@cosmoops/connect-sdk 0.2.0 → 0.6.0

package/dist/cjs/next/index.js

@@ -41,16 +41,22 @@ exports.createConnectHandlers = createConnectHandlers;
 exports.GET = handle;
 exports.POST = handle;
 exports.getConnectSession = getConnectSession;
+exports.requireConnectSession = requireConnectSession;
+const react_1 = require("react");
 const client_js_1 = require("../server/client.js");
 const handler_js_1 = require("../server/handler.js");
 /**
  * Plug-and-play wiring for Next.js.
  *
  * Everything below is server-side. Nothing here is *statically* imported from
- * `next`, so this module loads in App Router route handlers, the Node runtime
- * and the edge runtime alike - and needs no peer dependency. The one place
- * that does reach for `next/headers` does it behind a dynamic import, inside
- * the function that needs it, and says so when it isn't there.
+ * `next` itself, so this module loads in App Router route handlers, the Node
+ * runtime and the edge runtime alike without a `next` peer dependency. The
+ * one place that does reach for `next/headers` (or, in `requireConnectSession`,
+ * `next/navigation`) does it behind a dynamic import, inside the function that
+ * needs it, and says so when it isn't there. `react` is a real, static
+ * dependency though - `getConnectSession`'s automatic per-request memoization
+ * (below) is built on its `cache()`, which every App Router project already
+ * has.
  *
  * The whole integration is two files:
  *
@@ -76,7 +82,7 @@ const handler_js_1 = require("../server/handler.js");
  * | `CONNECT_SESSION_COOKIE` | no | session cookie name |
  *
  * Register `{your origin}/api/connect/callback` as a redirect URI in the
- * service's Setup tab. That is the only step this cannot do for you.
+ * service's Integration tab. That is the only step this cannot do for you.
  *
  * No `next.config.ts` changes needed either, including `transpilePackages`:
  * `dist/` is already ES2022 with `"use client"` hoisted to the top of every
@@ -227,6 +233,35 @@ async function requestFromHeaders() {
     const proto = incoming.get("x-forwarded-proto") ?? (host.startsWith("localhost") ? "http" : "https");
     return new Request(`${proto}://${host}/`, { headers: incoming });
 }
+async function readSession(request, options) {
+    const store = options.session ?? cookieSessionStore();
+    const token = await store.read(request);
+    if (!token)
+        return null;
+    try {
+        return await (options.client ?? connectClient()).identity.getUser(token);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The ambient case - no explicit `request`, default client, default cookie
+ * store - wrapped in React's `cache()` so every call in the same request
+ * shares one round trip to Connect. A layout reading the session for a nav
+ * avatar and the page beneath it reading it again for a role check hit this
+ * exact function; without the wrapper that's two live reads of the same
+ * answer.
+ *
+ * Deliberately its own zero-argument function rather than `cache()` wrapping
+ * `getConnectSession` directly - `cache()` keys on argument identity, and
+ * `getConnectSession`'s default `options = {}` is a fresh object on every
+ * call, so wrapping it as-is would never hit the cache for the very call
+ * pattern this exists to speed up.
+ */
+const cachedAmbientSession = (0, react_1.cache)(async () => {
+    return readSession(await requestFromHeaders(), {});
+});
 /**
  * The signed-in user for a Server Component, Route Handler or Server Action,
  * or `null`.
@@ -237,6 +272,9 @@ async function requestFromHeaders() {
  * if (!session) redirect("/api/connect/signin?next=/dashboard");
  * ```
  *
+ * `requireConnectSession()` below is that exact check in one call, for the
+ * common case of "redirect if signed out."
+ *
  * Pass a `Request` to use it somewhere `next/headers` does not exist - a
  * framework-agnostic handler, a test, a custom server. Both forms take the
  * same path afterwards; the argument is only how the cookie is found.
@@ -248,18 +286,61 @@ async function requestFromHeaders() {
  *
  * Returns `null` for every failure - an expired session and a missing one both
  * mean "not signed in", and a page guard should not need a try/catch.
+ *
+ * **Memoized per request for the plain, zero-argument call** - the shape
+ * every page, layout and Server Action actually uses - via React's `cache()`.
