@consiliency/agent-board-schema 1.60.0 → 1.64.0

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@consiliency/agent-board-schema",
-  "version": "1.60.0",
+  "version": "1.64.0",
   "description": "Canonical, immutable, exact-pinnable agent_board schema bundle: ordered SQL migrations, digest + compatibility manifest, and deterministic materialize/plan/check tooling for adopters.",
   "repository": "https://github.com/Consiliency/message-board.git",
   "type": "module",

package/schema-manifest.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "schema": "agent_board_schema_manifest.v1",
   "interface": "IF-0-MBPLANE-BUNDLE-1",
   "package": "@consiliency/agent-board-schema",
-  "packageVersion": "1.60.0",
+  "packageVersion": "1.64.0",
   "schemaVersion": 8,
   "minClientVersion": "1.1.0",
   "source": {
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@
       "usage": "upsert (retention/monitoring defaults; on conflict do nothing)"
     }
   ],
-  "migrationCount": 158,
-  "aggregateSha256": "e887208c42b9617a6a7cc2baae96c87d2d2a011320a8cd4799605d689159cf63",
+  "migrationCount": 162,
+  "aggregateSha256": "b6b24a1c50a1ac51cd935f6ad2091876a0b0ff98f001d776c89445a889416745",
   "migrations": [
     {
       "order": 0,
@@ -1470,6 +1470,42 @@
       "sourceRef": "message-board",
       "bytes": 25831,
       "sha256": "6cbbe0bb9ccf7ab65402a58de145ee21bc2158ddc7502671ea13a98415ca6421"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 158,
+      "id": "20261011000100_agent_board_session_identities",
+      "filename": "20261011000100_agent_board_session_identities.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 119197,
+      "sha256": "0f429d2b7c2a361741fb00019a173c82024a59362ea2d3a70cb11ab594b1d055"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 159,
+      "id": "20261012000100_agent_board_sidowner",
+      "filename": "20261012000100_agent_board_sidowner.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 9979,
+      "sha256": "e18fb5a7ce0b00e9cccf12a60cbad49d820612c2c50f65c648d4105c80fbc921"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 160,
+      "id": "20261014000100_agent_board_grant_target_role",
+      "filename": "20261014000100_agent_board_grant_target_role.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 14704,
+      "sha256": "4a6c00546a1d2837f88eece1de082cc76eec1f85cce8cf9ac7998e42bf32a5c5"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 161,
+      "id": "20261014000200_agent_board_last_owner",
+      "filename": "20261014000200_agent_board_last_owner.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 13141,
+      "sha256": "2fed8fc5a2c7c0ba9acbb12872b329db3f0902d96597c52cc50e21e4682c2fff"
     }
   ],
   "excludedBridge": {

package/src/tooling.test.mjs

@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ const historyExact = () => ({ applied: ordered.map((m) => ({ id: m.id, sha256: m
 const union = () => ordered.filter((m) => m.origin !== 'message-board-forward');
 
