@cotal-ai/manager 0.16.0 → 0.18.0

package/dist/console-crypto-shim.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/**
+ * A build-time `node:crypto` shim for the console session bundle (P2 item 6). The core §13.6 rail
+ * (endpoint-session-rail) + terminal-frame codec (session-terminal-frames) transitively import
+ * `node:crypto` at MODULE level — via endpoint-envelope → canonical.js (`createHash`) and
+ * endpoint-subjects → subjects.js (`randomBytes`) — but they NEVER invoke hashing or uid-minting at
+ * runtime (the rail moves bytes + derives subjects; the grant mint/verify that hashes stays on the
+ * node side). esbuild aliases `node:crypto` to this so the module-level imports RESOLVE for the
+ * browser.
+ *
+ * Both entries THROW LOUD if ever called: a reached call means the browser bundle started
+ * hashing / uid-minting, which is a bug (the wrong code got pulled in), never a silent degrade — so
+ * this is a fail-loud boundary, not a fallback.
+ */
+export declare function randomBytes(): never;
+export declare function createHash(): never;
+//# sourceMappingURL=console-crypto-shim.d.ts.map

package/dist/console-crypto-shim.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/console-crypto-shim.js

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/**
+ * A build-time `node:crypto` shim for the console session bundle (P2 item 6). The core §13.6 rail
+ * (endpoint-session-rail) + terminal-frame codec (session-terminal-frames) transitively import
+ * `node:crypto` at MODULE level — via endpoint-envelope → canonical.js (`createHash`) and
+ * endpoint-subjects → subjects.js (`randomBytes`) — but they NEVER invoke hashing or uid-minting at
+ * runtime (the rail moves bytes + derives subjects; the grant mint/verify that hashes stays on the
+ * node side). esbuild aliases `node:crypto` to this so the module-level imports RESOLVE for the
+ * browser.
+ *
+ * Both entries THROW LOUD if ever called: a reached call means the browser bundle started
+ * hashing / uid-minting, which is a bug (the wrong code got pulled in), never a silent degrade — so
+ * this is a fail-loud boundary, not a fallback.
+ */
+export function randomBytes() {
+    throw new Error("node:crypto.randomBytes is not available in the console session bundle (the §13.6 rail/codec never mint uids in-browser; a reached call is a bug)");
+}
+export function createHash() {
+    throw new Error("node:crypto.createHash is not available in the console session bundle (the §13.6 rail/codec never hash in-browser; a reached call is a bug)");
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=console-crypto-shim.js.map

package/dist/console-crypto-shim.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"console-crypto-shim.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/console-crypto-shim.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,WAAW;IACzB,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,mJAAmJ,CAAC,CAAC;AACvK,CAAC;AAED,MAAM,UAAU,UAAU;IACxB,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,6IAA6I,CAAC,CAAC;AACjK,CAAC"}

package/dist/console-session-entry.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=console-session-entry.d.ts.map

package/dist/console-session-entry.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"console-session-entry.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/console-session-entry.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}

package/dist/console-session-entry.js

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/**
+ * The manager console's browser session-client bundle ENTRY (P2 item 6). esbuild bundles this (and
+ * ONLY this: the browser-safe core subpath + nats-core's ws connect) into
+ * `dist/console/session-bundle.js`, served as a static asset. It runs IN THE BROWSER — the manager's
+ * node side never imports it (nats-core's ws path is baked into the bundle at build time; node rides
+ * `@nats-io/transport-node`).
+ *
+ * It exposes the core §13.6 rail + terminal-frame codec + `wsconnect` on one global so the console
+ * page can open a mesh session CALLER without a module loader: connect over the broker's websocket
+ * listener with the per-session, rails-only credential the loopback face hands it, open the caller
+ * rail with the redeemed grant, and drive xterm — the SAME core rail code the manager serves.
+ */
+import { wsconnect, credsAuthenticator } from "@nats-io/nats-core";
+import { openSessionRail, encodeTerminalData, terminalFrameBytes, decodeTerminalFrame, } from "@cotal-ai/core/session-browser";
+// A single browser global (no module system in the served console page). `credsAuthenticator` lets
+// the page present the per-session, rails-only caller credential the loopback face minted (static
+// mesh); an open mesh hands empty creds and the page connects bare.
+globalThis.CotalSession = {
+    wsconnect,
+    credsAuthenticator,
+    openSessionRail,
+    encodeTerminalData,
+    terminalFrameBytes,
+    decodeTerminalFrame,
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=console-session-entry.js.map

