@coo-quack/sensitive-canary 0.7.0 → 0.8.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,796 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## v0.8.0 (2026-08-16)
+
+### Breaking changes
+
+- **Two allow tags no longer add up.** Tags were resolved per category with the
+  first occurrence winning; the last tag now replaces the earlier ones whole.
+  `[allow-secret] [allow-pii]` resolves to the second tag alone, where in 0.7.0
+  it granted both — **`[allow-all]` is how both are asked for**. The change is
+  the other direction being wrong: `[allow-all]` narrowed to `[allow-secret]`
+  went on allowing PII, which is the opposite of what narrowing means and the
+  unsafe one of the two possible mistakes
+- **A tag written by anything other than a person no longer counts.** A line the
+  runtime writes under the user's role — a background task reporting back, most
+  often — is skipped, so an agent's report that quotes `[allow-all]` no longer
+  lifts the guard for the next tool call. A workflow that relied on a tag
+  arriving from a subagent's output has to write the tag in a prompt instead
+- **A tag between two fenced blocks is read as quoted.** Text from the first
+  fence marker in a message to the last is quoting, where before the markers
+  were paired off and the span between the second and third read as typed. A tag
+  before the first fence or after the last still counts
+
+### Features
+
+- Parse Bash commands as shell syntax rather than by splitting on whitespace.
+  The tokenizer understands quotes (including `$'…'` and `$"…"`), heredoc
+  bodies, command and process substitutions, subshells, shell keywords,
+  redirection operators and their file-descriptor prefixes. Several ordinary
+  ways of naming a file were invisible to the old split: a path with a space in
+  it, `cat <secrets` with no space, a `cat` on the second line of a multi-line
+  command, `(cat secrets)`, `while cat secrets; do :; done`, and
+  `echo $(cat secrets)`
+- Tokens record whether they came from a redirection operator or from a word, so
+  a quoted `>` is read as an operand. `grep ">" secrets`, an ordinary way to
+  search a file for a `>` character, previously had `secrets` skipped as though
+  it were an output target
+- Scan the value of a variable referenced through an expansion that carries a
+  suffix, such as `${TOKEN:-fallback}` or `${TOKEN#prefix}`. Only the bare
+  `$TOKEN` and `${TOKEN}` forms were recognised before
+- Expand the set of commands whose operands are treated as files written to
+  stdout, from seven to around forty: `tac`, `rev`, `strings`, `xxd`, `od`,
+  `hexdump`, `base64`, `cut`, `sort`, `uniq`, `shuf`, `column`, `paste`, `fold`,
+  `fmt`, `pr`, `expand`, `unexpand`, `iconv`, the `z*cat` family, `diff`, `comm`,
+  `join`, `look`, plus a second class whose first non-flag argument is a pattern
+  or script and whose remaining arguments are files (`sed`, `awk`, `grep`, `rg`,
+  `ag`, `jq`, `yq`). In-place editing is exempt: `sed -i`, `perl -i` and
+  `ruby -i` (including bundled forms such as `perl -pi -e` and `perl -lpi`) send
+  the result back to the file and write nothing to stdout. A bundle is read one
+  letter at a time, continuing only past switches that command accepts without a
+  value — the letters differ per command, so `sed -Ei` counts while
+  `perl -Ilib -pe` and `perl -MList::Util -pe` are reads rather than in-place
+  edits. A letter the list does not know stops the reading and the file is
+  scanned. `grep -i` is unaffected — its `-i` is case-insensitive matching, and
+  it still prints
+- Locate the command past a wrapper (`sudo`, `env VAR=1`, `timeout N`, `nice`,
+  `xargs`, `stdbuf`) and past a leading `VAR=value` assignment, so the wrapped
+  command is classified instead of the wrapper
+- Parse and scan inline program text from `-c` / `-e` / `-pe`, both as a nested
+  command line and for the quoted path literals in it, which is what catches
+  `python3 -c "open('.env').read()"`
+- Scan the file operands of git subcommands that print contents (`show`, `diff`,
+  `blame`, `annotate`, `grep`, `cat-file`) and of `dd if=`. `git log` counts only
+  when a patch is asked for (`-p`, `--patch`, `-U<n>`, and the merge-diff forms):
+  without one it prints who changed the file and when, never a line of it
+- Scan every environment variable when a bare `env` or `printenv` would print the
+  whole environment, including behind a wrapper (`sudo printenv`) and when the
+  output is redirected
+- Treat commands that only measure a file (`wc`, `cksum`, `md5sum`, `sha1sum`,
+  `sha256sum`) as non-reads, whether the file is named or fed in over `<`
+- Inspect the file inputs of every tool other than `Read` and `Bash`, `Grep` and
+  the MCP tools included. An input field naming an existing regular file is
+  scanned before the call: `path`, `paths`, `file`, `files`, `filepath`,
+  `filename`, `filenames`, `absolutepath`, `notebookpath` and `sourcepath`,
+  compared with separators and case removed so that `file_path`, `filePath` and
+  `filepath` are one name. Beyond those names, any value containing a `/` is
+  treated as a path whatever its field is called, which covers a tool carrying
+  one under `target`, `document` or `uri`. The `/` is what keeps a search
+  pattern from being read as a path — `{ "pattern": ".env" }` searches for that
+  text rather than reading the file — at the cost of missing a bare filename
+  under an unlisted name. Found up to four levels down and inside arrays, of
+  strings and of objects alike. A field naming a directory is left alone.