 describe('manifest integrity', () => {
+  it('pins the exact owner-authorized A3/A10.3 test amendment for Consiliency/message-board#675', () => {
+    expect(sha256(readFileSync(new URL('../tests/agent_board_grant_target_role.test.sql', import.meta.url)))).toBe('5c0a857d8c138f368235fa345a18c76fafa773cfe8eb57185b232d466d222f93');
+  });
   it('aggregate digest matches recomputation over ordered per-file digests', () => {
     const agg = sha256(Buffer.from(ordered.map((e) => `${e.order} ${e.id} ${e.sha256}`).join('\n')));
     expect(agg).toBe(manifest.aggregateSha256);
@@ -38,9 +41,9 @@ describe('manifest integrity', () => {
     expect(manifest.schemaVersion).toBe(8);
     expect(manifest.minClientVersion).toMatch(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/);
   });
-  it('registers the four MBAUTHZ + four MBSENDAUTHZ + four MBSESSION + four MBDELEG + three MBFED + three MBHARDEN + two MBPORTALGATE + two MBPORTAL-PR32 + two ROOMOWN + two ROOMLINK + one ROOMDELEG + one LOCALAUTH + one ROOMUIAPI + one FEDSESSION + one FEDSESSION-AUTOJOIN + one GATENULL + one MEMBSTATE + one AGENTSDIR + one LEAVEIDEM + one ROLERESET + one MBROWID + one MBHYGIENE + one MBCONSENT-A + one MBCONSENT-B(a) + one MBCONSENT-B(i) + one MBCONSENT-B(ii) + one MBCONSENT-B(iii) + one MBHARDEN-#97 + one MBHARDEN-#118 + one INVITEPOLICY + one OBSGATE + one OBSGATE-2 + one OBSGATE-3 + one OBSGATE-4 + one FLEETMACHINERLS + one RESOLVENOOP + one ROOMDELEG-LANEB + one CLAIMKEY + two MINTHARDEN + one FLEETMACHINEHIJACK + one CLAIMGATE-SHADOW + one CLAIMGATE-ENFORCE + one FLEETMACHINEREACTIVATION + one DELEGCAPCEILING + one FLEETMACHINERECLAIM + one DELEGSOLEWRITER + one FLEETDOMAINRECLAIM + five ATOMICFLEETONBOARDING (onboarding + ceiling-lock + revocation-evidence + fedsession-gate + fedsession-lock-order) + one OUTBOXWAKE + one ENROLLLOCKORDER + one FEDPROVIDERABSENCE + one WAKERECOVERY + one CONSENTRECONCILE + one ENROLLRESUMPTION + one SIGNEDAUTHORITY + one SIGNERLIFECYCLE + one LEDGERAUTHORITY + one CEILINGLOCKCOMMENT + one LEDGERBOARDCREATE + one RECEIPTSUBJECTGATE + one TASKTHREADLOCKORDER + one CLAIMSUBJECTGATE + one FEDSESSIONIDENTITYGATE + one FEDIDENTITYSLUG + one INVITENODOWNGRADE + one SIGNEDWRITEFLAG + one SIGNEDWRITEMODEL + one RTCREDCLAIM + one ORIGINPOSTURE + one BOARDCLAIMPOLICY + one HEARTBEATPRESERVE + one LIVENESSDENOM + one OWNERLESSRENEWTTL + one OWNERLESSQUOTACENSUS + one FLEETDOMAINNODOWNGRADE + one OWNERLESSQUOTACONVERGE + one ADVISORYREVERTRESET + one CLAIMPOLICYRACE + one CLAIMPOLICYLOCKGRANT + one SESSIONCHALLENGESUPERSEDE + one ROOMCONTRACT + one CALLBACKCONSUMER + one ENROLLTOKENSINGLEUSE + one ROOMCONTRACT-ACTIVEFIRST + one ONBOARD + one HOSTED + one HOSTED-FOLLOWUPS + one OWNPOST forward migrations (migrationCount = prior 113 + 5 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 158)', () => {