package/dist/console-session-entry.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/endpoint-evict.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/**
+ * The manager's VERIFIED-EVICTION seam for its own endpoint-registration barrier (SPEC 13.1, P2
+ * item 3, slice 3a). A restart re-registers the SAME logical instanceId with an ADVANCED epoch, and
+ * §13.1 requires the SUPERSEDED serve family to die BEFORE the new authority is visible — so the
+ * registration barrier's PHASE 2 must VERIFY-EVICT the predecessor's serve principal. The `$SYS`
+ * scan → KICK → verify capability lives with the DELIVERY DAEMON (co-located with the broker), never
+ * in this process (the manager holds the DATA signing seed; the D5 rail-split keeps `$SYS` material
+ * out of any seed-holder). This reaches the daemon over the privileged `ctl.delivery-admin` rail
+ * with a per-call SCOPED `endpoint-evictor` credential (pub the delivery-admin subject + reply +
+ * `$JS.API.INFO`, nothing else — narrower than the `supervisor` profile auth's barrier-evict reuses).
+ *
+ * NO-ORACLE = LOUD (no-fallbacks): if the daemon is unreachable the evictor THROWS an error NAMING
+ * THE CURE, so the barrier's PHASE-2 failure carries it and the gate stays frozen for reconciliation
+ * — a crash-restart on an auth mesh NEVER skips eviction. A reachable daemon that reports the
+ * principal still connected (or a garbled/contradictory result) returns `false` (not verified),
+ * which the barrier also treats as fail-closed. Verified-gone is conclusive only as (scan complete,
+ * none remain).
+ */
+import { type SpaceAuth } from "@cotal-ai/core";
+/** Build the registration barrier's `evict(holderPrincipal) → verifiedGone` over the delivery
+ *  daemon's `ctl.delivery-admin` rail. Per-call connection (eviction is a rare, heavyweight barrier
+ *  step; a standing privileged connection would be a wider surface holding nothing). */
+export declare function makeManagerEndpointEvictor(opts: {
+    space: string;
+    servers: string;
+    auth: SpaceAuth;
+    log: (line: string) => void;
+}): (holderPrincipal: string) => Promise<boolean>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=endpoint-evict.d.ts.map

package/dist/endpoint-evict.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/endpoint-evict.js

