@corenel/mcp 0.1.0

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Files changed (74) hide show
  1. package/LICENSE +93 -0
  2. package/dist/asAgentTools.d.ts +12 -0
  3. package/dist/asAgentTools.d.ts.map +1 -0
  4. package/dist/asAgentTools.js +71 -0
  5. package/dist/asAgentTools.js.map +1 -0
  6. package/dist/auth.d.ts +25 -0
  7. package/dist/auth.d.ts.map +1 -0
  8. package/dist/auth.js +97 -0
  9. package/dist/auth.js.map +1 -0
  10. package/dist/cache.d.ts +17 -0
  11. package/dist/cache.d.ts.map +1 -0
  12. package/dist/cache.js +81 -0
  13. package/dist/cache.js.map +1 -0
  14. package/dist/config.d.ts +71 -0
  15. package/dist/config.d.ts.map +1 -0
  16. package/dist/config.js +239 -0
  17. package/dist/config.js.map +1 -0
  18. package/dist/gatedAgentTools.d.ts +12 -0
  19. package/dist/gatedAgentTools.d.ts.map +1 -0
  20. package/dist/gatedAgentTools.js +36 -0
  21. package/dist/gatedAgentTools.js.map +1 -0
  22. package/dist/httpClient.d.ts +47 -0
  23. package/dist/httpClient.d.ts.map +1 -0
  24. package/dist/httpClient.js +196 -0
  25. package/dist/httpClient.js.map +1 -0
  26. package/dist/index.d.ts +15 -0
  27. package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
  28. package/dist/index.js +9 -0
  29. package/dist/index.js.map +1 -0
  30. package/dist/oauth/discovery.d.ts +55 -0
  31. package/dist/oauth/discovery.d.ts.map +1 -0
  32. package/dist/oauth/discovery.js +211 -0
  33. package/dist/oauth/discovery.js.map +1 -0
  34. package/dist/oauth/login.d.ts +41 -0
  35. package/dist/oauth/login.d.ts.map +1 -0
  36. package/dist/oauth/login.js +206 -0
  37. package/dist/oauth/login.js.map +1 -0
  38. package/dist/oauth/loopback.d.ts +58 -0
  39. package/dist/oauth/loopback.d.ts.map +1 -0
  40. package/dist/oauth/loopback.js +165 -0
  41. package/dist/oauth/loopback.js.map +1 -0
  42. package/dist/oauth/pkce.d.ts +45 -0
  43. package/dist/oauth/pkce.d.ts.map +1 -0
  44. package/dist/oauth/pkce.js +67 -0
  45. package/dist/oauth/pkce.js.map +1 -0
  46. package/dist/oauth/register.d.ts +34 -0
  47. package/dist/oauth/register.d.ts.map +1 -0
  48. package/dist/oauth/register.js +57 -0
  49. package/dist/oauth/register.js.map +1 -0
  50. package/dist/oauth/tokens.d.ts +62 -0
  51. package/dist/oauth/tokens.d.ts.map +1 -0
  52. package/dist/oauth/tokens.js +118 -0
  53. package/dist/oauth/tokens.js.map +1 -0
  54. package/dist/policy.d.ts +10 -0
  55. package/dist/policy.d.ts.map +1 -0
  56. package/dist/policy.js +71 -0
  57. package/dist/policy.js.map +1 -0
  58. package/dist/registry.d.ts +124 -0
  59. package/dist/registry.d.ts.map +1 -0
  60. package/dist/registry.js +265 -0
  61. package/dist/registry.js.map +1 -0
  62. package/dist/timedFetch.d.ts +10 -0
  63. package/dist/timedFetch.d.ts.map +1 -0
  64. package/dist/timedFetch.js +39 -0
  65. package/dist/timedFetch.js.map +1 -0
  66. package/dist/toolNames.d.ts +2 -0
  67. package/dist/toolNames.d.ts.map +1 -0
  68. package/dist/toolNames.js +14 -0
  69. package/dist/toolNames.js.map +1 -0
  70. package/dist/types.d.ts +62 -0
  71. package/dist/types.d.ts.map +1 -0
  72. package/dist/types.js +19 -0
  73. package/dist/types.js.map +1 -0
  74. package/package.json +44 -0
package/dist/oauth/loopback.js ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
1
+ /* THE LOOPBACK REDIRECT LISTENER -- the one-shot HTTP server that catches an
2
+ * OAuth authorization code on 127.0.0.1 and nowhere else.