+  it('registers the four MBAUTHZ + four MBSENDAUTHZ + four MBSESSION + four MBDELEG + three MBFED + three MBHARDEN + two MBPORTALGATE + two MBPORTAL-PR32 + two ROOMOWN + two ROOMLINK + one ROOMDELEG + one LOCALAUTH + one ROOMUIAPI + one FEDSESSION + one FEDSESSION-AUTOJOIN + one GATENULL + one MEMBSTATE + one AGENTSDIR + one LEAVEIDEM + one ROLERESET + one MBROWID + one MBHYGIENE + one MBCONSENT-A + one MBCONSENT-B(a) + one MBCONSENT-B(i) + one MBCONSENT-B(ii) + one MBCONSENT-B(iii) + one MBHARDEN-#97 + one MBHARDEN-#118 + one INVITEPOLICY + one OBSGATE + one OBSGATE-2 + one OBSGATE-3 + one OBSGATE-4 + one FLEETMACHINERLS + one RESOLVENOOP + one ROOMDELEG-LANEB + one CLAIMKEY + two MINTHARDEN + one FLEETMACHINEHIJACK + one CLAIMGATE-SHADOW + one CLAIMGATE-ENFORCE + one FLEETMACHINEREACTIVATION + one DELEGCAPCEILING + one FLEETMACHINERECLAIM + one DELEGSOLEWRITER + one FLEETDOMAINRECLAIM + five ATOMICFLEETONBOARDING (onboarding + ceiling-lock + revocation-evidence + fedsession-gate + fedsession-lock-order) + one OUTBOXWAKE + one ENROLLLOCKORDER + one FEDPROVIDERABSENCE + one WAKERECOVERY + one CONSENTRECONCILE + one ENROLLRESUMPTION + one SIGNEDAUTHORITY + one SIGNERLIFECYCLE + one LEDGERAUTHORITY + one CEILINGLOCKCOMMENT + one LEDGERBOARDCREATE + one RECEIPTSUBJECTGATE + one TASKTHREADLOCKORDER + one CLAIMSUBJECTGATE + one FEDSESSIONIDENTITYGATE + one FEDIDENTITYSLUG + one INVITENODOWNGRADE + one SIGNEDWRITEFLAG + one SIGNEDWRITEMODEL + one RTCREDCLAIM + one ORIGINPOSTURE + one BOARDCLAIMPOLICY + one HEARTBEATPRESERVE + one LIVENESSDENOM + one OWNERLESSRENEWTTL + one OWNERLESSQUOTACENSUS + one FLEETDOMAINNODOWNGRADE + one OWNERLESSQUOTACONVERGE + one ADVISORYREVERTRESET + one CLAIMPOLICYRACE + one CLAIMPOLICYLOCKGRANT + one SESSIONCHALLENGESUPERSEDE + one ROOMCONTRACT + one CALLBACKCONSUMER + one ENROLLTOKENSINGLEUSE + one ROOMCONTRACT-ACTIVEFIRST + one ONBOARD + one HOSTED + one HOSTED-FOLLOWUPS + one OWNPOST + one SIDSCHEMA + one SIDOWNER + one GRANTTARGETROLE (#674) + one LASTOWNER (Consiliency/message-board#675) forward migrations (migrationCount = prior 113 + 5 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 162)', () => {
     expect(manifest.migrationCount).toBe(manifest.migrations.length);
-    expect(manifest.migrationCount).toBe(158);
+    expect(manifest.migrationCount).toBe(162);
     // MBSESSION switched enforcement on (scoped-send re-grant): the client-visible
     // schema version bumped to 8. MBDELEG tightens delegation and MBFED adds only
     // enrollment-only additive surface (identity_providers registry, enrollment audit,
@@ -356,6 +359,11 @@ describe('manifest integrity', () => {
       // OWNPOST (#608): an agent's own board post is a feed-only row for it, not an inbox item;
       // a board-wide task fan-out skips its creator; own_inbox callbacks skip feed-only rows.
       '20261010000100_agent_board_own_post_not_delivered.sql',
+      '20261011000100_agent_board_session_identities.sql',
+      '20261012000100_agent_board_sidowner.sql',
+      // #674: grant_board_role checks the target's current role (C-A + C-B).
+      '20261014000100_agent_board_grant_target_role.sql',
+      '20261014000200_agent_board_last_owner.sql',
     ]) {
       expect(names.has(f)).toBe(true);
     }