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/**
+ * The manager's VERIFIED-EVICTION seam for its own endpoint-registration barrier (SPEC 13.1, P2
+ * item 3, slice 3a). A restart re-registers the SAME logical instanceId with an ADVANCED epoch, and
+ * §13.1 requires the SUPERSEDED serve family to die BEFORE the new authority is visible — so the
+ * registration barrier's PHASE 2 must VERIFY-EVICT the predecessor's serve principal. The `$SYS`
+ * scan → KICK → verify capability lives with the DELIVERY DAEMON (co-located with the broker), never
+ * in this process (the manager holds the DATA signing seed; the D5 rail-split keeps `$SYS` material
+ * out of any seed-holder). This reaches the daemon over the privileged `ctl.delivery-admin` rail
+ * with a per-call SCOPED `endpoint-evictor` credential (pub the delivery-admin subject + reply +
+ * `$JS.API.INFO`, nothing else — narrower than the `supervisor` profile auth's barrier-evict reuses).
+ *
+ * NO-ORACLE = LOUD (no-fallbacks): if the daemon is unreachable the evictor THROWS an error NAMING
+ * THE CURE, so the barrier's PHASE-2 failure carries it and the gate stays frozen for reconciliation
+ * — a crash-restart on an auth mesh NEVER skips eviction. A reachable daemon that reports the
+ * principal still connected (or a garbled/contradictory result) returns `false` (not verified),
+ * which the barrier also treats as fail-closed. Verified-gone is conclusive only as (scan complete,
+ * none remain).
+ */
+import { CotalEndpoint, mintCreds, newIdentity } from "@cotal-ai/core";
+/** Build the registration barrier's `evict(holderPrincipal) → verifiedGone` over the delivery
+ *  daemon's `ctl.delivery-admin` rail. Per-call connection (eviction is a rare, heavyweight barrier
+ *  step; a standing privileged connection would be a wider surface holding nothing). */
+export function makeManagerEndpointEvictor(opts) {
+    return async (principal) => {
+        const id = newIdentity();
+        let ep;
+        try {
+            // A per-eviction SCOPED cred for ONE ~15s delivery-admin call (60s TTL bounds a copied cred to
+            // a minute). endpoint-evictor holds EXACTLY its own delivery-admin request+reply rail — no
+            // lease, presence, store, consumer, KV, or executing right.
+            const creds = await mintCreds(opts.auth, id, "endpoint-evictor", { expiresInSeconds: 60 });
+            ep = new CotalEndpoint({
+                space: opts.space,
+                servers: opts.servers,
+                creds,
+                card: { id: id.id, name: "manager-endpoint-evict", kind: "endpoint" },
+                channels: [],
+                consume: false,
+                watchChannels: false,
+                watchPresence: false,
+                registerPresence: false,
+            });
+            ep.on("error", () => { });
+            await ep.start();
+            const r = await ep.requestDeliveryAdmin("evictPrincipal", { principal }, 15_000);
+            if (!r.ok) {
+                // The daemon is REACHABLE but refused (e.g. the principal is still connected — a genuine live
+                // predecessor). Not verified gone → fail-closed (the barrier leaves the gate frozen).
+                opts.log(`manager-endpoint-evict: ${principal}: the delivery daemon refused the eviction: ${r.error ?? "(no error copy)"}`);
+                return false;
+            }
+            const d = r.data;
+            if (d === undefined || d === null || d.principal !== principal ||
+                typeof d.kicked !== "number" || !Number.isSafeInteger(d.kicked) || d.kicked < 0 ||
+                typeof d.remaining !== "number" || !Number.isSafeInteger(d.remaining) || d.remaining < 0 ||
+                typeof d.verifiedGone !== "boolean" || typeof d.scanComplete !== "boolean") {
+                opts.log(`manager-endpoint-evict: ${principal}: garbled or foreign eviction result (${JSON.stringify(r.data ?? null)}); a result that does not verifiably describe this principal never authorizes`);
+                return false;
+            }
+            // An internally CONTRADICTORY success never authorizes (verified-gone is (scan complete, none remain)).
+            if (d.verifiedGone === true && (d.scanComplete !== true || d.remaining !== 0)) {
+                opts.log(`manager-endpoint-evict: ${principal}: verifiedGone with scanComplete=${String(d.scanComplete)} remaining=${d.remaining}; a contradictory result never authorizes`);
+                return false;
+            }
+            return d.verifiedGone === true;
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            // NO-ORACLE = LOUD (pin 3, SPEC 13.1, no-fallbacks): the delivery-admin rail is unreachable, so
+            // eviction is UNKNOWN. THROW naming the cure so the barrier's PHASE-2 error carries it and the
+            // gate stays frozen — never a silent skip that could resurrect old-epoch authority.
+            throw new Error(`the delivery daemon is not reachable on the ctl.delivery-admin rail (${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}); ` +
+                `a restart on an auth mesh cannot verify-evict the superseded serve family principal "${principal}" without the liveness oracle. ` +
+                `Start the delivery daemon (\`cotal up\` runs it) and retry — eviction is never skipped (SPEC 13.1)`);
+        }
+        finally {
+            await ep?.stop().catch(() => { });
+        }
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=endpoint-evict.js.map

