@cosmicdrift/kumiko-samples 0.338.0

package/packages/bundled-features/src/page-render/css-sanitize.ts

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+// Allowlist-based CSS sanitizer for UNTRUSTED tenant-supplied CSS (managed-pages
+// custom-css capability). Security model: allowlist-by-construction — the output
+// is REBUILT from validated tokens (scope-prefixed selector + allowed
+// `property: value` pairs), never a filtered passthrough of the input. A rule
+// that doesn't parse cleanly into that shape is dropped whole (fail-closed).
+// `url()`, `@import`, `expression()` and friends are closed BY CONSTRUCTION:
+// they can never match an allowed value grammar, so we never depend on detecting
+// their literal spelling — which CSS escape sequences like `\75rl(` would defeat.
+//
+// Scoping: every selector is prefixed with `scopeSelector`, so a tenant rule can
+// only style elements INSIDE the page-content container — never `html`/`body`/
+// `:root` (those become inert: no such element is a descendant of the scope) and
+// never another tenant's content. A segment may NOT start with a combinator
+// (`~ X`/`+ X`/`> X` would reach the scope's siblings/parent — the host chrome);
+// internal combinators stay in-scope. The container element itself is unreachable
+// (descendant combinator), so the host-emitted containment styles — including the
+// `overflow` clip and `isolation` in layout.ts — can't be overridden by tenant CSS.
+//
+// Hard rejections (no presentational CSS needs them): any `\` (escape-sequence
+// bypass), any `@`-rule (no `@media`/`@font-face`/`@import`), any function token
+// outside {rgb,rgba,hsl,hsla,calc} (closes `url`/`expression`/`var`/`image-set`),
+// any `[`/`]` (attribute selectors), `::` AND single-colon `:before`/`:after`/
+// `:first-line`/`:first-letter` (pseudo-elements → content/defacement), `url(`/
+// `expression(` in a selector, and `<`/`>`/`"`/`'`/`{`/`}`/`;`/`@` inside a value.
+//
+// Residual (documented, tier-gated): best-effort defense-in-depth for untrusted
+// tenants. The surface is deliberately small — no at-rules, no `url()`, no
+// `var()`/custom-props, no pseudo-elements, no quotes in values, no leading
+// combinators. A scoped element can still RESTYLE/DEFACE its own page area
+// (within the container's `overflow` clip) — that is the tenant's own content,
+// not host chrome. Keep CSS-inject behind the operator/tier gate; this is not a
+// hard isolation boundary (an iframe sandbox would be).
+
+const MAX_CSS_LENGTH = 8000;
+
+// Presentational properties only. `position` is intentionally NOT here — it is
+// allowed with a value constraint (fixed/sticky enable viewport overlays /
+// clickjacking), handled in sanitizeValue.
+const ALLOWED_PROPERTIES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set<string>([
+  "color",
+  "background-color",
+  "font-family",
+  "font-size",
+  "font-weight",
+  "font-style",
+  "font-variant",
+  "line-height",
+  "letter-spacing",
+  "word-spacing",
+  "text-align",
+  "text-decoration",
+  "text-transform",
+  "text-indent",
+  "text-shadow",
+  "white-space",
+  "margin",
+  "margin-top",
+  "margin-right",
+  "margin-bottom",
+  "margin-left",
+  "padding",
+  "padding-top",
+  "padding-right",
+  "padding-bottom",
+  "padding-left",
+  "border",
+  "border-top",
+  "border-right",
+  "border-bottom",
+  "border-left",
+  "border-color",
+  "border-width",
+  "border-style",
+  "border-radius",
+  "border-top-left-radius",
+  "border-top-right-radius",
+  "border-bottom-left-radius",
+  "border-bottom-right-radius",
+  "box-shadow",
+  "outline",
+  "outline-color",
+  "outline-width",
+  "outline-style",
+  "width",
+  "max-width",
+  "min-width",
+  "height",
+  "max-height",
+  "min-height",
+  "display",
+  "opacity",
+  "visibility",
+  "list-style",
+  "list-style-type",
+  "list-style-position",
+  "vertical-align",
+  "cursor",
+  "box-sizing",
+  "transition",
+  "transition-property",
+  "transition-duration",
+  "transition-timing-function",
+  "transition-delay",
+  "transform",
+  "transform-origin",
+  "z-index",
+]);
+
+// `position` is allowed only with these values — `fixed`/`sticky` (and anything
+// unknown) is dropped to deny viewport-pinned overlays / clickjacking.
