nWhat this does: the values are out of every descendant\'s environment, so an `env` dump, a CI log, a\nsuite that defaults its broker from the environment, or a tool handed a credential it never asked\nfor, all stop seeing them. What it does not do: hide the material from a process running as the same\nuser that deliberately opens the file. No environment-level control can, and the same is already true\nof `~/.cotal/auth/creds`. What changes is that reaching the material is a deliberate act rather than\nan inheritance nobody chose.\n\nDriving a connector session **by hand** still works the documented way: set `COTAL_CREDS` /\n`COTAL_SERVERS` (and the user-auth quartet) yourself, and no material file is involved. Setting both\na material file and any of them is refused rather than resolved by precedence: one launch carries one\nidentity plane. `COTAL_LINK` counts as one of them, because a join link carries the server, the auth\nand the space in a single string.\n\nThe control endpoint is a pair, and **half a pair is refused**. A launch with a control socket path\nand no resolvable token, or a token and no socket path, does not fall back to running without a\ncontrol plane: it fails with a sentence naming which half is missing. The one exception is the\nlifecycle hook relay, which catches that refusal, writes a single warning to stderr naming no values,\nand then does nothing, because a hook that throws is a hook that blocked the session. Failing open is\ndeliberate; failing open silently is not.\n\n## On-disk layout\n\n### Project: `.cotal/`\n\nA project\'s state lives in `.cotal/` at the mesh root (found by walking up from the cwd, like `.git`).\n**It is gitignored**; it holds secrets and machine-local process state.\n\n| Path | What it is |\n|---|---|\n| `auth/broker.json` | Broker trust material: the operator seed and the system account (secret; the system-account signing seed is stripped before writing). One per broker, shared by every space on it |\n| `auth/account.<key>.json` | One space\'s own NATS data account and signing seed (secret). One file per space, all signed by the broker above; `<key>` is a stable, case-safe hex encoding of the space name (never the raw name, so two case-differing spaces can\'t collide) |\n| `auth/space.<key>/` | One space\'s user-auth state (IdP pin, issuer keys, owner secret, callout account), present only when that space enables per-user auth. Keyed by the same case-safe hex encoding; pre-hex layouts (`auth/<space>/`) are renamed here on first touch |\n| `auth/creds/<name>.creds` | Per-agent minted NATS credentials |\n| `auth/server.conf` | Generated nats-server config for the broker. The core renderer accepts every space on the broker; `cotal up` currently orchestrates one space per root, so it renders that one space\'s account |\n| `broker-policy.json` | Durable broker **launch** policy (TLS-required cert/key path references, or plaintext). Survives `cotal down` so a bare re-`up` cannot silently drop TLS. Under the project root \u2014 **not** under `COTAL_HOME` |\n| `agents/<name>.md` | Persona / agent files ([Agent files](agent-files.md)) |\n| `manifests/<hash>.json` | Manifest-deploy ledger (records of `up -f` / `spawn -f` runs) |\n| `config.json` | Space-local connector config (the override layer above) |\n| `nats.pid` \xB7 `nats.log` | Background nats-server pid + log |\n| `manager.pid` \xB7 `manager.log` | Manager (supervisor) pid + log; `manager.delivery-aware` marks a delivery-aware build. The manager writes the pid itself, whatever started it, and removes it on a clean stop only while it still names that process. A reader treats the record as a running manager only if the pid is alive **and** the process is a supervisor: a recycled pid belonging to something else is reported as a stale record, never signalled |\n| `delivery.pid` \xB7 `delivery.log` \xB7 `delivery.creds` | Delivery daemon pid, log, and scoped cred (auth mode) |\n| `web.pid` \xB7 `web.log` | Web dashboard pid + log |\n| `membership.json` \xB7 `membership-*.creds` | Membership feed state + its scoped creds |\n| `setup.log` | Last `cotal setup` run |\n\n### Machine: `~/.cotal`\n\nCross-project machine state, so a `cotal spawn` from any directory can find a running mesh. Location:\n`~/.cotal` on POSIX, `%LOCALAPPDATA%\\Cotal` on Windows; overridable with `COTAL_HOME`.\n\n`COTAL_HOME` overrides **this tree only** (registry + current pointer + onboard marker). It is not a\nfull workstation sandbox. Broker launch policy, the JetStream store, pidfiles, and auth live under\nthe **project** `.cotal/` found by walking up from the cwd ([Project: `.cotal/`](#project-cotal)\nabove, including `broker-policy.json` on TLS meshes). A probe that sets `COTAL_HOME` alone and runs\n`cotal up --tls-cert \u2026` from a directory whose walked root is the operator home still writes those\nproject paths on the live machine.\n\n| Path | What it is |\n|---|---|\n| `meshes/space.<key>.json` | Registry of running meshes: one file per broker `cotal up` started (server URL, root path, mode, TLS-required client intent when recorded); `<key>` is the same case-safe hex encoding of the space name, and the record\'s own `space` field is authoritative |\n| `current-mesh` | Default space a bare `cotal spawn` joins (set by `cotal use`) |\n| `onboarded.json` | First-run marker (with `ONBOARD_VERSION`) that flips setup between first-run and status-card |\n| the Claude plugin marketplace | The installed `cotal-mesh` plugin assets |\n\n### Config dir: `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/cotal`\n\nDistinct from `~/.cotal`. Location: `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/cotal`, else `~/.config/cotal` on POSIX, or\n`%APPDATA%\\Cotal` on Windows.\n\n| Path | What it is |\n|---|---|\n| `config.json` | Operator-level connector config (the base layer above) |\n| `extensions/` | `cotal ext` install prefix: its own npm root (`node_modules`) plus an `extensions.json` provider/command-display cache. Built-in connectors install here too, seeded on first run |\n| `seed/` | Built-in-connector seeding state: the `ever-seeded` authority (+ durable backup), the init witness, the version stamp, the crash cursor, and `store/<version>/<name>` (the stable payloads `ext add --install-links` reifies each seeded connector from) |\n\nBoth `extensions/` and `seed/store/` are operator-global: shared by every space, project directory, and\ncheckout on the machine, and moved only by `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME` (a fresh project dir isolates `.cotal/`,\nnot these). Running `cotal up`, or any command that seeds, from a tree that is not a released install\nre-seeds `seed/store/<version>` with that tree\'s packages under the same version key, so every later\nmesh on the machine materializes those bytes while `cotal ext ls` still reports the published version.\nTo keep the machine-wide store untouched when running from a non-released checkout, point\n`$XDG_CONFIG_HOME` at an isolated dir (on Windows, `%APPDATA%` relocates them). The reconcile names on\nstderr both the store payloads it writes and any old generation it removes, so a machine-wide re-seed\nor cleanup is visible when it happens. Those lines are provenance output: a run whose stderr is closed\nor redirected away keeps the write and loses the line.\n\nFor how `cotal setup` populates the machine state and the plugin, and how the built-in connectors are\nseeded as removable extensions, see [setup internals](setup-internals.md).\n'
     },
     {
       "slug": "connect-claude",
       "title": "Connect Claude",
       "kind": "Guide (informative)",
       "summary": "The Claude Code connector turns a real claude session into a Cotal mesh peer.",
-      "body": "# Connect Claude\n\n> **Guide** (informative) \xB7 **For:** operators \xB7 **Prereqs:** [Quickstart](getting-started.md)\n\nThe Claude Code connector turns a real `claude` session into a Cotal mesh peer. A bundled\nplugin inside the session joins NATS, maps lifecycle hooks to presence, and exposes the\nmesh tools. Nothing wraps Claude; it is an ordinary session that happens to be on the\nmesh.\n\nThe shared mesh runtime (agent, `cotal_*` tools, hook relay) lives in\n[`@cotal-ai/connector-core`](../extensions/connector-core); this connector is the thin\nClaude-specific adapter over it. Siblings: [OpenCode](connect-opencode.md) (beta),\n[Hermes](connect-hermes.md) (alpha), [pi](connect-pi.md) (alpha); the\n[Connectors](connectors.md) matrix compares them feature-by-feature.\n\n## Set up\n\n```bash\ncotal setup      # one-time: installs the plugin, seeds one agent; launches nothing\ncotal up         # brings up the mesh + delivery daemon + a detached manager\n```\n\n`cotal setup` installs the cotal plugin (so the repo's Claude sessions get the `cotal_*`\ntools) and seeds one `default` persona; `cotal up` brings up the local stack so\n`cotal spawn --detach` / `cotal_spawn` work right away. Re-running either is idempotent.\nThe install mechanics and the invariants behind them are in\n[setup internals](setup-internals.md).\n\n`cotal setup` also installs Cotal's authored Agent Skills (`SKILL.md`, the agentskills.io format) for\ncoordinating agent teams (today `team-topology`), from one canonical source, on two channels:\n\n- **Claude Code** gets a second, skills-only plugin, `cotal-skills`, from the same `cotal-mesh`\n  marketplace, at **user scope** (machine-wide), and **independent of the mesh connector**: it carries no\n  code and no core dependency, installs whenever Claude is on `PATH` (even with the connector removed),\n  and uninstalls on its own with `claude plugin uninstall cotal-skills --scope user`. Its plugin version\n  is stamped from the running CLI release, so an upgrade + `cotal setup` runs `claude plugin update` and\n  the deployed install actually gets the new skill. `cotal setup` installs it on first run and on repeat\n  runs, so upgraders are not left behind.\n- **Every other harness** (Codex, Cursor, OpenCode, Gemini CLI, Windsurf/Devin) reads the cross-vendor\n  `~/.agents/skills/` directory convention, which has no remote index, so `cotal setup` **reconciles** it:\n  it installs/updates each Cotal skill, backs up a copy you have edited to `SKILL.md.bak` before\n  replacing it, and removes a Cotal skill that is no longer shipped. Only skills Cotal owns are touched;\n  your own or third-party skills there are left alone. `cotal status` reports whether the drop is current,\n  stale, missing, or has a retired skill to reconcile. This is the working cross-vendor path.\n\nCotal also generates an [Agent Skills discovery index](https://cotal.ai/.well-known/agent-skills/index.json)\non cotal.ai, but that RFC is still a draft with no harness consuming it yet, so it is a forward bet,\nnot a channel to rely on today.\n\n## Spawn a session\n\n```bash\ncotal spawn                 # foreground: your default agent, in this terminal\ncotal spawn dave --detach   # supervised: the manager runs it in a PTY\n```\n\nA spawn resolves a persona from `.cotal/agents/<name>.md` ([agent files](agent-files.md));\n`--model`, `--variant`, `--cwd`, `--prompt`, ACL overrides, and `--share-tools` apply to\nboth forms ([run a mesh](run-a-mesh.md) has the full resolution rules). The session joins\nwith identity from its environment and auto-registers presence by the time it is\ninteractive.\n\nInside the session, the agent orients with one read-only tool, `cotal_orientation`: its\nidentity, the channels it reads and may post to, its capabilities, the tools available,\nwho's present, and unread counts. The full tool surface is the\n[MCP tool catalog](mcp-tools.md). In auth mode the team-supervision tools\n(`cotal_spawn` / `cotal_persona`) are injected **only** for personas declaring\n`capabilities: [spawn]` (the same grant that opens the privileged control subject), so an\nagent's toolset matches what it can actually invoke. Clearing retained history is\noperator-only ([run a mesh](run-a-mesh.md)), never an agent tool.\n\n## How it binds\n\nClaude Code exposes four integration surfaces, and three of them collapse into a single\ndual-purpose MCP server:\n\n| Surface | Mechanism |\n|---|---|\n| Outbound, ambient | `http` lifecycle hooks \u2192 POST to the connector (presence, activity) |\n| Outbound, deliberate | MCP tools `cotal_send` / `cotal_dm` / `cotal_anycast` (+ `cotal_feedback`) |\n| Inbound, pull | MCP tool `cotal_inbox` (same server) |\n| Inbound, push | Channel nudge + hook drain (below) |\n\nThe manager launches the *real* `claude` (no wrapper):\n\n```\nclaude --strict-mcp-config --mcp-config '{\"mcpServers\":{\"cotal\":{\u2026}}}' \\\n       --dangerously-load-development-channels server:cotal\n# env: COTAL_SPACE, COTAL_NAME, COTAL_ROLE, COTAL_SERVERS, COTAL_CHANNEL=1\n```\n\n- **MCP isolation.** A spawned agent runs with **only** the cotal MCP server:\n  `--strict-mcp-config` ignores every other MCP source, crucially the operator's personal\n  `~/.claude.json` servers (several spawns each booting a heavy helper would starve\n  memory). Share your own servers deliberately (see below).\n- **Installed, not `--plugin-dir`.** The plugin is installed once (`claude plugin install\n  cotal@cotal-mesh --scope local`) because its hooks bind only to an *installed* plugin.\n  In a clone the marketplace is the repo's `.claude-plugin/marketplace.json`; `cotal setup`\n  (npx, no clone) materializes the same marketplace under `~/.cotal/claude-plugin/` (each plugin dir is\n  rebuilt from scratch and atomically replaced, never merged, so no stale file rides in). The\n  `cotal-skills` plugin installs from that same marketplace at user scope (`claude plugin install\n  cotal-skills@cotal-mesh --scope user`); its assets ship inside the CLI package, not the connector, and\n  its version tracks the CLI release so updates land.\n- **Identity-gated.** Connector code requires `COTAL_NAME` *or* `COTAL_LINK`. A plain\n  `claude` with no `COTAL_*` env stays inert and never joins, so your own sessions in a\n  repo do not appear as stray peers.\n- **Hands-free.** The dev-channels flag prints a one-time confirm prompt; the PTY runtime\n  auto-clears it, so a supervised launch needs no keypress.\n\nInbound mesh messages arrive in context as\n`<channel source=\"cotal\" from=\"bob\" kind=\"dm\" \u2026>\u2026</channel>`: each meta key a tag\nattribute the agent can read for routing.\n\n## How messages reach the session\n\nDurable deliveries land in the connector's inbox from JetStream consumers\n([SPEC \xA78](../SPEC.md#8-nats--jetstream-binding)); live channel traffic can instead arrive\nthrough an at-most-once core subscription. A durable message sent while the agent is busy\nor offline waits on the stream. Two things move a message from inbox to model; one\ndelivers, the other only wakes:\n\n- **Hook drain (delivery).** `SessionStart` / `UserPromptSubmit` hooks read automatic inbox items and\n  inject them as `additionalContext`. This is the single authoritative path: deterministic and works\n  on any Claude Code build. Quiet ambient is excluded and stays buffered for `cotal_inbox`.\n  A message is **acked only once the hook reply carrying it has cleared both legs of its journey**:\n  the connector's control socket to the hook process (which gives up after 2s), and the hook\n  process's own stdout to Claude Code (which it force-exits 1s after starting to write). The relay\n  sends a receipt back down the control socket from that stdout write's callback, and only on a\n  clean write (a runtime whose pipe has gone away fails it), and the connector treats that receipt,\n  not its own socket write, as delivery. So a large injection killed mid-flush, or one written to a\n  broken pipe, leaves the message un-acked and JetStream redelivers it. What this does *not* prove is\n  that Claude Code read or applied the reply: a payload small enough to fit the pipe buffer is\n  reported written the moment the kernel takes it. That residual is why the path errs toward\n  at-least-once rather than treating a confirmed write as a confirmed read. Acking when\n  the reply was merely *formatted* meant a lost reply was a lost message: it was already marked\n  handled, so its own redelivery was silently acked on arrival.\n  This errs toward **at-least-once**: if a reply lands but its confirmation does not, the batch is\n  surfaced again and flagged as a possible repeat. A duplicate injection is noise; a buried DM stops\n  the peer answering at all.\n- **Channel nudge (wake).** An arriving message fires a `notifications/claude/channel`\n  event that wakes an *idle* session into a turn, so the drain runs *now* instead of at\n  the next prompt. The nudge never acks anything. A nudge that the host rejects is retried with a\n  bounded backoff while anything is still pending. For an idle session it is the only wake source,\n  so dropping it means silence until someone types. If a nudge is lost anyway (a race in the host's\n  channel startup), JetStream redelivery re-announces the unacked durable item through the same\n  attention policy, so a durable message always wakes the session eventually. If the channel cannot\n  run at all, delivery still waits for the next hook. Live-only traffic has no durable retry.\n\n**Two priority tiers.** A *directed* message (DM, anycast, or a channel message that\n`@mentions` us) always nudges. *Ambient* channel chatter does not nudge mid-turn; it\naccumulates, and the `Stop` \u2192 idle transition fires one batch nudge so the backlog drains\ntogether.\n\n**Constraints (accepted).** Channels are a Claude Code research preview (\u2265 v2.1.80;\npermission relay \u2265 v2.1.81): Anthropic auth only, admin-enabled on Team/Enterprise, and a\ncustom channel needs the `--dangerously-load-development-channels` launch flag. The hook\ndrain does not depend on any of that; the channel only adds \"wake me when idle.\"\n\nThe same channel also relays **tool-permission requests** onto the mesh, so a peer (a\nhuman at the CLI, a policy node) can approve or deny an agent's pending tool call through\nCotal rather than a per-terminal prompt.\n\n### Attention: how much traffic wakes you\n\nAn agent picks how aggressively peer traffic reaches it with\n`cotal_status({ attention })` (three modes, orthogonal to presence):\n\n| arrival | open (default) | dnd | focus |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| directed (dm / anycast) | wake + inject | wake + inject | wake + inject |\n| channel `@mention` | wake + inject | wake + inject | ack-drop; wake to *pull*; not injected |\n| ambient channel chatter | wake when idle; hold while working | never wakes; injects next turn | ack-drop; recall via `cotal_inbox` |\n\nPer-channel overrides refine this: **quiet** (delivered, never wakes; `@mention` still\nwakes) and **muted** (dropped on receive, mentions included; DMs/anycast unaffected), set\nwith `cotal_channel_mode` or as agent-file defaults (`quiet:` / `muted:`,\n[agent files](agent-files.md)). A per-channel override is the final word for that channel.\nQuiet ambient is pull-only: it never hitchhikes on a human prompt, DM, mention, or other\nconnector-driven turn. `cotal_inbox` explicitly surfaces and clears it. A quiet-channel\n`@mention` remains automatic and injects normally.\n\nA pull is bounded too, and clears only what it hands over. One `cotal_inbox` call carries at most a\nreceivable window (direct messages and role requests first, then channel traffic, replayed history\nlast); whatever does not fit stays buffered, is named in the reply, and comes back on the next call.\nA message too large for one whole response is never consumed at all: it is named with its sender and\nsize and left buffered, because clearing what cannot be delivered is the loss this bound exists to stop.\nThat matters most on the path where it is easiest to lose mail: reconnecting brings a channel-history\nreplay with it, so the largest payload and the least expendable message arrive in the same read.\n\nThe local inbox is bounded. On pathological overflow it evicts pull-only items before automatic\ntraffic. If the bounded live/durable classification guard also fills, the connector fails closed:\notherwise-normal ambient becomes pull-only until restart. Muted hard-drop and normal focus recall\nstill take precedence. Focus also keeps a bounded exclusion list so mode toggles cannot recall\nquiet/muted traffic; if that safety bound fills, recall skips the affected channel and reports it\nas incomplete rather than risk resurfacing excluded content.\nIf the separate hard-drop disposition guard fills, channel traffic is dropped for the rest of the\nsession rather than risk a late copy bypassing an earlier muted/focus decision; DMs and anycast are\nunaffected.\n\nAttention is **advisory UX, not a boundary**: any peer can wake a dnd/focus agent by\nnaming it, and `muted` means \"I opted out of receiving\", not \"the channel is blocked\";\nthe broker still authorizes and delivers. Focus's real effect is shrinking the\nuntrusted-ambient injection surface (only subject-authenticated dm/anycast auto-inject).\nIt resets to **open** on `SessionStart`, so a restarted agent never stays silently deaf.\nYour attention is mirrored into presence so peers can see it.\n\n## Presence mapping\n\nThe connector wires a small subset of Claude Code hooks to presence states; presence is\ncoarse, and \"what it is doing\" rides on activity updates. Presence is **advisory**: a presence\npublish that fails (the endpoint mid-reconnect, say) is swallowed and never prevents the same hook\nfrom delivering messages or flushing held ones.\n\n| Hook | \u2192 state |\n|---|---|\n| `SessionStart` | `idle` (join; surfaces the inbox; captures the live model into `meta.model` when no pin) |\n| `UserPromptSubmit` | `working` (turn starts; surfaces the inbox) |\n| `PreToolUse` | no change; records *what* is about to run, so a permission wait can name it |\n| `Notification` (permission / elicitation) | `waiting` (blocked on a human: activity leads with the pending tool, e.g. `Bash: git push \u2026`) |\n| `Stop` / `StopFailure` | `idle` (turn done / died on an API error; flushes anything held while busy). On the [event plane](#event-plane) the two differ: `StopFailure` closes the run with `RUN_ERROR`. |\n| `SessionEnd` | `offline` (graceful leave) |\n\nHooks are relayed over the connector's **authenticated** local control endpoint (per-user\nsocket + per-launch token, constant-time checked), so a local process that finds the path\nstill can't drive presence or stop the agent. The full Claude Code hook-event list lives\nwith the adapter:\n[`extensions/connector-claude-code`](../extensions/connector-claude-code/README.md).\n\n## Event plane\n\nA session launched with `cotal spawn --events` publishes a **structured** account of what it\ndid: run boundaries per turn, assistant text, reasoning, and each tool call with its arguments,\nits end, and its result. Not prose about the work, the work itself, in a vocabulary a program can\nread. Arming is `COTAL_EVENTS`, which the launcher sets for `--events` spawns; a personal session\nwith the plugin installed publishes nothing.\n\nTool arguments and results go on this channel verbatim, so withholding user-authored text does not\nmake the stream safe to widen: anything a tool reads or prints, including a secret in a command line\nor in the contents of a file, reaches every reader of the channel.\n\nThe channel is **`events.<owner>.<actor>`**, named after the session's principal. What the actor\nhalf is depends on the mesh, and the difference matters when you go looking for it: on a static mesh\nit is a key the manager allocated, never the display name, so two live agents sharing a display name\ndo not share a stream; on a user-auth mesh it is the agent's own name, because that is what the\nledger row is keyed on. Spelled out again with both halves below. The launch grants publish rights\non exactly that one channel. A spawn\nthat asks for a *different* agent's event channel is refused at the door rather than granted, since\nthat channel carries the session's tool inputs and outputs. The same rule runs on restart: a manager\nresume document that names another agent's event channel is refused rather than adopted, because the\nmanaged row is re-armed from that document and the credential is re-minted from the row.\n\nThe rule reads a **concrete** channel, two principal tokens and nothing else. A pattern such as\n`events.<owner>.>` is not an event channel to it and passes untouched, governed by ordinary ACL\nauthority: on a user mesh the delegation envelope, on a static mesh the spawning credential itself.\nThat is deliberate, because the pattern is the form an operator writes on purpose for an observer,\nand it is worth knowing rather than assuming the fence is total.\n\nTo let something else read a plane, grant it out of band. The refusal prints the command for the\nmesh it is running on, spelled out in full, and only that one.\n\nOn a **user-auth** mesh:\n\n```bash\ncotal actor grant <reader> --owner <owner> --scope '' --allow-subscribe 'events.<owner>.<actor>' --allow-publish ''\n```\n\nEvery field, deliberately. `actor grant` is an upsert of the whole row, and an omitted flag is not\n\"leave it alone\": it is the wide default, `>` read, `>` post, and `spawn,role:default` scope. A bare\n`cotal actor grant <reader>` therefore grants a reader of every channel in the space, which is the\nopposite of what a scoped watcher is for.