@consiliency/agent-board-schema 1.63.0 → 1.68.0

package/migrations/20261015000200_agent_board_request_preserve_removed.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+-- Consiliency/message-board#680: a join request cannot erase an eviction.
+
+create or replace function agent_board.request_join_board(p_board_id uuid, p_agent_id uuid, p_metadata jsonb DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb)
+ RETURNS TABLE(membership_id uuid, board_id uuid, agent_id uuid, membership_state text, created_at timestamp with time zone, updated_at timestamp with time zone)
+ LANGUAGE plpgsql
+ SECURITY DEFINER
+ SET search_path TO 'agent_board', 'public'
+as $$
+declare
+  v_board agent_board.boards%rowtype;
+  v_membership agent_board.board_memberships%rowtype;
+  v_actor uuid := agent_board.current_agent_id();
+begin
+  -- GATENULL (#58): only service_role may proceed with an unresolved actor.
+  if v_actor is null and not agent_board._is_service_role() then
+    raise exception 'current agent principal not resolved' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  select * into v_board
+    from agent_board.boards
+   where id = p_board_id
+     and status = 'active'
+     and visibility in ('open', 'invite_only');
+
+  if v_board.id is null then
+    raise exception 'board not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+  if v_actor is not null and v_actor <> p_agent_id then
+    raise exception 'board request actor mismatch' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+  if not exists (select 1 from agent_board.agents where id = p_agent_id) then
+    raise exception 'agent not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+
+  -- Lock standing before deciding whether this request may replace a row.
+  perform 1 from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+   where bm.board_id = p_board_id and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+   order by bm.id
+   for update;
+
+  -- OPTION 3 ROOT CAUSE (#109 / Fable B5): an already-ACTIVE member requesting is a NO-OP.
+  -- The sink's active-preference UPDATE would otherwise DEMOTE their joined row to `requested`
+  -- (B5), or -- via other paths -- leave an (active, pending) duplicate that the resolver then
+  -- has to untangle. They are already in; requesting changes nothing. This is what stops the
+  -- dangerous duplicate arising from the request path in the first place.
+  if exists (
+    select 1 from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+       and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+       and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+  ) then
+    return query
+    select bm.id, bm.board_id, bm.agent_id, bm.membership_state, bm.created_at, bm.updated_at
+      from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+       and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+       and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+     order by bm.created_at desc, bm.id desc
+     limit 1;
+    return;
+  end if;
+
+  if exists (
+    select 1 from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+       and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+       and bm.membership_state = 'removed'
+  ) then
+    raise exception 'board join request refused for removed standing' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  v_membership := agent_board._upsert_board_membership_state(
+    p_board_id,
+    p_agent_id,
+    'requested',
+    p_agent_id,
+    p_metadata
+  );
+
+  return query
+  select v_membership.id, v_membership.board_id, v_membership.agent_id, v_membership.membership_state, v_membership.created_at, v_membership.updated_at;
+end;
+$$;
+
+revoke all on function agent_board.request_join_board(uuid,uuid,jsonb) from public, anon;
+grant execute on function agent_board.request_join_board(uuid,uuid,jsonb) to authenticated, service_role;
+comment on function agent_board.request_join_board(uuid,uuid,jsonb) is 'Self-service join request. Locks the subject membership rows before checking standing; active members are unchanged, and removed standing is refused for every caller without erasing eviction evidence.';

package/migrations/20261015000300_agent_board_rls_correlation.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+-- Consiliency/message-board#589: correlate policy subqueries to their protected row.
