@cotal-ai/core 0.171.0 → 0.171.2

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/endpoint.js CHANGED
@@ -5,18 +5,14 @@ import { nativeBindingAfter, nativeConnectionBinding } from "./native-connection
5
5
  import { EventEmitter } from "node:events";
6
6
  import { drainAndClose } from "./connection-cleanup.js";
7
7
  import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
8
- import { createConnection, isIP } from "node:net";
9
- import { connect, tokenAuthenticator, nanos, AuthorizationError, PermissionViolationError, UserAuthenticationExpiredError, NoRespondersError, RequestError, TimeoutError, ConnectionError, } from "@nats-io/transport-node";
10
- import { wsconnect } from "@nats-io/nats-core";
8
+ import { nanos, PermissionViolationError, NoRespondersError, RequestError, TimeoutError, } from "@nats-io/transport-node";
11
9
  import { responderFromLease, responderFromProbe, } from "./liveness.js";
12
10
  import { EndpointPresence } from "./endpoint-presence.js";
13
11
  export { PresenceWriteStuckError } from "./endpoint-presence.js";
14
12
  import { credsClaims, credsFingerprint, credsRenewalDelayMs, idFromCreds } from "./identity.js";
15
- import { nativeCredsAuthenticator } from "./creds-authenticator.js";
16
- import { armRenewal, renewalDeadlineMs, jitteredBackoffMs } from "./renewal.js";
13
+ import { armRenewal, jitteredBackoffMs } from "./renewal.js";
17
14
  import { requireBrokerFloor } from "./broker-floor.js";
18
15
  import { withDeadline } from "./deadline.js";
19
- import { inspectCredHealth } from "./provision.js";
20
16
  import {} from "./secret-store.js";
21
17
  import { BIND_SPLIT_REISSUES, resolveService } from "./endpoint-invoke.js";
22
18
  import { EpEnvelopeError, respondedButUnbound, replyRefusedBeforeEffect, replyTargetUnmapped } from "./endpoint-envelope.js";
@@ -33,7 +29,6 @@ import { assertValidKind } from "./agent-file.js";
33
29
  import { assertValidName } from "./resolve.js";
34
30
  import { nextHeartbeat } from "./presence-heartbeat.js";
35
31
  import { anycastStoreDefinition, taskDurableConfig, PRESENCE_STORAGE } from "./streams.js";
36
- import { DELIVERY_LIMIT_HEADER, PLANE3_MAX_MSGS_PER_SUBJECT } from "./backup-config.js";
37
32
  import { jetstream, jetstreamManager, AckPolicy, DeliverPolicy, JetStreamApiCodes, } from "@nats-io/jetstream";
38
33
  import {} from "@nats-io/jetstream";
39
34
  import { Kvm } from "@nats-io/kv";
@@ -49,87 +44,19 @@ import { EndpointChannelDiscovery } from "./endpoint-channel-discovery.js";
49
44
  import { EndpointLiveness } from "./endpoint-liveness.js";
50
45
  import { EndpointProvisioning } from "./endpoint-provisioning.js";
51
46
  import { EndpointBootMemberships } from "./endpoint-boot-memberships.js";
52
- import { ackWaitOf, authenticatedChannelMessage, durableDelivery, isRecord } from "./endpoint-inbound.js";
47
+ import { ackWaitOf, durableDelivery, isRecord } from "./endpoint-inbound.js";
53
48
  import { openChannelRegistry, effectiveReplay, effectiveReplayWindowMs, readChannelConfig, readChannelDefaults, } from "./channels.js";
54
49
  import { isCasLoss } from "./endpoint-records.js";
55
50
  import { ANYCAST_CANCEL_OP, ANYCAST_NOTICE_KEY, ANYCAST_RECORDS_CREDENTIAL_OUTDATED, ANYCAST_STATUS_OP, ANYCAST_TAKES_OP, AnycastRequestAuthority, isAnycastSeq, } from "./anycast-requests.js";
56
51
  import { assertValidRole, chatStream, chatSubject, controlServiceSubject, CONTROL_DELIVERY, CONTROL_DELIVERY_ADMIN, dmStream, dmDurable, membershipInAllow, isConcreteChannel, isChannelFamily, MENTION_NOTICE_KEY, parseSubject, isPrincipalOwnerToken, assertInboxConnId, presenceBucket, MEMBERSHIP_FEED_KEY, principalKey, parsePrincipalKey, assertLifecycleToken, mintLifecycleUid, lifecycleNameKey, DEV_OWNER, spacePrefix, spaceWildcard, subjectMatches, taskStream, taskDurable, takeServeFilter, takeSubject, parseTakeSubject, TAKE_ROUTE, token, unicastSubject, unicastRecvFilter, } from "./subjects.js";
57
52
  import { isPermissionDenied } from "./permission-denied.js";
58
53
  export { isPermissionDenied };
59
- export const DEFAULT_SERVER = "nats://127.0.0.1:4222";
60
- /** Takes a daemon answers at once; one more is refused as busy, so the holder keeps its copy and
61
- * asks again rather than queueing work the daemon cannot bound. */
62
- const MAX_TAKES_IN_FLIGHT = 64;
63
- /** How often the daemon runs the anycast records maintenance pass. */
64
- const ANYCAST_SWEEP_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
65
- /** How long a holder waits for the daemon to answer a take. */
66
- const ANYCAST_TAKE_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
67
- /** The DLV count a stored copy was written under, from its {@link DELIVERY_LIMIT_HEADER} (SPEC §8):
68
- * a whole number of at least 1, null for `none`, and 1000 when the header is absent, since only a
69
- * daemon from before the count was configurable writes a copy without it and its count was 1000.