package/dist/endpoint-evict.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/holder-liveness.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/**
+ * The gate reconciler's AFFIRMATIVE freeze-holder check (Cotal #391), over the delivery daemon's
+ * `ctl.delivery-admin` rail — the READ twin of {@link makeManagerEndpointEvictor}, and deliberately
+ * shaped like it so the two guards of the same repair read the same way.
+ *
+ * The `$SYS` CONNZ capability lives with the DELIVERY DAEMON (co-located with the broker), never in
+ * a seed-holding process — the same D5 rail-split the evictor obeys. This reaches it with a
+ * per-call SCOPED `endpoint-evictor` credential: pub the delivery-admin subject + reply +
+ * `$JS.API.INFO`, nothing else. That credential names eviction because it is the rail's existing
+ * scope; the VERB it calls here is read-only, and the daemon-side executor opens only the CONNZ
+ * observer cred — the kick-capable evictor cred is never read on that path.
+ *
+ * EVERY FAILURE IS A REFUSAL, NEVER A PASS. Unlike the evictor — whose no-oracle case throws so the
+ * barrier fails closed — this returns a STRUCTURED verdict, because the reconciler must tell the
+ * operator WHICH condition refused. The mapping is total and there is no branch that infers death:
+ *   - a reachable daemon's `live` / `gone` / `unknown` verdict passes through as-is;
+ *   - a daemon refusal, an unreachable rail, or a REQUEST TIMEOUT is `unestablishable` — a timeout
+ *     is the canonical "absence of evidence", and reading it as death is the exact defect this
+ *     command exists to avoid;
+ *   - a garbled reply, or one that does not ECHO the principal asked about, is `unestablishable` —
+ *     a result that does not verifiably describe THIS principal never authorizes.
+ */
+import { type SpaceAuth } from "@cotal-ai/core";
+import type { HolderLiveness } from "./reconcile-gate.js";
+/**
+ * Map a delivery-admin reply to the reconciler's verdict — the whole trust-boundary decision, as
+ * ONE pure function so the rail probe and the tests exercise the SAME mapping rather than two
+ * copies that can drift. Every non-verdict is `unestablishable`; nothing here can yield `gone`
+ * except an oracle that affirmatively said so under a complete sweep.
+ */
+export declare function holderLivenessFromReply(data: unknown, principal: string): HolderLiveness;
+/** Build the reconciler's `probeHolder(principal) → verdict`. Per-call connection, exactly as the
+ *  evictor does: a standing privileged connection would be a wider surface holding nothing. */
+export declare function makeManagerHolderLivenessProbe(opts: {
+    space: string;
+    servers: string;
+    auth: SpaceAuth;
+    log: (line: string) => void;
+}): (principal: string) => Promise<HolderLiveness>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=holder-liveness.d.ts.map

package/dist/holder-liveness.d.ts.map

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package/dist/holder-liveness.js