+
+drop policy if exists agent_board_authenticated_select_threads on agent_board.threads;
+create policy agent_board_authenticated_select_threads
+on agent_board.threads
+as permissive
+for select
+to authenticated
+using (
+  created_by_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+  or exists (
+    select 1
+      from agent_board.messages m
+     where m.thread_id = threads.id
+       and (
+         m.author_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+         or exists (
+           select 1
+             from agent_board.delivery_recipients dr
+            where dr.source_message_id = m.id
+              and (
+                dr.recipient_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+                or (
+                  dr.board_id is not null
+                  and exists (
+                    select 1
+                      from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+                     where bm.board_id = dr.board_id
+                       and bm.agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+                       and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+                  )
+                )
+              )
+         )
+       )
+  )
+  or exists (
+    select 1
+      from agent_board.tasks t
+     where t.thread_id = threads.id
+       and (
+         t.created_by_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+         or t.assigned_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+         or exists (
+           select 1
+             from agent_board.delivery_recipients dr
+            where dr.source_task_id = t.id
+              and (
+                dr.recipient_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+                or (
+                  dr.board_id is not null
+                  and exists (
+                    select 1
+                      from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+                     where bm.board_id = dr.board_id
+                       and bm.agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+                       and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+                  )
+                )
+              )
+         )
+       )
+  )
+  or exists (
+    select 1
+      from agent_board.read_receipts rr
+     where rr.thread_id = threads.id
+       and rr.agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+  )
+);
+
+comment on policy agent_board_authenticated_select_threads on agent_board.threads is 'Correlates visibility to the protected threads row; inner aliases cannot capture its key columns.';
+
+drop policy if exists agent_board_authenticated_select_delegations on agent_board.delegations;
+create policy agent_board_authenticated_select_delegations
+on agent_board.delegations
+as permissive
+for select
+to authenticated
+using (
+  delegated_by_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+  or delegated_to_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+  or exists (
+    select 1
+      from agent_board.tasks t
+     where t.id in (delegations.parent_task_id, delegations.child_task_id)
+       and (
+         t.created_by_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+         or t.assigned_agent_id = agent_board.current_agent_id()
+       )
+  )
+);
+
+comment on policy agent_board_authenticated_select_delegations on agent_board.delegations is 'Correlates visibility to the protected delegations row; inner aliases cannot capture its key columns.';
+
+revoke all on function agent_board._current_agent_has_board_access(uuid) from public, anon;
+
+grant execute on function agent_board._current_agent_has_board_access(uuid) to authenticated, service_role;
+
+comment on function agent_board._current_agent_has_board_access(uuid) is 'Session-derived read predicate used by authenticated RLS policies. Retains its existing access checks and service-role behavior; callable by authenticated and service_role.';
+
+revoke all on function agent_board._current_agent_can_access_thread(uuid) from public, anon;
+
+grant execute on function agent_board._current_agent_can_access_thread(uuid) to authenticated, service_role;
+
+comment on function agent_board._current_agent_can_access_thread(uuid) is
+  'Thread access for the CURRENT session: service_role short-circuits true, otherwise '
+  '_agent_can_access_thread(p_thread_id, current_agent_id()). The disjunct set lives in that '
+  'helper and is not restated here. '
+  'ACCESS ONCE HELD IS NEVER WITHDRAWN, AND THAT IS DELIBERATE (message-board#287, extended and '
+  'RATIFIED for claims on message-board#291). The read_receipts, claims and inbox_items '
+  'disjuncts are all PERMANENT: no role holds DELETE or TRUNCATE on any of those tables and no '
+  'function body removes a row from them, so LEAVING A BOARD, LOSING A TASK ASSIGNMENT, OR '
+  'RELEASING A CLAIM DOES NOT REVOKE ACCESS TO A THREAD THE AGENT ALREADY HELD. The rule is '
+  '"you keep what you saw". For claims this is sharper than it looks and was ruled on '
+  'explicitly: the claims disjunct filters on (thread_id, agent_id) and NOT on status or '
+  'lease_expires_at, so a RELEASED or LONG-EXPIRED claim still grants access indefinitely. '
+  'Two alternatives were considered and REJECTED on #291: (a) filtering the disjunct on an '
+  'active, unexpired lease -- rejected because it reverses the #287 ruling for this one case '
+  'and would strip access at deploy time from every holder of a released or expired claim; '
+  '(b) recording the access separately when the claim is taken, so a stale row is not itself '
+  'the key -- acknowledged as the more honest design, rejected for now on cost and because '
+  'agents holding historical released claims would need backfilling or would silently lose '
+  'access. A future migration that adds a status or lease filter here is REVERSING A RULING, '
+  'not fixing a bug. What IS closed is the mint: mark_read (#287) and acquire_claim (#291) both '
+  'gate the NAMED subject through _agent_can_access_thread, so a receipt or a claim can only '
+  'ever record access already held. '
+  'access_mode = ''restricted'' is UNREACHABLE through the shipped API -- no function writes '
+  'threads.access_mode (it defaults to ''inherit'') and authenticated/service_role hold SELECT '
+  'and only SELECT on agent_board.threads -- so the inherit disjunction governs every thread in '
+  'production and the per-thread ACL added in #27 is dormant.'