+const ALLOWED_POSITION_VALUES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set<string>([
+  "static",
+  "relative",
+  "absolute",
+]);
+
+const ALLOWED_FUNCTIONS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set<string>([
+  "rgb",
+  "rgba",
+  "hsl",
+  "hsla",
+  "calc",
+]);
+
+// Permitted value chars AFTER `!important` is split off. No `\` (escapes), no
+// `<`/`>`/`{`/`}`/`@`/`;` (breakouts), no quotes (string sinks like `content`,
+// quoted `url("…")`). `*` and `/` are kept for `calc()`.
+const VALUE_CHARS = /^[a-zA-Z0-9 \t.,#%()/*+-]+$/;
+const FUNCTION_NAME = /([a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9-]*)\s*\(/g;
+const IMPORTANT_SUFFIX = /\s*!\s*important\s*$/i;
+
+// Permitted selector chars. Class/id/element idents, descendant/child/sibling
+// combinators, single-colon pseudo-CLASS, universal, `()` for `:not()`/
+// `:nth-child()`. No `[`/`]` (attribute selectors), no `,` (split earlier), no
+// `\`/quotes/braces/`@`/angle brackets. `::` is rejected separately.
+const SELECTOR_CHARS = /^[a-zA-Z0-9 \t.#:>+~*_()-]+$/;
+// A segment may NOT start with a combinator: `[scope] ~ X` / `[scope] + X` reach
+// the scope container's SIBLINGS (e.g. the host brand-header) and `[scope] > X`
+// its direct children-from-outside — all escape "descendants only". Internal
+// combinators (`.a > .b`, `.a ~ .b`) stay in-scope and are fine.
+const LEADING_COMBINATOR = /^[>+~]/;
+// Single-colon legacy pseudo-elements are pseudo-elements too — the `::` check
+// alone misses them. Reject both syntaxes (no pseudo-elements at all).
+const LEGACY_PSEUDO_ELEMENT = /:(?:before|after|first-line|first-letter)\b/i;
+// `url()`/`expression()` in a SELECTOR (e.g. inside `:not()`) don't fetch/execute
+// — selector context never loads resources — but reject them anyway so no such
+// token ever reaches output (defense-in-depth, avoids engine quirks).
+const SELECTOR_FUNCTION_SINK = /(?:url|expression)\s*\(/i;
+
+type RawRule = { readonly prelude: string; readonly block: string };
+
+function stripComments(css: string): string {
+  let out = "";
+  let i = 0;
+  const n = css.length;
+  while (i < n) {
+    if (css[i] === "/" && css[i + 1] === "*") {
+      const end = css.indexOf("*/", i + 2);
+      if (end === -1) break; // unterminated comment → drop the rest (fail-closed)
+      i = end + 2;
+      out += " "; // a space so `@im/**/port` can't re-form a single token
+      continue;
+    }
+    out += css[i];
+    i++;
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+// Brace-depth-aware rule extractor. At depth 0, everything up to `{` is the
+// prelude; the matching `}` (tracking nested braces, e.g. an at-rule body)
+// closes the block. An unbalanced trailing `{` drops the rest (fail-closed).
+function extractRules(css: string): RawRule[] {
+  const rules: RawRule[] = [];
+  let prelude = "";
+  let i = 0;
+  const n = css.length;
+  while (i < n) {
+    const ch = css[i];
+    if (ch === "{") {
+      let depth = 1;
+      let block = "";
+      i++;
+      while (i < n && depth > 0) {
+        const c = css[i];
+        if (c === "{") depth++;
+        else if (c === "}") {
+          depth--;
+          if (depth === 0) {
+            i++;
+            break;
+          }
+        }
+        block += c;
+        i++;
+      }
+      if (depth > 0) return rules; // unbalanced → fail-closed
+      rules.push({ prelude, block });
+      prelude = "";
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (ch === "}") {
+      prelude = ""; // stray close brace → reset
+      i++;
+      continue;
+    }
+    prelude += ch;
+    i++;
+  }
+  return rules; // trailing prelude without a block is discarded
+}
+
+function splitTopLevel(str: string, delimiter: string): string[] {
+  const parts: string[] = [];
+  let depth = 0;
+  let buf = "";
+  for (const ch of str) {
+    if (ch === "(") depth++;
+    else if (ch === ")") depth = Math.max(0, depth - 1);
+    if (ch === delimiter && depth === 0) {
+      parts.push(buf);
+      buf = "";
+    } else {
+      buf += ch;
+    }
+  }
+  parts.push(buf);
+  return parts;
+}
+
+function parensBalanced(s: string): boolean {
+  let depth = 0;
+  for (const ch of s) {
+    if (ch === "(") depth++;
