@cosmicdrift/kumiko-bundled-features 0.322.0 → 0.323.0

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-bundled-features",
-  "version": "0.322.0",
+  "version": "0.323.0",
   "description": "Built-in features — tenant, user, auth, delivery. The stuff you'd rewrite anyway, already typed.",
   "license": "BUSL-1.1",
   "author": "Marc Frost <marc@cosmicdriftgamestudio.com>",
@@ -134,12 +134,12 @@
     "./workflow-runner": "./src/workflow-runner/index.ts"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-dispatcher-live": "0.322.0",
-    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-framework": "0.322.0",
-    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-headless": "0.322.0",
-    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-renderer": "0.322.0",
-    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-renderer-web": "0.322.0",
-    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-types": "0.322.0",
+    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-dispatcher-live": "0.323.0",
+    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-framework": "0.323.0",
+    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-headless": "0.323.0",
+    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-renderer": "0.323.0",
+    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-renderer-web": "0.323.0",
+    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-types": "0.323.0",
     "@mollie/api-client": "^4.5.0",
     "@node-rs/argon2": "^2.0.2",
     "@types/mailparser": "^3.4.6",
@@ -168,8 +168,8 @@
   ],
   "devDependencies": {
     "@testing-library/user-event": "^14.6.1",
-    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-locale-de": "0.322.0",
-    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-locale-es": "0.322.0",
+    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-locale-de": "0.323.0",
+    "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-locale-es": "0.323.0",
     "jsqr": "^1.4.0"
   }
 }

package/src/agent-tools/__tests__/kms-erase-gate.integration.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+// kms.eraseKey reached through configuredPiiSubjectKms() passes the same
+// agent-risk floor executor.forget()/delete() already enforce.
+
+import { afterAll, afterEach, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
+import {
+  configuredPiiSubjectKms,
+  configurePiiSubjectKms,
+  InMemoryKmsAdapter,
+  type SubjectId,
+} from "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-framework/crypto";
+import { defineFeature } from "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-framework/engine";
+import { setupTestStack, type TestStack, TestUsers } from "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-framework/stack";
+import { resetPiiSubjectKmsForTests } from "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-framework/testing";
+import * as z from "zod";
+import { buildAgentManifest } from "../agent-manifest";
+import { buildToolCatalog, toolNameForQn } from "../tool-catalog";
+import { dispatchToolCall } from "../tool-dispatch";
+
+const admin = TestUsers.admin;
+
+const SUBJECT: SubjectId = {
+  kind: "record",
+  entity: "kms-erase-gate-widget",
+  id: "aaaaaaaa-aaaa-4aaa-8aaa-000000000001",
+};
+
+const ERASE_MID_QN = "kms-erase-gate-test:write:erase-mid";
+const ERASE_HIGH_QN = "kms-erase-gate-test:write:erase-high";
+
+const kmsGateFeature = defineFeature("kms-erase-gate-test", (r) => {
+  r.writeHandler(
+    "erase-mid",
+    z.object({}),
+    async () => {
+      await configuredPiiSubjectKms()!.eraseKey(SUBJECT, {
+        requestId: "kms-erase-gate-test:erase-mid",
+        eraseReason: "test",
+      });
+      return { isSuccess: true as const, data: {} };
+    },
+    {
+      access: { roles: ["Admin"] },
+      description: "Erase the widget subject key (mid risk, default).",
+    },
+  );
+
+  r.writeHandler(
+    "erase-high",
+    z.object({}),
+    async () => {
+      await configuredPiiSubjectKms()!.eraseKey(SUBJECT, {
+        requestId: "kms-erase-gate-test:erase-high",
+        eraseReason: "test",
+      });
+      return { isSuccess: true as const, data: {} };
+    },
+    {
+      access: { roles: ["Admin"] },
+      description: "Erase the widget subject key (high risk).",
+      agent: { risk: "high" },
+    },
+  );
+});
+
+let stack: TestStack;
+let kms: InMemoryKmsAdapter;
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  stack = await setupTestStack({ features: [kmsGateFeature] });
+});
+
+afterAll(async () => {
+  await stack.cleanup();
+});
+
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  kms = new InMemoryKmsAdapter();
+  await kms.createKey(SUBJECT);
+  configurePiiSubjectKms(kms);
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  resetPiiSubjectKmsForTests();
+});
+
+function catalogFor(roles: readonly string[]) {
+  const manifest = buildAgentManifest(stack.registry, { locale: "en", roles });
+  return buildToolCatalog(stack.registry, manifest, { mode: "edit" });
+}
+
+describe("kms.eraseKey via configuredPiiSubjectKms() — agent-risk gate", () => {
+  test("a mid-risk (default) tool is denied, the key stays readable", async () => {
+    const catalog = catalogFor(admin.roles);
+    const result = await dispatchToolCall({
+      dispatcher: stack.dispatcher,
+      user: admin,
+      toolName: toolNameForQn(ERASE_MID_QN),
+      input: {},
+      dispatchTable: catalog.dispatchTable,
+      runId: "run-mid",
+      toolCallId: "call-mid",
+    });
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (result.ok) throw new Error("unreachable");
+    expect(result.error).toContain(ERASE_MID_QN);
+    expect(result.error).toContain("irreversible");
+    expect(result.error).toContain("kms.eraseKey");
+    await expect(kms.getKey(SUBJECT)).resolves.toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  test("a risk:high tool succeeds and the key is erased", async () => {
+    const catalog = catalogFor(admin.roles);
+    const result = await dispatchToolCall({
+      dispatcher: stack.dispatcher,
+      user: admin,
+      toolName: toolNameForQn(ERASE_HIGH_QN),
+      input: {},
+      dispatchTable: catalog.dispatchTable,
+      runId: "run-high",
+      toolCallId: "call-high",
+    });
+
+    expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+    await expect(kms.getKey(SUBJECT)).rejects.toThrow("Subject key erased");
+  });
+});

