@cotal-ai/manager 0.12.0 → 0.13.1

package/dist/manager.js

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
-import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+import { createHash, randomUUID, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+import { connect, credsAuthenticator } from "@nats-io/transport-node";
 import { existsSync, lstatSync, readFileSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
 import { join, dirname, resolve } from "node:path";
-import { CotalEndpoint, DEFAULT_SERVER, DEV_OWNER, MANAGER_LEASE_TTL_MS, STANDING_RENEWABLE_TTL_SEC, agentFilePath, clearSpaceHistory, connectorServers, deprovisionAgent, firstFreeName, idFromCreds, loadAgentFile, loadCotalConfig, mintCreds, mkSecretDir, newIdentity, parsePrincipalKey, parseShareSelection, principalKey, probeConnect, provisionAgent, provisionAgentDurables, registry, resolveAuthProvider, saveAgentFile, writeSecretFile, subjectMatches, CONTROL_PRIVILEGED, CONTROL_SELF_SERVICE, CONTROL_ADMIN, } from "@cotal-ai/core";
-import { agentAuthState, authDir, connectorInstallHint, DEFAULT_CONNECTOR, defaultAgentType, findCotalRoot, loadMeshes, loadSpaceAuth, manifestExtensionNames, materializeFromManifest, mergeLaunchOptions, remintDaemonCreds, resolveOnPath, userAuthStateDir, workspaceSecretStore, writeRenewalRecord } from "@cotal-ai/workspace";
+import { CotalEndpoint, DEFAULT_SERVER, DEV_OWNER, MANAGER_LEASE_TTL_MS, STANDING_RENEWABLE_TTL_SEC, agentFilePath, clearSpaceHistory, connectorServers, deprovisionAgent, firstFreeName, idFromCreds, loadAgentFile, loadCotalConfig, mintCreds, mintLifecycleUid, mkSecretDir, newIdentity, parsePrincipalKey, parseShareSelection, principalKey, probeConnect, provisionAgent, provisionAgentDurables, registry, resolveAuthProvider, saveAgentFile, subjectMatches, CONTROL_PRIVILEGED, CONTROL_SELF_SERVICE, CONTROL_ADMIN, CONTROL_AUTH_ADMIN, controlServiceSubject, } from "@cotal-ai/core";
+import { agentActorTokenKey, agentAuthState, agentCredsDir, agentCredsKey, agentSecretFilePaths, agentSentinelCredsKey, authDir, connectorInstallHint, DEFAULT_CONNECTOR, defaultAgentType, findCotalRoot, loadMeshes, loadSpaceAuth, manifestExtensionNames, materializeFromManifest, materializeSecretToFile, mergeLaunchOptions, remintDaemonCreds, resolveOnPath, userAuthStateDir, workspaceSecretStore, writeRenewalRecord } from "@cotal-ai/workspace";
 import { createRuntime, } from "./runtime/index.js";
 import { AttachEndpoint } from "./attach-endpoint.js";
 import { launchSpecForRun, materializePersona, launchAgentToStartOpts } from "./launch.js";
@@ -34,6 +35,13 @@ const DEPROVISION_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
 /** A hard preservation stop should settle quickly. The manager still waits and reports a partial
  * cut rather than pretending a child is gone. Held in ManagerOptions so fake runtimes can shorten it. */
 const PRESERVE_STOP_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
+/** The STABLE retirement opId for one lifecycle (#29 piece 3): deterministic from the uid, so a
+ *  despawn retry, a same-name-spawn nudge, and the auth service's boot resume all drive the SAME
+ *  operation (the rail's idempotence table needs exactly one op per retiring incarnation). 26 hex
+ *  chars = in the lifecycle-token grammar `[a-z0-9]{26,32}`, collision-resistant. */
+function retireOpId(lifecycleUid) {
+    return createHash("sha256").update(`retire:${lifecycleUid}`).digest("hex").slice(0, 26);
+}
 /** Sentinel owner-filter value that matches NO agent's `userOwner` (owner tokens never contain a
  *  dash) — what {@link Manager.psOwnerFilter} returns for an unparseable caller so a malformed
  *  principal fail-closes to an empty `ps` instead of an unbounded one. */
@@ -84,6 +92,29 @@ export class Manager {
     /** Expiry stamps (`startedAt + MIN_LIFETIME`) for slots that freed while still young — a
      *  count-only, lazily-pruned recycle floor (P4c). Pruned + summed into the ceiling gate. */
     cooling = [];
+    /** Names RESERVED PENDING RETIREMENT (#29 piece 3): a despawned agent's name stays held until
+     *  the auth plane confirms its lifecycle's retirement TERMINAL over the auth-admin rail — the
+     *  alias-reuse gate that closes the same-name despawn→respawn race at its root. An UNCERTAIN
+     *  outcome (rail down, timeout) keeps the hold with the last attempt's copy; a same-name spawn
+     *  refuses legibly AND re-fires the request. In-memory: across a manager restart the durable
+     *  truth is the auth-side lifecycle head itself (an unretired head refuses issuance — the
+     *  named residual this belt narrows, not replaces). */
+    retiring = new Map();
+    /** SINGLE-FLIGHT guard for {@link requestRetirement} (audit #1): one in-flight rail round-trip per
+     *  (name, lifecycleUid). The detached `deprovision` call and every same-name-spawn nudge for THAT
+     *  lifecycle JOIN the same promise instead of stacking independent requests that dual-enter the
+     *  barrier; a fresh trigger after it settles re-drives. Keyed by (name, uid) — NOT name alone — so a
+     *  same-name SUCCESSOR (which can spawn after the hold clears but before this flight's `nc.close`
+     *  yield settles) never joins the predecessor's rail request and skips its own retirement. */
+    retiringFlight = new Map();
+    /** SINGLE-FLIGHT guard for {@link deprovision} (INT-2/C): one in-flight teardown per
+     *  (name, lifecycleUid). The detached freeSlot teardown and every same-name-spawn nudge that
+     *  re-drives it JOIN one promise instead of launching a SECOND, concurrent teardown. Without it,
+     *  two teardowns race the NAME-KEYED ledger revoke: once the first frees the alias and a successor
+     *  mints its own row, the second's delayed revoke (which carries no lifecycle coordinate) would
+     *  delete the SUCCESSOR's standing authority. Keyed by (name, uid) so a later same-name lifecycle
+     *  gets its own flight; a fresh trigger after settle re-drives only if the hold still stands. */
+    deprovisioningFlight = new Map();
     attach;
     ep;
     /** Space trust material when the mesh runs in auth mode (`.cotal/auth` present);
@@ -191,6 +222,11 @@ export class Manager {
             servers: this.servers,
             channels: [],
             creds,
+            // The supervisor registers on the roster, and an authed presence-registering endpoint is
+            // lifecycle-keyed (SPEC 13.1, fail-before-presence). The manager process is the top of its
+            // own launch chain (the operator command IS its launcher), so it mints its incarnation's
+            // uid here - one per supervisor process, never reused across restarts.
