@cotal-ai/cli 0.16.0 → 0.18.0

package/dist/lib/delivery-proc.js

@@ -1,50 +1,77 @@
 import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
 import { existsSync, openSync, closeSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
 import { DEFAULT_SERVER, mintCreds, newIdentity, waitForDeliveryLease, } from "@cotal-ai/core";
-import { DELIVERY_CREDS_KEY, authDir, findCotalRoot, getSoleSpaceAuth, listSpaceAccounts, workspaceSecretStore } from "@cotal-ai/workspace";
+import { DELIVERY_CREDS_KEY, authDir, findCotalRoot, getSoleSpaceAuth, listSpaceAccounts, parsePid, probeLiveness, workspaceSecretStore } from "@cotal-ai/workspace";
 import { selfArgv } from "./self-exec.js";
 import { resolveSpace } from "./status.js";
 import { cotalPath } from "./paths.js";
-import { ensureManager, managerHasDeliveryMarker, managerUp, stopManager } from "./manager-proc.js";
+import { MANAGER_PID_PATH, ensureManager, managerHasDeliveryMarker, managerLiveness, stopManager } from "./manager-proc.js";
 const PID_PATH = () => cotalPath("delivery.pid");
 // The daemon's cred goes through the secret-store seam; the shared key (== the filename, so the
 // file stays `.cotal/delivery.creds`) comes from workspace — never a hand-copied literal.
 const credsStore = () => workspaceSecretStore(findCotalRoot());
-function alive(pid) {
-    try {
-        process.kill(pid, 0);
-        return true;
-    }
-    catch {
-        return false;
-    }
-}
-/** True if the delivery daemon we started for this folder is still running (pid file + liveness). */
-export function deliveryUp() {
+/** The recorded daemon's liveness, THREE-VALUED plus absent. See {@link managerLiveness} for why the
+ *  boolean collapse is the defect: `unknown` is reachable on a real kernel (a seccomp
+ *  `SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO` filter or an LSM policy answers `kill(pid, 0)` with an arbitrary errno and
+ *  libuv preserves it), and both ways of folding it into a boolean fail silently. */
+export function deliveryLiveness(probe = probeLiveness) {
     const p = PID_PATH();
     if (!existsSync(p))
-        return false;
-    const pid = Number(readFileSync(p, "utf8").trim());
-    return Number.isFinite(pid) && alive(pid);
+        return "absent";
+    const raw = readFileSync(p, "utf8").trim();
+    if (raw === "")
+        return "absent";
+    const pid = parsePid(raw);
+    if (pid === undefined)
+        return "unattributable"; // see managerLiveness: never fold this into absent
+    return probe(pid);
+}
+/** True only if the daemon is PROVABLY running. Callers that ACT on the answer take
+ *  {@link deliveryLiveness} instead; this cannot express "cannot tell". */
+export function deliveryUp() {
+    return deliveryLiveness() === "alive";
 }
 /** True when this folder runs an authed mesh — the only mode with a delivery daemon (Plane-3 needs the
  *  trusted reader; open dev mode is live-only). */
 function hasAuth() {
     return listSpaceAccounts(authDir(findCotalRoot())).length > 0;
 }
-/** True if an OLD (pre-delivery-daemon) Plane-3-hosting manager is live: a `manager.pid` that is alive
- *  but carries no delivery-aware marker. Such a manager still calls `startPlane3` and would double-bind
- *  `fanout`/`reader` against the new daemon. */
-function oldHostingManagerLive() {
-    return managerUp() && !managerHasDeliveryMarker();
+/** The cutover preflight's verdict, THREE-VALUED, because the boolean it replaced was read before the
+ *  refusal boundary and therefore defeated it.
+ *
+ *  `managerUp()` folds `unknown` to false, so an unattributable manager with no marker (which IS the
+ *  old Plane-3-hosting shape) read as "no old manager", the preflight skipped, and `ensureDelivery`
+ *  went on to mint a credential, write a pidfile and start a second daemon. Only afterwards did
+ *  `ensureManager` throw. Everything the refusal was supposed to prevent had already happened, and
+ *  the daemon's own lease cannot help: it is a delivery-daemon-only mechanism and can neither prove
+ *  nor exclude an old manager still hosting Plane 3.
