@cosmicdrift/kumiko-bundled-features 0.286.0 → 0.288.0

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Files changed (28) hide show
  1. package/package.json +12 -9
  2. package/src/auth-email-password/signed-token.ts +4 -86
  3. package/src/billing-foundation/__tests__/subscription-tier-sync.integration.test.ts +186 -0
  4. package/src/billing-foundation/changes.json +6 -0
  5. package/src/billing-foundation/subscription-tier-sync.ts +9 -4
  6. package/src/derivatives-sharp/__tests__/render.test.ts +246 -1
  7. package/src/derivatives-sharp/changes.json +8 -1
  8. package/src/derivatives-sharp/render.ts +172 -5
  9. package/src/file-derivatives/__tests__/public-variant-route.integration.test.ts +15 -1
  10. package/src/file-derivatives/changes.json +6 -0
  11. package/src/file-derivatives/feature.ts +9 -1
  12. package/src/shared/__tests__/row-bound-grant.integration.test.ts +184 -0
  13. package/src/shared/changes.json +8 -1
  14. package/src/shared/index.ts +12 -0
  15. package/src/shared/row-bound-grant.test.ts +294 -0
  16. package/src/shared/row-bound-grant.ts +115 -0
  17. package/src/{auth-email-password/__tests__ → shared}/signed-token.test.ts +1 -1
  18. package/src/shared/signed-token.ts +101 -0
  19. package/src/tenant/seeding.ts +4 -0
  20. package/src/user-data-rights/__tests__/deletion-token-compat.test.ts +35 -0
  21. package/src/user-data-rights/__tests__/run-export-jobs.integration.test.ts +90 -1
  22. package/src/user-data-rights/changes.json +12 -0
  23. package/src/user-data-rights/deletion-token.ts +41 -47
  24. package/src/user-data-rights/feature.ts +27 -0
  25. package/src/user-data-rights/handlers/confirm-deletion-by-token.write.ts +10 -20
  26. package/src/user-data-rights/run-export-jobs.ts +69 -1
  27. package/src/user-data-rights-defaults/__tests__/user-data-rights-defaults.integration.test.ts +198 -1
  28. package/src/user-data-rights-defaults/hooks/file-ref.userdata-hook.ts +76 -6
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ import { createEventStoreExecutor, type TenantDb } from "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-fra
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  import { derivativeListPrefix, isDerivativeKeyOf } from "@cosmicdrift/kumiko-framework/derivatives";
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  import {
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  createSystemUser,
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+ type FieldDefinition,
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+ type Registry,
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  type SessionUser,
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  type UserDataDeleteHook,
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  type UserDataExportHook,
@@ -28,10 +30,18 @@ const crud = createEventStoreExecutor(fileRefsTable, fileRefEntity, { entityName
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  // NICHT direkt — sie werden via signed-Download-URLs separat ins ZIP
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  // gepackt (S2.U3 Export-Job-Pipeline orchestriert das).
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  //
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- // Delete-Hook entfernt FileRef-Zeile + Binary:
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- // "delete": storageProvider.delete() pro File + Row hard-delete
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- // "anonymize": insertedById=null, Row + binary bleiben (FK-Refs
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- // koennen weiter zeigen; Personenbezug raus)
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+ // Delete-hook removes the fileRef row + binary:
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+ // "delete": storageProvider.delete() per file + row hard-delete — but
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+ // ONLY for rows whose field is marked as PII of the person
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+ // (isPersonalFileRow, #3005). All other rows (business/
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+ // tenant data, no resolvable field, no annotation) go
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+ // through severPersonLink instead, even when the entity
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+ // strategy is "delete" — the uploader axis (insertedById) is
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+ // not the subject axis.
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+ // "anonymize": insertedById=null, row + binary survive (FK refs can still
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+ // point at it; person-link removed) — applies to ALL rows
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+ // when the entity strategy itself is already anonymize (e.g.
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+ // blockDelete retention), regardless of the field.
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  //
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  // **Provider-Resolution:** der Provider kommt zur Lauf-Zeit aus
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  // `ctx.buildStorageProvider(ctx.tenantId)` — der Forget-Orchestrator
@@ -124,6 +134,46 @@ async function resolveProvider(ctx: UserDataHookCtx): Promise<UserDataStoragePro
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  }
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  }
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+ // Per-row Art.17 decision (kumiko-framework#3005): whether THIS file's field
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+ // carries personal data of the forgotten person, or is business/tenant data
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+ // that merely loses its uploader-attribution. insertedById names who
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+ // UPLOADED the file, not whose data it is — a dealer's vehicle photo
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+ // uploaded by an employee is the dealer's business data, not the employee's
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+ // PII. The field's own personal-annotation decides:
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+ // - pii / userOwned / recordOwned → the field's content IS personal data
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+ // of a person (self, owner-referenced, or the record's own subject) →
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+ // hard-delete path.