+ * Passing an explicit `request`, `client` or `session` bypasses the cache
+ * and always makes a live call: those are for tests and non-ambient
+ * callers, where a fresh read every time is the point, not an oversight.
  */
 async function getConnectSession(request, options = {}) {
-    const store = options.session ?? cookieSessionStore();
-    const token = await store.read(request ?? (await requestFromHeaders()));
-    if (!token)
-        return null;
-    try {
-        return await (options.client ?? connectClient()).identity.getUser(token);
-    }
-    catch {
-        return null;
-    }
+    if (!request && !options.client && !options.session)
+        return cachedAmbientSession();
+    return readSession(request ?? (await requestFromHeaders()), options);
+}
+/**
+ * `getConnectSession()`, minus the boilerplate of checking it and redirecting
+ * yourself:
+ *
+ * ```tsx
+ * // app/dashboard/page.tsx
+ * const session = await requireConnectSession();
+ * ```
+ *
+ * Redirects to `/signin` under the same `basePath` as `getConnectSession`'s
+ * default (`/api/connect`) when signed out - pass `signInPath` if you mounted
+ * the bridge somewhere else, and `next` to send the visitor back to where
+ * they were once they're signed in. Only sensible in a Server Component,
+ * Route Handler or Server Action, the same three places `redirect()` from
+ * `next/navigation` itself works.
+ *
+ * A thin wrapper, not a framework of its own - reach for `getConnectSession`
+ * plus your own check when "not signed in" isn't "redirect to sign-in"
+ * (an API route returning 401, say). Role and entitlement checks stay
+ * outside this function on purpose: `session.serviceRole.granted` and
+ * `connect.entitlements.*` are one line each on top of the session this
+ * already gives you, and where that line redirects (a plans page, a
+ * "forbidden" screen) is a decision only your app can make - see
+ * "Authentication & authorization" for the pattern.
+ */
+async function requireConnectSession(request, options = {}) {
+    const session = await getConnectSession(request, options);
+    if (session)
+        return session;
+    const signIn = options.signInPath ?? "/api/connect/signin";
+    return redirectTo(options.next ? `${signIn}?next=${encodeURIComponent(options.next)}` : signIn);
+}
+/**
+ * `next/navigation`'s `redirect()`, imported the same dynamic way as
+ * `next/headers` above and for the same reason: no static dependency on
+ * `next`'s own types at this package's build time. Typed by hand rather than
+ * imported, since that's the only way to erase them - `redirect()` itself is
+ * typed `never`, which is what lets `requireConnectSession` return here
+ * without its own `return` after the call.
+ */
+async function redirectTo(url) {
+    const { redirect } = (await Promise.resolve().then(() => __importStar(require("next/navigation"))));
+    return redirect(url);
 }
 var handler_js_2 = require("../server/handler.js");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "createConnectHandler", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return handler_js_2.createConnectHandler; } });

package/dist/cjs/server/client.js

@@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ const billing_js_1 = require("./resources/billing.js");
 const drive_js_1 = require("./resources/drive.js");
 const entitlements_js_1 = require("./resources/entitlements.js");
 const identity_js_1 = require("./resources/identity.js");
+const integrations_js_1 = require("./resources/integrations.js");
 const logs_js_1 = require("./resources/logs.js");
+const analytics_js_1 = require("./resources/analytics.js");
 const otp_js_1 = require("./resources/otp.js");
 const sessions_js_1 = require("./resources/sessions.js");
 exports.DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://connect.cosmoops.com";
@@ -79,12 +81,16 @@ class ConnectClient {
     otp;
     /** Feature events into the Console's audit log, filterable to your service. */
     logs;
+    /** Emit product events and read back this service's aggregated numbers. */
+    analytics;
     /** This Connect account's own login sessions - account-wide, not scoped to this service. Requires the `sessions:manage` scope. */
     sessions;
+    /** Composio-hosted third-party connections (Google Calendar, Slack, ...) an organization has connected. */
+    integrations;
     constructor(options) {
         assertNotBrowser();
         if (!options.apiKey) {
-            throw new TypeError("ConnectClient requires `apiKey` - the plaintext shown once in the Setup tab.");
+            throw new TypeError("ConnectClient requires `apiKey` - the plaintext shown once in the Integration tab.");
         }
         const appBaseUrl = (options.baseUrl ?? exports.DEFAULT_BASE_URL).replace(/\/+$/, "");
         const transport = {
@@ -106,9 +112,11 @@ class ConnectClient {
         this.ai = new ai_js_1.AiResource(transport);
         this.otp = new otp_js_1.OtpResource(transport);
         this.logs = new logs_js_1.LogsResource(transport);
+        this.analytics = new analytics_js_1.AnalyticsResource(transport);
