@cosmicdrift/kumiko-framework 0.146.4 → 0.147.1

package/src/db/event-store-executor-write.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,615 @@
+import { checkWriteFieldOwnership } from "../engine/field-access";
+import { userCanCreateFieldRow, userCanWriteFieldRow } from "../engine/ownership";
+import type { EntityId } from "../engine/types";
+import {
+  VersionConflictError as FrameworkVersionConflict,
+  InternalError,
+  NotFoundError,
+  UnprocessableError,
+  writeFailure,
+} from "../errors";
+import {
+  append,
+  VersionConflictError as EventStoreVersionConflict,
+  getStreamVersion,
+} from "../event-store";
+import { generateId } from "../utils";
+import { applyEntityEvent } from "./apply-entity-event";
+import { flattenCompoundTypes, rehydrateCompoundTypes } from "./compound-types";
+import type { DbRow } from "./connection";
+import type { EventStoreExecutor } from "./event-store-executor";
+import {
+  buildEventMetadata,
+  type ExecutorContext,
+  entityEventName,
+  tryMapUniqueViolation,
+} from "./event-store-executor-context";
+import { selectMany } from "./query";
+
+// The five write verbs (create/update/delete/forget/restore) of the event-
+// store-executor. Split out of event-store-executor.ts (#1005, Welle 2) —
+// behavior-preserving relocation, not a redesign: every closure below is
+// unchanged from the original, just relocated behind an explicit
+// ExecutorContext instead of capturing the factory's local scope directly.
+
+export function createWriteVerbs(
+  ctx: ExecutorContext,
+): Pick<EventStoreExecutor, "create" | "update" | "delete" | "forget" | "restore"> {
+  const {
+    table,
+    entity,
+    entityName,
+    entityCache,
+    softDelete,
+    streamTenantFor,
+    encryptForStorage,
+    decryptForRead,
+    applyDefaults,
+    stripSensitive,
+    loadById,
+    assertStreamWritable,
+  } = ctx;
+
+  return {
+    async create(payload, user, db) {
+      // Respect an explicit id in the payload (seed pattern, SCIM import). Without
+      // one the framework mints a fresh UUIDv7 via generateId. Strip it out of the
+      // event payload so defaults + downstream consumers don't see a redundant id field.
+      const explicitId = typeof payload["id"] === "string" ? (payload["id"] as string) : undefined; // @cast-boundary engine-payload
+      const aggregateId = explicitId ?? generateId();
+      const { id: _id, ...payloadWithoutId } = payload;
+      const data = applyDefaults(payloadWithoutId);
+
+      // H.2 — entity-level write-ownership on create. No oldRow exists, so
+      // only the new row is checked. No Straddle concern for creates.
+      if (!userCanCreateFieldRow(user, entity.access?.write, data)) {
+        return writeFailure(
+          new UnprocessableError("ownership_denied", {
+            i18nKey: "errors.ownershipDenied",
+            details: { scope: "entity", entityName, action: "create", userId: user.id },
+          }),
+        );
+      }
+
+      // Field-level write-ownership on create — mirror of entity-level but
+      // per declared field. Role-level was already checked by the
+      // dispatcher; here we enforce ownership-rules against the new row.
+      const fieldDeniedCreate = checkWriteFieldOwnership(entity, data, user);
+      if (fieldDeniedCreate) {
+        return writeFailure(
+          new UnprocessableError("ownership_denied", {
+            i18nKey: "errors.ownershipDenied",
+            details: {
+              scope: "field",
+              entityName,
+              action: "create",
+              field: fieldDeniedCreate,
+              userId: user.id,
+            },
+          }),
+        );
+      }
+
+      // Alle Compound-Types (locatedTimestamp, money, ...) gehen durch
+      // dieselbe Pipeline. Caller schickt combined API-Form, Framework
+      // speichert flat DB-Form. Siehe db/compound-types.ts.
+      // subjectSource carries the freshly minted aggregateId: the create
+      // payload has no id column, but a pii:true self-subject resolves from it.