70
- * Throws on any other value. */
71
- export function deliveryLimitOf(value) {
72
- if (value === undefined || value === "")
73
- return PLANE3_MAX_MSGS_PER_SUBJECT;
74
- if (value === "none")
75
- return null;
76
- if (!/^[1-9]\d*$/.test(value) || !Number.isSafeInteger(Number(value)))
77
- throw new Error(`plane-3 delivery: ${DELIVERY_LIMIT_HEADER} ${JSON.stringify(value)} is not a count`);
78
- return Number(value);
79
- }
80
- /** Space joined when none is given on the CLI (the `cotal-<space>` cmux tab, etc.). */
81
- export const DEFAULT_SPACE = "main";
82
- /** The longest delay `setTimeout` honors, 2^31-1 ms. */
83
- const MAX_TIMER_MS = 2_147_483_647;
84
- /** This endpoint's own `dm_` durable does not exist. A DM-only endpoint, and any endpoint on an
85
- * authenticated mesh, binds the durable its provisioner created and never creates one. */
86
- export class DmDurableMissingError extends Error {
87
- stream;
88
- durable;
89
- code = "dm-durable-missing";
90
- constructor(stream, durable) {
91
- super(`dm-durable-missing: durable "${durable}" on stream "${stream}" does not exist; this endpoint binds an existing durable and never creates one`);
92
- this.stream = stream;
93
- this.durable = durable;
94
- this.name = "DmDurableMissingError";
95
- }
96
- }
97
- /** The broker refused a DM-only endpoint's bind of its own `dm_` durable. No other credential or
98
- * read path is tried. */
99
- export class DmBindRefusedError extends Error {
100
- stream;
101
- durable;
102
- code = "dm-bind-refused";
103
- constructor(stream, durable, cause) {
104
- super(`dm-bind-refused: binding durable "${durable}" on stream "${stream}" was refused (${cause instanceof Error ? cause.message : String(cause)})`, { cause });
105
- this.stream = stream;
106
- this.durable = durable;
107
- this.name = "DmBindRefusedError";
108
- }
109
- }
110
- /** The NEWEST prefix-from-the-end of `items` whose serialized `readHistory` reply fits `budget`
111
- * bytes, order preserved. Returns `[]` when not even the newest single message fits — the caller
112
- * must refuse loudly there rather than serve an empty page, which would read as "no history".
113
- *
114
- * The `ControlReply` around the items rides the same NATS message, so it is charged too: items
115
- * that fit on their own can still make a reply the broker refuses.
116
- *
117
- * Measured in ENCODED bytes, not `string.length`: a page of multi-byte text would otherwise be
118
- * undercounted and still overflow the broker. Same discipline as `assertFactFits`. */
119
- export function fitHistoryPage(items, budget) {
120
- const enc = new TextEncoder();
121
- // The reply with no items, at its longer `complete` value.
122
- let used = enc.encode(JSON.stringify({ ok: true, data: { items: [], complete: false } })).length;
123
- let first = items.length; // index of the oldest kept item
124
- for (let i = items.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
125
- const size = enc.encode(JSON.stringify(items[i])).length + 1; // + the `,` separator
126
- if (used + size > budget)
127
- break;
128
- used += size;
129
- first = i;
130
- }
131
- return first === items.length ? [] : items.slice(first);
132
- }
54
+ import { DEFAULT_SERVER, isPublishPermissionDenied, dialerFor, probeConnect, isAuthRejection, kvWatchConsumer, decodeBearerPrincipal, bearerExpiryMs, bearerRenewalDeadlineMs, bearerLifetimeMs, retryAfterMs, authOpts, RepeatedRefusal, describeStatusError, } from "./endpoint-dial.js";
55
+ export { DEFAULT_SERVER, isPublishPermissionDenied, wsServers, defaultProbeTimeoutMs, dialerFor, isAuthRejection, isReachable, probeConnect, } from "./endpoint-dial.js";
56
+ import { MAX_TIMER_MS, ANYCAST_SWEEP_MS, MAX_TAKES_IN_FLIGHT, ANYCAST_TAKE_TIMEOUT_MS, DmDurableMissingError, DmBindRefusedError, } from "./endpoint-options.js";
57
+ export { deliveryLimitOf, DEFAULT_SPACE, DmDurableMissingError, DmBindRefusedError, fitHistoryPage, } from "./endpoint-options.js";
58
+ import { historyMessageFromDelivery, isUsableMessageId, isFromSubjectSender, authenticatedMessage, isReadableMessagePart, kindFromParsed, dmOnlyDelivery, } from "./endpoint-messages.js";
59
+ export { isFromSubjectSender, } from "./endpoint-messages.js";
133
60
  /** The highest `prompts` presence `seq` this process used under each runtime id (SPEC §6). A reader
134
61
  * orders lists by `seq` within one `runtime.id`, and a runtime id lives as long as the process, so
135
62
  * this does too: across a stopped serve, a stopped endpoint and a new endpoint for the lifecycle. */
@@ -4959,621 +4886,4 @@ export class CotalEndpoint extends EventEmitter {
4959
4886
  return this.presence.sweep();
4960
4887
  }
4961
4888
  }
4962
- /** A usable delivery-message id (#624): a string, possibly empty (the never-a-key case), but
4963
- * never absent and never a non-string. An absent or non-string id is a malformed envelope under
4964
- * SPEC sec 5; each delivery pump handles it per its own class (durable term, live drop, history
4965
- * skip) so it never reaches the receiver's id-keyed machinery as `undefined`. */
4966
- function isUsableMessageId(id) {
4967
- return typeof id === "string";
4968
- }
4969
- /** Map an authenticated parsed-subject kind to the message class surfaced to "message" listeners.
