@cortexkit/opencode-openai-auth 1.0.5 → 1.1.0

package/src/tui-compiled/raw/shared/0f77ebc3c914c9c6-custody.js

@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
+import { ClaustrumCredentialError, } from "@cortexkit/claustrum-client";
+import { createLogger } from "./cc9e0702a752cea7-index.js";
+import { readClaustrumEnrollmentToken } from "./b9588ad4725c1d10-enrollment.js";
+import { ClaustrumConsumerError } from "./ca0fccaba1d87af4-errors.js";
+import { CUSTODY_PLACEHOLDER_PREFIX } from "./d9d2892a4c371301-host-slot.js";
+/** Only a new version of the same account may replace an in-flight 401. */
+export function isScopedCredentialRotation(served, current) {
+    return (current !== undefined &&
+        current.credentialId === served.credentialId &&
+        current.accountIdentity === served.accountIdentity &&
+        current.recordVersion !== served.recordVersion);
+}
+function scopedRetryReason(served, current) {
+    if (current === undefined)
+        return 'reauthorize-failed';
+    if (current.credentialId !== served.credentialId)
+        return 'credential-changed';
+    if (current.accountIdentity !== served.accountIdentity)
+        return 'account-changed';
+    if (current.recordVersion === served.recordVersion)
+        return 'version-unchanged';
+    return 'rotated';
+}
+const defaultLogger = createLogger('claustrum');
+/**
+ * Decide whether a request that got a 401 should retry with the freshly
+ * re-authorized receipt, and log the decision. The vault can refresh a
+ * credential between the send and the 401; the log line lets that refresh be
+ * matched against the consumer's retry. `site` names the kind of request.
+ */
+export function decideScopedRetryAfter401(site, served, current, logger = defaultLogger) {
+    const retry = isScopedCredentialRotation(served, current);
+    logger.debug('scoped 401 re-authorized', {
+        site,
+        credentialId: served.credentialId,
+        servedVersion: served.recordVersion,
+        currentVersion: current?.recordVersion ?? null,
+        retry,
+        reason: scopedRetryReason(served, current),
+    });
+    return retry;
+}
+/**
+ * How long a served OAuth token must stay valid after the vault hands it out,
+ * so it cannot expire while a long request is still using it.
+ */
+export const SERVING_MARGIN_MS = 300_000;
+function invalidMaterial() {
+    return new ClaustrumConsumerError('invalid-material', 'Claustrum returned invalid credential material');
+}
+function accessTokenFromMaterial(material) {
+    let access = material.trim();
+    if (access.startsWith('{')) {
+        let parsed;
+        try {
+            parsed = JSON.parse(access);
+        }
+        catch {
+            throw invalidMaterial();
+        }
+        if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object')
+            throw invalidMaterial();
+        const record = parsed;
+        const value = record.access_token ?? record.access;
+        access = typeof value === 'string' ? value : '';
+    }
+    // A header-safe token only: control characters could split the request,
+    // and the custody placeholder must never be sent as a credential.
+    if (!/^[\x21-\x7e]+$/.test(access) ||
+        access.startsWith(CUSTODY_PLACEHOLDER_PREFIX)) {
+        throw invalidMaterial();
+    }
+    return access;
+}
+function credentialTypeOf(row, family) {
+    if (!row.operations.includes('read'))
+        return undefined;
+    if (!row.categories.includes(family.category))
+        return undefined;
+    if (row.credentialType === 'oauth')
+        return row.refreshAdapter === family.refreshAdapter ? 'oauth' : undefined;
+    if (row.credentialType === 'api_key' && family.apiKeys)
+        return row.refreshAdapter === undefined ? 'api_key' : undefined;
+    return undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * Reads this consumer's vault credentials (list, fetch, 401 report), with the
+ * enrollment token as authorization. Used by every host of a plugin. There is
+ * deliberately no credential cache and no single-flight of credential reads:
+ * each physical send is authorized by the vault, so a revoked enrollment or a
+ * changed record takes effect on the next send. The enrollment token is
+ * re-read per operation so an operator's reissue on disk is picked up.