+  Exempt are the tools that surface no file contents (`Write`, `Edit`, `MultiEdit`,
+  `NotebookEdit`, `TodoWrite`, `Glob`, `WebFetch`, `WebSearch`, `ExitPlanMode`,
+  `AskUserQuestion`) and tools whose name leads with a write verb (`write_file`,
+  `createPage`): naming a file they do not read is not a leak. The default
+  matcher becomes `Read|Bash|Grep|mcp__.*`
+- Add an opt-in integration test that runs the hook inside a real headless
+  Claude Code session and asserts both halves of the block contract: the read is
+  stopped, and the reason reaches Claude. Every other test spawns the hook and
+  reads its output itself, which says nothing about whether the runtime acts on
+  it. Set `SENSITIVE_CANARY_INTEGRATION=1` to run it; it needs credentials and
+  network, so CI skips it
+- The PreToolUse block reason is written to stderr instead of to a stdout
+  `{"decision":"block"}` payload. Both reach Claude on the current version, but
+  the documentation describes stdout as ignored on a non-zero exit and takes the
+  PreToolUse decision from `hookSpecificOutput` rather than a top-level
+  `decision` field, so the old form depended on undescribed behaviour. Blocking
+  is unchanged: exit 2 is what stops the call
+- Heredoc bodies are treated as text, not commands: writing a script that
+  mentions `.env` via `cat > deploy.sh <<EOF` is not a read. Known limitation: a
+  heredoc that feeds commands to a remote shell (`ssh host <<EOF`) is not caught,
+  written up under "② PreToolUse hook" in the README
+- Detect a PEM private key that has been base64-encoded, under the new
+  `private-key-base64` rule. `-----BEGIN` never appears in the text, so
+  `client-key-data` in a kubeconfig, `tls.key` in a Kubernetes Secret and a key
+  held in Terraform state were all invisible to the plaintext rule. Three bytes
+  encode to four characters, so the header looks different depending on where it
+  sits relative to that boundary: the rule carries all three forms, since
+  matching one would find one key in three. Swept over 986 real files on a
+  developer machine, it found four keys in a kubeconfig and nothing else
+- Detect credentials in the userinfo half of an http(s) URL, under the new
+  `url-basic-auth` rule — a git remote, a `.netrc`, a private registry, a `curl`
+  invocation. RFC 3986 §3.2.1 deprecates the form for the same reason. The
+  placeholder machinery already covers the near neighbours, so
+  `https://user:password@localhost`, `https://x-access-token:${GH_TOKEN}@…` and
+  `https://USERNAME:PASSWORD@example.com` stay quiet; the same sweep of 986 real
+  files flagged none of them
+- Count the hash in a Telegram bot token loosely. The pattern asked for exactly
+  33 characters after `AA` — not a minimum, an exact count — so a 32-character
+  token and a 35-character one were both invisible, and the bot id was capped at
+  ten digits. Now 6–12 digits and 30–40 characters, with word boundaries at
+  either end
+- Read `mongodb+srv://` as a connection string. The rule listed `mongodb` but
+  not the SRV scheme, which is the one MongoDB Atlas hands out
+- Recognise the AWS key prefixes `ABIA`, `ACCA`, `APKA` and `ASCA` alongside the
+  nine already listed
+
+### Fixes
+
+- Read a file both ways when its encoding is a guess. Eight NUL pairs — sixteen
+  bytes — in front of a UTF-8 file were enough for `detectUtf16` to call it
+  UTF-16, and the rest of it then decoded into characters no rule matches. The
+  counts cannot separate the two cases: a UTF-8 file with a few NULs on one side
+  of its pairs looks exactly like a page of Japanese UTF-16, where `一` (U+4E00)
+  puts a NUL on the minority side. A verdict that did not come from a
+  byte-order mark is marked as a guess and both readings are scanned. The same
+  cap was excluding real documents: thirty lines of Japanese with one `一`
+  apiece were not read as UTF-16 at all
+- Keep an `.env` in a swept directory whatever its bytes look like. The sweep
+  skips binaries so that a folder of images is not ground through every rule,
+  and that skip ran before the name guard, so eight bytes of NUL at the head of
+  a `.env` took the strongest guard in the tool out of the sweep
+- Do not honour a tag written by anything other than a person. A background task
+  reporting back arrives under the user's role carrying an agent's prose, and
+  prose about these tags was enough — a report quoting the documentation armed
+  the guard it was describing. The transcript says which lines are which, and
+  that is what the reader asks now
+- Read the run from the first fence marker to the last as quoted. Pairing the
+  markers off left the span between the second and third readable as typed, and
+  a pasted markdown document with a code block inside it puts a quoted tag in
+  exactly that span
+- Scan somewhere when a search names no path. `rg pattern`, `grep -r pattern`
+  and `Grep {pattern}` with no `path` all print from the working directory, and
+  with no field to collect there was nothing to scan. Judged on names alone: a
+  directory nobody named is every repository anyone searches, and reading their
+  contents stopped a plain `rg TODO` in four of twelve checkouts
+- Name `NotebookRead` in the hook matcher. It reached the hook only because
+  `Read` is a substring of it, and the `notebook_path` field the hook reads was
+  being served by that accident: anchoring the match, or a rename, would have
+  dropped notebooks with nothing to say so
+- Count one finding per category rather than per value. A value that a secret
+  rule and a PII rule both match is two findings, and collapsing on the value
+  alone reported whichever came first — so the block named one category while
+  the other was what held it, and which tag lifts it read as arbitrary
+- Stop the search for the wrapped command at a command that prints its
+  arguments. `sudo echo cat secrets` resolved to the `cat` sitting in echo's
+  arguments and scanned a file the command never opens, so `echo`, `printf`,
+  `true`, `false` and `:` end the descent
+- Leave the output file of `sort -o out.txt in.txt` and its siblings
+  (`shuf -o`, `iconv -o`, `tee`) out of the scan. The operand a flag names as a
+  destination is written, not printed, so naming it is not a read
+- Correct the boundaries of six rules. Discover's `65` range stopped at 6589;
+  the card alternatives all assumed groups of four, where Amex prints 4-6-5 and
+  Diners 4-6-4; Square's exact length meant one character over the guess stopped
+  the token matching at all rather than matching partly; `twilio-sid` had no
+  word boundary, so a certificate fingerprint was an Account SID;
+  `telegram-bot-token` capped its secret part at 40 and went invisible at 41;
+  and `pii-email` excluded `zip` at the TLD position as though a list of file
+  extensions were a list of domains
+- Stop treating every dotted value as a reference to code. `isNotSecretShaped`
+  waved through anything shaped `a.b.c`, and dotted credentials exist. What
+  separates them is that a name is words: measured over 147,643 dotted
+  identifiers from source on this machine, 0.06% fall below a mean word length
+  of 2.5, and the ones that do are JWTs
+- Redact by code point. Slicing by code unit cut a surrogate pair in half and
+  wrote a lone surrogate to the terminal
+- Match the placeholder rule's connection-string pattern once rather than three
+  times, and bound its scheme: an unbounded `\w+` in front of a literal that is
+  usually absent is quadratic in the length of a value someone else writes
+- Make the email rule near-linear on its worst input. The local part
+  (`[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+`) spans the word boundary at every dot, so on a long run
+  of digits and separators with no `@` — a log full of IP addresses or version
+  numbers is exactly that — every boundary cost a greedy consume of the rest
+  of the text plus a character-at-a-time backtrack in search of the `@`:
+  O(n²), half a minute for 200 KB, and effectively forever for a multi-MB
+  file. The local part is now bounded at 64 characters (RFC 5321's limit, so
+  no deliverable address is lost) and the domain is matched as dot-separated
+  labels, which leaves nothing to backtrack over
+- Bound the `connection-string` credentials too. `[^@\s]+` crosses both `:` and
+  `/`, so a line of `mongodb://` with no `@` in it ran to the end of the text
+  from every occurrence: 188 KB took 2.3s, and 1 MiB through the hook took 98s
+  and returned exit 0. Every adversarial shape then in the tests walked past it,
+  which is the shape list being caught short rather than the guard working, so
+  one written for this syntax was added
+- Bound the `env-assignment` pattern's name the same way. It read `[A-Z_]*`
+  before its keyword and `[A-Z_0-9]*` after, so a run of capitals with no `=`
+  backtracked from every position: 59 KB took 381ms, 234 KB 6.9s, 1 MiB 125s.