+  ' Callable by authenticated for its RLS policies and by service_role.';

package/migrations/20261015000400_agent_board_resolution_authority.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+-- Consiliency/message-board#668: resolution uses the pending reader's flat authority gate.
+--
+-- Consiliency/message-board#665 (integration): this migration sorts after
+-- 20261015000100_agent_board_session_provenance, so on every fresh apply THIS body is the one
+-- that survives. It therefore carries #665's session-derived attribution as well: both sink calls
+-- (the redundant-pending retirement and the resolution write) pass v_actor, never the caller's
+-- p_created_by_agent_id, which is retained for signature compatibility only. Because the gate
+-- below refuses an unresolved principal (including an unresolved service-role session), v_actor
+-- is always a resolved owner/admin when a sink is reached.
+
+create or replace function agent_board.resolve_board_request(
+  p_board_id uuid,
+  p_agent_id uuid,
+  p_membership_state text,
+  p_created_by_agent_id uuid,
+  p_metadata jsonb default '{}'::jsonb
+)
+returns table(membership_id uuid, board_id uuid, agent_id uuid, membership_state text, left_at timestamp with time zone, updated_at timestamp with time zone)
+language plpgsql
+security definer
+set search_path to 'agent_board', 'public'
+as $function$
+declare
+  v_effective_state text;
+  v_board agent_board.boards%rowtype;
+  v_membership_id uuid;
+  v_active_id uuid;
+  v_membership agent_board.board_memberships%rowtype;
+  v_actor uuid := agent_board.current_agent_id();
+begin
+  if v_actor is null and not agent_board._is_service_role() then
+    raise exception 'current agent principal not resolved' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  if p_membership_state not in ('joined', 'subscribed', 'removed') then
+    raise exception 'resolve_board_request only accepts joined, subscribed, or removed' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+  select * into v_board from agent_board.boards where id = p_board_id and status = 'active';
+  if v_board.id is null then
+    raise exception 'board not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+  if v_actor is null or not exists (
+    select 1 from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+       and bm.agent_id = v_actor
+       and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+       and bm.role in ('owner', 'admin')
+  ) then
+    raise exception 'board request resolution requires owner or admin role' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  -- Lock the WHOLE (board, agent) set first so a concurrent self-withdrawal on ANY physical row
+  -- serialises behind this resolution (#109's race is per-(board,agent), not per-row).
+  perform 1
+     from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+    where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+      and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+    order by bm.id
+      for update;
+
+  -- Select the PENDING row explicitly (not the total-order winner). B2 (#116): with TWO pending
+  -- rows (a requested AND an invited) for one subject this resolves the NEWEST; the older dangles.
+  -- Inherent to the multi-row model — resolution is one act on one row.
+  select bm.id
+    into v_membership_id
+    from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+   where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+     and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+     and bm.membership_state in ('requested', 'invited')
+   order by bm.created_at desc, bm.id desc
+   limit 1;
+
+  select bm.id
+    into v_active_id
+    from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+   where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+     and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+     and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+   order by bm.created_at desc, bm.id desc
+   limit 1;
+
+  if v_membership_id is null then
+    raise exception 'pending board membership not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+
+  -- OPTION 1 FALLBACK (#109 A3): approving a subject who is ALREADY active is a no-op success,
+  -- not a promotion of the pending row into collision with the active one. Return the active row
+  -- untouched. Rejection still falls through to act on the pending row.
+  --
+  -- B4 (#116): the no-op path intentionally IGNORES the requested target state and p_metadata —
+  -- approving with target 'subscribed' a 'joined' active row returns 'joined' (a self-toggle
+  -- belongs to update_board_membership, which is where the old path coupled the metadata write to
+  -- a demotion). Nothing legitimate is lost.
