@consiliency/contract 0.6.4 → 0.7.1

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Files changed (37) hide show
  1. package/README.md +50 -2
  2. package/conformance/registries/authority-key-registry.test.json +48 -0
  3. package/conformance/vectors/authority-algorithm-confusion.json +1 -1
  4. package/conformance/vectors/authority-bad-signature.json +1 -1
  5. package/conformance/vectors/authority-cert-digest-mismatch.json +1 -1
  6. package/conformance/vectors/authority-chain-appended-still-verifies.json +1 -1
  7. package/conformance/vectors/authority-core-validity-expired.json +1 -1
  8. package/conformance/vectors/authority-forged-self-minted.json +1 -1
  9. package/conformance/vectors/authority-key-expired.json +1 -1
  10. package/conformance/vectors/authority-key-revoked.json +1 -1
  11. package/conformance/vectors/authority-missing-signature.json +1 -1
  12. package/conformance/vectors/authority-signer-approver-mismatch.json +1 -1
  13. package/conformance/vectors/authority-unknown-key-id.json +1 -1
  14. package/conformance/vectors/authority-valid.json +1 -1
  15. package/conformance/vectors/authority-wrong-key-valid-id.json +1 -1
  16. package/core/authority-canon/provenance.json +1 -1
  17. package/core/contract.json +24 -4
  18. package/core/registries/authority-key-registry.json +3 -3
  19. package/core/registries/protected-source-categories.json +86 -0
  20. package/core/schemas/git-discipline-protocol.schema.json +1 -1
  21. package/core/schemas/protected-source-category.schema.json +29 -0
  22. package/core/schemas/version-skew-protocol.schema.json +3 -3
  23. package/core/supervised-run/admitted-launch-envelope.schema.json +226 -0
  24. package/core/supervised-run/admitted-launch-envelope.v2.schema.json +880 -0
  25. package/core/supervised-run/conformance/README.md +55 -0
  26. package/core/supervised-run/conformance/README.v2.md +297 -0
  27. package/core/supervised-run/conformance/SHA256SUMS +10 -0
  28. package/core/supervised-run/conformance/envelope.v2.apply.vectors.json +1938 -0
  29. package/core/supervised-run/conformance/envelope.v2.canonical.vectors.json +2088 -0
  30. package/core/supervised-run/conformance/envelope.v2.vectors.json +16359 -0
  31. package/core/supervised-run/conformance/envelope.vectors.json +557 -0
  32. package/core/supervised-run/conformance/run-status.vectors.json +2150 -0
  33. package/core/supervised-run/provenance.json +116 -0
  34. package/core/supervised-run/run-status.schema.json +768 -0
  35. package/package.json +1 -1
  36. package/src/index.d.ts +3 -1
  37. package/src/index.js +8 -1
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
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+ # Conformance vectors: admitted_launch_envelope.v1 and supervised_run_status.v1
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+
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+ Status: **provisional**. These files define a harness-neutral, language-neutral contract and its golden valid and
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+ negative vectors. They name no deployment, repository, host or application, and are meant to be vendored unchanged.
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+
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+ ## Files
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+
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+ | File | Content |
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+ |---|---|
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+ | `../admitted-launch-envelope.schema.json` | JSON Schema (draft 2020-12) for the envelope a harness receives after admission, its fixed enforcement tiers (`x-enforcement-tiers`) and its semantic rules (`x-semantic-rules`) |
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+ | `../run-status.schema.json` | JSON Schema for the journal line, projection, page request, page and reader view (`$defs`), journal rules (`x-journal-rules`) and semantic rules (`x-semantic-rules`) |
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+ | `envelope.vectors.json` | admission and caller-context echo vectors |
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+ | `run-status.vectors.json` | journal, projection, liveness, reader-view and page vectors |
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+ | `SHA256SUMS` | sha256 of the four files above and this README; pin its digest when vendoring |
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+
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+ ## Reading a vector
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+
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+ Each file has `cases`. A case with `role: control` carries a complete `input` and expects no diagnostics. A case with
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+ `role: negative` names its `control` and a `patch`: a JSON Patch (RFC 6902, operations `add`, `remove` and `replace`
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+ with RFC 6901 pointers) applied to a copy of the control's input. When `rehash` is `true`, recompute
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+ `envelope.envelope_digest` after patching, so the negative authority self-verifies and must be refused on its merits.