+ *
+ *  A guard that runs after the work is not a guard, so this one reads the tri-state directly and the
+ *  caller refuses BEFORE anything is minted, written or started. */
+function oldHostingManagerVerdict(probe = probeLiveness) {
+    const state = managerLiveness(probe);
+    if (state === "unknown" || state === "unattributable")
+        return "indeterminate";
+    if (state !== "alive")
+        return "proceed"; // dead or absent: nothing is hosting Plane 3
+    return managerHasDeliveryMarker() ? "proceed" : "stop-it"; // alive: the marker decides
 }
 /** Cutover preflight — the FIRST action, BEFORE the daemon can bind: stop any old Plane-3-hosting
  *  manager (live `manager.pid` without the delivery-aware marker) so it never double-binds the
  *  daemon's durables. A delivery-aware (this-build) manager is left running. No-op on a fresh install. */
-export function stopOldHostingManagerIfPresent() {
-    if (oldHostingManagerLive()) {
+export async function stopOldHostingManagerIfPresent(probe = probeLiveness, signal) {
+    const verdict = oldHostingManagerVerdict(probe);
+    // FIRST action, before any mint/write/start, so the refusal actually fences the daemon.
+    if (verdict === "indeterminate")
+        throw new Error(`the recorded manager pid (${readFileSync(MANAGER_PID_PATH(), "utf8").trim()}) cannot be attributed, so the delivery cutover preflight cannot run: the kernel answered neither "running" nor "no such process" (a seccomp filter or LSM policy does this inside some sandboxes).\n` +
+            `Refusing before the daemon starts. If that manager is an old Plane-3-hosting one it is still bound to fanout/reader, and starting the daemon anyway would double-bind them; the daemon's own lease cannot detect that.\n` +
+            `NEXT: verify the process yourself (\`ps -p <pid>\`). If it is gone, remove \`.cotal/manager.pid\` and re-run. If it is running, stop it with \`cotal down\` first.`);
+    if (verdict === "stop-it") {
         console.error("• stopping an old Plane-3-hosting manager before starting the delivery daemon (cutover preflight)");
-        stopManager();
+        // stopManager THROWS rather than reporting a stop it did not achieve (EPERM, or a process that
+        // outlived SIGTERM), so reaching the next line is the proof the old manager is gone. Letting that
+        // throw propagate is the point: the daemon must not start beside a manager still bound to Plane 3.
+        await stopManager(probe, signal);
     }
 }
 /** Start the delivery daemon detached (pid in `.cotal/delivery.pid`, output to `.cotal/delivery.log`),
@@ -60,6 +87,15 @@ export function startDeliveryDetached(o = {}) {
         o.space ?? resolveSpace(process.cwd()),
         "--server",
         o.server ?? DEFAULT_SERVER,
+        // Propagate the broker's transport decision. The daemon cannot derive it: it learns everything
+        // from argv by design - it is a pre-minted scoped-cred client, injectable behind a SecretStore,
+        // and making it read the machine-local mesh registry to pick a transport would couple a
+        // hosted-composable daemon to a workstation artifact. So the launcher, which DOES know, tells it.
+        //
+        // Without this the daemon connects plaintext-capable to a TLS broker and nothing looks wrong,
+        // because it still upgrades on the server's INFO. It holds a STANDING credential and reconnects
+        // unattended, so that exposure would repeat on every reconnect with nobody watching.
+        ...(o.tls ? ["--tls"] : []),
     ];
     // Internal child re-exec (the `up` that reached here already seeded); the delivery daemon does not
     // launch agents, so it skips the connector seed on boot (a direct `cotal deliver` still seeds).
@@ -74,10 +110,10 @@ export function startDeliveryDetached(o = {}) {
  *  never double-binds. Mints a SCOPED `delivery` cred from the local signer ONCE, writes it to
  *  `.cotal/delivery.creds` (0600), and launches the daemon WITHOUT signer access. Best-effort — callers
  *  treat it as non-fatal (a missing daemon degrades durable delivery, never live). */
-export async function ensureDelivery(o = {}) {
+export async function ensureDelivery(o = {}, probe = probeLiveness) {
     if (!hasAuth())
         return { running: false }; // open dev mode — no daemon, agents are live-only
-    if (oldHostingManagerLive()) {
+    if (oldHostingManagerVerdict(probe) === "stop-it") {
         console.error("✗ delivery: an old Plane-3-hosting manager is still live (no delivery-aware marker). Refusing to start the daemon - run `cotal down` first, then retry.");
         return { running: false };
     }
@@ -90,7 +126,15 @@ export async function ensureDelivery(o = {}) {
     const creds = await mintCreds(auth, id, "delivery");
     const space = o.space ?? resolveSpace(process.cwd());
     const server = o.server ?? DEFAULT_SERVER;
-    if (!deliveryUp()) {
+    const deliveryState = deliveryLiveness(probe);
+    // Same refusal as the manager: an unattributable pid must not be silently reused (a daemon
+    // reported running that is not there) nor silently replaced (two daemons on one fanout).