+    else if (ch === ")") {
+      depth--;
+      if (depth < 0) return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return depth === 0;
+}
+
+function sanitizeSelector(seg: string, scope: string): string | null {
+  const s = seg.trim();
+  if (s === "") return null;
+  if (s.includes("\\")) return null; // escape-sequence bypass
+  if (s.includes("::")) return null; // no pseudo-elements (content/defacement)
+  if (LEGACY_PSEUDO_ELEMENT.test(s)) return null; // single-colon pseudo-elements
+  if (LEADING_COMBINATOR.test(s)) return null; // scope-escape via leading >/+/~
+  if (SELECTOR_FUNCTION_SINK.test(s)) return null; // no url()/expression() in selectors
+  if (!SELECTOR_CHARS.test(s)) return null; // rejects [ ] , < > { } @ " '
+  if (!parensBalanced(s)) return null;
+  return `${scope} ${s}`;
+}
+
+function sanitizeValue(prop: string, rawValue: string): string | null {
+  let value = rawValue.trim();
+  if (value === "") return null;
+  if (value.includes("\\")) return null; // escape-sequence bypass
+
+  let important = "";
+  const imp = value.match(IMPORTANT_SUFFIX);
+  if (imp) {
+    important = " !important";
+    value = value.slice(0, value.length - imp[0].length).trim();
+    if (value === "") return null;
+  }
+
+  if (!VALUE_CHARS.test(value)) return null;
+  if (!parensBalanced(value)) return null;
+
+  // Every function token must be an allowed function — this is what closes
+  // url()/expression()/var()/image-set() without matching their literal names.
+  FUNCTION_NAME.lastIndex = 0;
+  let m: RegExpExecArray | null = FUNCTION_NAME.exec(value);
+  while (m !== null) {
+    const fnName = m[1];
+    if (fnName === undefined || !ALLOWED_FUNCTIONS.has(fnName.toLowerCase())) return null;
+    m = FUNCTION_NAME.exec(value);
+  }
+
+  if (prop === "position" && !ALLOWED_POSITION_VALUES.has(value.toLowerCase())) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  return value + important;
+}
+
+function sanitizeDeclarations(block: string): string {
+  const out: string[] = [];
+  for (const part of block.split(";")) {
+    const decl = part.trim();
+    if (decl === "") continue;
+    if (decl.includes("\\")) continue;
+    const colon = decl.indexOf(":");
+    if (colon <= 0) continue;
+    const prop = decl.slice(0, colon).trim().toLowerCase();
+    if (prop !== "position" && !ALLOWED_PROPERTIES.has(prop)) continue;
+    const value = sanitizeValue(prop, decl.slice(colon + 1));
+    if (value === null) continue;
+    out.push(`${prop}: ${value}`);
+  }
+  return out.join("; ");
+}
+
+function sanitizeRule(rule: RawRule, scope: string): string | null {
+  const prelude = rule.prelude.trim();
+  if (prelude === "") return null;
+  if (prelude.startsWith("@")) return null; // no at-rules
+  if (prelude.includes("\\")) return null; // escape-sequence bypass
+
+  const scoped: string[] = [];
+  for (const seg of splitTopLevel(prelude, ",")) {
+    const s = sanitizeSelector(seg, scope);
+    if (s === null) return null; // any bad selector segment → drop the rule
+    scoped.push(s);
+  }
+
+  const decls = sanitizeDeclarations(rule.block);
+  if (decls === "") return null;
+  return `${scoped.join(", ")} { ${decls} }`;
+}
+
+// Sanitize untrusted tenant CSS into a scoped, allowlisted stylesheet string
+// safe to drop into `<style>${...}</style>`. `scopeSelector` (e.g.
+// `[data-tenant-content]`) is prefixed onto every selector. Returns "" for
+// empty/over-cap/fully-rejected input — the caller emits no `<style>` block then.
+export function sanitizeTenantCss(css: string, scopeSelector: string): string {
+  if (typeof css !== "string") return "";
+  if (css.length === 0 || css.length > MAX_CSS_LENGTH) return "";
+
+  const decommented = stripComments(css);
+  const out: string[] = [];
+  for (const rule of extractRules(decommented)) {
+    const s = sanitizeRule(rule, scopeSelector);
+    if (s !== null) out.push(s);
+  }
+  const result = out.join("\n");
+
+  // Final breakout assert — reject any `<`, which is the only way to begin the
+  // `</style>` sequence that exits the RAWTEXT <style> element. `>` is left
+  // intact: it is a valid CSS child combinator and inert inside <style>.
+  if (result.includes("<")) return "";
+  return result;
+}