3
+ *
4
+ * Mirrors the shape of auth/login.ts's `awaitCallback` (the sidecar's OWN
5
+ * sign-in flow already solved this problem once) but narrower on purpose:
6
+ * this module answers only "wait for one redirect, checking state, then
7
+ * stop". Picking a port, building the authorization URL and opening a
8
+ * browser are the login command's job (config/mcpCmd.ts), not this module's.
9
+ *
10
+ * THREE SECURITY PROPERTIES THIS FILE OWNS -- losing any one of them is a
11
+ * real vulnerability, not a style nit:
12
+ *
13
+ * 1. Binds 127.0.0.1 ONLY, never 0.0.0.0. A device elsewhere on the LAN
14
+ * (or another user on a shared machine, on some platforms) must not be
15
+ * able to deliver a code to this listener.
16
+ * 2. `state` is checked BEFORE the code is even read out of the redirect --
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+ * a mismatched state means this request did not come from the browser
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+ * flow that started this login, and its code must never be exchanged.
19
+ * 3. The server closes after exactly one redirect, whatever the outcome.
20
+ * It never sits open waiting for a second attempt.
21
+ */
22
+ import { createServer } from 'node:http';
23
+ const PAGE_OK = `<!doctype html><meta charset="utf-8"><title>Signed in</title>
24
+ <body style="font:16px system-ui;padding:3rem;text-align:center">
25
+ <h1>Signed in</h1><p>You can close this tab and return to your terminal.</p></body>`;
26
+ const PAGE_FAIL = `<!doctype html><meta charset="utf-8"><title>Sign-in failed</title>
27
+ <body style="font:16px system-ui;padding:3rem;text-align:center">
28
+ <h1>Sign-in failed</h1><p>Return to your terminal for details.</p></body>`;
29
+ /** Five minutes -- long enough to sign in and clear an MFA challenge, short
30
+ * enough that a forgotten terminal does not hold a port open all day. */
31
+ const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
32
+ /**
33
+ * Listen on 127.0.0.1:`port` for exactly one OAuth redirect, and resolve
34
+ * with its authorization code -- or reject. Either way the listener closes
35
+ * before the returned promise settles.
36
+ *
37
+ * `expectedState` must equal the redirect's `state` query parameter or the
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+ * request is refused and the promise rejects, with the `code` parameter
39
+ * never read into a variable that could be exchanged. Without this check the
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+ * listener would accept a code from anyone who can reach the port, which on
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+ * a shared machine is everyone with a login shell.
42
+ */
43
+ export function awaitRedirect(port, expectedState, opts = {}) {
44
+ const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS;
45
+ return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
46
+ let settled = false;
47
+ /* Declared up here because `finish` closes it. See the listen call below for
48
+ * why there are two servers. */
49
+ const v6 = createServer((req, res) => onRequest(req, res));
50
+ const finish = (fn) => {
51
+ if (settled)
52
+ return;
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+ settled = true;
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+ clearTimeout(timer);
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+ // Stop listening after exactly one redirect, success or failure -- this
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+ // server exists for one exchange and must never wait around for a
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+ // second code. Both loopback listeners close: whichever one the browser
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+ // reached, the other is still holding the port.
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+ server.close();
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+ v6.close();
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+ fn();
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+ };
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+ const onRequest = (req, res) => {
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+ const url = new URL(req.url ?? '/', 'http://127.0.0.1');
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+ const state = url.searchParams.get('state');
66
+ const err = url.searchParams.get('error');
67
+ const code = url.searchParams.get('code');
68
+ // State check FIRST, before the code is even looked at.