+    if (deliveryState === "unknown" || deliveryState === "unattributable")
+        throw new Error(`the recorded delivery daemon pid (${readFileSync(PID_PATH(), "utf8").trim()}) cannot be attributed: the kernel answered neither "running" nor "no such process".\n` +
+            `A seccomp filter or LSM policy that intercepts \`kill(pid, 0)\` does this, so it is expected inside some sandboxes and containers.\n` +
+            `Cotal will not guess: reusing it would report a daemon that is not there, and starting a second would put two daemons on one fanout.\n` +
+            `NEXT: verify the process yourself (\`ps -p <pid>\`). If it is gone, remove \`.cotal/delivery.pid\` and re-run. If it is running, use it or stop it.`);
+    if (deliveryState !== "alive") {
         // The store's put hardens `.cotal/` first (the cred is born under a private ACL, no race) and
         // lands it atomically — same path and bytes as before the seam.
         await credsStore().put(DELIVERY_CREDS_KEY, creds);
@@ -109,25 +153,67 @@ export async function ensureDelivery(o = {}) {
  *  kill runs even if the creds delete fails (finally) — a delete error must never leave the daemon
  *  alive to outlive the teardown and reattach to a restarted broker; the error still propagates
  *  after the kill so the caller can surface it. */
-export async function stopDelivery() {
-    try {
+export async function stopDelivery(probe = probeLiveness, signal) {
+    const send = signal ?? ((pid, sig) => process.kill(pid, sig));
+    const p = PID_PATH();
+    // ORDER MATTERS, AND IT USED TO BE BACKWARDS. The credential was deleted FIRST, in a try whose
+    // finally then signalled and removed the pidfile unconditionally. Under a refused signal that left
+    // a LIVE daemon with no pidfile and no standing credential: still connected, still serving, and its
+    // reconnect and renewal source deleted out from under it, while the function returned success.
+    // Nothing is removed now until the process is proven gone.
+    // Once death is PROVEN, both records are stale and the pidfile goes first: a creds-delete failure
+    // (a blocked path, a store error) must still propagate loudly, but it must not leave behind a
+    // pidfile for a process that is definitely gone. delivery-teardown.smoke.ts pins exactly that
+    // combination, and caught this when the first version of this fix ordered them the other way.
+    const removeRecords = async () => {
+        rmSync(p, { force: true });
         await credsStore().delete(DELIVERY_CREDS_KEY);
+    };
+    if (!existsSync(p)) {
+        await credsStore().delete(DELIVERY_CREDS_KEY); // no pid recorded: no live daemon to strand
+        return;
+    }
+    const raw = readFileSync(p, "utf8").trim();
+    const pid = parsePid(raw);
+    if (pid === undefined) {
+        if (raw === "") {
+            await removeRecords(); // pre-protocol husk, nothing behind it
+            return;
+        }
+        // See the manager helper: unattributable content may front a live daemon, and clearing it here
+        // would also delete the standing credential of a process still using it.
