@cosmicdrift/kumiko-framework 0.387.0 → 0.388.0

package/dist/db/event-store-executor-write.js

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { ErasedSubjectHandlings, } from "../crypto/pii-field-encryption.js";
 import { checkWriteFieldOwnership } from "../engine/field-access.js";
 import { instructionFieldNames } from "../engine/instruction-fields.js";
 import { userCanCreateFieldRow, userCanWriteFieldRow } from "../engine/ownership.js";
@@ -6,104 +7,19 @@ import { findUnavailableSelectOptions, isRecordLocked, isUnchangedValue, } from
 import { AccessDeniedError, VersionConflictError as FrameworkVersionConflict, IdempotentReplayError, InternalError, isSubjectErasedConflict, NotFoundError, PreconditionFailedError, RecordLockedError, UnprocessableError, writeFailure, } from "../errors/index.js";
 import { append, IdempotentAppendConflictError as EventStoreIdempotentAppendConflict, VersionConflictError as EventStoreVersionConflict, getStreamVersion, } from "../event-store/index.js";
 import { assertInstructionFieldWriteAllowed, assertIrreversibleOperationAllowed, isIrreversibleEntityVerb, } from "../pipeline/irreversible-operation-gate.js";
-import { hasLiveProjectionsForEvent, runProjectionsForEvent, } from "../pipeline/projections-runner.js";
 import { generateId } from "../utils/index.js";
 import { applyEntityEvent } from "./apply-entity-event.js";
 import { flattenCompoundTypes, rehydrateCompoundTypes } from "./compound-types.js";
 import { WritePurposes, } from "./event-store-executor.js";
 import { buildEventMetadata, entityEventName, isForeignTenantOnGlobalEntity, ownershipSubject, tryMapUniqueViolation, } from "./event-store-executor-context.js";
+import { optimisticLockFailure, ownershipDeniedFailure, projectEntityEvent, runPreSave, selectOptionNotAvailableFailure, withoutEventInJson, } from "./event-store-executor-write-steps.js";
 import { isFrameworkSystemUser, isLockGuardBypassed } from "./lock-guard.js";
-import { projectionRegistryOf } from "./projection-registry-binding.js";
 import { runInSavepointIfSupported } from "./query.js";
 import { assertPersonalDataWrite, tableNameOf, withExecutorManagedWrites } from "./tenant-db.js";
 import { tenantDbWriteRunner } from "./tenant-db-runner.js";
-// The echoed event carries entity PII and must never reach a handler's JSON response, while
-// hooks and projections still read it by property. Non-enumerable keeps it out of spread/stringify.
-function withoutEventInJson(result) {
-    return Object.defineProperty(result, "event", { value: result.event, enumerable: false });
-}
-// Custom projections for a write that did not go through the dispatcher (hook or
-// job writing a second aggregate). Savepoint like applyEntityEvent: a throwing
-// projection fails the write and the caller's transaction rolls it back.
-async function projectEntityEvent(db, runner, event) {
-    const registry = projectionRegistryOf(db);
-    // skip: TenantDb not built by a dispatcher/job runner — nothing bound to project with
-    if (!registry)
-        return;
-    // skip: no live projection listens — avoid a SAVEPOINT round trip on every plain write
-    if (!hasLiveProjectionsForEvent(event, registry))
-        return;
-    await runInSavepointIfSupported(runner, (sp) => runProjectionsForEvent(event, registry, sp));
-}
 // The five write verbs (create/update/delete/forget/restore) of the event-
-// store-executor. Split out of event-store-executor.ts —
-// behavior-preserving relocation, not a redesign: every closure below is
-// unchanged from the original, just relocated behind an explicit
+// store-executor, split out of event-store-executor.ts. They read an explicit
 // ExecutorContext instead of capturing the factory's local scope directly.
-function selectOptionNotAvailableFailure(entries) {
-    const [first] = entries;
-    if (!first)
-        return undefined;
-    const i18nKey = "kumiko.validation.optionNotAvailable";
-    return writeFailure(new UnprocessableError("select_option_not_available", {
-        i18nKey,
-        details: {
-            field: first.field,
-            value: first.value,
-            allowed: first.allowed,
-            fields: entries.map((entry) => ({
-                path: entry.field,
-                code: "select_option_not_available",
-                i18nKey,
-                params: { allowed: entry.allowed },
-            })),
-        },
-    }));
-}
-// preSave runs before ownership checks: authorization must evaluate the row
-// as it will actually be persisted, including hook-derived fields. A throwing
-// hook is an app-author bug (bad business rule, not a framework fault) — map it
-// to a clean writeFailure instead of letting it propagate as an internal_error
-// 500.
-async function runPreSave(preSave, changes, previous, isNew, entityName, action, outputSchema) {
-    if (!preSave)
-        return { data: changes };
-    try {
-        const hookResult = await preSave(changes, previous, isNew);
-        // A hook that echoes `id`/`version` back (e.g. `{ ...changes, id: x }`)
-        // must not leak them into the persisted row — aggregateId already comes
-        // from generateId()/the loaded row, not from hook output.
-        const { id: _hookId, version: _hookVersion, ...safe } = hookResult;
-        // Hook output skips the handler's input validation yet goes straight into the projection.
-        // Validated only, not replaced by the parse result: hooks may set fields in storage form.
-        const parsed = outputSchema().safeParse(safe);
-        if (!parsed.success) {
-            return {
-                failure: writeFailure(new UnprocessableError("presave_hook_invalid_output", {
-                    i18nKey: "errors.presaveHookInvalidOutput",
-                    details: {
-                        entityName,
-                        action,
-                        handler: `${entityName}:${action}`,
-                        issues: parsed.error.issues.map((issue) => ({
-                            path: issue.path.join("."),
-                            message: issue.message,
-                        })),
-                    },
-                })),
-            };
-        }
-        return { data: safe };
-    }
-    catch (e) {
-        return {
-            failure: writeFailure(new UnprocessableError("presave_hook_failed", {
-                i18nKey: "errors.presaveHookFailed",
-                details: { entityName, action, message: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e) },
-            })),
-        };
-    }
-}
 export function createWriteVerbs(ctx) {
     const { table, entity, entityName, entityCache, softDelete, streamTenantFor, streamTenantOverrideFailure, streamTenantCreateFailure, encryptForStorage, decryptForRead, ownerTransitionRekeys, applyDefaults, stripSensitive, loadById, assertStreamWritable, loadExpectSnapshot, } = ctx;
     const entityInstructionFieldNames = instructionFieldNames(entity);
@@ -121,7 +37,9 @@ export function createWriteVerbs(ctx) {
     // Erasure writes run after the subject key is gone; they store the erased
     // sentinel for that subject's fields instead of failing on re-encrypt.