+      const flatCreateData = flattenCompoundTypes(data, entity);
+      const flatData = await encryptForStorage(flatCreateData, user, {
+        subjectSource: { ...flatCreateData, id: aggregateId },
+      });
+
+      // 1. Append event (same TX as the projection write — both must succeed
+      //    or both roll back; the dispatcher wraps both in one transaction).
+      //    flatData is already table ciphertext for pii/encrypted fields, so
+      //    the immutable log never sees plaintext and replay reproduces the
+      //    row byte-identically (#967).
+      //
+      //    `expectedVersion: 0` heißt: stream existiert noch nicht. Bei
+      //    deterministic-aggregate-id-Patterns (z.B. uuidv5(tenantId|naturalKey))
+      //    ist es legitim dass create kollidiert — selbe id, schon vorhandener
+      //    stream → version_conflict statt internal_error. Update hat den
+      //    selben catch (siehe line 493+).
+      let event: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof append>>;
+      try {
+        event = await append(db.raw, {
+          aggregateId,
+          aggregateType: entityName,
+          tenantId: streamTenantFor(user),
+          expectedVersion: 0,
+          type: entityEventName(entityName, "created"),
+          payload: flatData,
+          metadata: buildEventMetadata(user),
+        });
+      } catch (e) {
+        if (e instanceof EventStoreVersionConflict) {
+          // Try to look up the real stream-version for the diagnostic — but
+          // wrap defensively: when `append` raised the unique-violation, the
+          // current TX is already aborted, and a second query on the same
+          // runner would re-throw "current transaction is aborted". Update-
+          // path doesn't have this problem (it queries getStreamVersion
+          // BEFORE the try-block). Falling back to a sentinel keeps the
+          // version_conflict mapping reliable; the actual current version
+          // is recoverable client-side via a fresh detail-query if needed.
+          let currentVersion = -1;
+          try {
+            currentVersion = await getStreamVersion(db.raw, aggregateId, streamTenantFor(user));
+          } catch {
+            // Aborted TX or any lookup failure — keep the sentinel.
+          }
+          return writeFailure(
+            new FrameworkVersionConflict({
+              entityId: aggregateId,
+              expectedVersion: 0,
+              currentVersion,
+            }),
+          );
+        }
+        throw e;
+      }
+
+      // 2. Update projection via applyEntityEvent — derselbe Code-Pfad den
+      //    rebuildProjection für Replay nutzt, mit demselben StoredEvent →
+      //    Live==Rebuild by-construction (#967).
+      //
+      //    F8-Patch: app-level unique-violations (z.B. (tenantId, email)
+      //    auf User-Entity, (tenantId, slug) auf Article) werfen pg-23505
+      //    aus der projection-INSERT. Ohne den catch propagiert das als
+      //    unhandled exception → 500 internal_error. Map auf
+      //    UniqueViolationError 409 damit Designer/Frontend einen sauberen
+      //    "duplicate" zeigen können statt cryptic "internal server error".
+      let result: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof applyEntityEvent>>;
+      try {
+        result = await applyEntityEvent(event, table, entity, db.raw);
+      } catch (e) {
+        const mapped = tryMapUniqueViolation(e, entityName);
+        if (mapped) return mapped;
+        throw e;
+      }
+      if (result.kind !== "applied" || result.row === null) {
+        return writeFailure(new InternalError({ message: "projection insert returned no row" }));
+      }
+      const row = result.row;
+      // Read-Side Auto-Convert: DB-Form → API-combined-Form für alle
+      // Compound-Types in einem Pass.
+      const projection = await decryptForRead(
+        rehydrateCompoundTypes(row as DbRow, entity) as DbRow,
+      );
+
+      if (entityCache && entityName) {
+        await entityCache.del(user.tenantId, entityName, aggregateId);
+      }
+
+      return {
+        isSuccess: true,
+        data: {
+          kind: "save",
+          id: aggregateId,
+          data: projection,
+          changes: data,
+          previous: {},
+          isNew: true,
+          entityName,
+          // Persisted event carries ciphertext by design — the caller-facing
+          // echo must be plaintext like every other response field (#820).