+        throw new Error(`the delivery pidfile at ${p} is unattributable (${JSON.stringify(raw)}): it may still front a running daemon nobody can identify.\n` +
+            `Refusing to remove it or its standing credential, and refusing to report a clean stop.\n` +
+            `NEXT: find and stop that process, then remove the file by hand.`);
+    }
+    const before = probe(pid);
+    if (before === "dead") {
+        await removeRecords();
+        return;
+    }
+    if (before === "unknown")
+        throw new Error(`refusing to stop the delivery daemon (pid ${pid}): its liveness cannot be determined (a seccomp filter or LSM policy answers kill(pid,0) with an arbitrary errno).\n` +
+            `The pidfile and standing credential are LEFT IN PLACE: removing them would strand a daemon that may still be connected, with its renewal source gone.\n` +
+            `NEXT: verify with \`ps -p ${pid}\`, then stop it yourself or remove \`.cotal/delivery.pid\` if it is gone.`);
+    try {
+        send(pid, "SIGTERM");
     }
-    finally {
-        const p = PID_PATH();
-        if (existsSync(p)) {
-            const pid = Number(readFileSync(p, "utf8").trim());
-            if (Number.isFinite(pid)) {
-                try {
-                    process.kill(pid, "SIGTERM");
-                }
-                catch {
-                    /* already gone */
-                }
-            }
-            rmSync(p);
+    catch (e) {
+        const code = e.code;
+        if (code === "ESRCH") {
+            await removeRecords(); // raced to exit between probe and signal
+            return;
         }
+        throw new Error(`refusing to stop the delivery daemon (pid ${pid}): the signal was rejected (${code ?? "unknown error"}).\n` +
+            `EPERM means it belongs to another user, so it is running and not ours to stop. The pidfile and standing credential are LEFT IN PLACE.\n` +
+            `NEXT: stop it as its owner, or remove \`.cotal/delivery.pid\` if you are certain it is gone.`);
     }
+    const deadline = Date.now() + 15_000;
+    while (probe(pid) !== "dead" && Date.now() < deadline)
+        await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 100));
+    if (probe(pid) !== "dead")
+        throw new Error(`the delivery daemon (pid ${pid}) accepted SIGTERM but its death could not be confirmed; its pidfile and credential were preserved rather than recording a stop that did not happen.`);
+    await removeRecords();
 }
 /** Bring up the control plane in the correct cutover order: OLD-manager preflight → delivery daemon
  *  (auth only, fails closed on a live old manager) → manager (lifecycle, writes the delivery-aware
@@ -135,7 +221,7 @@ export async function stopDelivery() {
  *  first only to close the old-manager double-bind window and so freshly-spawned agents find the
  *  `ctl.delivery` responder for their boot self-join (a miss honest-degrades to live-only). */
 export async function ensureControlPlane(o = {}) {
-    stopOldHostingManagerIfPresent();
+    await stopOldHostingManagerIfPresent();
     await ensureDelivery(o);
     return ensureManager(o);
 }

package/dist/lib/delivery-proc.js.map

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package/dist/lib/join-target.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+/**
+ * Which broker addresses `cotal meshes add` may register.
+ *
+ * Registering a mesh is how a machine begins sending its agent credentials to a broker it does
+ * not run. NATS sends the initial INFO in plaintext and unauthenticated, so an on-path attacker
+ * can forge one that does not set `tls_required`, and a client that was never told to demand
+ * encryption puts its credentials in the CONNECT line for the attacker to read. The fence has to
+ * be client-side.
+ *
+ * The URL scheme is NOT that fence. Measured against `@nats-io/transport-node` 3.4.0 (the client
+ * this repo uses) pointed at a broker with no TLS configured at all:
+ *
+ *     nats://host:port  {}          -> CONNECTED
+ *     tls://host:port   {}          -> CONNECTED     <- the scheme is cosmetic
+ *     nats://host:port  {tls:{}}    -> REFUSED: server does not support 'tls'
+ *
+ * Only the explicit `tls` connect option makes the client demand TLS, and that option is the
+ * broker-TLS work's surface, not this one's. So this gates on the ADDRESS instead, in two steps.
+ * Step one, here: refuse public addresses, ordinary private ranges and every hostname outright,
+ * and refuse an overlay literal TOO unless the operator accepted it explicitly
+ * ({@link DialPolicy.allowUnencryptedOverlay}); accepted, it returns a {@link JoinTarget.residual}
+ * the caller prints and records as consent. Step two, once a record can carry TLS intent: the
+ * acceptance stops being needed because the transport is proven instead of promised.
+ *
+ * ONE deliberate limitation, stated rather than papered over: this classifies an ADDRESS, which
+ * is a guard against the obvious mistake (dialing a LAN or public address in the clear), not
+ * proof that the bytes are encrypted. An overlay address only rides an encrypted tunnel while the
+ * overlay is actually up on this machine; the same literal with the overlay down is just a CGNAT
+ * address.
+ *
+ * WHERE THIS GOES NEXT, so the next editor does not relax it for the wrong reason. Measured on
+ * this stack: the `tls` connect option verifies the certificate CHAIN AND THE HOSTNAME (Node
+ * defaults, `rejectUnauthorized: true`, servername from the URL), so a redirected name cannot
+ * complete the handshake and hostnames become safe — but only once something REQUIRES TLS. The
+ * relaxation is therefore a function of recorded strictness, not of time passing, and the agreed
+ * eventual shape is `classifyJoinTarget(url, { tlsRequired })` rather than a third verdict: one
+ * place keeps answering "may this machine send credentials to that address", with strictness as
+ * an input it cannot otherwise see. Two counterintuitive consequences worth keeping in view:
+ * the overlay ranges are the AWKWARD case under TLS (CGNAT space, no public CA will issue for it,
+ * verifying a literal needs an IP SAN, so it implies a private CA on every joiner), while the
+ * `<host>.ts.net` names refused below are the EASY case (publicly resolvable, publicly-trusted
+ * certs). Do not pre-relax: with nothing requiring TLS today, literals-only is the correct rule.