4970
- * Throws on `ctl` (control-plane is request/reply, never a "message") — per repo convention, no
4971
- * silent default: an unexpected delivering kind is a bug, not something to swallow. */
4972
- function kindFromParsed(kind) {
4973
- switch (kind) {
4974
- case "chat":
4975
- return "channel";
4976
- case "inst":
4977
- return "dm";
4978
- case "svc":
4979
- return "anycast";
4980
- default:
4981
- throw new Error(`cannot derive a message kind from subject kind "${kind}"`);
4982
- }
4983
- }
4984
- /** SPEC §5 on receive: a delivery comes from the principal its subject names. The payload is an
4985
- * object whose `from.id` is the subject's sender, and the subject's owner is a real principal, not
4986
- * an old-shape alias. Every receive path asks this one predicate. What a path does with a refusal
4987
- * (drop, skip, ack, term or reject) and its own extra checks (a usable id, its own echo) stay with
4988
- * the path. */
4989
- export function isFromSubjectSender(msg, parsed) {
4990
- return isRecord(msg) && isRecord(msg.from) && msg.from.id === parsed.sender && isPrincipalOwnerToken(parsed.owner);
4991
- }
4992
- /** Routing fields in the envelope are advisory. The broker forge-locks sender (and for DMs,
4993
- * recipient) into the subject. Callers MUST already have passed {@link isFromSubjectSender}
4994
- * (SPEC §5). This derives the remaining
4995
- * routing tokens from the subject for rows that survived — it does not rewrite a mismatched
4996
- * `from.id`. Live tails, channel backfill, and channel recall skip the mismatch; history
4997
- * does the same (#388). The row's other fields pass through UNTOUCHED, so what the caller's
4998
- * row type already verified stays verified (#1413). */
4999
- function authenticatedMessage(msg, parsed) {
5000
- if (parsed.kind === "chat" || parsed.kind === "evp")
5001
- return authenticatedChannelMessage(msg, parsed.rest);
5002
- if (parsed.kind === "inst")
5003
- return authenticatedDmMessage(msg, parsed.rest);
5004
- if (parsed.kind === "svc")
5005
- return authenticatedAnycastMessage(msg, parsed.rest);
5006
- return msg;
5007
- }
5008
- function authenticatedDmMessage(msg, to) {
5009
- if (msg.to === to && msg.channel === undefined && msg.toService === undefined)
5010
- return msg;
5011
- const { channel: _channel, toService: _toService, ...base } = msg;
5012
- return { ...base, to };
5013
- }
5014
- function authenticatedAnycastMessage(msg, toService) {
5015
- if (msg.toService === toService && msg.to === undefined && msg.channel === undefined)
5016
- return msg;
5017
- const { to: _to, channel: _channel, ...base } = msg;
5018
- return { ...base, toService };
5019
- }
5020
- /** A DM-only copy's delivery. An ack, nak or in-progress signal on a closed connection is refused
5021
- * with a throw instead of being dropped silently: the copy stays unacked and the broker redelivers it. */
5022
- function dmOnlyDelivery(m, ackWaitMs, nc) {
5023
- const open = (what) => {
5024
- if (!nc || nc.isClosed())
5025
- throw new Error(`DM-only ${what} refused: the connection that delivered this copy is closed; the broker will redeliver it`);
5026
- };
5027
- return {
5028
- ack: () => { open("ack"); m.ack(); },
5029
- nak: () => { open("nak"); m.nak(); },
5030
- durable: true,
5031
- redelivery: { deliveryCount: m.info.deliveryCount, ackWaitMs, working: () => { open("in-progress signal"); m.working(); } },
5032
- };
5033
- }
5034
- /** History drain keeps `m.json()` and used to throw the subject away. SPEC §5: on receive, verify
5035
- * `from.id` equals the subject sender; on mismatch, a missing `from`, or an unparseable delivery
5036
- * subject, reject and never surface. Fail closed on shape too: a stored JSON `null` or a truthy
5037
- * non-object `from` must not throw mid-array. Do not echo-drop `from.id === this.card.id`:
5038
- * god-view history must include the viewer's own sends. */
5039
- function historyMessageFromDelivery(m) {
5040
- let raw;
5041
- try {
5042
- raw = m.json();
5043
- }
5044
- catch {
5045
- return undefined;
5046
- }
5047
- if (!isHistoryDrainEnvelope(raw))
5048
- return undefined;
5049
- if (!isVerifiedHistoryRow(raw))
5050
- return undefined;
5051
- const parsed = parseSubject(m.subject);
5052
- if (!parsed || !isFromSubjectSender(raw, parsed))
5053
- return undefined;
5054
- return authenticatedMessage(raw, parsed);
5055
- }
5056
- /** The members `HistoryMessage` promises beyond the drain envelope (#1413): a full
5057
- * `EndpointRef` (`from.name`, and `from.role` only when a string), a finite `ts`, a string
5058
- * `space`, `parts` the drain could read, and the optional members in their promised shape
5059
- * when present. Every field the PUBLIC row type promises is checked here, before the row is
5060
- * returned. A row missing one is dropped, never returned with that member silently
5061
- * `undefined` under the full type — a consumer reading `msg.ts`, `msg.space`, `msg.parts`
5062
- * or `msg.from.name` must not be able to reach one that was never there. Nothing is invented
5063
- * for an absent field.
5064
- *
5065
- * `parts` is held to READABLE, not to `isMessagePart`: every member must be an object with a
5066
- * string `kind` (so `partsToText` can read `part.kind` without throwing), but a keyless
5067
- * `{kind:"data"}` row from a pre-#1404 producer is not dropped — history must surface it.
5068
- * `mentions`, `replyTo`, and `contextId` keep exactly their `CotalMessage` shapes when
5069
- * present: an array of strings, a string, a string. */
5070
- function isVerifiedHistoryRow(row) {
5071
- if (typeof row.from.name !== "string")
5072
- return false;
5073
- if (row.from.role !== undefined && typeof row.from.role !== "string")
5074
- return false;
5075
- if (typeof row.ts !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(row.ts))
5076
- return false;
5077
- if (typeof row.space !== "string")
5078
- return false;
5079
- if (!Array.isArray(row.parts) || !row.parts.every(isReadableMessagePart))
5080
- return false;
5081
- if (row.mentions !== undefined &&
5082
- (!Array.isArray(row.mentions) || !row.mentions.every((name) => typeof name === "string")))
5083
- return false;
5084
- if (row.replyTo !== undefined && typeof row.replyTo !== "string")
5085
- return false;
5086
- if (row.contextId !== undefined && typeof row.contextId !== "string")
5087
- return false;
5088
- return true;
5089
- }
5090
- /** A part `partsToText` can read without throwing: an object with a string `kind` (#1413).