+  1 MiB is what the file cap allows through, so capping the read did not stop
+  the hook being killed — measured, a 1 MiB file of repeated `SECRET` was still
+  killed at 40 seconds with the cap in place. Every rule in the config is now
+  run against a list of adversarial shapes in the tests, so this shape fails before
+  a release rather than after one
+- Read a file into a buffer of the cap's size rather than of the size `stat`
+  reports. procfs and sysfs entries are regular files that report zero bytes and
+  produce content anyway, so their content was read as empty and passed.
+  `readFileSync`, which this replaced, read to EOF and did not have the problem.
+  Reading such a file is not the same as scanning it whole: the NUL rule stops at
+  the first separator, so `/proc/self/environ` is read and only its first
+  variable is looked at, which is now listed under Known Limitations
+- Scan only the first 1 MiB of a file rather than reading it whole.
+  `readFileSync` has no size limit, so a large enough file kept the hook from
+  ever returning — and a hook killed by Claude Code's PreToolUse timeout does
+  not block the call, which made the hang a way through. A secret past the cut
+  is missed, the same trade the transcript's 64 KB tail read already makes
+- Scan the file operand of a pattern-first command when the pattern flag carries
+  its value written against it. `grep -eaws secrets`, `grep -faws secrets` and
+  `sed -e's/a/b/' secrets` scanned nothing: the attached spelling was not
+  recognised, so nothing marked the pattern as supplied and the file that
+  followed was consumed as the pattern. The separate (`grep -e aws`) and `=`
+  (`--regexp=aws`) spellings were already handled
+- Put back what quieting the rules had taken out. A corpus of five hundred
+  generated values, run against this release and against v0.7.0, found a hundred
+  and twenty-seven inputs the old version detected and this one did not — none of
+  which the thirty-two cases chosen by hand had caught. Restored:
+  - an address near an excluded word. One word within a couple of dozen
+    characters was erasing every address near it, three at a time in a CSV. The
+    exclusion is now the three shapes that are really hostnames: a VCS user, an
+    address straight after `ssh`/`scp`/`rsync`/`sftp`, and the `host:path` form
+  - a bare private address. Requiring a label lost `192.168.1.50`,
+    `X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.5` and `remote_addr=…`; what says an address is a
+    machine is the command around it, so that is what excludes it now, and a
+    `host:port` pair is a service rather than a person
+  - an assignment that is not at the start of a line: `docker run -e PASSWORD=…`,
+    `cd /app && PASSWORD=…`, a single-quoted value, a value with a trailing
+    semicolon or comma, and one indented past sixteen columns. `DB_PASS` counts
+    as well as `DB_PASSWORD`
+  - a Square token after `key_` or in a query string, which a boundary counting
+    `_` and `=` as base64 had erased
+  - the Korean resident and business numbers without their separators, which is
+    how they are stored. Context keeps a timestamp out instead
+  - a postal code next to the word `max`, and a connection string whose password
+    runs past 256 characters
+- Read a command that arrives as an argv array on the `Bash` tool too, not only
+  on an MCP one. The same command was scanned or not depending on who sent it
+- Block a `.env` template whose contents cannot be read whole. The exemption
+  assumed the contents would be scanned instead, and a NUL byte or a file past
+  the per-file cut stopped that — so `.env.nul.example` and `.env.big.example`
+  passed on their names after all
+- Expand `**` as a single `*` rather than refusing it. Refusing it meant `cat **`
+  was scanned not at all, while the shell expanded it and read the files
+- Read a command field that arrives as an argv array or nested under another key.
+  Only a top-level string was read, so `{"command":["cat",".env"]}` and
+  `{"args":{"command":"cat .env"}}` went past — both by a name with no slash in
+  it, which the path rules do not collect either
+- Stop reading after five seconds. A byte budget bounds what is read and not what
+  is walked, and a pattern reaching one level under a home directory took ten
+  seconds, which is close enough to the PreToolUse timeout to matter
+- Stop blocking ordinary work. Measured over sixty-four commands from a working
+  day, the hook blocked sixteen of them; it now blocks five, and four of those
+  five are this repository's own README and changelog, which contain an
+  AWS-shaped key as documentation. What changed:
+  - an address is not a person when an `ssh`, `scp`, `rsync`, `clone` or `git@`
+    is next to it, and `example.com` and the other RFC 2606 domains are nobody's
+    mail
+  - the published test card numbers are not cards
+  - `cap` is an English word as well as an Italian postal one, so sizes and
+    limits nearby say it is not a postal code
+  - the Korean resident and business numbers are written with their separators;
+    without that, a millisecond timestamp in a log was a finding
+  - a Square token inside a longer run of base64 is a slice of something else,
+    which is what made `cat ~/.ssh/known_hosts` a finding
+  - a value that is a variable reference (`PASSWORD: ${VAR}`) names a secret
+    rather than being one
+  - `.env.example`, `.env.sample`, `.env.template`, `.env.dist` and
+    `.env.defaults` are not blocked by name. Their contents are still scanned, so
+    a template with a real key in it is still caught — by what is in it
+- **`[allow-secret]` lifted PII blocks, which the README says it cannot.**
+  Deduplication ran before the allow tag, and it keys on the value — so a string
+  that a secret rule and a PII rule both match lost the PII finding first, and
+  the tag then removed what was left. The two hooks had the order the other way
+  round from each other; the prompt hook was right
+- **A pasted log could lift the guard on the key in the same message.** The
+  prompt hook read tags from the raw prompt while the other hook read them from
+  what the user typed, so a fenced log or a README quoting `[allow-secret]`
+  decided them. One implementation now answers for both
+- **Input the check could not read was treated as input the check approved.**
+  Two characters missing from the end of a payload passed a key through. Empty
+  stdin is still nothing to check; bytes that will not parse now stop the call
+- **A filename could put lines into the text Claude reads.** POSIX allows a
+  newline in a path and a path is attacker-chosen, so a file could be named such
+  that the block message grew a line saying the block was a false positive.