69
+ if (state !== expectedState) {
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+ res.writeHead(400, { 'content-type': 'text/html' }).end(PAGE_FAIL);
71
+ finish(() => reject(new Error('redirect state did not match the request that started this sign-in')));
72
+ return;
73
+ }
74
+ if (err) {
75
+ res.writeHead(400, { 'content-type': 'text/html' }).end(PAGE_FAIL);
76
+ finish(() => reject(new Error(`authorization failed: ${err}`)));
77
+ return;
78
+ }
79
+ if (!code) {
80
+ res.writeHead(400, { 'content-type': 'text/html' }).end(PAGE_FAIL);
81
+ finish(() => reject(new Error('redirect carried no authorization code')));
82
+ return;
83
+ }
84
+ res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/html' }).end(PAGE_OK);
85
+ finish(() => resolve({ code }));
86
+ };
87
+ const server = createServer(onRequest);
88
+ const timer = setTimeout(() => {
89
+ finish(() => reject(new Error('timed out waiting for the browser redirect')));
90
+ }, timeoutMs);
91
+ timer.unref?.();
92
+ server.once('error', (e) => {
93
+ finish(() => reject(e instanceof Error ? e : new Error(String(e))));
94
+ });
95
+ if (opts.signal) {
96
+ if (opts.signal.aborted) {
97
+ finish(() => reject(new Error('sign-in cancelled')));
98
+ }
99
+ else {
100
+ opts.signal.addEventListener('abort', () => finish(() => reject(new Error('sign-in cancelled'))), { once: true });
101
+ }
102
+ }
103
+ /* BOTH LOOPBACK ADDRESSES, because the redirect now names `localhost` and
104
+ * the browser decides what that resolves to. On Windows it commonly tries
105
+ * ::1 first; binding only 127.0.0.1 would leave the callback failing on
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+ * exactly the machines this is most used on. Two servers on one port is
107
+ * legal because they hold different addresses, and both are loopback -- the
108
+ * module's promise ("127.0.0.1, never 0.0.0.0") is about not being
109
+ * reachable from the network, which ::1 equally is not.
110
+ *
111
+ * The v6 bind is best-effort: a host with IPv6 disabled fails it, and that
112
+ * is fine -- the v4 listener is the one that must work, and its error is
113
+ * still fatal. */
114
+ v6.on('error', () => { });
115
+ try {
116
+ v6.listen(port, '::1');
117
+ }
118
+ catch { /* same */ }
119
+ // 127.0.0.1 explicitly -- never 0.0.0.0 -- see module comment.
120
+ server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => {
121
+ const addr = server.address();
122
+ opts.onListening?.(addr.address, addr.port);
123
+ });
124
+ });
125
+ }
126
+ /**
127
+ * A free ephemeral port on 127.0.0.1, for a caller to build a `redirect_uri`
128
+ * from before starting `awaitRedirect` on the same port -- the authorization
129
+ * URL needs the real port before the browser opens.
130
+ *
131
+ * There is an inherent, unavoidable race between this probe closing and the
132
+ * listener re-binding the same port: any "find a free port, then use it"
133
+ * strategy on a shared loopback interface has it. Acceptable here because
134
+ * this is a local, single-user, one-shot login flow, not a long-lived
135
+ * service placing a hard dependency on the exact port.
136
+ */
137
+ /**
138
+ * Whether `port` can be bound on 127.0.0.1 right now.
139
+ *
140
+ * Only meaningful for a PINNED port -- one an operator registered with a
141
+ * service, or one a previous registration named. An ephemeral port comes from
142
+ * `getFreePort` and is free by construction. The same inherent race as
143
+ * `getFreePort` applies and is acceptable for the same reason: this answers
144
+ * "is something already sitting on it", not "reserve it for me".
145
+ */
146
+ export function portFree(port) {
147
+ return new Promise((resolve) => {
148
+ const probe = createServer();
149
+ probe.once('error', () => resolve(false));
150
+ probe.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => {
151
+ probe.close(() => resolve(true));
152
+ });
153
+ });
154
+ }
155
+ export function getFreePort() {
156
+ return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
157
+ const probe = createServer();
158
+ probe.once('error', reject);
159
+ probe.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
160
+ const addr = probe.address();
161
+ probe.close(() => resolve(addr.port));
162
+ });
163
+ });
164
+ }
165
+ //# sourceMappingURL=loopback.js.map
package/dist/oauth/loopback.js.map ADDED
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package/dist/oauth/pkce.d.ts ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
1
+ import type { AuthMetadata } from './discovery.ts';
2
+ export interface Pkce {
3
+ verifier: string;
4
+ challenge: string;
5
+ }
6
+ /**
7
+ * Generate a fresh PKCE verifier/challenge pair.
8
+ *
9
+ * The verifier is 32 bytes (256 bits) from `node:crypto`'s `randomBytes` --
10
+ * NOT `Math.random()`, which is not cryptographically secure and would make
11
+ * the verifier guessable, defeating PKCE's entire purpose. The challenge is
12
+ * BASE64URL(SHA256(verifier)); RFC 7636 also allows a `plain` method (the
13
+ * challenge equals the verifier) but that provides no protection against an
14
+ * intercepted authorization request and is deliberately not offered here.