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+
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+ `expected` is the exact set of diagnostic codes a conforming reader or validator reports. A refusal that comes from
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+ JSON Schema validation instead of the named semantic rule does not satisfy a negative vector: every vector is
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+ schema-valid by construction. `expected_effect`, when present, is matched as a subset of the reported effect:
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+
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+ - admission: `attempt.state` is `queued` when admitted, or `refused` with `worker_invocations: 0` and a typed
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+ `refusal` (`reason`, `constraint`, `tier`) before any process starts;
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+ - journal and liveness: `display` lists the state shown per attempt (`unknown` for any fail-closed journal
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+ condition; `stale_unknown` when the owner is not live);
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+ - projection: `display` is `current` or `stale`.
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+
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+ ## Digests and bytes
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+
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+ - `envelope_digest` is the SHA-256 of the RFC 8785 (JCS) serialization of the envelope without `envelope_digest`.
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+ The vectors use ASCII object keys and integers only, so JCS key order is plain code-point order.
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+ - A journal attempt is a list of segments. Each segment lists its lines: an object line is serialized with JCS and a
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+ string line is the exact raw text of that line. Segment bytes are the lines joined by LF, plus a final LF when
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+ `final_newline` is `true`. A segment header's `previous_segment_sha256` is the SHA-256 of the previous segment's
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+ bytes.
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+
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+ ## Reader obligations the vectors exercise
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+
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+ - `seq` is the only ordering; `observed_at` is informational.
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+ - A torn last line, an unknown schema or version, a foreign writer, a seq gap or regression, a broken segment chain or
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+ a foreign attempt identity fail closed: the attempt is shown unknown and the reader never truncates or repairs.
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+ - `refused` exists only before a process starts. `finished` needs `termination {reason, signal, by}`.
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+ `completed` is runtime data, never a work outcome or evidence.
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+ - Records hold digests and repository-relative locators only; event text is at most 200 characters, has no line
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+ breaks and is labelled `untrusted_display_text`.
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+ - A later attempt never copies an earlier attempt's evidence; equal proposal digests across attempts are legitimate
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+ when each attempt binds its own envelope, run and attempt ids.
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+ - A projection behind the journal tail is shown stale; pages are bounded (at most 100) and report `has_more` and
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+ omitted counts.
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+ - `caller_context` is opaque and echoed byte-for-byte.
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
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+ # Conformance vectors: admitted_launch_envelope.v2
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+
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+ Status: **provisional**. `admitted_launch_envelope.v2` is a harness-neutral, language-neutral contract, published
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+ alongside the frozen `admitted_launch_envelope.v1`. It names no deployment, repository, host or application, and is
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+ meant to be vendored unchanged. `README.md` in this directory still describes v1 and `supervised_run_status.v1`; it is
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+ part of the frozen v1 pin set, so it is not edited.
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+
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+ ## Files
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+
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+ | File | Content |
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+ |---|---|
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+ | `../admitted-launch-envelope.v2.schema.json` | JSON Schema (draft 2020-12) for the v2 envelope, plus its normative annotations: tiers, constraint semantics, route qualification and grant coverage, locator grammar, environment commitment, process boundary, digest forms, apply outcomes, evaluation order and semantic rules |
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+ | `envelope.v2.vectors.json` | admission and caller-context echo vectors |
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+ | `envelope.v2.canonical.vectors.json` | RFC 8785 number, document and parse-boundary vectors, and source-tree capture vectors |
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+ | `envelope.v2.apply.vectors.json` | write_scope apply-check vectors and runtime-journal vectors |
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+ | `README.v2.md` | this file |
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+ | `SHA256SUMS` | its first five lines are the v1 manifest, byte for byte; the lines after them add the five v2 files |
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+
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+ v1 files and their digests do not change. A v1 envelope is not a v2 envelope (the `schema` const differs and `launch`
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+ is required); a reader selects the contract by `schema`.