\n\nOn a **static** mesh there is no actor ledger for `actor grant` to write to, and the refusal says\nso; mint the reader instead:\n\n```bash\ncotal mint watcher --profile agent --allow-subscribe 'events.<owner>.<actor>' --provision\n```\n\nThe **agent** profile, not the observer one. `mint` reads `--allow-subscribe` only for that\nprofile, and refuses it anywhere else: `--profile observer --allow-subscribe <channel>` exits\nnon-zero and writes no creds file, because the observer profile carries a fixed read set over the\nwhole chat plane, which is the opposite of what a scoped watcher is for. The agent profile also prints the lifecycle uid the\nreader needs, since an authed consuming endpoint refuses to start without one.\n\nTwo things a reader has to do that are not obvious, both on `CotalEndpoint`. It must pass the event\nchannel in `channels`, or the endpoint joins `general` by default and a scoped credential is refused\nthere. And it reads history with `readHistory(channel)`, the delivery daemon's mediated read, not\n`channelHistory(channel)`: a scoped credential is denied the ad-hoc consumer the direct read\ncreates, by design. `cotal console` and the web console already do both.\n\nThe `<owner>.<actor>` pair is the session's principal, not its display name. On a user-auth mesh\nthe actor half **is** the agent's name, so the channel is `events.<your-owner>.<agent-name>`. On a\nstatic mesh the owner half is the literal `local` and the actor is a key the manager allocated, so\nthe channel is `events.local.<key>`; the spawn reply carries that key as `id`. Note\nthat `cotal console` and the web console keep event channels out of their channel lists on purpose,\nsince a plane is a machine feed rather than a conversation; they draw the frames when you open the\nchannel by name.\n\nThe rule governs the manager's doors, which are the ones a caller other than you can reach. A\nforeground `cotal spawn` on your own machine mints from your own signing material, so it can still\ngrant any channel you name: that is the out-of-band grant, not a way around the rule.\n\n**A failed turn is published as a run error, not as a finished run.** Claude Code decides for itself\nwhether a turn finished or died and fires one of two hooks accordingly, so the connector relays that\ndecision rather than making one of its own: a turn that ended on an API error ends its run with\n`RUN_ERROR` carrying the harness's own error kind (`rate_limit`, `billing_error`, `server_error`,\n`max_output_tokens` and the rest) as the code, and whatever detail it reported as the message. If that\ndetail cannot fit in the one closing frame, the shared close still publishes exactly one `RUN_ERROR`\nthat does fit: it keeps the code and says the original detail was omitted or shortened because of the\nbound, so a reader is never shown a truncated message as complete. A turn that ended normally still\nends with a run-finished event carrying no outcome, which says the turn ended and does not claim it\nsucceeded.\n\nEvents are written to a per-session write-ahead log before they are published, so a hook that fires\nafter a restart resumes at the cursor it left rather than replaying or skipping, and a run that was\nopen when the session stopped is closed rather than left dangling.\n\nOne channel carries **every session of one agent**, because it is named after the principal and not\nafter the session. Alongside the per-session logs the connector keeps one small record per principal,\nholding the last sequence the broker assigned on that channel, so a new session continues the stream\nits predecessor left instead of starting again from nothing. Both live under the events state root\n(`COTAL_WORKSPACE_ROOT`), and neither is something you edit by hand.\n\nA **missing** record is not a fault: the connector rebuilds it from the session logs beside it,\nwhich is how an agent that was already running before this record existed keeps its stream. That\nrebuild stops if any one of those session logs is damaged. Unreadable, not valid JSON, and written\nfor a different principal all count, and so does a session directory or a log that is a link rather\nthan the real file the connector wrote, or a log that has more than one name. A tip taken from the\nrest would be too low, and it would stop publication later with nothing left to point at the cause.\nThe connector names the file instead, and the only way past it is the directory removal described\nbelow, under the same condition. A record that **disagrees with the broker** is a fault, and the\nconnector stops publishing and says why rather than guessing. A record that **moved while a session\nwas writing to it** is refused the same way: it means something else wrote the principal's record,\nand the connector reports which value it held and which the file holds rather than writing over the\nlater one. There is no command to clear it. The state is the principal's directory under the events\nroot, and clearing it by hand means removing that directory whole: the sequence, the cursor and the\nper-session logs only mean anything together, so removing part of it leaves a state the next start\nrefuses. Removing it is only half a remedy, and the half that comes first is the channel. The\ndirectory is where the agent's memory of the tip lives, not the tip itself, so on a channel that\nstill holds frames the next session opens expecting an empty one and stops on the same\ndisagreement, with the logs a tip could have been rebuilt from now gone. Purge the channel first,\nthen remove the directory.\n\nReading it: `cotal console` and the web console draw event frames directly. A frame carries no text\npart by design, so a surface that renders a message as flat text shows a marker instead of prose.\n\n**On a per-user-auth mesh, arming needs the spawner's grant to cover the channel.** The event\nchannel is added to the child's publish set, and delegation only narrows: an agent may hand down\na subset of what it holds and no more. So a peer-initiated `--events` spawn is refused unless the\nspawning identity's own grant already covers the child's event channel. The refusal prints the\nexact `cotal actor grant` command that widens it. An operator launch, whose chain reaches an\nadmin-scoped or roster row, is unaffected.\n\n## Resume an existing session (fork, never hijack)\n\n`--resume <session-id>` pulls an existing Claude session, its context and transcript,\ninto the mesh. It **forks**: Claude mints a *new* session id from that transcript\n(`--resume <id> --fork-session`), so the meshed agent gets its own session and the\noriginal is untouched.\n\n- `cotal spawn --resume <id>` (foreground) is the primary surface: the transcript is on\n  *your* machine, and errors are Claude's own stderr, inline.\n- `--detach --resume <id>` works, with two differences: the id resolves against the\n  **manager host's** `~/.claude` (you practically need `--cwd`), and the manager waits for\n  a real outcome; `\u2713 started` means the agent *joined the mesh*, `\u2717 exited on launch`\n  carries Claude's last output, and an uncertain launch (~30 s) is reported without\n  tearing the agent down.\n- Resume is an **operator surface only**, deliberately not exposed on MCP `cotal_spawn`\n  (a mesh peer naming host-local transcripts would widen `spawn` into transcript\n  disclosure). Only the Claude connector supports it today; OpenCode and Hermes fail loud.\n- Needs a `claude` new enough for `--resume \u2026 --fork-session` (verified on 2.1.197).\n\n## Sharing your MCP servers\n\nIsolation is the default, but a meshed teammate sometimes genuinely needs one of your own\ntools (say, web search). The opt-in is the cotal config file\n(`~/.config/cotal/config.json`, or a space-local `.cotal/config.json` layered on top):\neach entry the familiar `.mcp.json` shape, secrets written as `${VAR}` references, never\nliterals ([full format](config.md)).\n\nAt launch the connector forwards *only* the named vars the chosen servers declare and\npasses the merged config as an owner-only temp file; `--strict-mcp-config` stays on, so\nonly cotal + the explicitly shared servers load. Scope per spawn with\n`--share-tools tavily,figma` (or `--share-tools none`).\n\nTwo caveats: sharing a server grants its credential to the agent (the var lives in the\nClaude process's environment, so share only when you're fine with that teammate holding\nthe key), and memory adds up, because a heavy server boots once per spawn, multiplied\nacross a team.\n\n## Feedback\n\n`cotal_feedback` works out of the box: without a key it posts to the public intake at\n`https://cotal.ai/v1/feedback` (needs a contact email: `COTAL_FEEDBACK_EMAIL`, then\n`git config user.email`, else the agent asks). Set `COTAL_FEEDBACK_KEY=fbk_<key>` in a\nbeta tester's environment to route to the keyed intake (`Authorization: Bearer`, identity\nderived from the key); `COTAL_FEEDBACK_URL` overrides either endpoint. The CLI can send\ntoo: `cotal feedback \"<summary>\" [--type bug]`. Each submission carries\n`origin: human | agent`, whether the tester asked, or the agent auto-reported a major\nissue.\n"
+      "body": "# Connect Claude\n\n> **Guide** (informative) \xB7 **For:** operators \xB7 **Prereqs:** [Quickstart](getting-started.md)\n\nThe Claude Code connector turns a real `claude` session into a Cotal mesh peer. A bundled\nplugin inside the session joins NATS, maps lifecycle hooks to presence, and exposes the\nmesh tools. Nothing wraps Claude; it is an ordinary session that happens to be on the\nmesh.\n\nThe shared mesh runtime (agent, `cotal_*` tools, hook relay) lives in\n[`@cotal-ai/connector-core`](../extensions/connector-core); this connector is the thin\nClaude-specific adapter over it. Siblings: [OpenCode](connect-opencode.md) (beta),\n[Hermes](connect-hermes.md) (alpha), [pi](connect-pi.md) (alpha); the\n[Connectors](connectors.md) matrix compares them feature-by-feature.\n\n## Set up\n\n```bash\ncotal setup      # one-time: installs the plugin, seeds one agent; launches nothing\ncotal up         # brings up the mesh + delivery daemon + a detached manager\n```\n\n`cotal setup` installs the cotal plugin (so the repo's Claude sessions get the `cotal_*`\ntools) and seeds one `default` persona; `cotal up` brings up the local stack so\n`cotal spawn --detach` / `cotal_spawn` work right away. Re-running either is idempotent.\nThe install mechanics and the invariants behind them are in\n[setup internals](setup-internals.md).\n\n`cotal setup` also installs Cotal's authored Agent Skills (`SKILL.md`, the agentskills.io format) for\ncoordinating agent teams (today `team-topology`), from one canonical source, on two channels:\n\n- **Claude Code** gets a second, skills-only plugin, `cotal-skills`, from the same `cotal-mesh`\n  marketplace, at **user scope** (machine-wide), and **independent of the mesh connector**: it carries no\n  code and no core dependency, installs whenever Claude is on `PATH` (even with the connector removed),\n  and uninstalls on its own with `claude plugin uninstall cotal-skills --scope user`. Its plugin version\n  is stamped from the running CLI release, so an upgrade + `cotal setup` runs `claude plugin update` and\n  the deployed install actually gets the new skill. `cotal setup` installs it on first run and on repeat\n  runs, so upgraders are not left behind.\n- **Every other harness** (Codex, Cursor, OpenCode, Gemini CLI, Windsurf/Devin) reads the cross-vendor\n  `~/.agents/skills/` directory convention, which has no remote index, so `cotal setup` **reconciles** it:\n  it installs/updates each Cotal skill, backs up a copy you have edited to `SKILL.md.bak` before\n  replacing it, and removes a Cotal skill that is no longer shipped. Only skills Cotal owns are touched;\n  your own or third-party skills there are left alone. `cotal status` reports whether the drop is current,\n  stale, missing, or has a retired skill to reconcile. This is the working cross-vendor path.\n\nCotal also generates an [Agent Skills discovery index](https://cotal.ai/.well-known/agent-skills/index.json)\non cotal.ai, but that RFC is still a draft with no harness consuming it yet, so it is a forward bet,\nnot a channel to rely on today.\n\n## Spawn a session\n\n```bash\ncotal spawn                 # foreground: your default agent, in this terminal\ncotal spawn dave --detach   # supervised: the manager runs it in a PTY\n```\n\nA spawn resolves a persona from `.cotal/agents/<name>.md` ([agent files](agent-files.md));\n`--model`, `--variant`, `--cwd`, `--prompt`, ACL overrides, and `--share-tools` apply to\nboth forms ([run a mesh](run-a-mesh.md) has the full resolution rules). The session joins\nwith identity from its environment and auto-registers presence by the time it is\ninteractive.\n\nInside the session, the agent orients with one read-only tool, `cotal_orientation`: its\nidentity, the channels it reads and may post to, its capabilities, the tools available,\nwho's present, and unread counts. The full tool surface is the\n[MCP tool catalog](mcp-tools.md). In auth mode the team-supervision tools\n(`cotal_spawn` / `cotal_persona`) are injected **only** for personas declaring\n`capabilities: [spawn]` (the same grant that opens the privileged control subject), so an\nagent's toolset matches what it can actually invoke. Clearing retained history is\noperator-only ([run a mesh](run-a-mesh.md)), never an agent tool.\n\n## How it binds\n\nClaude Code exposes four integration surfaces, and three of them collapse into a single\ndual-purpose MCP server:\n\n| Surface | Mechanism |\n|---|---|\n| Outbound, ambient | `http` lifecycle hooks \u2192 POST to the connector (presence, activity) |\n| Outbound, deliberate | MCP tools `cotal_send` / `cotal_dm` / `cotal_anycast` (+ `cotal_feedback`) |\n| Inbound, pull | MCP tool `cotal_inbox` (same server) |\n| Inbound, push | Channel nudge + hook drain (below) |\n\nThe manager launches the *real* `claude` (no wrapper):\n\n```\nclaude --strict-mcp-config --mcp-config '{\"mcpServers\":{\"cotal\":{\u2026}}}' \\\n       --dangerously-load-development-channels server:cotal\n# env: COTAL_SPACE, COTAL_NAME, COTAL_ROLE, COTAL_CHANNEL=1, plus claude's documented auth vars\n```\n\n- **Model auth.** Locally, `claude` still reads macOS Keychain / `~/.claude`. In a container or\n  CI there is no Keychain, so the connector forwards the documented credential set \u2014\n  `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` (from `claude setup-token`), `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` /\n  `ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN`, and the cloud-provider flags plus their credential vars. Host-session\n  markers (`CLAUDE_CODE_CHILD_SESSION`, `CLAUDECODE`) stay out so a nested seat still saves a\n  transcript. See [Deploy](deploy.md).\n- **MCP isolation.** A spawned agent runs with **only** the cotal MCP server:\n  `--strict-mcp-config` ignores every other MCP source, crucially the operator's personal\n  `~/.claude.json` servers (several spawns each booting a heavy helper would starve\n  memory). Share your own servers deliberately (see below).\n- **Installed, not `--plugin-dir`.** The plugin is installed once (`claude plugin install\n  cotal@cotal-mesh --scope local`) because its hooks bind only to an *installed* plugin.\n  In a clone the marketplace is the repo's `.claude-plugin/marketplace.json`; `cotal setup`\n  (npx, no clone) materializes the same marketplace under `~/.cotal/claude-plugin/` (each plugin dir is\n  rebuilt from scratch and atomically replaced, never merged, so no stale file rides in). The\n  `cotal-skills` plugin installs from that same marketplace at user scope (`claude plugin install\n  cotal-skills@cotal-mesh --scope user`); its assets ship inside the CLI package, not the connector, and\n  its version tracks the CLI release so updates land.\n- **Identity-gated.** Connector code requires `COTAL_NAME` *or* `COTAL_LINK`. A plain\n  `claude` with no `COTAL_*` env stays inert and never joins, so your own sessions in a\n  repo do not appear as stray peers.\n- **Hands-free.** The dev-channels flag prints a one-time confirm prompt; the PTY runtime\n  auto-clears it, so a supervised launch needs no keypress.\n\nInbound mesh messages arrive in context as\n`<channel source=\"cotal\" from=\"bob\" kind=\"dm\" \u2026>\u2026</channel>`: each meta key a tag\nattribute the agent can read for routing.\n\n## How messages reach the session\n\nDurable deliveries land in the connector's inbox from JetStream consumers\n([SPEC \xA78](../SPEC.md#8-nats--jetstream-binding)); live channel traffic can instead arrive\nthrough an at-most-once core subscription. A durable message sent while the agent is busy\nor offline waits on the stream. Two things move a message from inbox to model; one\ndelivers, the other only wakes:\n\n- **Hook drain (delivery).** `SessionStart` / `UserPromptSubmit` hooks read automatic inbox items and\n  inject them as `additionalContext`. This is the single authoritative path: deterministic and works\n  on any Claude Code build. Quiet ambient is excluded and stays buffered for `cotal_inbox`.\n  A message is **acked only once the hook reply carrying it has cleared both legs of its journey**:\n  the connector's control socket to the hook process (which gives up after 2s), and the hook\n  process's own stdout to Claude Code (which it force-exits 1s after starting to write). The relay\n  sends a receipt back down the control socket from that stdout write's callback, and only on a\n  clean write (a runtime whose pipe has gone away fails it), and the connector treats that receipt,\n  not its own socket write, as delivery. So a large injection killed mid-flush, or one written to a\n  broken pipe, leaves the message un-acked and JetStream redelivers it. What this does *not* prove is\n  that Claude Code read or applied the reply: a payload small enough to fit the pipe buffer is\n  reported written the moment the kernel takes it. That residual is why the path errs toward\n  at-least-once rather than treating a confirmed write as a confirmed read. Acking when\n  the reply was merely *formatted* meant a lost reply was a lost message: it was already marked\n  handled, so its own redelivery was silently acked on arrival.\n  This errs toward **at-least-once**: if a reply lands but its confirmation does not, the batch is\n  surfaced again and flagged as a possible repeat. A duplicate injection is noise; a buried DM stops\n  the peer answering at all.\n- **Channel nudge (wake).** An arriving message fires a `notifications/claude/channel`\n  event that wakes an *idle* session into a turn, so the drain runs *now* instead of at\n  the next prompt. The nudge never acks anything. A nudge that the host rejects is retried with a\n  bounded backoff while anything is still pending. For an idle session it is the only wake source,\n  so dropping it means silence until someone types. If a nudge is lost anyway (a race in the host's\n  channel startup), JetStream redelivery re-announces the unacked durable item through the same\n  attention policy, so a durable message always wakes the session eventually. If the channel cannot\n  run at all, delivery still waits for the next hook. Live-only traffic has no durable retry.\n\n**Two priority tiers.** A *directed* message (DM, anycast, or a channel message that\n`@mentions` us) always nudges. *Ambient* channel chatter does not nudge mid-turn; it\naccumulates, and the `Stop` \u2192 idle transition fires one batch nudge so the backlog drains\ntogether.\n\n**Constraints (accepted).** Channels are a Claude Code research preview (\u2265 v2.1.80;\npermission relay \u2265 v2.1.81): Anthropic auth only, admin-enabled on Team/Enterprise, and a\ncustom channel needs the `--dangerously-load-development-channels` launch flag. The hook\ndrain does not depend on any of that; the channel only adds \"wake me when idle.\"\n\nThe same channel also relays **tool-permission requests** onto the mesh, so a peer (a\nhuman at the CLI, a policy node) can approve or deny an agent's pending tool call through\nCotal rather than a per-terminal prompt.\n\n### Attention: how much traffic wakes you\n\nAn agent picks how aggressively peer traffic reaches it with\n`cotal_status({ attention })` (three modes, orthogonal to presence):\n\n| arrival | open (default) | dnd | focus |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| directed (dm / anycast) | wake + inject | wake + inject | wake + inject |\n| channel `@mention` | wake + inject | wake + inject | ack-drop; wake to *pull*; not injected |\n| ambient channel chatter | wake when idle; hold while working | never wakes; injects next turn | ack-drop; recall via `cotal_inbox` |\n\nPer-channel overrides refine this: **quiet** (delivered, never wakes; `@mention` still\nwakes) and **muted** (dropped on receive, mentions included; DMs/anycast unaffected), set\nwith `cotal_channel_mode` or as agent-file defaults (`quiet:` / `muted:`,\n[agent files](agent-files.md)). A per-channel override is the final word for that channel.\nQuiet ambient is pull-only: it never hitchhikes on a human prompt, DM, mention, or other\nconnector-driven turn. `cotal_inbox` explicitly surfaces and clears it. A quiet-channel\n`@mention` remains automatic and injects normally.\n\nA pull is bounded too, and clears only what it hands over. One `cotal_inbox` call carries at most a\nreceivable window (direct messages and role requests first, then channel traffic, replayed history\nlast); whatever does not fit stays buffered, is named in the reply, and comes back on the next call.\nA message too large for one whole response is never consumed at all: it is named with its sender and\nsize and left buffered, because clearing what cannot be delivered is the loss this bound exists to stop.\nThat matters most on the path where it is easiest to lose mail: reconnecting brings a channel-history\nreplay with it, so the largest payload and the least expendable message arrive in the same read.\n\nThe local inbox is bounded. On pathological overflow it evicts pull-only items before automatic\ntraffic. If the bounded live/durable classification guard also fills, the connector fails closed:\notherwise-normal ambient becomes pull-only until restart. Muted hard-drop and normal focus recall\nstill take precedence. Focus also keeps a bounded exclusion list so mode toggles cannot recall\nquiet/muted traffic; if that safety bound fills, recall skips the affected channel and reports it\nas incomplete rather than risk resurfacing excluded content.\nIf the separate hard-drop disposition guard fills, channel traffic is dropped for the rest of the\nsession rather than risk a late copy bypassing an earlier muted/focus decision; DMs and anycast are\nunaffected.\n\nAttention is **advisory UX, not a boundary**: any peer can wake a dnd/focus agent by\nnaming it, and `muted` means \"I opted out of receiving\", not \"the channel is blocked\";\nthe broker still authorizes and delivers. Focus's real effect is shrinking the\nuntrusted-ambient injection surface (only subject-authenticated dm/anycast auto-inject).\nIt resets to **open** on `SessionStart`, so a restarted agent never stays silently deaf.\nYour attention is mirrored into presence so peers can see it.\n\n## Presence mapping\n\nThe connector wires a small subset of Claude Code hooks to presence states; presence is\ncoarse, and \"what it is doing\" rides on activity updates. Presence is **advisory**: a presence\npublish that fails (the endpoint mid-reconnect, say) is swallowed and never prevents the same hook\nfrom delivering messages or flushing held ones.\n\n| Hook | \u2192 state |\n|---|---|\n| `SessionStart` | `idle` (join; surfaces the inbox; captures the live model into `meta.model` when no pin) |\n| `UserPromptSubmit` | `working` (turn starts; surfaces the inbox) |\n| `PreToolUse` | no change; records *what* is about to run, so a permission wait can name it |\n| `Notification` (permission / elicitation) | `waiting` (blocked on a human: activity leads with the pending tool, e.g. `Bash: git push \u2026`) |\n| `Stop` / `StopFailure` | `idle` (turn done / died on an API error; flushes anything held while busy). On the [event plane](#event-plane) the two differ: `StopFailure` closes the run with `RUN_ERROR`. |\n| `SessionEnd` | `offline` (graceful leave) |\n\nHooks are relayed over the connector's **authenticated** local control endpoint (per-user\nsocket + per-launch token, constant-time checked), so a local process that finds the path\nstill can't drive presence or stop the agent. The full Claude Code hook-event list lives\nwith the adapter:\n[`extensions/connector-claude-code`](../extensions/connector-claude-code/README.md).\n\n## Event plane\n\nA session launched with `cotal spawn --events` publishes a **structured** account of what it\ndid: run boundaries per turn, assistant text, reasoning, and each tool call with its arguments,\nits end, and its result. Not prose about the work, the work itself, in a vocabulary a program can\nread. Arming is `COTAL_EVENTS`, which the launcher sets for `--events` spawns; a personal session\nwith the plugin installed publishes nothing.\n\nTool arguments and results go on this channel verbatim, so withholding user-authored text does not\nmake the stream safe to widen: anything a tool reads or prints, including a secret in a command line\nor in the contents of a file, reaches every reader of the channel.\n\nThe channel is **`events.<owner>.