+  if p_membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed') and v_active_id is not null then
+    -- B1 (#116): retire the redundant pending row so it stops showing in pending listings. The
+    -- subject is already active via v_active_id (untouched); route the retire through the sink so
+    -- the write EMITS (the emission-completeness invariant requires every membership write to hit
+    -- the ledger) — a board-authored 'left' event, which is NEUTRAL for consent (not the subject's
+    -- own act) and does not affect the subject's consent-present status carried by the active row.
+    -- 'left' is recoverable. Previously only a reject cleared this, leaving an owner-visible
+    -- dangling request after a no-op approve.
+    perform agent_board._upsert_board_membership_state(
+      p_board_id, p_agent_id, 'left', v_actor, p_metadata, v_membership_id, 'noop_superseded'
+    );
+
+    return query
+    select bm.id, bm.board_id, bm.agent_id, bm.membership_state, bm.left_at, bm.updated_at
+      from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     where bm.id = v_active_id;
+    return;
+  end if;
+
+  -- REJECTSEM (#89): a rejection is NOT an eviction — resolve only acts on a PENDING row, so a
+  -- refusal lands on 'left' (recoverable), never 'removed' (which bars self-re-entry). Applied to
+  -- both requested and invited origins.
+  v_effective_state := case when p_membership_state = 'removed' then 'left'
+                            else p_membership_state end;
+
+  -- #82: promotion into an active state requires the subject's own consent act (the sole
+  -- consent-predicate read site). Every accepted session, including service-role operators,
+  -- has a resolved owner/admin principal after the authority gate above; there is no exemption.
+  if v_actor is not null
+     and v_effective_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+     and not agent_board._membership_consent_present(p_board_id, p_agent_id) then
+    raise exception 'admitting % requires an act by that agent', p_agent_id
+      using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  v_membership := agent_board._upsert_board_membership_state(
+    p_board_id,
+    p_agent_id,
+    v_effective_state,
+    v_actor,
+    p_metadata,
+    v_membership_id,
+    case when p_membership_state = 'removed' then 'reject_withdrawn' else null end
+  );
+
+  return query
+  select v_membership.id, v_membership.board_id, v_membership.agent_id, v_membership.membership_state, v_membership.left_at, v_membership.updated_at;
+end;
+$function$;
+
+revoke all on function agent_board.resolve_board_request(uuid,uuid,text,uuid,jsonb) from public, anon;
+grant execute on function agent_board.resolve_board_request(uuid,uuid,text,uuid,jsonb) to authenticated, service_role;
+comment on function agent_board.resolve_board_request(uuid,uuid,text,uuid,jsonb) is 'Resolves pending memberships only for a resolved active owner/admin principal, independent of role_gate_enforced and creator identity. Matches list_board_pending_memberships, including refusal of an unresolved service-role session. Consent, rejection mapping and redundant-request retirement remain in force. Membership attribution is derived from current_agent_id(); p_created_by_agent_id is retained for signature compatibility only.';

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@consiliency/agent-board-schema",
-  "version": "1.63.0",
+  "version": "1.68.0",
   "description": "Canonical, immutable, exact-pinnable agent_board schema bundle: ordered SQL migrations, digest + compatibility manifest, and deterministic materialize/plan/check tooling for adopters.",
   "repository": "https://github.com/Consiliency/message-board.git",
   "type": "module",

package/schema-manifest.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "schema": "agent_board_schema_manifest.v1",
   "interface": "IF-0-MBPLANE-BUNDLE-1",
   "package": "@consiliency/agent-board-schema",
-  "packageVersion": "1.63.0",
+  "packageVersion": "1.68.0",
   "schemaVersion": 8,
   "minClientVersion": "1.1.0",
   "source": {
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@
       "usage": "upsert (retention/monitoring defaults; on conflict do nothing)"
     }
   ],
-  "migrationCount": 161,
-  "aggregateSha256": "884150d3dfbccdbe8a0be038688832baa83a185ae219ab0afcf9d585dc42a984",
+  "migrationCount": 166,