+ */
+export class ClaustrumScopedCustody {
+    #client;
+    #readToken;
+    #now;
+    #family;
+    #parseIdentity;
+    #requireAssertion;
+    #logger;
+    #provenance = new WeakMap();
+    #reports = new WeakMap();
+    #closed = false;
+    constructor(options) {
+        const tokenPath = options.tokenPath;
+        if (options.readToken) {
+            this.#readToken = options.readToken;
+        }
+        else if (tokenPath) {
+            this.#readToken = () => readClaustrumEnrollmentToken(tokenPath);
+        }
+        else {
+            throw new ClaustrumConsumerError('not-enrolled', 'Claustrum enrollment token path is required');
+        }
+        this.#client = options.client;
+        this.#family = options.family;
+        this.#parseIdentity = options.parseIdentity;
+        this.#requireAssertion = options.requireAssertion ?? false;
+        this.#now = options.now ?? Date.now;
+        this.#logger = options.logger ?? defaultLogger;
+    }
+    #check(signal) {
+        if (this.#closed)
+            throw new ClaustrumConsumerError('closed', 'Claustrum scoped custody is closed');
+        signal?.throwIfAborted();
+    }
+    async #token(signal) {
+        this.#check(signal);
+        const value = await this.#readToken();
+        this.#check(signal);
+        if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(value.token) ||
+            !Number.isSafeInteger(value.token_generation) ||
+            value.token_generation < 1) {
+            throw new ClaustrumConsumerError('invalid-token', 'Invalid Claustrum enrollment token');
+        }
+        return value.token;
+    }
+    async #call(operation, signal) {
+        this.#check(signal);
+        let result;
+        let removeAbortListener;
+        try {
+            const pending = operation();
+            result = signal
+                ? await Promise.race([
+                    pending,
+                    new Promise((_resolve, reject) => {
+                        const abort = () => reject(signal.reason);
+                        signal.addEventListener('abort', abort, { once: true });
+                        removeAbortListener = () => signal.removeEventListener('abort', abort);
+                        if (signal.aborted)
+                            abort();
+                    }),
+                ])
+                : await pending;
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            this.#check(signal);
+            // Keep the vault's own refusals (ClaustrumCredentialError, carrying
+            // code, class and action); replace any other error, whose text may echo
+            // request params that include the enrollment token.
+            if (error instanceof ClaustrumCredentialError)
+                throw error;
+            throw new ClaustrumConsumerError('unavailable', 'Claustrum scoped operation unavailable');
+        }
+        finally {
+            removeAbortListener?.();
+        }
+        this.#check(signal);
+        return result;
+    }
+    /**
+     * List this consumer's credentials. A record that cannot be used is skipped
+     * and warned about rather than failing the whole list, so one bad record
+     * never hides every other account. Records outside the family are not
+     * skipped records: they simply are not this consumer's.
+     */
+    async discover(signal) {
+        const token = await this.#token(signal);
+        const inventory = await this.#call(() => this.#client.listScoped(token), signal);
+        const skipped = [];
+        const candidates = [];
+        const counts = new Map();
+        for (const row of inventory.rows) {
+            const type = credentialTypeOf(row, this.#family);
+            if (!type)
+                continue;
+            candidates.push({ row, type });
+            counts.set(row.id, (counts.get(row.id) ?? 0) + 1);
+        }
+        const credentials = [];
+        for (const { row, type } of candidates) {
+            let reason;
+            if (!row.id.trim())
+                reason = 'empty credential id';
+            else if ((counts.get(row.id) ?? 0) > 1)
+                reason = 'duplicate credential id';
+            else if (row.accountId !== undefined && !row.accountId.trim())
+                reason = 'blank account identity';
+            else if (!row.state.trim())
+                reason = 'empty state';
+            if (reason) {
+                skipped.push({ ...(row.id.trim() && { credentialId: row.id }), reason });
+                continue;
+            }
+            credentials.push(Object.freeze({
+                credentialId: row.id,
+                credentialType: type,
+                ...(row.accountId !== undefined && {
+                    accountIdentity: row.accountId,
+                }),
+                state: row.state,
+                ...(row.email !== undefined && { email: row.email }),
+                ...(row.orgName !== undefined && { orgName: row.orgName }),
+            }));
+        }
+        for (const record of skipped)
+            this.#logger.warn('skipped malformed vault record', record);
+        return {
+            view: inventory.view,
+            credentials: Object.freeze(credentials),
+            skipped: Object.freeze(skipped),
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Fetch the credential for one physical send and wrap it in a fresh receipt.
+     * The vault's served identity (or, without one, the plugin's parse of the
+     * token) must equal the roster's when both are present. Without
+     * `requireAssertion`, absence on either side proves nothing and does not
+     * refuse; the receipt records what the vault asserted separately from what
+     * the roster expected. With it, a reply that does not itself name the
+     * credential id and the expected account is refused.
+     */
+    async authorize(identity, signal) {
+        if (!identity.credentialId)
+            throw new ClaustrumConsumerError('route-unavailable', 'Claustrum dispatch requires a credential id');
+        // Capture the caller's fields before yielding so a later mutation cannot move the fence.