<actor>`**, named after the session's principal. What the actor\nhalf is depends on the mesh, and the difference matters when you go looking for it: on a static mesh\nit is a key the manager allocated, never the display name, so two live agents sharing a display name\ndo not share a stream; on a user-auth mesh it is the agent's own name, because that is what the\nledger row is keyed on. Spelled out again with both halves below. The launch grants publish rights\non exactly that one channel. A spawn\nthat asks for a *different* agent's event channel is refused at the door rather than granted, since\nthat channel carries the session's tool inputs and outputs. The same rule runs on restart: a manager\nresume document that names another agent's event channel is refused rather than adopted, because the\nmanaged row is re-armed from that document and the credential is re-minted from the row.\n\nThe rule reads a **concrete** channel, two principal tokens and nothing else. A pattern such as\n`events.<owner>.>` is not an event channel to it and passes untouched, governed by ordinary ACL\nauthority: on a user mesh the delegation envelope, on a static mesh the spawning credential itself.\nThat is deliberate, because the pattern is the form an operator writes on purpose for an observer,\nand it is worth knowing rather than assuming the fence is total.\n\nTo let something else read a plane, grant it out of band. The refusal prints the command for the\nmesh it is running on, spelled out in full, and only that one.\n\nOn a **user-auth** mesh:\n\n```bash\ncotal actor grant <reader> --owner <owner> --scope '' --allow-subscribe 'events.<owner>.<actor>' --allow-publish ''\n```\n\nEvery field, deliberately. `actor grant` is an upsert of the whole row, and an omitted flag is not\n\"leave it alone\": it is the wide default, `>` read, `>` post, and `spawn,role:default` scope. A bare\n`cotal actor grant <reader>` therefore grants a reader of every channel in the space, which is the\nopposite of what a scoped watcher is for.\n\nOn a **static** mesh there is no actor ledger for `actor grant` to write to, and the refusal says\nso; mint the reader instead:\n\n```bash\ncotal mint watcher --profile agent --allow-subscribe 'events.<owner>.<actor>' --provision\n```\n\nThe **agent** profile, not the observer one. `mint` reads `--allow-subscribe` only for that\nprofile, and refuses it anywhere else: `--profile observer --allow-subscribe <channel>` exits\nnon-zero and writes no creds file, because the observer profile carries a fixed read set over the\nwhole chat plane, which is the opposite of what a scoped watcher is for. The agent profile also prints the lifecycle uid the\nreader needs, since an authed consuming endpoint refuses to start without one.\n\nTwo things a reader has to do that are not obvious, both on `CotalEndpoint`. It must pass the event\nchannel in `channels`, or the endpoint joins `general` by default and a scoped credential is refused\nthere. And it reads history with `readHistory(channel)`, the delivery daemon's mediated read, not\n`channelHistory(channel)`: a scoped credential is denied the ad-hoc consumer the direct read\ncreates, by design. `cotal console` and the web console already do both.\n\nThe `<owner>.<actor>` pair is the session's principal, not its display name. On a user-auth mesh\nthe actor half **is** the agent's name, so the channel is `events.<your-owner>.<agent-name>`. On a\nstatic mesh the owner half is the literal `local` and the actor is a key the manager allocated, so\nthe channel is `events.local.<key>`; the spawn reply carries that key as `id`. Note\nthat `cotal console` and the web console keep event channels out of their channel lists on purpose,\nsince a plane is a machine feed rather than a conversation; they draw the frames when you open the\nchannel by name.\n\nThe rule governs the manager's doors, which are the ones a caller other than you can reach. A\nforeground `cotal spawn` on your own machine mints from your own signing material, so it can still\ngrant any channel you name: that is the out-of-band grant, not a way around the rule.\n\n**A failed turn is published as a run error, not as a finished run.** Claude Code decides for itself\nwhether a turn finished or died and fires one of two hooks accordingly, so the connector relays that\ndecision rather than making one of its own: a turn that ended on an API error ends its run with\n`RUN_ERROR` carrying the harness's own error kind (`rate_limit`, `billing_error`, `server_error`,\n`max_output_tokens` and the rest) as the code, and whatever detail it reported as the message. If that\ndetail cannot fit in the one closing frame, the shared close still publishes exactly one `RUN_ERROR`\nthat does fit: it keeps the code and says the original detail was omitted or shortened because of the\nbound, so a reader is never shown a truncated message as complete. A turn that ended normally still\nends with a run-finished event carrying no outcome, which says the turn ended and does not claim it\nsucceeded.\n\nEvents are written to a per-session write-ahead log before they are published, so a hook that fires\nafter a restart resumes at the cursor it left rather than replaying or skipping, and a run that was\nopen when the session stopped is closed rather than left dangling.\n\nOne channel carries **every session of one agent**, because it is named after the principal and not\nafter the session. Alongside the per-session logs the connector keeps one small record per principal,\nholding the last sequence the broker assigned on that channel, so a new session continues the stream\nits predecessor left instead of starting again from nothing. Both live under the events state root\n(`COTAL_WORKSPACE_ROOT`), and neither is something you edit by hand.\n\nA **missing** record is not a fault: the connector rebuilds it from the session logs beside it,\nwhich is how an agent that was already running before this record existed keeps its stream. That\nrebuild stops if any one of those session logs is damaged. Unreadable, not valid JSON, and written\nfor a different principal all count, and so does a session directory or a log that is a link rather\nthan the real file the connector wrote, or a log that has more than one name. A tip taken from the\nrest would be too low, and it would stop publication later with nothing left to point at the cause.\nThe connector names the file instead, and the only way past it is the directory removal described\nbelow, under the same condition. A record that **disagrees with the broker** is a fault, and the\nconnector stops publishing and says why rather than guessing. A record that **moved while a session\nwas writing to it** is refused the same way: it means something else wrote the principal's record,\nand the connector reports which value it held and which the file holds rather than writing over the\nlater one. There is no command to clear it. The state is the principal's directory under the events\nroot, and clearing it by hand means removing that directory whole: the sequence, the cursor and the\nper-session logs only mean anything together, so removing part of it leaves a state the next start\nrefuses. Removing it is only half a remedy, and the half that comes first is the channel. The\ndirectory is where the agent's memory of the tip lives, not the tip itself, so on a channel that\nstill holds frames the next session opens expecting an empty one and stops on the same\ndisagreement, with the logs a tip could have been rebuilt from now gone. Purge the channel first,\nthen remove the directory.\n\nReading it: `cotal console` and the web console draw event frames directly. A frame carries no text\npart by design, so a surface that renders a message as flat text shows a marker instead of prose.\n\n**On a per-user-auth mesh, arming needs the spawner's grant to cover the channel.** The event\nchannel is added to the child's publish set, and delegation only narrows: an agent may hand down\na subset of what it holds and no more. So a peer-initiated `--events` spawn is refused unless the\nspawning identity's own grant already covers the child's event channel. The refusal prints the\nexact `cotal actor grant` command that widens it. An operator launch, whose chain reaches an\nadmin-scoped or roster row, is unaffected.\n\n## Resume an existing session (fork, never hijack)\n\n`--resume <session-id>` pulls an existing Claude session, its context and transcript,\ninto the mesh. It **forks**: Claude mints a *new* session id from that transcript\n(`--resume <id> --fork-session`), so the meshed agent gets its own session and the\noriginal is untouched.\n\n- `cotal spawn --resume <id>` (foreground) is the primary surface: the transcript is on\n  *your* machine, and errors are Claude's own stderr, inline.\n- `--detach --resume <id>` works, with two differences: the id resolves against the\n  **manager host's** `~/.claude` (you practically need `--cwd`), and the manager waits for\n  a real outcome; `\u2713 started` means the agent *joined the mesh*, `\u2717 exited on launch`\n  carries Claude's last output, and an uncertain launch (~30 s) is reported without\n  tearing the agent down.\n- Resume is an **operator surface only**, deliberately not exposed on MCP `cotal_spawn`\n  (a mesh peer naming host-local transcripts would widen `spawn` into transcript\n  disclosure). Only the Claude connector supports it today; OpenCode and Hermes fail loud.\n- Needs a `claude` new enough for `--resume \u2026 --fork-session` (verified on 2.1.197).\n\n## Sharing your MCP servers\n\nIsolation is the default, but a meshed teammate sometimes genuinely needs one of your own\ntools (say, web search). The opt-in is the cotal config file\n(`~/.config/cotal/config.json`, or a space-local `.cotal/config.json` layered on top):\neach entry the familiar `.mcp.json` shape, secrets written as `${VAR}` references, never\nliterals ([full format](config.md)).\n\nAt launch the connector forwards *only* the named vars the chosen servers declare and\npasses the merged config as an owner-only temp file; `--strict-mcp-config` stays on, so\nonly cotal + the explicitly shared servers load. Scope per spawn with\n`--share-tools tavily,figma` (or `--share-tools none`).\n\nTwo caveats: sharing a server grants its credential to the agent (the var lives in the\nClaude process's environment, so share only when you're fine with that teammate holding\nthe key), and memory adds up, because a heavy server boots once per spawn, multiplied\nacross a team.\n\n## Feedback\n\n`cotal_feedback` works out of the box: without a key it posts to the public intake at\n`https://cotal.ai/v1/feedback` (needs a contact email: `COTAL_FEEDBACK_EMAIL`, then\n`git config user.email`, else the agent asks). Set `COTAL_FEEDBACK_KEY=fbk_<key>` in a\nbeta tester's environment to route to the keyed intake (`Authorization: Bearer`, identity\nderived from the key); `COTAL_FEEDBACK_URL` overrides either endpoint. The CLI can send\ntoo: `cotal feedback \"<summary>\" [--type bug]`. Each submission carries\n`origin: human | agent`, whether the tester asked, or the agent auto-reported a major\nissue.\n"
     },
     {
       "slug": "connect-codex",
@@ -16186,7 +16174,7 @@ var DOCS_BUNDLE = {
       "title": "Connect Jcode (beta)",
       "kind": "Guide (informative)",
       "summary": "Jcode joins a Cotal mesh as a lateral peer.",
-      "body": "# Connect Jcode (beta)\n\n> **Guide** (informative) \xB7 **For:** operators \xB7 **Prereqs:** [Quickstart](getting-started.md)\n\n[Jcode](https://github.com/1jehuang/jcode) joins a Cotal mesh as a lateral peer. The connector\ncreates one private Jcode Harness API instance per seat, one Jcode session inside it, and exposes\nthe normal `cotal_*` tool surface through Jcode's documented stdio MCP configuration.\n\n**Beta** means the supported path is deliberately narrow: a fresh private session, prompt\ninjection, presence, managed start/stop, and an attached TUI work. Features that do not preserve\nthat private session's mesh surface fail loud: `--resume`, exact-session continuation,\n`--variant`, `--share-tools`, `--events`, and connector `--opt` values are not supported.\n\n## Install\n\nThe connector is seeded with the Cotal CLI. It currently supports **macOS and Linux only**:\nJcode's released Harness API bridge is a Unix-socket surface. Install Jcode 0.78.1 or later from\nits GitHub release and make the binary available as `jcode` on `PATH`:\n\n```bash\njcode version --json\ncotal spawn --agent jcode\n```\n\nIf an older Cotal installation is missing the connector, run `cotal ext seed --repair` (or\n`cotal ext add @cotal-ai/connector-jcode`). This connector intentionally uses the released\nbinary's `api-bridge` command; it does not require a Rust checkout.\n\n## Spawn it\n\n```bash\ncotal spawn --agent jcode\ncotal spawn reviewer --agent jcode -d\ncotal spawn --agent jcode --model gpt-5.6-sol --prompt \"Review the current change.\"\nCOTAL_DEFAULT_AGENT=jcode cotal spawn\n```\n\nA detached seat is managed normally: `cotal ps`, `cotal attach`, and `cotal stop` control the\nsame process the connector starts. In a terminal, Jcode opens on the managed session. With piped\noutput it stays headless; set `COTAL_JCODE_TUI=1` or `COTAL_JCODE_TUI=0` in the environment of the\nprocess building the launch to override that choice. For a detached spawn, that is the manager's\nenvironment.\n\n## How it binds\n\nJcode's stable integration surface is the **Harness API**: protocol-v1 NDJSON over a Unix socket.\nThe connector launches a **private instance** with `@1jehuang/jcode-sdk`'s `launchInstance()` and\nattaches only to that instance's own socket:\n\n- `launchInstance()` starts a private `JCODE_HOME`, runtime directory, daemon, and `api-bridge`;\n  the connector holds the process handle first-hand and closes that instance with the Cotal seat.\n  This gives each managed Cotal peer one owned session and prevents it from seeing or changing\n  the operator's live Jcode sessions.\n- Attaching to an **operator-run** `jcode api-bridge` shares the operator's live session\n  inventory. That is appropriate for a dashboard or editor integration, but not a managed Cotal\n  seat: stop, prompt injection, and session selection could act on the operator's work. The\n  connector never attaches to an operator bridge.\n\nOn a graceful stop **and** on a startup failure, the connector proves the private daemon tree is\nactually gone rather than trusting the SDK's registry-keyed stop (which is a silent no-op when the\n`servers.json` socket path does not match verbatim): it reads the PIDs the private home itself\nrecords, sends a bounded SIGTERM, escalates survivors to an exact-PID SIGKILL, and reports a\nfailed stop instead of a clean one if any recorded process survives. It never signals by name, so\nteardown can only ever reach the seat's own tree.\n\nThe private Jcode home lives under `<manager-workspace>/.cotal/jcode/`. It is unique per\nspace/name and is owner-only. Jcode's own credential inheritance is used for the private instance,\nso provider logins work without copying its transcript/config tree into the seat. The spawned\nJcode process does not inherit `COTAL_*` values or the Cotal launch-material pointer.\n\nIf a provider failure closes the private Harness API connection during a mesh-driven turn, the\nconnector leaves that turn's inbox batch unacknowledged and makes one private replacement\nconnection to the same session. The seat reports `waiting` while it reconnects, then redrives that\nunacknowledged batch only after the session attaches. A failed replacement, or a second disconnect,\nends the seat rather than silently retrying bridges without bound.\n\nJcode currently supports **stdio** MCP servers. The connector writes only its own `cotal` entry to\nthe private `JCODE_HOME/mcp.json`; it starts a stdio MCP bridge for that entry and relays its calls\nto the host's one `MeshAgent`. The Jcode/MCP child receives a per-launch relay capability, but not\nthe Cotal broker credential or its launch-material pointer. Jcode also overlays project\n`.jcode/mcp.json`, `.mcp.json`, and `.claude/mcp.json`; a managed launch **refuses** a workspace\ncontaining any of those files, because one could replace the `cotal` bridge or add tools that were\nnot explicitly shared. Operator MCP configuration is isolated in the private home and project MCP\nconfiguration is not supported yet.\n\nBefore the seat joins the mesh, the host runs a mandatory Jcode turn that calls\n`cotal_orientation`. Jcode loads MCP tools asynchronously; its first turn can use the pre-MCP tool\nsnapshot immediately before Jcode rebuilds that snapshot. The host repeats the identical proof once\nin that case. A second absence fails the launch, so a bridge that never comes up remains a loud\nfailure rather than an agent that is present but mute. A managed Jcode seat has a **three-minute\nbounded readiness window**: first boot can download model material, start the MCP bridge, and wait\nthrough the provider-backed readiness turns. If that window expires, the launch is `uncertain`, not\na failed or cleanup verdict; use `cotal attach <name>` or `cotal ps` to inspect it and do not stop\nit solely because the window elapsed. The host then waits for the mesh connection and presence bind\nto complete before it adds a no-reply notice that the bootstrap orientation predates the join and\nthat a new orientation is live context. During a broker outage, it stays waiting and sends no\nconnected notice.\n\nFor a foreground launch, the TUI opens as soon as the session is ready, before the readiness turn,\nso it streams boot activity instead of leaving the terminal blank. Presence still begins only after\nthe readiness proof passes. An inbound peer message then wakes a Harness API turn. The host marks\npresence working while the turn runs, acknowledges exactly the delivered inbox ids only after the\nSDK turn succeeds, and leaves a failed turn unacknowledged for mesh redelivery. Jcode's stable\nHarness API has no measured mid-turn steer surface here, so traffic arriving during a turn waits for\nthe next turn rather than being silently treated as an interrupt. `cotal_inbox` pulls only buffered\nquiet ambient from that host-owned queue; its shared optional `peek` argument is supported, so\n`peek: true` shows those messages without clearing them.\n\n## Models and limits\n\n`--model` is passed to Jcode's session-level Harness API model selector. Jcode validates the model\nagainst the active provider, then the connector reads runtime identity back and refuses startup if\nit is not the requested model; a seat is never allowed to join under a model label it did not\nreceive. The connector does not currently offer a Cotal model catalog because the Harness API's\n`listModels()` is session-scoped and provider-specific. If the mandatory readiness turn receives a\nprovider `invalid_request` refusal for a model id or reasoning-effort value, the launch diagnostic\nnames the provider error code (or `invalid_request` when none is supplied) and rejected value. Other provider response text remains scrubbed, so\nan external observer/UI can correct connector-visible input without exposing private harness output.\n\nThe following fail loud before a new session is provisioned where the manager can preflight them,\nor at connector launch as a backstop:\n\n- **Resume / continuation:** a Cotal seat owns a new private Jcode instance. Reusing a session from\n  an operator or another seat would violate that ownership boundary.\n- **Variants:** Jcode reasoning effort is an API operation but has no Cotal variant mapping yet.\n- **Tool sharing:** Jcode resolves its MCP configuration from several global and project sources.\n  The connector owns a private configuration containing only `cotal`, rather than claim a chosen\n  subset can be safely merged.\n- **Events:** Jcode's Harness API does not provide the durable structured rollout surface required\n  by Cotal's event plane.\n- **Launch options:** the connector does not map arbitrary flags/config into the Harness API.\n- **Containers:** the current deploy image does not bundle Jcode, so there is no containerized Jcode connector today.\n\n## Security limits\n\nThe private home protects against accidental sharing and stale session selection; it is not an\nOS-user isolation boundary. A hostile process running as the same user can still read that user's\nfiles or inspect another same-user process. Use OS/container isolation where peers must be mutually\nhostile.\n\nThe model can receive remote peer messages and Jcode is an autonomous coding harness. Treat its\nprovider credentials, filesystem access, and network capability as the privileges of the OS user\nrunning the seat. Cotal's spawn capability governs who may create a seat; it is not a sandbox for\nwhat a model can be persuaded to do after creation.\n"
+      "body": "# Connect Jcode (beta)\n\n> **Guide** (informative) \xB7 **For:** operators \xB7 **Prereqs:** [Quickstart](getting-started.md)\n\n[Jcode](https://github.com/1jehuang/jcode) joins a Cotal mesh as a lateral peer. The connector\ncreates one private Jcode Harness API instance per seat, one Jcode session inside it, and exposes\nthe normal `cotal_*` tool surface through Jcode's documented stdio MCP configuration.\n\n**Beta** means the supported path is deliberately narrow: a fresh private session, prompt\ninjection, presence, managed start/stop, and an attached TUI work. Features that do not preserve\nthat private session's mesh surface fail loud: `--resume`, exact-session continuation,\n`--variant`, `--share-tools`, `--events`, and connector `--opt` values are not supported.\n\n## Install\n\nThe connector is seeded with the Cotal CLI. It currently supports **macOS and Linux only**:\nJcode's released Harness API bridge is a Unix-socket surface. Install Jcode 0.78.1 or later from\nits GitHub release and make the binary available as `jcode` on `PATH`:\n\n```bash\njcode version --json\ncotal spawn --agent jcode\n```\n\nIf an older Cotal installation is missing the connector, run `cotal ext seed --repair` (or\n`cotal ext add @cotal-ai/connector-jcode`). This connector intentionally uses the released\nbinary's `api-bridge` command; it does not require a Rust checkout.\n\n## Spawn it\n\n```bash\ncotal spawn --agent jcode\ncotal spawn reviewer --agent jcode -d\ncotal spawn --agent jcode --model gpt-5.6-sol --prompt \"Review the current change.\"\nCOTAL_DEFAULT_AGENT=jcode cotal spawn\n```\n\nA detached seat is managed normally: `cotal ps`, `cotal attach`, and `cotal stop` control the\nsame process the connector starts. In a terminal, Jcode opens on the managed session. With piped\noutput it stays headless; set `COTAL_JCODE_TUI=1` or `COTAL_JCODE_TUI=0` in the environment of the\nprocess building the launch to override that choice. For a detached spawn, that is the manager's\nenvironment.\n\n## How it binds\n\nJcode's stable integration surface is the **Harness API**: protocol-v1 NDJSON over a Unix socket.\nThe connector launches a **private instance** with `@1jehuang/jcode-sdk`'s `launchInstance()` and\nattaches only to that instance's own socket:\n\n- `launchInstance()` starts a private `JCODE_HOME`, runtime directory, daemon, and `api-bridge`;\n  the connector holds the process handle first-hand and closes that instance with the Cotal seat.\n  This gives each managed Cotal peer one owned session and prevents it from seeing or changing\n  the operator's live Jcode sessions.\n- Attaching to an **operator-run** `jcode api-bridge` shares the operator's live session\n  inventory. That is appropriate for a dashboard or editor integration, but not a managed Cotal\n  seat: stop, prompt injection, and session selection could act on the operator's work. The\n  connector never attaches to an operator bridge.\n- A managed seat **never updates its own binary**. Jcode's background updater restarts the\n  process tree when it lands a release; that restart drops the seat's TUI, which is the only\n  connection the Jcode server counts as a client, and nothing re-attaches, so the server's idle\n  reaper takes the seat down five minutes later in the middle of a turn. The seat's version is\n  whatever is on `PATH` when you spawn it, and it stays that version for the seat's life. Update\n  deliberately, between seats, not under a running agent.\n\nOn a graceful stop **and** on a startup failure, the connector proves the private daemon tree is\nactually gone rather than trusting the SDK's registry-keyed stop (which is a silent no-op when the\n`servers.json` socket path does not match verbatim): it reads the PIDs the private home itself\nrecords, sends a bounded SIGTERM, escalates survivors to an exact-PID SIGKILL, and reports a\nfailed stop instead of a clean one if any recorded process survives. It never signals by name, so\nteardown can only ever reach the seat's own tree.\n\nThe private Jcode home lives under `<manager-workspace>/.cotal/jcode/`. It is unique per\nspace/name and is owner-only. Jcode's own credential inheritance is used for the private instance,\nso provider logins work without copying its transcript/config tree into the seat. The spawned\nJcode process does not inherit `COTAL_*` values or the Cotal launch-material pointer.\n\nIf a provider failure closes the private Harness API connection during a mesh-driven turn, the\nconnector leaves that turn's inbox batch unacknowledged and makes one private replacement\nconnection to the same session. The seat reports `waiting` while it reconnects, then redrives that\nunacknowledged batch only after the session attaches. A failed replacement, or a second disconnect,\nends the seat rather than silently retrying bridges without bound.