+  "aggregateSha256": "c59fcf6ae0ce9cf567f68a27abee5c8a3a11d0d98ebc4d5cb07a496e7832964c",
   "migrations": [
     {
       "order": 0,
@@ -1497,6 +1497,51 @@
       "sourceRef": "message-board",
       "bytes": 14704,
       "sha256": "4a6c00546a1d2837f88eece1de082cc76eec1f85cce8cf9ac7998e42bf32a5c5"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 161,
+      "id": "20261014000200_agent_board_last_owner",
+      "filename": "20261014000200_agent_board_last_owner.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 13141,
+      "sha256": "2fed8fc5a2c7c0ba9acbb12872b329db3f0902d96597c52cc50e21e4682c2fff"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 162,
+      "id": "20261015000100_agent_board_session_provenance",
+      "filename": "20261015000100_agent_board_session_provenance.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 16704,
+      "sha256": "b5e3c7fc859dff7c3a0ccd4c0a7fb22d6ada1df68cb028be138035b586e1462a"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 163,
+      "id": "20261015000200_agent_board_request_preserve_removed",
+      "filename": "20261015000200_agent_board_request_preserve_removed.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 3736,
+      "sha256": "9bad7438909e9c02cc034b59af67fa962e7251bedb53d691e762e651ba1c343c"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 164,
+      "id": "20261015000300_agent_board_rls_correlation",
+      "filename": "20261015000300_agent_board_rls_correlation.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 6348,
+      "sha256": "aafe4a4b6eb1b6a5e3f0b5fbd8b4e4d395399de079c6a7b2eb2535ef4514bdc4"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 165,
+      "id": "20261015000400_agent_board_resolution_authority",
+      "filename": "20261015000400_agent_board_resolution_authority.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 7396,
+      "sha256": "bfeb7bda1eb41bc431416502db69c33156ff72acfd79cefdfd556d933f79d809"
     }
   ],
   "excludedBridge": {

package/src/deployment-drift-main.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+// Run the shipped checker with REAL divergent Git history. Only npm/board I/O is stubbed.
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { chmodSync, copyFileSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
+
+const ROOT = fileURLToPath(new URL("../../../", import.meta.url));
+const PKG = "packages/agent-board-schema";
+const roots = [];
+afterEach((context) => { context.task.meta.drift_assertions = expect.getState().assertionCalls; for (const root of roots.splice(0)) rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); });
+const stamp = "2026-01-02T00:00:00+00:00";
+function git(cwd, args, env = {}) {
+  const r = spawnSync("git", args, { cwd, encoding: "utf8", env: { ...process.env, ...env } });
+  if (r.status !== 0) throw new Error(`fixture git failed: ${r.stderr}`);
+  return r.stdout.trim();
+}
+function installChecker(dir) {
+  mkdirSync(join(dir, "scripts/lib"), { recursive: true });
+  for (const file of ["check-deployment-drift.mjs", "lib/drift-evaluate.mjs"]) {
+    copyFileSync(join(ROOT, "scripts", file), join(dir, "scripts", file));
+  }
+}
+function fixture() {
+  const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "drift-main-")); roots.push(root);
+  const dir = join(root, "checkout"); mkdirSync(join(dir, PKG), { recursive: true });
+  git(dir, ["init", "-q", "-b", "main"]);
+  const commit = (version, date, description = "original") => {
+    writeFileSync(join(dir, PKG, "package.json"), JSON.stringify({ name: "@consiliency/agent-board-schema", version, description }, null, 2));
+    writeFileSync(join(dir, PKG, "schema-manifest.json"), JSON.stringify({ schemaVersion: 8, aggregateSha256: `digest-${version}` }));
+    git(dir, ["add", PKG]);
+    git(dir, ["-c", "user.name=fixture", "-c", "user.email=fixture@example.invalid", "commit", "-qm", version + description],
+      { GIT_AUTHOR_DATE: date, GIT_COMMITTER_DATE: date });
+    return git(dir, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"]);
+  };
+  commit("1.63.0", "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z");
+  commit("1.64.0", stamp);
+  const main = commit("1.64.0", "2026-01-04T00:00:00Z", "adjacent edit");
+  git(dir, ["switch", "-qc", "proposal"]);
+  const proposal = commit("1.65.0", "2026-01-05T00:00:00Z", "unmerged proposal");
+  // A cached tracking branch deliberately lies. CI must use the event's base SHA.