+        const { credentialId, credentialType, accountIdentity } = identity;
+        if (this.#requireAssertion && accountIdentity === undefined)
+            throw new ClaustrumConsumerError('identity-unasserted', 'Claustrum dispatch requires a known account identity');
+        const token = await this.#token(signal);
+        const served = await this.#call(() => this.#client.getScoped({
+            credentialId,
+            enrollmentToken: token,
+            ...(credentialType === 'oauth' && { minTtlMs: SERVING_MARGIN_MS }),
+        }), signal);
+        if (served.credentialId !== undefined &&
+            served.credentialId !== credentialId) {
+            throw new ClaustrumConsumerError('identity-changed', 'Claustrum served credential identity changed');
+        }
+        const expiresAtMs = served.expiresAtMs;
+        if (!Number.isSafeInteger(served.recordVersion) ||
+            served.recordVersion < 0 ||
+            (expiresAtMs === null && credentialType === 'oauth') ||
+            (expiresAtMs !== null &&
+                (!Number.isFinite(expiresAtMs) ||
+                    expiresAtMs - this.#now() < SERVING_MARGIN_MS))) {
+            throw new ClaustrumConsumerError('insufficient-validity', 'Claustrum served credential has insufficient validity');
+        }
+        const accessToken = accessTokenFromMaterial(served.material);
+        const assertedIdentity = served.accountId?.trim()
+            ? served.accountId
+            : undefined;
+        if (this.#requireAssertion &&
+            (served.credentialId === undefined || assertedIdentity === undefined))
+            throw new ClaustrumConsumerError('identity-unasserted', 'Claustrum served credential did not assert its identity');
+        const parsedIdentity = assertedIdentity === undefined
+            ? this.#parseIdentity?.(accessToken)
+            : undefined;
+        const servedIdentity = assertedIdentity ?? parsedIdentity;
+        if (accountIdentity !== undefined &&
+            servedIdentity !== undefined &&
+            servedIdentity !== accountIdentity) {
+            throw new ClaustrumConsumerError('identity-changed', 'Claustrum served credential identity changed');
+        }
+        const resolvedIdentity = servedIdentity ?? accountIdentity;
+        const source = assertedIdentity !== undefined
+            ? 'asserted'
+            : parsedIdentity !== undefined
+                ? 'parsed'
+                : accountIdentity !== undefined
+                    ? 'expected'
+                    : 'none';
+        const attempt = Object.freeze(Object.defineProperty({
+            credentialId,
+            credentialType,
+            ...(resolvedIdentity !== undefined && {
+                accountIdentity: resolvedIdentity,
+            }),
+            accountIdentitySource: source,
+            ...(accountIdentity !== undefined && {
+                expectedAccountIdentity: accountIdentity,
+            }),
+            ...(served.credentialId !== undefined && {
+                assertedCredentialId: served.credentialId,
+            }),
+            ...(assertedIdentity !== undefined && {
+                assertedAccountIdentity: assertedIdentity,
+            }),
+            ...(served.projectId !== undefined && {
+                projectId: served.projectId,
+            }),
+            recordVersion: served.recordVersion,
+            expiresAtMs,
+        }, 'accessToken', { value: accessToken, enumerable: false }));
+        this.#provenance.set(attempt, token);
+        return attempt;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Report that a send this consumer actually made was rejected. Only a 401
+     * is reported (the vault refuses 429, 402 and 5xx reports), addressed by
+     * credential id with the exact record version that send was served, and
+     * signed with the enrollment token that authorized it. A receipt this
+     * custody did not issue is refused rather than reported.