package/packages/bundled-features/src/page-render/index.ts

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+export {
+  type BrandingTokens,
+  brandingHeaderHtml,
+  brandingStyleBlock,
+  EMPTY_BRANDING,
+  isSafeHexColor,
+  isSafeHttpsUrl,
+  layoutMaxWidth,
+} from "./branding.js";
+export {
+  type CachedSecurePageResponseInit,
+  cachedSecurePageResponse,
+} from "./cached-page-response.js";
+export { sanitizeTenantCss } from "./css-sanitize.js";
+export {
+  type SeoHeadInput,
+  TENANT_CONTENT_ATTR,
+  tenantStyleBlock,
+  wrapInLayout,
+} from "./layout.js";
+export { renderSafeMarkdown } from "./markdown.js";
+export { securePageHeaders } from "./security-headers.js";

package/packages/bundled-features/src/page-render/layout.ts

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+import { escapeHtml, escapeHtmlAttr } from "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-headless";
+import { type ApexHead, renderApexHeadTags } from "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-headless/apex";
+import { type BrandingTokens, brandingHeaderHtml, brandingStyleBlock } from "./branding.js";
+import { sanitizeTenantCss } from "./css-sanitize.js";
+
+// Optional OG/JSON-LD/canonical extension for wrapInLayout — the same field
+// set renderApexPage accepts, minus title/description/lang (those come from
+// wrapInLayout's own opts, so callers don't repeat them).
+export type SeoHeadInput = Omit<ApexHead, "title" | "description" | "lang">;
+
+// Attribute marking the content container. The page body lives in
+// `<main data-tenant-content>`; tenant custom CSS is scoped to its descendants
+// and host containment clips its paint to this box. A custom wrapLayout that
+// enables CSS-inject MUST put this attribute on the element wrapping the body
+// (e.g. `<main ${TENANT_CONTENT_ATTR}>`) and emit `tenantStyleBlock(branding.
+// customCss)` in <head> — otherwise tenant rules attach to nothing and the
+// containment is absent. Exported so the attr and the helper's internal scope
+// can't drift.
+export const TENANT_CONTENT_ATTR = "data-tenant-content";
+const TENANT_SCOPE = `[${TENANT_CONTENT_ATTR}]`;
+// Host-controlled containment, emitted together with (and only alongside)
+// tenant CSS. position+isolation box a tenant `position:absolute`/z-index to
+// the container; overflow:hidden clips tenant paint (negative margins,
+// transform, huge shadows, absolute children) off the host chrome. Tenant
+// rules are scoped descendants (`[data-tenant-content] X`) and can't match the
+// bare container, so they can't override either rule. No tenant CSS → neither
+// is emitted → plain/legal pages render unclipped (normal overflow for wide
+// tables/<pre>).
+const TENANT_CONTAINMENT = `${TENANT_SCOPE}{position:relative;isolation:isolate}`;
+const TENANT_CLIP = `${TENANT_SCOPE}{overflow:hidden}`;
+
+// Render the per-tenant custom-CSS <style> block — the single emission path for
+// the default skeleton below AND any custom wrapLayout. Returns "" when the
+// input is empty or fully rejected (no element). Otherwise one `<style
+// data-tenant-css>` carrying host containment + clip + the allowlist-sanitized,
+// scope-prefixed tenant rules. Bakes in the scope so a caller can't mis-scope
+// and silently lose containment; position:fixed/sticky are dropped upstream by
+// the sanitizer.
+export function tenantStyleBlock(customCss: string): string {
+  const sanitized = sanitizeTenantCss(customCss, TENANT_SCOPE);
+  if (!sanitized) return "";
+  // html-ok: sanitizeTenantCss ist die Escaping-Boundary (Allowlist, strippt `<`).