+  git(dir, ["update-ref", "refs/remotes/origin/main", proposal]);
+  // A real local remote supplies operator truth without any network/service access.
+  const remote = join(root, "remote.git"); git(root, ["clone", "--bare", "-q", dir, remote]);
+  git(dir, ["remote", "add", "origin", remote]);
+  installChecker(dir);
+  const shims = join(root, "bin"); mkdirSync(shims);
+  writeFileSync(join(shims, "npm"), '#!/bin/sh\nprintf "%s\\n" "$PUBLISHED"\n'); chmodSync(join(shims, "npm"), 0o755);
+  const preload = join(root, "no-network.mjs");
+  writeFileSync(preload, 'globalThis.fetch = async () => ({ ok: true, json: async () => [JSON.parse(process.env.BOARD_ROW)] });');
+  const eventPath = join(root, "event.json");
+  const event = { pull_request: { base: { ref: "main", sha: main, repo: { full_name: "Consiliency/message-board" } } } };
+  const run = ({ env = {}, payload = event, cwd = dir, args = [] } = {}) => {
+    writeFileSync(eventPath, JSON.stringify(payload));
+    const r = spawnSync(process.execPath, [join(cwd, "scripts/check-deployment-drift.mjs"), "--json", ...args], {
+      cwd, encoding: "utf8", timeout: 15_000, env: { ...process.env,
+        PATH: `${shims}:${process.env.PATH}`, NODE_OPTIONS: `--import ${pathToFileURL(preload).href}`,
+        GITHUB_ACTIONS: "true", GITHUB_EVENT_NAME: "pull_request", GITHUB_EVENT_PATH: eventPath,
+        GITHUB_REF: "refs/pull/1/merge", GITHUB_SHA: proposal, GITHUB_REPOSITORY: "Consiliency/message-board",
+        PUBLISHED: "1.64.0", SUPABASE_ACCESS_TOKEN: "disposable-canary-never-authenticates", ...env },
+    });
+    expect(r.error).toBeUndefined();
+    const out = r.stdout + r.stderr;
+    const doc = JSON.parse(r.stdout);
+    return { ...r, out, doc };
+  };
+  return { root, dir, remote, main, proposal, event, run };
+}
+function expectMain(r, main) {
+  expect(r.status).toBe(0);
+  expect(r.doc.status).toBe("ok");
+  expect(r.doc.facts.merged).toBe("1.64.0");
+  expect(r.doc.facts.mergedCommit).toBe(main);
+  expect(new Date(r.doc.facts.bumpIso).toISOString()).toBe(new Date(stamp).toISOString());
+  expect(r.doc.facts.expectedDigest).toBe("digest-1.64.0");
+}
+function expectUnknown(r) {
+  expect(r.status).toBe(2);
+  expect(r.doc.status).toBe("unknown");
+  expect(r.doc.facts.mergedSourceError).toMatch(/authoritative main\/history unavailable/);
+}
+
+describe("authoritative main, independent of the checked-out proposal", () => {
+  it.each(["proposal", "merge"])("PR %s: main 1.64, old unmerged 1.65, poisoned origin/main", (checkout) => {
+    const f = fixture();
+    if (checkout === "merge") {
+      // An actual two-parent PR-style merge, still containing the unmerged 1.65 proposal.