     function erasureSentinelOption(options) {
-        return options?.writePurpose === WritePurposes.erasure ? { onErasedSubject: "sentinel" } : {};
+        return options?.writePurpose === WritePurposes.erasure
+            ? { onErasedSubject: ErasedSubjectHandlings.sentinel }
+            : {};
     }
     const eventVersion = entity.eventVersion ?? 1;
     let insertSchema;
@@ -169,25 +87,17 @@ export function createWriteVerbs(ctx) {
         catch (e) {
             if (isSubjectErasedConflict(e))
                 return { failure: writeFailure(e) };
-            if (e instanceof EventStoreVersionConflict) {
-                return {
-                    failure: writeFailure(new FrameworkVersionConflict({
-                        entityId: id,
-                        expectedVersion: currentVersion,
-                        currentVersion: await versionAfterConflict(runner, String(id), streamTenantFor(user, streamTenantId)),
-                    })),
-                };
-            }
-            if (e instanceof EventStoreIdempotentAppendConflict) {
-                return {
-                    failure: writeFailure(new IdempotentReplayError({ idempotencyKey: e.idempotencyKey })),
-                };
-            }
-            throw e;
+            return {
+                failure: await appendConflictFailure(e, runner, {
+                    entityId: id,
+                    expectedVersion: currentVersion,
+                    streamTenant: streamTenantFor(user, streamTenantId),
+                }),
+            };
         }
     }
-    // After a lost append race the stream version read before the append is stale;
-    // report the actual one. -1 when the lookup itself fails.
+    // Fallback for conflicts that carry no current version: the version read before the
+    // append is stale after a lost race. -1 when the lookup itself fails.
     async function versionAfterConflict(runner, aggregateId, tenantId) {
         try {
             return await getStreamVersion(runner, aggregateId, tenantId);
@@ -207,14 +117,304 @@ export function createWriteVerbs(ctx) {
         }
         return snapshot.streamVersion;
     }
+    async function appendConflictFailure(error, runner, conflict) {
+        if (error instanceof EventStoreVersionConflict) {
+            return writeFailure(new FrameworkVersionConflict({
+                entityId: conflict.entityId,
+                expectedVersion: conflict.expectedVersion,
+                currentVersion: error.currentVersion ??
+                    (await versionAfterConflict(runner, String(conflict.entityId), conflict.streamTenant)),
+            }));
+        }
+        if (error instanceof EventStoreIdempotentAppendConflict) {
+            return writeFailure(new IdempotentReplayError({ idempotencyKey: error.idempotencyKey }));
+        }
+        throw error;
+    }
+    // Stream-version is authoritative, not row.version. `ctx.appendEvent`
+    // can bump the stream between CRUD writes (domain event on the same
+    // aggregate); a stale row.version here would make the next CRUD write
+    // trip `events_aggregate_version_uq` (tenant_id, aggregate_id, version)
+    // with version_conflict.
+    //
+    // With `expect:` the version comes from loadExpectSnapshot's combined
+    // query instead; see its comment for why.
+    async function currentStreamVersion(db, runner, id, streamTenant, expect) {
+        return expect
+            ? await expectedStreamVersion(db, id, streamTenant, expect)
+            : await getStreamVersion(runner, String(id), streamTenant);
+    }
+    function assertFieldWritesAllowed(db, action, data) {
+        // After preSave so derived fields count, before the event append so nothing persists.
+        assertPersonalDataWrite(db, tableNameOf(table), Object.keys(data), entity);
+        assertInstructionFieldWriteAllowed(entityName, action, Object.keys(data), entityInstructionFieldNames);
+    }
+    function createOwnershipFailure(user, streamTenantId, payloadWithoutId, data) {
+        // H.2 — entity-level write-ownership on create. No oldRow exists, so
+        // only the new row is checked. No Straddle concern for creates.
+        if (!userCanCreateFieldRow(ownershipSubject(user, streamTenantId), entity.access?.write, data)) {
+            return ownershipDeniedFailure({
+                scope: "entity",
+                entityName,
+                action: "create",
+                userId: user.id,
+            });
+        }
+        // Field-level write-ownership on create — mirror of entity-level but
+        // per declared field. Role-level was already checked by the
+        // dispatcher; here we enforce ownership-rules against the new row.
+        //
+        // Which fields get checked is scoped to the pre-hook payload
+        // — a hook-derived field the user never submitted must not be
+        // field-ownership-checked against the user. The rule for a checked
+        // field is still evaluated against the full post-hook row (`data`) —
+        // an ownership rule can reference a column only a hook populates.
+        const fieldDeniedCreate = checkWriteFieldOwnership(entity, applyDefaults(payloadWithoutId), ownershipSubject(user, streamTenantId), undefined, data);
+        if (fieldDeniedCreate) {
+            return ownershipDeniedFailure({
+                scope: "field",
+                entityName,
+                action: "create",
+                field: fieldDeniedCreate,
+                userId: user.id,
+            });
+        }
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    function updateOwnershipFailure(user, streamTenantId, id, submittedChanges, previous, changes, mergedNew) {
+        // H.2 — entity-level write-ownership on update. Load old row (already
+        // done above), build post-change row via shallow merge. Straddle-safe
+        // multi-role check: at least one role must accept BOTH old and new —
+        // prevents the attack where role A passes old, role B passes new and
+        // aggregation would wrongly allow a row-grab.
+        if (!userCanWriteFieldRow(ownershipSubject(user, streamTenantId), entity.access?.write, previous, mergedNew)) {
+            return ownershipDeniedFailure({
+                scope: "entity",
+                entityName,
+                action: "update",
+                userId: user.id,
+                entityId: id,
+            });
+        }
+        // Field-level write-ownership on update — this is the path the
+        // dispatcher could not evaluate (no oldRow). Now that we have
+        // `previous`, we can run the ownership rules per field against both
+        // sides and reject individual fields the user isn't entitled to
+        // touch on this specific row.