15
+ *
16
+ * Must be called fresh for every authorization attempt -- a cached or
17
+ * module-level verifier would let one stolen/replayed code authorize a
18
+ * second, unrelated flow.
19
+ */
20
+ export declare function makePkce(): Pkce;
21
+ /** A fresh, per-request opaque value for CSRF protection on the redirect.
22
+ * Same freshness requirement as the verifier: generated per call, never
23
+ * cached. */
24
+ export declare function makeState(): string;
25
+ export interface AuthorizationUrlOptions {
26
+ clientId: string;
27
+ redirectUri: string;
28
+ codeChallenge: string;
29
+ state: string;
30
+ /** RFC 8707 resource indicator -- the MCP server URL this token must be
31
+ * scoped to. Without it, a token minted for one MCP server that trusts
32
+ * this authorization server can be replayed against another. */
33
+ resource: string;
34
+ }
35
+ /**
36
+ * Build the authorization request URL for the user's browser.
37
+ *
38
+ * Always includes `response_type=code`, `client_id`, `redirect_uri`,
39
+ * `code_challenge`/`code_challenge_method=S256`, `state`, and `resource`
40
+ * (RFC 8707). `scope` is added only when the authorization server declared
41
+ * `scopesSupported` -- asking for scopes a server never advertised is at
42
+ * best ignored and at worst rejected as invalid.
43
+ */
44
+ export declare function authorizationUrl(meta: AuthMetadata, opts: AuthorizationUrlOptions): string;
45
+ //# sourceMappingURL=pkce.d.ts.map
package/dist/oauth/pkce.d.ts.map ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"pkce.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/oauth/pkce.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAaA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAUnD,MAAM,WAAW,IAAI;IACnB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACnB;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAaG;AACH,wBAAgB,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,CAI/B;AAED;;cAEc;AACd,wBAAgB,SAAS,IAAI,MAAM,CAElC;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,uBAAuB;IACtC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACd;;qEAEiE;IACjE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAClB;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,gBAAgB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,uBAAuB,GAAG,MAAM,CAa1F"}
package/dist/oauth/pkce.js ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
1
+ /* PKCE (RFC 7636) AND THE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST URL (RFC 8707 resource
2
+ * indicators included).
3
+ *
4
+ * This module does not talk to the network -- it only produces the
5
+ * verifier/challenge pair and builds the URL the browser is sent to. The
6
+ * loopback listener that receives the redirect and the token exchange that
7
+ * spends the verifier are later tasks (Task 5); this module's job ends at
8
+ * handing back a URL and a verifier the caller must hold onto until the
9
+ * redirect comes back.
10
+ */
11
+ import { randomBytes, createHash } from 'node:crypto';
12
+ /** Base64url per RFC 4648 section 5: `+`/`/` swapped for `-`/`_`, and the
13
+ * `=` padding dropped entirely. A standard base64 encode (or padded
14
+ * base64url) is a DIFFERENT string that most authorization servers will
15
+ * reject outright rather than silently accept. */
16
+ function base64url(bytes) {
17
+ return bytes.toString('base64').replace(/\+/g, '-').replace(/\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/, '');
18
+ }
19
+ /**
20
+ * Generate a fresh PKCE verifier/challenge pair.
21
+ *
22
+ * The verifier is 32 bytes (256 bits) from `node:crypto`'s `randomBytes` --
23
+ * NOT `Math.random()`, which is not cryptographically secure and would make
24
+ * the verifier guessable, defeating PKCE's entire purpose. The challenge is
25
+ * BASE64URL(SHA256(verifier)); RFC 7636 also allows a `plain` method (the
26
+ * challenge equals the verifier) but that provides no protection against an
27
+ * intercepted authorization request and is deliberately not offered here.
28
+ *
29
+ * Must be called fresh for every authorization attempt -- a cached or
30
+ * module-level verifier would let one stolen/replayed code authorize a
31
+ * second, unrelated flow.
32
+ */
33
+ export function makePkce() {
34
+ const verifier = base64url(randomBytes(32));
35
+ const challenge = base64url(createHash('sha256').update(verifier).digest());
36
+ return { verifier, challenge };
37
+ }
38
+ /** A fresh, per-request opaque value for CSRF protection on the redirect.