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+
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+ ## What v2 binds
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+
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+ v2 keeps every v1 field with its v1 meaning and adds one required, closed `launch` block. It binds, by digest or
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+ logical locator only, every input that determines what process starts and what it is given:
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+
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+ | `launch` field | Binds |
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+ |---|---|
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+ | `action`, `transport_id`, `stdin` | execution or review; the route the harness selected; stdin is the instruction bytes once then end of file (`input`) or nothing (`devnull`) |
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+ | `instructions` | SHA-256 and length of the exact instruction bytes, and their `source` (null only when genuinely inline) |
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+ | `references` | ordered role, SHA-256, length and `source` of every other consumed byte sequence: exactly one `baseline`, plus `context` and `config` files |
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+ | `argv` | SHA-256 of the UTF-8 RFC 8785 array that starts the outermost chain entry, and its length |
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+ | `executable_chain` | every wrapper, outermost first, then the executable: locator (repository-relative or a declared name) and raw-file SHA-256 |
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+ | `workspace_state` | base commit (or null), tree-manifest digest of the materialized source tree including overlays, the worker `cwd`, and the workspace-to-protected target map |
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+ | `environment` | SHA-256 of the redacted environment object (no secret values), and the id and raw-byte digest of the policy that builds and classifies it |
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+ | `trusted_policy` | raw-byte SHA-256 of the trusted configuration, the template (including declared helper transformations) and the qualification evidence (null when there is none) |
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+ | `stop` | `timeout_seconds` (integer, 1 to 3600) and `deadline_action` |
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+ | `grants` (optional) | `{canonical_form, sha256}` of the filesystem view, descriptor capabilities, dependency projection, supervisor identity and egress policy actually applied |
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+
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+ Tier and constraints, and the assignment, snapshot, project and dependency authority, stay where v1 has them.
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+ `caller_context` stays required and opaque, and is never a source of any launch input.
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+
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+ ## Locators and sources
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+
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+ Every relative locator follows `x-locator-grammar`: one or more `/`-separated segments, none empty, `.` or `..`; no
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+ `:`, backslash, control character, or leading, trailing or repeated `/`. Invalid input is refused
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+ (`locator_not_repo_relative`), never normalized; only a cwd path may be exactly `.`.
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+
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+ A source is one of:
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+
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+ - `{"namespace": "workspace", "path": ...}`: a path in the captured source tree. The tree must hold exactly one
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+ regular or executable file entry at that path with the same digest. A symlink or a missing entry does not count.
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+ - `{"namespace": "declared_root", "root": ..., "path": ...}`: under a root the trusted configuration declares. The
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+ physical location stays local.
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+ - `{"namespace": "descriptor", "descriptor": ...}`: behind a descriptor that the bound descriptor_capabilities grant
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+ lists.
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+
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+ Sources outside the workspace are captured, hashed and rechecked where they are. They are never copied into the
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+ workspace to fit the schema.
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+
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+ The working directory is `{"namespace": "workspace", "path": ...}`, relative to the source tree, or
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+ `{"namespace": "view_root", "root": ..., "path": ...}`, under a root the bound filesystem_view grant declares. Moving the
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+ cwd never changes the source-tree digest. Files a route discovers from its cwd must be bound as references.
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+
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+ ## Environment commitment and secrets
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+
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+ `environment.map_sha256` is the SHA-256 of the UTF-8 RFC 8785 serialization of the closed object below:
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+
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+ - `non_secret`: every non-secret variable of the effective worker environment, with its value;
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+ - `secret_names`: the secret variables actually present, sorted by UTF-16 code units, names only.