+ */
+/** The address class a permitted target belongs to. This is a REACHABILITY allowlist: it says the
+ *  address is one we are willing to consider, never that the connection is protected. What
+ *  protects it is {@link DialPolicy.tlsRequired}, except on loopback where nothing leaves the
+ *  machine to protect. */
+export type JoinReach = 
+/** A loopback literal: the bytes never leave the machine. */
+"loopback"
+/** A private-overlay literal. Permitted TODAY without required TLS, carrying a
+ *  {@link JoinTarget.residual} that says so; it becomes conditional on TLS in step two. The
+ *  address alone is not a guarantee - see {@link DialPolicy.tlsRequired}. */
+ | "overlay";
+export interface JoinTarget {
+    /** The normalized dial URL, port defaulted. */
+    server: string;
+    reach: JoinReach;
+    /**
+     * Set when the target is permitted but its protection is NOT guaranteed, carrying the sentence
+     * the operator needs to read. Exactly one case produces it today: an overlay literal dialed
+     * without required TLS, where the address class is right but the tunnel being up is an
+     * assumption rather than a fact.
+     *
+     * It is a returned value rather than a throw because by the time it is produced the operator has
+     * ALREADY accepted the risk, so the remaining job is to carry the sentence: the caller prints it
+     * as a second notice and records it on the entry as evidence of consent. The refusal for someone
+     * who has NOT accepted happens earlier, and is a throw.
+     */
+    residual?: string;
+}
+/** What the eventual connection will insist on, which the address alone cannot tell us. */
+export interface DialPolicy {
+    /**
+     * Will the dial to this target REQUIRE TLS?
+     *
+     * This is the difference between an address and a guarantee, and getting it wrong was the
+     * defect this parameter exists to close. An overlay address is not proof the overlay transport
+     * is up: with the tunnel daemon stopped, `100.64.0.0/10` is ordinary CGNAT space, and hostile
+     * DHCP or routing can answer a dial to it. So the address class establishes only that we are
+     * willing to consider the target; requiring TLS is what makes it safe.
+     *
+     * There is no field on the mesh record to source this from yet — it arrives with the work that
+     * teaches the broker to serve TLS — so callers pass `false` today, and with it false an overlay
+     * literal is refused unless {@link DialPolicy.allowUnencryptedOverlay} says the operator
+     * accepted the tunnel dependency. When this can be `true` the acceptance stops being needed:
+     * the transport is then proven rather than promised, and the flag can go.
+     */
+    tlsRequired: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Did the operator EXPLICITLY accept the overlay's tunnel dependency?
+     *
+     * The default is `false` and the default refuses, because the previous shape — permit and print
+     * a warning — is not a fence. A warning is written to stderr, which a non-interactive caller
+     * need not read, and it was not persisted, so nothing repeated it at the dials that followed. A
+     * scripted registration therefore got the risk with none of the notice.
+     *
+     * A flag is the one form of notice a script cannot miss: without it the command fails, and the
+     * failure is in the exit code rather than in prose nobody reads. The acceptance is then recorded
+     * on the mesh entry, so a later dial can tell that a human agreed to this rather than inferring
+     * consent from an address.
+     */
+    allowUnencryptedOverlay: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Classify a registration target, or throw the reason it is refused.
+ *
+ * Refusal is the point: an unclassifiable target is one whose credentials would cross a network
+ * this build cannot encrypt, so it fails loud here rather than dialing and hoping.
+ */
+export declare function classifyJoinTarget(raw: string, policy: DialPolicy): JoinTarget;
+//# sourceMappingURL=join-target.d.ts.map

package/dist/lib/join-target.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/lib/join-target.js

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+/**
+ * Which broker addresses `cotal meshes add` may register.
+ *
+ * Registering a mesh is how a machine begins sending its agent credentials to a broker it does
+ * not run. NATS sends the initial INFO in plaintext and unauthenticated, so an on-path attacker
+ * can forge one that does not set `tls_required`, and a client that was never told to demand
+ * encryption puts its credentials in the CONNECT line for the attacker to read. The fence has to
+ * be client-side.