39
+ * Same freshness requirement as the verifier: generated per call, never
40
+ * cached. */
41
+ export function makeState() {
42
+ return base64url(randomBytes(16));
43
+ }
44
+ /**
45
+ * Build the authorization request URL for the user's browser.
46
+ *
47
+ * Always includes `response_type=code`, `client_id`, `redirect_uri`,
48
+ * `code_challenge`/`code_challenge_method=S256`, `state`, and `resource`
49
+ * (RFC 8707). `scope` is added only when the authorization server declared
50
+ * `scopesSupported` -- asking for scopes a server never advertised is at
51
+ * best ignored and at worst rejected as invalid.
52
+ */
53
+ export function authorizationUrl(meta, opts) {
54
+ const url = new URL(meta.authorizationEndpoint);
55
+ url.searchParams.set('response_type', 'code');
56
+ url.searchParams.set('client_id', opts.clientId);
57
+ url.searchParams.set('redirect_uri', opts.redirectUri);
58
+ url.searchParams.set('code_challenge', opts.codeChallenge);
59
+ url.searchParams.set('code_challenge_method', 'S256');
60
+ url.searchParams.set('state', opts.state);
61
+ url.searchParams.set('resource', opts.resource);
62
+ if (meta.scopesSupported && meta.scopesSupported.length > 0) {
63
+ url.searchParams.set('scope', meta.scopesSupported.join(' '));
64
+ }
65
+ return url.toString();
66
+ }
67
+ //# sourceMappingURL=pkce.js.map
package/dist/oauth/pkce.js.map ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
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package/dist/oauth/register.d.ts ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
1
+ import type { AuthMetadata } from './discovery.ts';
2
+ /** Shape of a fetch Response this module actually uses. */
3
+ type MinimalResponse = {
4
+ ok: boolean;
5
+ status: number;
6
+ json(): Promise<unknown>;
7
+ };
8
+ type FetchLike = (url: string, init: {
9
+ method: string;
10
+ headers: Record<string, string>;
11
+ body: string;
12
+ }) => Promise<MinimalResponse>;
13
+ export interface RegisteredClient {
14
+ clientId: string;
15
+ clientSecret?: string;
16
+ }
17
+ /**
18
+ * Register a client with the authorization server's dynamic client
19
+ * registration endpoint, if it has one.
20
+ *
21
+ * Returns `null` -- not a rejected promise -- when `meta.registrationEndpoint`
22
+ * is absent, because that is a normal, supported configuration (the server
23
+ * expects a pre-registered client id) rather than a failure. Callers must
24
+ * fall back to a configured client id in that case.
25
+ *
26
+ * `grant_types`/`response_types` are fixed to the authorization-code +
27
+ * refresh-token flow this sidecar actually uses; `token_endpoint_auth_method`
28
+ * is `none` because this is a public client (no client secret can be kept
29
+ * confidential in a local process) using PKCE for proof of possession
30
+ * instead.
31
+ */
32
+ export declare function registerClient(meta: AuthMetadata, redirectUri: string, fetchImpl: FetchLike): Promise<RegisteredClient | null>;
33
+ export {};
34
+ //# sourceMappingURL=register.d.ts.map
package/dist/oauth/register.d.ts.map ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"register.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/oauth/register.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAaA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAEnD,2DAA2D;AAC3D,KAAK,eAAe,GAAG;IACrB,EAAE,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACZ,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;CAC1B,CAAC;AAEF,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,CACf,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,EACX,IAAI,EAAE;IAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,KACpE,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC;AAE9B,MAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB;IAC/B,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACvB;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AACH,wBAAsB,cAAc,CAClC,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY,EAClB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,EACnB,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,GACnB,OAAO,CAAC,gBAAgB,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAgClC"}
package/dist/oauth/register.js ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
1
+ /* DYNAMIC CLIENT REGISTRATION (RFC 7591).
2
+ *
3
+ * `registration_endpoint` is OPTIONAL in an authorization server's metadata.
4
+ * A server without one expects the caller to already hold a pre-registered
5
+ * client id (configured out of band). Registration must therefore never be
6
+ * the reason a login against such a server fails -- the caller decides what
7
+ * "no endpoint" means (skip and use a configured client id), this module
8
+ * only performs the registration when there is somewhere to send it.
9
+ *
10
+ * `fetch` is injected (no default) so tests never open a socket -- same
11
+ * pattern as discovery.ts.