+        //
+        // Which fields get checked is scoped to `payload.changes` (the user's
+        // actual submission), NOT `changes` (post-preSave-hook data)
+        // — a hook-derived field the user never submitted (e.g. a system hook
+        // setting `assignedTo`) has no business being field-ownership-checked
+        // against the *user*, and doing so rejects writes the user is fully
+        // entitled to make. The dispatcher's role-gate (checkWriteFieldAccess)
+        // already runs on this same pre-hook payload for consistency. The rule
+        // for a checked field is still evaluated against the full post-hook
+        // row (`changes` merged onto `previous`) — an ownership rule can
+        // reference a column only a hook populates.
+        const fieldDeniedUpdate = checkWriteFieldOwnership(entity, submittedChanges, ownershipSubject(user, streamTenantId), previous, changes);
+        if (fieldDeniedUpdate) {
+            return ownershipDeniedFailure({
+                scope: "field",
+                entityName,
+                action: "update",
+                field: fieldDeniedUpdate,
+                userId: user.id,
+                entityId: id,
+            });
+        }
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    function updateSelectOptionFailure(user, mergedNew, previous, options) {
+        // Statutory retention/erasure writes may change a condition field (e.g. null a PII
+        // reference) and must not be blocked by the select rule — same exemption as the lock.
+        const isStatutorySystemWrite = options?.writePurpose !== undefined && isFrameworkSystemUser(user);
+        return isStatutorySystemWrite
+            ? undefined
+            : selectOptionNotAvailableFailure(findUnavailableSelectOptions(entity.fields, mergedNew, previous));
+    }
+    async function appendCreatedEvent(runner, user, streamTenantId, aggregateId, flatData) {
+        // 1. Append the event in the same transaction as the projection write — both must
+        //    succeed or both roll back; the dispatcher wraps them in one transaction.
+        //    flatData is already table ciphertext for pii/encrypted fields, so the immutable
+        //    log never sees plaintext and replay reproduces the row byte-for-byte.
+        //
+        //    `expectedVersion: 0` means the stream does not yet exist. With deterministic
+        //    aggregate-ID patterns (for example, uuidv5(tenantId|naturalKey)), a create can
+        //    legitimately collide — the same ID has an existing stream — so return
+        //    version_conflict instead of internal_error. Update uses the same catch.
+        try {
+            // Savepoint-scoped: postgres.js poisons the WHOLE surrounding
+            // begin() once any statement inside it errors, even if the JS error
+            // is caught — a losing concurrent create's unique-violation
+            // would otherwise abort the caller's outer transaction and surface as
+            // internal_error at commit time instead of the version_conflict this
+            // catch classifies. runInSavepointIfSupported confines the failed
+            // INSERT to a nested scope that rolls back on its own (same pattern as
+            // ctx.tryAppendEvent), and falls back to a plain call when the runner
+            // is a bare pool connection with no active transaction to poison
+            // (seeds/tests calling the executor directly).
+            const event = await runInSavepointIfSupported(runner, async (sp) => append(sp, {
+                aggregateId,
+                aggregateType: entityName,
+                tenantId: streamTenantFor(user, streamTenantId),
+                expectedVersion: 0,
+                type: entityEventName(entityName, "created"),
+                eventVersion,
+                payload: flatData,
+                metadata: buildEventMetadata(user),
+            }));
+            return { event };
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            return {
+                failure: await appendConflictFailure(e, runner, {
+                    entityId: aggregateId,
+                    expectedVersion: 0,
+                    streamTenant: streamTenantFor(user, streamTenantId),
+                }),
+            };
+        }
+    }
+    // 2. Update the projection through applyEntityEvent — the same code path used by
+    //    rebuildProjection for replay, with the same StoredEvent, so live and rebuild
+    //    produce the same result by construction.
+    //
+    //    Application-level unique violations (for example, (tenantId, email) on a User
+    //    entity or (tenantId, slug) on an Article) produce pg-23505 from the projection
+    //    write. Without this catch, the error propagates as an unhandled exception and
+    //    becomes a 500 internal_error. Map it to UniqueViolationError 409 so the
+    //    designer/frontend can show a clear "duplicate" message instead of a cryptic
+    //    "internal server error".
+    // Savepoint like the append: an unclassified DB error from the projection
+    // write would otherwise poison the enclosing transaction (postgres-js rejects the
+    // whole begin() once any statement in it fails). The savepoint rolls back the failed
+    // write while allowing the error to propagate and remain catchable.
+    async function applyProjection(runner, event, noRowMessage) {
+        let result;
+        try {
+            result = await runInSavepointIfSupported(withExecutorManagedWrites(runner), async (sp) => applyEntityEvent(event, table, entity, sp));
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            const mapped = tryMapUniqueViolation(e, entityName);
+            if (mapped)
+                return { failure: mapped };
+            throw e;
+        }
+        if (result.kind !== "applied" || result.row === null) {
+            return { failure: writeFailure(new InternalError({ message: noRowMessage })) };
+        }
+        return { row: result.row };
+    }
+    // Read-side conversion: DB form → combined API form for all compound types in one pass.
+    async function readProjectedRow(row) {
+        return await decryptForRead(rehydrateCompoundTypes(row, entity));
+    }
+    async function evictCachedEntity(user, streamTenantId, id) {
+        if (entityCache && entityName) {
+            await entityCache.del(streamTenantId ?? user.tenantId, entityName, id);
+        }
+    }
+    async function encryptUpdatePayload(user, streamTenantId, previous, changes, mergedNew, options) {
+        // Compound-type conversion in one pass.
+        // subjectSource: partial changes may carry a pii field without its
+        // ownerField — the merged row still identifies the subject.
+        // skipUnchanged is opt-in: an identical resubmitted key is dropped before
+        // encryption so pii/encrypted fields receive no fresh ciphertext when nothing
+        // actually changed.
+        // Direct callers (KEK rotation, backfill) rely on the default to force re-encryption.
+        const submittedChanges = options?.skipUnchanged
+            ? Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(changes).filter(([key, value]) => !isUnchangedValue(value, previous[key])))
+            : changes;
+        // Crypto-shredding follows the current owner, so personal
+        // fields not in this update are re-written under the new owner's key.
+        // Owner -> absent is not re-keyed; the value stays under the old owner.
