@cotal-ai/auth 0.87.0 → 0.89.0

package/dist/service.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+import { registryStores } from "./lifecycle-registry.js";
+import { createToolResultConsentSigner, makeToolResultConsentRecorder } from "./tool-result-consent.js";
 /**
  * The AUTH SERVICE daemon — the one server-side process a user-auth space runs alongside its broker
  * (the delivery-daemon pattern: spawned detached by `cotal up`, pid-filed per space, torn down by
@@ -114,6 +116,8 @@ export const MANAGED_RETIRE_PATH = "/managed-lifecycle/retire";
 export const VERIFY_ENROLLMENT_PATH = "/manager-service-authority/verify-enrollment";
 /** Host-only, capability-gated proof decision. It neither signs consent nor serves results. */
 export const TOOL_RESULT_HUMAN_PROOF_PATH = "/tool-result-human-proof/verify";
+/** Host-only signed consent issuance, never private result content. */
+export const TOOL_RESULT_CONSENT_PATH = "/tool-result-consent/issue";
 /** Failed-exchange rate limit: at most this many REFUSED exchanges per rolling minute; further
  *  attempts get 429 until the window drains. Successes are unthrottled (the CLI's normal path). */
 const FAILED_EXCHANGE_PER_MIN = 30;
@@ -424,6 +428,7 @@ async function buildAuthAuthorityPlane(opts, unwind, onConnection) {
     // the FRESH space-manager-lease holder check) and dispatches.
     const authAdmin = await openAuthAdminListener({ onConnection, server, space, dataAccount, reg: barrierReg, retirement, barrierFlight: retirementFlights, instanceId: authServeInstanceId, epoch: authServeGrant.epoch, grant: authServeGrant, log });
     unwind.push(() => authAdmin.close());
+    const recordToolResultConsent = makeToolResultConsentRecorder(registryStores(registry).authKv, () => refuseIfFenced(), space);
     const fileArm = ledgerAuthorizeConnect(opts.dir);
     // The callout's issuance evidence: create-only natkey row, then the connect authority re-read
     // in the same stream before the minted JWT may leave.
@@ -626,6 +631,7 @@ async function buildAuthAuthorityPlane(opts, unwind, onConnection) {
             refuseIfFenced();
             return recordIssuance(i);
         },
+        recordToolResultConsent,
         mintConnectCredential: (args) => {
             refuseIfFenced();
             return ensureRootCredential(registry, { ...args, managerInstance: `auth-service:${space}` });
@@ -1731,6 +1737,10 @@ export async function startAuthService(inputs) {
     const port = inputs.port ?? 0;
     if (!Number.isInteger(port) || port < 0 || port > 65535)
         throw new Error(`auth-service: port must be a port number, got ${port}`);
+    if (inputs.toolResultConsents !== undefined &&
+        (!inputs.toolResultConsents || typeof inputs.toolResultConsents.keyId !== "string" ||
+            !/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,200}$/.test(inputs.toolResultConsents.keyId) || typeof inputs.toolResultConsents.resolveAnchor !== "function"))
+        throw new Error("auth-service: tool-result consent signer requires a key id and fresh anchor resolver");
     if (inputs.platformControl !== undefined && typeof inputs.platformControl?.observeAssignment !== "function")
         throw new Error("auth-service: platformControl requires an observeAssignment function");
     const host = inputs.platformControl?.host;
@@ -1756,6 +1766,7 @@ export async function startAuthService(inputs) {
         ...(inputs.platformControl !== undefined ? { platformControl: inputs.platformControl } : {}),
         ...(inputs.platformSupervisor !== undefined ? { platformSupervisor: inputs.platformSupervisor } : {}),
         ...(inputs.standingRenewableTtlSeconds !== undefined ? { standingRenewableTtlSeconds: inputs.standingRenewableTtlSeconds } : {}),
+        ...(inputs.toolResultConsents !== undefined ? { toolResultConsents: inputs.toolResultConsents } : {}),
     });
     return { ...started.handle, readiness: () => ({ ...started.status(), context: inputs.context }) };
 }
@@ -1850,7 +1861,12 @@ async function startAuthContext(o) {
         let publicUrl;
         const failures = []; // rolling-window timestamps of REFUSED exchanges
         const badCaps = []; // rolling-window timestamps of invalid-capability attempts
+        const issueToolResultConsent = o.toolResultConsents === undefined ? undefined : createToolResultConsentSigner({
+            space, accountPublicKey: keys.dataAccount.pub, dir, store: secrets, idp: bridgeIdp, ownerSecret,
+            signer: o.toolResultConsents, record: plane.recordToolResultConsent,
+        });
         const ctx = {
+            ...(issueToolResultConsent ? { issueToolResultConsent } : {}),
             issuer,
             bridge,
             bridgeIdp,
@@ -2289,6 +2305,7 @@ const ROUTES = new Map([
     [MANAGED_RETIRE_PATH, handleManagedLifecycleRetirement],
     [VERIFY_ENROLLMENT_PATH, handleVerifyManagedAgentEnrollment],
     [TOOL_RESULT_HUMAN_PROOF_PATH, handleToolResultHumanProof],
+    [TOOL_RESULT_CONSENT_PATH, handleToolResultConsent],
 ]);
 /** Route one HTTP request against the loopback route table. Errors are JSON `{ error }`. */
 async function handle(req, res, ctx) {
@@ -2734,6 +2751,34 @@ export async function handleToolResultHumanProof(req, res, ctx) {
         return send(res, 403, { error: "fresh signed password proof required" });
     }
 }
+/** Consent issuance is confined to the authenticated host face and uses sanitized refusals. */
+export async function handleToolResultConsent(req, res, ctx) {
+    if (req.method !== "POST")
+        return send(res, 405, { error: "POST only" });
+    if (req.headers.origin !== undefined)
+        return send(res, 403, { error: "browser-origin requests are not served here" });
+    if (!/^application\/json\b/.test(req.headers["content-type"] ?? ""))
+        return send(res, 415, { error: "content-type must be application/json" });
+    if (req.headers.authorization !== `Bearer ${ctx.cap}`)
+        return refuseCapability(res, ctx, "missing/invalid exchange capability - consent issuance is a loopback host action");
+    if (!ctx.issueToolResultConsent)
+        return send(res, 503, { error: "tool-result-consent-unavailable", outcome: "not-executed" });
+    let body;
+    try {
+        body = await readJsonBody(req);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return send(res, 400, { error: "invalid consent request", outcome: "not-executed" });
+    }
+    try {
+        return send(res, 200, { consent: await ctx.issueToolResultConsent(body) }, { "cache-control": "no-store" });
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        const code = error instanceof EpEnvelopeError ? error.code : "unavailable";
+        const status = code === "bad-request" ? 400 : code === "permission-denied" ? 403 : code === "conflict" ? 409 : 503;
+        return send(res, status, { error: `tool-result-consent-${code}`, outcome: error instanceof EpEnvelopeError ? error.outcome ?? "unknown" : "unknown" });
+    }
+}
 /** The advertised broker address the public bundle carries — the URL participants will dial, so
  *  the same scheme family `cotal meshes add` accepts. Exported for the producer/consumer contract
  *  smoke; returns the refusal sentence, or undefined when the address is usable. */