+  Escape sequences went the same way and could clear the screen first. Control
+  characters are escaped on the way out now, and the finding list is capped —
+  one rule that matched everywhere produced forty thousand lines
+- **A single rule from a config file could hang the hook.** The scan budget is
+  checked between rules and cannot interrupt one match, so `(a+)+$` ran for
+  hours and the hook was killed — which does not block. A V8-side timeout does
+  interrupt a running match, at 0.06ms per scan
+- A config path that is a FIFO blocked the read forever, and a config with more
+  than about 120,000 rules threw while the module was still loading, before any
+  handler existed. Both exited without blocking
+- **`tail` printed the part that was not scanned.** The per-file cap reads the
+  first megabyte; `tail -2 app.log` shows the last lines, which on a large log is
+  where a failure has just printed a connection string. Both ends are read now.
+  What is still missed is the middle of a file larger than both windows
+- `view` and `vimdiff` print a file the way `less` does and were not on the list
+- The documentation said the hooks are active immediately after installing the
+  plugin. A session that is already running does not pick them up: it reports the
+  plugin as enabled and checks nothing. It also said a PreToolUse allow tag is
+  consumed by the first tool call — it lasts until a tool result is recorded, so
+  calls issued together are all covered by one. And it said a `.env` with an
+  allow tag is passed through without scanning, which is the opposite of what the
+  code does. All three are corrected, and the step that proves a hook is really
+  running is now on the recommended install path rather than only the pnpm one
+- The `phone-jp` validator existed and was named in neither document; a test now
+  holds both documents to the registry. Added a section on the ways a rule goes
+  quiet without warning — `secretGroup: 0` is not the same as omitting it, an
+  `entropyThreshold` above 8 rejects everything, `flags: "y"` matches only at the
+  start of the text, and a large `contextWindow` widens `excludeContext` too
+- **The same defect was still in `env-assignment`, and worse.** Its value
+  capture was open-ended, so a megabyte of `TOKEN=TOKEN=…` took six minutes —
+  past any hook timeout, and a killed hook does not block. The capture is atomic
+  now (`(?=(X))\1`, since every character the delimiter test accepts is one the
+  class already excludes, so retrying a shorter run could never succeed) and
+  capped, with a single character deciding whether the value simply ran past the
+  cap. 373 seconds to 2 milliseconds, and a fifty-thousand-character value is
+  still found
+- **The hook stopped every tool call, with no way out, when its working
+  directory had been removed.** `process.cwd()` throws there, and it was called
+  while the module was still loading — before the transcript is read — so the
+  message advising an allow tag described something that could not be honoured.
+  A build script that runs `rm -rf dist` from inside `dist`, or a
+  `git worktree remove`, is enough. There is nothing sensitive about a missing
+  directory: a relative path simply has no base
+- **A tag written in backticks did not work, and the documentation writes them
+  that way.** Treating inline code as quoting refused the form this project
+  teaches, and refused it silently — the block that followed advised adding the
+  tag it had just ignored. Fenced blocks still quote rather than issue, so a
+  pasted log cannot lift the guard
+- `<bash-input>` was missing from the elements that are not user input, an
+  unclosed element was not stripped at all, and a line the runtime wrote as an
+  assistant turn was read as user input if the message inside it claimed the
+  role
+- A UTF-16 file whose first characters are Japanese or Chinese has no zero byte
+  among them, and five hundred pairs of prefix decided the whole file. The
+  window is wider, the threshold is on the asymmetry rather than the rate, and
+  whether the result reads as text is what settles it
+- A FIFO named as the transcript blocked the read forever; a write to a closed
+  stderr threw on the way out of a block and turned it into a pass; and a
+  payload of `null` parsed successfully and then threw on the first field read
+- **Twenty-six wrong blocks out of six hundred real files.** A value that is a
+  URL, a path, an identifier, a header name, a number or a dotted setting name
+  is no longer read as the secret its variable is named after — `secret_name`,
+  `VAULT_TOKEN_PATH` and `TOKEN_HEADER_NAME` describe a secret rather than
+  holding one, and a key whose last word is `PROJECT` or `ENDPOINT` says so
+  outright. The shape test applies only where a rule captured a free-form value:
+  a Slack webhook is a URL and a secret both, and asking whether it looks like a
+  URL is the wrong question
+- A connection string with `${PGPASSWORD}` still in it holds no credential at
+  all, and `postgres:postgres@` is what a compose file ships with
+- A context word is a label, not a fragment of the identifier beside the number.
+  `extract-zip` supplied "zip" and `golang.org/x/mobile` supplied "mobile", so a
+  version number beside either read as a postal code or a telephone number —
+  which is to say lockfiles and `go.sum` could not be read at all. Nor could
+  `name@version`, which is an address by shape
+- Twelve identical digits satisfy the My Number checksum by arithmetic rather
+  than by being anyone's number, and `01-02-2024` is a date. A Japanese
+  telephone number has ten digits or eleven, and 0120 belongs to a business
+- **A megabyte of `eyJ` used to kill the hook, and a killed hook does not
+  block.** Two rules were shaped `{n,}` followed by a literal that may never
+  come, which makes the engine retry the whole tail from every start position.