+        const changesToPersist = {
+            ...submittedChanges,
+            ...ownerTransitionRekeys(previous, mergedNew, submittedChanges),
+        };
+        const flatChangesPlain = flattenCompoundTypes(changesToPersist, entity);
+        const flatChanges = await encryptForStorage(flatChangesPlain, user, {
+            onlyKeys: Object.keys(changesToPersist),
+            subjectSource: mergedNew,
+            keyTenantId: streamTenantId,
+            ...erasureSentinelOption(options),
+        });
+        // The event payload carries BOTH `changes` (what the user asked for) AND
+        // `previous` (the pre-update row). Cross-aggregate projections need the
+        // previous value to decrement/undo when a parent-FK moves — without it
+        // you'd have to snapshot-and-diff on every apply, and replays would
+        // break. Storage cost is acceptable (rows are bounded), correctness is
+        // not negotiable. `previous` came from loadById(), which decrypts —
+        // re-encrypt it before it's persisted so plaintext of pii/encrypted
+        // fields doesn't land in the immutable log (flatChanges is already
+        // ciphertext from encryptForStorage above).
+        // Owner chain for the ownerless-then-assigned row: previous owner, then
+        // the owner this event sets, then whenAbsent.
+        const encryptedPrevious = await encryptForStorage(previous, user, {
+            keyTenantId: streamTenantId,
+            ownerFallback: submittedChanges,
+            ...erasureSentinelOption(options),
+        });
+        return { flatChangesPlain, flatChanges, encryptedPrevious };
+    }
+    async function appendUpdatedEvent(runner, user, id, streamTenant, currentVersion, flatChanges, encryptedPrevious) {
+        // Savepoint-scoped — see appendCreatedEvent for why:
+        // confines a losing writer's unique-violation to a nested scope
+        // instead of poisoning the whole outer transaction.
+        return await runInSavepointIfSupported(runner, (sp) => append(sp, {
+            aggregateId: String(id),
+            aggregateType: entityName,
+            tenantId: streamTenant,
+            expectedVersion: currentVersion,
+            type: entityEventName(entityName, "updated"),
+            eventVersion,
+            payload: {
+                changes: flatChanges,
+                previous: encryptedPrevious,
+            },
+            metadata: buildEventMetadata(user),
+        }));
+    }
+    async function persistUpdate(input) {
+        const { db, runner, user, id, previous, changes, mergedNew, streamTenantId } = input;
+        const { flatChangesPlain, flatChanges, encryptedPrevious } = await encryptUpdatePayload(user, streamTenantId, previous, changes, mergedNew, input.options);
+        const event = await appendUpdatedEvent(runner, user, id, input.streamTenant, input.currentVersion, flatChanges, encryptedPrevious);
+        // Live and rebuild use applyEntityEvent with the same StoredEvent —
+        // apply reads only `changes`, which contain identical ciphertext in live writes
+        // and replays.
+        //
+        // An update that violates a unique index (for example, an email update to an
+        // already-existing value) is reported as 409 unique_violation instead of 500
+        // internal_error.
+        // Savepoint like the create path: a raw DB error from the projection UPDATE would
+        // otherwise poison the enclosing transaction, so a sibling write after a failed
+        // nested one would throw 500 instead of failing cleanly.
+        const projected = await applyProjection(runner, event, "projection update returned no row");
+        if ("failure" in projected)
+            return projected;
+        const data = await readProjectedRow(projected.row);
+        await evictCachedEntity(user, streamTenantId, id);
+        const echoEvent = {
+            ...event,
+            payload: {
+                changes: stripSensitive(flatChangesPlain),
+                previous: stripSensitive(previous),
+            },
+        };
+        await projectEntityEvent(db, runner, echoEvent);
+        return { data, echoEvent };
+    }
+    function assertTenantAllowedOnGlobalEntity(verb, payloadField, tenantId) {
+        if (isForeignTenantOnGlobalEntity(entity, tenantId)) {
+            throw new AccessDeniedError({
+                message: `${entityName}.${verb}: entity is tenancy: "global" — ${payloadField} must be SYSTEM_TENANT_ID or omitted.`,
+            });
+        }
+    }
     return {
         async create(payload, user, db, options) {
-            if (isForeignTenantOnGlobalEntity(entity, payload["tenantId"])) {
-                throw new AccessDeniedError({
-                    message: `${entityName}.create: entity is tenancy: "global" — payload.tenantId must be ` +
-                        "SYSTEM_TENANT_ID or omitted.",
-                });
-            }
+            assertTenantAllowedOnGlobalEntity("create", "payload.tenantId", payload["tenantId"]);
             const streamTenantId = options?.streamTenantId;
             const streamTenantMismatch = streamTenantCreateFailure(db, payload, streamTenantId);
             if (streamTenantMismatch)
@@ -230,39 +430,10 @@ export function createWriteVerbs(ctx) {
             if ("failure" in preSaveResult)
                 return preSaveResult.failure;
             const data = preSaveResult.data;
-            // After preSave so derived fields count, before the event append so nothing persists.
-            assertPersonalDataWrite(db, tableNameOf(table), Object.keys(data), entity);
-            assertInstructionFieldWriteAllowed(entityName, "create", Object.keys(data), entityInstructionFieldNames);
-            // H.2 — entity-level write-ownership on create. No oldRow exists, so
-            // only the new row is checked. No Straddle concern for creates.
-            if (!userCanCreateFieldRow(ownershipSubject(user, streamTenantId), entity.access?.write, data)) {
-                return writeFailure(new UnprocessableError("ownership_denied", {
-                    i18nKey: "errors.ownershipDenied",
-                    details: { scope: "entity", entityName, action: "create", userId: user.id },
-                }));
-            }
-            // Field-level write-ownership on create — mirror of entity-level but
-            // per declared field. Role-level was already checked by the
-            // dispatcher; here we enforce ownership-rules against the new row.
-            //
-            // Which fields get checked is scoped to the pre-hook payload
-            // — a hook-derived field the user never submitted must not be
-            // field-ownership-checked against the user. The rule for a checked
-            // field is still evaluated against the full post-hook row (`data`) —
-            // an ownership rule can reference a column only a hook populates.