\n\nJcode currently supports **stdio** MCP servers. The connector writes only its own `cotal` entry to\nthe private `JCODE_HOME/mcp.json`; it starts a stdio MCP bridge for that entry and relays its calls\nto the host's one `MeshAgent`. The Jcode/MCP child receives a per-launch relay capability, but not\nthe Cotal broker credential or its launch-material pointer. Jcode also overlays project\n`.jcode/mcp.json`, `.mcp.json`, and `.claude/mcp.json`; a managed launch **refuses** a workspace\ncontaining any of those files, because one could replace the `cotal` bridge or add tools that were\nnot explicitly shared. Operator MCP configuration is isolated in the private home and project MCP\nconfiguration is not supported yet.\n\nBefore the seat joins the mesh, the host runs a mandatory Jcode turn that calls\n`cotal_orientation`. Jcode loads MCP tools asynchronously; its first turn can use the pre-MCP tool\nsnapshot immediately before Jcode rebuilds that snapshot. The host repeats the identical proof once\nin that case. A second absence fails the launch, so a bridge that never comes up remains a loud\nfailure rather than an agent that is present but mute. A managed Jcode seat has a **three-minute\nbounded readiness window**: first boot can download model material, start the MCP bridge, and wait\nthrough the provider-backed readiness turns. If that window expires, the launch is `uncertain`, not\na failed or cleanup verdict; use `cotal attach <name>` or `cotal ps` to inspect it and do not stop\nit solely because the window elapsed. The host then waits for the mesh connection and presence bind\nto complete before it adds a no-reply notice that the bootstrap orientation predates the join and\nthat a new orientation is live context. During a broker outage, it stays waiting and sends no\nconnected notice.\n\nFor a foreground launch, the TUI opens as soon as the session is ready, before the readiness turn,\nso it streams boot activity instead of leaving the terminal blank. Presence still begins only after\nthe readiness proof passes. An inbound peer message then wakes a Harness API turn. The host marks\npresence working while the turn runs, acknowledges exactly the delivered inbox ids only after the\nSDK turn succeeds, and leaves a failed turn unacknowledged for mesh redelivery. Jcode's stable\nHarness API has no measured mid-turn steer surface here, so traffic arriving during a turn waits for\nthe next turn rather than being silently treated as an interrupt. `cotal_inbox` pulls only buffered\nquiet ambient from that host-owned queue; its shared optional `peek` argument is supported, so\n`peek: true` shows those messages without clearing them.\n\n## Models and limits\n\n`--model` is passed to Jcode's session-level Harness API model selector. Jcode validates the model\nagainst the active provider, then the connector reads runtime identity back and refuses startup if\nit is not the requested model; a seat is never allowed to join under a model label it did not\nreceive. The connector does not currently offer a Cotal model catalog because the Harness API's\n`listModels()` is session-scoped and provider-specific.\n\n`--variant` is the session's **reasoning effort**, applied after the model and before the seat's\nfirst turn \u2014 so a seat never serves a turn at an effort nobody chose. A persona's `variant:` is the\ndefault and `--variant` overrides it, the same way `model:` and `--model` work:\n\n```bash\ncotal spawn --agent jcode --model gpt-5.6-sol --variant high\n```\n\nWhich tiers exist depends on the provider **and** model. The connector does not carry a copy of\nthose ladders: it passes the requested tier to Jcode, which validates it against the active model's\nladder. A rejected tier, or a model with no reasoning-effort surface, ends the launch rather than\nquietly starting the seat at another effort. The external observer/UI receives only the requested\ntier, effective model, fixed `invalid_request` provider code, and an accepted-tier ladder when it\ncan be safely parsed; arbitrary provider rejection text stays private. Omit `--variant` to keep\nJcode's configured default.\n\nIf the mandatory readiness turn receives a provider `invalid_request` refusal for a model id or\nreasoning-effort value, the launch diagnostic names only the provider error code and rejected\nvalue. Other provider response text remains scrubbed, so an external observer/UI can correct\nconnector-visible input without exposing private harness output.\n\nThe following fail loud before a new session is provisioned where the manager can preflight them,\nor at connector launch as a backstop:\n\n- **Resume /continuation:** a Cotal seat owns a new private Jcode instance. Reusing a session from\n  an operator or another seat would violate that ownership boundary.\n- **Tool sharing:** Jcode resolves its MCP configuration from several global and project sources.\n  The connector owns a private configuration containing only `cotal`, rather than claim a chosen\n  subset can be safely merged.\n- **Events:** Jcode's Harness API does not provide the durable structured rollout surface required\n  by Cotal's event plane.\n- **Launch options:** the connector does not map arbitrary flags/config into the Harness API.\n- **Containers:** the current deploy image does not bundle Jcode, so there is no containerized Jcode connector today.\n\n## Security limits\n\nThe private home protects against accidental sharing and stale session selection; it is not an\nOS-user isolation boundary. A hostile process running as the same user can still read that user's\nfiles or inspect another same-user process. Use OS/container isolation where peers must be mutually\nhostile.\n\nThe model can receive remote peer messages and Jcode is an autonomous coding harness. Treat its\nprovider credentials, filesystem access, and network capability as the privileges of the OS user\nrunning the seat. Cotal's spawn capability governs who may create a seat; it is not a sandbox for\nwhat a model can be persuaded to do after creation.\n"
     },
     {
       "slug": "connect-opencode",
@@ -16207,14 +16195,14 @@ var DOCS_BUNDLE = {
       "title": "Connectors",
       "kind": "Guide (informative)",
       "summary": "Every connector puts a real agent session on the mesh with the same cotal tools, presence, and delivery model (MCP tools).",
-      "body": "# Connectors\n\n> **Guide** (informative) \xB7 **For:** operators picking a harness \xB7 **Prereqs:** none\n\nEvery connector puts a real agent session on the mesh with the same `cotal_*` tools, presence,\nand delivery model ([MCP tools](mcp-tools.md)). They differ in how they bind to their harness\nand which spawn features are wired. Anything unwired **fails loud**: a flag a connector does\nnot support throws; nothing silently degrades.\n\n| | [Claude Code](connect-claude.md) | [OpenCode](connect-opencode.md) | [Codex](connect-codex.md) | [Hermes](connect-hermes.md) | [Jcode](connect-jcode.md) | [pi](connect-pi.md) |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n| Maturity | stable | beta | beta | alpha | beta | alpha |\n| Binds via | installed plugin + MCP server | in-process plugin (native runtime) | host-mode peer driving `codex app-server` | native Python plugin, socket-bridged | host-mode peer driving Jcode Harness API | native pi extension, in-process |\n| Install | `cotal setup` | none, just `opencode` on PATH | seeded with the CLI; needs an authenticated `codex` on PATH | BYO `uv` + `hermes-agent` 0.16; Unix only | seeded with the CLI; needs `jcode` 0.78.1+ on PATH | pi 0.79.10 (one copied file for interactive/SDK) |\n| Watch the real TUI | \u2713 | \u2713 | \u2713 (attached to the mesh-driven thread) | \u2717 (headless gateway) | \u2713 (attached to the managed Jcode session) | \u2713 |\n| Inbound delivery | hook drain at turn start + idle-wake nudge | injected as a turn | wakes a turn; directed messages steer the live turn | fresh agent per message | injected as a Harness API turn | steered into the live turn |\n| Mid-turn steering | \u2717 | \u2717 | \u2713 (directed messages) | \u2014 | \u2717 | \u2713 |\n| Session resume (`--resume`) | \u2713 (forks) | \u2717 ([#154](https://github.com/Cotal-AI/Cotal/issues/154)) | \u2717 (a resumed thread has no MCP tools upstream) | \u2717 | \u2717 (private Harness API instance) | \u2717 |\n| Tool-sharing (`--share-tools`) | \u2713 (scoped opt-in) | \u2717 (inherits your servers wholesale) | \u2717 (isolated per-agent `CODEX_HOME`) | \u2717 | \u2717 (private MCP configuration) | \u2717 |\n| Models | `--model` | `--model` + catalog (`cotal models`) + `--variant` | `--model` + catalog (`cotal models`) + `--variant` (reasoning effort) | any provider, via env | `--model` | `--model` |\n| Event plane (`--events`) | \u2713 | \u2713 | \u2713 | \u2717 | \u2717 | \u2717 |\n| Containers ([deploy](deploy.md)) | \u2713 | \u2713 | \u2717 | \u2717 | \u2717 | \u2717 |\n\n**Native vs. bridged.** OpenCode and pi expose real plugin runtimes, so the connector runs\ninside the host process; pi most directly: peer messages steer the live turn instead of\nwaiting for it to end. Claude Code has no in-process plugin runtime; the connector composes\nthree sanctioned surfaces (an MCP server for tools, lifecycle hooks for presence and delivery\nat turn boundaries, and a research-preview channel that only wakes an idle session). Codex has\nno plugin runtime either and its MCP client cannot wake an idle session, so the connector runs\na host-mode peer over Codex's own app-server protocol (the one the Codex TUI runs on): real\nwake, mid-turn steer, and the `cotal_*` tools served from the host over a loopback MCP endpoint\n\u2014 which is also what keeps them working on a turn typed into the attached Codex TUI. Hermes runs a\nnative plugin inside its Python gateway, bridged to the connector over a local socket; the\ngateway model starts a fresh agent per inbound message, so there is no live turn to steer. Jcode's\nstable Harness API is a Unix-socket NDJSON bridge: the connector starts one private instance,\ncreates one session, and calls its documented stdio MCP configuration from a private `JCODE_HOME`.\n\nEach guide covers spawn forms, model selection, and the exact limits: [Claude\nCode](connect-claude.md) \xB7 [OpenCode](connect-opencode.md) \xB7 [Codex](connect-codex.md) \xB7\n[Hermes](connect-hermes.md) \xB7 [Jcode](connect-jcode.md) \xB7 [pi](connect-pi.md).\n"
+      "body": "# Connectors\n\n> **Guide** (informative) \xB7 **For:** operators picking a harness \xB7 **Prereqs:** none\n\nEvery connector puts a real agent session on the mesh with the same `cotal_*` tools, presence,\nand delivery model ([MCP tools](mcp-tools.md)). They differ in how they bind to their harness\nand which spawn features are wired. Anything unwired **fails loud**: a flag a connector does\nnot support throws; nothing silently degrades.\n\n| | [Claude Code](connect-claude.md) | [OpenCode](connect-opencode.md) | [Codex](connect-codex.md) | [Hermes](connect-hermes.md) | [Jcode](connect-jcode.md) | [pi](connect-pi.md) |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n| Maturity | stable | beta | beta | alpha | beta | alpha |\n| Binds via | installed plugin + MCP server | in-process plugin (native runtime) | host-mode peer driving `codex app-server` | native Python plugin, socket-bridged | host-mode peer driving Jcode Harness API | native pi extension, in-process |\n| Install | `cotal setup` | none, just `opencode` on PATH | seeded with the CLI; needs an authenticated `codex` on PATH | BYO `uv` + `hermes-agent` 0.16; Unix only | seeded with the CLI; needs `jcode` 0.78.1+ on PATH | pi 0.79.10 (one copied file for interactive/SDK) |\n| Watch the real TUI | \u2713 | \u2713 | \u2713 (attached to the mesh-driven thread) | \u2717 (headless gateway) | \u2713 (attached to the managed Jcode session) | \u2713 |\n| Inbound delivery | hook drain at turn start + idle-wake nudge | injected as a turn | wakes a turn; directed messages steer the live turn | fresh agent per message | injected as a Harness API turn | steered into the live turn |\n| Mid-turn steering | \u2717 | \u2717 | \u2713 (directed messages) | \u2014 | \u2717 | \u2713 |\n| Session resume (`--resume`) | \u2713 (forks) | \u2717 ([#154](https://github.com/Cotal-AI/Cotal/issues/154)) | \u2717 (a resumed thread has no MCP tools upstream) | \u2717 | \u2717 (private Harness API instance) | \u2717 |\n| Tool-sharing (`--share-tools`) | \u2713 (scoped opt-in) | \u2717 (inherits your servers wholesale) | \u2717 (isolated per-agent `CODEX_HOME`) | \u2717 | \u2717 (private MCP configuration) | \u2717 |\n| Models | `--model` | `--model` + catalog (`cotal models`) + `--variant` | `--model` + catalog (`cotal models`) + `--variant` (reasoning effort) | any provider, via env | `--model` + `--variant` (reasoning effort) | `--model` |\n| Event plane (`--events`) | \u2713 | \u2713 | \u2713 | \u2717 | \u2717 | \u2717 |\n| Containers ([deploy](deploy.md)) | \u2713 | \u2713 | \u2717 | \u2717 | \u2717 | \u2717 |\n\n**Native vs. bridged.** OpenCode and pi expose real plugin runtimes, so the connector runs\ninside the host process; pi most directly: peer messages steer the live turn instead of\nwaiting for it to end. Claude Code has no in-process plugin runtime; the connector composes\nthree sanctioned surfaces (an MCP server for tools, lifecycle hooks for presence and delivery\nat turn boundaries, and a research-preview channel that only wakes an idle session). Codex has\nno plugin runtime either and its MCP client cannot wake an idle session, so the connector runs\na host-mode peer over Codex's own app-server protocol (the one the Codex TUI runs on): real\nwake, mid-turn steer, and the `cotal_*` tools served from the host over a loopback MCP endpoint\n\u2014 which is also what keeps them working on a turn typed into the attached Codex TUI. Hermes runs a\nnative plugin inside its Python gateway, bridged to the connector over a local socket; the\ngateway model starts a fresh agent per inbound message, so there is no live turn to steer. Jcode's\nstable Harness API is a Unix-socket NDJSON bridge: the connector starts one private instance,\ncreates one session, and calls its documented stdio MCP configuration from a private `JCODE_HOME`.\n\nEach guide covers spawn forms, model selection, and the exact limits: [Claude\nCode](connect-claude.md) \xB7 [OpenCode](connect-opencode.md) \xB7 [Codex](connect-codex.md) \xB7\n[Hermes](connect-hermes.md) \xB7 [Jcode](connect-jcode.md) \xB7 [pi](connect-pi.md).\n"
     },
     {
       "slug": "control-surface",
       "title": "The control surface",
       "kind": "Concept (informative)",
       "summary": "Cotal once had a privileged control rail: a fixed set of named service tiers (self / manager / admin / delivery) on their own ctl.",
-      "body": '# The control surface\n\n> **Concept** (informative) \xB7 **For:** operators and client authors who want to know how the manager and other daemons are driven \xB7 **Normative:** [SPEC \xA713](../SPEC.md#13-endpoint-control-surface-v04)\n\nCotal once had a privileged control rail: a fixed set of named service tiers\n(`self` / `manager` / `admin` / `delivery`) on their own `ctl.*` subjects, with the manager\nas a special case the broker recognised by name. That rail is gone. Everything that serves\nstructured commands now, the manager, the delivery daemon, a wrapped MCP server, a\nthird-party service, is an ordinary **endpoint**: a daemon that registers a service\nidentity, publishes its contracts, and answers `describe`. `manager` is an endpoint name\nlike any other; no subject, envelope, or grant in this surface knows it specially. The\nmanager is a service on the mesh, not an authority over it: it holds only the capability\nrows its callers grant it, and serves over a scoped credential.\n\n## The `ep` rails\n\nOne kind, `ep`, carries every request under a mode token that says where the request\nroutes, never which verb it is (the verb rides the envelope): `one` (queue-group anycast,\nexactly one class member), `all` (scatter, every instance), and `inst` (one instance by its\nstable address). Replies come back on a `reply` rail keyed to the serving instance and its\nepoch. Around these sit the sibling planes the composites use: per-goal events, timers,\nsessions, and the journal that holds durable facts. Every request carries the caller as\nthree forge-locked tokens, `owner`, `actor`, and lifecycle `uid`, plus an unguessable\nnonce, so the broker polices who is calling in the subject grammar itself. See\n[SPEC \xA713.2](../SPEC.md#132-grammar) for the grammar and [\xA713.5](../SPEC.md#135-verbs) for\nthe verbs (`call`, `cast`, `watch`, `claim`, `scatter`).\n\n## Lifecycle identity\n\nA principal `owner.actor` is a reusable routing alias: a despawn frees the actor name and a\nlater spawn may legitimately reuse it, so the alias alone is never authority. Two further\ncoordinates make an identity durable: a **lifecycle uid**, an unguessable, never-reused id\nfor one managed lifecycle under a principal, and a **process epoch**, the fenced ownership\nepoch of the process currently animating it, advanced on every restart or takeover. At most\none live epoch owns an identity, and a superseded epoch must stop serving. Durables and\ncredentials key on the lifecycle uid, not the reusable name, which is what lets a\nsupervised restart recover the same lifecycle instead of minting a new one. See\n[SPEC \xA713.1](../SPEC.md#131-lifecycle-identity) and [identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\n## Discovery: describe and invoke\n\nNo client has compile-time knowledge of any endpoint\'s commands. `cotal describe\n<endpoint>` resolves a registered endpoint\'s command set off the wire: the reserved\n`describe` command answers the registered contract digests, the schemas are fetched from the\nspace\'s content-addressed contract store, recompiled, and verified against those digests.\nEach command prints with its capability class and targeting shape. `cotal invoke <endpoint>\n<command> --args \'<json>\'` then calls one command by name, validating the arguments against\nthe fetched input schema before publish. Every built-in manager command uses this same\ntrust chain, so there is nothing the built-ins can reach that a described contract cannot.\nSee [SPEC \xA713.7](../SPEC.md#137-contracts-and-discovery) and [cli.md](cli.md).\n\n## Spawn is a goal\n\nLong-running commands are **actions** ([SPEC \xA713.6](../SPEC.md#136-composites)): the caller\nsubmits with a client-generated `goalId` and a request fingerprint, the endpoint records a\ndurable accept or reject decision, progress rides per-goal events, and the work ends in one\nterminal outcome (`succeeded`, `failed`, `cancelled`, `expired`, or `uncertain`). Spawn is\nthe reference case. Rather than block the caller for up to 30 seconds while an agent comes\nup, the manager accepts the goal and returns the allocated identity at once:\n\n```json\n{\n  "name": "reviewer-2",\n  "owner": "u_...", "actor": "reviewer", "uid": "...",\n  "goalId": "...", "fingerprint": "...",\n  "executor": { "lifecycleUid": "...", "epoch": 3 }\n}\n```\n\nThe name is the one actually allocated: a persona-derived collision is auto-numbered\n(`reviewer`, then `reviewer-2`), while a hard-pinned `--name` that collides with a live\nagent is refused at accept, before anything is minted. The triple plus `goalId` let the\ncaller follow progress (connector handoff, process launched, presence join) and reconcile\nlater against the exact instance that accepted. Presence within the manager\'s default\n30-second readiness window, or a connector\'s declared bounded window, settles the goal\n`succeeded`; an early process exit is `failed`; the window passing with neither is `uncertain`,\na bounded, durable outcome that a later `ps` or status read settles against the live roster.\n`uncertain` is a real terminal outcome, not an absence and not a silent hang. It carries the\ndiagnosis of whoever owned the deadline: for a launch that\nnames the agent and says to inspect it rather than re-issue, since re-issuing after a launch\nthat in fact succeeded mints a duplicate. A committer that supplies no diagnosis falls back to\n"the success signal did not arrive within the readiness deadline". The agent\'s own eventual\nstate is then observable on its presence record.\n\n## Instance addressing and scatter\n\nA space can run more than one manager. Each manager persists a stable logical instance id\nacross restarts and advances its process epoch when it comes back, so callers address a\nspecific manager without caring which process currently serves it. An untargeted spawn\nrides class anycast (any manager may accept, and the acceptance records which one did);\n`cotal spawn <persona> --detach --on <instance>` pins one instance by its exact id (a\nforeground spawn has no manager to pin and refuses the flag). There are no ordinal\naliases and no short forms: wherever a display names an instance you can address, it prints\nthe whole id, because `--on` takes nothing else.\n\nThe resolve and the invoke are separate trips through the same anycast queue, so in a\nmulti-manager space an unpinned call can land on an instance the caller did not resolve. Every\ncall carries the incarnation it resolved against, and a manager that is not that incarnation\n**refuses before running the command** \u2014 so the failure an operator sees says the command did\nnot run, and re-issuing it cannot duplicate the effect. That is the difference that matters for\na mutation: the older behaviour detected the mismatch on the reply, after the manager had\nalready acted, and could only tell you to go and check. `--on` still matters for reaching a\nspecific manager (`ps`, `stop`, `attach`, `spawn --detach`), but it is no longer what stands\nbetween a split and a duplicated spawn. Against a manager older than this fence the refusal is\nstill after the fact, and its message says so. The re-issue is automatic only when the refusal\nstates `not-executed` in its `outcome` field; a refusal that omits the field, or states\n`unknown`, is surfaced to the caller instead of repaired, because neither proves the command did\nnot run. `ps` and\n`status` become a **scatter** across every registered instance: the caller freezes the\nexpected set from the service registry, invokes each under a shared deadline, and merges the\nresults with per-instance attribution. A non-answering instance is labelled as registered\nwith no answer within the deadline, never silently omitted. See [SPEC \xA713.5](../SPEC.md#135-verbs) (scatter) and [cli.md](cli.md).\n\nThe expected set comes from the **registry**, which records registration rather than liveness.\nAn instance that crashes never deregisters, so it stays in the set and the gather has nothing\nleft to wait for but an answer that cannot come. It pays the whole deadline, on every scatter,\nindefinitely. A scatter can therefore be given a per-instance liveness probe: when the broker\nitself reports that an instance holds no subscription on its own instance rail, the gather stops\nwaiting for it. Only that affirmative report counts. A lapsed presence entry, a probe that timed\nout, and a probe that failed are all *absence of evidence*, and treating any of them as death\nwould turn a slow correct answer into a fast wrong one, so they leave the full deadline standing.\nNothing about the outcome changes either way: an instance that did not answer is still\nunreachable, still surfaced, and the scatter is still not complete.\n\nThe probe is supplied by the **caller**, not invented by the scatter. Asking about an instance is\na publish on that instance\'s rail, and a credential that holds no row for it is refused by the\nbroker asynchronously, while the publish itself returns normally. A refused probe is therefore\nsilent, and silence is exactly what a live but slow instance looks like. Only the layer that\nminted the credential knows which ids it may ask about, so that layer asks about those and no\nothers, and prints any refusal the broker raises anyway rather than letting it expire into a\ntimeout. `cotal ps` freezes the class on its first connection, re-mints an instrument pinned to\nexactly the frozen ids, and scatters on a second.\n\nThis does not help against an instance that is **connected but not answering**. A hung manager\nholds its subscriptions, so it is indistinguishable from a slow one, and it still costs the full\ndeadline. That is the correct result, not a gap in the probe.\n\n### Deregistration\n\nA probe makes a dead registration cheap to skip; it does not remove it. Removal is the\nregistration\'s own exit, and there are exactly two routes to it, both explicit\n([SPEC \xA713.5](../SPEC.md#135-verbs): a deleted `svc` spec *is* the deregistration).\n\nA manager that stops cleanly deletes its own two records keys as part of stopping, so an instance\nthat was shut down leaves no row behind. This is a **graceful stop** only. A manager that loses\nits lease tears down fail-closed and deliberately does not deregister: it is not the authority on\nits own record at that point, and the incarnation that took the lease from it is.