         this.sessions = new sessions_js_1.SessionsResource(transport, options.clientId ?? null);
+        this.integrations = new integrations_js_1.IntegrationsResource(transport);
     }
 }
 exports.ConnectClient = ConnectClient;
 /** Kept in step with `package.json` by `sdk.test.ts`. */
-exports.SDK_VERSION = "0.1.0";
+exports.SDK_VERSION = "0.6.0";

package/dist/cjs/server/handler.js

@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ function createConnectHandler(options) {
     const { client, session } = options;
     const defaultRedirect = options.defaultRedirect ?? "/";
     const stateCookieName = options.stateCookieName ?? "connect_oauth_state";
+    const silentCookieName = `${stateCookieName}_silent`;
     const callbackPath = `${basePath}/callback`;
     /**
      * Short-lived, httpOnly, and `SameSite=Lax` - `Strict` would not be sent on
@@ -124,6 +125,32 @@ function createConnectHandler(options) {
             .filter(Boolean)
             .join("; ");
     }
+    /**
+     * Marks the in-flight round trip as a silent (`prompt=none`) one, so the
+     * callback can tell a *probe that found nobody* from a *sign-in that
+     * failed*. The two arrive as the identical `error=login_required`, and they
+     * need opposite handling - see the callback.
+     *
+     * A cookie of its own rather than a flag folded into the state cookie:
+     * that one is parsed by splitting on `:` with the destination URL rejoined
+     * from the remainder, so smuggling a third field through it is exactly the
+     * kind of encoding trick that breaks the first time a `next` URL contains
+     * something unexpected. Same attributes and lifetime as the state cookie
+     * it travels beside.
+     */
+    function silentCookie(value, secure) {
+        const cleared = value === "";
+        return [
+            `${silentCookieName}=${encodeURIComponent(value)}`,
+            `Path=${basePath}`,
+            "HttpOnly",
+            "SameSite=Lax",
+            secure ? "Secure" : "",
+            cleared ? "Max-Age=0" : "Max-Age=900",
+        ]
+            .filter(Boolean)
+            .join("; ");
+    }
     async function requireToken(request) {
         const token = await session.read(request);
         if (!token) {
@@ -169,6 +196,37 @@ function createConnectHandler(options) {
             const { user } = await whoami(request);
             return json({ apps: await client.apps.list(user.organizationId) });
         },
+        "GET /integrations": async (request) => {
+            const { user } = await whoami(request);
+            return json({ toolkits: await client.integrations.list(user.organizationId) });
+        },
+        "POST /integrations/connect": async (request) => {
+            const { user } = await whoami(request);
+            const body = (await request.json().catch(() => null));
+            if (!body?.toolkitSlug || !body?.returnUrl) {
+                throw new errors_js_1.ConnectError({
+                    status: 400,
+                    code: "validation_error",
+                    message: "toolkitSlug and returnUrl are required",
+                    endpoint: "POST /integrations/connect",
+                });
+            }
+            return json(await client.integrations.initiateConnect(user.organizationId, body.toolkitSlug, body.returnUrl));
+        },
+        "POST /integrations/disconnect": async (request) => {
+            const { user } = await whoami(request);
+            const body = (await request.json().catch(() => null));
+            if (!body?.toolkitSlug) {
+                throw new errors_js_1.ConnectError({
+                    status: 400,
+                    code: "validation_error",
+                    message: "toolkitSlug is required",
+                    endpoint: "POST /integrations/disconnect",
+                });
+            }
+            await client.integrations.disconnect(user.organizationId, body.toolkitSlug);
+            return json({ ok: true });
+        },
         // Account-wide, not scoped to this service - see `SessionsResource`'s
         // doc comment. `requireToken` alone identifies the caller; the target
         // `sessionId` on the revoke routes travels in the JSON body, not the
@@ -208,14 +266,19 @@ function createConnectHandler(options) {
             const secure = url.protocol === "https:";
             const state = (0, identity_js_1.createState)();
             const next = safeRedirect(url.searchParams.get("next"), defaultRedirect);
+            const requestedPrompt = url.searchParams.get("prompt");
+            const prompt = requestedPrompt === "create" || requestedPrompt === "none" ? requestedPrompt : undefined;
             const authorizeUrl = client.identity.authorizeUrl({
                 redirectUri: `${url.origin}${callbackPath}`,
                 state,
-                ...(url.searchParams.get("prompt") === "create" ? { prompt: "create" } : {}),
+                ...(prompt ? { prompt } : {}),
             });
             // State and destination travel together in one cookie so the callback
             // cannot end up with one and not the other.