+            lifecycleUid: mintLifecycleUid(),
             // The supervisor serves control + watches presence; it never consumes chat/dm/task
             // (no message handler). consume:false avoids binding consumers it doesn't use — and
             // under auth avoids trying to bind its own DM/task durables that nothing pre-created.
@@ -599,22 +635,20 @@ export class Manager {
             : { owner: DEV_OWNER, actor: a.id };
         if (!principal)
             throw new Error(`managed agent ${a.name} has an invalid principal ${a.id}`);
-        const credsDir = join(authDir(this.workspaceRoot), "creds");
-        const staticCredsPath = join(credsDir, `${a.name}.creds`);
-        const actorTokenPath = join(credsDir, `${a.name}.actor-token`);
-        const sentinelPath = join(credsDir, `${a.name}.sentinel.creds`);
+        const files = agentSecretFilePaths(this.workspaceRoot, a.name);
         const identity = a.userOwner
             ? {
                 mode: "user",
                 owner: principal.owner,
                 actor: principal.actor,
-                actorToken: { kind: "file", path: actorTokenPath, sha256: this.fileDigestOrEmpty(actorTokenPath) },
-                sentinelCredential: { kind: "file", path: sentinelPath, sha256: this.fileDigestOrEmpty(sentinelPath) },
-                health: { kind: "file", path: join(credsDir, `${a.name}.auth-health.json`) },
+                lifecycleUid: a.lifecycleUid,
+                actorToken: { kind: "file", path: files.actorToken, sha256: this.fileDigestOrEmpty(files.actorToken) },
+                sentinelCredential: { kind: "file", path: files.sentinelCreds, sha256: this.fileDigestOrEmpty(files.sentinelCreds) },
+                health: { kind: "file", path: files.health },
             }
             : this.auth
-                ? { mode: "static", id: principal.actor, credential: { kind: "file", path: staticCredsPath, sha256: this.fileDigestOrEmpty(staticCredsPath) } }
-                : { mode: "open", id: principal.actor };
+                ? { mode: "static", id: principal.actor, lifecycleUid: a.lifecycleUid, credential: { kind: "file", path: files.creds, sha256: this.fileDigestOrEmpty(files.creds) } }
+                : { mode: "open", id: principal.actor, lifecycleUid: a.lifecycleUid };
         const dependencies = [a.launch.source.configPath];
         if (a.launch.source.kind === "manifest" && a.launch.source.runId)
             dependencies.unshift(join(this.workspaceRoot, ".cotal", "run", `${a.launch.source.runId}.json`));
@@ -1038,6 +1072,13 @@ export class Manager {
                 inactive.push(`${entry.name} no longer holds retained principal ${expectedPrincipal}`);
                 continue;
             }
+            // The late paths (commit/finalize) must prove the SAME incarnation the incarnation-exact
+            // readiness fence proved (§13.1): a principal-only match lets a wrong/absent-uid presence under
+            // the reused alias satisfy commit/finalize after a readiness timeout, undoing the fence.
+            if (managed.lifecycleUid !== entry.identity.lifecycleUid) {
+                inactive.push(`${entry.name} manager metadata incarnation ${managed.lifecycleUid} drifted from the inventory's ${entry.identity.lifecycleUid}`);
+                continue;
+            }
             if (managed.handle.name !== entry.name || managed.handle.kind !== entry.launch.runtime) {
                 inactive.push(`${entry.name} is not attached to its exact retained ${entry.launch.runtime} handle`);
                 continue;
@@ -1052,8 +1093,9 @@ export class Manager {
                 inactive.push(`${entry.name} runtime status failed: ${e.message}`);
                 continue;
             }
-            if (!roster.some((presence) => presence.card.id === expectedPrincipal && presence.card.name === entry.name && presence.status !== "offline"))
-                inactive.push(`${entry.name} principal ${expectedPrincipal} is not exactly present`);
+            if (!roster.some((presence) => presence.card.id === expectedPrincipal && presence.card.name === entry.name && presence.status !== "offline" &&
+                presence.lifecycleUid === entry.identity.lifecycleUid))
+                inactive.push(`${entry.name} incarnation ${entry.identity.lifecycleUid} (principal ${expectedPrincipal}) is not exactly present`);
         }
         return inactive;
     }
@@ -1168,20 +1210,19 @@ export class Manager {
         // pass through too (a persona may hold delegable roles) — the ledger's envelope walk still
         // attenuates every one of these against the spawner chain.
         const scope = (opts.capabilities ?? []).filter((c) => c === "spawn" || c === "admin" || /^role:[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(c));
-        const credsDir = join(authDir(this.workspaceRoot), "creds");
-        const tokenPath = join(credsDir, `${name}.actor-token`);
-        const sentinelPath = join(credsDir, `${name}.sentinel.creds`);
-        const healthPath = join(credsDir, `${name}.auth-health.json`);
+        // LOCAL composition, hardcoded: until the manager's entry is store-threaded (the same
+        // later slice as its renewal-owner store, with/after the membership-rw reader migration),
+        // a pure-KMS hosted manager CANNOT read the callout material this grant needs — hosted
+        // user-mode spawn via the manager is UNAVAILABLE, not silently degraded, until then.