5091
- * Deliberately weaker than `isMessagePart` — a keyless `{kind:"data"}` part passes here —
5092
- * because history must surface rows a pre-#1404 producer wrote, not drop them. */
5093
- function isReadableMessagePart(value) {
5094
- return isRecord(value) && typeof value.kind === "string";
5095
- }
5096
- /**
5097
- * Narrow enough for the type checker and for fail-closed history: object envelope, usable `id`,
5098
- * object `from`. That is what lets `authenticatedMessage` take the row without a cast.
5099
- *
5100
- * Does NOT verify SPEC §5 message shape. It does not require a string `from.id` (the SPEC §5
5101
- * comparison still rejects a mismatch) or exactly one route key. The members the PUBLIC
5102
- * history row promises beyond this envelope — a full EndpointRef `from` (`name`/`role`), a
5103
- * finite `ts`, a string `space` — are checked by {@link isVerifiedHistoryRow} before the row
5104
- * is returned (#1413). Well-formed `parts` still belong to `isCotalMessage` (Plane-3), and
5105
- * history must not use that guard: a publisher now REFUSES a `data` part carrying a non-JSON
5106
- * value, but a keyless `{kind:"data"}` row from a pre-fix producer can still sit in a stream,
5107
- * and history must surface it rather than drop it.
5108
- */
5109
- function isHistoryDrainEnvelope(value) {
5110
- return isRecord(value) && isUsableMessageId(value.id) && isRecord(value.from);
5111
- }
5112
- function authOpts(a) {
5113
- const tls = a.tls ? {} : undefined;
5114
- // USER MODE: present the shared auth-account sentinel creds AND the user bearer as `auth_token` (an
5115
- // authenticator ARRAY — nats.js merges them into one CONNECT). The connect lands in the callout
5116
- // account, which validates the bearer and re-binds the client into the data account with a scoped JWT.
5117
- if (a.bearer) {
5118
- if (a.creds || a.token || a.user || a.pass)
5119
- throw new Error("bearer (user-mode auth) is mutually exclusive with creds/token/user/pass");
5120
- if (!a.sentinelCreds)
5121
- throw new Error("user-mode bearer requires sentinelCreds");
5122
- return {
5123
- authenticator: [nativeCredsAuthenticator(a.sentinelCreds), tokenAuthenticator(a.bearer)],
5124
- tls,
5125
- };
5126
- }
5127
- // creds (JWT/nkey) are mutually exclusive with token/user/pass — reject rather than
5128
- // silently pick one, so a misconfigured caller fails loud.
5129
- if (a.creds) {
5130
- if (a.token || a.user || a.pass)
5131
- throw new Error("creds are mutually exclusive with token/user/pass auth");
5132
- const creds = a.creds;
5133
- // A getter re-wraps per (re)connect attempt so each attempt signs with the freshest cred;
5134
- // nats.js invokes the authenticator function on every attempt, including internal reconnects.
5135
- const authenticator = (nonce) => {
5136
- const presented = typeof creds === "function" ? creds() : creds;
5137
- const authenticated = nativeCredsAuthenticator(presented)(nonce);
5138
- a.onCreds?.(presented);
5139
- return authenticated;
5140
- };
5141
- return { authenticator, tls };
5142
- }
5143
- return { token: a.token, user: a.user, pass: a.pass, tls };
5144
- }
5145
- /** The bearer's `exp` as epoch ms — what the refresh schedule keys on. A bearer without a numeric
5146
- * `exp` is structurally unusable for a refreshing endpoint (fail-loud, like the principal decode). */
5147
- function bearerExpiryMs(bearer) {
5148
- return bearerLifetimeMs(bearer, 0).expiresAtMs;
5149
- }
5150
- /** The bearer's lifetime as epoch ms: `iat` to `exp`, starting at `adoptedAtMs` when it carries no
5151
- * `iat`. */
5152
- function bearerLifetimeMs(bearer, adoptedAtMs) {
5153
- const payload = bearer.split(".")[1];
5154
- if (!payload)
5155
- throw new Error("user-mode bearer is not a JWT (no payload segment)");
5156
- let claims;
5157
- try {
5158
- claims = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payload, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
5159
- }
5160
- catch {
5161
- throw new Error("user-mode bearer payload is not valid base64url JSON");
5162
- }
5163
- if (typeof claims.exp !== "number")
5164
- throw new Error("user-mode bearer is missing a numeric exp claim");
5165
- const expiresAtMs = claims.exp * 1000;
5166
- return { issuedAtMs: Math.min(typeof claims.iat === "number" ? claims.iat * 1000 : adoptedAtMs, expiresAtMs), expiresAtMs };
5167
- }
5168
- /** Past this point a held bearer is overdue: its renewal should already have replaced it. */
5169
- function bearerRenewalDeadlineMs(bearer, adoptedAtMs) {
5170
- const { issuedAtMs, expiresAtMs } = bearerLifetimeMs(bearer, adoptedAtMs);
5171
- return renewalDeadlineMs(issuedAtMs, expiresAtMs);
5172
- }
5173
- /** A refusal already surfaced once for this outage. The rebuild loop retries it without a notice,
5174
- * so an endpoint that cannot renew shows one status line rather than one per attempt. */
5175
- class RepeatedRefusal extends Error {
5176
- }
5177
- /** Decode the owner+actor PRINCIPAL from a user bearer WITHOUT verifying it — the client trusts its own
5178
- * bearer only to build its subjects; the broker's minted grant (from the callout, which DOES verify the
5179
- * bearer) is the real boundary, so a client that lied to itself would just be denied. Per the token
5180
- * claim semantics the OWNER is the JWT `sub` (`act.owner` merely restates it) and the ACTOR is
5181
- * `act.actor`. Throws on a structurally-unusable bearer (fail-loud). */
5182
- function decodeBearerPrincipal(bearer) {
5183
- const payload = bearer.split(".")[1];
5184
- if (!payload)
5185
- throw new Error("user-mode bearer is not a JWT (no payload segment)");
5186
- let claims;
5187
- try {
5188
- claims = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payload, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
5189
- }
5190
- catch {
5191
- throw new Error("user-mode bearer payload is not valid base64url JSON");
5192
- }
5193
- const owner = claims.sub, actor = claims.act?.actor;
5194
- if (typeof owner !== "string" || typeof actor !== "string")
5195
- throw new Error("user-mode bearer is missing a string sub (owner) / act.actor claim");
5196
- return { owner, actor };
5197
- }
5198
- /** Turn a raw async-status error into one whose message says *why* — a permission
5199
- * violation looks like absence unless it's named as a denial. */
5200
- function describeStatusError(err) {
5201
- if (err instanceof PermissionViolationError) {