-            const fieldDeniedCreate = checkWriteFieldOwnership(entity, applyDefaults(payloadWithoutId), ownershipSubject(user, streamTenantId), undefined, data);
-            if (fieldDeniedCreate) {
-                return writeFailure(new UnprocessableError("ownership_denied", {
-                    i18nKey: "errors.ownershipDenied",
-                    details: {
-                        scope: "field",
-                        entityName,
-                        action: "create",
-                        field: fieldDeniedCreate,
-                        userId: user.id,
-                    },
-                }));
-            }
+            assertFieldWritesAllowed(db, "create", data);
+            const ownershipDenied = createOwnershipFailure(user, streamTenantId, payloadWithoutId, data);
+            if (ownershipDenied)
+                return ownershipDenied;
             const unavailableOnCreate = selectOptionNotAvailableFailure(findUnavailableSelectOptions(entity.fields, data));
             if (unavailableOnCreate)
                 return unavailableOnCreate;
@@ -276,86 +447,15 @@ export function createWriteVerbs(ctx) {
                 subjectSource: { ...flatCreateData, id: aggregateId },
                 keyTenantId: streamTenantId,
             });
-            // 1. Append the event in the same transaction as the projection write — both must
-            //    succeed or both roll back; the dispatcher wraps them in one transaction.
-            //    flatData is already table ciphertext for pii/encrypted fields, so the immutable
-            //    log never sees plaintext and replay reproduces the row byte-for-byte.
-            //
-            //    `expectedVersion: 0` means the stream does not yet exist. With deterministic
-            //    aggregate-ID patterns (for example, uuidv5(tenantId|naturalKey)), a create can
-            //    legitimately collide — the same ID has an existing stream — so return
-            //    version_conflict instead of internal_error. Update uses the same catch.
-            let event;
-            try {
-                // Savepoint-scoped: postgres.js poisons the WHOLE surrounding
-                // begin() once any statement inside it errors, even if the JS error
-                // is caught — a losing concurrent create's unique-violation
-                // would otherwise abort the caller's outer transaction and surface as
-                // internal_error at commit time instead of the version_conflict this
-                // catch classifies. runInSavepointIfSupported confines the failed
-                // INSERT to a nested scope that rolls back on its own (same pattern as
-                // ctx.tryAppendEvent), and falls back to a plain call when the runner
-                // is a bare pool connection with no active transaction to poison
-                // (seeds/tests calling the executor directly).
-                event = await runInSavepointIfSupported(runner, async (sp) => append(sp, {
-                    aggregateId,
-                    aggregateType: entityName,
-                    tenantId: streamTenantFor(user, streamTenantId),
-                    expectedVersion: 0,
-                    type: entityEventName(entityName, "created"),
-                    eventVersion,
-                    payload: flatData,
-                    metadata: buildEventMetadata(user),
-                }));
-            }
-            catch (e) {
-                if (e instanceof EventStoreVersionConflict) {
-                    const currentVersion = await versionAfterConflict(runner, aggregateId, streamTenantFor(user, streamTenantId));
-                    return writeFailure(new FrameworkVersionConflict({
-                        entityId: aggregateId,
-                        expectedVersion: 0,
-                        currentVersion,
-                    }));
-                }
-                if (e instanceof EventStoreIdempotentAppendConflict) {
-                    return writeFailure(new IdempotentReplayError({ idempotencyKey: e.idempotencyKey }));
-                }
-                throw e;
-            }
-            // 2. Update the projection through applyEntityEvent — the same code path used by
-            //    rebuildProjection for replay, with the same StoredEvent, so live and rebuild
-            //    produce the same result by construction.
-            //
-            //    Application-level unique violations (for example, (tenantId, email) on a User
-            //    entity or (tenantId, slug) on an Article) produce pg-23505 from the projection
-            //    INSERT. Without this catch, the error propagates as an unhandled exception and
-            //    becomes a 500 internal_error. Map it to UniqueViolationError 409 so the
-            //    designer/frontend can show a clear "duplicate" message instead of a cryptic
-            //    "internal server error".
-            // Savepoint like the append above: an unclassified DB error from the projection
-            // INSERT would otherwise poison the enclosing transaction (postgres-js rejects the
-            // whole begin() once any statement in it fails). The savepoint rolls back the failed
-            // INSERT while allowing the error to propagate and remain catchable.
-            let result;
-            try {
-                result = await runInSavepointIfSupported(withExecutorManagedWrites(runner), async (sp) => applyEntityEvent(event, table, entity, sp));
-            }
-            catch (e) {
-                const mapped = tryMapUniqueViolation(e, entityName);
-                if (mapped)
-                    return mapped;
-                throw e;
-            }
-            if (result.kind !== "applied" || result.row === null) {
-                return writeFailure(new InternalError({ message: "projection insert returned no row" }));
-            }
-            const row = result.row;
-            // Read-side conversion: DB form → combined API form for all
-            // compound types in one pass.
-            const projection = await decryptForRead(rehydrateCompoundTypes(row, entity));
-            if (entityCache && entityName) {
-                await entityCache.del(streamTenantId ?? user.tenantId, entityName, aggregateId);
-            }
+            const appended = await appendCreatedEvent(runner, user, streamTenantId, aggregateId, flatData);
+            if ("failure" in appended)
+                return appended.failure;
+            const event = appended.event;
+            const projected = await applyProjection(runner, event, "projection insert returned no row");
+            if ("failure" in projected)
+                return projected.failure;
+            const projection = await readProjectedRow(projected.row);
+            await evictCachedEntity(user, streamTenantId, aggregateId);
             // The echoed event is the one projections see (and the dispatcher later
             // skips), so build it before projecting.
             const echoEvent = { ...event, payload: stripSensitive(flatCreateData) };
@@ -378,12 +478,7 @@ export function createWriteVerbs(ctx) {
         },
         async update(payload, user, db, updateOptions) {
             const runner = tenantDbWriteRunner(db, "ctx.db executor update");
-            if (isForeignTenantOnGlobalEntity(entity, payload.changes["tenantId"])) {
-                throw new AccessDeniedError({
-                    message: `${entityName}.update: entity is tenancy: "global" — payload.changes.tenantId must ` +
-                        "be SYSTEM_TENANT_ID or omitted.",
-                });
-            }
+            assertTenantAllowedOnGlobalEntity("update", "payload.changes.tenantId", payload.changes["tenantId"]);
             const previous = await loadById(payload.id, db, {
                 includeDeleted: updateOptions?.includeDeleted === true,
             });
@@ -397,193 +492,38 @@ export function createWriteVerbs(ctx) {
             if ("failure" in preSaveResult)
                 return preSaveResult.failure;
             const changes = preSaveResult.data;
-            // After preSave so derived fields count, before the event append so nothing persists.