+        const secrets = workspaceSecretStore(this.workspaceRoot);
+        const files = agentSecretFilePaths(this.workspaceRoot, name);
+        const { actorToken: tokenPath, sentinelCreds: sentinelPath, health: healthPath } = files;
         try {
             // The GRANT first — it is the envelope-rule enforcement point (a delegation must sit within
             // the spawner's own grant), so a refused delegation exits here having touched nothing beyond
             // the ledger: no durables, no broker footprint, nothing for a corrected respawn to race.
             const grant = await provider.grantAgent({
-                // LOCAL composition, hardcoded: until the manager's entry is store-threaded (the same
-                // later slice as its renewal-owner store, with/after the membership-rw reader migration),
-                // a pure-KMS hosted manager CANNOT read the callout material this grant needs — hosted
-                // user-mode spawn via the manager is UNAVAILABLE, not silently degraded, until then.
-                store: workspaceSecretStore(this.workspaceRoot),
+                store: secrets,
                 dir,
                 space: this.space,
                 owner,
@@ -1192,17 +1233,23 @@ export class Manager {
                 role: opts.role,
                 parent: spawnerPr ? opts.spawner : undefined,
                 label: opts.label,
+                lifecycleUid: opts.lifecycleUid,
             });
-            // Durables + ACL row, principal-keyed — the same onboarding as static agents minus the mint
-            // (a user agent's credential is its bearer, minted by the callout per connect).
-            await this.withProvisioner((prov) => provisionAgentDurables(prov, { owner, actor: name }, {
+            // Durables + ACL row, LIFECYCLE-keyed (SPEC 13.1) — the same onboarding as static agents minus
+            // the mint (a user agent's credential is its bearer, minted by the callout per connect from the
+            // ledger row's recorded lifecycleUid — the same value provisioned here).
+            await this.withProvisioner((prov) => provisionAgentDurables(prov, { owner, actor: name, lifecycleUid: opts.lifecycleUid }, {
                 subscribe: opts.subscribe,
                 allowSubscribe: opts.allowSubscribe,
                 role: opts.role,
             }));
-            mkSecretDir(credsDir);
-            writeSecretFile(tokenPath, grant.actorToken);
-            writeSecretFile(sentinelPath, grant.sentinelCreds);
+            // The store holds the source of truth; the bearer re-exec (`--token-file`) and the launch's
+            // sentinel handoff read FILES, so materialize both at the canonical paths (under the local
+            // FS composition, a byte-identical rewrite of the keys' own locations).
+            await secrets.put(agentActorTokenKey(name), grant.actorToken);
+            await secrets.put(agentSentinelCredsKey(name), grant.sentinelCreds);
+            await materializeSecretToFile(secrets, agentActorTokenKey(name), tokenPath);
+            await materializeSecretToFile(secrets, agentSentinelCredsKey(name), sentinelPath);
             rmSync(healthPath, { force: true }); // a fresh start opens a fresh health window
             const bearerCmd = [
                 // The manager's own invocation prefix (node + loader flags + the cotal entry) — the agent
@@ -1229,10 +1276,12 @@ export class Manager {
             // may respawn the moment it reads the refusal, and a detached teardown would race (and
             // delete) that fresh spawn's just-provisioned durables.
             await provider.revokeAgent({ dir, owner, actor: name }).catch(() => { });
+            await secrets.delete(agentActorTokenKey(name)).catch(() => { });
+            await secrets.delete(agentSentinelCredsKey(name)).catch(() => { });
             rmSync(tokenPath, { force: true });
             rmSync(sentinelPath, { force: true });
             rmSync(healthPath, { force: true });
-            await this.deprovision({ id: principalKey(owner, name).key, name, userOwner: owner }).catch((err) => console.error(`rollback deprovision ${name}: ${err.message}`));
+            await this.deprovision({ id: principalKey(owner, name).key, name, lifecycleUid: opts.lifecycleUid, userOwner: owner }).catch((err) => console.error(`rollback deprovision ${name}: ${err.message}`));
             return { error: `agent auth preflight failed for "${name}": ${e.message}` };
         }
     }
@@ -1247,6 +1296,19 @@ export class Manager {
         this.agents.delete(a.name);
         if (floor && Date.now() - a.startedAt < MIN_LIFETIME)
             this.cooling.push(a.startedAt + MIN_LIFETIME);
+        // #29 piece 3: on a USER mesh the name is RESERVED PENDING RETIREMENT — despawn started this
+        // lifecycle's FULL teardown (footprint + standing-authority revoke + the auth-side retirement),
+        // and the alias frees only when all of it completes (not the retirement alone). The detached
+        // deprovision below drives it; a failed revoke or an unreachable rail keeps the name held,
+        // re-driven by a retry. Gate on userMode BY
+        // CONSTRUCTION (NEW-1): a static-auth mint has no user-mode lifecycle head to retire, so the
+        // reservation + rail request simply don't apply there (the incidental nkey-parse used to mask
+        // this, but the intent is "user mode only", not "any principal-shaped id").