\n\nFor the instance that cannot cooperate, an operator names it:\n`cotal deregister-instance --instance <id>` ([cli.md](cli.md#deregister-instance)). It removes the\nrecord only on the same evidence `cotal ps` acts on: the broker reporting nothing subscribed on\nthat instance\'s own rail. It refuses if the instance answers a describe, refuses if the probe could\nnot run at all, and refuses if the instance is merely quiet, because a hung process still holds its\nsubscriptions and is therefore not affirmed gone. Nothing sweeps the registry on an age threshold\nor on silence.\nAn instance that is deregistered while it is merely wedged re-registers over the tombstone on its\nnext start, which is what makes the operator\'s decision a recoverable one.\n\n## Attach sessions\n\n`cotal attach` no longer returns a `ws://127.0.0.1` URL. It creates a one-use, holder-bound\nsession offer: the manager mints a token bound to the caller, the target lifecycle, its own\ninstance id and epoch, and an expiry, and replies with a session id and expiry only, no URL\nand no secret in the reply. The CLI redeems the offer over the mesh (a second redeem is\nrefused), and terminal bytes then stream on core-NATS session subjects scoped to the two\nparties. Backpressure is a bounded in-flight window with an explicit drop notice, never\nsilent loss; a late attach still repaints the full screen from a replayed terminal\nsnapshot. Close, expiry, target despawn, and a manager restart are distinct, surfaced end\nstates: a restarted manager\'s successor refuses the old epoch\'s sessions and the client\nshows "manager restarted; re-attach".\n\n## Seat input\n\n`attach` is a stream, so it is the wrong shape for a program that wants to send one line: it\nholds a session open and expects a terminal at the caller\'s end. The `input` command is the\nother half. One authorized call writes text into a running seat\'s terminal as if it had been\ntyped there, and answers with the seat and the number of bytes delivered.\n\nIt exists for **harness commands**. A line beginning with `/` (`/compact`, `/clear`, `/model`)\nis neither chat nor an event: the agent\'s own harness handles it, and the keyboard is the only\nway in. An external control surface that can already read a seat\'s turns and talk to it still\ncannot drive it without this.\n\nThe op is targeted, rides the `manager.lifecycle` capability, and declares authz modes `owner`\nand `any`, the row shape `attach` and `despawn` already carry, checked by the same authorization.\nEnter is appended unless the caller suppresses it, and nothing is echoed back, since the resulting\nturns already have somewhere to go.\n\n**Who may call it is narrower than either of those**, and the reasoning is worth stating because\nthe natural assumption is wrong. `despawn` and `attach` are granted to anything holding `spawn`;\n`input` is granted only to operator credentials. The tempting argument for treating them alike is\nthat an attach session\'s `write` already reaches the same terminal, so `input` adds nothing. It\ndoes not reach it: an attach yields a signed session offer, and redeeming one needs a per-session\ncredential minted from the space signing seed, which no agent holds. So `input` would be new\nauthority, and the own-owner rule that bounds `despawn` covers every seat under an owner rather\nthan only the ones a caller launched. Killing a peer is denial; typing into a peer is control of\nit. The write therefore sits with the credential that is already the administrative authority for\nthe domain.\n\nOnly a runtime that owns the child\'s input stream can serve it. The `pty` runtime does; the\nexternal terminal runtimes attach to a process they do not own, and there the command refuses\nand names the runtime rather than dropping the keystroke. A seat that is not running refuses for\nits own reason, and the two are distinguishable, so a caller can tell "this will never work"\nfrom "not right now". See [cli.md](cli.md#input).\n\n## Grants\n\nThere is no broad control credential. A caller holds one capability row per command it is\nallowed to send, and minting maps each named capability to exactly the request subjects it\nneeds, nothing wider. The manager serves over a scoped serve credential that can answer and\nreply but cannot, for instance, write another endpoint\'s records or forge a goal terminal;\nthe goal-fact writer and the session writer are separate, narrowly scoped credentials the\nbroker fences by subject. Authorization is checked at the serving boundary, and for actions\nit linearises at acceptance: a spawn refused there mints no reservation and leaves no\nprocess. See [SPEC \xA713.9](../SPEC.md#139-authority-boundary) and\n[identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\n## See also\n\n- [Architecture](architecture.md), where the manager and the wire fit in the whole system.\n- [CLI](cli.md), for `describe`, `invoke`, `spawn`, `ps`, `status`, `attach`, and `input`.\n- [SPEC \xA713](../SPEC.md#13-endpoint-control-surface-v04), the normative contract.\n'
+      "body": '# The control surface\n\n> **Concept** (informative) \xB7 **For:** operators and client authors who want to know how the manager and other daemons are driven \xB7 **Normative:** [SPEC \xA713](../SPEC.md#13-endpoint-control-surface-v04)\n\nCotal once had a privileged control rail: a fixed set of named service tiers\n(`self` / `manager` / `admin` / `delivery`) on their own `ctl.*` subjects, with the manager\nas a special case the broker recognised by name. That rail is gone. Everything that serves\nstructured commands now, the manager, the delivery daemon, a wrapped MCP server, a\nthird-party service, is an ordinary **endpoint**: a daemon that registers a service\nidentity, publishes its contracts, and answers `describe`. `manager` is an endpoint name\nlike any other; no subject, envelope, or grant in this surface knows it specially. The\nmanager is a service on the mesh, not an authority over it: it holds only the capability\nrows its callers grant it, and serves over a scoped credential.\n\n## The `ep` rails\n\nOne kind, `ep`, carries every request under a mode token that says where the request\nroutes, never which verb it is (the verb rides the envelope): `one` (queue-group anycast,\nexactly one class member), `all` (scatter, every instance), and `inst` (one instance by its\nstable address). Replies come back on a `reply` rail keyed to the serving instance and its\nepoch. Around these sit the sibling planes the composites use: per-goal events, timers,\nsessions, and the journal that holds durable facts. Every request carries the caller as\nthree forge-locked tokens, `owner`, `actor`, and lifecycle `uid`, plus an unguessable\nnonce, so the broker polices who is calling in the subject grammar itself. See\n[SPEC \xA713.2](../SPEC.md#132-grammar) for the grammar and [\xA713.5](../SPEC.md#135-verbs) for\nthe verbs (`call`, `cast`, `watch`, `claim`, `scatter`).\n\n## Lifecycle identity\n\nA principal `owner.actor` is a reusable routing alias: a despawn frees the actor name and a\nlater spawn may legitimately reuse it, so the alias alone is never authority. Two further\ncoordinates make an identity durable: a **lifecycle uid**, an unguessable, never-reused id\nfor one managed lifecycle under a principal, and a **process epoch**, the fenced ownership\nepoch of the process currently animating it, advanced on every restart or takeover. At most\none live epoch owns an identity, and a superseded epoch must stop serving. Durables and\ncredentials key on the lifecycle uid, not the reusable name, which is what lets a\nsupervised restart recover the same lifecycle instead of minting a new one. See\n[SPEC \xA713.1](../SPEC.md#131-lifecycle-identity) and [identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\n## Discovery: describe and invoke\n\nNo client has compile-time knowledge of any endpoint\'s commands. `cotal describe\n<endpoint>` resolves a registered endpoint\'s command set off the wire: the reserved\n`describe` command answers the registered contract digests, the schemas are fetched from the\nspace\'s content-addressed contract store, recompiled, and verified against those digests.\nEach command prints with its capability class and targeting shape. `cotal invoke <endpoint>\n<command> --args \'<json>\'` then calls one command by name, validating the arguments against\nthe fetched input schema before publish. Every built-in manager command uses this same\ntrust chain, so there is nothing the built-ins can reach that a described contract cannot.\nSee [SPEC \xA713.7](../SPEC.md#137-contracts-and-discovery) and [cli.md](cli.md).\n\n## Spawn is a goal\n\nLong-running commands are **actions** ([SPEC \xA713.6](../SPEC.md#136-composites)): the caller\nsubmits with a client-generated `goalId` and a request fingerprint, the endpoint records a\ndurable accept or reject decision, progress rides per-goal events, and the work ends in one\nterminal outcome (`succeeded`, `failed`, `cancelled`, `expired`, or `uncertain`). Spawn is\nthe reference case. Rather than block the caller for up to 30 seconds while an agent comes\nup, the manager accepts the goal and returns the allocated identity at once:\n\n```json\n{\n  "name": "reviewer-2",\n  "owner": "u_...", "actor": "reviewer", "uid": "...",\n  "goalId": "...", "fingerprint": "...",\n  "executor": { "lifecycleUid": "...", "epoch": 3 }\n}\n```\n\nThe name is the one actually allocated: a persona-derived collision is auto-numbered\n(`reviewer`, then `reviewer-2`), while a hard-pinned `--name` that collides with a live\nagent is refused at accept, before anything is minted. The triple plus `goalId` let the\ncaller follow progress (connector handoff, process launched, presence join) and reconcile\nlater against the exact instance that accepted. Presence within the manager\'s default\n30-second readiness window, or a connector\'s declared bounded window, settles the goal\n`succeeded`; an early process exit is `failed`; the window passing with neither is `uncertain`,\na bounded, durable outcome that a later `ps` or status read settles against the live roster.\n`uncertain` is a real terminal outcome, not an absence and not a silent hang. It carries the\ndiagnosis of whoever owned the deadline: for a launch that\nnames the agent and says to inspect it rather than re-issue, since re-issuing after a launch\nthat in fact succeeded mints a duplicate. A committer that supplies no diagnosis falls back to\n"the success signal did not arrive within the readiness deadline". The agent\'s own eventual\nstate is then observable on its presence record.\n\n## Instance addressing and scatter\n\nA space can run more than one manager. Each manager persists a stable logical instance id\nacross restarts and advances its process epoch when it comes back, so callers address a\nspecific manager without caring which process currently serves it. An untargeted spawn\nrides class anycast (any manager may accept, and the acceptance records which one did);\n`cotal spawn <persona> --detach --on <instance>` pins one instance by its exact id (a\nforeground spawn has no manager to pin and refuses the flag). There are no ordinal\naliases and no short forms: wherever a display names an instance you can address, it prints\nthe whole id, because `--on` takes nothing else.\n\nThe resolve and the invoke are separate trips through the same anycast queue, so in a\nmulti-manager space an unpinned call can land on an instance the caller did not resolve. Every\ncall carries the incarnation it resolved against, and a manager that is not that incarnation\n**refuses before running the command** \u2014 so the failure an operator sees says the command did\nnot run, and re-issuing it cannot duplicate the effect. That is the difference that matters for\na mutation: the older behaviour detected the mismatch on the reply, after the manager had\nalready acted, and could only tell you to go and check. `--on` still matters for reaching a\nspecific manager (`ps`, `stop`, `attach`, `spawn --detach`), but it is no longer what stands\nbetween a split and a duplicated spawn. Against a manager older than this fence the refusal is\nstill after the fact, and its message says so. The re-issue is automatic only when the refusal\nstates `not-executed` in its `outcome` field; a refusal that omits the field, or states\n`unknown`, is surfaced to the caller instead of repaired, because neither proves the command did\nnot run. `ps` and\n`status` become a **scatter** across every registered instance: the caller freezes the\nexpected set from the service registry, invokes each under a shared deadline, and merges the\nresults with per-instance attribution. A non-answering instance is labelled as registered\nwith no answer within the deadline, never silently omitted. See [SPEC \xA713.5](../SPEC.md#135-verbs) (scatter) and [cli.md](cli.md).\n\nThe expected set comes from the **registry**, which records registration rather than liveness.\nAn instance that crashes never deregisters, so it stays in the set and the gather has nothing\nleft to wait for but an answer that cannot come. It pays the whole deadline, on every scatter,\nindefinitely. A scatter can therefore be given a per-instance liveness probe: when the broker\nitself reports that an instance holds no subscription on its own instance rail, the gather stops\nwaiting for it. Only that affirmative report counts. A lapsed presence entry, a probe that timed\nout, and a probe that failed are all *absence of evidence*, and treating any of them as death\nwould turn a slow correct answer into a fast wrong one, so they leave the full deadline standing.\nNothing about the outcome changes either way: an instance that did not answer is still\nunreachable, still surfaced, and the scatter is still not complete.\n\nThe probe is supplied by the **caller**, not invented by the scatter. Asking about an instance is\na publish on that instance\'s rail, and a credential that holds no row for it is refused by the\nbroker asynchronously, while the publish itself returns normally. A refused probe is therefore\nsilent, and silence is exactly what a live but slow instance looks like. Only the layer that\nminted the credential knows which ids it may ask about, so that layer asks about those and no\nothers, and prints any refusal the broker raises anyway rather than letting it expire into a\ntimeout. `cotal ps` freezes the class on its first connection, re-mints an instrument pinned to\nexactly the frozen ids, and scatters on a second.\n\nThis does not help against an instance that is **connected but not answering**. A hung manager\nholds its subscriptions, so it is indistinguishable from a slow one, and it still costs the full\ndeadline. That is the correct result, not a gap in the probe.\n\n### Deregistration\n\nA probe makes a dead registration cheap to skip; it does not remove it. Removal is the\nregistration\'s own exit, and there are exactly two routes to it, both explicit\n([SPEC \xA713.5](../SPEC.md#135-verbs): a deleted `svc` spec *is* the deregistration).\n\nA manager that stops cleanly deletes its own two records keys as part of stopping, so an instance\nthat was shut down leaves no row behind. This is a **graceful stop** only. A manager that loses\nits lease tears down fail-closed and deliberately does not deregister: it is not the authority on\nits own record at that point, and the incarnation that took the lease from it is. A restart that\ndied *mid-registration* is a different residue: the issuance gate stays frozen under that op. The\nsuccessor completes the dead registration on boot when the freeze-holder is affirmatively gone\nunder a complete CONNZ sweep (the same composition as [`cotal reconcile-gate`](cli.md#reconcile-gate)),\nthen runs its normal takeover. It does not invent a TTL and it does not start a new freeze over a\nstill-held one.\n\nFor the instance that cannot cooperate, an operator names it:\n`cotal deregister-instance --instance <id>` ([cli.md](cli.md#deregister-instance)). It removes the\nrecord only on the same evidence `cotal ps` acts on: the broker reporting nothing subscribed on\nthat instance\'s own rail. It refuses if the instance answers a describe, refuses if the probe could\nnot run at all, and refuses if the instance is merely quiet, because a hung process still holds its\nsubscriptions and is therefore not affirmed gone. Nothing sweeps the registry on an age threshold\nor on silence.\nAn instance that is deregistered while it is merely wedged re-registers over the tombstone on its\nnext start, which is what makes the operator\'s decision a recoverable one.\n\n## Attach sessions\n\n`cotal attach` no longer returns a `ws://127.0.0.1` URL. It creates a one-use, holder-bound\nsession offer: the manager mints a token bound to the caller, the target lifecycle, its own\ninstance id and epoch, and an expiry, and replies with a session id and expiry only, no URL\nand no secret in the reply. The CLI redeems the offer over the mesh (a second redeem is\nrefused), and terminal bytes then stream on core-NATS session subjects scoped to the two\nparties. Backpressure is a bounded in-flight window with an explicit drop notice, never\nsilent loss; a late attach still repaints the full screen from a replayed terminal\nsnapshot. Close, expiry, target despawn, and a manager restart are distinct, surfaced end\nstates: a restarted manager\'s successor refuses the old epoch\'s sessions and the client\nshows "manager restarted; re-attach".\n\n## Seat input\n\n`attach` is a stream, so it is the wrong shape for a program that wants to send one line: it\nholds a session open and expects a terminal at the caller\'s end. The `input` command is the\nother half. One authorized call writes text into a running seat\'s terminal as if it had been\ntyped there, and answers with the seat and the number of bytes delivered.\n\nIt exists for **harness commands**. A line beginning with `/` (`/compact`, `/clear`, `/model`)\nis neither chat nor an event: the agent\'s own harness handles it, and the keyboard is the only\nway in. An external control surface that can already read a seat\'s turns and talk to it still\ncannot drive it without this.\n\nThe op is targeted, rides the `manager.lifecycle` capability, and declares authz modes `owner`\nand `any`, the row shape `attach` and `despawn` already carry, checked by the same authorization.\nEnter is appended unless the caller suppresses it, and nothing is echoed back, since the resulting\nturns already have somewhere to go.\n\n**Who may call it is narrower than either of those**, and the reasoning is worth stating because\nthe natural assumption is wrong. `despawn` and `attach` are granted to anything holding `spawn`;\n`input` is granted only to operator credentials. The tempting argument for treating them alike is\nthat an attach session\'s `write` already reaches the same terminal, so `input` adds nothing. It\ndoes not reach it: an attach yields a signed session offer, and redeeming one needs a per-session\ncredential minted from the space signing seed, which no agent holds. So `input` would be new\nauthority, and the own-owner rule that bounds `despawn` covers every seat under an owner rather\nthan only the ones a caller launched. Killing a peer is denial; typing into a peer is control of\nit. The write therefore sits with the credential that is already the administrative authority for\nthe domain.\n\nOnly a runtime that owns the child\'s input stream can serve it. The `pty` runtime does; the\nexternal terminal runtimes attach to a process they do not own, and there the command refuses\nand names the runtime rather than dropping the keystroke. A seat that is not running refuses for\nits own reason, and the two are distinguishable, so a caller can tell "this will never work"\nfrom "not right now". See [cli.md](cli.md#input).\n\n## Grants\n\nThere is no broad control credential. A caller holds one capability row per command it is\nallowed to send, and minting maps each named capability to exactly the request subjects it\nneeds, nothing wider. The manager serves over a scoped serve credential that can answer and\nreply but cannot, for instance, write another endpoint\'s records or forge a goal terminal;\nthe goal-fact writer and the session writer are separate, narrowly scoped credentials the\nbroker fences by subject. Authorization is checked at the serving boundary, and for actions\nit linearises at acceptance: a spawn refused there mints no reservation and leaves no\nprocess. See [SPEC \xA713.9](../SPEC.md#139-authority-boundary) and\n[identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\n## See also\n\n- [Architecture](architecture.md), where the manager and the wire fit in the whole system.\n- [CLI](cli.md), for `describe`, `invoke`, `spawn`, `ps`, `status`, `attach`, and `input`.\n- [SPEC \xA713](../SPEC.md#13-endpoint-control-surface-v04), the normative contract.\n'
     },
     {
       "slug": "define-a-team",
@@ -16235,7 +16223,7 @@ var DOCS_BUNDLE = {
       "title": "Deploy: agent teams against an external broker",
       "kind": "Guide (informative)",
       "summary": "The deploy/ tree runs a team of agents in an isolated container that dials out to an existing Cotal broker.",
-      "body": "# Deploy: agent teams against an external broker\n\n> **Guide** (informative) \xB7 **For:** operators \xB7 **Prereqs:** [Quickstart](getting-started.md)\n\nThe `deploy/` tree runs a team of agents in an isolated container that dials **out** to an\nexisting Cotal broker. The container gets no host file access; only NATS traffic crosses the wall.\nOne image, configured entirely by env and mounts; add or reshape a team by editing the roster and\nagent files, never the image.\n\n`deploy/README.md` is the full walkthrough (a local quickstart plus production notes). This page\nis the map: what the tree provides, what you need, and how creds flow.\n\n## What the deploy tree provides\n\n| file | what it is |\n|---|---|\n| `deploy/docker/Dockerfile` | Builds one image (`cotal-runner`) bundling the `cotal`, `claude`, and `opencode` CLIs, installing the mesh plugin (`cotal setup`), and pre-completing Claude's first-run onboarding for unattended use. |\n| `deploy/docker/entrypoint.sh` | Waits for the broker to be reachable, then runs `cotal <cmd> --server $COTAL_SERVERS`. |\n| `deploy/docker/compose.yaml` | Two example services: `team-a` (a manager + roster) and `solo` (one agent). |\n| `deploy/docker/roster.example.yaml` | A roster template to copy. |\n\n**What it does *not* provide:** the broker (external: you point at it), and, per the README,\nhost-side per-agent cred provisioning and stronger sandbox isolation are called out as *later*\nhardening; they are **not built yet**. What ships today is the phase-1 container boundary\ndescribed under [Isolation](#isolation).\n\nThe image supports **Claude Code and OpenCode** agents only; it does not bundle `uv`/`hermes-agent`,\nso [Hermes](connect-hermes.md) cannot run in a container today.\n\n## Two shapes\n\nThe container's command picks the shape:\n\n| command | shape |\n|---|---|\n| `supervise --space <s> --roster /workspace/roster.yaml` | a manager that boots every agent in the roster (all in one container, pty runtime) |\n| `spawn <name>` | one foreground agent, loading `.cotal/agents/<name>.md` |\n\nMix connector types freely within a roster (`agent: claude` / `agent: opencode` per entry). See\n[Define a team](define-a-team.md) for the roster and persona files.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- **Docker.**\n- **An external broker**, reachable from the container. `cotal up` binds loopback by default; a\n  broker containers dial out to needs `cotal up --host 0.0.0.0` (and auth, the default). Point\n  `COTAL_SERVERS` at it: `nats://host.docker.internal:4222` for a broker on your machine, or\n  `tls://broker.host:4222` for a hosted one. The deploy tree never runs the broker. The broker\n  must be nats-server 2.12 or newer (the v0.4 control surface floor); agents fail loud at connect\n  against an older one.\n- **The account signer:** on the host beside your broker, `cotal mint --signer` writes\n  `signer.json`: account signing material with no operator key.\n- **A model credential per connector type** (see below).\n\n## Steps\n\nBuild once, from the repo root:\n\n```bash\ndocker build -f deploy/docker/Dockerfile -t cotal-runner .\n```\n\nThen run a team. With compose, paths are relative to `docker/`, so put `signer.json`,\n`team-a/roster.yaml`, and `team-a/agents/*.md` there:\n\n```bash\ncp deploy/docker/roster.example.yaml deploy/docker/team-a/roster.yaml   # then edit; add agents + signer.json\nCOTAL_SERVERS=tls://broker.host:4222 \\\nCLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=<token> OPENCODE_API_KEY=<key> \\\n  docker compose -f deploy/docker/compose.yaml up team-a\n```\n\nThe README's quickstart shows the equivalent single `docker run` (with the mounts spelled out) and\na local-broker variant. Watch the team join with `cotal console --plain --space <s>`.\n\n## How creds and auth flow\n\nTwo independent credentials, both set from **outside** the container:\n\n**Broker auth (the NATS mesh).** Mount the stripped `signer.json` read-only at\n`/workspace/.cotal/auth/auth.json`. Inside the container, each agent's own scoped creds are minted\nfrom it into a tmpfs (`/workspace/.cotal/auth/creds`, RAM only). The operator root-of-trust never\nenters a container, so a leaked signer cannot escalate beyond its one NATS account. Inside that\naccount, though, it is full compromise: it can mint `admin` (DM read) and destructive profiles, not\njust ordinary users. The account boundary contains cross-tenant escalation, not damage within the\ntenant. See [Identity and auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\n**Model auth (the LLM provider).** Set each connector's credential as an env var; the supervisor\nforwards the named vars and each CLI reads only the ones it understands:\n\n| connector | env | notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| `claude` | `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` | from `claude setup-token` on your host; runs on your Claude Pro/Max subscription, same as local |\n| `opencode` | the env var of the provider behind each agent's `model:` | per provider: `OPENCODE_API_KEY` for OpenCode's hosted models, `OPENAI_API_KEY`, `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, etc. |\n\nEvery var set on a team container reaches every agent in it; **the container is the team's trust\nboundary**, so secrets are not isolated *between* agents in the same container. For hard per-agent\nisolation, run one agent per container (the `solo` service: same image, `spawn <name>`).\n\n## Container layout\n\n`/workspace` is the working directory:\n\n| path | mode | holds |\n|---|---|---|\n| `/workspace/.cotal/auth/auth.json` | ro mount | the stripped signer |\n| `/workspace/.cotal/agents/*.md` | ro mount | personas |\n| `/workspace/roster.yaml` | ro mount | the roster (supervise mode) |\n| `/workspace/.cotal/auth/creds/` | tmpfs (`mode=01777`) | minted per-agent creds, RAM only |\n\n## Isolation\n\nPhase 1 is a non-root user (uid 10001), `cap_drop: ALL`, no host mounts beyond the read-only ones\nabove, and an ephemeral writable fs. Egress is the broker plus each agent's model API. Stronger\nisolation (a fully read-only rootfs, or gVisor / Kata via `--runtime`) is a later swap with no app\nchange.\n\n## See also\n\n- [Define a team](define-a-team.md): roster and persona files\n- [Identity and auth](identity-and-auth.md): the signer, minting, and account scoping\n- [Connect Claude Code](connect-claude.md) \xB7 [Connect OpenCode](connect-opencode.md)\n"