+          event: { ...event, payload: stripSensitive(flatCreateData) },
+        },
+      };
+    },
+
+    async update(payload, user, db, updateOptions) {
+      const previous = await loadById(payload.id, db);
+      if (!previous) return writeFailure(new NotFoundError(entityName, payload.id));
+
+      // H.2 — entity-level write-ownership on update. Load old row (already
+      // done above), build post-change row via shallow merge. Straddle-safe
+      // multi-role check: at least one role must accept BOTH old and new —
+      // prevents the attack where role A passes old, role B passes new and
+      // aggregation would wrongly allow a row-grab.
+      const mergedNew: Record<string, unknown> = { ...previous, ...payload.changes };
+      if (!userCanWriteFieldRow(user, entity.access?.write, previous, mergedNew)) {
+        return writeFailure(
+          new UnprocessableError("ownership_denied", {
+            i18nKey: "errors.ownershipDenied",
+            details: {
+              scope: "entity",
+              entityName,
+              action: "update",
+              userId: user.id,
+              entityId: payload.id,
+            },
+          }),
+        );
+      }
+
+      // Field-level write-ownership on update — this is the path the
+      // dispatcher could not evaluate (no oldRow). Now that we have
+      // `previous`, we can run the ownership rules per field against both
+      // sides and reject individual fields the user isn't entitled to
+      // touch on this specific row.
+      const fieldDeniedUpdate = checkWriteFieldOwnership(entity, payload.changes, user, previous);
+      if (fieldDeniedUpdate) {
+        return writeFailure(
+          new UnprocessableError("ownership_denied", {
+            i18nKey: "errors.ownershipDenied",
+            details: {
+              scope: "field",
+              entityName,
+              action: "update",
+              field: fieldDeniedUpdate,
+              userId: user.id,
+              entityId: payload.id,
+            },
+          }),
+        );
+      }
+
+      await assertStreamWritable(db, payload.id, streamTenantFor(user));
+
+      // Stream-version is authoritative, not row.version. `ctx.appendEvent`
+      // can bump the stream between CRUD writes (domain event on the same
+      // aggregate); a stale row.version here would make the next CRUD write
+      // trip `events_aggregate_version_uq` (tenant_id, aggregate_id, version)
+      // with version_conflict.
+      const currentVersion = await getStreamVersion(
+        db.raw,
+        String(payload.id),
+        streamTenantFor(user),
+      );
+      if (!updateOptions?.skipOptimisticLock) {
+        if (payload.version === undefined) {
+          return writeFailure(
+            new FrameworkVersionConflict({
+              entityId: payload.id,
+              expectedVersion: 0,
+              currentVersion,
+            }),
+          );
+        }
+        if (currentVersion !== payload.version) {
+          return writeFailure(
+            new FrameworkVersionConflict({
+              entityId: payload.id,
+              expectedVersion: payload.version,
+              currentVersion,
+            }),
+          );
+        }
+      }
+
+      try {
+        // Compound-Types Auto-Convert (alle in einem Pass).
+        // subjectSource: partial changes may carry a pii field without its
+        // ownerField — the merged row still names the subject.
+        const flatChangesPlain = flattenCompoundTypes(payload.changes, entity);
+        const flatChanges = await encryptForStorage(flatChangesPlain, user, {
+          onlyKeys: Object.keys(payload.changes),
+          subjectSource: mergedNew,
+        });
+
+        // The event payload carries BOTH `changes` (what the user asked for) AND
+        // `previous` (the pre-update row). Cross-aggregate projections need the
+        // previous value to decrement/undo when a parent-FK moves — without it
+        // you'd have to snapshot-and-diff on every apply, and replays would
+        // break. Storage cost is acceptable (rows are bounded), correctness is
+        // not negotiable. `previous` came from loadById(), which decrypts —
+        // re-encrypt it before it's persisted so plaintext of pii/encrypted
+        // fields doesn't land in the immutable log (flatChanges is already
+        // ciphertext from encryptForStorage above).