package/src/auth-email-password/__tests__/invite-flow.integration.test.ts

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ import { tenantEntity, tenantTable } from "../../tenant/schema/tenant";
 import { seedTenant, seedTenantMembership } from "../../tenant/seeding";
 import { createUserFeature } from "../../user/feature";
 import { userEntity, userTable } from "../../user/schema/user";
-import { AuthErrors, AuthHandlers } from "../constants";
+import { AuthErrors, AuthHandlers, AuthQueries } from "../constants";
 import { createAuthEmailPasswordFeature } from "../feature";
 import { storeInviteToken } from "../invite-token-store";
 import { seedUser } from "../seeding";
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ beforeAll(async () => {
         acceptHandler: AuthHandlers.inviteAccept,
         acceptWithLoginHandler: AuthHandlers.inviteAcceptWithLogin,
         signupCompleteHandler: AuthHandlers.inviteSignupComplete,
+        infoHandler: AuthQueries.inviteInfo,
       },
     },
   });
@@ -149,8 +150,11 @@ beforeEach(async () => {
   await asRawClient(stack.db).unsafe(`DELETE FROM "${tenantInvitationsTable.tableName}"`);
   await asRawClient(stack.db).unsafe(`DELETE FROM "${tenantTable.tableName}"`);
   emailTransport.sent.length = 0;
-  const allKeys = await stack.redis.redis.keys("invite:*");
-  if (allKeys.length > 0) await stack.redis.redis.del(...allKeys);
+  // Also clears rate-limit buckets: trustedProxyHops defaults to 0, so
+  // every call in this file shares one unknown-IP bucket per handler —
+  // without this, earlier invite-info calls would count toward the
+  // rate-limit test's own budget.
+  await stack.redis.flushNamespace();
 
   // Pro Test frische Tenant-IDs + tenant.key (sonst unique-violation
   // auf read_tenants_key_unique beim 2. Run).
@@ -438,7 +442,7 @@ describe("invite-accept-with-login (Branch 2: anon + existing email)", () => {
     }
   });
 
-  test("Wrong password → 422 invalid_invite_token (anti-enum)", async () => {
+  test("Wrong password → 422 invalid_credentials, invite stays acceptable", async () => {
     const token = await inviteEmail(BOB_EMAIL, "Editor");
     const res = await stack.http.raw("POST", "/api/auth/invite-accept-with-login", {
       token,
@@ -447,7 +451,16 @@ describe("invite-accept-with-login (Branch 2: anon + existing email)", () => {
     });
     expect(res.status).toBe(422);
     const body = (await res.json()) as { error?: { details?: { reason?: string } } };
-    expect(body.error?.details?.reason).toBe(AuthErrors.invalidInviteToken);
+    expect(body.error?.details?.reason).toBe(AuthErrors.invalidCredentials);
+
+    // Token was released on failure (existing finally/unburn) — the same
+    // invite must still be acceptable with the correct password.
+    const retryRes = await stack.http.raw("POST", "/api/auth/invite-accept-with-login", {
+      token,
+      email: BOB_EMAIL,
+      password: BOB_PASSWORD,
+    });
+    expect(retryRes.status).toBe(200);
   });
 
   test("common password → 400 (schema rejects breach-list password) (#1340)", async () => {
@@ -536,6 +549,112 @@ describe("invite-signup-complete (Branch 3: anon + new email)", () => {
   });
 });
 