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+
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+ The bound environment policy classifies every variable, in trust, as non-secret or as secret with its credential
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+ source. A variable it does not classify fails closed. Each secret's source must be authorized by the single matching
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+ qualification record (`grant_unqualified` otherwise).
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+
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+ No secret value, and no digest of one, may appear in any commitment: the envelope itself, `caller_context`
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+ included (member names, nested values and arrays, after decoding escapes), argv, references, and policy, template or
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+ grant documents. `caller_context` stays opaque. That means no field has a meaning, and generic secret-safety
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+ validation is not interpretation. Its producer must not put secrets in it, and a known secret or derived digest
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+ found there is `launch_input_unbound`; the payload is never redacted to pass. A route that would need one bound is not representable. Rotating a secret value leaves the envelope
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+ unchanged; the vectors `E2-secret-env` and `E2-secret-env-rotated` show this. The digest is deterministic, unsalted
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+ and unkeyed. It commits the non-secret content but does not keep it confidential.
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+
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+ ## Process boundary and delivery
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+
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+ - **argv:** binds the outermost spawn.
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+ - **environment and cwd:** bind the effective worker after the helper transformations declared in the bound template.
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+ These are argument consumption, consumed and set variables, and a cwd change. The spawn environment and cwd are
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+ exactly what those transformations need, with nothing ambient.
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+ - **deadline:** starts at the first launch-chain process and is never restarted.
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+ - **qualification probes:** run before admission. They are not worker invocations and must not change captured
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+ material.
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+ - **refusals:** every admission refusal happens with zero launch-chain processes and zero worker invocations. A
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+ failure after the chain starts is `running -> finished` (`failed_to_start`), never `refused`.
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+
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+ Interactive terminal delivery is not representable in v2. That covers a pseudo-terminal, prompt responses, paste
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+ framing and input after output. Routes that need it are out of scope and refused; no transport label or grant
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+ changes that.
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+
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+ ## Tiers, qualification and grants
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+
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+ `x-enforcement-tiers` states each tier's semantics and limits; it does not qualify any installed tool.
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+
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+ Admission under a defined tier needs **exactly one** validator-held record that matches the route key. That key is the
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+ tier, action, transport, executable chain, template digest and qualification digest. Zero or several matches, including
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+ duplicates, are `route_not_qualified`, decided before any grant check. Records are never chosen by order or merged.
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+ The single record covers each grant by its exact `{canonical_form, sha256}`. A template or profile record with
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+ placeholders does not cover a concrete per-run grant.
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+
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+ A tier's `checked_before_apply` guarantee runs whether or not `required_constraints` lists it. The write_scope apply
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+ check rejects the whole proposal, or applies all of it, as an `x-apply-outcomes` work outcome. The attempt's journal
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+ is still `running -> finished`; a post-launch `refused` is `refused_after_launch`. `write_prevention` is never
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+ provided by a defined tier.
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+
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+ ## Reading a vector
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+
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+ Each envelope case has `role`:
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+
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+ - `control`: a complete `input`, admitted (`expected: []`, effect `queued`).
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+ - `negative`: a JSON Patch (RFC 6902 `add`, `remove` and `replace`, RFC 6901 pointers) applied to a copy of the named
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+ control's input. The envelope stays schema-valid; it must be refused by the semantic rules in `expected`.
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+ - `schema_negative`: a patch that makes the envelope schema-invalid. `expected` is `["envelope_schema_invalid"]`, and
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+ `expected_schema_errors` is the exact set of `{instance_path, keyword}` pairs. A `type` failure masks the other
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+ keywords at its node, and `anyOf` is reported at its own node.
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+
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+ With `rehash: true`, recompute `envelope_digest` by RFC 8785 after patching. `expected` is the exact set of diagnostics
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+ of the first reporting stage of `x-evaluation-order`. `expected_effect` is matched as a subset. `finding` names the
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+ review item a case closes.