+  `eyJ` recurs every three characters, so one 400 KiB file was enough to spend
+  the PreToolUse timeout and take the rest of the call with it — including the
+  `.env` name guard, by naming the padding first. A JWT begins at a token
+  boundary, and saying so leaves one start instead of a third of a million: a
+  megabyte went from 104 seconds to 27 milliseconds. The Mapbox, Sentry and
+  Square patterns had the same shape and are bounded too
+- A scan that runs past ten seconds now stops the call rather than finishing
+  quietly. Bounding those patterns fixed the two rules that could do it; this is
+  so the next rule of that shape is caught instead of repeating it. The check
+  sits between rules, since a single match cannot be interrupted
+- **An allow tag could be issued by something other than the user.** Claude Code
+  records the output of a `!` command, slash-command names and system reminders
+  as user messages, so `[allow-all]` appearing in any of them lifted the guard
+  for the next tool call — `grep -r allow-all` was enough. A tag inside a code
+  fence no longer counts either: a pasted log is quoting the tag, not asking for
+  it
+- **A UTF-16 file was not scanned at all.** Every other byte is NUL, and the
+  scan stops at the first one, so the contents came to one character. PowerShell
+  5.1 writes UTF-16LE by default, which makes redirecting a command's output to
+  a file a way past this. Little-endian, big-endian and byte-order-marked files
+  are all read now; genuinely binary files are still left alone
+- `Read` with a `file_path` that is not a string exited 0, while the same shape
+  under any other tool name reached the shared collector and blocked
+- **A crash no longer passes the call through.** Only exit 2 blocks, and an
+  unforeseen error exits 1 — so any bug anywhere in a hook silently switched the
+  protection off, which is the failure this tool exists to prevent. Both hooks
+  now stop the call instead, with a message saying the check did not finish
+  rather than claiming a finding. Input the hooks do understand is unaffected;
+  `[allow-all]` gets past it
+- **A prompt that is not a string is read rather than dropped.** Not throwing on
+  `{"prompt":{"text":"…"}}` was only half the fix: coercing it to the empty
+  string exited 0, which is the same silence the exception produced. Every
+  string inside the value is collected now, to a bounded depth, so object,
+  array and content-block prompts are scanned like a plain one
+- A field named `command.line` or `command line` was walked past while
+  `file.path` was read correctly — the two collectors normalised field names
+  with a regex each, and the one for commands dropped only `-` and `_`
+- The placeholder recognition added above could be used to smuggle a live
+  credential: it asked whether a value *contained* a placeholder word, so
+  `changeme_` in front of a real key switched the rule off. The whole value has
+  to be placeholder now
+- Widening the Stripe and OpenAI rules swallowed two rules whole:
+  `stripe-restricted-key` became a strict subset of `stripe-secret-key`, and
+  `openai-project-key` stopped being reported at all. Both fire again
+- **Private IPv4 addresses are no longer detected.** An RFC 1918 address is
+  non-routable and identifies nothing outside the network it belongs to, and the
+  rule spent its time on ansible inventories, ssh configs, Kubernetes manifests
+  and docker-compose files — five such files, all blocked before, all quiet now.
+  Public addresses are unchanged and still require a nearby label. Anyone who
+  wants the old behaviour can add the rule back through the config file; the
+  `excludeContext` field it used is documented now and still serves the postal
+  code rule
+- The release could not publish. GitHub runs every `run:` step as `bash -e {0}`,
+  and the smoke test added last round pipes into a hook that exits 2 on purpose,
+  so errexit killed the step before the assertion that expected the 2. The gate
+  written to make the release safer made it impossible; every invocation now
+  captures its status instead of letting the pipeline decide the step's fate
+- The release gates now run against the tarball `npm publish` would upload, not
+  the checked-out tree. Deleting `"dist/"` from the `files` field used to pass
+  every gate while shipping a package whose hooks cannot start — verified by
+  doing it, along with dropping `hooks/` and shipping the tests
+- `hooks/hooks.json` — the file the plugin install path reads, and the only one
+  still pointing at the TypeScript sources — had no gate at all. Emptying it left
+  every check green. The release now parses it, requires both events, and
+  resolves every command's path inside the tarball
+- Recognise a value written to be replaced. Half of a realistic `.env.example`
+  was blocked on its contents (`your-password-here`, `REPLACE_ME_WITH_REAL`,
+  `django-insecure-...`, `postgres://user:password@localhost/db`), which defeats
+  exempting the name: the file exists to be committed and read. Ten realistic
+  templates now read clean, and one holding a live key is still blocked. Only
+  secret rules consult the list, and `example` is deliberately not on it — AWS's
+  own documented key ends in it and is still a key
+- An address stopped being found when a remote-shell word appeared anywhere
+  within forty characters: `rsync failed, notify alice@corp.io` was silently
+  dropped. The exemption now covers the operand position only — `ssh user@host`
+  and at most two arguments in between — and the `host:path` forms of scp and
+  rsync are left to the trailing-colon rule that already handled them
+- Cover the credit card brands the rule claimed and did not match. The Discover
+  branch required seventeen digits, so no Discover, JCB or Diners card could
+  reach it, and Mastercard's 2-series (2221-2720) and UnionPay were absent
+  outright — five brands undetected. Ranges follow Discover's published IIN
+  summary, which also puts the Discover range at 644-658, so 659 is no longer
+  claimed
+- Slack's rotated tokens (`xoxe-`), app-level tokens (`xapp-`) and workflow
+  tokens (`xwfp-`) were not matched; nor were Stripe restricted, organization
+  and webhook-signing secrets, nor eight of GitLab's ten token prefixes
+- Mapbox and Sentry tokens were written to shapes those services do not issue —
+  Mapbox delimits into three parts of which the first is the literal `pk`, `sk`
+  or `tk`, and a Sentry org token is underscore-separated, not dotted. Neither
+  rule had ever matched a real token
+- A Square token longer than sixty characters was missed. Square's contract
+  allows up to 1024; the length had been pinned at exactly what appears in the
+  wild
+- Codice fiscale: omocodia substitutes letters for digits at the seven numeric
+  positions when two people would share the first fifteen characters, and both
+  the pattern and the checksum guard demanded digits there — so every such code,
+  each issued to a real person, was missed
+- Add two more from a format survey: an Azure Shared Access Key
+  (`SharedAccessKey=` + 44-char base64, for Service Bus, Event Hubs and IoT Hub,
+  which is a different length from the 88-character storage account key) and a
+  Google OAuth client secret (`GOCSPX-`). Google's `ya29.` access tokens and
+  `1//` refresh tokens are deliberately not matched: Google documents no format
+  for them beyond a size cap and reserves the right to change it, so a pattern
+  would be a guess that reads as a guarantee
+- Add nine rules for credentials that no rule covered: OpenAI service-account and
+  admin keys, Azure Storage account keys, Fly.io, Databricks, HashiCorp Vault,
+  Shopify, Doppler, Grafana and Notion tokens. 64 rules to 73
+- Stop repeating the blocked command back to Claude. The reason a block gives
+  carried the first eighty characters of the command, so blocking
+  `export GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_…` handed the token to the model inside the sentence
+  explaining that it had been withheld. The detection lines were already
+  redacted; the line above them was not
+- Read a command out of a tool input field. Only `Bash` was ever parsed as a
+  command, so an MCP server that runs a shell — `{"command":"cat .env"}` — was
+  looked at as a path, found not to be a file, and let through, with the default
+  matcher sending every `mcp__*` tool down that path. `command`, `cmd`, `script`
+  and `code` are read now, the last for the paths quoted inside it
+- Treat an input of the wrong type as absent rather than throwing. A `command`
+  that is a number, a `prompt` that is an object, a `cwd` that is an array: each
+  threw, and an exception exits 1, which does not block —
+  `{"prompt":{"text":"<a key>"}}` went through unscanned
+- Anchor the assignment rule to the start of a line and require its value to be a
+  value. Widening it to `:` and lower case made it read ordinary code:
+  `function check(token: ShellToken)` was a secret, and the plugin could not read
+  its own source — 97 findings across 17 files of this repository, now none
+- Resolve a relative path against the directory the tool runs in. The payload
+  carries a `cwd` and nothing read it, so `cat secrets.txt` named a path relative
+  to wherever the hook process happened to start and was dropped as a file that
+  is not there. A literal `cd` earlier in the same command moves the base too,
+  which is what `cd build && cat secrets` needs
+- Read an assignment written with `:` and with a lower-case name. The rule wanted
+  `[A-Z_]` and `=`, so a `docker-compose.yml` full of `POSTGRES_PASSWORD: …`, an
+  `appsettings.json` with `"client_secret": …` and an `~/.aws/credentials` with
+  `aws_secret_access_key = …` all passed — the three file shapes this tool exists
+  to guard
+- Keep a substitution among the operands instead of ending the segment at it.