+        if (this.userMode) {
+            const p = parsePrincipalKey(a.id);
+            if (p)
+                this.retiring.set(a.name, { opId: retireOpId(a.lifecycleUid), lifecycleUid: a.lifecycleUid, owner: p.owner, actor: p.actor, agentId: a.id, userOwner: a.userOwner, startedAt: Date.now() });
+        }
         // Auth mode: tear down the departed agent's minted broker footprint + creds file (#159 B2). The
         // process is already gone, so this must never block the slot free or throw into the caller — it runs
         // detached, and a failure is logged loudly (never swallowed), not retried. The `agents` guard above
@@ -1269,34 +1331,184 @@ export class Manager {
     async deprovision(a) {
         if (!this.auth)
             return; // open mesh mints no creds/durables — nothing to tear down
+        // SINGLE-FLIGHT per (name, lifecycleUid) (INT-2/C): join an in-flight teardown for this exact
+        // lifecycle rather than launching a second concurrent one whose delayed name-keyed revoke could
+        // outlive the hold-clear and delete a successor's row. A fresh trigger after settle re-drives.
+        const key = JSON.stringify([a.name, a.lifecycleUid]); // ASCII-safe, delimiter-collision-free
+        const inflight = this.deprovisioningFlight.get(key);
+        if (inflight)
+            return inflight;
+        const flight = this.driveDeprovision(a).finally(() => {
+            if (this.deprovisioningFlight.get(key) === flight)
+                this.deprovisioningFlight.delete(key);
+        });
+        this.deprovisioningFlight.set(key, flight);
+        return flight;
+    }
+    /** The actual footprint teardown (wrapped by {@link deprovision}'s single-flight). */
+    async driveDeprovision(a) {
+        if (!this.auth)
+            return; // guaranteed by deprovision; re-checked for the deprovisionBroker narrowing
         // Drop the local creds file FIRST + unconditionally — it is a usable identity on disk, useless for a
         // departed agent, so it must not survive even if the broker teardown below fails or times out. The
         // teardown mints its OWN deprovisioner cred (not this file), so removing it early is independent.
-        rmSync(join(authDir(this.workspaceRoot), "creds", `${a.name}.creds`), { force: true });
+        // Migrated kinds: the store delete is the authoritative removal; the rmSync clears the FS
+        // materialization (a byte-identical no-op under the local composition, real once the manager
+        // is store-threaded onto a non-FS store).
+        const secrets = workspaceSecretStore(this.workspaceRoot);
+        const files = agentSecretFilePaths(this.workspaceRoot, a.name);
+        await secrets.delete(agentCredsKey(a.name));
+        rmSync(files.creds, { force: true });
         if (a.userOwner) {
             // USER MODE: this teardown IS revocation, not just footprint reduction — the ledger row is
             // the agent's standing mint authority, so delete it (next exchange refused, next connect
             // denied) and shred the secret/sentinel/health files. A copied actor token dies here; a
             // still-LIVE connection ends at its bearer-bound JWT expiry (≤ the agent TTL).
-            const credsDir = join(authDir(this.workspaceRoot), "creds");
-            for (const f of [`${a.name}.actor-token`, `${a.name}.sentinel.creds`, `${a.name}.auth-health.json`])
-                rmSync(join(credsDir, f), { force: true });
+            await secrets.delete(agentActorTokenKey(a.name));
+            await secrets.delete(agentSentinelCredsKey(a.name));
+            for (const f of [files.actorToken, files.sentinelCreds, files.health])
+                rmSync(f, { force: true });
+            // The ledger row IS the agent's STANDING mint authority (a different store from the auth-plane
+            // cred ledger the rail retirement covers): while it lives, a copied actor token can still mint a
+            // fresh connect credential. So a FAILED revoke must NOT be swallowed into a clean terminal (INT-2):
+            // mark the standing authority live on the hold so the retirement can never free the name (a freed
+            // name says "this lifecycle is fully gone" - false while the mint authority stands), and carry a
+            // legible operator copy. A retry re-drives this whole teardown (the same-name-spawn nudge routes
+            // through deprovision, not the rail alone), so the revoke is re-attempted, not stranded.
+            const holdRevoke = this.retiring.get(a.name);
+            if (holdRevoke && holdRevoke.lifecycleUid === a.lifecycleUid)
+                holdRevoke.standingAuthorityLive = true;
             try {
                 await resolveAuthProvider().revokeAgent({
                     dir: userAuthStateDir(this.workspaceRoot, this.space),
                     owner: a.userOwner,
                     actor: a.name,
                 });
+                const done = this.retiring.get(a.name);
+                if (done && done.lifecycleUid === a.lifecycleUid)
+                    done.standingAuthorityLive = false;
             }
             catch (e) {
+                const h = this.retiring.get(a.name);
+                if (h && h.lifecycleUid === a.lifecycleUid)
+                    h.lastError = `the agent's standing mint authority could not be revoked (${e.message}); the name stays held so a copied actor token cannot mint fresh credentials. NEXT: a same-name spawn re-drives the full teardown (including the revoke), or recover the auth state.`;
                 console.error(`revoke agent grant ${a.name}: ${e.message}`);
             }
         }
-        const creds = await mintCreds(this.auth, newIdentity(), "deprovisioner", { deprovisionTarget: a.id });
+        await this.deprovisionBroker(a);
+        // #29 piece 3: after the footprint teardown, ask the AUTH plane to RETIRE the lifecycle over
+        // the auth-admin rail. The rail re-checks the space-manager lease at serve time; the terminal
+        // (or an already-retired answer) clears the name reservation. Failures keep the hold with
+        // their operator copy — legible, retryable, never a silent half-state.