+      git(f.dir, ["switch", "-qc", "merge", f.main]);
+      git(f.dir, ["-c", "user.name=fixture", "-c", "user.email=fixture@example.invalid", "merge", "--no-ff", "-qm", "PR merge", "proposal"]);
+    }
+    expect(JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(f.dir, PKG, "package.json"))).version).toBe("1.65.0");
+    expectMain(f.run({ env: { GITHUB_SHA: git(f.dir, ["rev-parse", "HEAD"]) } }), f.main);
+  });
+  it.each(["push", "schedule", "workflow_dispatch"])("%s uses its main event SHA, with another ref checked out", (event) => {
+    const f = fixture();
+    expectMain(f.run({ env: { GITHUB_EVENT_NAME: event, GITHUB_REF: "refs/heads/main", GITHUB_SHA: f.main } }), f.main);
+  });
+  it("operator resolves live origin main despite poisoned tracking ref and proposal checkout", () => {
+    const f = fixture(); expectMain(f.run({ env: { GITHUB_ACTIONS: "false" } }), f.main);
+  });
+  it("a real merged publication gap still fails its age threshold", () => {
+    const f = fixture(); const r = f.run({ env: { PUBLISHED: "1.63.0" } });
+    expect(r.status).toBe(1); expect(r.doc.status).toBe("drift");
+    expect(new Date(r.doc.facts.bumpIso).toISOString()).toBe(new Date(stamp).toISOString());
+    expect(r.out).toMatch(/1 schema version\(s\) merged but NOT published/);
+  });
+  it("version threshold remains independent of the age threshold", () => {
+    const f = fixture(); const r = f.run({ env: { PUBLISHED: "1.60.0" }, args: ["--max-days", "10000"] });
+    expect(r.status).toBe(1); expect(r.out).toMatch(/4 schema version\(s\)/);
+    expect(f.run({ env: { PUBLISHED: "1.63.0" }, args: ["--max-days", "10000"] }).status).toBe(0);
+  });
+  it("board comparisons use main's manifest along with main's version", () => {
+    const f = fixture(); const row = { package_version: "1.64.0", schema_version: 8, bundle_digest: "digest-1.64.0", installed_at: "2026-01-06T00:00:00Z" };
+    const options = { args: ["--board", "fixture-only"], env: { BOARD_ROW: JSON.stringify(row) } };
+    expectMain(f.run(options), f.main);
+    const mismatch = f.run({ ...options, env: { BOARD_ROW: JSON.stringify({ ...row, bundle_digest: "digest-1.65.0" }) } });
+    expect(mismatch.status).toBe(1); expect(mismatch.out).toMatch(/digest/);
+  });
+  it.each([{}, { pull_request: { base: { ref: "proposal", sha: "a".repeat(40) } } },
+    { pull_request: { base: { ref: "main", sha: "a".repeat(40), repo: { full_name: "other/repo" } } } }])("missing/untrusted PR base is UNKNOWN, never HEAD fallback: %j", (payload) => {
+    const f = fixture(); expectUnknown(f.run({ payload }));
+  });
+  it("an unavailable authoritative commit is UNKNOWN even when HEAD could pass", () => {
+    const f = fixture(); f.event.pull_request.base.sha = "f".repeat(40); expectUnknown(f.run());
+  });
+  it.each(["push", "schedule", "workflow_dispatch", "unrecognized"])("%s outside main cannot fall back to checkout or cached main", (event) => {
+    const f = fixture(); expectUnknown(f.run({ env: { GITHUB_EVENT_NAME: event, GITHUB_REF: "refs/heads/proposal" } }));
+  });
+  it("missing event SHA is UNKNOWN", () => {
+    const f = fixture(); expectUnknown(f.run({ env: { GITHUB_EVENT_NAME: "push", GITHUB_REF: "refs/heads/main", GITHUB_SHA: "" } }));
+  });
+  it("unreadable PR event is UNKNOWN", () => {
+    const f = fixture(); expectUnknown(f.run({ env: { GITHUB_EVENT_PATH: join(f.root, "absent.json") } }));
+  });
+  it("shallow main is UNKNOWN even when its version equals published", () => {
+    const f = fixture(); const shallow = join(f.root, "shallow");
+    git(f.root, ["clone", "-q", "--depth=1", "--branch=main", pathToFileURL(f.remote).href, shallow]);
+    expect(git(shallow, ["rev-parse", "--is-shallow-repository"])).toBe("true");
+    installChecker(shallow); expectUnknown(f.run({ cwd: shallow }));
+  });
+  it("operator refuses missing live main; credential-bearing git errors are never echoed", () => {
+    const f = fixture(); const canary = "do-not-echo-this-credential";
+    git(f.dir, ["remote", "set-url", "origin", `file://${join(f.root, canary, "absent.git")}`]);
+    const r = f.run({ env: { GITHUB_ACTIONS: "false" } }); expectUnknown(r); expect(r.out).not.toContain(canary);
+  });
+  it("operator refuses a live main object unavailable in its checkout", () => {
+    const f = fixture();
+    // Create a remote-only descendant without fetching it into the checked-out repo.