+  `cat <(echo hi) secrets` left `secrets` in a segment of its own, where it was
+  read as a command name; the comment at that line said the only cost was
+  reaching the inner command twice
+- Bound the work of one tool call at 64 MiB across every file it reads, and skip a
+  file already read. A glob naming three hundred large files took half a minute,
+  and five overlapping globs read the same files five times
+- Lift the `.env` name block only for a tag that allows secrets. `parseAllowTags`
+  reads `[allow-<anything>]`, and the guard asked only whether any tag was
+  present, so `[allow-pii]` and a mistyped `[allow-pi]` both turned it off. It no
+  longer skips the content scan either: a tag for one category was silently
+  covering the other
+- Expand `~` and `~/…` to the home directory. `cat ~/.aws/credentials` named a
+  path that exists on no disk, so it was dropped as a file that is not there —
+  and `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.npmrc` and `~/.netrc` went the same way
+- Expand `{a,b}` as well as `*`, `?` and `[`. `cat .env{,.bak}` reached the name
+  guard as the single name `.env{`, which is not an `.env` file, so the guard
+  that reads names rather than disks did not fire
+- Keep the literal candidate beside a glob's matches. Returning only the matches
+  was a way through this hook did not have before the expansion existed:
+  `cat /nonexistent/.env.*` matches nothing, so nothing was scanned and the
+  `.env` name guard never ran, and a file really named `report[2].txt` was read
+  as a character class and expanded to `report2.txt`
+- Read a shell's bundled `-c`. `bash -lc 'cat secrets'` runs what `bash -c`
+  runs, and only the exact spelling was recognised, so the inline code went
+  unparsed. The letters before the `c` have to be valueless switches
+- Step past `eval` the way the other wrappers are stepped past
+- Read `$(<secrets)`, which has no command in it at all: bash reads the file and
+  substitutes its contents, so the redirection is the only thing there
+- Scan the quoted literals inside an awk or sed program.
+  `awk 'BEGIN{while((getline l < "secrets")>0) print l}'` names a file without
+  ever passing it as an operand
+- Detect `-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----` and the SSH2 spelling, which
+  `openssl genpkey -aes256` writes and the rule did not list
+- Expand a glob before deciding whether it names a file. `cat sec*` collected
+  `sec*`, found nothing on disk by that name, and allowed the read; `cat .env*`
+  did the same, one character away from `cat .env`, which is blocked on its name.
+  A pattern is now expanded and each match is scanned, up to 256 of them
+- Read a redirection that stands before the command. `< secrets cat` is `cat`
+  reading `secrets`, but the operator was skipped and its target taken for the
+  command name, so the real command went unclassified and nothing of it was
+  collected — while `cat < secrets` blocked
+- Scan the file named inside a `git log -L` range. `-L1,10:secrets` prints the
+  lines of that file, and the file is written inside the flag's own argument
+  where neither the flag nor the operand handling would look for it
+- Read `--` as the end of option parsing for the in-place test too. In
+  `sed -- -i secrets`, `-i` is the script and `secrets` is a file sed prints; read
+  as the in-place flag, the command counted as writing and the file was skipped
+- Collect a path from an array inside an array. `{ "paths": [["…"]] }` fell
+  between the string branch and the object branch and was never looked at
+- Stop reading a path that names something other than a regular file. Reading
+  `/dev/zero` never reaches the end of the file, so the hook did not return and
+  Claude Code's PreToolUse timeout killed it — and a killed hook does not block
+  the call, which made the hang a way through. The tool-input side already
+  stat'd first; the Bash side now does too. On the paths that name a file
+  outright — `Read` and a Bash command — `.env` and `.env.*` are still blocked
+  on the name alone, before anything is opened. A tool input naming no existing
+  file is left alone as before, since its "path" may be a URL route or an object
+  key. What is no longer read is a FIFO, a process substitution or `/dev/stdin`,
+  which is now listed under Known Limitations
+- Read `--` as the end of option parsing. `grep -- -aws secrets` searches for
+  `-aws` in `secrets`, but `-aws` was taken for a flag, so nothing marked the
+  pattern as supplied and `secrets` was consumed in its place rather than
+  scanned. Without the `--` the same tokens mean what they did before: the file
+  is the pattern and the command reads stdin
+- Scan a variable named inside another expansion's suffix. `${A:-$TOKEN}` prints
+  `$TOKEN` whenever `A` is unset, but each expansion was matched whole, so the
+  skip to the closing brace swallowed the suffix and the name in it. Every `$` a
+  name follows now counts, which also takes in an unclosed `${TOKEN`: searching
+  a checkout for template references with `grep -rn '${TOKEN' .` is blocked when
+  that variable holds a secret. A false block, and the same direction the hook
+  already errs in for `echo '$TOKEN'`
+- `.claude-plugin/plugin.json` declared `0.5.1` while `package.json` declared
+  `0.7.0`: the release checklist asks for both, and the bump was missed for
+  0.6.0 and 0.7.0. The plugin manifest now matches the released version
+- Also treat the rest of the digest commands as measuring a file rather than
+  printing it: `sha512sum < secrets` was scanned while `sha256sum < secrets` was
+  not, because only four of the family were listed. `sha224sum`, `sha384sum`,
+  `sha512sum`, `b2sum`, `shasum`, `md5` and `sum` join them
+- Read a directory when a tool is pointed at one. `grep -r AKIA .` and a Grep
+  whose `path` names a folder both return file contents, and both reached a
+  check that asks whether the candidate is a regular file, found it is not, and
+  let the call through — with the key printed to stdout. The files directly
+  inside are now scanned, one level deep and capped at the same limit a glob is.