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+ // - anything else (explicit `personal: false`, `tenantOwned`,
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+ // `subjectRef`, or no annotation at all) → not personal-to-a-person
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+ // content → sever the uploader link only, keep row + binary.
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+ function isPersonalPiiField(field: FieldDefinition | undefined): boolean {
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+ if (!field) return false;
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+ return (
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+ ("pii" in field && field.pii === true) ||
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+ ("userOwned" in field && field.userOwned !== undefined) ||
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+ ("recordOwned" in field && field.recordOwned === true)
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+ );
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+ }
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+
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+ // Three cases the field-lookup itself can't resolve (issue #3005's rule for
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+ // the non-resolvable cases):
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+ // 1. Unattached upload (entityType/fieldName both null) → hard-delete: a
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+ // file with no entity binding belongs to nobody but its uploader.
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+ // 2. Field exists but carries no PII annotation → anonymize (the
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+ // conservative path); the boot-validator warns on a PII-typical field
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+ // name so this stays visible and quiet-fixable via `personal`.
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+ // 3. Entity or field not resolvable (upload hardening in file-routes.ts
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+ // should prevent this from ever being written; theoretical remainder
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+ // only) → anonymize, never a silent hard-delete.
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+ function isPersonalFileRow(registry: Registry, row: Record<string, unknown>): boolean {
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+ const entityType = row["entityType"]; // @cast-boundary db-row
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+ const fieldName = row["fieldName"]; // @cast-boundary db-row
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+ if (entityType === null && fieldName === null) return true;
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+ if (typeof entityType !== "string" || typeof fieldName !== "string") return false;
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+ const fieldDef = registry.getEntity(entityType)?.fields[fieldName];
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+ return isPersonalPiiField(fieldDef);
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+ }
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+
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  // Derivatives (thumbnails/resized variants — see derivatives-context.ts) are
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  // never tracked anywhere but the storage layer: they're rendered under a
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  // deterministic key (deriveKey + variantSuffix) computed from the original's
@@ -221,14 +271,34 @@ export const fileRefDeleteHook: UserDataDeleteHook = async (ctx, strategy) => {
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  if (strategy !== "delete") {
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  // anonymize: insertedById=null, FileRef + binary bleiben. Use-case: shared
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  // chat-Attachment im Multi-User-Channel — Author-ID raus, Datei bleibt sichtbar.
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+ // Applies to ALL rows — the entity strategy comes from a retention
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+ // policy (e.g. blockDelete) and overrides the per-field decision below,
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+ // which only applies for strategy="delete".
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  await severPersonLink(ctx.db, systemUser, rows);
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  // skip: anonymize is complete — the hard-delete path below runs only for strategy "delete".
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  return;
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  }
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+ // strategy="delete" decides PER ROW based on the field, not uniformly
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+ // (#3005): only rows whose field is marked as PII of the person (or
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+ // unattached, see isPersonalFileRow) take the hard path. Everything else
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+ // only loses the uploader link.
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+ const personalRows: Record<string, unknown>[] = [];
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+ const businessRows: Record<string, unknown>[] = [];
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+ for (const row of rows) {
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+ (isPersonalFileRow(ctx.registry, row) ? personalRows : businessRows).push(row);
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+ }
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+
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+ if (businessRows.length > 0) {
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+ await severPersonLink(ctx.db, systemUser, businessRows);
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+ }
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+
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+ // skip: nothing left to hard-delete — businessRows above already had their person link severed via severPersonLink.
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+ if (personalRows.length === 0) return;
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+
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  const storageProvider = await resolveProvider(ctx);
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  if (storageProvider) {
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- const failedKeys = await deleteBinaries(rows, storageProvider);
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+ const failedKeys = await deleteBinaries(personalRows, storageProvider);
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  if (failedKeys.length > 0) {
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  throw new Error(
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  `[user-data-rights-defaults:fileRef] ${failedKeys.length} binary delete(s) failed — aborting forget so the rows are retried next run (keys: ${failedKeys.join(", ")})`,
@@ -250,7 +320,7 @@ export const fileRefDeleteHook: UserDataDeleteHook = async (ctx, strategy) => {
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  // auto-verb, the erasure replays on rebuild (created → forgotten → row gone).
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  // The old hard deleteMany was resurrected on rebuild; this closes that Art.17
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  // hole without a direct write.
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- for (const row of rows) {
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+ for (const row of personalRows) {
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  const id = row["id"]; // @cast-boundary db-row
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  if (typeof id !== "string") continue;
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  assertErased(await crud.forget({ id }, systemUser, ctx.db), "fileRef", id);