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+
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+ An admission input has three parts.
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+
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+ - `envelope`: the record under test.
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+ - `validator_context`: what the validator holds independently. That is the expected authority values,
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+ `timeout_max_seconds`, and `qualified_routes`. Each route has `tier`, `action`, `transport_id`, `executable_chain`,
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+ `template_sha256`, `qualification_sha256`, `grants` (kind to `{canonical_form, sha256}`) and `credential_sources`.
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+ - `launch_material`: what the harness captured and is about to use. Text stands for exact UTF-8 bytes.
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+ - `instructions`, `references[]`: `source`, `content` (null when not captured) and `within_root`.
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+ - `stdin`: `mode`, which is `pipe`, `devnull` or `pty`, and `writes`, each `{after: start|output, text}`.
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+ - `process`:
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+ - `spawn` and `worker`, each `{argv, env, cwd}`;
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+ - `cwd_resolution` (`within_root`, `discovered` sources);
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+ - `deadline` (`origin`, `seconds`, `restarted_at_helper`);
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+ - qualification `probes`.
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+ - `executable_chain`: the resolved-file digests.
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+ - `workspace`: `base_commit`, a `capture` listing of filesystem objects, and `target_map`.
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+ - `environment`: `policy_id`, and `policy` as JSON text with `classification`.
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+ - `policy`: `config` (with `root <id> = ...` lines), `template` (JSON text with `argv`, `spawn_cwd` and `helpers`),
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+ `qualification`, and `grants`. Each grant is `{canonical_form: raw_bytes, text}` or
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+ `{canonical_form: rfc8785, value}`.
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+ - `unbound_inputs`: any input not covered by the launch block.
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+
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+ ## Canonicalization (envelope.v2.canonical.vectors.json)
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+
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+ RFC 8785 throughout:
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+
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+ - members are sorted by UTF-16 code units;
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+ - numbers use the ECMAScript form, and `-0` serializes as `0`;
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+ - strings use only the RFC 8785 escapes;
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+ - the output is UTF-8.
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+
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+ Before anything is hashed, the v2 input boundary is checked on raw input and again on in-memory values:
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+
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+ - valid UTF-8, no duplicate member names, no lone surrogates;
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+ - `__proto__` is an ordinary member name like any other;
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+ - numbers are finite binary64 values, and an integer-valued number must lie within -9007199254740991 through
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+ 9007199254740991, whatever its spelling. So `9007199254740992`, `9007199254740992.0`, `9.007199254740992e15`,
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+ `1e21` and `999999999999999900000` are all refused. Non-integral numbers stay valid.
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+
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+ This is a deliberately narrower v2 profile, not a claim that RFC 8785 disallows larger doubles; large opaque
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+ identifiers can be strings. Unrepresentable launch input is `launch_input_unbound`.
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+
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+ The file contains:
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+
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+ - `numbers`: serializer primitives only. They are IEEE-754 bit patterns and their ECMAScript Number-to-String form,
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+ with the RFC 8785 Appendix B rows copied from the RFC. They prove serialization, not acceptance;
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+ - `domain`: number tokens, each accepted with its canonical form or refused, through both raw parsing and in-memory
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+ commitment;
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+ - `documents`: raw text, the exact canonical text and its digest, or `reject`;
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+ - `alternates`: wrong preimages that must not match;
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+ - `tree_captures`: capture listings, the manifest each must yield and its digest, or `unbindable`;
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+ - `tree_alternates`: the manifests a wrong walk produces, which fail `launch_workspace_mismatch`.
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+
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+ Capture follows these rules:
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+
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+ - The root `.git` (directory, file or symlink) is excluded without descending; a nested `.git` is ordinary content.
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+ - A regular file is `executable_file` when its POSIX mode has any of `0o111` set.