+  Measured over forty-five real directories, five block, and all five hold
+  credential-shaped assignments
+- Scan what a command says, not only what it opens, for every tool rather than
+  only `Bash`. An MCP server that runs a shell takes `{"command":"echo AKIA…"}`,
+  and the key was in the argument list unread
+- Scan every run of text in a file that holds NUL bytes. Scanning stopped at the
+  first one, so a single leading NUL reduced the scan to the empty string — and
+  an empty scan finds nothing and allows the read. The runs are joined by
+  newlines so no rule matches across two of them
+- Recognise UTF-16 when one side of each byte pair dominates, rather than when
+  the other side is empty. Characters in the U+xx00 rows — U+3000, the
+  ideographic space, among them — put a single NUL on the wrong side, and one of
+  those in a Japanese document sent the whole file down the binary path
+- Expand `$VAR` and `${VAR}` in a path. `cat ~/.aws/credentials` was blocked and
+  `cat $HOME/.aws/credentials` was not, so the guard turned on which of two
+  spellings the author used. A variable that is unset is left as written
+- Hold the scan budget across the whole hook invocation rather than resetting it
+  per `scan()` call. A hook scans once per environment variable and twice per
+  file, so each call stayed inside the budget while the total did not: with a
+  slow rule in a user config and sixty variables, measured at 29 seconds and
+  exit 0. Now capped at 10.5 seconds, and past the budget it exits 2
+- Fifteen detection rules matched a shape the vendor does not issue. `flyio-token`
+  required the `FlyV1 ` auth scheme, which is not part of the token, and excluded
+  `_` and `-` from a base64url body; `linear-key`, `twilio-sid` and `postman-key`
+  were lower-case only against mixed-case and hex formats; `notion-token`,
+  `digitalocean-pat`, `gitlab-pat`, `square-access-token` and `huggingface-token`
+  each covered one of the prefixes their vendor issues; `replicate-token` omitted
+  the hyphen; `azure-sas-key` fixed the length at 43 where Azure IoT DPS
+  documents 16–64 byte keys; `anthropic-key` asked for 95 characters after the
+  prefix where the format has 101, truncating the match; and `twilio-sid` had no
+  rule for the API Key SID at all
+- Start the scan clock when the payload arrives, not when the process does.
+  Both the five-second file deadline and the scan budget began at module load
+  and counted the wait for stdin against themselves, so a slow handover spent
+  the whole allowance before a file was read: six seconds of delay and nothing
+  was scanned, on an exit code of 0
+- Stop a compaction summary and a skill body from carrying an allow tag. Both
+  are written by the runtime with the user's role, and neither is anyone asking
+  for anything: a summary re-injects earlier turns, so a tag discussed at any
+  point in a conversation came back armed, and a meta line carries file content,
+  so writing a `SKILL.md` was enough to lift every check
+- Treat a fence that never closes as quoting, the way an unclosed synthetic
+  element already was. A paste cut short is still a paste
+- Return a quarter of a value in the block reason rather than eight characters
+  of it. The reason is written to stderr, which is where Claude reads it, so it
+  reaches the API the block exists to keep the value from — of a nine-character
+  password, eight characters were being handed back
+- Skip binaries when a directory is swept, while still scanning one in full when
+  it is named outright. Nobody asked for the files a directory sweep picks up,
+  and a folder of images cost three seconds and reported the compressed bytes as
+  email addresses. Measured: 8 MiB of images, 3,103ms to 131ms
+- Require a NUL imbalance to be near-total before reading a file as UTF-16. An
+  eight-to-one ratio read four real binaries out of seventeen thousand as text,
+  and a key sitting in a JPEG's bytes went unfound because the file decoded to
+  nonsense
+- Stop reading a reference to a value in code as the value. `env-assignment`
+  matched `process.env.API_TOKEN`, `user.password_digest` and `self.api_key`;
+  two in five of the distinct values it matched across thirty thousand real
+  files were one of these
+- The last tag in a message is the one that applies, replacing the earlier ones
+  rather than merging with them. Resolving each category separately kept the
+  wider grant of the two, so `[allow-all]` narrowed to `[allow-secret]` went on
+  allowing PII — the opposite of what narrowing means. Two tags no longer add
+  up: `[allow-all]` is how both categories are asked for
+- Resolve tags the same way in both hooks. `PreToolUse` collected every allow
+  tag and never looked at mask tags, so `[mask-secret] [allow-secret]` stopped
+  the prompt and then allowed the tool call it was stopping
+- Read AWS's documented keys as documentation. AWS writes `EXAMPLE` where the
+  random part would end — `AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE` and its siblings — and those
+  appear in every setup guide and in every README that copies one, where a block
+  reads exactly like a block on a live key. The new `aws-key` validator rejects
+  the suffix; a real key whose last seven characters spell it is one in
+  thirty-six to the seventh. This project's own README, installation page and
+  getting-started page were among the files it made unreadable
+- Stop reading a Retina asset filename as an email address. `logo@2x.png`
+  satisfied the pattern because `png` is two or more letters. Thirty asset
+  extensions are excluded, none of which is a country code
+- Match card numbers at every length their brand issues. ISO/IEC 7812 allows
+  10–19 digits and the pattern encoded one length per brand, so 19-digit
+  UnionPay, JCB and Discover cards, 13-digit Visa, and every Maestro card went
+  unmatched. Swept over 986 real files, the wider pattern adds no false positive
+
+### Documentation
+
+- `SECURITY.md` described the parse-error path as a fail-open that exits 0. It
+  exits 2 — the security policy stated the protection backwards
+- `docs/troubleshooting.md` said hooks activate without a restart, which the
+  README, the installation page and the getting-started page all contradict.