package/tests/agent_board_atomic_fleet_onboarding.test.sql

@@ -307,11 +307,11 @@ select ok(
   'agent fleet revocation takes its machine locks before the agent lock [SOLE PIN: no isolation spec discriminates this ordering -- measured against all 20]'
 );
 select ok(
-  strpos(lower(agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board._revoke_agent_principal(uuid,uuid,text)'::regprocedure)), 'from agent_board.agents a where a.id = p_agent_id for update'
+  strpos(lower(agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board._revoke_agent_principal(uuid,uuid,text)'::regprocedure)), 'from agent_board.agents a where a.id = v_id for update'
   ) > 0
   and strpos(lower(agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board._revoke_agent_principal(uuid,uuid,text)'::regprocedure)), 'from agent_board.agent_signing_keys'
   ) > 0
-  and strpos(lower(agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board._revoke_agent_principal(uuid,uuid,text)'::regprocedure)), 'from agent_board.agents a where a.id = p_agent_id for update'
+  and strpos(lower(agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board._revoke_agent_principal(uuid,uuid,text)'::regprocedure)), 'from agent_board.agents a where a.id = v_id for update'
   ) < strpos(lower(agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board._revoke_agent_principal(uuid,uuid,text)'::regprocedure)), 'from agent_board.agent_signing_keys'
   ),
   'subtree primitive locks the agent before signing keys [SOLE PIN: no isolation spec discriminates this ordering -- measured against all 20]'
@@ -558,7 +558,10 @@ select is( -- pgtap-allow-raise-checked: catalog read only; the RPC names below
     -- lock also closes this reader's exposure to the ceiling row's ABSENCE, one of the three
     -- 20260901000110 left explicitly undetermined.
     'agent_board.grant_board_role(uuid,uuid,text,uuid) => serialized',
-    'agent_board.onboard_federated_fleet_agent(text,text,text,jsonb,text,text,text,text,boolean,text,timestamp with time zone,text,text,text[],text[],text,uuid,uuid,text,text,text,text,text,text,text) => serialized'
+    'agent_board.link_session_alias(uuid,text,text) => serialized',
+    'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid,text,jsonb,text,interval,boolean,text,text,text,jsonb,jsonb,uuid) => serialized',
+    'agent_board.onboard_federated_fleet_agent(text,text,text,jsonb,text,text,text,text,boolean,text,timestamp with time zone,text,text,text[],text[],text,uuid,uuid,text,text,text,text,text,text,text) => serialized',
+    'agent_board.readmit_session_identity(uuid,text,text,jsonb,jsonb,interval) => serialized'
   ]::text[],
   'every ceiling-authorization reader in pg_proc is declared with its serialization state'
 );
@@ -697,6 +700,7 @@ select is( -- pgtap-allow-raise-checked: catalog read only; the RPC names below
     -- than naming the table itself. Internal — it reads rows for an arbitrary agent id with no
     -- authorization of its own, so service_role only, like every other helper here.
     'agent_board._actor_fleet_revoked(uuid) [definer] => service_role',
+    'agent_board._board_memberships_last_owner_guard() [definer] => (none)',
     'agent_board._lock_board_authority_ceiling(uuid) [invoker] => service_role',
     'agent_board._redeem_fleet_invite_for_agent(text,uuid) [definer] => service_role',
     'agent_board._redeem_invite_for_agent(text,uuid) [definer] => service_role',
@@ -718,8 +722,11 @@ select is( -- pgtap-allow-raise-checked: catalog read only; the RPC names below
     -- once the ledger gate made it lock both). Still authenticated,service_role — #276 removes
     -- authority from a revoked principal, it does not change who may call the RPC.
     'agent_board.grant_board_role(uuid,uuid,text,uuid) [definer] => authenticated,service_role',
+    'agent_board.link_session_alias(uuid,text,text) [definer] => service_role',
+    'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid,text,jsonb,text,interval,boolean,text,text,text,jsonb,jsonb,uuid) [definer] => service_role',
     'agent_board.onboard_federated_fleet_agent(text,text,text,jsonb,text,text,text,text,boolean,text,timestamp with time zone,text,text,text[],text[],text,uuid,uuid,text,text,text,text,text,text,text) [definer] => service_role',
     'agent_board.reactivate_fleet_machine(uuid,uuid,text) [definer] => service_role',
+    'agent_board.readmit_session_identity(uuid,text,text,jsonb,jsonb,interval) [definer] => authenticated',
     'agent_board.revoke_fleet_subject(text,uuid,uuid,text,jsonb) [definer] => authenticated,service_role',
     'agent_board.revoke_human_subtree(uuid,uuid,text) [definer] => service_role',
     'agent_board.set_board_authority_ceiling(uuid,text,uuid) [definer] => authenticated,service_role',
@@ -727,7 +734,11 @@ select is( -- pgtap-allow-raise-checked: catalog read only; the RPC names below
     -- FIRST, because its order was board_memberships(grantee) -> agents(signer) against
     -- onboard_federated_fleet_agent's agents -> board_memberships -- a reproduced ABBA between
     -- two honest callers. It is service_role-only like every other signed_* wrapper (#118).
-    'agent_board.signed_grant_board_role(jsonb,jsonb) [definer] => service_role'
+    'agent_board.signed_grant_board_role(jsonb,jsonb) [definer] => service_role',
+    -- SIDSCHEMA integrity repair: the verified Portal withdrawal now takes board mutexes
+    -- before the instance/family rows. Its service-only transport is unchanged.
+    'agent_board.tombstone_delegate_instance(text,text,text,text) [definer] => service_role',
+    'agent_board.update_board_membership(uuid,uuid,text,jsonb) [definer] => authenticated,service_role'
   ]::text[],
   'every function on this migration set''s surface is declared with its definer flag and exact EXECUTE grantees'
 );

package/tests/agent_board_atomic_fleet_onboarding_runtime.test.sql

@@ -837,6 +837,13 @@ select is(
   '0/0', 'generic-invite rejection leaves uses and redemption counts unchanged'
 );
 
+-- Preserve a second owner while exercising the invite creator's lost membership.
+insert into agent_board.agents(id, agent_type, handle, display_name, status)
+values ('16210000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002', 'agent', 'atomic-runtime-coowner', 'Atomic Runtime Coowner', 'active');
+insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, role)
+select board_id, '16210000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002', 'joined', 'owner' from _atomic_cfg;
+select agent_board._lock_board_authority_ceiling(board_id) from _atomic_cfg;
+
 update agent_board.board_memberships
    set membership_state='removed', left_at=now(), updated_at=now()
  where board_id=(select board_id from _atomic_cfg)

package/tests/agent_board_consent_emission.test.sql

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
 
 begin;
 