+      "body": "# Deploy: agent teams against an external broker\n\n> **Guide** (informative) \xB7 **For:** operators \xB7 **Prereqs:** [Quickstart](getting-started.md)\n\nThe `deploy/` tree runs a team of agents in an isolated container that dials **out** to an\nexisting Cotal broker. The container gets no host file access; only NATS traffic crosses the wall.\nOne image, configured entirely by env and mounts; add or reshape a team by editing the roster and\nagent files, never the image.\n\n`deploy/README.md` is the full walkthrough (a local quickstart plus production notes). This page\nis the map: what the tree provides, what you need, and how creds flow.\n\n## What the deploy tree provides\n\n| file | what it is |\n|---|---|\n| `deploy/docker/Dockerfile` | Builds one image (`cotal-runner`) bundling the `cotal`, `claude`, and `opencode` CLIs, installing the mesh plugin (`cotal setup`), and pre-completing Claude's first-run onboarding for unattended use. |\n| `deploy/docker/entrypoint.sh` | Waits for the broker to be reachable, then runs `cotal <cmd> --server $COTAL_SERVERS`. |\n| `deploy/docker/compose.yaml` | Two example services: `team-a` (a manager + roster) and `solo` (one agent). |\n| `deploy/docker/roster.example.yaml` | A roster template to copy. |\n\n**What it does *not* provide:** the broker (external: you point at it), and, per the README,\nhost-side per-agent cred provisioning and stronger sandbox isolation are called out as *later*\nhardening; they are **not built yet**. What ships today is the phase-1 container boundary\ndescribed under [Isolation](#isolation).\n\nThe image supports **Claude Code and OpenCode** agents only; it does not bundle `uv`/`hermes-agent`,\nso [Hermes](connect-hermes.md) cannot run in a container today.\n\n## Two shapes\n\nThe container's command picks the shape:\n\n| command | shape |\n|---|---|\n| `supervise --space <s> --roster /workspace/roster.yaml` | a manager that boots every agent in the roster (all in one container, pty runtime) |\n| `spawn <name>` | one foreground agent, loading `.cotal/agents/<name>.md` |\n\nMix connector types freely within a roster (`agent: claude` / `agent: opencode` per entry). See\n[Define a team](define-a-team.md) for the roster and persona files.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- **Docker.**\n- **An external broker**, reachable from the container. `cotal up` binds loopback by default; a\n  broker containers dial out to needs `cotal up --host 0.0.0.0` (and auth, the default). Point\n  `COTAL_SERVERS` at it: `nats://host.docker.internal:4222` for a broker on your machine, or\n  `tls://broker.host:4222` for a hosted one. The deploy tree never runs the broker. The broker\n  must be nats-server 2.12 or newer (the v0.4 control surface floor); agents fail loud at connect\n  against an older one.\n- **The account signer:** on the host beside your broker, `cotal mint --signer` writes\n  `signer.json`: account signing material with no operator key.\n- **A model credential per connector type** (see below).\n\n## Steps\n\nBuild once, from the repo root:\n\n```bash\ndocker build -f deploy/docker/Dockerfile -t cotal-runner .\n```\n\nThen run a team. With compose, paths are relative to `docker/`, so put `signer.json`,\n`team-a/roster.yaml`, and `team-a/agents/*.md` there:\n\n```bash\ncp deploy/docker/roster.example.yaml deploy/docker/team-a/roster.yaml   # then edit; add agents + signer.json\nCOTAL_SERVERS=tls://broker.host:4222 \\\nCLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=<token> OPENCODE_API_KEY=<key> \\\n  docker compose -f deploy/docker/compose.yaml up team-a\n```\n\nThe README's quickstart shows the equivalent single `docker run` (with the mounts spelled out) and\na local-broker variant. Watch the team join with `cotal console --plain --space <s>`.\n\n## How creds and auth flow\n\nTwo independent credentials, both set from **outside** the container:\n\n**Broker auth (the NATS mesh).** Mount the stripped `signer.json` read-only at\n`/workspace/.cotal/auth/auth.json`. Inside the container, each agent's own scoped creds are minted\nfrom it into a tmpfs (`/workspace/.cotal/auth/creds`, RAM only). The operator root-of-trust never\nenters a container, so a leaked signer cannot escalate beyond its one NATS account. Inside that\naccount, though, it is full compromise: it can mint `admin` (DM read) and destructive profiles, not\njust ordinary users. The account boundary contains cross-tenant escalation, not damage within the\ntenant. See [Identity and auth](identity-and-auth.md).\n\n**Model auth (the LLM provider).** Set each connector's credential as an env var; the supervisor\nforwards the named vars the connector declares (not the manager's whole environment) and each CLI\nreads only the ones it understands. A Claude seat therefore receives `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`\nbecause the Claude connector lists it, not because every `CLAUDE_CODE_*` name is inherited:\n\n| connector | env | notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| `claude` | `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` | from `claude setup-token` on your host; runs on your Claude Pro/Max subscription, same as local |\n| `opencode` | the env var of the provider behind each agent's `model:` | per provider: `OPENCODE_API_KEY` for OpenCode's hosted models, `OPENAI_API_KEY`, `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, etc. |\n\nEvery var set on a team container reaches every agent in it; **the container is the team's trust\nboundary**, so secrets are not isolated *between* agents in the same container. For hard per-agent\nisolation, run one agent per container (the `solo` service: same image, `spawn <name>`).\n\n## Container layout\n\n`/workspace` is the working directory:\n\n| path | mode | holds |\n|---|---|---|\n| `/workspace/.cotal/auth/auth.json` | ro mount | the stripped signer |\n| `/workspace/.cotal/agents/*.md` | ro mount | personas |\n| `/workspace/roster.yaml` | ro mount | the roster (supervise mode) |\n| `/workspace/.cotal/auth/creds/` | tmpfs (`mode=01777`) | minted per-agent creds, RAM only |\n\n## Isolation\n\nPhase 1 is a non-root user (uid 10001), `cap_drop: ALL`, no host mounts beyond the read-only ones\nabove, and an ephemeral writable fs. Egress is the broker plus each agent's model API. Stronger\nisolation (a fully read-only rootfs, or gVisor / Kata via `--runtime`) is a later swap with no app\nchange.\n\n## See also\n\n- [Define a team](define-a-team.md): roster and persona files\n- [Identity and auth](identity-and-auth.md): the signer, minting, and account scoping\n- [Connect Claude Code](connect-claude.md) \xB7 [Connect OpenCode](connect-opencode.md)\n"
     },
     {
       "slug": "embedding",
@@ -16298,14 +16286,14 @@ var DOCS_BUNDLE = {
       "title": "Run a mesh",
       "kind": "Guide (informative)",
       "summary": "Day-to-day operation of a local mesh: what cotal up actually runs, how spawning resolves personas, harnesses, and models, how to reach a mesh from any directory, and the operator-only maintenance v\u2026",
-      "body": "# Run a mesh\n\n> **Guide** (informative) \xB7 **For:** operators \xB7 **Prereqs:** [Quickstart](getting-started.md)\n\nDay-to-day operation of a local mesh: what `cotal up` actually runs, how spawning\nresolves personas, harnesses, and models, how to reach a mesh from any directory, and the\noperator-only maintenance verbs. Every command's full flag set is in the\n[CLI reference](cli.md).\n\n## The stack\n\n`cotal up` brings up the whole local stack and bare `cotal down` stops it:\n\n- **Broker**: a local `nats-server` (logs to `.cotal/nats.log`).\n- **Delivery daemon**: the durable backstop, auth mode only\n  ([what it does](delivery-daemon.md)).\n- **Manager**: a detached supervisor answering the control plane, so\n  `cotal spawn --detach` and the `cotal_spawn` tool work right after `up`.\n\nThree modes:\n\n- **Default (static auth).** JWT-authed, on by default: sender authenticity and per-agent\n  ACLs, enforced by the broker ([how](identity-and-auth.md)).\n- **`--user-auth --idp <url>`.** Per-user auth: people `cotal login` once, the operator\n  grants their agents on the actor ledger, and every connect is authorized live against\n  that grant. Starts the space's auth service alongside the broker\n  ([how](identity-and-auth.md)).\n- **`--open`.** An unauthenticated, live-only dev mesh (no auth, no delivery daemon). For\n  quick local experiments.\n\nThe broker and local services bind **loopback** by default. `--host 0.0.0.0` widens the broker\nbind independently of the auth mode, so \"network-reachable\" never silently means\n\"unauthenticated\". With no explicit `--server`, `cotal up` auto-selects a free local port when\nthe default address is already held by another project; an explicit `--server` fails loud on\ncollision.\n\nA user-auth mesh can expose only its credential exchange through an operator-owned HTTPS reverse\nproxy while leaving the existing local exchange untouched:\n\n```bash\ncotal up --user-auth --idp https://idp.example/api/auth \\\n  --exchange-public-port 7443 \\\n  --exchange-public-url https://auth.example\n```\n\nThe public listener itself still binds `127.0.0.1:7443`; configure the proxy to terminate TLS and\nforward to it. It serves only `/health`, `/jwks`, `/exchange`, and `/.well-known/cotal-mesh` with\nthe documented methods. It needs no local file capability: the signed IdP JWT or managed-agent\nactor token is the proof, while the original loopback listener remains capability-gated. Add\n`--exchange-trusted-proxy` only when that listener is reachable exclusively through your trusted\nproxy; it keys failure throttling by the last `X-Forwarded-For` hop instead of the socket address.\nThe well-known bundle includes IdP pins and a deny-all sentinel credential, so fetch it only from\nthe configured HTTPS origin. To change these listener flags, stop and restart the mesh; a refresh\nof an already-running service does not replace its bind or proxy policy. See\n[Identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md#per-user-auth-people-sign-in) for the trust boundary.\n\n`cotal status` prints the detailed setup, process, registry, and live mesh status;\n`cotal setup` (after the first run) prints the compact card.\n\nStop one part without tearing down the mesh by naming its registered component: `cotal down\nmanager`, `cotal down delivery`, or `cotal down web`. Component names from installed extensions\njoin the same surface; `cotal down` with no names retains whole-stack behavior.\n\n## Remote supervised agents\n\nOn a remote user-auth mesh, foreground `cotal spawn` remains the default participant path. A\nparticipant can run detached agents only after the host advertises and operates the remote manager\nauthority service, and the participant's actor-ledger row includes `supervise`. This is not implied\nby `spawn` or `admin`.\n\nThe participant's loopback/operator exchange obtains one closed `manager-service` view for its\nordinary derived owner, a fixed server-selected manager actor, and one opaque manager instance.\nThe host, not the participant, issues the public-nkey JWT material via the replay-safe,\nlifecycle-bound prepare \u2192 activate \u2192 renew exchange. It never exports the space signer, a static\nprovisioner credential, or generic storage authority. The manager may provision only descendants\nof that same owner, with host validation at each provision.\n\nWhen the authority service, login, or renewal is unavailable, the remote manager degrades\nfail-closed: it refuses new agents, restarts, and credential replacement rather than pretending\nlocal authority exists. Existing agents remain live only while their independent credentials are\nvalid. Restore service and renew successfully before asking it to recover an agent. See\n[Identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md#remote-manager-authority) and the [CLI\nreference](cli.md#supervise).\n\n## Spawning agents\n\n```bash\ncotal spawn                        # foreground: your default agent, in this terminal\ncotal spawn reviewer --detach      # supervised: the manager runs it in a PTY\ncotal attach --name reviewer       # watch/type into a detached agent (Ctrl-] detaches)\ncotal ps                           # what the manager is running\ncotal stop --name reviewer         # stop one\n```\n\nHow a spawn resolves:\n\n- **Persona.** A bare `cotal spawn` uses `.cotal/agents/default.md`; a positional name\n  picks `.cotal/agents/<name>.md`; `--config` takes an explicit ref or path. Set\n  `COTAL_DEFAULT_PERSONA=<name-or-path>` to change the fallback. Fields and format:\n  [agent files](agent-files.md).\n- **Harness.** Claude by default; `--agent opencode` / `--agent hermes` / `--agent pi` per\n  spawn, or `COTAL_DEFAULT_AGENT` to change the default. Compared in\n  [Connectors](connectors.md); per-connector guides:\n  [Claude](connect-claude.md) \xB7 [OpenCode](connect-opencode.md) \xB7\n  [Hermes](connect-hermes.md) \xB7 [pi](connect-pi.md).\n- **Model.** `--model` overrides the persona file's `model:` (Claude: `opus` / `sonnet` or\n  a full id; OpenCode: `provider/model`). Connectors that expose a catalog report it via\n  `cotal models --agent opencode`: model ids plus available variants; pick one with\n  `--model provider/model --variant high`.\n- **Tools.** A spawned agent gets only the cotal tools by default; share your own MCP\n  servers deliberately with `--share-tools` ([config](config.md)).\n- **Launch options.** `--opt key=value` (repeatable) passes a native harness flag straight\n  through; a persona or manifest `launchOptions:` mapping does the same declaratively (a\n  `--opt` wins per key). It is a **raw passthrough**, with no allow/deny list: Claude renders\n  each as `--key value` (a bare `--key` for an empty value), OpenCode merges them into its\n  agent config, and Hermes has no option surface so it fails loud. The trust boundary is the\n  `spawn` capability itself, not the flag set, so granting `spawn` is host-launch authority\n  ([security](security.md)). A key must be a plain flag name; malformed or prototype-polluting\n  keys are refused.\n\nDetach from an attached PTY with **Ctrl-]** (the agent keeps running); rebind it with\n`COTAL_DETACH_KEY=ctrl-<char>` when it clashes with a keybinding inside the agent's TUI.\n\n**Runtimes.** The manager spawns into a **pty** it owns by default. Optional runtimes are installed\nthrough the extension surface, for example `cotal ext add @cotal-ai/orca`, then selected with\n`--runtime orca` (similarly `@cotal-ai/tmux`, `@cotal-ai/cmux`, and `@cotal-ai/herdr`). They put teammates in native\nterminal surfaces rather than manager-owned PTYs. Runtime names are open-ended and resolved from\nthe registry; a missing provider or app throws, never silently falls back\n([architecture](architecture.md)).\n\n## From any directory: the mesh registry\n\n`cotal up` records each running mesh in a machine-local registry\n(`~/.cotal/meshes/space.<key>.json`, named by a case-safe hex encoding of the space: broker URL, the project root holding its creds and\npersonas, and its mode). So a bare `cotal spawn <persona>` from *any* directory joins the\nrunning mesh with the right credentials instead of mistaking the cwd for a space:\n\n- `cotal use <name>` sets the default from every directory, including inside another mesh's\n  project. `--space <name>` overrides it for one command.\n- With no live selected default, a project with its own `.cotal/` resolves to that project's\n  mesh; otherwise one running mesh is used automatically and several are an error.\n- `cotal meshes` lists them (a `*` marks the default); `cotal down` removes the entry.\n\nThe registry stores a *path*, never a secret; trust material stays in each project's\n`.cotal/auth`. If the mesh is down or won't take your creds, spawn fails with one\nsentence, never a raw NATS trace.\n\n### Meshes you did not start here\n\nA mesh running on another machine has no `cotal up` on this one, so register it by hand:\n\n```bash\ncotal meshes add            # guided: asks for the broker, probes it, offers what it finds\ncotal meshes add optiplex --server nats://100.90.12.34:4222 --root ~/meshes/optiplex \\\n  --allow-unencrypted-overlay      # see below: an overlay address needs this\ncotal meshes rm optiplex\n```\n\nOn a terminal, a bare `cotal meshes add` walks you through it: it probes the broker you name and\nreports whether it is open or requires credentials, offers the spaces the folder already holds\ncredentials for, and shows the record before writing it. Scripts and agents keep the flag form -\nwithout a terminal nothing prompts.\n\n`--root` is the local folder holding that mesh's `.cotal/auth` and `.cotal/agents` (its personas);\nthe mode is inferred from what that folder holds.\n\n**Know what you are copying.** For an authenticated mesh that folder carries the space's account\n**signing seed**, which is the authority to mint any identity in the space. A machine holding it\nis a certificate authority for the mesh rather than a client of it: anyone who reads it can\nimpersonate any agent, read every retained channel and DM, change ACLs, and keep issuing\nthemselves credentials. There is no per-machine revocation; undoing it means rotating the signing\nkey and re-minting every credential in the space. Copy it only to machines you would trust with\nthe whole mesh. `cotal mint` on its own does not substitute here: registering an `auth` mesh needs\nsigning material that composes, which a minted user credential is not. The\nbroker is probed before the record is written, so a bad address or a credential that mesh will not\naccept fails at registration rather than at your first `spawn` (`--force` records it without verifying \u2014\nuseful when the mesh is simply down right now).\n\n#### Which addresses you may register\n\nRegistering a mesh is how this machine starts sending agent credentials to a broker it does not\nrun. NATS announces itself in plaintext before anyone authenticates, so an attacker on the path\ncan pose as the broker and read the credential out of the connect \u2014 unless the connection\n**requires TLS**, which is recorded on the entry and enforced on every dial through it.\n\nWhat the record will require decides what you may register:\n\n- **Without required TLS**, the address is the gate: **loopback** (`127.0.0.0/8`, `::1`), or\n  **your private overlay** (`100.64.0.0/10`, `fd7a:115c:a1e0::/48`) with\n  `--allow-unencrypted-overlay`, because the protection is real only while the tunnel is running\n  and this command cannot check that for you. Hostnames are refused \u2014 whoever answers the lookup\n  would be choosing which machine receives your credentials.\n- **With required TLS** (`--tls`, or a `tls://` URL \u2014 the scheme is recorded and enforced, not\n  cosmetic), a **hostname or public address** is accepted too: the certificate chain and\n  hostname check pick the peer, not the resolver. A `tls://` registration against a broker that\n  cannot complete the handshake fails at registration \u2014 unless you pass `--force`, which records\n  the entry without verifying it at all \u2014 and on every later dial regardless.\n\nOrdinary private ranges like `10.x` and `192.168.x` are refused in **both** modes: a caf\xE9's wifi\nis a private network too, being private is not the same as being yours, and no public CA issues\ncertificates for those ranges. How an address is *spelled* changes nothing: `[::ffff:192.168.1.10]`,\n`3232235786`, `0300.0250.01.012` and `192.168.257` are all private addresses that your machine\nwould dial as such, so each gets the same refusal as its dotted form. `--force` does not waive any of this \u2014 it exists for a mesh that\nis *down*, not for sending credentials somewhere unsafe.\n\n#### Registering a hosted user-auth mesh\n\nA user-auth space's IdP pins are established where the mesh runs and are never guessed. Register\none from **supplied** trust: `--user-auth-file bundle.json` (exported on the mesh's machine), or\n`--from https://\u2026/.well-known/cotal-mesh`, which asks before it contacts the address at all,\nfetches the discovery document over HTTPS, shows you the pins, and asks again before adopting\nthem. Redirects are refused rather than followed \u2014 a 302 can walk a pinned fetch down to\nplaintext or onto another host \u2014 and the pinned exchange must be an `https://` URL too. The one\nexception is an exchange on **this machine**, where nothing leaves the box: plain `http://` is\naccepted for a loopback *literal* (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, and any spelling of them), but **not** for\n`localhost`, which is a name a hosts entry or a poisoned lookup could point elsewhere \u2014 use the\nliteral. Registration checks that the pinned exchange\nanswers `/health` and `/jwks` as the pinned issuer and that the broker refuses a bare connect \u2014\nthat refusal is the pass. The bundle's sentinel credentials are written to a private (0600) file\nunder the entry's root; the registry itself never carries the secret.\n\n**Without required TLS**, an overlay address is **refused unless you accept the dependency\nexplicitly**, with `--allow-unencrypted-overlay`. The address is not the guarantee: it is protected\nwhile the tunnel is up, and if the tunnel is down that range is ordinary carrier-grade NAT and\nwhoever answers the dial receives your credentials. Only you can know which it is, so the command\nasks you to say so. Your acceptance is recorded on the mesh entry rather than printed and\nforgotten, and the guided form asks the same question instead of taking the flag.\n\n**With required TLS** (`--tls`, or a `tls://` URL) that consent is no longer asked for, and the\nflag is not needed: the handshake is what protects the connection, so the acceptance it stood in\nfor has been replaced by proof rather than promise. `cotal meshes add <space> --server\nnats://100.64.0.1 --tls` registers an overlay address with no prompt, no flag and no recorded\nacceptance \u2014 this is the \"the flag disappears once the broker can be served over TLS\" case, and it\nhas now arrived.\n\nThis gate is on **registration**. `cotal join --creds --server <url>` deliberately takes an\nexplicit connection at face value and does not consult the registry, so it is not covered \u2014 join\nthat way only to an address you would have registered.\n\nRecords added this way are removed only by something that names them. A mesh this machine started\ncan be dropped on a hunch \u2014 a failed liveness probe, a `cotal down` in its project \u2014 because\n`cotal up` writes the record straight back. One you registered by hand cannot be reconstructed, so\nnothing removes it by inference: an unreachable broker is shown as `offline` in `cotal meshes`, and\n`cotal down` / `cotal clean all` leave it alone even when `--root` pointed at the project they are\ntearing down. A `cotal up` for that space refuses outright (naming `cotal meshes rm`) unless it is\nthat same endpoint: finding a broker already answering there is a refresh that starts nothing and\nleaves the record's provenance alone, while actually starting the broker for that space, server and\nroot makes this machine the one running it, so the record becomes an ordinary local one that\n`cotal down` clears. `cotal meshes rm` drops it and re-registering with `--force` replaces it. `rm`\nonly forgets a mesh \u2014 to stop one running here, use `cotal down`.