5202
- return new Error(`NATS permission denied: cannot ${err.operation} "${err.subject}" - check this ` +
5203
- `endpoint's ACLs (a denied peer looks "absent" rather than blocked)`, { cause: err });
5204
- }
5205
- return err;
5206
- }
5207
- /** The ordered consumer behind a KV watch, which nats.js keeps on the iterator and the KV types hide. */
5208
- function kvWatchConsumer(iter) {
5209
- const consumer = iter._data;
5210
- if (!consumer)
5211
- throw new Error("KV watch carries no consumer - the pinned nats.js changed shape");
5212
- return consumer;
5213
- }
5214
- /** True ONLY for a denial on a **publish** — the single case that proves the message was never
5215
- * ACCEPTED or stored. (Not "never reached the server": the server necessarily received enough of
5216
- * it to reject it. The distinction matters precisely here, because this helper exists to separate
5217
- * provably-not-stored from possibly-stored, and the looser phrasing overstates the very thing
5218
- * being measured.) {@link isPermissionDenied} deliberately does not look at the operation: it exists to
5219
- * separate "denied" from "service down", and that answer is the same either way. The operation
5220
- * matters enormously to a caller that reports *delivery*, because a JetStream publish is
5221
- * request/PubAck and the subscription half is the reply inbox — a denial THERE rejects
5222
- * `js.publish()` while the stream may already hold the message. Verified against a live broker: a
5223
- * user allowed to publish but denied its `_INBOX` subscription got
5224
- * `Permissions Violation for Subscription to "_INBOX.….*"` back from `js.publish()`, and an
5225
- * unrestricted observer then read `messages: 1` off the stream.
5226
- *
5227
- * Note what is deliberately NOT accepted: the untyped text fallback above. A permission-shaped
5228
- * message string carries no operation, so it cannot prove non-delivery, and guessing "publish"
5229
- * from wording would reintroduce exactly the false certainty this exists to prevent. Anything not
5230
- * provably a publish denial is unknown, and a caller reporting delivery must fail toward
5231
- * "I could not confirm" rather than toward "it did not happen" — the costly mistake is telling
5232
- * someone to re-send a message that was in fact stored. */
5233
- export function isPublishPermissionDenied(e) {
5234
- const typed = e instanceof PermissionViolationError
5235
- ? e
5236
- : e?.cause instanceof PermissionViolationError
5237
- ? (e.cause)
5238
- : undefined;
5239
- return typed?.operation === "publish";
5240
- }
5241
- /** Whether a server list dials over websocket: the FIRST entry's scheme decides (one list, one
5242
- * transport — a mixed tcp+ws list would race two transports over one identity). */
5243
- export function wsServers(servers) {
5244
- return /^wss?:\/\//i.test((servers.split(",")[0] ?? "").trim());
5245
- }
5246
- /** Default probe budget by TRANSPORT. 1s was tuned for the loopback/LAN TCP brokers every local
5247
- * probe dials; a ws(s) broker is by definition published through an HTTPS edge (CDN tunnel,
5248
- * reverse proxy), where TLS + upgrade + INFO + the auth round-trip routinely exceeds 1s cold —
5249
- * measured ~60% spurious "not reachable" against a Cloudflare-fronted broker. Callers passing an
5250
- * explicit `timeoutMs` are untouched.
5251
- *
5252
- * EXPORTED because a caller that judges a probe by WHEN it answered has to compare against the
5253
- * deadline this function actually handed the probe. The delivery watchdog does exactly that, and
5254
- * hardcoding 1000 there silently misread every ws broker: honest refusals arrive at 2-5s, past a
5255
- * budget that was never theirs, and would be classified as this process's starvation rather than
5256
- * the server's refusal. The budget and the judgment must come from one place. */
5257
- export function defaultProbeTimeoutMs(servers) {
5258
- return wsServers(servers) ? 5000 : 1000;
5259
- }
5260
- /** Pick the dial function by SCHEME: `ws://`/`wss://` servers go through nats-core's
5261
- * `wsconnect` (the websocket transport - e.g. a broker published through an HTTPS edge at
5262
- * `wss://host/path`), everything else through the TCP transport. The websocket dial OWNS its
5263
- * transport options: a required TLS connection refuses any `ws://` target before dialing.
5264
- * `wss://` performs TLS itself, and the w3c transport refuses a `tls` block outright
5265
- * ("'tls' is not configurable"), so the block is removed after that check.
5266
- * A TCP dial that requires TLS to one IP address names that address as the host its certificate
5267
- * must cover (see {@link withDialedTlsHost}). */
5268
- export function dialerFor(servers) {
5269
- if (!wsServers(servers))
5270
- return ((opts) => connect(withDialedTlsHost(servers, opts)));
5271
- return ((opts) => {
5272
- const { tls, ...rest } = (opts ?? {});
5273
- const targets = Array.isArray(rest.servers) ? rest.servers : String(rest.servers ?? servers).split(",");
5274
- if (tls && targets.some((target) => !/^wss:\/\//i.test(String(target).trim())))
5275
- return Promise.reject(new Error("TLS-required WebSocket connections must use wss:// for every server"));
5276
- return wsconnect(rest);
5277
- });
5278
- }
5279
- /** `opts` for a dial to `servers`, with the IP address it names as the host a TLS certificate must
5280
- * cover when the dial requires TLS: a `tls` block, or a `tls://` address. The TCP transport upgrades
5281
- * to TLS with no server name for an IP, and Node then checks the certificate against "localhost":
5282
- * a certificate for the dialed address alone is refused, and one naming localhost passes for any
5283
- * address. A dial that does not require TLS keeps its options, because a `tls` block refuses a
5284
- * plaintext broker, and so does a list of several servers, whose one host the options cannot name. */
5285
- function withDialedTlsHost(servers, opts) {
5286
- const urls = servers.split(",").map((url) => url.trim()).filter(Boolean);
5287
- const tls = opts?.tls;
5288
- if (urls.length !== 1 || tls === null || tls === undefined && !/^tls:\/\//i.test(urls[0]))
5289
- return opts;
5290
- let host;
5291
- try {
5292
- ({ host } = hostPort(urls[0]));
5293
- }
5294
- catch {
5295
- return opts;
5296
- }
5297
- // Node checks an upgraded socket's certificate against `host` when no server name is set.