+        await this.requestRetirement(a);
+    }
+    /** Request the auth-side retirement of a departed agent's lifecycle (#29 piece 3): an ephemeral
+     *  `retirement-requester` credential (request + reply only), the generic `retireLifecycle` op,
+     *  a STABLE opId (derived from the lifecycleUid, so every retry re-drives the SAME operation),
+     *  and the four-outcome handling in operator vocabulary. */
+    async requestRetirement(a) {
+        if (!this.userMode)
+            return; // NEW-1: lifecycle retirement is a user-mesh concept; a static mint has no head to retire
+        // SINGLE-FLIGHT per (name, lifecycleUid) (audit #1): the detached deprovision call and every
+        // same-name-spawn nudge for THIS lifecycle share ONE in-flight retirement, so concurrent triggers
+        // never stack independent rail requests that dual-enter runAgentRetirementBarrier. Keyed by
+        // (name, uid), NOT name alone: driveRetirement clears the hold on rail ok but then yields at
+        // `nc.close()` with the flight still stored, so the alias can free and a SUCCESSOR (new uid) spawn.
+        // A name-only key would let that successor's own teardown JOIN the predecessor's still-pending
+        // flight and never send its OWN retirement — leaving the successor's lifecycle unretired. The uid in
+        // the key gives the successor a disjoint flight (mirrors {@link deprovisioningFlight}). A fresh
+        // trigger after settle re-drives (a still-present hold => retirement not yet confirmed).
+        const key = JSON.stringify([a.name, a.lifecycleUid]);
+        const inflight = this.retiringFlight.get(key);
+        if (inflight)
+            return inflight;
+        const flight = this.driveRetirement(a).finally(() => {
+            if (this.retiringFlight.get(key) === flight)
+                this.retiringFlight.delete(key);
+        });
+        this.retiringFlight.set(key, flight);
+        return flight;
+    }
+    /** The rail round-trip for one retirement (wrapped by {@link requestRetirement}'s single-flight). */
+    async driveRetirement(a) {
+        if (!this.auth)
+            return; // guaranteed by requestRetirement; re-checked for the type narrowing below
+        const held = this.retiring.get(a.name);
+        const me = parsePrincipalKey(this.ep.ref().id);
+        const target = parsePrincipalKey(a.id);
+        if (!me || !target) {
+            if (held)
+                held.lastError = "the manager or target principal could not be derived; the retirement was not requested";
+            return;
+        }
+        const uncertain = (why) => `the despawn stopped "${a.name}", but the retirement's completion could NOT be confirmed (${why}). The name stays held - not failed, not done - and a same-name spawn re-drives the same teardown; the auth service also finishes any started retirement on its next boot. NEXT: if the auth rail stays unreachable, recover the stack (\`cotal supervise\`), then re-attempt the same-name spawn.`;
+        try {
+            const creds = await mintCreds(this.auth, newIdentity(), "retirement-requester", { retirementRequester: { owner: me.owner, actor: me.actor } });
+            const nc = await connect({ servers: this.servers ?? DEFAULT_SERVER, authenticator: credsAuthenticator(new TextEncoder().encode(creds)), maxReconnectAttempts: 0 });
+            try {
+                const subject = controlServiceSubject(this.space, CONTROL_AUTH_ADMIN, me.owner, me.actor);
+                const m = await nc.request(subject, JSON.stringify({ op: "retireLifecycle", args: { owner: target.owner, actor: target.actor, lifecycleUid: a.lifecycleUid, opId: retireOpId(a.lifecycleUid) } }), { timeout: 20_000, noMux: true, reply: `${subject}.reply.${randomUUID()}` });
+                const r = m.json();
+                if (r.ok) {
+                    // CAS the hold clear (audit #1 ABA): free the alias ONLY if the current hold is still THIS
+                    // lifecycle's - a late reply for a retired predecessor must never clear a successor's newer hold.
+                    const cur = this.retiring.get(a.name);
+                    if (cur && cur.lifecycleUid === a.lifecycleUid) {
+                        if (cur.standingAuthorityLive) {
+                            // INT-2: the auth-plane lifecycle retired, but the manager-side STANDING mint authority is
+                            // not yet revoked (a failed revoke). Freeing the name here would be a false terminal (a
+                            // copied token could still mint), so keep the hold with its revoke-failure copy; a retry
+                            // re-drives the full teardown (revoke included).
+                            console.error(`despawn ${a.name}: the auth-plane lifecycle retired, but the standing mint authority is not yet revoked; the name stays held. ${cur.lastError ?? ""}`);
+                        }
+                        else {
+                            this.retiring.delete(a.name);
+                            console.error(`despawn ${a.name}: the agent's retirement completed; the name is free for reuse`);
+                        }
+                    }
+                    else {
+                        console.error(`despawn ${a.name}: retirement confirmed for a prior lifecycle of "${a.name}"; the current hold is left intact`);
+                    }
+                }
+                else {
+                    // The rail's refusal is already the operator copy (lease-loss/stale/foreign-op faces,
+                    // full-no-op statements included) - surface it INTACT, never flattened.