-            return redirect(authorizeUrl, [stateCookie(`${state}:${next}`, secure)]);
+            const cookies = [stateCookie(`${state}:${next}`, secure)];
+            if (prompt === "none")
+                cookies.push(silentCookie("1", secure));
+            return redirect(authorizeUrl, cookies);
         },
         /**
          * The other end of the round trip. Verifies `state`, exchanges the code,
@@ -232,10 +295,29 @@ function createConnectHandler(options) {
             if (!cookieState || !sameState(cookieState, returnedState)) {
                 // Either a forged callback or a genuinely stale tab. Neither should
                 // mint a session, and neither is worth an error page.
-                return redirect(`${next}${next.includes("?") ? "&" : "?"}connect_error=state_mismatch`, [clearState]);
+                return redirect(`${next}${next.includes("?") ? "&" : "?"}connect_error=state_mismatch`, [
+                    clearState,
+                    silentCookie("", secure),
+                ]);
             }
+            const wasSilent = readCookie(request, silentCookieName) === "1";
+            const clearSilent = silentCookie("", secure);
             const error = url.searchParams.get("error");
             if (error) {
+                // A silent (`prompt=none`) probe that came back empty-handed. All
+                // three of its outcomes mean the same thing to the app - "carry on
+                // signed out" - so it returns to `next` quietly: no retry, and no
+                // `connect_error`, because nothing went wrong.
+                //
+                // Getting this wrong is not subtle. The retry below fires on exactly
+                // the `login_required` a silent probe returns, so without this branch
+                // every silent attempt for a signed-out visitor would escalate itself
+                // into a full interactive sign-in redirect - turning "quietly check
+                // if they're already here" into "force everyone to log in", which is
+                // the precise opposite of the feature.
+                if (wasSilent) {
+                    return redirect(next, [clearState, clearSilent]);
+                }
                 // `login_required` is normal traffic, not a fault: a new account gets
                 // pulled out to their inbox to verify, and the ~15 minute request
                 // expires before they return. Connect has already signed them in, so
@@ -245,15 +327,16 @@ function createConnectHandler(options) {
                     const retry = new URL(`${url.origin}${basePath}/signin`);
                     retry.searchParams.set("next", next);
                     retry.searchParams.set("connect_retry", "1");
-                    return redirect(retry.toString(), [clearState]);
+                    return redirect(retry.toString(), [clearState, clearSilent]);
                 }
                 return redirect(`${next}${next.includes("?") ? "&" : "?"}connect_error=${encodeURIComponent(error)}`, [
                     clearState,
+                    clearSilent,
                 ]);
             }
             const code = url.searchParams.get("code");
             if (!code) {
-                return redirect(`${next}${next.includes("?") ? "&" : "?"}connect_error=missing_code`, [clearState]);
+                return redirect(`${next}${next.includes("?") ? "&" : "?"}connect_error=missing_code`, [clearState, clearSilent]);
             }
             const result = await client.identity.exchangeCode({
                 code,
@@ -262,7 +345,7 @@ function createConnectHandler(options) {
             // Verified before the session is stored, not after - an unverifiable
             // token must never become a signed-in user.
             await client.identity.verifyIdToken(result.idToken);
-            const response = redirect(next, [clearState]);
+            const response = redirect(next, [clearState, clearSilent]);
             await session.write(request, response, result.sessionToken);
             return response;
         },

package/dist/cjs/server/index.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.createState = exports.createConnectHandler = exports.SDK_VERSION = exports.DEFAULT_BASE_URL = exports.ConnectClient = void 0;
+exports.verifyConnectWebhook = exports.createConnectWebhookHandler = exports.createState = exports.createConnectHandler = exports.SDK_VERSION = exports.DEFAULT_BASE_URL = exports.ConnectClient = void 0;
 /**
  * Server-only half of `@cosmoops/connect-sdk`.