\n\n## Watching\n\n`cotal console` is the terminal view (TUI on a real terminal, plain line stream when\npiped); `cotal web` is the browser dashboard. Both are read-only observers; the\nwalkthrough is [Watch a mesh](watch-a-mesh.md).\n\n## History\n\nRetained history is operator-owned. `cotal clean history --force` purges a space's\nretained channel history; `--dms` also purges DMs (`cotal history clear` is an alias).\nIt is deliberately **not** an agent tool: agents cannot wipe the record\n([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). For a **stopped** mesh, `cotal clean store\n--force` deletes the on-disk JetStream store outright, and `cotal clean all --force`\nalso resets the space identity ([CLI reference](cli.md#clean)).\n\n## Offline backup\n\nFor a coherent durable cut, preserve the whole stack first, then create the artifact while it stays\ndown:\n\n```bash\ncotal down --preserve-state\ncotal backup create ./space-backup        # full by default\n# later: deliberately resume the unchanged source\ncotal up --detach\n# or, from another preserved cut, restore before the normal listener opens\ncotal up --restore ./space-backup --detach\n```\n\nUse `--store-dir` on both preservation and backup for a custom JetStream store. `registry` is the\nonly partial selection (`backup create ... --only registry`; `up --restore ... --restore-only\nregistry`). Backup never stops or restarts a mesh implicitly, never opens the original store, and\ndoes not contain credentials or trust secrets. Backup/restore in every auth mode \u2014 open included \u2014\nuses isolated, operation-specific maintenance logins; normal agent credentials cannot enter that\nlistener. Full\nrestore requires the same space and exact current local trust continuity, recreates conservative\nconsumer checkpoints bound to their snapshot stream sequence state, and resumes retained agents under\ntheir original principals. The trust commitment includes the cryptographically validated full\noperator/system/data-account root chain as well as static/user authority state. A registry-only\nrestore completes canonical empty infrastructure but leaves retained agents stopped because their\nDM/DLV/TASK/ACL state is outside that selection. Authenticated restore validates the complete space\ntrust bundle before staging or changing the preserved store. Interrupted ordinary resume retries the\nsame durable attempt after its prior listener is stopped. Restore re-entry can recover a surviving normal listener\nonly when its attempt nonce, NATS server name, process owner, endpoint, and target-store identity all\nmatch the fsynced proof. A provably dead uncommitted owner is retired under lock and replaced with a\nfresh attempt-bound listener; an occupied foreign listener or ambiguous owner is never adopted. The\nmanager commit validates while retained cleanup is still suppressed; the CLI durably records its\nattempt-bound 64-hex token in `manager-committed` / `resume-committed` before `finalizeResume` can\nrelease suppression. A retry from either committed state goes straight to exact-token finalization;\nfailure preserves the committed gate and retained cleanup suppression. Missing commit evidence,\ninterrupted finalization, a live recorded endpoint despite missing pidfiles, or ambiguous proof fails closed. See the [CLI\nbackup and restore contract](cli.md#backup-and-restore) for artifact, checkpoint, fallback,\ndisaster-consent, and degraded-recovery details.\n\n## Personas from the CLI\n\n`cotal personas` manages the local catalog offline: `list` (`--running` overlays live\nmarkers), `show <name>`, `edit <name>` (re-validates on save), `new <name>`, `rm <name>\n--force`. The runtime counterpart is the `cotal_persona` tool, which goes over the wire\nwith the manager's ownership checks. Fields: [agent files](agent-files.md).\n\n## When something looks absent\n\nPermission denials are **loud, never silent**: an over-tight ACL shows up as a logged\ndenial on the endpoint, not as a peer that mysteriously looks absent. Check\n`.cotal/manager.log`, `.cotal/delivery.log`, and `.cotal/nats.log`; `cotal status` shows\nwhat is actually running. The access rules are collected in\n[Channels & permissions](channels-and-permissions.md).\n"
+      "body": "# Run a mesh\n\n> **Guide** (informative) \xB7 **For:** operators \xB7 **Prereqs:** [Quickstart](getting-started.md)\n\nDay-to-day operation of a local mesh: what `cotal up` actually runs, how spawning\nresolves personas, harnesses, and models, how to reach a mesh from any directory, and the\noperator-only maintenance verbs. Every command's full flag set is in the\n[CLI reference](cli.md).\n\n## The stack\n\n`cotal up` brings up the whole local stack and bare `cotal down` stops it:\n\n- **Broker**: a local `nats-server` (logs to `.cotal/nats.log`).\n- **Delivery daemon**: the durable backstop, auth mode only\n  ([what it does](delivery-daemon.md)).\n- **Manager**: a detached supervisor answering the control plane, so\n  `cotal spawn --detach` and the `cotal_spawn` tool work right after `up`.\n\nThree modes:\n\n- **Default (static auth).** JWT-authed, on by default: sender authenticity and per-agent\n  ACLs, enforced by the broker ([how](identity-and-auth.md)).\n- **`--user-auth --idp <url>`.** Per-user auth: people `cotal login` once, the operator\n  grants their agents on the actor ledger, and every connect is authorized live against\n  that grant. Starts the space's auth service alongside the broker\n  ([how](identity-and-auth.md)).\n- **`--open`.** An unauthenticated, live-only dev mesh (no auth, no delivery daemon). For\n  quick local experiments.\n\nThe broker and local services bind **loopback** by default. `--host 0.0.0.0` widens the broker\nbind independently of the auth mode, so \"network-reachable\" never silently means\n\"unauthenticated\". With no explicit `--server`, `cotal up` auto-selects a free local port when\nthe default address is already held by another project; an explicit `--server` fails loud on\ncollision.\n\nA user-auth mesh can expose only its credential exchange through an operator-owned HTTPS reverse\nproxy while leaving the existing local exchange untouched:\n\n```bash\ncotal up --user-auth --idp https://idp.example/api/auth \\\n  --exchange-public-port 7443 \\\n  --exchange-public-url https://auth.example\n```\n\nThe public listener itself still binds `127.0.0.1:7443`; configure the proxy to terminate TLS and\nforward to it. It serves only `/health`, `/jwks`, `/exchange`, and `/.well-known/cotal-mesh` with\nthe documented methods. It needs no local file capability: the signed IdP JWT or managed-agent\nactor token is the proof, while the original loopback listener remains capability-gated. Add\n`--exchange-trusted-proxy` only when that listener is reachable exclusively through your trusted\nproxy; it keys failure throttling by the last `X-Forwarded-For` hop instead of the socket address.\nThe well-known bundle includes IdP pins and a deny-all sentinel credential, so fetch it only from\nthe configured HTTPS origin. To change these listener flags, stop and restart the mesh; a refresh\nof an already-running service does not replace its bind or proxy policy. See\n[Identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md#per-user-auth-people-sign-in) for the trust boundary.\n\n`cotal status` prints the detailed setup, process, registry, and live mesh status;\n`cotal setup` (after the first run) prints the compact card.\n\nStop one part without tearing down the mesh by naming its registered component: `cotal down\nmanager`, `cotal down delivery`, or `cotal down web`. Component names from installed extensions\njoin the same surface; `cotal down` with no names retains whole-stack behavior.\n\n## Remote supervised agents\n\nOn a remote user-auth mesh, foreground `cotal spawn` remains the default participant path. A\nparticipant can run detached agents only after the host advertises and operates the remote manager\nauthority service, and the participant's actor-ledger row includes `supervise`. This is not implied\nby `spawn` or `admin`.\n\nThe participant's loopback/operator exchange obtains one closed `manager-service` view for its\nordinary derived owner, a fixed server-selected manager actor, and one opaque manager instance.\nThe host, not the participant, issues the public-nkey JWT material via the replay-safe,\nlifecycle-bound prepare \u2192 activate \u2192 renew exchange. It never exports the space signer, a static\nprovisioner credential, or generic storage authority. The manager may provision only descendants\nof that same owner, with host validation at each provision.\n\nWhen the authority service, login, or renewal is unavailable, the remote manager degrades\nfail-closed: it refuses new agents, restarts, and credential replacement rather than pretending\nlocal authority exists. Existing agents remain live only while their independent credentials are\nvalid. Restore service and renew successfully before asking it to recover an agent. See\n[Identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md#remote-manager-authority) and the [CLI\nreference](cli.md#supervise).\n\n## Spawning agents\n\n```bash\ncotal spawn                        # foreground: your default agent, in this terminal\ncotal spawn reviewer --detach      # supervised: the manager runs it in a PTY\ncotal attach --name reviewer       # watch/type into a detached agent (Ctrl-] detaches)\ncotal ps                           # what the manager is running\ncotal stop --name reviewer         # stop one\n```\n\nHow a spawn resolves:\n\n- **Persona.** A bare `cotal spawn` uses `.cotal/agents/default.md`; a positional name\n  picks `.cotal/agents/<name>.md`; `--config` takes an explicit ref or path. Set\n  `COTAL_DEFAULT_PERSONA=<name-or-path>` to change the fallback. Fields and format:\n  [agent files](agent-files.md).\n- **Harness.** Claude by default; `--agent opencode` / `--agent hermes` / `--agent pi` per\n  spawn, or `COTAL_DEFAULT_AGENT` to change the default. Compared in\n  [Connectors](connectors.md); per-connector guides:\n  [Claude](connect-claude.md) \xB7 [OpenCode](connect-opencode.md) \xB7\n  [Hermes](connect-hermes.md) \xB7 [pi](connect-pi.md).\n- **Model.** `--model` overrides the persona file's `model:` (Claude: `opus` / `sonnet` or\n  a full id; OpenCode: `provider/model`). Connectors that expose a catalog report it via\n  `cotal models --agent opencode`: model ids plus available variants; pick one with\n  `--model provider/model --variant high`.\n- **Tools.** A spawned agent gets only the cotal tools by default; share your own MCP\n  servers deliberately with `--share-tools` ([config](config.md)).\n- **Launch options.** `--opt key=value` (repeatable) passes a native harness flag straight\n  through; a persona or manifest `launchOptions:` mapping does the same declaratively (a\n  `--opt` wins per key). It is a **raw passthrough**, with no allow/deny list: Claude renders\n  each as `--key value` (a bare `--key` for an empty value), OpenCode merges them into its\n  agent config, and Hermes has no option surface so it fails loud. The trust boundary is the\n  `spawn` capability itself, not the flag set, so granting `spawn` is host-launch authority\n  ([security](security.md)). A key must be a plain flag name; malformed or prototype-polluting\n  keys are refused.\n\nDetach from an attached PTY with **Ctrl-]** (the agent keeps running); rebind it with\n`COTAL_DETACH_KEY=ctrl-<char>` when it clashes with a keybinding inside the agent's TUI.\n\n**Runtimes.** The manager spawns into a **pty** it owns by default. Optional runtimes are installed\nthrough the extension surface, for example `cotal ext add @cotal-ai/orca`, then selected with\n`--runtime orca` (similarly `@cotal-ai/tmux`, `@cotal-ai/cmux`, and `@cotal-ai/herdr`). They put teammates in native\nterminal surfaces rather than manager-owned PTYs. Runtime names are open-ended and resolved from\nthe registry; a missing provider or app throws, never silently falls back\n([architecture](architecture.md)).\n\n## From any directory: the mesh registry\n\n`cotal up` records each running mesh in a machine-local registry\n(`~/.cotal/meshes/space.<key>.json`, named by a case-safe hex encoding of the space: broker URL, the project root holding its creds and\npersonas, and its mode). So a bare `cotal spawn <persona>` from *any* directory joins the\nrunning mesh with the right credentials instead of mistaking the cwd for a space:\n\n- `cotal use <name>` sets the default from every directory, including inside another mesh's\n  project. `--space <name>` overrides it for one command.\n- With no live selected default, a project with its own `.cotal/` resolves to that project's\n  mesh; otherwise one running mesh is used automatically and several are an error.\n- `cotal meshes` lists them (a `*` marks the default); `cotal down` removes the entry.\n\nThe registry stores a *path*, never a secret; trust material stays in each project's\n`.cotal/auth`. If the mesh is down or won't take your creds, spawn fails with one\nsentence, never a raw NATS trace.\n\n### Meshes you did not start here\n\nA mesh running on another machine has no `cotal up` on this one, so register it by hand:\n\n```bash\ncotal meshes add            # guided: asks for the broker, probes it, offers what it finds\ncotal meshes add optiplex --server nats://100.90.12.34:4222 --root ~/meshes/optiplex \\\n  --allow-unencrypted-overlay      # see below: an overlay address needs this\ncotal meshes rm optiplex\n```\n\nOn a terminal, a bare `cotal meshes add` walks you through it: it probes the broker you name and\nreports whether it is open or requires credentials, offers the spaces the folder already holds\ncredentials for, and shows the record before writing it. Scripts and agents keep the flag form -\nwithout a terminal nothing prompts.\n\n`--root` is the local folder holding that mesh's `.cotal/auth` and `.cotal/agents` (its personas);\nthe mode is inferred from what that folder holds.\n\n**Know what you are copying.** For an authenticated mesh that folder carries the space's account\n**signing seed**, which is the authority to mint any identity in the space. A machine holding it\nis a certificate authority for the mesh rather than a client of it: anyone who reads it can\nimpersonate any agent, read every retained channel and DM, change ACLs, and keep issuing\nthemselves credentials. There is no per-machine revocation; undoing it means rotating the signing\nkey and re-minting every credential in the space. Copy it only to machines you would trust with\nthe whole mesh. `cotal mint` on its own does not substitute here: registering an `auth` mesh needs\nsigning material that composes, which a minted user credential is not. The\nbroker is probed before the record is written, so a bad address or a credential that mesh will not\naccept fails at registration rather than at your first `spawn` (`--force` records it without verifying \u2014\nuseful when the mesh is simply down right now).\n\n#### Which addresses you may register\n\nRegistering a mesh is how this machine starts sending agent credentials to a broker it does not\nrun. NATS announces itself in plaintext before anyone authenticates, so an attacker on the path\ncan pose as the broker and read the credential out of the connect \u2014 unless the connection\n**requires TLS**, which is recorded on the entry and enforced on every dial through it.\n\nWhat the record will require decides what you may register:\n\n- **Without required TLS**, the address is the gate: **loopback** (`127.0.0.0/8`, `::1`), or\n  **your private overlay** (`100.64.0.0/10`, `fd7a:115c:a1e0::/48`) with\n  `--allow-unencrypted-overlay`, because the protection is real only while the tunnel is running\n  and this command cannot check that for you. Hostnames are refused \u2014 whoever answers the lookup\n  would be choosing which machine receives your credentials.\n- **With required TLS** (`--tls`, or a `tls://` URL \u2014 the scheme is recorded and enforced, not\n  cosmetic), a **hostname or public address** is accepted too: the certificate chain and\n  hostname check pick the peer, not the resolver. A `tls://` registration against a broker that\n  cannot complete the handshake fails at registration \u2014 unless you pass `--force`, which records\n  the entry without verifying it at all \u2014 and on every later dial regardless.\n\nOrdinary private ranges like `10.x` and `192.168.x` are refused in **both** modes: a caf\xE9's wifi\nis a private network too, being private is not the same as being yours, and no public CA issues\ncertificates for those ranges. How an address is *spelled* changes nothing: `[::ffff:192.168.1.10]`,\n`3232235786`, `0300.0250.01.012` and `192.168.257` are all private addresses that your machine\nwould dial as such, so each gets the same refusal as its dotted form. `--force` does not waive any of this \u2014 it exists for a mesh that\nis *down*, not for sending credentials somewhere unsafe.\n\n#### Registering a hosted user-auth mesh\n\nA user-auth space's IdP pins are established where the mesh runs and are never guessed. Register\none from **supplied** trust: `--user-auth-file bundle.json` (exported on the mesh's machine), or\n`--from https://\u2026/.well-known/cotal-mesh`, which asks before it contacts the address at all,\nfetches the discovery document over HTTPS, shows you the pins, and asks again before adopting\nthem. Redirects are refused rather than followed \u2014 a 302 can walk a pinned fetch down to\nplaintext or onto another host \u2014 and the pinned exchange must be an `https://` URL too. The one\nexception is an exchange on **this machine**, where nothing leaves the box: plain `http://` is\naccepted for a loopback *literal* (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, and any spelling of them), but **not** for\n`localhost`, which is a name a hosts entry or a poisoned lookup could point elsewhere \u2014 use the\nliteral. Registration checks that the pinned exchange\nanswers `/health` and `/jwks` as the pinned issuer and that the broker refuses a bare connect \u2014\nthat refusal is the pass. The bundle's sentinel credentials are written to a private (0600) file\nunder the entry's root; the registry itself never carries the secret.\n\n**Without required TLS**, an overlay address is **refused unless you accept the dependency\nexplicitly**, with `--allow-unencrypted-overlay`. The address is not the guarantee: it is protected\nwhile the tunnel is up, and if the tunnel is down that range is ordinary carrier-grade NAT and\nwhoever answers the dial receives your credentials. Only you can know which it is, so the command\nasks you to say so. Your acceptance is recorded on the mesh entry rather than printed and\nforgotten, and the guided form asks the same question instead of taking the flag.\n\n**With required TLS** (`--tls`, or a `tls://` URL) that consent is no longer asked for, and the\nflag is not needed: the handshake is what protects the connection, so the acceptance it stood in\nfor has been replaced by proof rather than promise. `cotal meshes add <space> --server\nnats://100.64.0.1 --tls` registers an overlay address with no prompt, no flag and no recorded\nacceptance \u2014 this is the \"the flag disappears once the broker can be served over TLS\" case, and it\nhas now arrived.\n\nThis gate is on **registration**. `cotal join --creds --server <url>` deliberately takes an\nexplicit connection at face value and does not consult the registry, so it is not covered \u2014 join\nthat way only to an address you would have registered.\n\nRecords added this way are removed only by something that names them. A mesh this machine started\ncan be dropped on a hunch \u2014 a failed liveness probe, a `cotal down` in its project \u2014 because\n`cotal up` writes the record straight back. One you registered by hand cannot be reconstructed, so\nnothing removes it by inference: an unreachable broker is shown as `offline` in `cotal meshes`, and\n`cotal down` / `cotal clean all` leave it alone even when `--root` pointed at the project they are\ntearing down. A `cotal up` for that space refuses outright (naming `cotal meshes rm`) unless it is\nthat same endpoint: finding a broker already answering there is a refresh that starts nothing and\nleaves the record's provenance alone, while actually starting the broker for that space, server and\nroot makes this machine the one running it, so the record becomes an ordinary local one that\n`cotal down` clears. `cotal meshes rm` drops it and re-registering with `--force` replaces it. `rm`\nonly forgets a mesh \u2014 to stop one running here, use `cotal down`.\n\n## Watching\n\n`cotal console` is the terminal view (TUI on a real terminal, plain line stream when\npiped); `cotal web` is the browser dashboard. Both are read-only observers; the\nwalkthrough is [Watch a mesh](watch-a-mesh.md).\n\n## History\n\nRetained history is operator-owned. `cotal clean history --force` purges a space's\nretained channel history; `--dms` also purges DMs (`cotal history clear` is an alias).\nIt is deliberately **not** an agent tool: agents cannot wipe the record\n([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). For a **stopped** mesh, `cotal clean store\n--force` deletes the on-disk JetStream store outright, and `cotal clean all --force`\nalso resets the space identity ([CLI reference](cli.md#clean)).\n\n## Offline backup\n\nFor a coherent durable cut, preserve the whole stack first, then create the artifact while it stays\ndown:\n\n```bash\ncotal down --preserve-state\ncotal backup create ./space-backup        # full by default\n# later: deliberately resume the unchanged source\ncotal up --detach\n# or, from another preserved cut, restore before the normal listener opens\ncotal up --restore ./space-backup --detach\n```\n\nUse `--store-dir` on both preservation and backup for a custom JetStream store. `registry` is the\nonly partial selection (`backup create ... --only registry`; `up --restore ... --restore-only\nregistry`). Backup never stops or restarts a mesh implicitly, never opens the original store, and\ndoes not contain credentials or trust secrets. Backup/restore in every auth mode \u2014 open included \u2014\nuses isolated, operation-specific maintenance logins; normal agent credentials cannot enter that\nlistener. Full\nrestore requires the same space and exact current local trust continuity, recreates conservative\nconsumer checkpoints bound to their snapshot stream sequence state, and resumes retained agents under\ntheir original principals. The trust commitment includes the cryptographically validated full\noperator/system/data-account root chain as well as static/user authority state. A registry-only\nrestore completes canonical empty infrastructure but leaves retained agents stopped because their\nDM/DLV/TASK/ACL state is outside that selection. Authenticated restore validates the complete space\ntrust bundle before staging or changing the preserved store. Interrupted ordinary resume retries the\nsame durable attempt after its prior listener is stopped. Restore re-entry can recover a surviving normal listener\nonly when its attempt nonce, NATS server name, process owner, endpoint, and target-store identity all\nmatch the fsynced proof. A provably dead uncommitted owner is retired under lock and replaced with a\nfresh attempt-bound listener; an occupied foreign listener or ambiguous owner is never adopted. The\nmanager commit validates while retained cleanup is still suppressed; the CLI durably records its\nattempt-bound 64-hex token in `manager-committed` / `resume-committed` before `finalizeResume` can\nrelease suppression. A retry from either committed state goes straight to exact-token finalization;\nfailure preserves the committed gate and retained cleanup suppression. Missing commit evidence,\ninterrupted finalization, a live recorded endpoint despite missing pidfiles, or ambiguous proof fails closed. See the [CLI\nbackup and restore contract](cli.md#backup-and-restore) for artifact, checkpoint, fallback,\ndisaster-consent, and degraded-recovery details.\n\n## Personas from the CLI\n\n`cotal personas` manages the local catalog offline: `list` (`--running` overlays live\nmarkers), `show <name>`, `edit <name>` (re-validates on save), `new <name>`, `rm <name>\n--force`. The runtime counterpart is the `cotal_persona` tool, which goes over the wire\nwith the manager's ownership checks. Fields: [agent files](agent-files.md).\n\n## Manager restart and a frozen issuance gate\n\nA manager that dies mid-registration leaves its issuance gate *frozen* under that registration\nop. The freeze is correct: it stops two incarnations serving at once. The successor now completes\nthat dead op on boot, using the same guard as [`cotal reconcile-gate`](cli.md#reconcile-gate): it\nacts only when the freeze-holder is affirmatively gone under a complete CONNZ sweep (`gone` and\n`sweepComplete=true`), abort-reopens the gate (generation+1, processEpoch unchanged), and continues\nthe normal takeover. A live holder, an incomplete sweep, or an unreachable delivery daemon still\nrefuses \u2014 silence is never death, and there is no TTL. Use `cotal reconcile-gate` when the boot\npath cannot run (daemon down, a non-manager endpoint, or you want to lift the freeze without\nstarting a manager).\n\n## When something looks absent\n\nPermission denials are **loud, never silent**: an over-tight ACL shows up as a logged\ndenial on the endpoint, not as a peer that mysteriously looks absent. Check\n`.cotal/manager.log`, `.cotal/delivery.log`, and `.cotal/nats.log`; `cotal status` shows\nwhat is actually running. The access rules are collected in\n[Channels & permissions](channels-and-permissions.md).\n"