-select plan(68);
+select plan(69);
 
 create function pg_temp.claims(p_sub text) returns void language plpgsql as $$
 begin
@@ -215,9 +215,10 @@ select is(
 -- reason. Keying only on INSERT would miss a future path that flips membership_state via
 -- UPDATE -- and catching FUTURE writers is the entire purpose of this assertion.
 --
--- The single exemption is grant_board_role: it sets `role` only, with membership_state
--- appearing exclusively in its WHERE clauses, so it cannot change membership state and a role
--- change is not a consent event. If that ever stops being true, this assertion fails.
+-- The exemptions are grant_board_role and set_board_member_label: each changes metadata
+-- only, with membership_state appearing exclusively outside a SET clause, so neither can
+-- change membership state and neither is a consent event. If that ever stops being true,
+-- the positive assertion below fails.
 -- COMMENTS ARE STRIPPED and CALL SITES ARE COUNTED. Checking that the emitter name appears
 -- anywhere in the body is fail-open twice over: the name in a comment or a dead branch would
 -- satisfy it, and calling the emitter TWICE would too -- while this suite claims exactly one
@@ -234,7 +235,12 @@ select is(
       and p.prolang <> (select oid from pg_language where lanname = 'internal')
       and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.stmt_re('insert into|update', 'board_memberships')
       and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) !~* 'perform agent_board\._emit_membership_event'
-      and p.proname <> 'grant_board_role'),
+      -- Mixed SID writers change state only through the emitting sink; their
+      -- direct role-only UPDATE is not a second membership transition.
+      and (agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) !~ agent_board_test.call_re('_upsert_board_membership_state', false)
+        or agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.stmt_re('insert into', 'board_memberships')
+        or agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.col_write_re('board_memberships', 'membership_state'))
+      and p.proname not in ('grant_board_role', 'set_board_member_label')),
   '',
   'COMPLETENESS: every function writing board_memberships emits, or is a stated exemption');
 
@@ -261,13 +267,26 @@ select is(
   '',
   'COMPLETENESS: no writer emits more than once (exactly one event per transition)');
 
--- ...and the one exemption is genuinely state-blind: membership_state never appears in a SET.
-select ok(
-  (select agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid, true)
-            !~ agent_board_test.re(agent_board_test.col_assign_frag('board_memberships', 'membership_state', agent_board_test.bare_ok(p.oid)))
+-- ...and each exemption is genuinely state-blind: membership_state never appears in a SET.
+select is(
+  (select coalesce(string_agg(p.proname, ', ' order by p.proname), '')
      from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace
-    where n.nspname = 'agent_board' and p.proname = 'grant_board_role'),
-  'COMPLETENESS: the exemption holds -- grant_board_role never SETs membership_state');
+    where n.nspname = 'agent_board'
+      and p.proname in ('grant_board_role', 'set_board_member_label')
+      and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid, true)
+            !~ agent_board_test.re(agent_board_test.col_assign_frag('board_memberships', 'membership_state', agent_board_test.bare_ok(p.oid)))),
+  'grant_board_role, set_board_member_label',
+  'COMPLETENESS: each stated exemption is state-blind and never SETs membership_state');
+
+select is(
+  (select string_agg(p.proname, ', ' order by p.proname)
+   from pg_proc p where p.pronamespace = 'agent_board'::regnamespace
+     and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.col_write_re('board_memberships', 'role')
+     and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_upsert_board_membership_state', false)
+     and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) !~ agent_board_test.stmt_re('insert into', 'board_memberships')
+     and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) !~ agent_board_test.col_write_re('board_memberships', 'membership_state')),
+  'link_session_alias, mint_delegated_child, readmit_session_identity',
+  'COMPLETENESS: each mixed SID writer directly writes roles and delegates state transitions to the emitting sink');
 
 -- ...and the emitter itself is the single implementation, not five copies.
 select is(

package/tests/agent_board_consent_gating.test.sql

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
 
 begin;
 
-select plan(54);
+select plan(55);
 
 create function pg_temp.claims(p_sub text) returns void language plpgsql as $$
 begin
@@ -350,11 +350,25 @@ select is(
         'invite_board_member', -- writes `invited` only -- an offer, not a membership
         'request_join_board',  -- writes `requested` only
         'leave_board',         -- writes `left` only
-        'grant_board_role'     -- requires an already-active membership; never SETs the state
+        'grant_board_role',    -- requires an already-active membership; never SETs the state
+        'readmit_session_identity' -- human owner mints a NEW principal; positively pinned below and behaviorally in SID readmission
       )),
   '',
   'EC-4 CLASS: every authenticated route reaching an active membership is gated or exempt');
 