+ *
+ * The URL scheme is NOT that fence. Measured against `@nats-io/transport-node` 3.4.0 (the client
+ * this repo uses) pointed at a broker with no TLS configured at all:
+ *
+ *     nats://host:port  {}          -> CONNECTED
+ *     tls://host:port   {}          -> CONNECTED     <- the scheme is cosmetic
+ *     nats://host:port  {tls:{}}    -> REFUSED: server does not support 'tls'
+ *
+ * Only the explicit `tls` connect option makes the client demand TLS, and that option is the
+ * broker-TLS work's surface, not this one's. So this gates on the ADDRESS instead, in two steps.
+ * Step one, here: refuse public addresses, ordinary private ranges and every hostname outright,
+ * and refuse an overlay literal TOO unless the operator accepted it explicitly
+ * ({@link DialPolicy.allowUnencryptedOverlay}); accepted, it returns a {@link JoinTarget.residual}
+ * the caller prints and records as consent. Step two, once a record can carry TLS intent: the
+ * acceptance stops being needed because the transport is proven instead of promised.
+ *
+ * ONE deliberate limitation, stated rather than papered over: this classifies an ADDRESS, which
+ * is a guard against the obvious mistake (dialing a LAN or public address in the clear), not
+ * proof that the bytes are encrypted. An overlay address only rides an encrypted tunnel while the
+ * overlay is actually up on this machine; the same literal with the overlay down is just a CGNAT
+ * address.
+ *
+ * WHERE THIS GOES NEXT, so the next editor does not relax it for the wrong reason. Measured on
+ * this stack: the `tls` connect option verifies the certificate CHAIN AND THE HOSTNAME (Node
+ * defaults, `rejectUnauthorized: true`, servername from the URL), so a redirected name cannot
+ * complete the handshake and hostnames become safe — but only once something REQUIRES TLS. The
+ * relaxation is therefore a function of recorded strictness, not of time passing, and the agreed
+ * eventual shape is `classifyJoinTarget(url, { tlsRequired })` rather than a third verdict: one
+ * place keeps answering "may this machine send credentials to that address", with strictness as
+ * an input it cannot otherwise see. Two counterintuitive consequences worth keeping in view:
+ * the overlay ranges are the AWKWARD case under TLS (CGNAT space, no public CA will issue for it,
+ * verifying a literal needs an IP SAN, so it implies a private CA on every joiner), while the
+ * `<host>.ts.net` names refused below are the EASY case (publicly resolvable, publicly-trusted
+ * certs). Do not pre-relax: with nothing requiring TLS today, literals-only is the correct rule.
+ */
+/** The NATS default client port, used when the join URL omits one. */
+const DEFAULT_PORT = 4222;
+/** Loopback: `127.0.0.0/8` and `::1`. LITERALS ONLY, never `localhost`, because the whole point is
+ *  a verdict that does not depend on a resolver an attacker could influence (a hosts-file entry or
+ *  a poisoned lookup would otherwise turn "loopback" into any address at all). */
+function isLoopbackLiteral(host) {
+    if (host === "::1" || host === "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1")
+        return true;
+    const v4 = host.match(/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/);
+    if (!v4)
+        return false;
+    const parts = v4.slice(1).map(Number);
+    if (parts.some((n) => n > 255))
+        return false;
+    return parts[0] === 127;
+}
+/** The private overlay's address space: `100.64.0.0/10` (the CGNAT range Tailscale assigns) and
+ *  `fd7a:115c:a1e0::/48` (its ULA prefix). LITERALS ONLY, for the same reason as loopback: a
+ *  MagicDNS name like `<host>.ts.net` is a resolver answer, and accepting it would let whoever
+ *  answers that lookup redirect a plaintext credential-bearing dial anywhere they like. */
+function isOverlayLiteral(host) {
+    const v4 = host.match(/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/);
+    if (v4) {
+        const parts = v4.slice(1).map(Number);
+        if (parts.some((n) => n > 255))
+            return false;
+        // 100.64.0.0/10 == 100.64.0.0 through 100.127.255.255.