12
+ */
13
+ /**
14
+ * Register a client with the authorization server's dynamic client
15
+ * registration endpoint, if it has one.
16
+ *
17
+ * Returns `null` -- not a rejected promise -- when `meta.registrationEndpoint`
18
+ * is absent, because that is a normal, supported configuration (the server
19
+ * expects a pre-registered client id) rather than a failure. Callers must
20
+ * fall back to a configured client id in that case.
21
+ *
22
+ * `grant_types`/`response_types` are fixed to the authorization-code +
23
+ * refresh-token flow this sidecar actually uses; `token_endpoint_auth_method`
24
+ * is `none` because this is a public client (no client secret can be kept
25
+ * confidential in a local process) using PKCE for proof of possession
26
+ * instead.
27
+ */
28
+ export async function registerClient(meta, redirectUri, fetchImpl) {
29
+ if (!meta.registrationEndpoint)
30
+ return null;
31
+ const res = await fetchImpl(meta.registrationEndpoint, {
32
+ method: 'POST',
33
+ headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
34
+ body: JSON.stringify({
35
+ client_name: 'Corenel Sidecar',
36
+ redirect_uris: [redirectUri],
37
+ grant_types: ['authorization_code', 'refresh_token'],
38
+ response_types: ['code'],
39
+ token_endpoint_auth_method: 'none',
40
+ }),
41
+ });
42
+ if (!res.ok) {
43
+ throw new Error(`Client registration failed at ${meta.registrationEndpoint} (HTTP ${res.status})`);
44
+ }
45
+ const body = await res.json();
46
+ if (typeof body !== 'object' || body === null || Array.isArray(body)) {
47
+ throw new Error(`Client registration at ${meta.registrationEndpoint} returned a malformed response`);
48
+ }
49
+ const record = body;
50
+ const clientId = record.client_id;
51
+ if (typeof clientId !== 'string' || clientId.length === 0) {
52
+ throw new Error(`Client registration at ${meta.registrationEndpoint} did not return a client_id`);
53
+ }
54
+ const clientSecret = typeof record.client_secret === 'string' ? record.client_secret : undefined;
55
+ return { clientId, clientSecret };
56
+ }
57
+ //# sourceMappingURL=register.js.map
package/dist/oauth/register.js.map ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"register.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/oauth/register.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AAqBH;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,UAAU,cAAc,CAClC,IAAkB,EAClB,WAAmB,EACnB,SAAoB;IAEpB,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IAE5C,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,EAAE;QACrD,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM;QACd,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE;QAC/C,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;YACnB,WAAW,EAAE,iBAAiB;YAC9B,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC;YAC5B,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,oBAAoB,EAAE,eAAe,CAAC;YACpD,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;YACxB,0BAA0B,EAAE,MAAM;SACnC,CAAC;KACH,CAAC,CAAC;IAEH,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;QACZ,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,iCAAiC,IAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,UAAU,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;IACrG,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;IAC9B,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACrE,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,0BAA0B,IAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,gCAAgC,CAAC,CAAC;IACvG,CAAC;IACD,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,IAA+B,CAAC;IAE/C,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;IAClC,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1D,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,0BAA0B,IAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,6BAA6B,CAAC,CAAC;IACpG,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;IACjG,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC;AACpC,CAAC"}
package/dist/oauth/tokens.d.ts ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
1
+ import type { AuthMetadata } from './discovery.ts';
2
+ import type { McpOAuthCredential } from '../types.ts';
3
+ /** Shape of a fetch Response this module actually reads from. */
4
+ type MinimalResponse = {
5
+ ok: boolean;
6
+ status: number;
7
+ json(): Promise<unknown>;
8
+ };
9
+ type FetchLike = (url: string, init: {
10
+ method: string;
11
+ headers: Record<string, string>;
12
+ body: string;
13
+ }) => Promise<MinimalResponse>;
14
+ export interface ExchangeOptions {
15
+ clientId: string;
16
+ clientSecret?: string;
17
+ code: string;
18
+ verifier: string;
19
+ redirectUri: string;
20
+ /** RFC 8707 resource indicator -- the MCP server URL this token must be
21
+ * scoped to, matching the one sent in the authorization request. */
22
+ resource: string;
23
+ authServer: string;
24
+ }
25
+ /**
26
+ * Exchange an authorization code (and its PKCE verifier) for a fresh
27
+ * `McpOAuthCredential`.