+    const other = join(f.root, "writer"); git(f.root, ["clone", "-q", "--branch=main", f.remote, other]);
+    writeFileSync(join(other, "new.txt"), "remote-only"); git(other, ["add", "new.txt"]);
+    git(other, ["-c", "user.name=fixture", "-c", "user.email=fixture@example.invalid", "commit", "-qm", "remote-only"]);
+    git(other, ["push", "-q", "origin", "main"]);
+    expectUnknown(f.run({ env: { GITHUB_ACTIONS: "false" } }));
+  });
+});

package/src/deployment-drift-script.test.mjs

@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ let PRELOAD;
 beforeAll(() => {
   SHIMS = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "drift-shims-"));
   ARGV_LOG = join(SHIMS, "argv.log");
+  writeFileSync(join(SHIMS, "package.json"), readFileSync(PKG_JSON));
+  writeFileSync(join(SHIMS, "manifest.json"), readFileSync(MANIFEST));
 
   // One arg per line, `--` between invocations, so an assertion can read exact argv rather
   // than a space-joined approximation.
@@ -78,7 +80,7 @@ beforeAll(() => {
   );
   writeFileSync(
     join(SHIMS, "git"),
-    `#!/bin/sh\n${logArgv}\ncase " $* " in\n  *" rev-parse "*) printf "%s\\n" "\${FAKE_SHALLOW:-false}" ;;\n  *" log "*) [ -n "\${FAKE_BUMP_ISO:-}" ] || exit 1; printf "%s\\n" "$FAKE_BUMP_ISO" ;;\n  *) exit 1 ;;\nesac\n`,
+    `#!/bin/sh\n${logArgv}\ncase " $* " in\n  *" --is-shallow-repository "*) printf "%s\n" "\${FAKE_SHALLOW:-false}" ;;\n  *" cat-file "*) exit 0 ;;\n  *" show "*"/package.json "*) cat "$DRIFT_SHIMS/package.json" ;;\n  *" show "*"/schema-manifest.json "*) cat "$DRIFT_SHIMS/manifest.json" ;;\n  *" log "*) [ -n "\${FAKE_BUMP_ISO:-}" ] || exit 1; printf "%s\n" "$FAKE_BUMP_ISO" ;;\n  *) exit 1 ;;\nesac\n`,
   );
   chmodSync(join(SHIMS, "npm"), 0o755);
   chmodSync(join(SHIMS, "git"), 0o755);
@@ -139,6 +141,11 @@ function runScript(args = [], env = {}) {
       PATH: `${SHIMS}:${process.env.PATH}`,
       NODE_OPTIONS: `--import ${pathToFileURL(PRELOAD).href}`,
       DRIFT_ARGV_LOG: ARGV_LOG,
+      DRIFT_SHIMS: SHIMS,
+      GITHUB_ACTIONS: "true",
+      GITHUB_EVENT_NAME: "push",
+      GITHUB_REF: "refs/heads/main",
+      GITHUB_SHA: "a".repeat(40),
       FAKE_BUMP_ISO: FRESH_BUMP,
       FAKE_SHALLOW: "false",
       FAKE_FETCH_MODE: "",
@@ -186,6 +193,12 @@ describe("the shipped script's exit mapping", () => {
     expect(r.status).toBe(2);
   });
 
+  it("missing bump history is UNKNOWN even when merged and published agree", () => {
+    const r = runScript([], { FAKE_NPM_VERSION: MERGED, FAKE_BUMP_ISO: "" });
+    expect(r.status).toBe(2);
+    expect(r.out).toMatch(/authoritative main\/history unavailable/);
+  });
+
   it("refuses to date the bump on a shallow clone, so an unpublished gap is UNKNOWN", () => {
     // FAKE_SHALLOW was never true in any test, so the shallow-clone refusal the previous
     // round added was driven by nothing. Making isShallowClone() return false