+        return parts[0] === 100 && parts[1] >= 64 && parts[1] <= 127;
+    }
+    return /^fd7a:115c:a1e0:/i.test(host);
+}
+/** A URL's hostname with an IPv6 literal's brackets removed (`[::1]` -> `::1`). */
+function bareHost(url) {
+    return url.hostname.startsWith("[") && url.hostname.endsWith("]")
+        ? url.hostname.slice(1, -1)
+        : url.hostname;
+}
+/**
+ * Classify a registration target, or throw the reason it is refused.
+ *
+ * Refusal is the point: an unclassifiable target is one whose credentials would cross a network
+ * this build cannot encrypt, so it fails loud here rather than dialing and hoping.
+ */
+export function classifyJoinTarget(raw, policy) {
+    let url;
+    try {
+        url = new URL(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new Error(`${JSON.stringify(raw)} is not a URL - pass a broker address like nats://100.64.0.1:4222`);
+    }
+    if (url.protocol !== "nats:" && url.protocol !== "tls:")
+        throw new Error(`${JSON.stringify(raw)} must be a nats:// or tls:// URL, not ${url.protocol}//`);
+    const host = bareHost(url);
+    if (!host)
+        throw new Error(`${JSON.stringify(raw)} has no host`);
+    const port = url.port || String(DEFAULT_PORT);
+    const server = `${url.protocol}//${url.hostname}:${port}`;
+    // Loopback is the one class that needs no transport guarantee: nothing leaves the machine, so
+    // there is nothing on a wire for anyone to sit on.
+    if (isLoopbackLiteral(host))
+        return { server, reach: "loopback" };
+    if (isOverlayLiteral(host)) {
+        if (policy.tlsRequired)
+            return { server, reach: "overlay" };
+        if (!policy.allowUnencryptedOverlay)
+            throw new Error(`${JSON.stringify(raw)} refused: ${host} is a private-overlay address, and this build cannot require TLS on the connection.\n` +
+                `  That is safe while the overlay tunnel is up, and NOT safe if it is down: the range is then ordinary carrier-grade\n` +
+                `  NAT, and whoever answers the dial receives the credentials this machine sends.\n` +
+                `  Only you can know whether the tunnel is up, so accept it explicitly with --allow-unencrypted-overlay, which records\n` +
+                `  your acceptance on the mesh entry. The flag goes away once the broker can be served over TLS.`);
+        return {
+            server,
+            reach: "overlay",
+            residual: `${host} is a private-overlay address, and this build cannot yet require TLS on the connection.\n` +
+                `  That is safe while the overlay tunnel is actually up: it authenticates both machines and encrypts the link.\n` +
+                `  It is NOT safe if the tunnel is down. That range is then ordinary carrier-grade NAT space, and whoever\n` +
+                `  answers the dial receives the credentials this machine will send. Keep the tunnel up, and expect this to\n` +
+                `  become a refusal once the broker can be served over TLS and the record can say TLS is required.`,
+        };
+    }
+    throw new Error(`${JSON.stringify(raw)} refused: this build cannot protect a connection to ${host}, and a machine that registers a mesh sends its agent credentials to that broker.\n` +
+        `  Only a loopback literal (127.0.0.0/8, ::1) or a private-overlay literal (100.64.0.0/10, fd7a:115c:a1e0::/48) may be registered. An overlay literal additionally needs --allow-unencrypted-overlay, which records that you accepted its tunnel dependency.\n` +
+        `  Ordinary private ranges are refused too: a cafe network is private, and private is not the same as yours.\n` +
+        `  A hostname is refused even when it resolves somewhere permitted - otherwise whoever answers the lookup chooses which machine receives the credentials. Pass the address itself.`);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=join-target.js.map

package/dist/lib/join-target.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/lib/manager-proc.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,19 @@
-/** True if the manager we started for this folder is still running (pid file + liveness). */
+import { type LivenessProbe } from "@cotal-ai/workspace";
+/** Exported so the delivery cutover preflight can NAME the pid it refused on: an error that says
+ *  "cannot be attributed" without saying which pid is not actionable. */
+export declare const MANAGER_PID_PATH: () => string;
+/** The recorded manager's liveness, THREE-VALUED plus absent, because collapsing it to a boolean is
+ *  what made this dangerous. Both collapses are silent and both are wrong:
+ *    `!== "dead"`  -> an `unknown` reports UP forever; no retry clears it and nothing starts.
+ *    `=== "alive"` -> an `unknown` reports DOWN and a second manager launches onto a possibly-live one.