+  return `\n<style data-tenant-css>${TENANT_CONTAINMENT}\n${TENANT_CLIP}\n${sanitized}</style>`;
+}
+
+// Minimaler HTML5-Skeleton mit Inline-CSS — Default-`wrapLayout` für
+// server-gerenderte Public-Pages, damit sie auch ohne App-Layout sauber
+// aussehen. Apps die ihr eigenes Marketing-Layout (Header/Footer/Theme)
+// um den Body legen wollen, übergeben ihre eigene Render-Function.
+//
+// Branding (optional): emittiert nach dem Base-`<style>` einen scoped
+// `:root`-Override (Accent-Farbe, Layout-Preset → max-width) plus einen
+// Logo-/Titel-Header. Alle Branding-Werte sind tenant-supplied + untrusted
+// und werden in branding.ts re-validiert/escaped, bevor sie ins Markup gehen.
+export function wrapInLayout(opts: {
+  title: string;
+  bodyHtml: string;
+  lang: string;
+  description?: string | null;
+  branding?: BrandingTokens;
+  /** Adds Open Graph/Twitter/canonical/JSON-LD tags via the shared apex head
+   *  renderer. Omitted → unchanged minimal title+description behavior. */
+  seo?: SeoHeadInput;
+}): string {
+  const themeStyleHtml = opts.branding ? brandingStyleBlock(opts.branding) : "";
+  const header = opts.branding ? brandingHeaderHtml(opts.branding) : "";
+  // Untrusted per-tenant CSS — scoped, allowlist-sanitized and host-contained
+  // at the render boundary by tenantStyleBlock (same helper a custom wrapLayout
+  // calls, so containment can't drift between the two paths). Empty/rejected →
+  // no block, plain/legal pages keep normal overflow.
+  const tenantStyle = tenantStyleBlock(opts.branding?.customCss ?? "");
+  // Page description wins; the tenant's branding description is the site-wide
+  // fallback when a page omits its own (keeps branding-description a live key).
+  const description =
+    opts.description && opts.description.length > 0
+      ? opts.description
+      : (opts.branding?.description ?? "");
+  const metaDescription = description
+    ? `\n<meta name="description" content="${escapeHtmlAttr(description)}">`
+    : "";
+  // Without `seo`: identical title+description emission as before (no
+  // behavior change for legal-pages/managed-pages callers that don't pass it).
+  const headHtml = opts.seo
+    ? renderApexHeadTags({ title: opts.title, description, lang: opts.lang, ...opts.seo })
+    : `<title>${escapeHtml(opts.title)}</title>${metaDescription}`;
+  return `<!doctype html>
+<html lang="${escapeHtmlAttr(opts.lang)}">
+<head>
+<meta charset="utf-8">
+<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
+${headHtml}
+<style>
+  :root { --accent: #0066cc; --page-max-width: 720px; }
+  body { font-family: system-ui, -apple-system, sans-serif; max-width: var(--page-max-width);
+         margin: 2rem auto; padding: 0 1rem; line-height: 1.6; color: #222; }
+  h1, h2, h3 { line-height: 1.2; margin-top: 2rem; }
+  h1 { font-size: 1.8rem; } h2 { font-size: 1.4rem; } h3 { font-size: 1.15rem; }
+  a { color: var(--accent); }
+  code { background: #f4f4f4; padding: 0.1rem 0.3rem; border-radius: 3px; }
+  hr { border: 0; border-top: 1px solid #ddd; margin: 2rem 0; }
+  .brand-header { position: relative; z-index: 1; display: flex; align-items: center;
+                  gap: 0.6rem; margin-bottom: 1.5rem; }
+  .brand-header a { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 0.6rem; color: inherit; text-decoration: none; }
+  .brand-logo { height: 2rem; width: auto; }
+  .brand-title { font-weight: 600; font-size: 1.1rem; }
+</style>${themeStyleHtml}${tenantStyle}
+</head>
+<body>
+${header}
+<main data-tenant-content>
+${opts.bodyHtml}
+</main>
+</body>
+</html>`;
+}