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/**
+ * The gate reconciler's AFFIRMATIVE freeze-holder check (Cotal #391), over the delivery daemon's
+ * `ctl.delivery-admin` rail — the READ twin of {@link makeManagerEndpointEvictor}, and deliberately
+ * shaped like it so the two guards of the same repair read the same way.
+ *
+ * The `$SYS` CONNZ capability lives with the DELIVERY DAEMON (co-located with the broker), never in
+ * a seed-holding process — the same D5 rail-split the evictor obeys. This reaches it with a
+ * per-call SCOPED `endpoint-evictor` credential: pub the delivery-admin subject + reply +
+ * `$JS.API.INFO`, nothing else. That credential names eviction because it is the rail's existing
+ * scope; the VERB it calls here is read-only, and the daemon-side executor opens only the CONNZ
+ * observer cred — the kick-capable evictor cred is never read on that path.
+ *
+ * EVERY FAILURE IS A REFUSAL, NEVER A PASS. Unlike the evictor — whose no-oracle case throws so the
+ * barrier fails closed — this returns a STRUCTURED verdict, because the reconciler must tell the
+ * operator WHICH condition refused. The mapping is total and there is no branch that infers death:
+ *   - a reachable daemon's `live` / `gone` / `unknown` verdict passes through as-is;
+ *   - a daemon refusal, an unreachable rail, or a REQUEST TIMEOUT is `unestablishable` — a timeout
+ *     is the canonical "absence of evidence", and reading it as death is the exact defect this
+ *     command exists to avoid;
+ *   - a garbled reply, or one that does not ECHO the principal asked about, is `unestablishable` —
+ *     a result that does not verifiably describe THIS principal never authorizes.
+ */
+import { CotalEndpoint, mintCreds, newIdentity, parsePrincipalLivenessResult } from "@cotal-ai/core";
+/**
+ * Map a delivery-admin reply to the reconciler's verdict — the whole trust-boundary decision, as
+ * ONE pure function so the rail probe and the tests exercise the SAME mapping rather than two
+ * copies that can drift. Every non-verdict is `unestablishable`; nothing here can yield `gone`
+ * except an oracle that affirmatively said so under a complete sweep.
+ */
+export function holderLivenessFromReply(data, principal) {
+    // Closed + ECHO-BOUND parse: the reply crosses a trust boundary, and one that describes a
+    // different principal (or no principal) tells us nothing about ours.
+    const parsed = parsePrincipalLivenessResult(data, principal);
+    if (parsed === undefined)
+        return {
+            state: "unestablishable",
+            detail: `garbled or foreign liveness result (${JSON.stringify(data ?? null)}); a result that does not verifiably describe "${principal}" never authorizes`,
+        };
+    // An internally CONTRADICTORY success never authorizes: `gone` is (sweep complete, none remain),
+    // so `gone` under an incomplete sweep is a broken oracle, not a verdict.
+    if (parsed.state === "gone" && parsed.sweepComplete !== true)
+        return {
+            state: "unestablishable",
+            detail: "the oracle reported gone with sweepComplete=false; a contradictory result never authorizes",
+        };
+    return {
+        state: parsed.state,
+        detail: `delivery-daemon CONNZ sweep, sweepComplete=${String(parsed.sweepComplete)}${parsed.note ? `: ${parsed.note}` : ""}`,
+    };
+}
+/** Build the reconciler's `probeHolder(principal) → verdict`. Per-call connection, exactly as the
+ *  evictor does: a standing privileged connection would be a wider surface holding nothing. */
+export function makeManagerHolderLivenessProbe(opts) {
+    return async (principal) => {
+        const id = newIdentity();
+        let ep;
+        try {
+            const creds = await mintCreds(opts.auth, id, "endpoint-evictor", { expiresInSeconds: 60 });
+            ep = new CotalEndpoint({
+                space: opts.space,
+                servers: opts.servers,
+                creds,
+                card: { id: id.id, name: "manager-holder-liveness", kind: "endpoint" },
+                channels: [],
+                consume: false,
+                watchChannels: false,
+                watchPresence: false,
+                registerPresence: false,
+            });
+            ep.on("error", () => { });
+            await ep.start();
+            const r = await ep.requestDeliveryAdmin("principalLiveness", { principal }, 15_000);
+            if (!r.ok)
+                return {
+                    state: "unestablishable",
+                    detail: `the delivery daemon refused the liveness query: ${r.error ?? "(no error copy)"}`,
+                };
+            const verdict = holderLivenessFromReply(r.data, principal);
+            opts.log(`manager-holder-liveness: ${principal}: ${verdict.state} (${verdict.detail})`);
+            return verdict;
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            // The rail is unreachable, or the request TIMED OUT. Both are UNKNOWABILITY, and neither is
+            // death: this is the branch a mutation would have to corrupt to turn verify-dead into
+            // assume-dead-on-timeout, and it is the reason the reconciler refuses instead of proceeding.
+            return {
+                state: "unestablishable",
+                detail: `the delivery daemon is not reachable on the ctl.delivery-admin rail (${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}); ` +
+                    `without the liveness oracle the freeze-holder "${principal}" cannot be proven gone. ` +
+                    "Start the delivery daemon (`cotal up` runs it) and re-run — this repair never infers death from silence",
+            };
+        }
+        finally {
+            await ep?.stop().catch(() => { });
+        }
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=holder-liveness.js.map