+        const event = await append(db.raw, {
+          aggregateId: String(payload.id),
+          aggregateType: entityName,
+          tenantId: streamTenantFor(user),
+          expectedVersion: currentVersion,
+          type: entityEventName(entityName, "updated"),
+          payload: {
+            changes: flatChanges,
+            previous: await encryptForStorage(previous, user),
+          },
+          metadata: buildEventMetadata(user),
+        });
+
+        // Live==Rebuild via applyEntityEvent mit demselben StoredEvent —
+        // apply liest nur `changes`, und die sind live wie im Replay
+        // identischer Ciphertext (#967).
+        //
+        // F8-Patch: dasselbe unique-violation-handling wie im create-Pfad
+        // — ein update das einen unique-Index verletzt (z.B. email-update
+        // auf einen schon-existierenden Wert) wird mit 409 unique_violation
+        // statt 500 internal_error rückgemeldet.
+        let result: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof applyEntityEvent>>;
+        try {
+          result = await applyEntityEvent(event, table, entity, db.raw);
+        } catch (e) {
+          const mapped = tryMapUniqueViolation(e, entityName);
+          if (mapped) return mapped;
+          throw e;
+        }
+        if (result.kind !== "applied" || result.row === null) {
+          return writeFailure(new InternalError({ message: "projection update returned no row" }));
+        }
+        const row = result.row;
+        const data = await decryptForRead(rehydrateCompoundTypes(row as DbRow, entity) as DbRow);
+
+        if (entityCache && entityName) {
+          await entityCache.del(user.tenantId, entityName, payload.id);
+        }
+
+        return {
+          isSuccess: true,
+          data: {
+            kind: "save",
+            id: data["id"] as EntityId, // @cast-boundary engine-payload
+            data,
+            changes: payload.changes,
+            previous,
+            isNew: false,
+            entityName,
+            event: {
+              ...event,
+              payload: {
+                changes: stripSensitive(flatChangesPlain),
+                previous: stripSensitive(previous),
+              },
+            },
+          },
+        };
+      } catch (e) {
+        // The pre-check above eliminates the common stale-version case; this
+        // branch catches the narrow race where two writers both read version=N
+        // and both pass the local check — the unique index on (aggregate_id,
+        // version) serializes them, one wins, the other lands here.
+        if (e instanceof EventStoreVersionConflict) {
+          return writeFailure(
+            new FrameworkVersionConflict({
+              entityId: payload.id,
+              expectedVersion: payload.version ?? 0,
+              currentVersion,
+            }),
+          );
+        }
+        throw e;
+      }
+    },
+
+    async delete(payload, user, db) {
+      const existing = await loadById(payload.id, db);
+      if (!existing) return writeFailure(new NotFoundError(entityName, payload.id));
+
+      // H.2 — entity-level write-ownership on delete. Only the pre-delete
+      // row matters (there's no "new" row for a delete); passing existing
+      // twice to userCanWriteFieldRow makes the Straddle check trivial
+      // (same row on both sides) while keeping the multi-role-atomic shape.
+      if (!userCanWriteFieldRow(user, entity.access?.write, existing, existing)) {
+        return writeFailure(
+          new UnprocessableError("ownership_denied", {
+            i18nKey: "errors.ownershipDenied",
+            details: {
+              scope: "entity",
+              entityName,
+              action: "delete",
+              userId: user.id,
+              entityId: payload.id,
+            },
+          }),
+        );
+      }
+
+      await assertStreamWritable(db, payload.id, streamTenantFor(user));
+
+      // Stream-version authoritative (see update() for rationale).