  *
@@ -16,3 +16,10 @@ var handler_js_1 = require("./handler.js");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "createConnectHandler", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return handler_js_1.createConnectHandler; } });
 var identity_js_1 = require("./resources/identity.js");
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "createState", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return identity_js_1.createState; } });
+/**
+ * Webhook verification and a ready-made POST route. Server-only for the
+ * obvious reason: the signing secret must never reach a browser bundle.
+ */
+var webhooks_js_1 = require("./webhooks.js");
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "createConnectWebhookHandler", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return webhooks_js_1.createConnectWebhookHandler; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "verifyConnectWebhook", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return webhooks_js_1.verifyConnectWebhook; } });

package/dist/cjs/server/resources/analytics.js

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.AnalyticsResource = void 0;
+const http_js_1 = require("../http.js");
+/**
+ * Your service's own analytics: emit product events, and read back the daily
+ * numbers Connect aggregates from them.
+ *
+ * There is no way to name a service in either call. The scope is always the one
+ * your API key belongs to - that is the endpoint's security model, not an
+ * omission.
+ */
+class AnalyticsResource {
+    transport;
+    constructor(transport) {
+        this.transport = transport;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Daily series for the requested metrics, up to 90 days.
+     *
+     * **Throws on failure**, unlike `emit` below. A read whose result you are
+     * about to render has to be able to say "I could not load"; silently
+     * returning an empty series would draw a chart of zeroes.
+     */
+    async series(query) {
+        const params = new URLSearchParams({
+            metrics: query.metrics.join(","),
+            from: query.from,
+            to: query.to,
+        });
+        return (0, http_js_1.request)(this.transport, {
+            method: "GET",
+            path: `/analytics?${params.toString()}`,
+        });
+    }
+    /**
+     * Never throws - the same judgement `LogsResource.write` makes, for the same
+     * reason: telemetry that takes down the code path it was observing is worse
+     * than a lost event. A failure is reported through `delivered`.
+     *
+     * Up to 50 events per call. Pass `sessionToken` on an event to attribute it
+     * to the signed-in user; without one it still lands, just unattributed.
+     */
+    async emit(events) {
+        const normalized = events.map((event) => ({
+            ...event,
+            occurredAt: event.occurredAt instanceof Date ? event.occurredAt.toISOString() : event.occurredAt,
+        }));
+        try {
+            const result = await (0, http_js_1.request)(this.transport, {
+                method: "POST",
+                path: "/events",
+                json: { events: normalized },
+            });
+            return {
+                delivered: true,
+                accepted: result?.accepted ?? events.length,
+                attributed: result?.attributed ?? 0,
+            };
+        }
+        catch {
+            return { delivered: false, accepted: 0, attributed: 0 };
+        }
+    }
+}
+exports.AnalyticsResource = AnalyticsResource;

package/dist/cjs/server/resources/identity.js

@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ class IdentityResource {
             throw new errors_js_1.ConnectError({
                 status: 0,
                 code: "missing_client_id",
-                message: "identity.* needs `clientId`. Pass it to `new ConnectClient({ clientId, apiKey })` - it is shown in this service's Setup tab once SSO is enabled.",
+                message: "identity.* needs `clientId`. Pass it to `new ConnectClient({ clientId, apiKey })` - it is shown in this service's Integration tab, under Connect client.",
                 endpoint: "identity",
             });
         }

package/dist/cjs/server/resources/integrations.js

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.IntegrationsResource = void 0;
+const http_js_1 = require("../http.js");
+/**
+ * Composio-hosted third-party connections (Google Calendar, Slack,
+ * Twitter/X, ...) an organization has connected. Connect proxies every call
+ * here - your service never sees or holds the underlying OAuth token, which
+ * stays with Composio.