+describe("invite-info (anonymous, read-only lookup)", () => {
+  test("open invite for an existing account → {email, hasAccount:true}, token stays acceptable afterwards", async () => {
+    const token = await inviteEmail(BOB_EMAIL, "Editor");
+
+    const res = await stack.http.raw("POST", "/api/auth/invite-info", { token });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const body = (await res.json()) as { email?: string; hasAccount?: boolean };
+    expect(body.email).toBe(BOB_EMAIL);
+    expect(body.hasAccount).toBe(true);
+
+    // Token was never consumed — the same invite can still be accepted.
+    const acceptRes = await stack.http.raw("POST", "/api/auth/invite-accept-with-login", {
+      token,
+      email: BOB_EMAIL,
+      password: BOB_PASSWORD,
+    });
+    expect(acceptRes.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  test("open invite for a new email → hasAccount:false", async () => {
+    const token = await inviteEmail(CAROL_EMAIL, "Admin");
+
+    const res = await stack.http.raw("POST", "/api/auth/invite-info", { token });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const body = (await res.json()) as { email?: string; hasAccount?: boolean };
+    expect(body.email).toBe(CAROL_EMAIL);
+    expect(body.hasAccount).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test("unknown token → 422 invalid_invite_token", async () => {
+    const res = await stack.http.raw("POST", "/api/auth/invite-info", {
+      token: "not-a-real-token",
+    });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(422);
+    const body = (await res.json()) as { error?: { details?: { reason?: string } } };
+    expect(body.error?.details?.reason).toBe(AuthErrors.invalidInviteToken);
+  });
+
+  test("error body has the same shape as the write routes' — invalid_invite_token sits at error.details.reason on both", async () => {
+    const infoRes = await stack.http.raw("POST", "/api/auth/invite-info", {
+      token: "not-a-real-token",
+    });
+    const writeRes = await stack.http.raw("POST", "/api/auth/invite-accept-with-login", {
+      token: "not-a-real-token",
+      email: BOB_EMAIL,
+      password: BOB_PASSWORD,
+    });
+    expect(infoRes.status).toBe(422);
+    expect(writeRes.status).toBe(422);
+    type ErrorBody = {
+      isSuccess?: boolean;
+      error?: {
+        code?: string;
+        httpStatus?: number;
+        i18nKey?: string;
+        details?: { reason?: string };
+      };
+    };
+    const infoBody = (await infoRes.json()) as ErrorBody;
+    const writeBody = (await writeRes.json()) as ErrorBody;
+    expect(Object.keys(infoBody).sort()).toEqual(Object.keys(writeBody).sort());
+    expect(Object.keys(infoBody.error ?? {}).sort()).toEqual(
+      Object.keys(writeBody.error ?? {}).sort(),
+    );
+    expect(infoBody.error?.details?.reason).toBe(AuthErrors.invalidInviteToken);
+    expect(writeBody.error?.details?.reason).toBe(AuthErrors.invalidInviteToken);
+  });
+
+  test("already-accepted invitation → 422 invalid_invite_token", async () => {
+    const token = await inviteEmail(BOB_EMAIL, "Editor");
+    const acceptRes = await stack.http.raw("POST", "/api/auth/invite-accept-with-login", {
+      token,
+      email: BOB_EMAIL,
+      password: BOB_PASSWORD,
+    });
+    expect(acceptRes.status).toBe(200);
+
+    const res = await stack.http.raw("POST", "/api/auth/invite-info", { token });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(422);
+    const body = (await res.json()) as { error?: { details?: { reason?: string } } };
+    expect(body.error?.details?.reason).toBe(AuthErrors.invalidInviteToken);
+  });
+
+  test("token in the query string instead of the body → invalid_body", async () => {
+    const token = await inviteEmail(BOB_EMAIL, "Editor");
+    const res = await stack.http.raw(
+      "POST",
+      `/api/auth/invite-info?token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}`,
+      {},
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    const body = (await res.json()) as { error?: string };
+    expect(body.error).toBe("invalid_body");
+  });
+
+  test("rate limit: the 21st call in a window is rejected with 429", async () => {
+    const token = await inviteEmail(BOB_EMAIL, "Editor");
+    for (let i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
+      const res = await stack.http.raw("POST", "/api/auth/invite-info", { token });
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    }
+    const limited = await stack.http.raw("POST", "/api/auth/invite-info", { token });
+    expect(limited.status).toBe(429);
+  });
+});
+
 describe("invite-accept defense-in-depth (assertAssignableMembershipRoles)", () => {
   test("a forbidden role planted directly on the invitation row (bug/migration) is rejected, not silently granted", async () => {
     // Simulates the ONE scenario this depth-layer exists for: a forbidden role