+      const currentVersion = await getStreamVersion(
+        db.raw,
+        String(payload.id),
+        streamTenantFor(user),
+      );
+
+      // Deletes carry the full pre-delete row as `previous`. That's what
+      // projections and downstream consumers need to reverse any aggregates —
+      // a `{}`-payload delete would make cross-aggregate projections impossible
+      // to rebuild from the event log alone. `existing` came from loadById(),
+      // which decrypts — re-encrypt before persisting so plaintext doesn't
+      // land in the immutable log.
+      const event = await append(db.raw, {
+        aggregateId: String(payload.id),
+        aggregateType: entityName,
+        tenantId: streamTenantFor(user),
+        expectedVersion: currentVersion,
+        type: entityEventName(entityName, "deleted"),
+        payload: { previous: await encryptForStorage(existing, user) },
+        metadata: buildEventMetadata(user),
+      });
+
+      // Live==Rebuild via applyEntityEvent. Delete-Operation hat keine
+      // sensitive-Drift weil das Event-Payload nur `previous` ist und das
+      // wird vom soft/hard-delete-Code gar nicht in die Tabelle geschrieben
+      // (nur isDeleted/deletedAt/version-Bump). Live + Replay schreiben
+      // dasselbe — kein payload-override nötig.
+      const deleteResult = await applyEntityEvent(event, table, entity, db.raw);
+      if (deleteResult.kind !== "applied") {
+        return writeFailure(
+          new InternalError({ message: "projection delete: applyEntityEvent skipped" }),
+        );
+      }
+
+      if (entityCache && entityName) {
+        await entityCache.del(user.tenantId, entityName, payload.id);
+      }
+
+      return {
+        isSuccess: true,
+        data: {
+          kind: "delete",
+          id: payload.id,
+          data: existing,
+          entityName,
+          event: { ...event, payload: { previous: stripSensitive(existing) } },
+        },
+      };
+    },
+
+    // Hard-purge (Art. 17). Same shape as delete(), but emits `forgotten` which
+    // hard-deletes the row regardless of softDelete — and, being an auto-verb,
+    // the erasure replays on rebuild (created → forgotten → row gone). Loads
+    // without the isDeleted filter so trashed (soft-deleted) rows are erased too.
+    async forget(payload, user, db) {
+      const raw = await db.fetchOne<Record<string, unknown>>(table, { id: payload.id });
+      if (!raw) return writeFailure(new NotFoundError(entityName, payload.id));
+      const existing = await decryptForRead(rehydrateCompoundTypes(raw as DbRow, entity) as DbRow);
+
+      if (!userCanWriteFieldRow(user, entity.access?.write, existing, existing)) {
+        return writeFailure(
+          new UnprocessableError("ownership_denied", {
+            i18nKey: "errors.ownershipDenied",
+            details: {
+              scope: "entity",
+              entityName,
+              action: "delete",
+              userId: user.id,
+              entityId: payload.id,
+            },
+          }),
+        );
+      }
+
+      await assertStreamWritable(db, payload.id, streamTenantFor(user));
+      const currentVersion = await getStreamVersion(
+        db.raw,
+        String(payload.id),
+        streamTenantFor(user),
+      );
+
+      const event = await append(db.raw, {
+        aggregateId: String(payload.id),
+        aggregateType: entityName,
+        tenantId: streamTenantFor(user),
+        expectedVersion: currentVersion,
+        type: entityEventName(entityName, "forgotten"),
+        // Re-encrypt like delete(): `existing` came decrypted from loadById —
+        // plaintext must not land in the immutable log, least of all on forget.