+                    if (held)
+                        held.lastError = r.error ?? "the auth service refused the retirement without a reason";
+                    console.error(`despawn ${a.name}: ${r.error ?? "the auth service refused the retirement without a reason"}`);
+                }
+            }
+            finally {
+                await nc.close().catch(() => { });
+            }
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            const copy = uncertain(e.message);
+            if (held)
+                held.lastError = copy;
+            console.error(`despawn ${a.name}: ${copy}`);
+        }
+    }
+    /** The teardown's ASYNC BROKER PHASE: mint the ephemeral target-pinned deprovisioner cred and
+     *  delete the agent's broker footprint (dm_/dlv_ durables + read-ACL row). Split from
+     *  {@link deprovision} because it runs LAST in the ordered teardown chain — after the creds/secret
+     *  shred and the awaited ledger revoke, which precede it in that same single-flighted chain (the
+     *  revoke is awaited and can be deliberately slow, so it is not merely a synchronous prefix). The name
+     *  is NOT freed while any teardown phase is still in flight — the hold clears only after the
+     *  standing-authority revoke AND the lifecycle retirement both confirm (see {@link driveRetirement}) —
+     *  but the deletes here are still lifecycle-uid-pinned so even a replayed/stale teardown can never
+     *  reach a same-name successor's footprint (its names embed a different uid). */
+    async deprovisionBroker(a) {
+        // LIFECYCLE-PINNED (SPEC 13.1): both the credential's exact-name grants and the delete names
+        // carry a.lifecycleUid, so a stale/replayed teardown for this retired incarnation is broker-denied
+        // against a same-name successor's footprint (its names embed a different uid).
+        const creds = await mintCreds(this.auth, newIdentity(), "deprovisioner", {
+            deprovisionTarget: { principal: a.id, lifecycleUid: a.lifecycleUid },
+        });
         // Bound the detached broker teardown so a wedged broker can't leave the deprovision promise pending
         // forever with no log — the timeout rejects into freeSlot's fail-loud `.catch` (paired with the
         // helper's own fail-fast connect). The durables/ACL row still fall to space teardown as a backstop.
-        await withTimeout(deprovisionAgent({ servers: this.servers ?? DEFAULT_SERVER, space: this.space, targetId: a.id, creds }), DEPROVISION_TIMEOUT_MS, `deprovision ${a.name} (${a.id}): broker teardown timed out`);
+        await withTimeout(deprovisionAgent({ servers: this.servers ?? DEFAULT_SERVER, space: this.space, targetId: a.id, lifecycleUid: a.lifecycleUid, creds }), DEPROVISION_TIMEOUT_MS, `deprovision ${a.name} (${a.id}): broker teardown timed out`);
     }
     /** Reap a parent's children on its exit (P4b). Every descendant remains managed until the runtime's
      * authoritative wait proves exit; the wait participates in the lifecycle drain, so preservation can
@@ -1333,7 +1545,7 @@ export class Manager {
      *  in-flight (reserved) slots. Lets a colliding spawn auto-number instead of being rejected, so
      *  callers never have to invent a unique name. */
     uniqueName(base) {
-        return firstFreeName(base, (n) => this.agents.has(n) || this.reserved.has(n));
+        return firstFreeName(base, (n) => this.agents.has(n) || this.reserved.has(n) || this.retiring.has(n));
     }
     /** Spawn a teammate by persona ref (`name` loads `.cotal/agents/<name>.md`; the peer presents
      *  under that file's own `name:`), as if a peer asked via the control plane. Used to pre-spawn the
@@ -1689,6 +1901,20 @@ export class Manager {
         const idErr = this.nameError(identityName);
         if (idErr)
             return { ok: false, error: opts.resolved ? `launch agent: ${idErr}` : `persona ${configPath}: ${idErr}` };
+        // The alias-reuse gate (#29 piece 3): a name whose previous agent is still retiring REFUSES
+        // legibly (never a silent suffix), and the refusal re-drives the FULL durable teardown so
+        // "retry the spawn" is also the nudge. It routes through `deprovision` (not `requestRetirement`
+        // alone) so a retry re-drives the standing-authority revoke (INT-2) AND the broker cleanup before
+        // any hold-clear (C): the alias must not free while the durable teardown or the revoke is still
+        // outstanding. All the teardown ops are idempotent, and the rail request is single-flighted.
+        const held = this.retiring.get(identityName);
+        if (held !== undefined) {
+            void this.deprovision({ id: held.agentId, name: identityName, lifecycleUid: held.lifecycleUid, userOwner: held.userOwner }).catch(() => { });
+            return {
+                ok: false,
+                error: `the name "${identityName}" is reserved pending retirement: its previous agent's despawn started that lifecycle's teardown (footprint + standing-authority revoke + auth-side retirement), and the name frees only when all of it completes${held.lastError !== undefined ? ` (last attempt: ${held.lastError})` : ""}. NEXT: wait a moment and retry this spawn (retrying re-drives the whole teardown), or pick another name.`,
+            };
+        }
         if (variant && !connector.supportsModelVariant)
             return { ok: false, error: `${agent} connector does not support model variants (variant)` };
         const name = this.uniqueName(identityName);
@@ -1721,6 +1947,10 @@ export class Manager {
             // A stable nkey identity assigned at spawn: the public key is the agent's card.id (threaded via
             // COTAL_ID); the seed is retained to mint matching creds later.
             const identity = newIdentity();
+            // The incarnation's lifecycle UID (SPEC 13.1), minted ONCE per spawn: every lifecycle-keyed
+            // broker resource (dm_/dlv_/chathist_ durables, ACL row, memberships) and the teardown
+            // credential carry it, so a same-name successor's footprint is name-disjoint by construction.
+            const lifecycleUid = mintLifecycleUid();
             // In auth mode, mint the agent's creds from the space signing key and write them where the
             // spawned session reads them (COTAL_CREDS path). Open mesh → no creds. Scope = the resolved
             // subscribe/allowSubscribe (read) + allowPublish (post, default-deny).