+  Restarting is now the first step, since a session that missed the hooks lists
+  the plugin as enabled and checks nothing
+- `README.md` said only the first 1 MiB of a file is scanned. Both ends are
+  read; what is missed is the middle
+- `docs/rules.md` said any allow tag lifts the `.env` name block and passes the
+  file through without scanning. `[allow-pii]` does not lift it, and the
+  contents are scanned either way
+- `docs/rules.md` gave `API_KEY=placeholder` as a value the entropy threshold
+  reports. It is not reported — the placeholder test drops it
+- The file structure in `README.md` listed two files under `src/lib/`, from
+  before this release added three more and moved the rules into JSON
+- The development commands in `README.md` were `npm`, while `CONTRIBUTING.md`
+  and every CI job are `pnpm`. The lockfile is pnpm's, so following the README
+  ignored it, wrote a second lockfile, and resolved a different tree from the one
+  that is tested
+
+### CI
+
+- Publish compiled JavaScript. Node refuses to strip types from a `.ts` file
+  inside `node_modules`, so an npm install wired to `src/` started the hook,
+  failed with `ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NODE_MODULES_TYPE_STRIPPING`, exited 1 — and a
+  non-zero exit that is not 2 does not block. The tool looked installed and
+  checked nothing. `dist/` now ships beside `src/`, the npm instructions point at
+  it, and no type stripper or `tsx` download is involved. The plugin install
+  keeps using the sources, which sit outside `node_modules` and work
+- Run the release path's own gates. `release.yml` is reached by a push to `main`
+  and is not chained to the pull-request build, so a red branch could publish. It
+  now runs the audit, the version-agreement check whose absence let the plugin
+  manifest ship stale twice, a build, and a smoke test that starts both published
+  hooks with plain `node`
+- Stop shipping the tests. `files` carried `src/`, which carried `__tests__`:
+  more than half the tarball, and none of it useful to anyone installing
+
+- Add a `versions` job that fails when `package.json` and
+  `.claude-plugin/plugin.json` declare different versions, or when either
+  declares nothing that looks like one
+- Check `vitest.config.ts` the way `src/` is checked. It sits at the repository
+  root, and both `tsc` and `biome` were scoped to `src`, so the file that decides
+  how the tests run was neither typechecked nor linted
+- Run CI on pushes to `main` and `develop`, not only on pull requests. The
+  commit a merge makes belongs to no PR, so nothing built it: two branches that
+  are green apart can still be red together
+- The release could not publish, again, and for a new reason. The smoke test now
+  starts each hook through `eval`, and under the `bash -e {0}` GitHub runs every
+  step with, errexit fires inside the pipeline's subshell: a hook exiting 2 on
+  purpose reached the assertion as 1, so all eight blocking assertions failed.
+  `set -uo pipefail` does not clear `-e`, which arrives from the invocation.
+  Measured: without `set +e`, eight errors and the step exits 1
+- Make every step after the publish recoverable. The job was gated on
+  `should_release`, which npm alone decides, so a failure after the publish left
+  the version on npm with no GitHub Release and no catalog sync, and a re-run
+  skipped the job entirely. Only the publish is conditional now; the tag, the
+  release and the sync are idempotent and run every time
+- Run the release smoke test against the commands `hooks/hooks.json` declares,
+  as well as against `dist/`. The manifest starts `src/*.ts` under type
+  stripping, which is what a plugin install runs and what the gate only checked
+  the existence of; `dist/*.js` is what the npm instructions point at. The
+  commands are read back from the manifest so the two cannot drift apart
+- Fail the release when the marketplace catalog does not pin this plugin to
+  `main`. `/plugin install` serves the entry's `ref`, and with no `ref` that is
+  the repository's default branch — `develop`. Every gate in `release.yml`
+  guards `main` and npm, and none of them was on the path a plugin user installs
+  from, so a merge into `develop` reached users directly
+- Anchor the version shape test at both ends, in `ci.yml` and `release.yml`
+  alike. `^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+` with no `$` accepts anything at all after a
+  valid prefix, and `release.yml` splices that value into four `run:` scripts:
+  `0.8.0"; curl … | sh; echo "`, `0.8.0 && rm -rf /` and `0.8.0$(id)` were all
+  accepted by the old test and are all rejected by the new one. The version is
+  now validated in the job that captures it, before it reaches `$GITHUB_OUTPUT`,
+  and every step that uses it reads it from `env:` rather than by interpolation
+- Create the git tag before publishing to npm, and let npm alone decide whether
+  a version is released. npm refuses to republish, so a publish that landed and
+  was followed by a failing step could not be retried — the tag it never created
+  had to be made by hand, and the release job declined to act on a re-run
+- Give `release.yml` a `concurrency` group, so two pushes to `main` in quick
+  succession cannot race over the tag and the publish. Nothing is cancelled: a
+  release half-way through is worse than one that waits
+- Put a `timeout-minutes` on every job in both workflows. A hung step otherwise
+  holds a runner for the six-hour default
+- Assert that the published `UserPromptSubmit` hook allows a clean prompt. Every
+  assertion made of it was that it exits 2, so a hook that exits 2
+  unconditionally — blocking every prompt the user types — would have shipped
+  green
+- Install with `--frozen-lockfile` in CI. A lockfile CI is allowed to rewrite is
+  a lockfile CI does not check
+- Take CodeQL off GitHub's default setup and run it from `codeql.yml`. Default
+  setup only analyses a pull request whose base is the default or a protected
+  branch, so a PR stacked on another feature branch was never scanned — the same
+  gap `ci.yml` had, and the branches it covers cannot be configured. The new
+  workflow analyses pull requests, pushes to `main` and `develop`, and a weekly
+  schedule, because an advisory lands after a change merges rather than only
+  alongside one. The two setups cannot coexist: default setup has to be off for
+  these analyses to be accepted
+- Fail the lint on warnings, and check `docs/.vitepress/` the way `src/` is
+  checked. `biome lint` exits 0 on a warning, so the dead `tokenize` in
+  `src/lib/rules.ts` — superseded by `contextTokens`, and carrying a comment
+  describing the behaviour that replaced it — sat in the tree reported and
+  ignored. Two rules are turned off rather than obeyed: `useLiteralKeys`
+  contradicts this project's `noPropertyAccessFromIndexSignature`, and applying
+  it broke the typecheck; `noTemplateCurlyInString` is off for the test tree,
+  which cannot test `${VAR}` handling without writing one
+
+---
+
 ## v0.7.0 (2026-08-04)
 
 ### Features