28
+ *
29
+ * `expiresAt` is computed as an ABSOLUTE epoch ms from the response's
30
+ * relative `expires_in`, using the injected clock -- absent when the server
31
+ * did not send `expires_in`, matching McpOAuthCredential's documented
32
+ * convention (absent means "did not say", not "does not expire").
33
+ */
34
+ export declare function exchangeCode(meta: AuthMetadata, opts: ExchangeOptions, fetchImpl?: FetchLike, now?: () => number): Promise<McpOAuthCredential>;
35
+ /**
36
+ * Refresh an OAuth credential against its own authorization server.
37
+ *
38
+ * Throws if `cred` carries no `refreshToken` -- there is nothing to spend,
39
+ * and the caller (mcp/auth.ts) must send the user back through `login`
40
+ * rather than treat a thrown refresh as some other kind of failure.
41
+ *
42
+ * When the response omits a new `refresh_token`, the OLD one is kept.
43
+ * Rotation is optional per RFC 6749 section 6; a server that does not rotate
44
+ * simply does not send one, and treating that as "no refresh token anymore"
45
+ * would strand the credential at the NEXT refresh -- silently, since this
46
+ * one still succeeds.
47
+ */
48
+ export declare function refresh(meta: AuthMetadata, cred: McpOAuthCredential, fetchImpl?: FetchLike, now?: () => number): Promise<McpOAuthCredential>;
49
+ /**
50
+ * True when `cred` is expired, or will expire within the next
51
+ * `EXPIRY_SKEW_MS` -- treated as expired now so a caller refreshes ahead of
52
+ * the deadline rather than racing it.
53
+ *
54
+ * No `expiresAt` means the issuer did not say, which is NOT the same as
55
+ * "does not expire" -- but assuming expired in that case would force a
56
+ * refresh before every single call, so absent is treated as valid.
57
+ */
58
+ export declare function isExpired(cred: {
59
+ expiresAt?: number;
60
+ }, nowMs: number): boolean;
61
+ export {};
62
+ //# sourceMappingURL=tokens.d.ts.map
package/dist/oauth/tokens.d.ts.map ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
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package/dist/oauth/tokens.js ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
1
+ function parseTokenResponse(body) {
2
+ if (typeof body !== 'object' || body === null || Array.isArray(body)) {
3
+ throw new Error('token endpoint returned a malformed response');
4
+ }
5
+ const r = body;
6
+ if (typeof r.access_token !== 'string' || r.access_token.length === 0) {
7
+ // Never echo the rest of the body: on a misconfigured server it can carry
8
+ // another caller's data, and this lands in an error a terminal may log.
9
+ throw new Error('token endpoint response did not include an access_token');
10
+ }
11
+ return {
12
+ access_token: r.access_token,
13
+ ...(typeof r.refresh_token === 'string' ? { refresh_token: r.refresh_token } : {}),
14
+ ...(typeof r.expires_in === 'number' ? { expires_in: r.expires_in } : {}),
15
+ ...(typeof r.scope === 'string' ? { scope: r.scope } : {}),
16
+ };
17
+ }
18
+ /** POST `body` to `endpoint` and parse a token response, or throw naming the
19
+ * endpoint and HTTP status -- never the response body, which on a token
20
+ * endpoint can carry a code, a token, or another caller's data. */
21
+ async function postToken(endpoint, body, fetchImpl) {
22
+ const res = await fetchImpl(endpoint, {
23
+ method: 'POST',
24
+ headers: { 'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
25
+ body: body.toString(),
26
+ });
27
+ if (!res.ok) {
28
+ throw new Error(`token request failed at ${endpoint} (HTTP ${res.status})`);
29
+ }
30
+ return parseTokenResponse(await res.json());
31
+ }
32
+ /**
33
+ * Exchange an authorization code (and its PKCE verifier) for a fresh
34
+ * `McpOAuthCredential`.
35
+ *
36
+ * `expiresAt` is computed as an ABSOLUTE epoch ms from the response's
37
+ * relative `expires_in`, using the injected clock -- absent when the server
38
+ * did not send `expires_in`, matching McpOAuthCredential's documented
39
+ * convention (absent means "did not say", not "does not expire").