+     */
+    async reportFailure(attempt, status, reporterSource) {
+        if (status !== 401)
+            return;
+        this.#check();
+        const token = this.#provenance.get(attempt);
+        if (!token)
+            throw new ClaustrumConsumerError('no-receipt', 'Claustrum failure report requires an original dispatch receipt');
+        const pending = this.#reports.get(attempt);
+        if (pending)
+            return pending;
+        const report = this.#call(() => this.#client.reportAuthFailureScoped({
+            credentialId: attempt.credentialId,
+            enrollmentToken: token,
+            providerStatus: 401,
+            recordVersion: attempt.recordVersion,
+            reporterSource,
+        }));
+        this.#reports.set(attempt, report);
+        try {
+            await report;
+            this.#logger.debug('scoped 401 reported', {
+                credentialId: attempt.credentialId,
+                recordVersion: attempt.recordVersion,
+                reporterSource,
+            });
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            this.#reports.delete(attempt);
+            throw error;
+        }
+    }
+    close() {
+        if (this.#closed)
+            return;
+        this.#closed = true;
+        this.#client.close();
+    }
+}

package/src/tui-compiled/raw/shared/134b008900698fe0-backoff.js

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+export const NON_TRANSIENT_REFRESH_RETRY_DELAY_MS = 86400000;
+const MIN_REFRESH_RETRY_DELAY_MS = 300000, MAX_REFRESH_RETRY_DELAY_MS = 3600000, MIN_QUOTA_RETRY_DELAY_MS = 60000, MAX_QUOTA_RETRY_DELAY_MS = 900000, NON_TRANSIENT_QUOTA_RETRY_DELAY_MS = 300000;
+function formatErrorMessage(error) {
+  return error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+}
+export function isTransientRefreshError(error) {
+  const status = error?.status;
+  if (typeof status === "number")
+    return status === 429 || status >= 500;
+  if (!(error instanceof Error))
+    return !1;
+  return error.name === "AbortError" || error.name === "TimeoutError" || error.message.includes("fetch failed") || "code" in error && (error.code === "ECONNRESET" || error.code === "ECONNREFUSED" || error.code === "ETIMEDOUT" || error.code === "UND_ERR_CONNECT_TIMEOUT");
+}
+export function isTransientQuotaError(error) {
+  const message = formatErrorMessage(error), status = error?.status;
+  if (typeof status === "number")
+    return status === 429 || status >= 500;
+  if (!(error instanceof Error))
+    return !1;
+  const code = error.code;
+  return error.name === "AbortError" || error.name === "TimeoutError" || message.includes("fetch failed") || code === "ECONNRESET" || code === "ECONNREFUSED" || code === "ETIMEDOUT" || code === "UND_ERR_CONNECT_TIMEOUT";
+}
+export function hashRefreshToken(refreshToken) {
+  return createHash("sha256").update(refreshToken).digest("hex");
+}
+export function buildRefreshOperationError(input) {
+  const tokenHash = hashRefreshToken(input.refreshToken), retryCount = (input.previous?.tokenHash === tokenHash ? input.previous.retryCount ?? 0 : 0) + 1;
+  let delay;
+  const retryAfter = input.error?.retryAfter;
+  if (typeof retryAfter === "number" && retryAfter > 0)
+    delay = retryAfter * 1000;
+  else if (isTransientRefreshError(input.error))
+    delay = Math.min(MAX_REFRESH_RETRY_DELAY_MS, MIN_REFRESH_RETRY_DELAY_MS * 2 ** Math.min(retryCount - 1, 6));
+  else
+    delay = NON_TRANSIENT_REFRESH_RETRY_DELAY_MS;
+  return {
+    message: formatErrorMessage(input.error),
+    checkedAt: input.now,
+    nextRetryAt: input.now + delay,
+    retryCount,
+    tokenHash
+  };
+}
+export function refreshBackoffActive(error, refreshToken, now) {
+  if (!error?.nextRetryAt || error.nextRetryAt <= now)
+    return !1;
+  if (!refreshToken)
+    return !0;
+  return error.tokenHash === hashRefreshToken(refreshToken);
+}
+export function formatRefreshBackoffMessage(error, now) {
+  return `Codex OAuth refresh is backed off for ${Math.max(1, Math.ceil(((error.nextRetryAt ?? now) - now) / 1000))}s after: ${error.message}`;
+}
+export function buildQuotaOperationError(input) {
+  const retryCount = (input.previous?.retryCount ?? 0) + 1;
+  let delay;
+  const retryAfter = input.error?.retryAfter;
+  if (typeof retryAfter === "number" && retryAfter > 0)
+    delay = retryAfter * 1000;
+  else if (isTransientQuotaError(input.error))
+    delay = Math.min(MAX_QUOTA_RETRY_DELAY_MS, MIN_QUOTA_RETRY_DELAY_MS * 2 ** Math.min(retryCount - 1, 6));
+  else
+    delay = NON_TRANSIENT_QUOTA_RETRY_DELAY_MS;
+  return {
+    message: formatErrorMessage(input.error),
+    checkedAt: input.now,
+    nextRetryAt: input.now + delay,
+    retryCount
+  };
+}
+export function quotaBackoffActive(error, now) {
+  if (!error?.nextRetryAt || error.nextRetryAt <= now)
+    return !1;
+  return !0;
+}
+export function formatQuotaBackoffMessage(error, now) {
+  return `Quota API backed off for ${Math.max(1, Math.ceil(((error.nextRetryAt ?? now) - now) / 1000))}s after: ${error.message}`;
+}
+export function parseRetryAfter(value) {
+  if (!value)
+    return;
+  const seconds = Number(value);
+  if (Number.isFinite(seconds) && seconds > 0)
+    return Math.ceil(seconds);
+  const date = Date.parse(value);
+  if (Number.isFinite(date)) {
+    const delta = Math.ceil((date - Date.now()) / 1000);
+    return delta > 0 ? delta : void 0;
+  }
+  return;
+}