+        payload: { previous: await encryptForStorage(existing, user) },
+        metadata: buildEventMetadata(user),
+      });
+
+      const forgetResult = await applyEntityEvent(event, table, entity, db.raw);
+      if (forgetResult.kind !== "applied") {
+        return writeFailure(
+          new InternalError({ message: "projection forget: applyEntityEvent skipped" }),
+        );
+      }
+
+      if (entityCache && entityName) {
+        await entityCache.del(user.tenantId, entityName, payload.id);
+      }
+
+      return {
+        isSuccess: true,
+        data: {
+          kind: "delete",
+          id: payload.id,
+          data: existing,
+          entityName,
+          event: { ...event, payload: { previous: stripSensitive(existing) } },
+        },
+      };
+    },
+
+    async restore(payload, user, db) {
+      if (!softDelete) {
+        return writeFailure(
+          new UnprocessableError("soft_delete_not_enabled", {
+            i18nKey: "errors.softDeleteNotEnabled",
+          }),
+        );
+      }
+
+      const [row] = await selectMany(db.raw, table, { id: payload.id });
+      if (!row) return writeFailure(new NotFoundError(entityName, payload.id));
+      const data = row as DbRow;
+      if (!data["isDeleted"]) {
+        return writeFailure(
+          new UnprocessableError("not_deleted", { i18nKey: "errors.notDeleted" }),
+        );
+      }
+
+      // H.2 — entity-level write-ownership on restore. Same shape as delete:
+      // only the stored row matters. Stored row carries pre-soft-delete
+      // teamId/... fields, so the ownership predicate still applies cleanly.
+      if (!userCanWriteFieldRow(user, entity.access?.write, data, data)) {
+        return writeFailure(
+          new UnprocessableError("ownership_denied", {
+            i18nKey: "errors.ownershipDenied",
+            details: {
+              scope: "entity",
+              entityName,
+              action: "restore",
+              userId: user.id,
+              entityId: payload.id,
+            },
+          }),
+        );
+      }
+
+      await assertStreamWritable(db, payload.id, streamTenantFor(user));
+
+      // Stream-version authoritative (see update() for rationale).
+      const currentVersion = await getStreamVersion(
+        db.raw,
+        String(payload.id),
+        streamTenantFor(user),
+      );
+      // Restore carries the soft-deleted snapshot as `previous` — mirror of
+      // delete for symmetry. Projections that decremented on delete use
+      // `previous` to re-increment on restore without re-querying the entity
+      // table. `data` is the raw stored row — pii/encrypted fields are
+      // already ciphertext, no re-encrypt needed.
+      const event = await append(db.raw, {
+        aggregateId: String(payload.id),
+        aggregateType: entityName,
+        tenantId: streamTenantFor(user),
+        expectedVersion: currentVersion,
+        type: entityEventName(entityName, "restored"),
+        payload: { previous: data },
+        metadata: buildEventMetadata(user),
+      });
+
+      // Live==Rebuild via applyEntityEvent. Restore schreibt nur isDeleted=
+      // false + version-Bump in die Tabelle — keine sensitive-Drift, daher
+      // kein payload-override nötig.
+      const restoreResult = await applyEntityEvent(event, table, entity, db.raw);
+      if (restoreResult.kind !== "applied" || restoreResult.row === null) {
+        return writeFailure(new InternalError({ message: "projection restore returned no row" }));
+      }
+      const restored = restoreResult.row;
+
+      if (entityCache && entityName) {
+        await entityCache.del(user.tenantId, entityName, payload.id);
+      }
+
+      // Read-Side Auto-Convert für Compound-Types (parallel zu update/list).
+      // decryptForRead matches create/update/list/detail: the caller-facing
+      // row and `previous` snapshot must be plaintext for `encrypted` fields,
+      // same as every other executor method — `data`/`restored` are raw rows
+      // (selectMany / applyEntityEvent), never decrypted before this point.
+      const restoredHydrated = await decryptForRead(
+        rehydrateCompoundTypes(restored as DbRow, entity) as DbRow,
+      );
+
+      const previousPlain = await decryptForRead(data);
+      return {
+        isSuccess: true,
+        data: {
+          kind: "save",
+          id: payload.id,
+          data: restoredHydrated,
+          changes: { isDeleted: false },
+          previous: previousPlain,
+          isNew: false,
+          entityName,
+          event: { ...event, payload: { previous: stripSensitive(previousPlain) } },
+        },
+      };
+    },
+  };
+}