5298
- return isIP(host) ? { ...opts, tls: { host, ...tls } } : opts;
5299
- }
5300
- /** Parse a NATS server URL (`nats://host:port`, `host:port`, a bare host, or a comma list — the
5301
- * first entry wins) into a host+port for {@link tcpInfoProbe}. Defaults the port to 4222. */
5302
- function hostPort(server) {
5303
- const raw = (server.split(",")[0] ?? "").trim();
5304
- const scheme = raw.match(/^([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*):\/\//i)?.[1]?.toLowerCase();
5305
- const first = raw.replace(/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//i, ""); // strip scheme
5306
- const u = new URL(`http://${first}`); // http:// so .hostname/.port resolve (incl. bracketed IPv6)
5307
- // A websocket broker rides the web's ports, not NATS's: `wss://host/path` reaches TCP 443.
5308
- const fallback = scheme === "wss" ? 443 : scheme === "ws" ? 80 : 4222;
5309
- return { host: u.hostname, port: u.port ? Number(u.port) : fallback };
5310
- }
5311
- /** Silent credless liveness probe. Opens a plain TCP connection and confirms a NATS server is there
5312
- * by reading its UNPROMPTED `INFO {…}` greeting — which the server sends on accept, BEFORE the
5313
- * client's CONNECT/auth (per the NATS client protocol) — then closes immediately without
5314
- * authenticating. Since it never sends CONNECT, an auth broker has nothing to reject, so this emits
5315
- * NO broker-side auth-error/auth-timeout log line (unlike a credless `connect()`, which an auth
5316
- * broker rejects and logs). It is a *plaintext NATS* liveness check only:
5317
- * • a TLS-first (`handshake_first`, NATS ≥ 2.10.4) listener sends its TLS handshake before INFO,
5318
- * so the read won't match → returns false (a documented false-negative for that broker config);
5319
- * • a non-NATS listener never sends a valid `INFO {` → also false, and a silent one resolves
5320
- * `"silent"` (we require the real greeting, never "any open port is reachable").
5321
- * Closes well within the server's ~1s authorization timeout, so it cannot trip a timeout log.
5322
- * A live server resolves to what its greeting said about auth. A peer that accepted the connection
5323
- * and sent no full line before the deadline, as a stopped or overloaded broker does, resolves
5324
- * `"silent"`; anything else resolves `false`. */
5325
- function tcpInfoProbe(server, timeoutMs) {
5326
- return new Promise((resolve) => {
5327
- let socket;
5328
- let done = false;
5329
- let connected = false;
5330
- const finish = (live) => {
5331
- if (done)
5332
- return;
5333
- done = true;
5334
- try {
5335
- socket?.destroy();
5336
- }
5337
- catch { /* already gone */ }
5338
- resolve(live);
5339
- };
5340
- let host, port;
5341
- try {
5342
- ({ host, port } = hostPort(server));
5343
- }
5344
- catch {
5345
- return resolve(false);
5346
- }
5347
- socket = createConnection({ host, port });
5348
- socket.setTimeout(timeoutMs);
5349
- let buf = "";
5350
- socket.on("data", (chunk) => {
5351
- buf += chunk.toString("utf8");
5352
- const nl = buf.indexOf("\r\n");
5353
- if (nl === -1) {
5354
- if (buf.length > 4096)
5355
- finish(false);
5356
- return;
5357
- } // no real INFO line is 4KB+
5358
- const line = buf.slice(0, nl);
5359
- const brace = line.indexOf("{"); // greeting is `INFO {json}` (the server appends a trailing space)
5360
- if (!/^INFO\b/.test(line) || brace === -1)
5361
- return finish(false); // not NATS (incl. a TLS-first handshake)
5362
- try {
5363
- finish({ authRequired: JSON.parse(line.slice(brace))?.auth_required === true });
5364
- } // require a real INFO greeting, not arbitrary bytes
5365
- catch {
5366
- finish(false);
5367
- }
5368
- });
5369
- socket.on("connect", () => { connected = true; });
5370
- socket.on("timeout", () => finish(connected ? "silent" : false));
5371
- socket.on("error", () => finish(false)); // refused / reset / DNS failure
5372
- socket.on("close", () => finish(false)); // closed before a full INFO line arrived
5373
- });
5374
- }
5375
- /** Bounded TCP reachability on a socket we OWN: does a handshake to `server` complete within
5376
- * `timeoutMs`? Deliberately narrower than {@link tcpInfoProbe} — it asks only whether the
5377
- * transport can be reached, never whether NATS is speaking there, so the TLS-first listener that
5378
- * `tcpInfoProbe` reports false for still passes this gate and goes on to a real connect.
5379
- *
5380
- * It exists because `connect()` cannot be trusted to release a connection it never established.