+ */
+class IntegrationsResource {
+    transport;
+    constructor(transport) {
+        this.transport = transport;
+    }
+    /** Enabled toolkits and this organization's connection status for each. */
+    async list(organizationId) {
+        const result = await (0, http_js_1.request)(this.transport, {
+            method: "GET",
+            path: "/integrations",
+            query: { organizationId },
+        });
+        // `?? []` for the same reason `AppsResource.list` has it - a collection
+        // every caller immediately maps or measures.
+        return result.toolkits ?? [];
+    }
+    /**
+     * Starts a Composio-hosted connection for one toolkit. The returned
+     * `redirectUrl` is where the browser completes the provider's OAuth
+     * screen, then Composio bounces it back to `returnUrl`.
+     *
+     * **The connection is not active when this returns.** Treat the toolkit
+     * as `pending` until a later `list()` call reports `active` - only
+     * Connect's own webhook from Composio confirms that, never the redirect
+     * itself. Reconnecting a disconnected/failed toolkit calls this same
+     * method - there is no separate reconnect.
+     *
+     * Meant to be called on behalf of a signed-in org admin (this is what the
+     * bridge's fixed `POST /integrations/connect` route does), not as a bare
+     * background action with no admin present to complete the OAuth screen.
+     */
+    async initiateConnect(organizationId, toolkitSlug, returnUrl) {
+        return (0, http_js_1.request)(this.transport, {
+            method: "POST",
+            path: "/integrations/connect",
+            json: { organizationId, toolkitSlug, returnUrl },
+        });
+    }
+    /** Idempotent - disconnecting a toolkit that was never connected, or is already disconnected, is a success. */
+    async disconnect(organizationId, toolkitSlug) {
+        return (0, http_js_1.request)(this.transport, {
+            method: "POST",
+            path: "/integrations/disconnect",
+            json: { organizationId, toolkitSlug },
+        });
+    }
+    /** Calls a Composio action against this organization's connected account for the named toolkit. */
+    async execute(organizationId, input) {
+        return (0, http_js_1.request)(this.transport, {
+            method: "POST",
+            path: "/integrations/actions/execute",
+            json: { organizationId, ...input },
+        });
+    }
+}
+exports.IntegrationsResource = IntegrationsResource;

package/dist/cjs/server/resources/sessions.js

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ class SessionsResource {
             throw new errors_js_1.ConnectError({
                 status: 0,
                 code: "missing_client_id",
-                message: "sessions.* needs `clientId`. Pass it to `new ConnectClient({ clientId, apiKey })` - it is shown in this service's Setup tab once SSO is enabled.",
+                message: "sessions.* needs `clientId`. Pass it to `new ConnectClient({ clientId, apiKey })` - it is shown in this service's Integration tab, under Connect client.",
                 endpoint: "sessions",
             });
         }

package/dist/cjs/server/webhooks.js

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyConnectWebhook = verifyConnectWebhook;
+exports.createConnectWebhookHandler = createConnectWebhookHandler;
+const node_crypto_1 = require("node:crypto");
+/**
+ * How far out of date a timestamp may be. Five minutes, the same value
+ * Connect signs against and the same one Stripe uses - so a backend that
+ * already verifies Stripe webhooks needs no new assumptions.
+ */
+const TIMESTAMP_TOLERANCE_SECONDS = 300;
+const SIGNATURE_HEADER = "connect-signature";
+/**
+ * Verifies a `Connect-Signature` header against the raw request body.
+ *
+ * Exported on its own for anyone wiring this into a framework
+ * `createConnectWebhookHandler` does not cover. The **raw** body matters:
+ * verify before parsing, and never re-serialise - `JSON.stringify(await
+ * req.json())` produces a different string whenever key order or number
+ * formatting differs, and the signature will not match.
+ *
+ * Returns a boolean and never explains which check failed. Reporting "bad
+ * timestamp" separately from "bad signature" tells whoever is probing which
+ * half of a forgery to keep working on.