package/src/auth-email-password/changes.json

@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@
 [
+  {
+    "version": "0.323.0",
+    "type": "improvement",
+    "title": "New anonymous invite-info lookup route; invite-accept-with-login now returns invalid_credentials for a wrong or missing password",
+    "detail": "POST /auth/invite-info ({token} -> {email, hasAccount}) lets an invite-acceptance page pre-fill the email and show a login-vs-signup form without consuming the token; it 422s invalid_invite_token for any unknown/non-pending token, same as the accept routes. invite-accept-with-login's wrong-password and no-password-set branches now return 422 invalid_credentials instead of collapsing into invalid_invite_token — safe to reveal because reaching that branch already required a valid, open invite token plus the matching invitation email.",
+    "migration": "No action needed for apps using createAuthEmailPasswordFeature's default wiring via runProdApp/runDevApp — the new route only mounts when the host app's auth-routes config sets invite.infoHandler (runProdApp/runDevApp now do this automatically when the invite feature is enabled). A client that special-cased invite-accept-with-login's invalid_invite_token response to also mean \"wrong password\" should switch to matching invalid_credentials for that case."
+  },
   {
     "version": "0.320.0",
     "type": "fix",

package/src/auth-email-password/constants.ts

@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ export const AuthHandlers = {
 // signup page can decide whether to show its own link/form.
 export const AuthQueries = {
   signupRegistrationStatus: "auth-email-password:query:signup-registration-status",
+  // Anonymous, read-only invite lookup for the invite-acceptance page —
+  // see invite-info.query.ts. Does not consume the token.
+  inviteInfo: "auth-email-password:query:invite-info",
 } as const;
 
 // Error codes — kept intentionally generic so clients can't distinguish

package/src/auth-email-password/feature.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import {
   createInviteCreateHandler,
   type InviteCreateOptions,
 } from "./handlers/invite-create.write";
+import { inviteInfoQuery } from "./handlers/invite-info.query";
 import { createInviteSignupCompleteHandler } from "./handlers/invite-signup-complete.write";
 import { createLoginHandler, type LoginHandlerOptions } from "./handlers/login.write";
 import { logoutWrite } from "./handlers/logout.write";
@@ -233,6 +234,9 @@ export function createAuthEmailPasswordFeature(
       ...(opts.signup && {
         signupRegistrationStatus: r.queryHandler(selfRegistrationStatusQuery),
       }),
+      ...(opts.invite && {
+        inviteInfo: r.queryHandler(inviteInfoQuery),
+      }),
     };
 
     if (opts.signup) {

package/src/auth-email-password/handlers/invite-accept-with-login.write.ts

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ import {
   AUTH_LOCKOUT_DEFAULT_DURATION_MINUTES,
   AUTH_LOCKOUT_DEFAULT_MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS,
 } from "../constants";
-import { invalidInviteToken, inviteEmailMismatch } from "../errors";
+import { invalidCredentials, invalidInviteToken, inviteEmailMismatch } from "../errors";
 import {
   burnInviteToken,
   deleteInviteToken,
@@ -191,14 +191,13 @@ export function createInviteAcceptWithLoginHandler(opts: InviteAcceptWithLoginOp
           email: invitationEmail,
           isDeleted: false,
         });
-        if (!userRow?.passwordHash) return invalidInviteToken();
+        // No enumeration risk: reaching here already required a valid, open
+        // invite token plus the matching invitation email.
+        if (!userRow?.passwordHash) return invalidCredentials();
 
         const lockoutGate = await gateEnforceLockout(ctx, userRow.id);
         if (!lockoutGate.ok) return lockoutGate.result;
 