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+ - A symlink hashes its raw target bytes and is never followed.
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+ - Entries are sorted by the UTF-8 bytes of their path.
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+ - Other object types, duplicate or ungrammatical paths, and missing modes are unbindable.
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+ - A represented file, symlink or other non-directory object is never a proper ancestor of another listed path,
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+ whatever the listing order; directories may be implicit. Capture never traverses a symlink ancestor.
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+
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+ ## Apply and journals (envelope.v2.apply.vectors.json)
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+
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+ - `applications`: a proposal against the bound scope and target map. Each gives the `x-apply-outcomes` outcome and
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+ the protected state afterwards, which is unchanged unless the outcome is `proposal_applied`. Every fixture has an
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+ empty `required_constraints`.
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+ - `journals`: `supervised_run_status.v1` journals whose lines validate against the frozen `journal_line` schema, with
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+ the diagnostics the frozen rules give.
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+
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+ ## Worked example: grants with per-run resources (control `E2-grants-worked`)
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+
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+ A run writes its output to a run-specific resource. The contract names that resource by logical identity, purpose and
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+ access (`run-output`, `output`, `write`). The directory it maps to, any descriptor number and any host path stay local.
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+ The trusted evidence that establishes the concrete mapping for this run is the qualification evidence the validator
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+ holds, a per-run attestation here; its digest is bound by `trusted_policy.qualification_sha256`.
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+
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+ `filesystem_view_sha256`, form `rfc8785` (in-memory structure). Exact UTF-8 preimage:
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+
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+ ```json
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+ {"resources":[{"access":"write","id":"run-output","purpose":"output"}],"roots":[{"access":"read","id":"tree"}]}
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+ ```
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+
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+ SHA-256: `53b5dee41446896ad01e9dbf6690489b8384a263a8c3c406b7bbc4cb7b6c3e27`
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+
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+ `descriptor_capabilities_sha256`, form `rfc8785` (in-memory structure). Exact UTF-8 preimage:
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+
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+ ```json
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+ {"descriptors":[{"access":"write","id":"run-output","purpose":"output"}]}
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+ ```
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+
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+ SHA-256: `bec2a4cd7032cb76308098bce96308a231bf93127eff0ab673a40ec87a212957`
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+
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+ `egress_policy_sha256`, form `raw_bytes` (the loaded document, rules in order). Exact bytes:
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+
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+ ```text
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+ egress v1
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+ 1 allow api.example:443
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+ 2 deny *
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+ ```
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+
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+ SHA-256: `ed47ec90e18651569e52e868eded06823ebdffd6803805ea8c245859e1d433b7`
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+
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+ The envelope's `launch.grants`:
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+
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+ ```json
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+ {
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+ "filesystem_view_sha256": {
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+ "canonical_form": "rfc8785",