5381
- * `@nats-io/transport-node`'s `NodeTransport.dial()` keeps its socket in a local until the
5382
- * handshake resolves (`this.socket = await this.dial(hp)`), so `this.socket` is STILL UNDEFINED
5383
- * when the client's own connect timeout wins the race in `protocol.ts`'s `dial` and the catch
5384
- * calls `transport.close()` — whose teardown is `this.socket?.destroy()`, i.e. a destroy of
5385
- * nothing. Against an address that BLACKHOLES (SYN unanswered) rather than REFUSES (RST), the
5386
- * socket is orphaned in libuv until the OS SYN timeout, and the process cannot exit for minutes
5387
- * after the probe already returned its answer. That is issue #389, and it is upstream: nothing a
5388
- * caller passes (`reconnect: false`, `timeout`) reaches the orphan. Our socket, our `destroy()`,
5389
- * on every exit path — never an `unref`/force-exit, which would hide the symptom and a future
5390
- * real hang with it. A second orphan case (#2156) needs a greeting, not just a handshake, so it is
5391
- * gated by {@link tcpInfoProbe} instead wherever the dial will be plaintext. */
5392
- function tcpDialable(server, timeoutMs) {
5393
- return new Promise((resolve) => {
5394
- let socket;
5395
- let done = false;
5396
- const finish = (dialable) => {
5397
- if (done)
5398
- return;
5399
- done = true;
5400
- try {
5401
- socket?.destroy();
5402
- }
5403
- catch { /* already gone */ }
5404
- resolve(dialable);
5405
- };
5406
- let host, port;
5407
- try {
5408
- ({ host, port } = hostPort(server));
5409
- }
5410
- catch {
5411
- return resolve(false);
5412
- }
5413
- socket = createConnection({ host, port });
5414
- socket.setTimeout(timeoutMs);
5415
- socket.on("connect", () => finish(true));
5416
- socket.on("timeout", () => finish(false)); // blackhole: SYN unanswered inside our deadline
5417
- socket.on("error", () => finish(false)); // refused / reset / DNS failure
5418
- socket.on("close", () => finish(false));
5419
- });
5420
- }
5421
- /** Whether a failed connect was the server refusing these credentials: a server answered, so it is
5422
- * up. The same errors {@link isReachable} reads as up after its own authenticated connect. */
5423
- export function isAuthRejection(e) {
5424
- return e instanceof AuthorizationError || e instanceof UserAuthenticationExpiredError;
5425
- }
5426
- /** The wait a credential source asked for with a numeric `retryAfterSeconds` on its error, in
5427
- * milliseconds, or 0. */
5428
- function retryAfterMs(e) {
5429
- const seconds = e?.retryAfterSeconds;
5430
- return typeof seconds === "number" && Number.isFinite(seconds) && seconds > 0 ? seconds * 1000 : 0;
5431
- }
5432
- /** Whether a NATS server is *running* at `servers`. With NO creds this is a SILENT plaintext
5433
- * liveness check ({@link tcpInfoProbe}): it reads the server's pre-auth `INFO` greeting and closes
5434
- * WITHOUT authenticating, so a live broker (open OR auth — INFO precedes auth) returns true while
5435
- * emitting no broker auth-error log. It may return false for a TLS-first listener — the credless
5436
- * probe is plaintext-only. With creds/token/tls supplied it is instead the AUTHORITATIVE identity
5437
- * check: a real authenticated connect, true on success AND on an auth rejection (a server that
5438
- * refuses these creds is still up — so the caller surfaces the real auth failure, and `up` won't
5439
- * start a duplicate on the bound port). Only a genuine connection failure (refused/timeout) is false. */
5440
- export async function isReachable(servers = DEFAULT_SERVER, opts = {}) {
5441
- const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? defaultProbeTimeoutMs(servers);
5442
- if (!opts.creds && !opts.token && !opts.user && !opts.pass && !opts.tls) {
5443
- // A websocket broker rides an HTTPS edge: the plaintext INFO probe reads TLS bytes and
5444
- // declares a perfectly live broker down (which then blocks spawn/connect with a wrong
5445
- // remedy). Dial the ws transport credless instead — an auth broker REJECTING the bare
5446
- // connect still proves it is there, the same reading the authed branch below gives its
5447
- // catch. Costs one broker-side auth-error log line per probe, which the INFO probe was
5448
- // designed to avoid; on a ws broker there is no silent alternative.
5449
- if (wsServers(servers)) {
5450
- try {
5451
- const nc = await dialerFor(servers)({ servers, timeout: timeoutMs, reconnect: false, maxReconnectAttempts: 0 });
5452
- await nc.close();
5453
- return true;
5454
- }
5455
- catch (e) {
5456
- return e instanceof AuthorizationError || e instanceof UserAuthenticationExpiredError;
5457
- }
5458
- }
5459
- return typeof (await tcpInfoProbe(servers, timeoutMs)) === "object";
5460
- }
5461
- // The credless branch above already owns its socket. This one reaches `connect()`, so it carries
5462
- // the same orphaned-socket defects probeConnect did (#389, and the slow-greeting case #2156) and
5463
- // takes the same gate choice: reach the address on a socket we own first, requiring the NATS
5464
- // greeting for a plaintext dial (the upstream transport orphans a socket whose handshake
5465
- // completed but whose greeting came late) and only the handshake for a TLS-required or websocket
5466
- // dial (no plaintext greeting to read), then give `connect()` the remainder of the budget its own
5467
- // timeout always covered. A gate failure is a genuine connection failure, which is exactly the
5468
- // `false` the catch below already returns for one — an auth rejection cannot reach us from an
5469
- // address that never completed a handshake.
5470
- const started = Date.now();
5471
- const gate = opts.tls || wsServers(servers) ? tcpDialable : tcpInfoProbe;
5472
- const reached = await gate(servers, timeoutMs);
5473
- if (!reached || reached === "silent")
5474
- return false;
5475
- try {
5476
- const nc = await dialerFor(servers)({
5477
- servers,
5478
- timeout: Math.max(1, timeoutMs - (Date.now() - started)),
5479
- reconnect: false,
5480
- maxReconnectAttempts: 0,
5481
- ...authOpts(opts),
5482
- });
5483
- await nc.close();
5484
- return true;
5485
- }
5486
- catch (e) {
5487
- return e instanceof AuthorizationError || e instanceof UserAuthenticationExpiredError;
5488
- }
5489
- }
5490
- /** Like {@link isReachable}, but distinguishes "up but won't take these creds" from "nothing there".