+ *  `unknown` is REACHABLE on a real kernel, not just under a test shim: a Linux seccomp filter
+ *  (`SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO`) or an LSM policy can return an arbitrary errno for `kill(pid, 0)` without
+ *  executing it at all, and libuv preserves it. Proven with a live seccomp BPF filter, not by
+ *  interposition. So the caller has to SEE the third state and refuse. */
+export declare function managerLiveness(probe?: LivenessProbe): "alive" | "dead" | "unknown" | "absent" | "unattributable";
+/** True only if the manager is PROVABLY running. `unknown` is not up, and callers that would ACT on
+ *  that answer must use {@link managerLiveness} instead: this boolean cannot express the difference
+ *  between "not running" and "cannot tell", and acting on the difference is the whole point. */
 export declare function managerUp(): boolean;
 /** True if the live manager carries a delivery-aware marker BOUND to its current pid (i.e. it's THIS
  *  build, non-hosting). Fail-closed: the marker stores the pid it was written for, and this requires it
@@ -20,11 +35,20 @@ export declare function startManagerDetached(o?: {
     attachHost?: string;
     resumeAttempt?: string;
     resumeCommitToken?: string;
+    wsPort?: number;
 }): number;
 /** Make the control plane available: reuse a manager already running for this folder, else start
  *  one detached. Best-effort — callers treat it as non-fatal. A caller that needs THE manager to
  *  carry a runtime/launch spec (`up -f`) must stop any leftover manager first — a reused one is
  *  taken as-is. */
+/** Refuse to stand a manager up OVER a record we cannot read or attribute.
+ *
+ *  Exported because `ensureManager` is not the only path that starts one: `cotal spawn -f` calls
+ *  `startManagerDetached` directly after its own lease checks, and so skipped this entirely. A lease
+ *  says nobody is ANSWERING; it does not say the recorded pid is dead. Overwriting an unknown or
+ *  unattributable record is the same defect as deleting it, reached through a different verb, which
+ *  is the third time that shape has appeared in this change. Any future starter calls this first. */
+export declare function assertManagerRecordReplaceable(probe?: LivenessProbe): void;
 export declare function ensureManager(o?: {
     space?: string;
     server?: string;
@@ -34,10 +58,29 @@ export declare function ensureManager(o?: {
     attachHost?: string;
     resumeAttempt?: string;
     resumeCommitToken?: string;
-}): {
+    wsPort?: number;
+}, probe?: LivenessProbe): {
     running: boolean;
 };
-/** Stop the detached (pty) manager if we started one. Used when switching to the cmux-tab manager
- *  so the two don't both answer the control plane (queue-grouped requests would split between them). */
-export declare function stopManager(): void;
+/** A signal, injectable for the same reason the probe is: `EPERM` from `kill` is producible only by
+ *  another user's process or by kernel policy, so the branch that handles it is otherwise unreachable
+ *  from a test. Production passes nothing. */
+export type SignalFn = (pid: number, signal: NodeJS.Signals) => void;
+/** What a stop actually achieved, because "void" let this function claim success it had not earned. */
+export type StopVerdict = "stopped" | "already-gone";
+/** Blocking sleep. DO NOT reintroduce this for death-waiting: it blocks the event loop, so a child
+ *  of this process is never reaped, remains a signalable zombie, and reads `alive` forever. That
+ *  turned `cotal up` + Ctrl-C into an exit-1 that left the broker running. Death-waits await. */
+/** Stop the detached (pty) manager if we started one, and remove its records ONLY once it is gone.
+ *
+ *  THIS USED TO CATCH EVERY SIGNAL FAILURE AS "already gone" AND DELETE THE RECORDS ANYWAY. That was
+ *  survivable while `EPERM` was misread as dead, because the caller never got here: the cutover
+ *  preflight skipped a manager it thought was not running. Resolving `EPERM` to `alive` (the fix this
+ *  change exists for) makes the preflight recognise ANOTHER USER's live manager and call this, at
+ *  which point the old code sent a signal it was not permitted to send, swallowed the refusal, and
+ *  deleted the pidfile and marker of a process that was still running and still bound to Plane 3.
+ *  A correct fix upstream reaching a latent destructive bug downstream is the worst shape available,
+ *  so this refuses instead: records are removed only on proven death, never on a signal we could not
+ *  send or a death we could not confirm. Found by review, with a kernel seccomp proof. */
+export declare function stopManager(probe?: LivenessProbe, signal?: SignalFn | undefined): Promise<StopVerdict>;
 //# sourceMappingURL=manager-proc.d.ts.map

package/dist/lib/manager-proc.d.ts.map

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