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+ "sha256": "53b5dee41446896ad01e9dbf6690489b8384a263a8c3c406b7bbc4cb7b6c3e27"
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+ },
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+ "descriptor_capabilities_sha256": {
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+ "canonical_form": "rfc8785",
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+ "sha256": "bec2a4cd7032cb76308098bce96308a231bf93127eff0ab673a40ec87a212957"
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+ },
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+ "egress_policy_sha256": {
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+ "canonical_form": "raw_bytes",
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+ "sha256": "ed47ec90e18651569e52e868eded06823ebdffd6803805ea8c245859e1d433b7"
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+ }
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+ }
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+ ```
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+
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+ The single validator-held qualification record for this route, which covers exactly these commitments (`grants`, serialized by RFC 8785):
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+
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+ ```json
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+ {"descriptor_capabilities_sha256":{"canonical_form":"rfc8785","sha256":"bec2a4cd7032cb76308098bce96308a231bf93127eff0ab673a40ec87a212957"},"egress_policy_sha256":{"canonical_form":"raw_bytes","sha256":"ed47ec90e18651569e52e868eded06823ebdffd6803805ea8c245859e1d433b7"},"filesystem_view_sha256":{"canonical_form":"rfc8785","sha256":"53b5dee41446896ad01e9dbf6690489b8384a263a8c3c406b7bbc4cb7b6c3e27"}}
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+ ```
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+
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+ Its full route key and coverage:
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+
261
+ ```json
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+ {
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+ "tier": "provider_readonly_patch_return_audit",
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+ "action": "execution",
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+ "transport_id": "cli",
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+ "executable_chain": [
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+ {
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+ "locator_kind": "declared",
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+ "locator": "provider-cli",
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+ "sha256": "4b70047af52679bb9d2955b7270a2f1941c6942ecbd8540f75229d7819f933a0"
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+ }
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+ ],
273
+ "template_sha256": "297f770282a217a9b0c482d20b080d1baa9eb7bf9ec308fb013ccf501bcc1fe0",
274
+ "qualification_sha256": "ef315227a572d65ee3bd3092be7c0fe9b655867496c6253a8dcd0025b73c3a77",
275
+ "grants": {
276
+ "filesystem_view_sha256": {
277
+ "canonical_form": "rfc8785",
278
+ "sha256": "53b5dee41446896ad01e9dbf6690489b8384a263a8c3c406b7bbc4cb7b6c3e27"
279
+ },
280
+ "descriptor_capabilities_sha256": {
281
+ "canonical_form": "rfc8785",
282
+ "sha256": "bec2a4cd7032cb76308098bce96308a231bf93127eff0ab673a40ec87a212957"
283
+ },
284
+ "egress_policy_sha256": {
285
+ "canonical_form": "raw_bytes",
286
+ "sha256": "ed47ec90e18651569e52e868eded06823ebdffd6803805ea8c245859e1d433b7"
287
+ }
288
+ },
289
+ "credential_sources": []
290
+ }
291
+ ```
292
+
293
+ A record covering only the placeholder template (`{run_output}` in place of `run-output`) does not cover this grant
294
+ (`S2-grant-template-only`). Neither does a record that lacks the egress commitment (`S2-grant-uncovered-per-run`) or
295
+ lists the same digest under another form (`S2-grant-form-wrong`). Changing the applied bytes or structure is
296
+ `launch_policy_mismatch` (`S2-grant-raw-whitespace`, `S2-grant-raw-rule-order`, `S2-grant-jcs-value-changed`,
297
+ `S2-grant-jcs-list-order`).
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
1
+ 0273f7a5d80eab95ee84660cd657445e881431bca3b8f91cec61015a5d39d41d ../admitted-launch-envelope.schema.json
2
+ 5118c1ab8604e85990150d66bf6b8c1af979dcc404fc84ee5a3c4ba4fead9a30 ../run-status.schema.json
3
+ 2d5045245105af88f1f45f720aa8bc3f366efc95c25e25a9c50e402a175533ca README.md
4
+ 876d322c313b444e49d7a95ee8f7ca39eef13c45864c67a0b3877235e1db6d7f envelope.vectors.json
5
+ 5bf9dfbf65805f7340290586d546038fc88659785e60e2f55532df4ac6696730 run-status.vectors.json
6
+ 6d6b2f89c55d160c2c132c29b3aa330a0a91c40ab017707040478a60b469194f ../admitted-launch-envelope.v2.schema.json
7
+ c6ab5d9da4707adf5dad9602b483b201a2dfe89f638ecba84129e0c477d72637 README.v2.md
8
+ e742d2774d410c2508405eaffed84575b992483da68c07f28591097d6ec5bc2f envelope.v2.vectors.json
9
+ f7f11c7667d12b0c876102781fdd5773074f5301f152a6d18be509894bc0e8f8 envelope.v2.canonical.vectors.json
10
+ 57e0fd4d2e88c75bb8dfbab94448431ca3c752f6444febf1bd492323b044c078 envelope.v2.apply.vectors.json