5491
- * `spawn` needs the difference: auth-required → name the trust dir + next step; unreachable → the
5492
- * mesh is down (prune the stale entry, tell the user to `cotal up`). Pass `creds` to confirm a
5493
- * specific identity is accepted (`ok`); omit them to probe mere liveness (an auth broker answers
5494
- * `auth-required`, which still proves it's up). */
5495
- export async function probeConnect(server = DEFAULT_SERVER, opts = {}) {
5496
- const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? defaultProbeTimeoutMs(server);
5497
- const started = Date.now();
5498
- // Reach the address on a socket we own BEFORE handing it to `connect()`, which orphans the
5499
- // connection it never established (see {@link tcpDialable} for the upstream mechanism, #389,
5500
- // and {@link tcpInfoProbe} for the second orphan case below, #2156). For a plaintext dial the
5501
- // gate must see the server's NATS greeting, not just the handshake: `connect()`'s own timeout
5502
- // can fire while it is still waiting on that greeting, and the upstream transport only destroys
5503
- // a socket whose handshake never completed, not one whose greeting came late (`_closed`'s guard
5504
- // on `connected`, which is set only after the greeting is read) — so `tcpInfoProbe` (which owns
5505
- // its socket and requires the greeting) is the gate there, while a TLS-required or websocket
5506
- // dial has no plaintext greeting to read and keeps the handshake-only `tcpDialable` gate. This
5507
- // cannot change any verdict: every address that gets past here had to complete a TCP handshake
5508
- // for `connect()` to have gotten anywhere either, and a gate failure is routed through the SAME
5509
- // classification the catch uses — so a locally-dead cred is still `stale-auth` and not silently
5510
- // downgraded to `unreachable` by the address being dark. The cost is one extra handshake (and,
5511
- // off TLS/ws, one extra greeting read) on the reachable path; the deadline below is the
5512
- // REMAINDER of the budget, because `connect()`'s own `timeout` always covered its handshake too.
5513
- const gate = opts.tls || wsServers(server) ? tcpDialable : tcpInfoProbe;
5514
- const greeting = await gate(server, timeoutMs);
5515
- if (!greeting)
5516
- return classifyProbeFailure(undefined, opts);
5517
- // A peer that took the connection and never greeted is there but not answering, as a stopped or
5518
- // overloaded broker is. That is the same latency verdict as a dial that ran out of its budget.
5519
- if (greeting === "silent")
5520
- return classifyProbeFailure(undefined, opts, false, "timeout");
5521
- try {
5522
- const nc = await dialerFor(server)({
5523
- servers: server,
5524
- timeout: Math.max(1, timeoutMs - (Date.now() - started)),
5525
- reconnect: false,
5526
- maxReconnectAttempts: 0,
5527
- ...authOpts(opts),
5528
- });
5529
- await nc.close();
5530
- return { ok: true };
5531
- }
5532
- catch (e) {
5533
- return classifyProbeFailure(e, opts, greeting !== true && greeting.authRequired);
5534
- }
5535
- }
5536
- /** Why a {@link probeConnect} attempt did not end in `ok`. Shared by the pre-connect reachability
5537
- * gate and the connect catch so both classify identically — the gate must never turn a diagnosable
5538
- * credential death into a bare `unreachable` just because the address went dark.
5539
- *
5540
- * A presented cred that is PROVABLY expired by its own JWT is stale-auth (credential death) — and
5541
- * that is knowable LOCALLY, without the network, so it is decided FIRST, before the error type. On
5542
- * the wire the broker's rejection and the socket close race: a slow CI/Windows handshake can
5543
- * surface a bare transport failure (→ "unreachable") instead of a clean AuthorizationError, which
5544
- * used to misclassify a dead cred. Reading the cred removes that timing dependency entirely, so the
5545
- * classification is deterministic. Unreadable content falls through to the wire truth (no false
5546
- * stale diagnosis from garbage). `e` is undefined when the gate refused before any connect.
5547
- * `authRequired` is true when the gate read a greeting that asked for auth. `otherwise` is the
5548
- * verdict when nothing more specific applies. */
5549
- function classifyProbeFailure(e, opts, authRequired = false, otherwise = "unreachable") {
5550
- if (typeof opts.creds === "string") {
5551
- try {
5552
- if (inspectCredHealth(opts.creds).state === "expired")
5553
- return { ok: false, reason: "stale-auth" };
5554
- }
5555
- catch { /* not introspectable — keep the wire truth */ }
5556
- }
5557
- if (e instanceof UserAuthenticationExpiredError)
5558
- return { ok: false, reason: "stale-auth" };
5559
- // The broker answered but rejected these creds (so it IS up) — auth-required, not stale-auth.
5560
- if (e instanceof AuthorizationError)
5561
- return { ok: false, reason: "auth-required" };
5562
- // A dial that ran out of its own budget is neither a refusal nor a dead broker — it is latency,
5563
- // and grading it `unreachable` made a TLS-required target read as a trust failure (#851). Only
5564
- // nats-core's TimeoutError means that: a peer's `-ERR` that mentions a timeout answered at once.
5565
- if (e instanceof TimeoutError)
5566
- return { ok: false, reason: "timeout" };
5567
- // The native client read a greeting without TLS support and refused the TLS requirement.
5568
- // That is a transport mismatch, not an unreachable listener or proof of mesh identity.
5569
- if (e instanceof ConnectionError && e.message === "server does not support 'tls'")
5570
- return { ok: false, reason: "tls-unsupported" };
5571
- // A broker that greeted us asking for auth and then reset the handshake most likely refused it.
5572
- // Windows can discard its `-ERR 'Authorization Violation'` when the reset lands, so the client
5573
- // sees only ECONNRESET, and a running auth broker used to read as gone. No rejection was read, so
5574
- // the verdict is marked inferred.
5575
- if (authRequired && e?.code === "ECONNRESET")
5576
- return { ok: false, reason: "auth-required", inferred: true };
5577
- return { ok: false, reason: otherwise };
5578
- }
5579
4889
  //# sourceMappingURL=endpoint.js.map