package/dist/holder-liveness.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/manager-service-contract.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+/**
+ * The manager's v0.4 SERVICE CONTRACT (control-surface P2 item 1): the §13.7 cluster document +
+ * compiled command contracts that let the manager register as an ordinary `service` endpoint and
+ * serve typed commands on the `ep.*` rails, dual-served beside its bespoke
+ * `ctl.<tier>.<owner>.<actor>` control subjects until 1d deletes those.
+ *
+ * This module is PURE DATA + schema (no broker, no barrier, no wire I/O): the content-addressed
+ * cluster document (the authority for every command's served shape) and the provenance-branded
+ * `compileContract` pairs each `EpCommandDef` must carry. The registration/serve WIRING lives in
+ * the manager (`registerManagerService`).
+ *
+ * REVISION 2 (slice 1b): the FULL op fan-out. Every served `ctl` op maps to a typed command; the
+ * v0.3 op names map onto the Appendix-B caller vocabulary where one exists (`start` -> `spawn`;
+ * the named `stop` -> `despawn` — on the v0.3 surface a named stop and a despawn are the same
+ * terminal; the self no-name `stop` -> `stop` with authz-mode `self`; the per-agent `status`
+ * read -> `inspect`, distinct from the 1a manager-level `status`). Targeting: `despawn`/`attach`
+ * ride owner mode (the target block names the agent's principal + lifecycle uid; the fresh
+ * resolver checks currency). `child` mode is DELIBERATELY NOT DECLARED anywhere — the panel's 1b
+ * gate requires a DURABLE spawner record before child mode exists, so it fails closed by absence
+ * until that record lands; own-child narrowing on despawn/attach meanwhile rides the SAME
+ * `authorizeNamedControl` policy the ctl privileged tier runs (in-memory spawner, identical
+ * source both doors). `ledger` mode is likewise absent (admin != ledger in static mode): every
+ * admin-class command is untargeted + capability-gated — the broker grant (who holds the
+ * request-publish row) stays the load-bearing tier boundary, exactly as the ctl cred layer is
+ * today; the 1c migration table names who mints which capability.
+ *
+ * Capability labels (describe/grant vocabulary, one per tier class):
+ *   manager.read     status / ps / inspect / models        (read-only)
+ *   manager.spawn    spawn                                 (privileged-grade creation)
+ *   manager.lifecycle despawn / attach                     (owner-mode terminal/interactive)
+ *   manager.self     stop                                  (self-mode halt; baseline)
+ *   manager.persona  definePersona                         (privileged-grade; ownership-checked)
+ *   manager.admin    purge / launch / resume family        (operator instruments only)
+ */
+import { type CompiledContract, type EpAuthzMode, type EpCommandDef, type EpServeContext } from "@cotal-ai/core";
+/** The manager's endpoint NAME — a core single-label name (needs OPERATOR name authority at
+ *  registration; the manager holds the space signing seed, so it self-authorizes). */
+export declare const MANAGER_ENDPOINT = "manager";
+/** The manager cluster document's URN (§13.7 content-addressed authority). */
+export declare const MANAGER_CLUSTER_URN = "ai.cotal.manager";
+/** The typed shape a `status` invocation returns (the compiled output contract validates it). */
+export interface ManagerStatus {
+    instanceId: string;
+    runtime: string;
+    agentCount: number;
+    uptimeMs: number;
+}
+/** Per-command compiled contract pairs, exported for CALLERS (`epCall` pins the same digests the
+ *  cluster document registers; the generic invoke CLI compiles these from the STORE instead). */
+export declare const MANAGER_CONTRACTS: Readonly<Record<string, {
+    input: CompiledContract;
+    output: CompiledContract;
+}>>;
+/** Every §13.7 contract artifact the manager PUBLISHES to the EPC store at registration (P2 item
+ *  1, 1c): each DISTINCT schema root plus its single-member closure manifest — the two artifacts
+ *  a caller fetches at a command's input/output CLOSURE digest (`fetchContractClosure` walks
+ *  manifest → root) to recompile the digest-matching validators. The cluster document + ITS
+ *  manifest ride separately ({@link managerClusterArtifacts}). */