package/packages/bundled-features/src/page-render/markdown.ts

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+import { escapeHtml, isSafeHref } from "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-headless";
+import { Marked } from "marked";
+
+// Geteilter, gehärteter Markdown→HTML-Kern für server-gerenderte Public-
+// Pages (legal-pages, managed-pages). Annahme: untrusted Tenant-Authoren.
+// Raw-HTML-Tokens werden als Text escaped (kein <script>/<img onerror>-
+// Passthrough), und link/image-hrefs auf http(s)/mailto/relativ beschränkt
+// (kein javascript:/data:). Markdown-Struktur (Headings, Listen, Links,
+// Code) bleibt intakt — das neutralisiert die XSS-Vektoren ohne Sanitizer-
+// Dependency. Defense-in-Depth ergänzt `securePageHeaders` (`script-src
+// 'none'`). GFM aus, breaks aus — strukturierte Pages brauchen keine
+// Tables/Strikethrough/Task-Lists.
+const safeRenderer = new Marked({ gfm: false, breaks: false });
+safeRenderer.use({
+  walkTokens(token) {
+    if ((token.type === "link" || token.type === "image") && !isSafeHref(token.href)) {
+      token.href = "#";
+    }
+  },
+  renderer: {
+    html({ text }) {
+      return escapeHtml(text);
+    },
+  },
+});
+
+export function renderSafeMarkdown(markdown: string): string {
+  // @cast-boundary marked.parse return-type ist `string | Promise<string>`;
+  // `{ async: false }` garantiert sync (string) — Cast nur API-Vertragsfix.
+  return safeRenderer.parse(markdown, { async: false }) as string;
+}

package/packages/bundled-features/src/page-render/security-headers.ts

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+// Security-Header für server-gerenderte Public-HTML-Pages (legal-pages,
+// managed-pages). `script-src 'none'` ist Defense-in-Depth: selbst wenn
+// HTML-Injection durchrutscht, läuft kein Script. Bewusst KEIN `default-src`
+// → Styles/Images/Fonts bleiben unrestricted (rückwärtskompatibel zu
+// Inline-<style>-Layouts wie publicstatus' renderLegalLayout).
+// nosniff/SAMEORIGIN/Referrer-Policy sind universell sichere Defaults.
+const PUBLIC_PAGE_SECURITY_HEADERS = {
+  "content-security-policy": "script-src 'none'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'",
+  "x-content-type-options": "nosniff",
+  "x-frame-options": "SAMEORIGIN",
+  "referrer-policy": "strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
+} as const;
+
+// Security headers spread LAST so a caller's `extra` can never override a
+// hardened default (CSP/nosniff/frame-options); extra only adds non-security
+// headers like content-type/cache-control/vary.
+export function securePageHeaders(extra: Record<string, string>): Record<string, string> {
+  return { ...extra, ...PUBLIC_PAGE_SECURITY_HEADERS };
+}

package/packages/bundled-features/src/page-render/web.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// kumiko-lint-ignore app-feature-structure Server-side re-export barrel (branding/sanitize helpers), not a client screen — name collision with the web.ts monolith heuristic
+export {
+  type BrandingTokens,
+  brandingHeaderHtml,
+  brandingStyleBlock,
+  EMPTY_BRANDING,
+  isSafeHexColor,
+  isSafeHttpsUrl,
+  layoutMaxWidth,
+} from "./branding.js";
+export { sanitizeTenantCss } from "./css-sanitize.js";
+export { TENANT_CONTENT_ATTR, tenantStyleBlock, wrapInLayout } from "./layout.js";
+export { renderSafeMarkdown } from "./markdown.js";
+export { securePageHeaders } from "./security-headers.js";