+select ok(
+  agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.readmit_session_identity(uuid,text,text,jsonb,jsonb,interval)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_session_identity_owner', false)
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.readmit_session_identity(uuid,text,text,jsonb,jsonb,interval)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.stmt_re('insert into', 'agents', false)
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.readmit_session_identity(uuid,text,text,jsonb,jsonb,interval)'::regprocedure, true)
+    ~ agent_board_test.re(agent_board_test.call_frag('_upsert_board_membership_state', false) || '\s*v_board\s*,\s*v_new_id\s*,\s*''joined''')
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board._session_identity_owner(uuid)'::regprocedure, true)
+    like '%human.agent_type = ''human''%'
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board._session_identity_owner(uuid)'::regprocedure)
+    like '%root.owner_user_id = auth.uid()%',
+  'EC-4-readmit: human-root-owner placement is onto a fresh principal, never manufactured target consent');
+
 -- ...and the exemptions are not assertions of convenience: the three "writes only X" claims are
 -- checked, because an exemption that stops being true is how the fifth route hid.
 -- Matches the literal passed to EITHER the shared sink OR update_board_membership. The first

package/tests/agent_board_delegate_role_class.test.sql

@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ select f.oid, f.name,
 -- 24
 select is(
   (select string_agg(name || case when writes_role then '[role]' else '' end, ',' order by name) from _bm_writers),
-  '_fedsession_autojoin_default_board[role],_redeem_unbounded_invite_for_agent[role],bootstrap_board_owner_memberships[role],create_board[role],grant_board_role[role]',
+  '_fedsession_autojoin_default_board[role],_redeem_unbounded_invite_for_agent[role],bootstrap_board_owner_memberships[role],create_board[role],grant_board_role[role],link_session_alias[role],mint_delegated_child[role],readmit_session_identity[role],set_board_member_label',
   'the direct board_memberships writers outside the sink, derived (a new one names itself)');
 -- 25
 select is(

package/tests/agent_board_delegation_cap_ceiling.test.sql

@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
 --   * REQUIRE DURABILITY (invariant 4): an operator require=true is not relaxed to false by
 --     self-service (the self-pin), so a keyless self-service mint is refused — mutate the pin
 --     (true -> coalesce(p_require,true)) and both the state read and the keyless-mint throw flip.
---   * OPERATOR LATITUDE (invariant 5): the operator path is unaffected — it honors the stored
---     caps and can still set/loosen its own ceiling.
+--   * SIDSCHEMA: both mint paths consume the tighter operator ceiling. The operator
+--     can still set/loosen that ceiling through its existing writer path.
 --   * NO REGRESSION: a root with no operator policy self-services bounded only by the global
 --     25/24h ceiling.
 --   * EXECUTE class: CREATE OR REPLACE (no DROP) kept the ACL — mint stays service_role-only,
@@ -31,7 +31,11 @@ set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
 
 begin;
 
-select plan(40);
+select plan(42);
+create temp table _a_opcap(child_agent_id uuid, grant_expires_at timestamptz, signing_key_id uuid);
+create temp table _b_ssttl(like _a_opcap);
+create temp table _b_opttl(like _a_opcap);
+create temp table _d_ss(like _a_opcap);
 
 create temp table _cf (
   owner_id uuid,
@@ -148,12 +152,19 @@ select throws_ok(
   '42501', 'max_active_children: root has reached its active delegated-child ceiling',
   'A: self-service mint clamps max_active_children to the operator ceiling of 1 (stored 25 NOT trusted)');
 
--- Operator path (p_self_service=false) honors the stored 25 and mints despite the 1 live grant
--- (operator latitude). require=true after the self-service pin, so supply a key.
+-- SIDSCHEMA's operator ceiling bounds BOTH mint paths, not merely self-service.
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($$ select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, false) $$,
+     cap, 'cf-opfull-'||replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text,1,8),'-',''), k1) from _cf),
+  '42501', 'max_active_children: root has reached its active delegated-child ceiling',
+  'A: operator mint cannot bypass its tighter stored operator ceiling');
+select is((select count(*) from _a_opcap), 0::bigint,
+  'A: operator ceiling refusal leaves no returned child');
+update agent_board.delegation_grants set revoked_at = now() where child_agent_id = (select cap_child from _cf);
 select lives_ok(
-  (select format($$ create temp table _a_opcap as select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, false) $$,
+  (select format($$ insert into _a_opcap select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, false) $$,
      cap, 'cf-opcap-'||replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text,1,8),'-',''), k1) from _cf),
-  'A: operator mint honors the stored 25 (1 live grant < 25 => mints; latitude)');
+  'A: operator mint succeeds below the tighter ceiling (0 active grants < 1)');
 select is((select count(*) from _a_opcap), 1::bigint,
   'A: operator cap mint produced exactly one child (not a silent zero-row pass)');
 