-        // Wrong password still collapses to invalidInviteToken (existing
-        // anti-enum contract for this endpoint) — gateVerifyPassword runs
-        // regardless, for its failed-attempt recording side effect.
         const passwordGate = await gateVerifyPassword(
           ctx,
           { id: userRow.id, passwordHash: userRow.passwordHash },
@@ -206,7 +205,7 @@ export function createInviteAcceptWithLoginHandler(opts: InviteAcceptWithLoginOp
           maxFailedAttempts,
           lockoutDurationMinutes,
         );
-        if (!passwordGate.ok) return invalidInviteToken();
+        if (!passwordGate.ok) return invalidCredentials();
 
         const emailGate = gateEnforceEmailVerified(userRow, strictVerification);
         if (!emailGate.ok) return emailGate.result;

package/src/auth-email-password/handlers/invite-info.query.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+// Tenant-Invite magic-link: anonymous, read-only lookup so the invite
+// acceptance page can pre-fill the email and choose between the
+// accept-with-login (Branch 2) and signup-complete (Branch 3) forms before
+// the user submits anything. Unlike the accept handlers, this never touches
+// the token store — the token is not burned and stays usable for the
+// actual accept call.
+
+import { fetchOne } from "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-framework/bun-db";
+import { defineQueryHandler } from "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-framework/engine";
+import { UnprocessableError } from "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-framework/errors";
+import * as z from "zod";
+import { decryptStoredPii } from "../../shared";
+// kumiko-lint-ignore cross-feature-import invite-flow lebt in auth-email-password (Magic-Link), DB-row-owner ist tenant-feature
+import { INVITATION_STATUS, tenantInvitationsTable } from "../../tenant/invitation-table";
+// kumiko-lint-ignore cross-feature-import login-style account lookup, same as invite-accept-with-login
+import { userTable } from "../../user/schema/user";
+import { AuthErrors } from "../constants";
+import { getInvitationIdForToken } from "../invite-token-store";
+
+const InviteInfoSchema = z.object({
+  token: z.string().min(1),
+});
+
+export type InviteInfoData = {
+  readonly email: string;
+  readonly hasAccount: boolean;
+};
+
+const READ_PENDING_INVITATION_REASON =
+  "reads the pending invitation by id for the anonymous invite-info lookup; the caller has no tenant context yet";
+
+// Every failure branch (unknown/expired token, non-pending invitation, no
+// redis) collapses onto the same invalidInviteToken code as the accept
+// handlers — anti-enumeration, same contract as invite-accept-with-login.
+function throwInvalidInviteToken(): never {
+  throw new UnprocessableError(AuthErrors.invalidInviteToken, {
+    i18nKey: "auth.errors.invalidInviteToken",
+  });
+}
+
+export const inviteInfoQuery = defineQueryHandler({
+  name: "invite-info",
+  schema: InviteInfoSchema,
+  access: { roles: ["anonymous"] },
+  rateLimit: { per: "ip+handler", limit: 20, windowSeconds: 60 },
+  agent: { expose: false },
+  escapeHatch: {
+    reason: READ_PENDING_INVITATION_REASON,
+  },
+  description:
+    "Anonymous, read-only invite lookup for the invite-acceptance page: reveals the invited " +
+    "email and whether an account already exists for it, without consuming the token.",
+  handler: async (query, ctx) => {
+    if (!ctx.redis) throwInvalidInviteToken();
+
+    const invitationId = await getInvitationIdForToken(ctx.redis, query.payload.token);
+    if (!invitationId) throwInvalidInviteToken();
+
+    type InvitationRow = {
+      readonly status: string;
+      readonly email: string;
+    };
+    type UserRow = {
+      readonly id: string;
+    };
+
+    const invitation = await fetchOne<InvitationRow>(
+      ctx.db.unsafeRaw(READ_PENDING_INVITATION_REASON),
+      tenantInvitationsTable,
+      { id: invitationId },
+    );
+    if (!invitation || invitation.status !== INVITATION_STATUS.pending) {
+      throwInvalidInviteToken();
+    }
+
+    const invitationEmail = await decryptStoredPii(invitation.email, "email", "auth:invite-info");
+
+    const userRow = await ctx.db.global(userTable).fetchOne<UserRow>({
+      email: invitationEmail,
+      isDeleted: false,
+    });
+
+    const data: InviteInfoData = {
+      email: invitationEmail,
+      hasAccount: userRow !== undefined,
+    };
+    return data;
+  },
+});