-            assertPersonalDataWrite(db, tableNameOf(table), Object.keys(changes), entity);
-            assertInstructionFieldWriteAllowed(entityName, "update", Object.keys(changes), entityInstructionFieldNames);
-            // H.2 — entity-level write-ownership on update. Load old row (already
-            // done above), build post-change row via shallow merge. Straddle-safe
-            // multi-role check: at least one role must accept BOTH old and new —
-            // prevents the attack where role A passes old, role B passes new and
-            // aggregation would wrongly allow a row-grab.
+            assertFieldWritesAllowed(db, "update", changes);
             const mergedNew = { ...previous, ...changes };
-            if (!userCanWriteFieldRow(ownershipSubject(user, streamTenantId), entity.access?.write, previous, mergedNew)) {
-                return writeFailure(new UnprocessableError("ownership_denied", {
-                    i18nKey: "errors.ownershipDenied",
-                    details: {
-                        scope: "entity",
-                        entityName,
-                        action: "update",
-                        userId: user.id,
-                        entityId: payload.id,
-                    },
-                }));
-            }
-            // Field-level write-ownership on update — this is the path the
-            // dispatcher could not evaluate (no oldRow). Now that we have
-            // `previous`, we can run the ownership rules per field against both
-            // sides and reject individual fields the user isn't entitled to
-            // touch on this specific row.
-            //
-            // Which fields get checked is scoped to `payload.changes` (the user's
-            // actual submission), NOT `changes` (post-preSave-hook data)
-            // — a hook-derived field the user never submitted (e.g. a system hook
-            // setting `assignedTo`) has no business being field-ownership-checked
-            // against the *user*, and doing so rejects writes the user is fully
-            // entitled to make. The dispatcher's role-gate (checkWriteFieldAccess)
-            // already runs on this same pre-hook payload for consistency. The rule
-            // for a checked field is still evaluated against the full post-hook
-            // row (`changes` merged onto `previous`) — an ownership rule can
-            // reference a column only a hook populates.
-            const fieldDeniedUpdate = checkWriteFieldOwnership(entity, payload.changes, ownershipSubject(user, streamTenantId), previous, changes);
-            if (fieldDeniedUpdate) {
-                return writeFailure(new UnprocessableError("ownership_denied", {
-                    i18nKey: "errors.ownershipDenied",
-                    details: {
-                        scope: "field",
-                        entityName,
-                        action: "update",
-                        field: fieldDeniedUpdate,
-                        userId: user.id,
-                        entityId: payload.id,
-                    },
-                }));
-            }
-            const lockedUpdate = recordLockedFailure(previous, payload.id, user, updateOptions);
-            if (lockedUpdate)
-                return lockedUpdate;
-            // Statutory retention/erasure writes may change a condition field (e.g. null a PII
-            // reference) and must not be blocked by the select rule — same exemption as the lock.
-            const isStatutorySystemWrite = updateOptions?.writePurpose !== undefined && isFrameworkSystemUser(user);
-            const unavailableOnUpdate = isStatutorySystemWrite
-                ? undefined
-                : selectOptionNotAvailableFailure(findUnavailableSelectOptions(entity.fields, mergedNew, previous));
-            if (unavailableOnUpdate)
-                return unavailableOnUpdate;
+            const guardFailure = updateOwnershipFailure(user, streamTenantId, payload.id, payload.changes, previous, changes, mergedNew) ??
+                recordLockedFailure(previous, payload.id, user, updateOptions) ??
+                updateSelectOptionFailure(user, mergedNew, previous, updateOptions);
+            if (guardFailure)
+                return guardFailure;
             const streamTenant = streamTenantFor(user, streamTenantId);
             await assertStreamWritable(db, payload.id, streamTenant);
-            // Stream-version is authoritative, not row.version. `ctx.appendEvent`
-            // can bump the stream between CRUD writes (domain event on the same
-            // aggregate); a stale row.version here would make the next CRUD write
-            // trip `events_aggregate_version_uq` (tenant_id, aggregate_id, version)
-            // with version_conflict.
-            //
-            // With `expect:` the version comes from loadExpectSnapshot's combined
-            // query instead; see its comment for why.
-            const expect = updateOptions?.expect;
-            const currentVersion = expect
-                ? await expectedStreamVersion(db, payload.id, streamTenant, expect)
-                : await getStreamVersion(runner, String(payload.id), streamTenant);
+            const currentVersion = await currentStreamVersion(db, runner, payload.id, streamTenant, updateOptions?.expect);
             if (typeof currentVersion !== "number")
                 return currentVersion;
-            if (!updateOptions?.skipOptimisticLock) {
-                if (payload.version === undefined) {
-                    return writeFailure(new FrameworkVersionConflict({
-                        entityId: payload.id,
-                        expectedVersion: 0,
-                        currentVersion,
-                    }));
-                }
-                if (currentVersion !== payload.version) {
-                    return writeFailure(new FrameworkVersionConflict({
-                        entityId: payload.id,
-                        expectedVersion: payload.version,
-                        currentVersion,
-                    }));
-                }
-            }
+            const versionConflict = optimisticLockFailure(payload.id, payload.version, currentVersion, updateOptions?.skipOptimisticLock);
+            if (versionConflict)
+                return versionConflict;
             try {
-                // Compound-type conversion in one pass.
-                // subjectSource: partial changes may carry a pii field without its
-                // ownerField — the merged row still identifies the subject.
-                // skipUnchanged is opt-in: an identical resubmitted key is dropped before
-                // encryption so pii/encrypted fields receive no fresh ciphertext when nothing
-                // actually changed.
-                // Direct callers (KEK rotation, backfill) rely on the default to force re-encryption.
-                const submittedChanges = updateOptions?.skipUnchanged
-                    ? Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(changes).filter(([key, value]) => !isUnchangedValue(value, previous[key])))
-                    : changes;
-                // Crypto-shredding follows the current owner, so personal
-                // fields not in this update are re-written under the new owner's key.
-                // Owner -> absent is not re-keyed; the value stays under the old owner.
-                const changesToPersist = {
-                    ...submittedChanges,
-                    ...ownerTransitionRekeys(previous, mergedNew, submittedChanges),
-                };
-                const flatChangesPlain = flattenCompoundTypes(changesToPersist, entity);
-                const flatChanges = await encryptForStorage(flatChangesPlain, user, {
-                    onlyKeys: Object.keys(changesToPersist),
-                    subjectSource: mergedNew,
-                    keyTenantId: streamTenantId,
-                    ...erasureSentinelOption(updateOptions),
-                });
-                // The event payload carries BOTH `changes` (what the user asked for) AND
-                // `previous` (the pre-update row). Cross-aggregate projections need the
-                // previous value to decrement/undo when a parent-FK moves — without it
-                // you'd have to snapshot-and-diff on every apply, and replays would
-                // break. Storage cost is acceptable (rows are bounded), correctness is
-                // not negotiable. `previous` came from loadById(), which decrypts —
-                // re-encrypt it before it's persisted so plaintext of pii/encrypted
-                // fields doesn't land in the immutable log (flatChanges is already
-                // ciphertext from encryptForStorage above).