@@ -185,21 +196,21 @@ select is((select child_ttl_ceiling from agent_board.delegation_policies where r
 select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', '', true);
 select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '', true);
 select lives_ok(
-  (select format($$ create temp table _b_ssttl as select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, true) $$,
+  (select format($$ insert into _b_ssttl select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, true) $$,
      ttl, 'cf-ssttl-'||replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text,1,8),'-',''), k2) from _cf),
   'B: self-service mint under the 2h operator ceiling lives');
 select ok(
   (select grant_expires_at <= now() + interval '2 hours' + interval '1 minute' from _b_ssttl),
   'B: self-service child TTL clamped to the 2h operator ceiling (stored 24h NOT trusted)');
 
--- Operator path honors the stored 24h ceiling (NOT clamped to the 2h operator ceiling: latitude).
+-- The operator mint also consumes the durable 2h ceiling, per SIDSCHEMA's matrix.
 select lives_ok(
-  (select format($$ create temp table _b_opttl as select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, false) $$,
+  (select format($$ insert into _b_opttl select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, false) $$,
      ttl, 'cf-opttl-'||replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text,1,8),'-',''), k3) from _cf),
   'B: operator mint under the same policy lives');
 select ok(
-  (select grant_expires_at > now() + interval '3 hours' from _b_opttl),
-  'B: operator path honors the stored 24h ceiling (not clamped to the 2h operator ceiling; latitude)');
+  (select grant_expires_at <= now() + interval '2 hours' + interval '1 minute' from _b_opttl),
+  'B: operator mint consumes the same tighter 2h operator ceiling');
 
 -- ===========================================================================
 -- C. Operator require_child_signing_key=true is durable: self-service cannot relax it
@@ -251,7 +262,7 @@ select is((select operator_child_ttl_ceiling from agent_board.delegation_policie
 select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', '', true);
 select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '', true);
 select lives_ok(
-  (select format($$ create temp table _d_ss as select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, true) $$,
+  (select format($$ insert into _d_ss select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, true) $$,
      none, 'cf-ssnone-'||replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text,1,8),'-',''), k4) from _cf),
   'D: self-service mint with no operator policy lives');
 select ok(
@@ -284,7 +295,7 @@ select is((select scope_attestation from agent_board.delegation_policies where r
 --    re-opened to PUBLIC/anon.
 -- ===========================================================================
 select ok(not has_function_privilege('authenticated',
-  'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid, text, jsonb, text, interval, boolean)', 'EXECUTE'),
+  'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid, text, jsonb, text, interval, boolean, text, text, text, jsonb, jsonb, uuid)', 'EXECUTE'),
   'F: mint_delegated_child stays service_role-only (authenticated has NO EXECUTE after recreate)');
 select ok(not has_function_privilege('anon',
   'agent_board.upsert_delegation_policy(uuid, text, jsonb, integer, interval, boolean)', 'EXECUTE'),
@@ -293,7 +304,7 @@ select ok(has_function_privilege('authenticated',
   'agent_board.upsert_delegation_policy(uuid, text, jsonb, integer, interval, boolean)', 'EXECUTE'),
   'F: authenticated retains EXECUTE on upsert_delegation_policy after recreate');
 select ok(has_function_privilege('service_role',
-  'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid, text, jsonb, text, interval, boolean)', 'EXECUTE'),
+  'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid, text, jsonb, text, interval, boolean, text, text, text, jsonb, jsonb, uuid)', 'EXECUTE'),
   'F: service_role retains EXECUTE on mint_delegated_child');
 
 select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', '', true);

package/tests/agent_board_delegation_enforcement.test.sql

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ end
 $$;
 
 -- Function existence.
-select has_function('agent_board', 'mint_delegated_child', array['uuid','text','jsonb','text','interval','boolean'], 'mint_delegated_child exists');
+select has_function('agent_board', 'mint_delegated_child', array['uuid','text','jsonb','text','interval','boolean','text','text','text','jsonb','jsonb','uuid'], 'mint_delegated_child exists');
 select has_function('agent_board', 'renew_delegated_grant', array['uuid','interval'], 'renew_delegated_grant exists');
 
 -- Happy mint: grant row shape.

package/tests/agent_board_enroll_resumption.test.sql

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
 
 begin;
 
-select plan(35);
+select plan(37);
 
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 -- Fixtures
@@ -185,7 +185,10 @@ select is(
   '_enroll_federated_identity_once, enroll_federated_identity, onboard_federated_fleet_agent',
   'EC-1: exactly three agent_board routes accept an enrolled key fingerprint (pg_proc-derived)');
 