package/packages/bundled-features/src/personal-access-tokens/changes.json

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+[
+  {
+    "version": "0.336.0",
+    "type": "fix",
+    "title": "PAT revoke and its revoked-event commit atomically when called on a pool"
+  },
+  {
+    "version": "0.330.0",
+    "type": "fix",
+    "title": "The token list status column shows translated labels instead of raw status values"
+  },
+  {
+    "version": "0.202.0",
+    "type": "breaking",
+    "title": "personal-access-tokens: `write:create` now requires `currentPassword` (+ `mfaCode` if MFA enrolled) (e91d4cb).",
+    "detail": "`personal-access-tokens:write:create` now requires `currentPassword` (verified against the caller's password hash) before minting a token, and rejects when the caller has MFA enrolled and `mfaCode` is missing or wrong — a session cookie alone is no longer enough to stand up a durable API credential. `expiresInDays` now defaults to 90 days instead of never-expiring when omitted (the existing 3650-day cap is unchanged, so a genuinely long-lived token is still possible if requested explicitly). Changing a user's password, or enabling/disabling MFA, now revokes all of that user's live PAT tokens — mirrors the existing session auto-revoke-on-password-change behavior. `run-prod-app`/`run-dev-app` wire the new MFA↔PAT revoke callback automatically when both `auth-mfa` and `personal-access-tokens` are mounted; no app-level change needed for that part.",
+    "migration": "Apps that already mint PATs (their own client code, scripts, or tests) need to add `currentPassword` to the `create` request payload — this is a breaking change to the `create` request shape despite the minor bump (bundled-features doesn't follow strict semver across its handler schemas yet). If the caller has MFA enrolled, also include a valid `mfaCode`."
+  },
+  {
+    "version": "0.117.0",
+    "type": "improvement",
+    "title": "personal-access-tokens: add `toggleable` option so the whole feature can be tier-gated vi…",
+    "detail": "personal-access-tokens: add `toggleable` option so the whole feature can be tier-gated via the tier-engine (mirrors ledger/tags). Pass `{ toggleable: { default: false } }` for fail-closed gating — PAT is then off until a tier lists `\"personal-access-tokens\"` in its features. Omitting the option keeps PAT always-on (no behaviour change for existing consumers)."
+  }
+]

package/packages/bundled-features/src/personal-access-tokens/constants.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+// @runtime client
+// Pure constants — client-marked so the web screen (web/) may import screen-id
+// and QN names without pulling the feature's server runtime barrel.
+export const PAT_FEATURE = "personal-access-tokens";
+export const API_TOKEN_ENTITY_NAME = "api-token" as const;
+
+// Snake_case reason strings (Error-Reasons guard: no colons/dashes).
+export const PatErrors = {
+  ownershipDenied: "ownership_denied",
+  // Uniform for wrong-password AND missing/wrong MFA code — a distinct
+  // reason per case would leak whether the account has MFA enrolled.
+  reauthRequired: "reauth_required",
+} as const;
+
+// expiresInDays default when omitted at mint time. A silent "never expires"
+// default is a standing-credential risk; the existing 3650-day cap still
+// lets callers who genuinely want a long-lived token pass it explicitly.
+export const PAT_DEFAULT_EXPIRES_IN_DAYS = 90;
+
+// Declarative projectionList screen id — the caller's own tokens, revoke as a
+// row action. The app places it via r.nav.
+export const PAT_SCREEN_ID = "api-tokens";
+
+// Declarative secretMint screen id — mints a new token, reveals it once.
+export const PAT_MINT_SCREEN_ID = "api-token-create";
+
+export const PatHandlers = {
+  create: "personal-access-tokens:write:create",
+  revoke: "personal-access-tokens:write:revoke",
+} as const;
+
+export const PatQueries = {
+  mine: "personal-access-tokens:query:mine",
+  availableScopes: "personal-access-tokens:query:available-scopes",
+} as const;
+
+// Only the first chars of a minted token are stored (alongside the hash) so the
+// UI can show "kpat_ab12…" for recognition without ever holding the secret.
+export const PAT_PREFIX_DISPLAY_LENGTH = 12;
+
+export type PatRateLimit = { readonly maxRequests: number; readonly windowMs: number };
+
+// Default per-token request rate for PAT-authenticated calls. Generous enough
+// for normal automation, low enough to blunt a leaked-token abuse spike.
+export const PAT_DEFAULT_RATE_LIMIT: PatRateLimit = { maxRequests: 120, windowMs: 60_000 };

package/packages/bundled-features/src/personal-access-tokens/expiry.ts

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+import { Temporal } from "temporal-polyfill";
+
+export function isExpiredAt(expiresAt: { epochMilliseconds: number } | null): boolean {
+  return (
+    expiresAt !== null && expiresAt.epochMilliseconds <= Temporal.Now.instant().epochMilliseconds
+  );
+}