     },
     {
       "slug": "security",
       "title": "Security model",
       "kind": "Concept (informative threat model)",
       "summary": "Cotal v0 provides containment and sender authenticity for peers sharing one trusted NATS broker.",
-      "body": "# Security model\n\n> **Concept** (informative threat model) \xB7 **For:** operators and security reviewers \xB7 **Normative:** [SPEC \xA79](../SPEC.md#9-nats--jetstream-security-and-authorization). This page is the threat model SPEC \xA79 references; where the two disagree, the spec wins.\n\nCotal v0 provides containment and sender authenticity for peers sharing one trusted NATS\nbroker. It is not an end-to-end encrypted or untrusted-relay protocol. The enforcement\nmechanics (profiles, ACLs, consumer confinement) are defined in\n[SPEC \xA79](../SPEC.md#9-nats--jetstream-security-and-authorization) and\n[Appendix B](../SPEC.md#appendix-b-profile-acls), explained informally in\n[identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md); this page covers **who the adversaries are and\nwhat is (not) defended**.\n\n## Trust boundary\n\n- One Cotal space maps to one NATS account.\n- The broker, operator, account signing key holder, and any `admin` credential are trusted.\n- On a per-user-auth mesh, ledger scope `admin` is the same trust grade as an `admin`\n  credential: it unlocks the elevated views (the whole-space read tap, history and channel\n  purges, channel-registry writes, cross-owner control), so grant it as operator authority,\n  not as a convenience ([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)).\n- Agents are not trusted to self-report sender identity, channel permissions, or DM access.\n\n## Adversaries\n\nEach adversary, what it can attempt, and what stops it (or why it is out of scope).\n\n- **Compromised or malicious peer agent** (authenticated, in-space): the primary adversary.\n  It cannot forge another agent's `from.id` (the subject sender, an `owner.actor` principal,\n  is pinned to its connection by NATS permissions; not another owner, and not a sibling actor\n  under its own owner), cannot publish to channels outside its declared allow-list, and cannot read\n  another agent's DMs or another role's work queue ([SPEC \xA79](../SPEC.md#9-nats--jetstream-security-and-authorization)).\n  It still can send well-formed hostile content to channels it is allowed on\n  (see *Prompt-facing data*) and flood within its limits (see *availability* under *What v0\n  does not protect*). These are **broker-enforced** guarantees and assume the peer has no host\n  filesystem or process access to the account signer: the default single-host manager and container\n  compositions do not isolate the signer from a same-uid agent, which could then mint `admin` and\n  read any DM. Isolating it is a hosted-composition concern (see [Embedding Cotal](embedding.md) and\n  [Deploy](deploy.md)).\n- **Buggy or lazy receiver:** sender authenticity depends on the receiver enforcing the\n  `from.id`-equals-subject-sender check; a client that skips it accepts spoofed senders. The\n  check is therefore normative: receivers MUST reject on mismatch\n  ([SPEC \xA75](../SPEC.md#5-envelopes), [\xA712](../SPEC.md#12-conformance)).\n- **On-path network attacker** (between an agent and the broker): defeated only when the join\n  link uses `cotals://` (TLS **required** \u2014 client refuses if the broker is not TLS). Plain\n  `cotal://` does **not** require TLS: a NATS client may still auto-upgrade against an honest\n  TLS broker, but a forged plaintext `INFO` can strip the upgrade and harvest credentials. Use\n  plain `cotal://` only on trusted networks and in dev.\n- **Content author targeting a reading model:** any writer of channel `description` /\n  `instructions`, presence `activity`, message bodies, or free-form metadata can attempt\n  prompt injection against an agent that reads it. See *Prompt-facing data*.\n- **Untrusted broker, relay, operator, or admin:** out of scope by definition. The broker and\n  any `admin` credential can read, drop, replay, or alter all plaintext traffic. v0 makes no\n  claim against a hostile broker; signed envelopes and untrusted-relay bindings are reserved\n  for a later version ([roadmap](roadmap.md)).\n\n## What v0 protects\n\nThe guarantees, at a glance, each enforced by the broker per\n[SPEC \xA79](../SPEC.md#9-nats--jetstream-security-and-authorization):\n\n- **Sender authenticity**: the sender id is encoded in the subject and enforced by NATS\n  permissions; receivers reject payloads whose `from.id` mismatches.\n- **Space containment**: account boundaries isolate one space's subjects, streams, and KV\n  buckets from another.\n- **Channel publish scope**: posting only as self, only to declared `allowPublish`\n  channels (default-deny).\n- **Channel read scope**, reads bounded to the `allowSubscribe` ACL: live joins are\n  broker-refused outside it, and history reads ride server-pinned single-channel consumers.\n  - **Known metadata leak (not content):** agents hold `STREAM.INFO` on the chat stream, so\n    a `subjects_filter` query can enumerate retained chat *subjects* (channel names, sender\n    ids, per-subject counts) including channels outside `allowSubscribe`. This is metadata,\n    never message content, and channel *names* are already public via the registry. Hiding\n    even the existence/volume of other channels requires the per-channel-stream model and is\n    deferred strict-containment work ([roadmap](roadmap.md)).\n- **DM / task peer confidentiality**: per-identity inbox prefixes plus\n  provisioner-created bind-only consumers, so an agent cannot read someone else's inbox or\n  steal another role's work; durable-channel backstop reads are re-authorized by a trusted\n  reader ([delivery daemon](delivery-daemon.md)).\n- **Transport secrecy (optional)**: `cotals://` enforces TLS for the hop to the broker.\n  It protects that hop, not the broker itself.\n\n## What v0 does not protect\n\n- **Untrusted broker or relay:** the broker can read, drop, replay, or alter plaintext\n  traffic. Signed envelopes are reserved for a later version.\n- **End-to-end secrecy:** DMs are plaintext to the broker and to `admin`. Cotal v0\n  deliberately does not add end-to-end encryption, trading secrecy for a single trusted broker.\n- **Non-repudiation:** sender authenticity is broker-enforced, not portable proof. (A2A signs\n  every message for this; here it is reserved as signed envelopes.)\n- **Availability:** an authenticated peer can flood any channel or inbox it may write to. v0\n  relies on coarse NATS account limits (connections, subscriptions, payload and storage caps)\n  and adds no per-agent application-level rate limiting.\n- **Replay by a peer:** a peer may re-send its own prior messages; v0 defines no protocol-level\n  nonce or idempotency key. It cannot replay as another agent (subject binding still holds).\n- **Static agent credential revocation:** on a static-auth mesh, a *manager-spawned* agent cred\n  is now bounded (24h TTL, renewed by the manager for live agents only) and lifecycle-registered:\n  despawn drives the full \xA713.1 retirement \u2014 its ledger rows are revoked and the manager's\n  control surface refuses the retired incarnation's credential outright. What remains: within\n  the TTL window a *copied* cred keeps its inline data-plane grants (static has no auth callout,\n  so nothing re-checks at reconnect), and an out-of-band `cotal mint` cred is still long-lived\n  until key rotation. A per-user-auth mesh closes both: short-lived bearers, ledger revocation\n  that bites at the next connect, and live-connection eviction\n  ([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). A copied signing *seed* still stays valid until\n  rotation on either kind of mesh.\n- **The operator's own environment, in a spawned agent:** a managed spawn hands the child the\n  operator's environment, on the reasoning that a harness they installed should behave the way it\n  does in their shell, and that the alternative was Cotal maintaining a list of inference vendors.\n  So an agent can read whatever sits in the shell the mesh was started from. This is a smaller change\n  than it sounds: `HOME` and the config dirs were always forwarded, so an agent with a shell could\n  already read `~/.aws`, `~/.ssh` and `~/.cotal` off disk, and the model key is in its process by\n  necessity. It matters for secrets that exist **only** in the environment, such as an\n  `aws-vault exec` or `op run` shell. `spawn.env` in the [config file](config.md) restores an\n  allow-list for operators who need it; real containment is a workspace sandbox or a VM. What is\n  **not** optional is the reset of Cotal's own `COTAL_*` namespace, which stops one agent's\n  credential path, ACL or lifecycle uid from reaching another.\n- **Manager compromise:** the operator side is split into narrow, single-purpose profiles (there\n  is **no allow-all cred**); the long-lived **supervisor** serves control and touches\n  presence/its lease but cannot read a DM, create a consumer, or delete a stream; the destructive\n  verbs (`STREAM.DELETE`/`PURGE`, cross-agent stop, per-agent provisioning) ride ephemeral\n  per-command creds (teardown / control-caller-admin / deployer / provisioner). What stays hot on\n  a static-auth mesh is the account **signing key** on the mint/manager box (a compromise there\n  can still mint fresh creds); on a per-user-auth mesh it is held by the auth service (the callout\n  stage) and by any running manager, which self-mints its supervisor cred and renewals from it\n  ([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)).\n- **A static mesh's spawn credential is the ACL tier:** a caller that may spawn may also name the\n  child's channel ACL, and on a static-auth mesh nothing attenuates that against the caller's own\n  grant, because there is no ledger to attenuate against. This is the same class as the entry above\n  and is not specific to any channel: the read set a spawn-capable static caller may hand its child\n  covers ordinary channels, and `events.*` alongside them. A per-user-auth mesh does attenuate it:\n  every delegation must sit inside the spawner's own grant, checked by NATS-pattern containment\n  along the whole chain, at the grant write and again at every bearer exchange\n  ([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). Grant `spawn` on a static mesh as ACL authority, not\n  as a narrow \"add a teammate\" permission.\n- **`spawn` is host-launch authority:** launch options are a raw passthrough (no allow/deny\n  list), so a persona holding `capabilities: [spawn]` can drive the connector's full launch\n  surface on the manager host (Claude `--mcp-config`, `--add-dir`, permission flags; OpenCode\n  agent-config keys). The boundary is *who* may spawn (the authenticated caller, gated by the\n  capability), not *which* flags they pass. Grant `spawn` as host-launch authority, not a narrow\n  \"add a teammate\" permission ([run a mesh](run-a-mesh.md#spawning-agents)).\n\n## Prompt-facing data\n\nChannel `description` and `instructions`, presence `activity`, message bodies, and free-form\nmetadata may reach models. Writers that can set channel registry text are privileged, and\nregistry text is length-bounded, but clients MUST still render all of it as attributed,\nadvisory data, never as trusted system instruction. This is the indirect-prompt-injection\nsurface common to agent protocols (MCP tool descriptions, A2A agent cards): Cotal's position is\nthat the reading client, not the wire, is the trust boundary for model-facing text.\n\n## Reporting\n\nReport a suspected vulnerability privately to the maintainers rather than in a public issue.\n"
+      "body": "# Security model\n\n> **Concept** (informative threat model) \xB7 **For:** operators and security reviewers \xB7 **Normative:** [SPEC \xA79](../SPEC.md#9-nats--jetstream-security-and-authorization). This page is the threat model SPEC \xA79 references; where the two disagree, the spec wins.\n\nCotal v0 provides containment and sender authenticity for peers sharing one trusted NATS\nbroker. It is not an end-to-end encrypted or untrusted-relay protocol. The enforcement\nmechanics (profiles, ACLs, consumer confinement) are defined in\n[SPEC \xA79](../SPEC.md#9-nats--jetstream-security-and-authorization) and\n[Appendix B](../SPEC.md#appendix-b-profile-acls), explained informally in\n[identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md); this page covers **who the adversaries are and\nwhat is (not) defended**.\n\n## Trust boundary\n\n- One Cotal space maps to one NATS account.\n- The broker, operator, account signing key holder, and any `admin` credential are trusted.\n- On a per-user-auth mesh, ledger scope `admin` is the same trust grade as an `admin`\n  credential: it unlocks the elevated views (the whole-space read tap, history and channel\n  purges, channel-registry writes, cross-owner control), so grant it as operator authority,\n  not as a convenience ([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)).\n- Agents are not trusted to self-report sender identity, channel permissions, or DM access.\n\n## Adversaries\n\nEach adversary, what it can attempt, and what stops it (or why it is out of scope).\n\n- **Compromised or malicious peer agent** (authenticated, in-space): the primary adversary.\n  It cannot forge another agent's `from.id` (the subject sender, an `owner.actor` principal,\n  is pinned to its connection by NATS permissions; not another owner, and not a sibling actor\n  under its own owner), cannot publish to channels outside its declared allow-list, and cannot read\n  another agent's DMs or another role's work queue ([SPEC \xA79](../SPEC.md#9-nats--jetstream-security-and-authorization)).\n  It still can send well-formed hostile content to channels it is allowed on\n  (see *Prompt-facing data*) and flood within its limits (see *availability* under *What v0\n  does not protect*). These are **broker-enforced** guarantees and assume the peer has no host\n  filesystem or process access to the account signer: the default single-host manager and container\n  compositions do not isolate the signer from a same-uid agent, which could then mint `admin` and\n  read any DM. Isolating it is a hosted-composition concern (see [Embedding Cotal](embedding.md) and\n  [Deploy](deploy.md)).\n- **Buggy or lazy receiver:** sender authenticity depends on the receiver enforcing the\n  `from.id`-equals-subject-sender check; a client that skips it accepts spoofed senders. The\n  check is therefore normative: receivers MUST reject on mismatch\n  ([SPEC \xA75](../SPEC.md#5-envelopes), [\xA712](../SPEC.md#12-conformance)).\n- **On-path network attacker** (between an agent and the broker): defeated only when the join\n  link uses `cotals://` (TLS **required** \u2014 client refuses if the broker is not TLS). Plain\n  `cotal://` does **not** require TLS: a NATS client may still auto-upgrade against an honest\n  TLS broker, but a forged plaintext `INFO` can strip the upgrade and harvest credentials. Use\n  plain `cotal://` only on trusted networks and in dev.\n- **Content author targeting a reading model:** any writer of channel `description` /\n  `instructions`, presence `activity`, message bodies, or free-form metadata can attempt\n  prompt injection against an agent that reads it. See *Prompt-facing data*.\n- **Untrusted broker, relay, operator, or admin:** out of scope by definition. The broker and\n  any `admin` credential can read, drop, replay, or alter all plaintext traffic. v0 makes no\n  claim against a hostile broker; signed envelopes and untrusted-relay bindings are reserved\n  for a later version ([roadmap](roadmap.md)).\n\n## What v0 protects\n\nThe guarantees, at a glance, each enforced by the broker per\n[SPEC \xA79](../SPEC.md#9-nats--jetstream-security-and-authorization):\n\n- **Sender authenticity**: the sender id is encoded in the subject and enforced by NATS\n  permissions; receivers reject payloads whose `from.id` mismatches.\n- **Space containment**: account boundaries isolate one space's subjects, streams, and KV\n  buckets from another.\n- **Channel publish scope**: posting only as self, only to declared `allowPublish`\n  channels (default-deny).\n- **Channel read scope**, reads bounded to the `allowSubscribe` ACL: live joins are\n  broker-refused outside it, and history reads ride server-pinned single-channel consumers.\n  - **Known metadata leak (not content):** agents hold `STREAM.INFO` on the chat stream, so\n    a `subjects_filter` query can enumerate retained chat *subjects* (channel names, sender\n    ids, per-subject counts) including channels outside `allowSubscribe`. This is metadata,\n    never message content, and channel *names* are already public via the registry. Hiding\n    even the existence/volume of other channels requires the per-channel-stream model and is\n    deferred strict-containment work ([roadmap](roadmap.md)).\n- **DM / task peer confidentiality**: per-identity inbox prefixes plus\n  provisioner-created bind-only consumers, so an agent cannot read someone else's inbox or\n  steal another role's work; durable-channel backstop reads are re-authorized by a trusted\n  reader ([delivery daemon](delivery-daemon.md)).\n- **Transport secrecy (optional)**: `cotals://` enforces TLS for the hop to the broker.\n  It protects that hop, not the broker itself.\n\n## What v0 does not protect\n\n- **Untrusted broker or relay:** the broker can read, drop, replay, or alter plaintext\n  traffic. Signed envelopes are reserved for a later version.\n- **End-to-end secrecy:** DMs are plaintext to the broker and to `admin`. Cotal v0\n  deliberately does not add end-to-end encryption, trading secrecy for a single trusted broker.\n- **Non-repudiation:** sender authenticity is broker-enforced, not portable proof. (A2A signs\n  every message for this; here it is reserved as signed envelopes.)\n- **Availability:** an authenticated peer can flood any channel or inbox it may write to. v0\n  relies on coarse NATS account limits (connections, subscriptions, payload and storage caps)\n  and adds no per-agent application-level rate limiting.\n- **Replay by a peer:** a peer may re-send its own prior messages; v0 defines no protocol-level\n  nonce or idempotency key. It cannot replay as another agent (subject binding still holds).\n- **Static agent credential revocation:** on a static-auth mesh, a *manager-spawned* agent cred\n  is now bounded (24h TTL, renewed by the manager for live agents only) and lifecycle-registered:\n  despawn drives the full \xA713.1 retirement \u2014 its ledger rows are revoked and the manager's\n  control surface refuses the retired incarnation's credential outright. What remains: within\n  the TTL window a *copied* cred keeps its inline data-plane grants (static has no auth callout,\n  so nothing re-checks at reconnect), and an out-of-band `cotal mint` cred is still long-lived\n  until key rotation. A per-user-auth mesh closes both: short-lived bearers, ledger revocation\n  that bites at the next connect, and live-connection eviction\n  ([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). A copied signing *seed* still stays valid until\n  rotation on either kind of mesh.\n- **Operator environment capability in a spawned agent:** a managed spawn receives a fixed OS\n  execution allow-list (PATH included, so connector binaries under `~/.local/bin` still resolve),\n  the machine-wide `COTAL_*` operator knobs, connector-declared provider inputs, shared-MCP\n  references, and only names explicitly added through `spawn.env` in the [config file](config.md).\n  It does not receive ambient host-session markers (`CLAUDE_CODE_CHILD_SESSION`, `CLAUDECODE`,\n  `CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT`, and the analogous names other hosts use to mark a nested session),\n  temporary credentials, source-control tokens, or unrelated service secrets unless a persona or\n  operator names them. Connector-declared auth vars still cross: a Claude seat receives\n  `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` (and the rest of that connector's documented credential set) so a\n  container with no Keychain can authenticate, which is the forwarding `docs/deploy.md` promises.\n  This boundary does not confine files accessible through HOME or other supplied filesystem roots.\n  Use a sandbox or VM when filesystem containment is required.\n- **Manager compromise:** the operator side is split into narrow, single-purpose profiles (there\n  is **no allow-all cred**); the long-lived **supervisor** serves control and touches\n  presence/its lease but cannot read a DM, create a consumer, or delete a stream; the destructive\n  verbs (`STREAM.DELETE`/`PURGE`, cross-agent stop, per-agent provisioning) ride ephemeral\n  per-command creds (teardown / control-caller-admin / deployer / provisioner). What stays hot on\n  a static-auth mesh is the account **signing key** on the mint/manager box (a compromise there\n  can still mint fresh creds); on a per-user-auth mesh it is held by the auth service (the callout\n  stage) and by any running manager, which self-mints its supervisor cred and renewals from it\n  ([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)).\n- **A static mesh's spawn credential is the ACL tier:** a caller that may spawn may also name the\n  child's channel ACL, and on a static-auth mesh nothing attenuates that against the caller's own\n  grant, because there is no ledger to attenuate against. This is the same class as the entry above\n  and is not specific to any channel: the read set a spawn-capable static caller may hand its child\n  covers ordinary channels, and `events.*` alongside them. A per-user-auth mesh does attenuate it:\n  every delegation must sit inside the spawner's own grant, checked by NATS-pattern containment\n  along the whole chain, at the grant write and again at every bearer exchange\n  ([identity & auth](identity-and-auth.md)). Grant `spawn` on a static mesh as ACL authority, not\n  as a narrow \"add a teammate\" permission.\n- **`spawn` is host-launch authority:** launch options are a raw passthrough (no allow/deny\n  list), so a persona holding `capabilities: [spawn]` can drive the connector's full launch\n  surface on the manager host (Claude `--mcp-config`, `--add-dir`, permission flags; OpenCode\n  agent-config keys). The boundary is *who* may spawn (the authenticated caller, gated by the\n  capability), not *which* flags they pass. Grant `spawn` as host-launch authority, not a narrow\n  \"add a teammate\" permission ([run a mesh](run-a-mesh.md#spawning-agents)).\n\n## Prompt-facing data\n\nChannel `description` and `instructions`, presence `activity`, message bodies, and free-form\nmetadata may reach models. Writers that can set channel registry text are privileged, and\nregistry text is length-bounded, but clients MUST still render all of it as attributed,\nadvisory data, never as trusted system instruction. This is the indirect-prompt-injection\nsurface common to agent protocols (MCP tool descriptions, A2A agent cards): Cotal's position is\nthat the reading client, not the wire, is the trust boundary for model-facing text.\n\n## Reporting\n\nReport a suspected vulnerability privately to the maintainers rather than in a public issue.\n"
     },
     {
       "slug": "setup-internals",
@@ -17487,6 +17475,37 @@ function startControlServer(agent, endpoint, handle, opts = {}) {
 var STANDALONE = fileURLToPath(
   import.meta.url.includes("/dist/") ? new URL("./standalone.js", import.meta.url) : new URL("../dist/standalone.js", import.meta.url)
 );
+var PI_PROVIDER_KEYS = [
+  "ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN",
+  "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
+  "OPENAI_API_KEY",
+  "OPENROUTER_API_KEY",
+  "OPENCODE_API_KEY",
+  "GEMINI_API_KEY",
+  "GOOGLE_CLOUD_API_KEY",
+  "GROQ_API_KEY",
+  "CEREBRAS_API_KEY",
+  "DEEPSEEK_API_KEY",
+  "MISTRAL_API_KEY",
+  "XAI_API_KEY",
+  "ZAI_API_KEY",
+  "ZAI_CODING_CN_API_KEY",
+  "MINIMAX_API_KEY",
+  "MINIMAX_CN_API_KEY",
+  "MOONSHOT_API_KEY",
+  "FIREWORKS_API_KEY",
+  "TOGETHER_API_KEY",
+  "NVIDIA_API_KEY",
+  "KIMI_API_KEY",
+  "HF_TOKEN",
+  "COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN",
+  "AI_GATEWAY_API_KEY",
+  "CLOUDFLARE_API_KEY",
+  "XIAOMI_API_KEY",
+  "XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_CN_API_KEY",
+  "XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_AMS_API_KEY",
+  "XIAOMI_TOKEN_PLAN_SGP_API_KEY"
+];
 var piConnector = {
   kind: "connector",
   name: "pi",
@@ -17514,7 +17533,7 @@ var piConnector = {
     if (stateRoot) mkSecretDir(stateRoot);
     if (sessionStatePath2) rmSync(sessionStatePath2, { force: true });
     const env = {
-      ...launchEnv({ envAllow: opts.envAllow }),
+      ...launchEnv({ providerKeys: PI_PROVIDER_KEYS, envAllow: opts.envAllow }),
       ...aclEnv(opts),
       // Creds, broker URL and the control token ride a 0600 file; only its path is exported, and the
       // extension drops even that once it has read it, so a shell this seat runs inherits neither.