--- ...and only two functions in the whole schema can CREATE a signing key, so
+-- Readmission creates a fresh pending key for a verified human owner, never an
+-- enrollment resumption. The exemption is positively checked below and exercised
+-- with a real human owner and proof challenge in the SIDSCHEMA readmission suite.
+-- The other creators still reach an enrolled key through the enroll wrapper, so
 -- onboard_federated_fleet_agent necessarily reaches an already-enrolled key through
 -- enroll_federated_identity rather than deciding the duplicate case itself.
 select is(
@@ -201,8 +204,23 @@ select is(
       -- invisible to the #196 lint because that lint only inspects POSITIONAL and
       -- NEGATIVE assertions, and this is a PRESENCE match -- see the note on the lint.
       and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.stmt_re('insert into', 'agent_signing_keys')),
-  '_enroll_federated_identity_once, mint_delegated_child',
-  'EC-2: only the enroll creator and delegated-child mint insert signing keys (strip_sql-derived)');
+  '_enroll_federated_identity_once, mint_delegated_child, readmit_session_identity',
+  'EC-2: only enroll, delegated-child mint and fresh readmission insert signing keys (strip_sql-derived)');
+select is(
+  (select string_agg(r || '=' || has_function_privilege(r, p.oid, 'EXECUTE')::text, ' ' order by r)
+     from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace,
+          unnest(array['anon', 'authenticated', 'public', 'service_role']) r
+    where n.nspname = 'agent_board' and p.proname = 'readmit_session_identity'),
+  'anon=false authenticated=true public=false service_role=false',
+  'EC-2: readmission is human-authenticated only, not a service enrollment route');
+select ok(
+  (select count(*) = 1 and bool_and(
+       agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_session_identity_owner')
+       -- Keep literals only because these two key-state values are the markers.
+       and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid, true) ~ $$'pending_proof'\s*,\s*'unproven'$$)
+     from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace
+    where n.nspname = 'agent_board' and p.proname = 'readmit_session_identity'),
+  'EC-2: readmission positively verifies the owner and writes a pending, unproven fresh key');
 
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 -- R-1 -- THE #176 FIX: an unstamped enrollment resumes for its owner

package/tests/agent_board_enroll_token_single_use.test.sql

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
 
 begin;
 
-select plan(66);
+select plan(68);
 
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 -- Fixtures
@@ -452,8 +452,23 @@ select is(
      from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace
     where n.nspname = 'agent_board' and p.prokind = 'f'
       and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.stmt_re('insert into', 'agent_signing_keys')),
-  '_enroll_federated_identity_once, mint_delegated_child',
-  'EC-T2: exactly two functions insert signing keys (the EC-2 form)');
+  '_enroll_federated_identity_once, mint_delegated_child, readmit_session_identity',
+  'EC-T2: exactly three functions insert signing keys, including fresh readmission (the EC-2 form)');
+select is(
+  (select string_agg(r || '=' || has_function_privilege(r, p.oid, 'EXECUTE')::text, ' ' order by r)
+     from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace,
+          unnest(array['anon', 'authenticated', 'public', 'service_role']) r
+    where n.nspname = 'agent_board' and p.proname = 'readmit_session_identity'),
+  'anon=false authenticated=true public=false service_role=false',
+  'EC-T2: readmission is human-authenticated only, not a Portal-token enrollment route');
+select ok(
+  (select count(*) = 1 and bool_and(
+       agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_session_identity_owner')
+       -- Keep literals only because these two key-state values are the markers.
+       and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid, true) ~ $$'pending_proof'\s*,\s*'unproven'$$)
+     from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace
+    where n.nspname = 'agent_board' and p.proname = 'readmit_session_identity'),
+  'EC-T2: readmission positively verifies the owner and writes a pending, unproven fresh key');
 select is(
   (select string_agg(r || '=' || has_function_privilege(r, p.oid, 'EXECUTE')::text, ' ' order by r)
      from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace,

package/tests/agent_board_federated_lock_order_class.test.sql

@@ -233,8 +233,8 @@ select is(
   (select string_agg(split_part(sig, '(', 1), ', ' order by split_part(sig, '(', 1))
      from _lockclass where reaches_board and reaches_owner),
   '_enroll_federated_human_after_revocation_gate, _enroll_federated_identity_once, '
-  || 'enroll_federated_human, enroll_federated_identity, onboard_federated_fleet_agent',
-  'EC-2: the board+owner lock class is exactly the five federated write routes');
+  || 'enroll_federated_human, enroll_federated_identity, mint_delegated_child, onboard_federated_fleet_agent, readmit_session_identity',
+  'EC-2: the board+owner lock class includes the federated routes and both SID mints');
 
 -- EC-3: THE ORDERING INVARIANT. Never acquire auth.users before boards. The failure
 -- prints the offending signatures (pre-fix this named enroll_federated_identity and