-                // Owner chain for the ownerless-then-assigned row: previous owner, then
-                // the owner this event sets, then whenAbsent.
-                const encryptedPrevious = await encryptForStorage(previous, user, {
-                    keyTenantId: streamTenantId,
-                    ownerFallback: submittedChanges,
-                    ...erasureSentinelOption(updateOptions),
+                const persisted = await persistUpdate({
+                    db,
+                    runner,
+                    user,
+                    id: payload.id,
+                    previous,
+                    changes,
+                    mergedNew,
+                    streamTenantId,
+                    streamTenant,
+                    currentVersion,
+                    options: updateOptions,
                 });
-                // Savepoint-scoped — see the create() append() above for why:
-                // confines a losing writer's unique-violation to a nested scope
-                // instead of poisoning the whole outer transaction.
-                const event = await runInSavepointIfSupported(runner, (sp) => append(sp, {
-                    aggregateId: String(payload.id),
-                    aggregateType: entityName,
-                    tenantId: streamTenant,
-                    expectedVersion: currentVersion,
-                    type: entityEventName(entityName, "updated"),
-                    eventVersion,
-                    payload: {
-                        changes: flatChanges,
-                        previous: encryptedPrevious,
-                    },
-                    metadata: buildEventMetadata(user),
-                }));
-                // Live and rebuild use applyEntityEvent with the same StoredEvent —
-                // apply reads only `changes`, which contain identical ciphertext in live writes
-                // and replays.
-                //
-                // An update that violates a unique index (for example, an email update to an
-                // already-existing value) is reported as 409 unique_violation instead of 500
-                // internal_error.
-                // Savepoint like the create path: a raw DB error from the projection UPDATE would
-                // otherwise poison the enclosing transaction, so a sibling write after a failed
-                // nested one would throw 500 instead of failing cleanly.
-                let result;
-                try {
-                    result = await runInSavepointIfSupported(withExecutorManagedWrites(runner), async (sp) => applyEntityEvent(event, table, entity, sp));
-                }
-                catch (e) {
-                    const mapped = tryMapUniqueViolation(e, entityName);
-                    if (mapped)
-                        return mapped;
-                    throw e;
-                }
-                if (result.kind !== "applied" || result.row === null) {
-                    return writeFailure(new InternalError({ message: "projection update returned no row" }));
-                }
-                const row = result.row;
-                const data = await decryptForRead(rehydrateCompoundTypes(row, entity));
-                if (entityCache && entityName) {
-                    await entityCache.del(streamTenantId ?? user.tenantId, entityName, payload.id);
-                }
-                const echoEvent = {
-                    ...event,
-                    payload: {
-                        changes: stripSensitive(flatChangesPlain),
-                        previous: stripSensitive(previous),
-                    },
-                };
-                await projectEntityEvent(db, runner, echoEvent);
+                if ("failure" in persisted)
+                    return persisted.failure;
+                const { data, echoEvent } = persisted;
                 return {
                     isSuccess: true,
                     data: withoutEventInJson({
@@ -603,17 +543,11 @@ export function createWriteVerbs(ctx) {
                 // branch catches the narrow race where two writers both read version=N
                 // and both pass the local check — the unique index on (aggregate_id,
                 // version) serializes them, one wins, the other lands here.
-                if (e instanceof EventStoreVersionConflict) {
-                    return writeFailure(new FrameworkVersionConflict({
-                        entityId: payload.id,
-                        expectedVersion: payload.version ?? 0,
-                        currentVersion: await versionAfterConflict(runner, String(payload.id), streamTenant),
-                    }));
-                }
-                if (e instanceof EventStoreIdempotentAppendConflict) {
-                    return writeFailure(new IdempotentReplayError({ idempotencyKey: e.idempotencyKey }));
-                }
-                throw e;
+                return await appendConflictFailure(e, runner, {
+                    entityId: payload.id,
+                    expectedVersion: currentVersion,
+                    streamTenant,
+                });
             }
         },
         async delete(payload, user, db, options) {
@@ -633,16 +567,13 @@ export function createWriteVerbs(ctx) {
             // twice to userCanWriteFieldRow makes the Straddle check trivial
             // (same row on both sides) while keeping the multi-role-atomic shape.
             if (!userCanWriteFieldRow(ownershipSubject(user, streamTenantId), entity.access?.write, existing, existing)) {
-                return writeFailure(new UnprocessableError("ownership_denied", {
-                    i18nKey: "errors.ownershipDenied",
-                    details: {
-                        scope: "entity",
-                        entityName,
-                        action: "delete",
-                        userId: user.id,
-                        entityId: payload.id,
-                    },
-                }));
+                return ownershipDeniedFailure({
+                    scope: "entity",
+                    entityName,
+                    action: "delete",
+                    userId: user.id,
+                    entityId: payload.id,
+                });
             }
             const lockedDelete = recordLockedFailure(existing, payload.id, user, options);
             if (lockedDelete)
@@ -675,26 +606,18 @@ export function createWriteVerbs(ctx) {
                 }));
             }
             catch (e) {
-                if (e instanceof EventStoreVersionConflict) {
-                    return writeFailure(new FrameworkVersionConflict({
-                        entityId: payload.id,
-                        expectedVersion: currentVersion,
-                        currentVersion: await versionAfterConflict(runner, String(payload.id), streamTenantFor(user, streamTenantId)),
-                    }));
-                }
-                if (e instanceof EventStoreIdempotentAppendConflict) {
-                    return writeFailure(new IdempotentReplayError({ idempotencyKey: e.idempotencyKey }));
-                }
-                throw e;
+                return await appendConflictFailure(e, runner, {
+                    entityId: payload.id,
+                    expectedVersion: currentVersion,
+                    streamTenant: streamTenantFor(user, streamTenantId),
+                });
             }
             // Live==Rebuild via applyEntityEvent. Savepoint like create/update.