+ */
+function verifyConnectWebhook(rawBody, signatureHeader, secret, now = new Date()) {
+    if (!signatureHeader)
+        return false;
+    const parts = new Map(signatureHeader
+        .split(",")
+        .map((part) => part.trim().split("="))
+        .filter((pair) => pair.length === 2)
+        .map(([key, value]) => [key, value]));
+    const timestamp = Number(parts.get("t"));
+    const presented = parts.get("v1");
+    if (!presented || !Number.isFinite(timestamp))
+        return false;
+    // Absolute difference: a timestamp from the future is as much a sign of a
+    // forgery as a stale one, and accepting it would let somebody mint a
+    // signature that stays valid indefinitely.
+    const nowSeconds = Math.floor(now.getTime() / 1000);
+    if (Math.abs(nowSeconds - timestamp) > TIMESTAMP_TOLERANCE_SECONDS)
+        return false;
+    const expected = (0, node_crypto_1.createHmac)("sha256", secret)
+        .update(`${timestamp}.${rawBody}`)
+        .digest("hex");
+    // `timingSafeEqual` throws on a length mismatch, and a wrong-length hex
+    // string is exactly what a probe looks like - so lengths are compared
+    // first and only equal-length buffers reach it.
+    if (presented.length !== expected.length)
+        return false;
+    return (0, node_crypto_1.timingSafeEqual)(Buffer.from(presented, "utf8"), Buffer.from(expected, "utf8"));
+}
+/**
+ * A ready-made `POST` route for Connect's webhooks.
+ *
+ * ```ts
+ * export const POST = createConnectWebhookHandler({
+ *   secret: process.env.CONNECT_WEBHOOK_SECRET!,
+ *   on: {
+ *     "organization.deletion_scheduled": ({ organizationId, purgeAfter }) =>
+ *       freeze(organizationId, purgeAfter),
+ *     "organization.deletion_cancelled": ({ organizationId }) => unfreeze(organizationId),
+ *     "organization.deleted": ({ organizationId }) => purge(organizationId),
+ *   },
+ * })
+ * ```
+ *
+ * Three behaviours worth knowing, because each of them is a decision rather
+ * than an accident:
+ *
+ * **An unverified request gets a 401 and nothing else happens.** No parsing,
+ * no logging of the body, no handler. The endpoint is a public URL, so
+ * anything reachable before the signature check is reachable by anyone.
+ *
+ * **An unhandled event type is a 200.** Connect adds event types over time,
+ * and answering 4xx to one you have not written code for would dead-letter
+ * it immediately and, after enough of them, disable your endpoint. Silence
+ * is the correct answer to "we do not care about this one".
+ *
+ * **A throwing handler produces a 500, on purpose.** That is what makes
+ * Connect retry. Swallowing the error would acknowledge an event you failed
+ * to process, and the retry ladder is the only thing standing between a
+ * transient failure and a permanently missed deletion.
+ *
+ * Delivery is at-least-once and unordered. Dedupe on `envelope.id`, and
+ * reconcile against the readiness endpoint rather than trusting arrival
+ * order - the pull channel is authoritative, this one is fast.
+ */
+function createConnectWebhookHandler(options) {
+    return async function POST(request) {
+        // Read as text and verify before parsing. `JSON.stringify(await
+        // request.json())` is not the same string that was signed - key order and
+        // number formatting both differ - so a handler that parses first can
+        // never verify.
+        const rawBody = await request.text();
+        const signature = request.headers.get(SIGNATURE_HEADER);
+        if (!verifyConnectWebhook(rawBody, signature, options.secret)) {
+            return new Response("Invalid signature", { status: 401 });
+        }
+        let envelope;
+        try {
+            envelope = JSON.parse(rawBody);
+        }
+        catch {
+            // Signed by us and still unparseable is not something a retry fixes.
+            return new Response("Malformed payload", { status: 400 });
+        }
+        const handler = options.on[envelope.type];
+        if (!handler)
+            return new Response(null, { status: 200 });
+        try {
+            await handler(envelope.data, envelope);
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            if (options.onError) {
+                await options.onError(error, envelope);
+            }
+            else {
+                console.error(`Connect webhook ${envelope.type} (${envelope.id}) failed:`, error);
+            }
+            // Deliberately a 500: it is what makes Connect retry. See the doc above.
+            return new Response("Handler failed", { status: 500 });
+        }
+        return new Response(null, { status: 200 });
+    };
+}