+export declare function managerContractArtifactValues(): unknown[];
+/** The 1a `status` pair, kept as a named export (existing callers/smokes). */
+export declare const MANAGER_STATUS_CONTRACT: {
+    input: CompiledContract;
+    output: CompiledContract;
+};
+/** The §13.7 cluster DOCUMENT: the content-addressed authority for the manager's served command
+ *  surface. Revisions: 3 = the 1c any-mode despawn/attach admission; 4 = item-2's spawn-as-action;
+ *  5 = item-6's `attach` output flip (ws:// URL → the holder-bound §13.6 session grant).
+ *
+ *  6 = `launch` accepts the inline `spec` of a remote manifest deploy. The handler branch for it
+ *  merged in ahead of the schema, so the compiled contract refused every request that carried the
+ *  field and the feature was unreachable through this door (executed: the compiled input validator
+ *  returned false for `{runId, name, spec}` while the CLI sends exactly that). ONE revision 6
+ *  covers the whole branch: when the journal-action work lands, its `action` marker and
+ *  `readinessDeadlineMs` declaration join THIS revision rather than minting a seventh. */
+export declare function managerClusterDocument(): {
+    urn: string;
+    revision: number;
+    attributes: never[];
+    events: never[];
+    commands: Array<{
+        name: string;
+        class: "ephemeral";
+        targeted: boolean;
+        modes?: EpAuthzMode[];
+        capability: string;
+        inputDigest: string;
+        outputDigest: string;
+    }>;
+};
+/** The two-digest §13.7 content addressing for the manager document: the registered CLOSURE digest
+ *  names a `{v:1, root:<artifactDigest>, members:[]}` manifest whose root names the DOCUMENT. Both
+ *  artifacts are published to the `epc` store at their own digest; `clusterDigests` in the service
+ *  spec carries the closure digest. Returned together so the manager publishes both then registers
+ *  under the closure digest. */
+export declare function managerClusterArtifacts(): {
+    document: ReturnType<typeof managerClusterDocument>;
+    rootDigest: string;
+    manifest: {
+        v: 1;
+        root: string;
+        members: string[];
+    };
+    closureDigest: string;
+};
+/** The handlers the manager supplies to back each served command. Each receives the serve
+ *  CONTEXT (the broker-authenticated subject shape beside the validated args/target) so the
+ *  manager can run its shared admission chokepoint and derive the caller principal; each returns
+ *  the command's output value (the compiled output contract validates it at the serve boundary).
+ *  Kept as a narrow interface so the contract module stays broker-free. */
+export interface ManagerServiceHandlers {
+    status(ctx: EpServeContext): ManagerStatus | Promise<ManagerStatus>;
+    ps(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+    inspect(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+    models(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+    spawn(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+    despawn(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+    attach(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+    stopSelf(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+    definePersona(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+    purge(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+    launch(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+    resumePreserved(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+    commitResume(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+    finalizeResume(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+    preparePreservation(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+    commitPreservation(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+    abortPreservation(ctx: EpServeContext): unknown | Promise<unknown>;
+}
+/** Build the `EpCommandDef[]` `serveEndpoint` consumes: each command's provenance-branded compiled
+ *  contracts (matching the document's pinned digests exactly) plus its handler. */
+export declare function managerCommandDefs(handlers: ManagerServiceHandlers): EpCommandDef[];
+//# sourceMappingURL=manager-service-contract.d.ts.map

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