@@ -1737,6 +1967,7 @@ export class Manager {
                     role,
                     capabilities,
                     label: ref,
+                    lifecycleUid,
                 });
                 if ("error" in prep) {
                     this.reserved.delete(name);
@@ -1744,7 +1975,7 @@ export class Manager {
                 }
                 userLaunch = prep.launch;
                 userOwner = prep.owner;
-                provisioned = { id: principalKey(prep.owner, name).key, name, userOwner: prep.owner };
+                provisioned = { id: principalKey(prep.owner, name).key, name, lifecycleUid, userOwner: prep.owner };
             }
             else if (this.auth) {
                 // Pre-create the agent's bind-only chat (+ DM + role TASK) durables and mint its scoped creds
@@ -1757,11 +1988,16 @@ export class Manager {
                     allowPublish,
                     role,
                     capabilities,
+                    lifecycleUid,
                 }));
-                credsPath = join(authDir(this.workspaceRoot), "creds", `${name}.creds`);
-                mkSecretDir(dirname(credsPath)); // harden the creds dir before the cred lands
-                writeSecretFile(credsPath, creds);
-                provisioned = { id: identity.id, name }; // footprint now exists — the finally rolls it back if the spawn throws
+                // Store first (the source of truth), then materialize: `buildLaunch` hands the CHILD this
+                // file path, so the cred must exist as a file regardless of the store behind the seam.
+                // LOCAL composition, hardcoded, same posture as provisionUserAgent's grant store above.
+                const secrets = workspaceSecretStore(this.workspaceRoot);
+                credsPath = agentSecretFilePaths(this.workspaceRoot, name).creds;
+                await secrets.put(agentCredsKey(name), creds);
+                await materializeSecretToFile(secrets, agentCredsKey(name), credsPath);
+                provisioned = { id: identity.id, name, lifecycleUid }; // footprint now exists — the finally rolls it back if the spawn throws
             }
             // Personal MCP servers the operator opted to share with manager-spawned agents of this type
             // (cotal config; default none → isolated, the memory-safe default this guards), narrowed by
@@ -1785,6 +2021,10 @@ export class Manager {
                 id: userLaunch ? undefined : identity.id,
                 creds: credsPath,
                 userAuth: userLaunch,
+                // The incarnation's lifecycle UID: the agent endpoint binds its lifecycle-keyed dm/dlv/
+                // chathist durables by this exact value (its creds pin the same names, so a mismatch fails
+                // at the broker, never silently).
+                lifecycleUid,
                 servers: this.servers,
                 configPath,
                 model,
@@ -1816,6 +2056,7 @@ export class Manager {
                 role,
                 agent,
                 id: userLaunch ? principalKey(userLaunch.owner, name).key : identity.id,
+                lifecycleUid,
                 ...(userLaunch ? { userOwner } : { seed: identity.seed }),
                 spawner: spawner ?? this.ep.ref().id,
                 authorityParent: userLaunch && spawner && parsePrincipalKey(spawner) ? spawner : undefined,
@@ -1981,15 +2222,21 @@ export class Manager {
         if (entry.identity.mode === "static") {
             if (!this.auth || this.userMode)
                 throw new Error(`retained agent ${entry.name} is static-auth but the current manager is not`);
-            const expected = resolve(authDir(this.workspaceRoot), "creds", `${entry.name}.creds`);
+            const expected = resolve(agentSecretFilePaths(this.workspaceRoot, entry.name).creds);
             if (resolve(entry.identity.credential.path) !== expected)
                 throw new Error(`retained credential reference for ${entry.name} is not the manager-owned path ${expected}`);
             let credentialText;
             try {
+                // The lstat guards the FS MATERIALIZATION the child will read at launch; the identity check
+                // runs on the store's value — the source of truth (byte-identical here, the local FS
+                // composition resolves the key to this same path).
                 const st = lstatSync(expected);
                 if (!st.isFile() || st.isSymbolicLink())
                     throw new Error("not a regular non-symlink file");
-                credentialText = readFileSync(expected, "utf8");
+                const stored = await workspaceSecretStore(this.workspaceRoot).get(agentCredsKey(entry.name));
+                if (stored === undefined)
+                    throw new Error("the credential is not in the secret store");
+                credentialText = stored;
                 const actual = idFromCreds(credentialText);
                 if (actual !== entry.identity.id)
                     throw new Error(`retained credential identity ${actual} does not match inventory principal ${entry.identity.id}`);
@@ -2006,10 +2253,20 @@ export class Manager {
             throw new Error(`retained agent ${entry.name} is user-auth but the current manager is not`);
         try {
             const provider = resolveAuthProvider();
-            const actorToken = readFileSync(entry.identity.actorToken.path, "utf8");
-            const sentinelCreds = readFileSync(entry.identity.sentinelCredential.path, "utf8");
+            // Mirror the static branch's expected-path equality: the store reads below are keyed by
+            // NAME, so a retained record aimed at a foreign path would otherwise pass its digest checks
+            // there while a different secret gets validated here. Canonical paths only.
+            const files = agentSecretFilePaths(this.workspaceRoot, entry.name);
+            if (resolve(entry.identity.actorToken.path) !== resolve(files.actorToken) ||
+                resolve(entry.identity.sentinelCredential.path) !== resolve(files.sentinelCreds))
+                throw new Error(`retained identity references are not the manager-owned paths under ${agentCredsDir(this.workspaceRoot)}`);
+            const secrets = workspaceSecretStore(this.workspaceRoot);
+            const actorToken = await secrets.get(agentActorTokenKey(entry.name));
+            const sentinelCreds = await secrets.get(agentSentinelCredsKey(entry.name));
+            if (actorToken === undefined || sentinelCreds === undefined)
+                throw new Error("the retained actor token / sentinel credential is not in the secret store");
             const adopted = await provider.validateRetainedAgent({
-                store: workspaceSecretStore(this.workspaceRoot),
+                store: secrets,
                 dir: userAuthStateDir(this.workspaceRoot, this.space),
                 space: this.space,
                 owner: entry.identity.owner,
@@ -2019,6 +2276,11 @@ export class Manager {
             });
             if (adopted.owner !== entry.identity.owner || adopted.actor !== entry.identity.actor)
                 throw new Error(`auth provider returned a replacement principal; expected ${entry.identity.owner}.${entry.identity.actor}`);
+            // Bind the inventory's uid to the CURRENT authority row BEFORE any spawn: a corrupt or
+            // admin-supplied inventory naming a different incarnation is refused at pre-effect validation,
+            // never left to broker-fail after the child is already running (SPEC §13.1).