             const deleteResult = await runInSavepointIfSupported(withExecutorManagedWrites(runner), async (sp) => applyEntityEvent(event, table, entity, sp));
             if (deleteResult.kind !== "applied") {
                 return writeFailure(new InternalError({ message: "projection delete: applyEntityEvent skipped" }));
             }
-            if (entityCache && entityName) {
-                await entityCache.del(streamTenantId ?? user.tenantId, entityName, payload.id);
-            }
+            await evictCachedEntity(user, streamTenantId, payload.id);
             const echoEvent = { ...event, payload: { previous: stripSensitive(existing) } };
             await projectEntityEvent(db, runner, echoEvent);
             return {
@@ -723,19 +646,16 @@ export function createWriteVerbs(ctx) {
             const streamTenantMismatch = streamTenantOverrideFailure(db, raw, streamTenantId);
             if (streamTenantMismatch)
                 return streamTenantMismatch;
-            const existing = await decryptForRead(rehydrateCompoundTypes(raw, entity));
+            const existing = await readProjectedRow(raw);
             if (!isFrameworkSystemUser(user) &&
                 !userCanWriteFieldRow(ownershipSubject(user, streamTenantId), entity.access?.write, existing, existing)) {
-                return writeFailure(new UnprocessableError("ownership_denied", {
-                    i18nKey: "errors.ownershipDenied",
-                    details: {
-                        scope: "entity",
-                        entityName,
-                        action: "delete",
-                        userId: user.id,
-                        entityId: payload.id,
-                    },
-                }));
+                return ownershipDeniedFailure({
+                    scope: "entity",
+                    entityName,
+                    action: "delete",
+                    userId: user.id,
+                    entityId: payload.id,
+                });
             }
             await assertStreamWritable(db, payload.id, streamTenantFor(user, streamTenantId));
             const currentVersion = await getStreamVersion(runner, String(payload.id), streamTenantFor(user, streamTenantId));
@@ -753,32 +673,24 @@ export function createWriteVerbs(ctx) {
                     payload: {
                         previous: await encryptForStorage(existing, user, {
                             keyTenantId: streamTenantId,
-                            onErasedSubject: "sentinel",
+                            onErasedSubject: ErasedSubjectHandlings.sentinel,
                         }),
                     },
                     metadata: buildEventMetadata(user),
                 }));
             }
             catch (e) {
-                if (e instanceof EventStoreVersionConflict) {
-                    return writeFailure(new FrameworkVersionConflict({
-                        entityId: payload.id,
-                        expectedVersion: currentVersion,
-                        currentVersion: await versionAfterConflict(runner, String(payload.id), streamTenantFor(user, streamTenantId)),
-                    }));
-                }
-                if (e instanceof EventStoreIdempotentAppendConflict) {
-                    return writeFailure(new IdempotentReplayError({ idempotencyKey: e.idempotencyKey }));
-                }
-                throw e;
+                return await appendConflictFailure(e, runner, {
+                    entityId: payload.id,
+                    expectedVersion: currentVersion,
+                    streamTenant: streamTenantFor(user, streamTenantId),
+                });
             }
             const forgetResult = await runInSavepointIfSupported(withExecutorManagedWrites(runner), async (sp) => applyEntityEvent(event, table, entity, sp));
             if (forgetResult.kind !== "applied") {
                 return writeFailure(new InternalError({ message: "projection forget: applyEntityEvent skipped" }));
             }
-            if (entityCache && entityName) {
-                await entityCache.del(streamTenantId ?? user.tenantId, entityName, payload.id);
-            }
+            await evictCachedEntity(user, streamTenantId, payload.id);
             const echoEvent = { ...event, payload: { previous: stripSensitive(existing) } };
             await projectEntityEvent(db, runner, echoEvent);
             return {
@@ -809,16 +721,13 @@ export function createWriteVerbs(ctx) {
             // only the stored row matters. Stored row carries pre-soft-delete
             // teamId/... fields, so the ownership predicate still applies cleanly.
             if (!userCanWriteFieldRow(ownershipSubject(user, streamTenantId), entity.access?.write, data, data)) {
-                return writeFailure(new UnprocessableError("ownership_denied", {
-                    i18nKey: "errors.ownershipDenied",
-                    details: {
-                        scope: "entity",
-                        entityName,
-                        action: "restore",
-                        userId: user.id,
-                        entityId: payload.id,
-                    },
-                }));
+                return ownershipDeniedFailure({
+                    scope: "entity",
+                    entityName,
+                    action: "restore",
+                    userId: user.id,
+                    entityId: payload.id,
+                });
             }
             await assertStreamWritable(db, payload.id, streamTenantFor(user, streamTenantId));
             // Stream-version authoritative (see update() for rationale).
@@ -838,29 +747,16 @@ export function createWriteVerbs(ctx) {
             // plus the version bump, so there is no sensitive-field drift and no
             // payload override is needed.
             // Soft-delete unique indexes are partial (WHERE is_deleted = false), so a live row may have re-taken the value this restore brings back.
-            let restoreResult;
-            try {
-                restoreResult = await runInSavepointIfSupported(withExecutorManagedWrites(runner), async (sp) => applyEntityEvent(event, table, entity, sp));
-            }
-            catch (e) {
-                const mapped = tryMapUniqueViolation(e, entityName);
-                if (mapped)
-                    return mapped;
-                throw e;
-            }
-            if (restoreResult.kind !== "applied" || restoreResult.row === null) {
-                return writeFailure(new InternalError({ message: "projection restore returned no row" }));
-            }
-            const restored = restoreResult.row;
-            if (entityCache && entityName) {
-                await entityCache.del(streamTenantId ?? user.tenantId, entityName, payload.id);
-            }
+            const projected = await applyProjection(runner, event, "projection restore returned no row");
+            if ("failure" in projected)
+                return projected.failure;
+            await evictCachedEntity(user, streamTenantId, payload.id);
             // Read-side auto-convert for compound types, same as update/list.
             // decryptForRead matches create/update/list/detail: the caller-facing
             // row and `previous` snapshot must be plaintext for `encrypted` fields,
             // same as every other executor method — `data`/`restored` are raw rows
             // (db.fetchOne / applyEntityEvent), never decrypted before this point.
-            const restoredHydrated = await decryptForRead(rehydrateCompoundTypes(restored, entity));
+            const restoredHydrated = await readProjectedRow(projected.row);
             const echoEvent = { ...event, payload: { previous: stripSensitive(previousPlain) } };
             await projectEntityEvent(db, runner, echoEvent);
             return {