40
+ */
41
+ export async function exchangeCode(meta, opts, fetchImpl = fetch, now = Date.now) {
42
+ const body = new URLSearchParams({
43
+ grant_type: 'authorization_code',
44
+ client_id: opts.clientId,
45
+ code: opts.code,
46
+ code_verifier: opts.verifier,
47
+ redirect_uri: opts.redirectUri,
48
+ resource: opts.resource,
49
+ });
50
+ if (opts.clientSecret)
51
+ body.set('client_secret', opts.clientSecret);
52
+ const tokens = await postToken(meta.tokenEndpoint, body, fetchImpl);
53
+ return {
54
+ kind: 'oauth',
55
+ accessToken: tokens.access_token,
56
+ ...(tokens.refresh_token ? { refreshToken: tokens.refresh_token } : {}),
57
+ ...(typeof tokens.expires_in === 'number' ? { expiresAt: now() + tokens.expires_in * 1000 } : {}),
58
+ clientId: opts.clientId,
59
+ ...(opts.clientSecret ? { clientSecret: opts.clientSecret } : {}),
60
+ authServer: opts.authServer,
61
+ ...(tokens.scope ? { scope: tokens.scope } : {}),
62
+ };
63
+ }
64
+ /**
65
+ * Refresh an OAuth credential against its own authorization server.
66
+ *
67
+ * Throws if `cred` carries no `refreshToken` -- there is nothing to spend,
68
+ * and the caller (mcp/auth.ts) must send the user back through `login`
69
+ * rather than treat a thrown refresh as some other kind of failure.
70
+ *
71
+ * When the response omits a new `refresh_token`, the OLD one is kept.
72
+ * Rotation is optional per RFC 6749 section 6; a server that does not rotate
73
+ * simply does not send one, and treating that as "no refresh token anymore"
74
+ * would strand the credential at the NEXT refresh -- silently, since this
75
+ * one still succeeds.
76
+ */
77
+ export async function refresh(meta, cred, fetchImpl = fetch, now = Date.now) {
78
+ if (!cred.refreshToken) {
79
+ throw new Error('credential has no refresh token to refresh with -- sign in again');
80
+ }
81
+ const body = new URLSearchParams({
82
+ grant_type: 'refresh_token',
83
+ refresh_token: cred.refreshToken,
84
+ client_id: cred.clientId,
85
+ });
86
+ if (cred.clientSecret)
87
+ body.set('client_secret', cred.clientSecret);
88
+ const tokens = await postToken(meta.tokenEndpoint, body, fetchImpl);
89
+ return {
90
+ kind: 'oauth',
91
+ accessToken: tokens.access_token,
92
+ // Keep the old refresh token when the server did not send a new one.
93
+ refreshToken: tokens.refresh_token ?? cred.refreshToken,
94
+ ...(typeof tokens.expires_in === 'number' ? { expiresAt: now() + tokens.expires_in * 1000 } : {}),
95
+ clientId: cred.clientId,
96
+ ...(cred.clientSecret ? { clientSecret: cred.clientSecret } : {}),
97
+ authServer: cred.authServer,
98
+ scope: tokens.scope ?? cred.scope,
99
+ };
100
+ }
101
+ /** 60 seconds. A call already in flight when a token expires must not 401
102
+ * because the check ran a moment too late. */
103
+ const EXPIRY_SKEW_MS = 60_000;
104
+ /**
105
+ * True when `cred` is expired, or will expire within the next
106
+ * `EXPIRY_SKEW_MS` -- treated as expired now so a caller refreshes ahead of
107
+ * the deadline rather than racing it.
108
+ *
109
+ * No `expiresAt` means the issuer did not say, which is NOT the same as
110
+ * "does not expire" -- but assuming expired in that case would force a
111
+ * refresh before every single call, so absent is treated as valid.
112
+ */
113
+ export function isExpired(cred, nowMs) {
114
+ if (cred.expiresAt === undefined)
115
+ return false;
116
+ return cred.expiresAt - nowMs <= EXPIRY_SKEW_MS;
117
+ }
118
+ //# sourceMappingURL=tokens.js.map
package/dist/oauth/tokens.js.map ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
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package/dist/policy.d.ts ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
1
+ import type { Policy } from '@corenel/protocol';
2
+ export type McpCallDecision = {
3
+ ok: true;
4
+ } | {
5
+ ok: false;
6
+ reason: string;
7
+ };
8
+ /** Deny-by-default gate for one `mcp:<server>/<tool>` address. */
9
+ export declare function mcpCallAllowed(address: string, policy: Policy): McpCallDecision;
10
+ //# sourceMappingURL=policy.d.ts.map
package/dist/policy.d.ts.map ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
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