+            if (adopted.lifecycleUid !== entry.identity.lifecycleUid)
+                throw new Error(`retained user authority for ${entry.identity.owner}.${entry.identity.actor} is incarnation ${adopted.lifecycleUid}, not the inventory's ${entry.identity.lifecycleUid}; a resume binds the exact recovered uid before any spawn (SPEC 13.1)`);
             if (!sameStrings(adopted.allowSubscribe, entry.launch.allowSubscribe) ||
                 !sameStrings(adopted.allowPublish, entry.launch.allowPublish) ||
                 !sameStrings(adopted.scope, entry.launch.capabilities) ||
@@ -2140,6 +2402,12 @@ export class Manager {
                     id: authority.id,
                     creds: authority.creds,
                     userAuth: authority.userAuth,
+                    // Recover the ORIGINAL incarnation uid (never a fresh mint on resume): the child endpoint
+                    // binds its lifecycle-keyed dm/dlv/chathist durables by this exact value, and its creds pin
+                    // the same names. Omitting it here (as the pre-fix resume path did) leaves the resumed child
+                    // with no COTAL_LIFECYCLE_UID: static/user fail the connector auth gate and open self-mints a
+                    // fresh uid that orphans the preserved durables and never matches the readiness fence.
+                    lifecycleUid: entry.identity.lifecycleUid,
                     servers: this.servers,
                     configPath: entry.launch.source.configPath,
                     model: entry.launch.model,
@@ -2178,6 +2446,8 @@ export class Manager {
                 role: entry.role,
                 agent: entry.launch.connector,
                 id: entry.identity.mode === "user" ? principalKey(entry.identity.owner, entry.identity.actor).key : entry.identity.id,
+                // Recover the ORIGINAL incarnation uid the durables are keyed by (never a fresh mint on resume).
+                lifecycleUid: entry.identity.lifecycleUid,
                 userOwner: entry.identity.mode === "user" ? entry.identity.owner : undefined,
                 spawner: entry.spawner,
                 authorityParent: entry.authorityParent,
@@ -2231,7 +2501,9 @@ export class Manager {
     probeStaticCredential(creds) {
         return probeConnect(this.servers ?? DEFAULT_SERVER, { creds, timeoutMs: 5_000 });
     }
-    /** An uncertain resume remains non-destructive until exact-principal presence arrives later. */
+    /** An uncertain resume remains non-destructive until exact-principal AND exact-incarnation presence
+     *  arrives later. Same predicate as the readiness fence: a principal-only match would let a
+     *  wrong/absent-uid presence under the reused alias clear cleanup suppression on another incarnation. */
     watchResumeAdoption(a) {
         const wanted = this.managedPrincipal(a);
         const onPresence = () => {
@@ -2239,7 +2511,7 @@ export class Manager {
                 this.ep.off("presence", onPresence);
                 return;
             }
-            if (!this.ep.getRoster().some((p) => p.card.id === wanted && p.status !== "offline"))
+            if (!this.ep.getRoster().some((p) => p.card.id === wanted && p.status !== "offline" && p.lifecycleUid === a.lifecycleUid))
                 return;
             if (!this.resumeRequired)
                 a.suppressCleanup = false;
@@ -2274,7 +2546,16 @@ export class Manager {
         // through managedPrincipal or a static launch can never be seen joining (every static spawn would
         // resolve "uncertain"; caught by the lifecycle e2e).
         const wanted = this.managedPrincipal(a);
-        const joined = () => this.ep.getRoster().some((p) => p.card.id === wanted && p.status !== "offline");
+        // READINESS LIFECYCLE FENCE (SPEC 13.1): match the exact principal AND the exact lifecycle uid
+        // the manager minted for THIS spawn (presence carries it, §6/:315). The endpoint's own
+        // register-only broker proof is gated on the CLIENT-authored `card.kind`, which a managed child
+        // holding a valid agent credential could set to "endpoint" to skip - so it is defense-in-depth,
+        // NOT the authority boundary. This equality is: the manager (not the child) owns the expected
+        // uid, so a ghost that advertises a wrong/absent uid never reports STARTED, whatever kind it
+        // claims. The manager threads the uid into EVERY mode's launch (open included), so the child
+        // adopts it over a self-mint and publishes it in presence; the uid is absent only from a peer
+        // the manager never launched (a pure operator/daemon connection that never registers).
+        const joined = () => this.ep.getRoster().some((p) => p.card.id === wanted && p.status !== "offline" && p.lifecycleUid === a.lifecycleUid);
         return await new Promise((resolve) => {
             let done = false;
             let timer;
@@ -2508,7 +2789,7 @@ export class Manager {
             // FAIL-CLOSED: a failed record is the failure + repair sentence; a missing/malformed or
             // stale record on a live agent is auth-unknown/auth-stale, NEVER silently healthy.
             const health = a.userOwner
-                ? agentAuthState(join(authDir(this.workspaceRoot), "creds", `${a.name}.auth-health.json`))
+                ? agentAuthState(agentSecretFilePaths(this.workspaceRoot, a.name).health)
                 : undefined;
             return {
                 name: a.name,